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Emma Lazarus Federation of Jewish Women's Clubs

150 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK, N. Y. 10011 • CHelsea 3-3640

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Chicago

May 10, 1982

President Ronald W. Reagan
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear President Reagan:

The following resolution was adopted at a meeting of our National Executive Committee which was held on Thursday, May 6, 1982:

As Jews we are heir to ethical tradition calling for the choice of Life. The Prophets have ever recognized that nothing is ordained for us, that the choices we make are ours, and that the welfare of humanity and the very existence of the world may well depend upon those choices.

Humanity today is at a crossroads. While the super-powers increase the number and destructive potential of their weaponry, each already has the power to destroy civilization as we know it. Our tradition calls upon us to speak out for Life and Blessing, and against this ever-escalating Death-oriented Curse.

Our experience as Jews, particularly in this century, reinforces our mandate not to be silent. During the Holocaust, one-third of our people was destroyed while the world looked on in silence. The few who spoke up for Life, heroes of the Modern Age, give us strength and hope.

As Jews, therefore, we join our brothers and sisters of all faiths in demanding a permanent freeze on the further development, manufacturing, testing and deployment of nuclear weapons. We demand this in fulfillment of the most basic commandment of our tradition, to "choose life", that we and our children might live.

EMMA LAZARUS FEDERATION
OF JEWISH WOMEN'S CLUBS

Miriam Silver
Miriam Silver
National Cultural Director

Gertrude R. Decker *per se*
Gertrude R. Decker

National Legislative Director

Emma Lazarus Federation
of Jewish Women's Clubs
150 Fifth Avenue, Rm. 632
New York, N. Y. 10011



President Ronald W. Reagan
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 18, 1982


Dear Ms. Silver and Ms. Decker:

In behalf of the President, thank you for your letter of May 10 regarding the reduction of nuclear weapons.

The President is most concerned with the growth of weapons in countries throughout the world. Because of this, he has proposed the initiation of Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) with the Soviet Union in an attempt to stop the nuclear arms race.

I appreciate your taking the time to write and express your views.

Sincerely,



Jack Burgess
Special Assistant to
the President

Ms. Miriam Silver
National Cultural Director
Ms. Gertrude R. Decker
National Legislative Director
Emma Lazarus Federation of
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SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCE DEVELOPMENTS

TESTIMONY BEFORE A JOINT SESSION OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE
ON STRATEGIC AND THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES OF THE
SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

AND

THE DEFENSE SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

JUNE 26, 1985

BY

ROBERT M. GATES
CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, AND
DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

LAWRENCE K. GERSHWIN
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER FOR STRATEGIC PROGRAMS
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL

I. Introduction

By the mid-1990s, nearly all of the Soviets' currently deployed intercontinental nuclear attack forces--land- and sea-based ballistic missiles and heavy bombers--will be replaced by new and improved systems. New mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and a variety of cruise missiles are about to enter the force. The number of deployed strategic force warheads will increase by a few thousand over the next five years, with the potential for greater expansion in the 1990s. We are concerned about the Soviets' longstanding commitment to strategic defense, including an extensive program to protect their leadership, their potential to deploy widespread defenses against ballistic missiles, and their extensive efforts in directed-energy weapons technologies, particularly high-energy lasers. Their vigorous effort in strategic force research, development, and deployment is not new, but is the result of an unswerving commitment for the past two decades to build up and improve their strategic force capabilities.

Soviet leaders are attempting to prepare their military forces for the possibility that they will actually have to fight a nuclear war. They have seriously addressed many of the problems of conducting military operations in a nuclear war, thereby improving their ability to deal with the many contingencies of such a conflict.

We judge that the Soviets would plan to conduct a military campaign that would seek to end a nuclear war on their terms--by neutralizing the ability of US intercontinental and theater nuclear forces to interfere with Soviet capabilities to prevail in a conflict in Eurasia.

II. Strategic Offensive Forces

The most notable recent trend in offensive forces is the construction of bases for mobile strategic missiles--SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) and new ICBMs:

- During 1984, the Soviets embarked on an unprecedented program for constructing new SS-20 bases, starting more new bases than in any previous year.

- The Soviets have made major strides in preparing for the deployment of their two new mobile ICBMs--the road-mobile SS-X-25 and the rail-mobile SS-X-24. The Soviets' commitment to deploy mobile ICBMs represents a major resource decision; such systems require substantially more support infrastructure than do silo-based systems, and thus are much more costly to operate and maintain.

All elements of Soviet strategic offensive forces will be extensively modernized by the mid-1990s, as the result of programs that have been in train for many years. While the Soviets will continue to rely on fixed, silo-based

ICBMs, mobile ICBMs will be deployed in large numbers (see figure 1), and major improvements will be made to the sea-based and bomber forces. The major changes in the force will include:

- An improved capability against hardened targets. The Soviets already have enough hard-target-capable ICBM reentry vehicles today to attack all US ICBM silos and launch control centers and will have larger numbers of hard-target-capable RVs in the future. In such an attack today, they would stand a good chance of destroying Minuteman silos. The projected accuracy improvements for the new heavy ICBM we expect the Soviets to deploy in the late 1980s would result in a substantial increase in this damage capability.
- Significantly better survivability from improvements in the submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) force--through quieter submarines and longer range missiles--and deployment of mobile ICBMs. Today, a large part of the Soviet silo-based ICBM force would survive an attack by US forces. However, with the increasing vulnerability of Soviet ICBM silos in the next ten years if more accurate US missiles are deployed, the Soviets will increasingly depend on the survivability of their mobile ICBM and SLBM forces.
- A substantial increase in the number of deliverable warheads for the bomber force as a result of the deployment of new bombers with long-range, land-attack cruise missiles.

ICBMs

Chart 1 shows new Soviet strategic ballistic missiles, land- and sea-based, and submarines--those recently deployed or now in testing and those we expect to see tested over the next five years.

The ICBM force, as shown in figure 2, will have been almost entirely replaced with new systems by the mid-1990s:

- The Soviets are preparing to deploy the SS-X-24 ICBM in silos in 1986 and on rail-mobile launchers in 1987. We expect SS-X-24-class ICBMs equipped with 10 multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) to replace the MIRVed SS-17 and SS-19 silo-based ICBMs, which carry fewer warheads.
- The Soviets have started to retire older silo-based single-RV SS-11s as they prepare to deploy the single-RV road-mobile SS-X-25. We expect the SS-X-25 to be operational by late 1985.
- We expect at least three new ICBMs will be flight-tested in the 1986-90 time period:
 - A new silo-based heavy ICBM, to replace the SS-18.
 - A new version of the SS-X-24.

- A new version of the mobile SS-X-25, which could have a MIRVed payload option.

SS-20s

The SS-20 force of intermediate-range ballistic missiles is expected to expand to over 450 deployed launchers by 1987, as a result of an extensive program of constructing new bases. More new bases were started in 1984 than in any previous year. The total would have been considerably higher if the Soviets had not deactivated SS-20 bases in the central USSR to convert to SS-X-25 ICBM bases. A follow-on to the SS-20, which also carries three warheads and is probably designed to improve lethality, began flight-testing in 1984.

SLBMs

An extensive modernization program will result in replacement of the entire MIRVed Soviet SLBM force and deployment of much better nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). The major changes, as shown in figure 3, will include:

- Deployment of Delta-IV and additional Typhoon SSBNs. These boats have improvements that will contribute to their survivability. In addition, a new class of submarines is likely to enter the force in the early 1990s.
- Deployment of the new SS-NX-23 SLBM beginning in late 1985 or early 1986 on Delta-IVs and on Delta-IIIs. The increased range of the SS-NX-23, relative to that of the SS-N-18 missile currently on Delta-IIIs, will make SS-NX-23-equipped SSBNs more survivable because they will be able to operate closer to Soviet shores, where the Soviet Navy can better protect them.
- A replacement for the SS-N-20 on Typhoon SSBNs will probably be flight-tested in late 1985 or 1986, and a missile in the SS-NX-23 class will probably be tested later in the 1980s.

Heavy Bombers

Chart 2 shows new Soviet strategic bombers and a variety of new long-range, land-attack cruise missiles.

The Soviet heavy bomber force is undergoing its first major modernization since the 1960s; by the mid-1990s, as shown in figure 4, most of the older bombers will have been replaced. The heavy bomber force will have a greater role in intercontinental attack:

- The AS-15 air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) became operational on newly produced Bear H aircraft in 1984. By using newly produced aircraft of an old design, the Soviets were able to deploy ALCMs at least four years earlier than if they had waited for the new Blackjack bomber.

- We project Blackjack will be operational in 1988 or 1989, carrying both ALCMs and bombs.

Cruise Missiles

The ALCM is the first in a series of deployments of long-range, land-attack cruise missiles. Over the next 10 years, we expect them to deploy 2,000 to 3,000 nuclear-armed ALCMs, sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs), and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs). The deployment of cruise missiles provides the Soviets with new multidirectional capabilities against US targets.

Growth of Intercontinental Attack Forces

The projected growth in the number of deployed warheads on Soviet intercontinental attack forces, under various assumptions, is shown in figure 5:

- The force currently consists of over 9,000 deployed warheads on some 2,500 deployed ballistic missile launchers and heavy bombers. Most warheads are in the ICBM force.
- Warheads are increasing: new Soviet Typhoon and Delta-IV submarines, Bear H bombers, and SS-X-24 ICBMs will carry many more warheads than the systems they are replacing.
- By 1990, if the Soviets continue to have about 2,500 missile launchers and heavy bombers and if they are within the quantitative sublimits of SALT II, the deployed warheads will grow to over 12,000.
- The 1983 Soviet proposal at the strategic arms reduction talks (START) would also result in an expansion in the number of warheads, although under its limits the Soviets would have about 1,000 fewer by 1990 than under SALT II limits.
- The effect of the 1983 US START proposal would be to reverse this trend and, by the 1990s, lead to substantial reductions.
- While the Soviets would not necessarily expand their intercontinental attack forces beyond some 12,000 to 13,000 warheads in the absence of arms control constraints, they clearly have the capability for significant further expansion, to between 16,000 and 21,000 deployed warheads by the mid-1990s. The lower figure represents a continuation of recent trends in deployment rates; the upper figure is not a maximum effort but would require a substantially greater commitment of resources.

The Soviets will face important decisions in the next few years, as they proceed with flight-testing the ballistic missiles which are scheduled to begin deployment in the late 1980s and early 1990s. (See Chart 1) Specifically, they have technical options to test new ICBMs in such a way as to conform with, or exceed, the limitations on characteristics and improvements in the unratified SALT II Treaty.

III. Strategic Defense

Soviet active and passive strategic defenses, while unable to prevent large-scale damage from a major attack, are intended to provide a degree of protection for the leadership, military, and military-related facilities necessary for wartime operations. The Soviets will significantly improve the capabilities of their strategic defenses over the next 10 years, as a number of new types of weapons are introduced and many of the older systems retired. Significant developments include the following:

Ballistic Missile Defense

- The Soviets have actively engaged in antiballistic missile (ABM) research, development, and deployment programs for many years.
- When completed by about 1987, the improved Moscow ABM system will consist of 100 silo-based high acceleration missiles and modified Galosh interceptors, providing an improved intercept capability against small-scale attacks on key targets around Moscow.
- By the end of the decade, when a new network of large phased-array radars (including the Krasnoyarsk radar) is expected to be fully operational, the Soviets will have a much improved capability for ballistic missile early warning, attack assessment, and accurate target tracking. These radars will be technically capable of providing battle management support to a widespread ABM system, but there are uncertainties about whether the Soviets would rely on these radars to support a widespread ABM deployment.
- The SA-X-12 system, to be deployed in the Soviet ground forces in 1985-86, can engage conventional aircraft, cruise missiles, and tactical ballistic missiles. It could have capabilities to intercept some types of US strategic ballistic missile RVs. Its technical capabilities bring to the forefront the problem that improving technology is blurring the distinction between air defense and ABM systems. This problem will be further complicated as newer, more complex air defense missile systems are developed.

We are particularly concerned that the Soviets' continuing development efforts give them the potential for widespread ABM deployments. The Soviets have the major components for an ABM system that could be used for widespread ABM deployments well in excess of ABM Treaty limits. The components include radars, an aboveground launcher, and the high acceleration missile that will be deployed around Moscow. The potential exists for the production lines associated with the upgrade of the Moscow ABM system to be used to support a

widespread deployment. We judge they could undertake rapidly paced ABM deployments to strengthen the defenses at Moscow and cover key targets in the western USSR, and to extend protection to key targets east of the Urals, by the early 1990s. In contemplating such a deployment, however, the Soviets will have to weigh the military advantages they would see in such defenses, against the disadvantages of such a move, particularly the responses by the United States and its Allies.

Air Defense

Deployment of new low-altitude-capable strategic air defense systems will increase. (See figure 6.) The Soviets are continuing to deploy the new SA-10 all-altitude surface-to-air missile (SAM), are deploying new aircraft with much better capabilities against low-flying targets, and will deploy the Mainstay airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft in 1985. Penetration of Soviet air defenses by currently deployed bombers would be more difficult as improved systems are deployed. These defenses, however, would be considerably less effective against US cruise missiles. Against a combined attack of penetrating bombers and cruise missiles, Soviet air defenses during the next 10 years probably would not be capable of inflicting sufficient losses to prevent large-scale damage to the USSR. We judge, however, that the Soviets will be able to provide an increasingly capable air defense for many key leadership, control, and military and industrial installations essential to wartime operations.

Antisubmarine Warfare

The Soviets still lack effective means to locate US ballistic missile submarines at sea. We expect them to continue to pursue vigorously all antisubmarine warfare (ASW) technologies as potential solutions to the problems of countering US SSBNs and defending their own SSBNs against US attack submarines. We are concerned about the energetic Soviet ASW research and technology efforts. However, we do not believe there is a realistic possibility that the Soviets will be able to deploy in the 1990s a system that could pose any significant threat to US SSBNs on patrol.

Leadership Protection

The Soviets have a large program to provide protection for their leadership. We judge that, with as little as a few hours' warning, a large percentage of the wartime management structure would survive the initial effects of a large-scale US nuclear attack. We estimate there are at least 800, perhaps as many as 1,500, relocation facilities for leaders at the national and regional levels. Deep underground facilities for the top national leadership might enable the top leadership to survive--a key objective of their wartime management plans.

IV. Command and Control Considerations

While significant improvements in the capabilities of both Soviet and US strategic offensive forces will occur throughout the next 10 years, sizable forces on both sides would survive large-scale nuclear strikes. The Soviets' confidence in their capabilities for global conflict and in their ability to limit damage to the Soviet Union would be affected to a large extent by command and control considerations--the need for continuity in their own command and control capabilities, and their prospects for disrupting and destroying the ability of the United States and its Allies to command and to operate their forces.

--Although US attacks could destroy many known fixed command, control, and communications facilities, the Soviets' emphasis in this area has resulted in their having many key hardened facilities and redundant means of communications; thus, it seems highly likely that the Soviets could maintain overall continuity of command and control, although it would probably be degraded and they could experience difficulty in maintaining endurance.

--We believe the Soviets would launch continuing attacks on US and Allied strategic command, control, and communications to try to prevent or impair the coordination of retaliatory strikes, thereby easing the burden on Soviet strategic defenses, and impairing US and Allied abilities to marshal military and civilian resources to reconstitute forces. While the Soviets would devote substantial efforts to this mission, they probably are not confident that they could accomplish these objectives.

V. Space Program

The vigorous Soviet space program is predominantly military in nature. More than 70 percent of Soviet space missions are for military purposes only, with much of the rest serving a dual military-civil function. The Soviets view space as an integral part of their overall offensive and defensive force structure, not as a separate arena or as a sanctuary. While the Soviets seek to be able to deny enemy use of space in wartime, current Soviet antisatellite capabilities are limited and fall short of meeting this apparent requirement. Today, in addition to the dedicated nonnuclear orbital interceptor, other systems--the nuclear Galosh ABM interceptor and two ground-based high-energy lasers--have the potential to destroy or interfere with some satellites in near-Earth orbit, but the potential threat to satellites in higher orbit is limited. It is likely that the Soviets would attempt to destroy or interfere with US satellites during an intense conventional conflict, and in the initial stages of a nuclear war. These capabilities, however, would not survive a nuclear attack. Some improvements in Soviet antisatellite capabilities are expected.

VI. Directed-Energy and Hypervelocity Kinetic-Energy Weapons

Directed-energy and kinetic-energy weapons potentially could be developed for several strategic weapons applications--antisatellite (ASAT), air defense, battlefield use, and, in the longer term, ballistic missile defense (BMD).

There is strong evidence of Soviet efforts to develop high-energy laser weapons, and these efforts have been taking place, in some cases, since the 1960s:

- We estimate a laser weapon program of the magnitude of the Soviet effort would cost roughly \$1 billion per year if carried out in the United States.
- Two facilities at the Saryshagan test range are assessed to have high-energy lasers with the potential to function as ASAT weapons.
- We are concerned about a large Soviet program to develop ground-based laser weapons for terminal defense against reentry vehicles. There are major uncertainties, however, concerning the feasibility and practicality of using ground-based lasers for BMD. We expect the Soviets to test the feasibility of such a system during the 1980s, probably using one of the high-energy laser facilities at Saryshagan. An operational system could not be deployed until many years later, probably not until after the year 2000.
- The Soviets appear to be developing two high-energy laser weapons with potential strategic air defense applications--ground-based and naval point defense.
- The Soviets are continuing to develop an airborne laser.
- Soviet research includes a project to develop high-energy laser weapons for use in space. A prototype high-energy, space-based laser ASAT weapon could be tested in low orbit in the early 1990s. Even if testing were successful, such a system probably could not be operational before the mid-1990s.

The Soviets are also conducting research under military sponsorship for the purpose of acquiring the ability to develop particle beam weapons (PBWs). We believe the Soviets will eventually attempt to build a space-based PBW, but the technical requirements are so severe that we estimate there is a low probability they will test a prototype before the year 2000.

The Soviets are strong in the technologies appropriate for radiofrequency (RF) weapons, which could be used to interfere with or destroy components of missiles or satellites, and we judge they are probably capable of developing a prototype RF weapon system.

We are concerned that Soviet directed-energy programs may have proceeded to the point where they could construct operational ground-based ASAT weapons.

The Soviets have expended significant resources since the 1960s in R&D on technologies with potential applications for hypervelocity kinetic-energy weapons.

VII. Resources for Projected Developments and Arms Control Considerations

Strategic offensive and defensive forces account for about one-fifth of total defense spending--about one-tenth each. The Soviets are increasing their resource commitments to their already formidable strategic forces research, development, and deployment programs. We estimate that total investment and operating expenditures for projected Soviet strategic offensive forces (intercontinental attack and intermediate range) and strategic defensive forces (assuming no widespread ABM deployments) will result in a growth in total Soviet strategic force expenditures of between 5 and 7 percent a year over the next five years. (The rate would be 7 to 10 percent if widespread ABM defenses were deployed.)

A growth rate of 5 to 7 percent a year for strategic programs, combined with the projected growth rate for nonstrategic programs of about 3 percent, would lead to a growth in total defense spending of between 3 and 4 percent per year--at the same time that we foresee sluggish growth in the Soviet economy for the rest of the decade. Increasing the share of the GNP devoted to defense will confront the Soviets with the difficult choice of reducing the growth in investment, which is critical to modernizing the industrial base, or curtailing growth in consumption, which is an important factor in the Soviet drive to improve labor productivity.

Despite serious economic problems since the mid-1970s, Soviet military procurement has been at high annual levels; in particular, the Soviets have continued to procure large quantities of new strategic weapons. Since the mid-1970s, for example, the Soviets fielded their MIRVed ICBM force, and then improved it; deployed the MIRVed SLBM force on new SSBNs; and deployed their mobile SS-20 force. In recent years the Soviets have increased their resource commitments to emerging new systems, particularly with respect to the deployment of costly mobile missile systems.

While Soviet economic problems are severe, we see no signs that the Soviets feel compelled to forgo important strategic programs or that they will make substantial concessions in arms control in order to relieve economic pressures. Soviet force decisions and arms control decisions are likely to continue to be driven by calculations of political-strategic benefits and the dynamism of weapons technology. We judge that strategic forces will continue to command the highest resource priorities and therefore would be affected less by economic problems than any other element of the Soviet military. We believe, however, that, as a result of the stark economic realities, decisions involving the rate of strategic force modernization probably will be influenced by economic factors more now than in the past and some deployment programs could be stretched out.

We believe the Soviets are determined to prevent any erosion of the military gains the USSR has made over the past decade. They recognize that new US strategic systems being deployed or under development will increase the threat to the survivability of their silo-based ICBM force, complicate their

ASW efforts, and present their air defense forces with increasingly complex problems. By their actions and propaganda, the Soviets have demonstrated they are very concerned about the US Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and its focus on advanced technology. In their view, it could force them to redirect their offensive ballistic missile development programs to reduce vulnerabilities or could stimulate a costly, open-ended high-technology competition for which they probably are concerned that the United States can outpace their own ongoing efforts. They are probably also concerned that SDI will lead to a sustained US effort in strategic defenses.

Soviet leaders view arms control policy as an important factor in advancing their strategy of achieving strategic advantage. They have been willing to negotiate restraints on force improvements and deployments when it served their interests. Moscow has long believed that arms control must first and foremost protect the capabilities of Soviet military forces relative to their opponents. The Soviets seek to limit US force modernization through both the arms control process and any resulting agreements. A salient feature of Soviet arms control policy will be its emphasis on trying to limit US ballistic missile defense and space warfare capabilities. The Soviets will try to use arms control discussions as a means of delaying or undercutting the US SDI program.

Remarks by
RICHARD PERLE
Assistant Secretary of Defense,
to the
Committee for the Free World
Beyond 1984 Conference
London, 19 March 1985

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I am pleased and honored to have been asked to address this distinguished gathering and to come together with so many good friends. It is a particular pleasure to be in the company of those of you whom I know, by what you have said and written and done, as allies in the great cause of freedom.

As I listened to Vladimir Bukovsky at lunch I was reminded of a cartoon that appeared in the New Yorker some years ago. It depicted a scene from the American West -- New Mexico or perhaps Nevada -- of a broad mesa on either side of a vast valley. On one side there was an Indian, huddled over a camp fire, sending a wispy smoke signal into the air. On the distant side of the valley there loomed a large, mushroom-shaped cloud. The Indian turns to his companion and says, "I wish I'd said that."

I want to speak tonight about security -- about the strategic relationship between East and West, President Reagan's strategic defense initiative, and about arms control. I should say at the outset that I am moved to do so after having read Sir Geoffrey Howe's speech and The Times leader commenting on it.

Consideration of the complex issues of peace and security by which we in the West are challenged, intellectually as well as politically, requires more than ordinary clarity and discipline when the Soviet Union unveils a new leader. We have heard much of that last night and today, and far too little of it beyond these rooms. We have been well advised to remember the fundamentals that are so easily obscured by the euphoria to which the West is so easily given. Of these fundamentals Orwell had much to say. I will quote him only once. "The Soviet Union is a place where yesterday's weather can be changed by decree."

To the euphoria, western politicians have had much to contribute. Consider this statement from Denis Healey about the new General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: "Emotions flicker over a face of unusual sensitivity like summer breezes on a pond." And this from a former Minister of Defense who has, on more than one occasion, called your humble speaker "the prince of darkness." Without meaning in any way to comment on internal British politics, let me just say that Britain is a place where yesterday's minister can be changed by sheer glee -- and the decline of the Labor Party.

Last Friday the British Foreign Secretary spoke to the Royal United Services Institute about the military relationship between East and West, the evolution of strategic forces and policy in the decade and a half following the arms control agreements of 1972 and about the American strategic defense initiative.

It was a speech that proved again an old axiom of geometry: that length is no substitute for depth. For in a mere 27 pages he succeeded in rewriting the recent history of the Soviet-American strategic relationship, rendering it unrecognizable to anyone who has charted its course; in mistaking the unfulfilled promise of 1972 with the reality that followed; in questioning -- in a manner that is both tendentious and obliquely declaratory -- the strategic defense program of the United States; in declaring that our best hope lies in "a balance of capability matched by mutual confidence about intentions," while warning against "raising hopes that it may be impossible to fulfill."

I should have thought that, in all of that, room might have been found for a sentence, or even a phrase, on the implications of the enlarging pattern of Soviet violations of the most important arms control agreements that exist between the United States and the Soviet Union. Yet on this the speech is silent.

In what may earn its place as the understatement of 1985 on the unrelenting build-up of Soviet nuclear forces, Sir Geoffrey observes that "We know that historical experience has inclined them towards over-insurance." I must say that, even in this city of Lloyd's, I find the concept of insurance a less than persuasive description of Soviet strategic weapons programs -- programs that have resulted in the addition to their arsenal of more than 8,000 strategic warheads since we first met at the negotiating table in 1969, 4,000 of which have been deployed since the second SALT agreement was signed in 1979.

Surely there is something deeper behind the Soviet drive to amass nuclear weapons on a scale that Sir Geoffrey himself says goes "far beyond the reasonable requirements necessary for the defence of the Soviet Union." But on this too the speech is silent. And while the speech takes pains to reiterate President Reagan's statement that the United States is not seeking military superiority, it nowhere even poses the question of whether the same might be said of the Soviet Union.

Sir Geoffrey evidently believes that in signing the ABM Treaty in 1972 the Soviet Union "...reflected the agreement that there could be no winner in a nuclear conflict and that it was a dangerous illusion to believe that we could get round this reality." And he goes on to say that "The net effect (of the ABM Treaty) was ... to enhance the strategy of nuclear deterrence through the clear recognition of mutual vulnerability."

While I believe that this is a fair characterization of the thinking that attended the ABM Treaty on the American side, I can find no persuasive evidence that this view is held by the military or political leaders of the Soviet Union. Indeed, such evidence as there is suggests that the Soviets hold a quite different view, that they have never accepted the notion that it is desirable to remain vulnerable to nuclear retaliation. The massive build-up of strategic weapons in the aftermath of the ABM Treaty strongly suggests that the Soviets have all along

sought to acquire the capacity to destroy with offensive weapons the retaliatory forces of the United States and our British and French allies. The deployment of their offensive ballistic missiles, in numbers and of a quality that greatly exceeds parity with the United States, can have no plausible purpose other than to menace the American deterrent.

The growth of Soviet air defenses, which now consist of more than 13,000 launchers for surface-to-air missiles and a formidable array of radars and interceptors, hardly suggests that the Soviets are content to permit American strategic bombers to reach their targets in retaliation. And the investment the Soviets have made, and continue to make, in all forms of anti-ballistic missile defense, including precisely those technologies that are encompassed in the American strategic defense research program, could hardly be consistent with a policy of benign acquiescence in the doctrine of mutual assured destruction.

On this latter point, Soviet policy with respect to strategic defense, there is an underlying hypocrisy of Orwellian dimensions. Some 10 days after President Reagan outlined his plan for research aimed at establishing whether a strategic defense is feasible, there appeared, in Pravda and elsewhere, a statement deploring the devotion of scientific talent and resources to the development of military systems and defensive systems in particular. It was signed by a long list of Soviet scientists. Among the signers were the man in charge of the Soviet strategic defense program, the designer of the most lethal Soviet strategic missiles, the head of the Soviet military laser program, the architect of the ABM system now deployed around Moscow, and several dozen of their collaborators.

I believe that there is a far simpler explanation for the Soviet interest in the ABM Treaty of 1972 than the one suggested by the Foreign Minister. Simpler and more sinister. In 1972, when the United States had begun the deployment of a limited ABM system incorporating what was then state-of-the-art technology, the Soviets were far behind technologically. So far behind, in fact, that they were then unable to deploy a system even approaching ours. And they were certainly in no position to contemplate a crash effort without slowing the massive build-up of offensive weapons to which they were by then already committed.

So they did the obvious thing. They agreed to ban ABM systems while planning to accelerate their own research and development. They halted the American program, the deployment of which had begun; and they used the opportunity the treaty afforded to develop their own. Today the Soviets are ahead of the United States in the deployment and technology of strategic defenses. In 1985 the Soviets have in place more of the large phased-array radars on which a nation-wide ABM system might be based than the United States planned to deploy for the system we abandoned in 1972. Twice as many. And among these there is the radar now under construction near Krasnoyarsk, a radar that

blatantly and unapologetically violates the ABM Treaty that Sir Geoffrey calls "... a political and military keystone in the still shaky arch of security we have constructed with the East over the past decade and a half.

In Geneva the Soviets will doubtless continue to press for another agreement like the ABM Treaty of 1972, insisting that the United States abandon its current program of research. They know that an agreement restricting our research and theirs would be unverifiable -- and therefore unilateral. They have every reason -- nostalgia among them -- to wish to return to a situation in which they alone can carry forward, while we accept a negotiated and one-sided paralysis for however long the Soviets might require to develop their own SDI. Having learned from the past I can assure that we will not agree; we will not make the same mistake again.

There is another point to be made about the ABM Treaty and the agreement to which it was linked -- the interim agreement on offensive arms. The understanding that we thought had been reached in 1972 was that we could safely refrain from deploying an ABM system of which we were capable because the Soviets had agreed to restrictions on the growth of their offensive forces that would obviate the requirement for that system of defense. But through a variety of devices, beginning, I must say, with skillful negotiating on the part of the Soviet negotiators and rather less skillful on the part of our own, and ultimately including out-and-out violations of those agreements, the Soviets have succeeded, despite our hopes, in deploying an offensive force of a size and character even larger than that we envisioned when we decided it was necessary to deploy an anti-ballistic missile defense to protect against an offense of those dimensions.

The Soviets did rather more than that. We are all familiar -- having survived the difficult debate in Europe over the deployment of the SS-20 -- with that weapon system. It is, not many people recognize, a product of that very SALT I agreement of 1972. The 1972 agreement limited the number of launchers for ballistic missiles with a range greater than 5500 kilometers. So the Soviet Union did the obvious thing: they took a three-stage missile then in their inventory that had a range greater than 5500 kilometers, called the SS-16. They removed one of the three stages, thereby reducing its range to approximately 5,000 kilometers. And free from any treaty restraint or limitation, they began to deploy the SS-20. We now face over 400 SS-20s, each with three warheads, deployed against every conceivable target in Europe. Indeed there are rather more SS-20 warheads than there are targets. And finally, as I indicated, the Soviets began a process -- initially rather tentatively and, more recently, rather open and blatant -- of violating the provisions of that agreement. I can't help but think that the more recent and blatant violations have something to do with the failure to respond earlier to the more subtle and arguable violations.

The "shaky arch of security" to which Sir Geoffrey refers is perhaps best expressed by the trend in the military balance of the last two decades -- a trend that steadily diminished the capacity of the United States and its allies to deter hostile Soviet activity, thereby limiting the risks the Soviets would assume in exploiting opportunities for aggression and subversion.

Let me cite a few examples of the different US and Soviet trends in weapons development over the past two decades. The last of our B-52 bombers rolled off the production line in 1962 -- 23 years ago; and some of our active fleet of strategic bombers were built as far back as 1956. We began deploying our newest land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) 15 years ago. During the same year, we began deploying the POSEIDON submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM). We did not field another new strategic system until 1978, when we began deploying the TRIDENT I SLBM. Since then we have begun to deploy air- and sea-launched cruise missiles, and to build the TRIDENT I ballistic missile-carrying submarine (SSBN) at the rate of about one a year.

By contrast the Soviet Union since 1971 has deployed at least three and probably four new types of ICBMs (the SS-17, SS-18, SS-19 and probably the SS-16), eight improved versions of existing ICBMs, five new types of SSBNs, four new types of SLBMs, five improved versions of existing SLBMs, long-range cruise missiles, and a new intercontinental bomber. And the Soviet Union is continuing to develop new strategic weapons of all types.

It is often said of the Soviets that they are conservative and disinclined to take risks. With this assessment I agree. But curiously, the view of the Soviets as averse to risk-taking is frequently put forward as a reason why the United States need not carry out its defense modernization and rearmament program. With this I most strenuously disagree.

For there is a clear relationship between our military potential and the willingness of the Soviet Union to take risks. Soviet perception of our willingness to defend our interests and those of our allies will depend on their assessment of the military balance. The Soviet Union took actions in the 1970s that it would not have taken in the 1960s. Such actions were less risky for the Soviets in the mid- and late-1970s because the military balance had substantially changed in their favor.

It is the nature of the military relationship that determines, above all else, whether a course is risky for the Soviets, or safe. Until the presidency of Ronald Reagan the Soviets had become accustomed to riskless adventure and subversion. The importance of the President's action in Grenada was that it marked the end of an era in which the Soviet leadership, emboldened by the declining strength and will of the United States, could engage in aggression and subversion with little or no fear that they would elicit an American response.

The President's election signaled a clear consensus on the part of the American people that something needed to be done immediately to redress the serious imbalance created by an ambitious Soviet military build-up coupled with US restraint in the 1970s. It is my strong belief that the American people continue to share that concern and assessment. They overwhelmingly support the President's commitment to continue upgrading US military capabilities in order to meet the enlarged Soviet threat and to restore the adequacy of US and allied deterrent capabilities.

I must say I find patronizing and absurd this suggestion, now fashionable among editorialists and columnists who have never shared the President's clear and forthright judgment about the Soviet Union, that Ronald Reagan will now embrace the demonstrably false theory of detente of the 1970s in order to assure his "place in history". That theory of detente, in which the Soviets were to be adroitly enmeshed in a web of relationships, expressed in terms of agreements across a broad range of political, cultural, economic and military relationships, will doubtless earn its own place in history -- as an experiment that failed.

For when the haze that surrounded the detente policy of the early and mid-1970s was dissipated by the winds of Soviet internal repression, subversion in the third-world, war in Afghanistan, technological espionage on a grand scale and unprecedented military programs, it became clear that it was we, and not the Soviets, who became enmeshed in a web of unrealistic expectations, commercial greed, self-imposed inhibitions on the President's freedom to protect our security -- and military vigilance diminished, along with shrinking defense budgets, to a dangerous indifference.

Twice in his speech Sir Geoffrey found it necessary to declare the seriousness with which Her Majesty's Government regard the effort to negotiate arms control agreements with the Soviet Union. That is a sentiment we share; although I must say that the frequency with which we feel obliged to reiterate the point is its own testimony to the propaganda, Soviet and domestic, that surrounds the issue of arms control.

I welcome the opportunity this occasion affords me to comment on the subject of arms control -- a subject the discussion of which is in danger of deteriorating into an exchange of epithets between "good guys" and "bad guys". And as one of those officials who is so often placed in the latter category by those who feel themselves firmly in the former one, a chance to explain where we differ -- and to do so in my own words and not the words of others so airily attributed to me -- is a rare privilege indeed.

I believe that the principal difference between the American Administration and its critics on the subject of arms control lies in the standard we each set for the reaching of agreement. I confess that I believe we set a higher standard than our detractors: we are searching for arms control agreements that will significantly constrain the growth of Soviet military power, while limiting our own proportionately.

7

We are searching for negotiated arms limitations which, if agreed to, would provide for greater stability at sharply lower levels of weapons. We are trying, as our Congress has directed, to obtain agreements that are based upon the principle of equality between the United States and its main adversary, the Soviet Union. We are attempting to achieve agreements that are sufficiently precise so that we can verify compliance with them. And in attempting all this we are mindful that there are some agreements that are better than others; all too many that convey the appearance -- but not the reality -- of militarily meaningful restraint; and some that are worse than none at all.

Our efforts to achieve agreements that are militarily significant, drawn with precision, balanced and equitable and verifiable are taking place against a background of anxiety, here and abroad, that clouds our vision and complicates our task.

The most prominent expression of this anxiety is found in the two words "arms race," and in the awesome image these words conjure in our minds -- an image of the endless piling of weapon upon weapon, an ever upward spiral without end, a race to the apocalypse. Yet the reality is more mundane, and quite elusive. It is this: the United States has today, deployed worldwide, some 8,000 fewer nuclear weapons than we had deployed in the later half of the 1960s. For fifteen years or more we have engaged in a sustained program of unilateral arms reductions while the Soviet Union has been adding constantly to its arsenal of strategic and theater nuclear weapons. Calculated in terms of megatonnage the reduction of US forces is even more impressive: we have reduced the megatonnage of our deployed weapons by 75 percent over the last two decades.

But what has this to do with arms control? Nothing -- and everything. Nothing because the US reductions, and the Soviet increases, have proceeded without regard to the three major treaties under which we and the Soviets have been living since 1972. Everything because the irrelevance of the treaties meant to regulate the competition in strategic weapons has become increasingly clear as the Soviet build-up has occurred, largely within their provisions. Indeed, it is striking how nostalgia for the arms control of the early 1970s has become an almost automatic response to current concerns about "the upward spiral of the arms race" -- as though the agreements of the 1970s were not now in effect when in fact they are. Every strategic weapon added to the arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union since 1972 has been added under the terms (sometimes interpreted generously by the Soviets) of one treaty in force, one expired but still observed, and one never ratified but adhered to nevertheless. So much for nostalgia; it ain't what it used to be.

In all of the confusion that surrounds the subject of arms control there is none so serious as the issue of seriousness. It has become commonplace for the Administration's critics to accuse it of a lack of seriousness about arms control. In support

of this accusation there are learned journalistic excursions into the bureaucratic world of the heroic but ineffective "good guys" (who are serious about arms control) and the dominant "bad guys" (who are secretly opposed to arms control, and block it at every turn, but go through the motions in a false show of seriousness). And by some obscure litmus test we are -- all of us -- herded into one camp or the other.

But what does seriousness in arms control mean? Is it a sign of seriousness to make concessions to the Soviet desire to accumulate and preserve significant advantages in nuclear weapons? Is the ease with which we abandon our objectives and make "progress" toward an agreement -- any agreement -- a sign of seriousness? Is there any relationship between seriousness and the content of the agreements we seek to negotiate?

The charge that this Administration is not serious about arms control because it has set a standard for agreement that is difficult to achieve precisely because it is worth achieving, is damaging and unworthy -- damaging to our efforts and unworthy of those who make the charge.

The burden of advice we are receiving from many of our critics amounts to little more than that we should modify our proposals so as to permit the Soviets to retain a vastly larger strategic arsenal than the levels the Administration has proposed.

According to this view, seriousness is to be found on the side of the big guns -- or, in this case, the big missiles. Demand too much restraint on the part of the Soviets, even though the levels we have proposed would be equal for both sides -- and you are not serious. Hold out for an agreement worthy of our children's respect (and with some chance of protecting their safety and liberty) and you are not serious. Seriousness resides with those who don't worry too much about the terms of an agreement as long as something gets signed.

That is, needless to say, not our view of what constitutes being serious about arms control. In our view seriousness requires clear-sighted objectives, militarily significant outcomes, agreements that are equal and verifiable -- and the patience and courage to achieve results. It can't be done quickly or easily. Our adversaries won't permit it. They prefer to wait for terms more to their liking -- terms which, like those to which they have become accustomed, leave their military programs largely unimpeded and their build-up undiminished.

With the new Soviet leader in place, it will not be long before we hear the charge emanating from Geneva that we are not serious.

I rather suspect that the Soviets in Geneva will propose that we stop research on strategic defense; that we freeze our strategic forces; that we freeze the deployment of intermediate missiles in Europe; in short, that we stop where we are, enshrining

ARMS CONTROL AND NEW TECHNOLOGIES:

A DUAL APPROACH TO ACHIEVING STABILITY

Arms

The term "arms race" most often evokes an image of endless competition between the superpowers to acquire more--and more sophisticated--nuclear arms. This popular image of a spiralling growth of nuclear arsenals, however, does not accord with the hard facts of recent years. The United States today has some 8,000 fewer nuclear weapons deployed worldwide than was the case in 1966. Moreover, the megatonnage--i.e., the aggregate explosive power--of today's weapons amounts to barely one-fourth of the comparable figure of the late 1960s. For example, the United States withdrew 1,000 nuclear weapons from Europe following NATO's "dual decision" in December 1979. Less than four years later, NATO Defense Ministers meeting in Montebello, Canada, decided to withdraw an additional 1,400 nuclear weapons from Europe. Once completed, this total reduction of 2,400 weapons will leave the United States with the smallest deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe in 25 years. Moreover, that smaller number will not be increased through NATO's deployment of cruise and Pershing II missiles, since one existing weapon will be withdrawn for each new cruise or Pershing II deployed.

Unfortunately, the other superpower has been steadily expanding its nuclear weapons arsenal during this same period. In other words, if the world is plagued today with larger numbers of nuclear weapons than twenty years ago, this is because the increases on the Soviet side have exceeded the reductions on the American side. In my view, any discussion of the future of the arms race must first recognize these essential facts.

It is true, of course, that in many ways the United States has a more formidable arsenal today despite its reduced numbers. Our weapons, for example, are more accurate and reliable. Nonetheless, the important point remains that we cannot speak of a steady, upward spiralling arms race. One side has gone up, but the other--ours--has gone down.

With this background in mind, I would like to present my view on the interrelationship--now and in the foreseeable future--between arms control agreements and the development of new technologies. Briefly stated, new technologies may limit the prospects for bilateral arms control agreements of the sort to which we have become accustomed, but these technologies may nevertheless bring about a greater degree of stability in military relationships between East and West.

Shortcomings of Arms Control

A familiar cliché states that "technology is outstripping the ability of politicians to control it." When applied to nuclear weapons, the cliché suggests that technology somehow is advancing in ways that will make arms control more difficult. In fact, in the modern world--and certainly since the dawn of the nuclear age--a unilateral decision-making process based largely on budgetary and weapons technology

constraints has been the principal method of controlling arms. In the United States, for example, our budget for strategic forces has amounted to some 14 percent of the entire defense budget for the past several years. During the 1970s, the comparable figure averaged around 10 percent. Thus, we clearly have had the capability to deploy greater numbers and varieties of weapons than we have chosen to deploy. Our decision not to go "all out" was not a consequence of arms control agreements, but rather of internal judgments reflecting our view of defense requirements.

Similarly, the Soviets' choices about weaponry did not stem from inhibitions resulting from arms control treaties--existing bilateral treaties have not proven to be a major inhibition at all--but instead from their view of Soviet military needs and the forces deemed appropriate to meet those needs. We find the Soviet forces rather menacing and excessive. In any event, we still see that defense planners and budgeters on each side decide the size of the respective nuclear forces--not arms controllers and bilateral treaties.

Those who argue that new technology is making arms control more difficult generally focus on the question of verification. Verifying adherence to agreements is becoming more difficult, they say, as technological advancements are introduced in the arsenals of both sides. I agree that Soviet compliance has been more difficult to verify than we thought at the outset. It is fair to say that during the early days of our bilateral treaties, we in the West became overconfident. Because we were sure we could count the number of Soviet missile silos, we concluded--wrongly--that the verification problem was under control.

One obvious example of our difficulties concerns mobile missiles. Such missiles, whether of intercontinental or intermediate range, need not be deployed in fixed sites. Unlike large ICBM's that can be counted in their silos by means of satellite photography, mobile missiles can be hidden. Another much discussed example is the "dual-capable" nature of many of the weapons systems deployed by both sides, that is weapons that exist in both nuclear and non-nuclear versions. Virtually all of the Soviet shorter-range missiles can carry nuclear or conventional warheads--and, we suspect, chemical weapons as well.

Admittedly, mobile missiles and dual-capable weapons do complicate the problem of knowing precisely what the other side is doing in the context of an arms control agreement. I hasten to add, however, that this complicating factor is less important than many have suggested.

Knowing what the other side is doing represents only a small part of the verification problem. It is far more important to have confidence that the agreements we have signed are, in fact, working to limit the threat that we face. This is the element of confidence that has been lacking--sometimes for reasons having little or nothing to do with precise knowledge of what the other side is doing.

One reason for this is that the Soviets have been extraordinarily skillful--they might say "successful"--in exploiting ambiguities. Threading their way through loopholes in the treaties, they have

undertaken military programs that we believed to be capped or prohibited. Again, the issue does not involve defining what they are doing; we know what they are doing. The issue is whether the confidence that we invested in the treaty was justified in light of subsequent Soviet behavior and its military consequences.

The most interesting and immediate example of such Soviet behavior concerns the SS-20. This missile, which has preoccupied the NATO Alliance and indeed the whole of Europe, is actually part--specifically, two of the three stages--of another missile called the SS-16. As a consequence of the first strategic arms limitation treaty (SALT I) signed in 1972, the Soviets undertook not to deploy the SS-16. The reason: the SS-16's range of more than 5,500 kilometers would qualify it as an intercontinental ballistic missile, whose numbers were limited by the agreement.

SALT I placed no limitation, however, on the deployment of launchers or missiles with a range of less than 5,500 kilometers. So what did the Soviets do? Having signed an agreement in which they undertook not to add launchers for missiles with a range greater than 5,500 kilometers, they took the SS-16, removed one stage, called it an SS-20, and began to deploy it in large numbers. The number of SS-20's deployed--each with three warheads, each highly mobile, each consisting of two-thirds of an SS-16--today exceeds 400 and is climbing.

The saga of the SS-16 and SS-20 is enough to shake one's confidence in the arms control process. The Soviets stopped just under the SALT I range limit--the SS-20 has a range of 5,000 kilometers--and thereby built a powerful missile entirely consistent with the fine print of SALT I, which they could--and are deploying--in very large number.

A lesser known example concerns one of the fundamental distinctions made in SALT I, i.e., the difference between so-called "heavy" and "light" missiles. In this case, the Soviets did not take advantage of a loophole per se but of an ambiguity that amounted to a loophole.

During the SALT I negotiations, the Soviets refused to agree precisely to define a "heavy" missile. Still, they led the United States to believe that their view of what constituted a "heavy" missile was very similar to our position. As soon as SALT I was signed, they proceeded to deploy a new generation of missiles. One of these--the SS-19--had three times the capacity of its predecessor to deliver warheads over intercontinental distances. Owing to an ambiguity in the definition of the term "heavy," however, the Soviets did not regard the SS-19 as a "heavy." The United States protested that this was utterly inconsistent with the spirit of SALT I, but the Soviets--as they always do--invoked not the spirit but the letter of the agreement. When we carefully reexamined the letter, we discovered that we had failed adequately to define the term "heavy" even though it had been at the center of the negotiations for two and a half years!

When we discover unpleasant surprises like missiles that are not "heavy" even though they have three times the capability of the missiles they replaced, when we discover SS-20s that are really SS-16s with a little bit removed, when we discover such Soviet behavior that devastates the confidence we had when the agreements were signed, then the issue of knowing precisely what the Soviets are doing becomes a good deal less important.

But the problems of verification and confidence do not end here. The SS-20 and SS-19 are examples of Soviet behavior that, arguably, could be considered consistent with the precise terms of SALT I. More recently, and much to our regret, the Soviets have gone beyond merely exploiting loopholes to clear-cut violation of precise terms. After a year-long study involving all agencies of the United States Government--including agencies that, because it is their job to do so, tried very hard to find plausible explanations for Soviet behavior--President Reagan reached the conclusion that the Soviets were violating the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, the SALT I Treaty, and the unratified SALT II agreement.

Knowing what the Soviets are doing is one thing; dealing with violations is quite another problem. We have no adequate international mechanism for dealing with violations. So while we must be concerned that technological advancements could make verification more difficult, we must not delude ourselves: knowledge of what the Soviets are doing is not equivalent to a solution to the problem of violations. Regrettably, even when we know that violations have taken place, there is not very much we can do about it except to complain in international fora and hope that someone is listening.

Benefits of New Technologies

If arms control agreements are not a panacea for restraining the arms race, are there other--perhaps complementary--approaches to improving stability? Arms control is, after all, not an end in itself but a means to an end--i.e., reducing the risk of nuclear conflict.

In my view, some new technologies--I refer both to technologies that have already emerged and those on the horizon--have remarkable potential for strengthening the stability of the military balance between the superpowers. To those who see weapons technology as an implacable foe of stability, I perhaps should point to the obvious: some of the weapons technology developed since Hiroshima and Nagasaki has helped the world, even during severe international crises, to avoid slipping into the abyss of nuclear conflict. Thanks to improved weapons and communications technology, we have virtually eliminated the risk of accidental or unauthorized detonation of nuclear weapons. We should not underestimate these accomplishments.

Looking to the future we can see significant potential for improvement in conventional weapons. Let us not forget that the Soviet Union's overwhelming advantage in conventional military power today constitutes the principal threat to a stable balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. NATO has been forced to respond to this Soviet advantage by both developing its conventional capabilities and maintaining and modernizing its nuclear deterrent. If NATO could improve the stability of the conventional military balance, it would raise the nuclear threshold and diminish the possibility that nuclear weapons would ever need to be used to guarantee the defense of Western Europe.

Currently there are technological innovations on American drawing boards--and almost certainly on Soviet drawing boards, in no small measure thanks to their efficient theft of Western technology--that would give conventional weapons a precision once unimaginable. For example, one device now in the advanced developmental stage can be used to guide conventionally-armed cruise missiles over long distances and in virtually any weather to within three meters of the target. Thus, a cruise missile launched near London could reach an office in the Kremlin and almost distinguish between two windows. We are on the verge of similar breakthroughs in terminal guidance for battlefield use, including weapons that can seek out moving targets or interdict Soviet tank armies.

The implication of such developments is clear and profound: we are acquiring the capability to carry out current "nuclear missions" with conventional forces. This offers enormous hope that the West, with its vastly smaller conventional forces, will be able effectively to deter the Soviets without recourse to nuclear weapons. In my judgment, stability would be tremendously enhanced.

We also are on the verge of computerizing every level of military organization in the European theater. Individual soldiers soon will have at their fingertips a high speed data link allowing them to communicate urgent information to a battlefield commander. This information, in turn, can be automatically integrated and distributed to other battlefield units. This veritable information revolution will significantly improve the management of conventional forces, again strengthening NATO's ability to mount an effective defense without resorting to nuclear weapons.

These advanced technologies obviously carry with them a special but necessary burden: for the sake of its own security, the West must be far more vigilant in the future than it has in the past in controlling technology transfers to the East. Let us make no mistake about it: the Soviets and their allies are using Western technologies in their military systems. If we are not very careful, the application of new technologies to conventional defense will be turned against us by our adversaries. Indeed, in some cases they have even outpaced us in incorporating Western technologies into military applications. Can there be any doubt that, if the Soviets can combine the "force-multiplier" effect of new technologies with their vastly larger forces,

our one great hope for stability could become a dangerous new source of instability?

Role of the Strategic Defense Initiative

To conclude, I would like to offer my observations on a controversial topic which relates closely to the questions of new technologies and arms control.

Under the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) announced by President Reagan in 1983, the United States is placing a much greater emphasis on research in strategic defense. The Soviets, of course, try to make it sound as though the United States alone discovered this concept. In fact, the Soviets have been very involved in strategic defense for many years. Even with the recent increase in the American SDI research budget, the Soviets are outspending us in this area.

Ironically, any ability that the United States eventually may have to deploy strategic defenses (either ground-or space-based) has not, at least until now, resulted from careful investments in defense research. This ability instead has resulted from advancements in civilian technologies that happen to be highly adaptable to the task of strategic defense. Much of the SDI, in fact, consists of exploring how civilian sensors and data and signal processing can be integrated into a defensive system. To oversimplify a bit, our children's love for putting coins into video games has spurred development of basic technologies that we can now use to think realistically of a strategic defense system.

I know very well the argument that goes as follows: American deployment of strategic defenses would create instability and heat up the arms race, since the Soviets would have no alternative to multiplying their offensive nuclear forces. But this argument misses two key points. First, the stability of the balance between the superpowers depends on successful deterrence. Second, deterrence requires that the Soviet side continue to have an appreciable margin of doubt concerning their ability to launch a successful attack on the retaliatory capability of the United States. I believe that strategic defenses, if successfully developed and deployed, would help enormously to add to the uncertainty of that initial attack.

As things stand today, the Soviets can be all too confident that an attack aimed at destroying American land-based missiles would succeed. The Soviets have over 6,000 warheads on their land-based ICBM force, and they know the United States has 1,000 ICBMs. Thus, if they allocate only two or three warheads to each American silo, they can have a high confidence in their ability to destroy our land-based force. Their confidence has the result of diminishing the deterrent effect of our retaliatory capability.

Once defensive systems are introduced into the strategic equation, their ability to destroy some fraction--perhaps even a large fraction--of Soviet warheads can go a long way toward restoring deterrence, at

least with respect to that land-based part of retaliatory capability that has become vulnerable. In short, increasing the uncertainty faced by the Soviets is essential to the maintenance of stability.

Thus, the view that any strategic defense will cause instability is simply shallow and wrong. In any event, the Soviets are hard at work on strategic defenses, and I cannot imagine a more uncomfortable situation for the West--and for neutrals whose security depends on a balance between the superpowers--than to find the Soviets with a monopoly on strategic defense as well as an offensive arsenal capable of destroying much of the American retaliatory capability. The United States cannot afford--and, I trust, will not decide--to abandon research and development of SDI and leave the field to the Soviet Union. The development and, perhaps, the eventual deployment of a strategic defense system could constitute an ultimate form of arms control at a time when arms control is needed most.

My intention is not to paint an unduly bleak picture. To the contrary, I hold that the same trends in technological development seen by some as undermining arms control may, in fact, promote stability between the superpowers; that by applying technological innovations to NATO's conventional forces, we can improve our ability to deter a Soviet attack in Europe without resorting to nuclear weapons; and, finally, that we can strengthen stability even if we cannot achieve new arms control agreements. We will continue to seek meaningful arms control agreements with the Soviets. But if the confidence that we sought to build with treaties in the early 1970s cannot be found in the 1980s, should we turn a blind eye to other positive approaches in our grasp?

Verification and Soviet Treaty Violations

There is one final concern I wish to touch on, and that is the issue of verification and Soviet treaty violations. This continues to be a perplexing and frustrating topic. It is one of those curious questions in life on which a great many people seem somehow to suspend their common sense. Imaginative energies have been expended over the past several years in the service of exculpating Soviet violations of arms control treaties and commitments. Some of the arguments we hear are a testimony to the abiding role of absurdity in human life. As George Orwell once said, some things are so absurd only an intellectual could have thought of them.

We hear that we should not concern ourselves with the violations because they are not comprehensive. That is to say, we should not be concerned because, as yet, the Soviets have failed to violate *every* provision of the treaties. It is a statistical fact that only a tiny percentage of people in this country cheat on their income tax. It is also a fact that even these people seldom cheat on every provision of the tax code. But does anyone seriously suppose the government could forgo audits and penalties for income tax evasion—even of those who only evade a few provisions of the code—without a total breakdown of the system? Why should we have a lower standard of compliance in an area vital to our national security than we do in our own tax system?

We also hear that the arms control violations are not "serious." How serious do they have to be? The Soviets have built a new large phased-array radar in Siberia with a location and orientation explicitly forbidden by the ABM [Anti-Ballistic Missile] Treaty. Hundreds of hours were expended negotiating this treaty provision. Violation of this provision strikes at the heart of the ABM Treaty. The Soviets have tested and are now deploying a second new ballistic missile in violation of SALT II. What is SALT II's primary function other than to limit missiles? How serious do the violations have to be? Must we have a total debacle, must we have a total disaster on our hands, before anyone is roused to act? The fact is that violations of arms control treaties are likely to begin in small ways, just as festering wounds begin as small inflammations. Do we neglect to treat such wounds until there is evidence of gangrene—for fear that the antiseptic will sting?

The basic point is this. The Soviets, as good Marxist-Leninists, respect treaties only so long as they reflect the real relations of power in the world. Violations are a sign of declining respect—the surest sign we have that the arms control process is weakening, that it is losing out to more aggressive impulses. It is imperative, for the sake of arms control, that we make it clear to the Soviets that a record of strict and

literal compliance is essential to continuation of the arms control process. If our message is to get through to Soviet leaders, it must have public support.

Conclusion

Arms control is never easy; it is never a risk-free business, especially for a democracy. One reason it is difficult is that it demands contradictory qualities: it demands that we keep realism and tough-mindedness alive amid hope. I sometimes think that nothing has proved so fatal to the arms control enterprise over the years as its moments of success—for precisely at such moments we are inclined to forget the safeguards, the caution, and the resolve necessary both to obtain and to preserve success.

At the present moment, we will be tempted to yield to optimism. But let us never forget that the preservation of optimism demands that we not be overcome by it, that we keep our wits about us, that in this new atmosphere of seeming amity, we keep alive the awareness of our principles and our strengths. ■

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It would seem that this Soviet position was based on the assumption—or at least the hope—that we might be prevailed upon to abandon our SDI—that, at bottom, we were not all that serious about strategic defense research. This, I think it is fair to say, is a bad miscalculation—a miscalculation that the Geneva meeting may have moved to dispel. Real progress will not be possible until the Soviets recognize that their sweeping and unverifiable demand for an end to U.S. research on strategic defense has not the slightest chance of being met. That's a fact. The sooner the Soviets grasp it, the sooner we can move out on arms control.

The Current Negotiations

There are signs—small signs, tentative signs—that this may already be happening, though we still have a long way to go. Nonetheless, at the summit conference, Mr. Gorbachev did seem to imply, in a new departure from the old Soviet position, that a new arms agreement might permit some U.S. intermediate-range systems to remain in Europe. He also suggested that an agreement on intermediate-range forces might be possible without direct linkage to space and strategic armaments. This constitutes progress, for it means that an agreement on intermediate-range missiles is no longer held hostage by the Soviets to an unverifiable ban on strategic defense research.

Now the same should apply to the START [strategic arms reduction talks] negotiations on long-range strategic systems—that these issues, too, can be considered on their own merits. Such would constitute a major step in the upcoming round IV and be a major move to open real progress. We hope the Soviets will move to such a position.

The Soviets have also said, again for the first time over the past months, that they accept our basic principle of deep cuts—beginning with 50% reductions, appropriately applied, in nuclear forces. This new departure comes with a twist; for there is a major discrepancy here between the headline message of public relations and the fine print of actual negotiations.

As anyone who has looked closely at the current Soviet proposals is aware, they are absurdly one-sided. They include as “strategic” a number of intermediate-range systems on our side, while excluding over 2,000 obviously comparable systems on the Soviet side. Thus, the new Soviet proposal includes all U.S. nuclear systems deployed to

protect our allies in Europe and excludes all Soviet systems that threaten our allies—both in Europe and Asia. In particular, the Soviets' proposal attempts to include our so-called forward-based systems in Europe. This is a retrogressive step, which takes us back to 1970, when the Soviets tried to include “forward-based systems” in the SALT I talks.

Progress in SALT I, as the Soviets were well aware, hinged on moving beyond this one-sided position. To return now to the opening negotiating positions of 1970 tends to make mockery of the notion of “progress” in arms control, of the notion that we are in a position to build on past achievements. So there has been a large dose of propaganda and a correspondingly large dose of retrogression in recent Soviet proposals.

But the Soviets have made unreasonable demands before, and they have eventually abandoned them—once it became clear that such proposals have no chance of being met.

Take INF [intermediate-range nuclear forces], for example. In 1977, the Soviet Union began to deploy, unprovoked, a new generation of powerful intermediate-range missiles in Europe—the SS-20s. In 1979, NATO attempted to meet this threat with a “dual-track” decision to try to negotiate a new arms agreement and, if necessary, to deploy American Pershing and cruise missiles in response. While the NATO nations were debating this proposal, the Soviets said that if the dual-track decision were adopted, they would simply refuse to negotiate. The dual-track decision was adopted, and by June 1980, the Soviets had reversed themselves and had come to the negotiating table. In 1983, when the first American missiles were deployed in Europe, the Soviets left the table and declared they would never return so long as the missiles remained in Europe. Well, the missiles are in Europe, and they are back negotiating, even coming up with a proposal enabling us to keep some INF systems deployed in Europe.

Despite enormous pressures, we held firm on INF, insisting upon agreements that respected the needs of both sides. Indeed, arms control agreements must be good for each side or they are good for nothing. In the process, we proved the bond among NATO countries to be far stronger than many skeptics supposed. We also brought the

Soviet Union back to the bargaining table. There is little doubt that the improvement in relations now is a reward for our resolution then.

Much of our current task in negotiations is to persuade the Soviets that their more one-sided and unreasonable proposals have no chance of being met. More than that, we must persuade them that they have nothing to gain by sticking to one-sided and unreasonable proposals, that they will not be rewarded in the West for taking such positions.

One form of reward is press and media coverage. If the Soviets know that they gain a page one story in the West and a spot on network news by advancing a completely unreasonable and one-sided position, they will be sorely tempted to do so. If, on the other hand, they understand that such propaganda maneuvers will be relegated to page 13, then the incentive to put such propagandistic proposals forward is weakened.

There is one other pitfall we must avoid—the perennial folly of assuming that unilateral concessions and restraints on our part will inspire reciprocal restraints on the Soviet side. This approach to arms control has a very bad record—the examples are too numerous to cite here. Unilateral cancellations on our part result in unilateral advantages on their part. Our capacity to assure our national security and to succeed on arms control is contingent upon, and underwritten by, our strength and resolve and by our ability to convey these to the Soviet leadership. Remove the threat of American force modernization, remove the advance of America's ability to deter and to seek new means of deterrence, and you have removed part of our safety and our incentive for arms control. If we show a lack of resolve, vacillation, and an unwillingness to stand firm on these key measures of will, the Soviets will not need bilateral arms control. They will be able to sit back and watch us unilaterally disarm ourselves. For they take such cancellations not as a sign of good will but as a sign of lack of will.

This is not a pleasant truth. It is not as pleasing as the quasi-Quandian notion that our example of self-restraint will inspire corresponding self-restraint in Soviet leaders; but it is a fact of life. And what I say applies quite directly to the ASAT [anti-satellite systems] testing ban now enforced by Congress. Such bans have the effect simply of removing the incentive for negotiation of shrinking the realm in which the writ of arms control may run. They are bad for genuine arms control.

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SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCE DEVELOPMENTS

TESTIMONY BEFORE A JOINT SESSION OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE
ON STRATEGIC AND THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES OF THE
SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

AND

THE DEFENSE SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

JUNE 26, 1985

BY

ROBERT M. GATES
CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, AND
DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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I. Introduction

By the mid-1990s, nearly all of the Soviets' currently deployed intercontinental nuclear attack forces--land- and sea-based ballistic missiles and heavy bombers--will be replaced by new and improved systems. New mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and a variety of cruise missiles are about to enter the force. The number of deployed strategic force warheads will increase by a few thousand over the next five years, with the potential for greater expansion in the 1990s. We are concerned about the Soviets' longstanding commitment to strategic defense, including an extensive program to protect their leadership, their potential to deploy widespread defenses against ballistic missiles, and their extensive efforts in directed-energy weapons technologies, particularly high-energy lasers. Their vigorous effort in strategic force research, development, and deployment is not new, but is the result of an unswerving commitment for the past two decades to build up and improve their strategic force capabilities.

Soviet leaders are attempting to prepare their military forces for the possibility that they will actually have to fight a nuclear war. They have seriously addressed many of the problems of conducting military operations in a nuclear war, thereby improving their ability to deal with the many contingencies of such a conflict.

We judge that the Soviets would plan to conduct a military campaign that would seek to end a nuclear war on their terms--by neutralizing the ability of US intercontinental and theater nuclear forces to interfere with Soviet capabilities to prevail in a conflict in Eurasia.

II. Strategic Offensive Forces

The most notable recent trend in offensive forces is the construction of bases for mobile strategic missiles--SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) and new ICBMs:

- During 1984, the Soviets embarked on an unprecedented program for constructing new SS-20 bases, starting more new bases than in any previous year.
- The Soviets have made major strides in preparing for the deployment of their two new mobile ICBMs--the road-mobile SS-X-25 and the rail-mobile SS-X-24. The Soviets' commitment to deploy mobile ICBMs represents a major resource decision; such systems require substantially more support infrastructure than do silo-based systems, and thus are much more costly to operate and maintain.

All elements of Soviet strategic offensive forces will be extensively modernized by the mid-1990s, as the result of programs that have been in train for many years. While the Soviets will continue to rely on fixed, silo-based

ICBMs, mobile ICBMs will be deployed in large numbers (see figure 1), and major improvements will be made to the sea-based and bomber forces. The major changes in the force will include:

- An improved capability against hardened targets. The Soviets already have enough hard-target-capable ICBM reentry vehicles today to attack all US ICBM silos and launch control centers and will have larger numbers of hard-target-capable RVs in the future. In such an attack today, they would stand a good chance of destroying Minuteman silos. The projected accuracy improvements for the new heavy ICBM we expect the Soviets to deploy in the late 1980s would result in a substantial increase in this damage capability.
- Significantly better survivability from improvements in the submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) force--through quieter submarines and longer range missiles--and deployment of mobile ICBMs. Today, a large part of the Soviet silo-based ICBM force would survive an attack by US forces. However, with the increasing vulnerability of Soviet ICBM silos in the next ten years if more accurate US missiles are deployed, the Soviets will increasingly depend on the survivability of their mobile ICBM and SLBM forces.
- A substantial increase in the number of deliverable warheads for the bomber force as a result of the deployment of new bombers with long-range, land-attack cruise missiles.

ICBMs

Chart 1 shows new Soviet strategic ballistic missiles, land- and sea-based, and submarines--those recently deployed or now in testing and those we expect to see tested over the next five years.

The ICBM force, as shown in figure 2, will have been almost entirely replaced with new systems by the mid-1990s:

- The Soviets are preparing to deploy the SS-X-24 ICBM in silos in 1986 and on rail-mobile launchers in 1987. We expect SS-X-24-class ICBMs equipped with 10 multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) to replace the MIRVed SS-17 and SS-19 silo-based ICBMs, which carry fewer warheads.
- The Soviets have started to retire older silo-based single-RV SS-11s as they prepare to deploy the single-RV road-mobile SS-X-25. We expect the SS-X-25 to be operational by late 1985.
- We expect at least three new ICBMs will be flight-tested in the 1986-90 time period:
 - A new silo-based heavy ICBM, to replace the SS-18.
 - A new version of the SS-X-24.

- A new version of the mobile SS-X-25, which could have a MIRVed payload option.

SS-20s

The SS-20 force of intermediate-range ballistic missiles is expected to expand to over 450 deployed launchers by 1987, as a result of an extensive program of constructing new bases. More new bases were started in 1984 than in any previous year. The total would have been considerably higher if the Soviets had not deactivated SS-20 bases in the central USSR to convert to SS-X-25 ICBM bases. A follow-on to the SS-20, which also carries three warheads and is probably designed to improve lethality, began flight-testing in 1984.

SLBMs

An extensive modernization program will result in replacement of the entire MIRVed Soviet SLBM force and deployment of much better nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). The major changes, as shown in figure 3, will include:

- Deployment of Delta-IV and additional Typhoon SSBNs. These boats have improvements that will contribute to their survivability. In addition, a new class of submarines is likely to enter the force in the early 1990s.
- Deployment of the new SS-NX-23 SLBM beginning in late 1985 or early 1986 on Delta-IVs and on Delta-IIIs. The increased range of the SS-NX-23, relative to that of the SS-N-18 missile currently on Delta-IIIs, will make SS-NX-23-equipped SSBNs more survivable because they will be able to operate closer to Soviet shores, where the Soviet Navy can better protect them.
- A replacement for the SS-N-20 on Typhoon SSBNs will probably be flight-tested in late 1985 or 1986, and a missile in the SS-NX-23 class will probably be tested later in the 1980s.

Heavy Bombers

Chart 2 shows new Soviet strategic bombers and a variety of new long-range, land-attack cruise missiles.

The Soviet heavy bomber force is undergoing its first major modernization since the 1960s; by the mid-1990s, as shown in figure 4, most of the older bombers will have been replaced. The heavy bomber force will have a greater role in intercontinental attack:

- The AS-15 air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) became operational on newly produced Bear H aircraft in 1984. By using newly produced aircraft of an old design, the Soviets were able to deploy ALCMs at least four years earlier than if they had waited for the new Blackjack bomber.

- We project Blackjack will be operational in 1988 or 1989, carrying both ALCMs and bombs.

Cruise Missiles

The ALCM is the first in a series of deployments of long-range, land-attack cruise missiles. Over the next 10 years, we expect them to deploy 2,000 to 3,000 nuclear-armed ALCMs, sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs), and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs). The deployment of cruise missiles provides the Soviets with new multidirectional capabilities against US targets.

Growth of Intercontinental Attack Forces

The projected growth in the number of deployed warheads on Soviet intercontinental attack forces, under various assumptions, is shown in figure 5:

- The force currently consists of over 9,000 deployed warheads on some 2,500 deployed ballistic missile launchers and heavy bombers. Most warheads are in the ICBM force.
- Warheads are increasing: new Soviet Typhoon and Delta-IV submarines, Bear H bombers, and SS-X-24 ICBMs will carry many more warheads than the systems they are replacing.
- By 1990, if the Soviets continue to have about 2,500 missile launchers and heavy bombers and if they are within the quantitative sublimits of SALT II, the deployed warheads will grow to over 12,000.
- The 1983 Soviet proposal at the strategic arms reduction talks (START) would also result in an expansion in the number of warheads, although under its limits the Soviets would have about 1,000 fewer by 1990 than under SALT II limits.
- The effect of the 1983 US START proposal would be to reverse this trend and, by the 1990s, lead to substantial reductions.
- While the Soviets would not necessarily expand their intercontinental attack forces beyond some 12,000 to 13,000 warheads in the absence of arms control constraints, they clearly have the capability for significant further expansion, to between 16,000 and 21,000 deployed warheads by the mid-1990s. The lower figure represents a continuation of recent trends in deployment rates; the upper figure is not a maximum effort but would require a substantially greater commitment of resources.

The Soviets will face important decisions in the next few years, as they proceed with flight-testing the ballistic missiles which are scheduled to begin deployment in the late 1980s and early 1990s. (See Chart 1) Specifically, they have technical options to test new ICBMs in such a way as to conform with, or exceed, the limitations on characteristics and improvements in the unratified SALT II Treaty.

III. Strategic Defense

Soviet active and passive strategic defenses, while unable to prevent large-scale damage from a major attack, are intended to provide a degree of protection for the leadership, military, and military-related facilities necessary for wartime operations. The Soviets will significantly improve the capabilities of their strategic defenses over the next 10 years, as a number of new types of weapons are introduced and many of the older systems retired. Significant developments include the following:

Ballistic Missile Defense

- The Soviets have actively engaged in antiballistic missile (ABM) research, development, and deployment programs for many years.
- When completed by about 1987, the improved Moscow ABM system will consist of 100 silo-based high acceleration missiles and modified Galosh interceptors, providing an improved intercept capability against small-scale attacks on key targets around Moscow.
- By the end of the decade, when a new network of large phased-array radars (including the Krasnoyarsk radar) is expected to be fully operational, the Soviets will have a much improved capability for ballistic missile early warning, attack assessment, and accurate target tracking. These radars will be technically capable of providing battle management support to a widespread ABM system, but there are uncertainties about whether the Soviets would rely on these radars to support a widespread ABM deployment.
- The SA-X-12 system, to be deployed in the Soviet ground forces in 1985-86, can engage conventional aircraft, cruise missiles, and tactical ballistic missiles. It could have capabilities to intercept some types of US strategic ballistic missile RVs. Its technical capabilities bring to the forefront the problem that improving technology is blurring the distinction between air defense and ABM systems. This problem will be further complicated as newer, more complex air defense missile systems are developed.

We are particularly concerned that the Soviets' continuing development efforts give them the potential for widespread ABM deployments. The Soviets have the major components for an ABM system that could be used for widespread ABM deployments well in excess of ABM Treaty limits. The components include radars, an aboveground launcher, and the high acceleration missile that will be deployed around Moscow. The potential exists for the production lines associated with the upgrade of the Moscow ABM system to be used to support a

widespread deployment. We judge they could undertake rapidly paced ABM deployments to strengthen the defenses at Moscow and cover key targets in the western USSR, and to extend protection to key targets east of the Urals, by the early 1990s. In contemplating such a deployment, however, the Soviets will have to weigh the military advantages they would see in such defenses, against the disadvantages of such a move, particularly the responses by the United States and its Allies.

Air Defense

Deployment of new low-altitude-capable strategic air defense systems will increase. (See figure 6.) The Soviets are continuing to deploy the new SA-10 all-altitude surface-to-air missile (SAM), are deploying new aircraft with much better capabilities against low-flying targets, and will deploy the Mainstay airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft in 1985. Penetration of Soviet air defenses by currently deployed bombers would be more difficult as improved systems are deployed. These defenses, however, would be considerably less effective against US cruise missiles. Against a combined attack of penetrating bombers and cruise missiles, Soviet air defenses during the next 10 years probably would not be capable of inflicting sufficient losses to prevent large-scale damage to the USSR. We judge, however, that the Soviets will be able to provide an increasingly capable air defense for many key leadership, control, and military and industrial installations essential to wartime operations.

Antisubmarine Warfare

The Soviets still lack effective means to locate US ballistic missile submarines at sea. We expect them to continue to pursue vigorously all antisubmarine warfare (ASW) technologies as potential solutions to the problems of countering US SSBNs and defending their own SSBNs against US attack submarines. We are concerned about the energetic Soviet ASW research and technology efforts. However, we do not believe there is a realistic possibility that the Soviets will be able to deploy in the 1990s a system that could pose any significant threat to US SSBNs on patrol.

Leadership Protection

The Soviets have a large program to provide protection for their leadership. We judge that, with as little as a few hours' warning, a large percentage of the wartime management structure would survive the initial effects of a large-scale US nuclear attack. We estimate there are at least 800, perhaps as many as 1,500, relocation facilities for leaders at the national and regional levels. Deep underground facilities for the top national leadership might enable the top leadership to survive--a key objective of their wartime management plans.

IV. Command and Control Considerations

While significant improvements in the capabilities of both Soviet and US strategic offensive forces will occur throughout the next 10 years, sizable forces on both sides would survive large-scale nuclear strikes. The Soviets' confidence in their capabilities for global conflict and in their ability to limit damage to the Soviet Union would be affected to a large extent by command and control considerations--the need for continuity in their own command and control capabilities, and their prospects for disrupting and destroying the ability of the United States and its Allies to command and to operate their forces.

--Although US attacks could destroy many known fixed command, control, and communications facilities, the Soviets' emphasis in this area has resulted in their having many key hardened facilities and redundant means of communications; thus, it seems highly likely that the Soviets could maintain overall continuity of command and control, although it would probably be degraded and they could experience difficulty in maintaining endurance.

--We believe the Soviets would launch continuing attacks on US and Allied strategic command, control, and communications to try to prevent or impair the coordination of retaliatory strikes, thereby easing the burden on Soviet strategic defenses, and impairing US and Allied abilities to marshal military and civilian resources to reconstitute forces. While the Soviets would devote substantial efforts to this mission, they probably are not confident that they could accomplish these objectives.

V. Space Program

The vigorous Soviet space program is predominantly military in nature. More than 70 percent of Soviet space missions are for military purposes only, with much of the rest serving a dual military-civil function. The Soviets view space as an integral part of their overall offensive and defensive force structure, not as a separate arena or as a sanctuary. While the Soviets seek to be able to deny enemy use of space in wartime, current Soviet antisatellite capabilities are limited and fall short of meeting this apparent requirement. Today, in addition to the dedicated nonnuclear orbital interceptor, other systems--the nuclear Galosh ABM interceptor and two ground-based high-energy lasers--have the potential to destroy or interfere with some satellites in near-Earth orbit, but the potential threat to satellites in higher orbit is limited. It is likely that the Soviets would attempt to destroy or interfere with US satellites during an intense conventional conflict, and in the initial stages of a nuclear war. These capabilities, however, would not survive a nuclear attack. Some improvements in Soviet antisatellite capabilities are expected.

VI. Directed-Energy and Hypervelocity Kinetic-Energy Weapons

Directed-energy and kinetic-energy weapons potentially could be developed for several strategic weapons applications--antisatellite (ASAT), air defense, battlefield use, and, in the longer term, ballistic missile defense (BMD).

There is strong evidence of Soviet efforts to develop high-energy laser weapons, and these efforts have been taking place, in some cases, since the 1960s:

- We estimate a laser weapon program of the magnitude of the Soviet effort would cost roughly \$1 billion per year if carried out in the United States.
- Two facilities at the Saryshagan test range are assessed to have high-energy lasers with the potential to function as ASAT weapons.
- We are concerned about a large Soviet program to develop ground-based laser weapons for terminal defense against reentry vehicles. There are major uncertainties, however, concerning the feasibility and practicality of using ground-based lasers for BMD. We expect the Soviets to test the feasibility of such a system during the 1980s, probably using one of the high-energy laser facilities at Saryshagan. An operational system could not be deployed until many years later, probably not until after the year 2000.
- The Soviets appear to be developing two high-energy laser weapons with potential strategic air defense applications--ground-based and naval point defense.
- The Soviets are continuing to develop an airborne laser.
- Soviet research includes a project to develop high-energy laser weapons for use in space. A prototype high-energy, space-based laser ASAT weapon could be tested in low orbit in the early 1990s. Even if testing were successful, such a system probably could not be operational before the mid-1990s.

The Soviets are also conducting research under military sponsorship for the purpose of acquiring the ability to develop particle beam weapons (PBWs). We believe the Soviets will eventually attempt to build a space-based PBW, but the technical requirements are so severe that we estimate there is a low probability they will test a prototype before the year 2000.

The Soviets are strong in the technologies appropriate for radiofrequency (RF) weapons, which could be used to interfere with or destroy components of missiles or satellites, and we judge they are probably capable of developing a prototype RF weapon system.

We are concerned that Soviet directed-energy programs may have proceeded to the point where they could construct operational ground-based ASAT weapons.

The Soviets have expended significant resources since the 1960s in R&D on technologies with potential applications for hypervelocity kinetic-energy weapons.

VII. Resources for Projected Developments and Arms Control Considerations

Strategic offensive and defensive forces account for about one-fifth of total defense spending--about one-tenth each. The Soviets are increasing their resource commitments to their already formidable strategic forces research, development, and deployment programs. We estimate that total investment and operating expenditures for projected Soviet strategic offensive forces (intercontinental attack and intermediate range) and strategic defensive forces (assuming no widespread ABM deployments) will result in a growth in total Soviet strategic force expenditures of between 5 and 7 percent a year over the next five years. (The rate would be 7 to 10 percent if widespread ABM defenses were deployed.)

A growth rate of 5 to 7 percent a year for strategic programs, combined with the projected growth rate for nonstrategic programs of about 3 percent, would lead to a growth in total defense spending of between 3 and 4 percent per year--at the same time that we foresee sluggish growth in the Soviet economy for the rest of the decade. Increasing the share of the GNP devoted to defense will confront the Soviets with the difficult choice of reducing the growth in investment, which is critical to modernizing the industrial base, or curtailing growth in consumption, which is an important factor in the Soviet drive to improve labor productivity.

Despite serious economic problems since the mid-1970s, Soviet military procurement has been at high annual levels; in particular, the Soviets have continued to procure large quantities of new strategic weapons. Since the mid-1970s, for example, the Soviets fielded their MIRVed ICBM force, and then improved it; deployed the MIRVed SLBM force on new SSBNs; and deployed their mobile SS-20 force. In recent years the Soviets have increased their resource commitments to emerging new systems, particularly with respect to the deployment of costly mobile missile systems.

While Soviet economic problems are severe, we see no signs that the Soviets feel compelled to forgo important strategic programs or that they will make substantial concessions in arms control in order to relieve economic pressures. Soviet force decisions and arms control decisions are likely to continue to be driven by calculations of political-strategic benefits and the dynamism of weapons technology. We judge that strategic forces will continue to command the highest resource priorities and therefore would be affected less by economic problems than any other element of the Soviet military. We believe, however, that, as a result of the stark economic realities, decisions involving the rate of strategic force modernization probably will be influenced by economic factors more now than in the past and some deployment programs could be stretched out.

We believe the Soviets are determined to prevent any erosion of the military gains the USSR has made over the past decade. They recognize that new US strategic systems being deployed or under development will increase the threat to the survivability of their silo-based ICBM force, complicate their

ASW efforts, and present their air defense forces with increasingly complex problems. By their actions and propaganda, the Soviets have demonstrated they are very concerned about the US Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and its focus on advanced technology. In their view, it could force them to redirect their offensive ballistic missile development programs to reduce vulnerabilities or could stimulate a costly, open-ended high-technology competition for which they probably are concerned that the United States can outpace their own ongoing efforts. They are probably also concerned that SDI will lead to a sustained US effort in strategic defenses.

Soviet leaders view arms control policy as an important factor in advancing their strategy of achieving strategic advantage. They have been willing to negotiate restraints on force improvements and deployments when it served their interests. Moscow has long believed that arms control must first and foremost protect the capabilities of Soviet military forces relative to their opponents. The Soviets seek to limit US force modernization through both the arms control process and any resulting agreements. A salient feature of Soviet arms control policy will be its emphasis on trying to limit US ballistic missile defense and space warfare capabilities. The Soviets will try to use arms control discussions as a means of delaying or undercutting the US SDI program.

Soviet Noncompliance With Arms Control Agreements

December 1985



United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.

Following is the President's unclassified report on Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements along with his letter of transmittal to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the President of the Senate on December 23, 1985.

Transmittal Letter

Dear Mr. Speaker (Dear Mr. President):

In response to Congressional requests as set forth in Public Law 99-145, I am forwarding herewith classified and unclassified versions of the Administration's report to the Congress on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements.

Detailed classified briefings will be available to the Congress early in the new year.

I believe the additional information provided, and issues addressed, especially in the detailed classified report, will significantly increase understanding of Soviet violations and probable violations. Such understanding, and strong Congressional consensus on the importance of compliance to achieving effective arms control, will do much to strengthen our efforts both in seeking corrective actions and in negotiations with the Soviet Union.

Sincerely,

RONALD REAGAN

Unclassified Report

In reporting to the Congress on February 1 of this year on Soviet non-

compliance with arms control agreements, I have stated that:

In order for arms control to have meaning and credibly contribute to national security and to global or regional stability, it is essential that all parties to agreements fully comply with them. Strict compliance with all provisions of arms control agreements is fundamental, and this Administration will not accept anything less. To do so would undermine the arms control process and damage the chances for establishing a more constructive U.S.-Soviet relationship.

I further stated that:

Soviet noncompliance is a serious matter. It calls into question important security benefits from arms control, and could create new security risks. It undermines the confidence essential to an effective arms control process in the future. With regard to the issues analyzed in the January 1984 report, the Soviet Union has thus far not provided satisfactory explanations nor undertaken corrective actions sufficient to alleviate our concerns. The United States Government has vigorously pressed, and will continue to press, these compliance issues with the Soviet Union through diplomatic channels.

The important role of treaty compliance for future arms control was recently recognized by the United Nations. On December 12, 1985, the General Assembly passed by a vote of 131-0 (with 16 abstentions) a resolution on arms control compliance which had been introduced by the United States and other co-sponsors. The resolution:

- urges all parties to arms limitation and disarmament agreements to comply with their provisions;

- calls upon those parties to consider the implications of noncompliance for international security and stability and for the prospects for further progress in the field of disarmament; and

- appeals to all U.N. members to support efforts to resolve noncompliance questions "with a view toward encouraging strict observance of the provisions subscribed to and maintaining or restoring the integrity of arms limitation or disarmament agreements."

At the request of the Congress, I have in the past two years provided three reports to the Congress on Soviet compliance issues. The first, forwarded in January 1984, reviewed seven compliance issues, concluding that the Soviet Union had, in fact, violated a number of important arms control commitments.

In September 1984 I provided, at the request of the Congress, a report on Soviet noncompliance prepared by the independent General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament. That report concluded that over a 25-year span the Soviets had violated a substantial number of arms control commitments.

In February 1985, I submitted a report to the Congress updating the Administration's January 1984 report and reviewing 13 issues that could be treated in unclassified terms and an additional group of six issues treated on a classified basis. That report discussed the pattern of Soviet arms control violations, probable violations, or ambiguous

activity in seventeen cases. The U.S. Government found seven Soviet violations, three probable violations, one likely and one potential violation. The Soviets were found to be in compliance in two other cases examined.

One of those issues, Yankee-Class submarine reconfiguration, is not addressed in the current report. While a submarine reconfigured to carry long-range cruise missiles constitutes a threat similar to that of the original SSBN, I reported in February that Soviet reconfiguration activities have not been in violation of the SALT I [strategic arms limitation talks] Interim Agreement. This issue, therefore, requires no further judgment in terms of compliance at present.

Public Law 99-145 requires the Administration to provide on an annual basis by December 1 of each year a classified and unclassified report to the Congress containing the findings of the President and any additional information necessary to keep the Congress informed on Soviet compliance with arms control agreements.

The current report responds to this Congressional requirement. It is the product of months of careful technical and legal analysis by all relevant agencies of the United States Government and represents the Administration's authoritative updated treatment of this important matter.

The current unclassified report examines one new issue and updates all of the issues studied in the classified report of February 1985, except the issue of Yankee-Class submarine reconfiguration. There are violations in nine cases. Of the nine cases involving violations, one SALT II issue—that of Soviet concealment of the association between missiles and their launchers—is examined for the first time. The Soviet Union has now also violated its commitment to the SALT I Interim Agreement through the prohibited use of remaining facilities at former SS-7 ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] sites. In addition, Soviet deployment of the SS-25 ICBM during 1985 constitutes a further violation of the SALT II prohibition on a second new type of ICBM. Several other issues involve potential, probable or likely violations.

The current unclassified report reaffirms the findings of the February 1985 classified report concerning ABM [anti-ballistic missile] issues, making public two of them for the first time. It also reaffirms the February findings concerning SALT II issues involving violations, including one concerning strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, which has not previously been made public. In two SALT II issues with respect to which the Soviets were not judged to be in

clear violation in the classified report of last February, the findings are altered or updated. These two issues are the SS-16 and an issue made public for the first time—Backfire Bomber production rate.

The Administration's most recent studies support its conclusion that there is a pattern of Soviet noncompliance. As documented in this and previous reports, the Soviet Union has violated its legal obligation under or political commitment to the SALT I ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement, the SALT II agreement, the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, the Geneva Protocol on Chemical Weapons, and the Helsinki Final Act. In addition, the U.S.S.R. has likely violated provisions of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.

While we remain concerned about Soviet violations of Basket I of the Helsinki Final Act and the Limited Test Ban Treaty, there is no unambiguous evidence of new 1985 Soviet violations of these two treaties. With regard to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, or the Geneva Protocol on Chemical Weapons, there also is no unambiguous evidence of new 1985 Soviet lethal attacks that meets our strict standards of evidence. However, the Soviets clearly remain in violation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SOVIET NONCOMPLIANCE

Through its noncompliance, the Soviet Union has made military gains in the areas of strategic offensive arms as well as chemical, biological and toxin weapons. If the yields of Soviet nuclear tests have been substantially above 150 kilotons, then Soviet testing would allow proportionately greater gains in nuclear weapons development than the U.S. could achieve. The possible extent of the Soviet Union's military gains by virtue of its noncompliance in the area of strategic defense also is of increasing importance and serious concern.

In a fundamental sense, all deliberate Soviet violations are equally important. As violations of legal obligations or political commitments, they cause grave concern regarding Soviet commitment to arms control, and they darken the atmosphere in which current negotiations are being conducted in Geneva and elsewhere.

In another sense, Soviet violations are not of equal importance. While some individual violations are of little apparent military significance in their own

right, such violations can acquire importance if, left unaddressed, they are permitted to become precedents for future, more threatening violations. Moreover, some issues that individually have little military significance could conceivably become significant when taken in their aggregate.

The Krasnoyarsk Radar

The radar under construction near Krasnoyarsk in Siberia is disturbing for both political and military reasons. Politically, the radar demonstrates that the Soviets are capable of violating arms control obligations and commitments even when they are negotiating with the United States or when they know we will detect a violation. The 1972 ABM Treaty prohibits the Soviets from siting an ABM radar, or siting and orienting a ballistic missile detection and tracking radar, as the Krasnoyarsk radar is sited and oriented.

Militarily, the Krasnoyarsk radar violation goes to the heart of the ABM Treaty. Large phased-array radars (LPARs) like that under construction near Krasnoyarsk were recognized during the ABM Treaty negotiations as the critical, long lead-time element of a nationwide ABM defense.

When considered as a part of a Soviet network of new LPARs, the Krasnoyarsk radar has the inherent potential to contribute to ABM radar coverage of a significant portion of the central U.S.S.R. Moreover, the Krasnoyarsk radar closes the remaining gap in Soviet ballistic missile detection and tracking coverage.

ABM Territorial Defense and Other ABM Activities

The Krasnoyarsk radar appears even more menacing when considered in the context of other Soviet ABM-related activities. Together they cause concern that the Soviet Union may be preparing an ABM territorial defense. Some of these activities, such as permitted LPARs and the Moscow ABM deployment area, are consistent with the ABM Treaty. Others involve potential or probable Soviet violations or other ambiguous activity, including:

- the apparent testing and development of components required for an ABM system which could be deployed to a site in months rather than years;
- the probable concurrent testing of air defense components and ABM components;
- the development of a modern air defense system, the SA-X-12, which may have some ABM capabilities; and
- the demonstration of an ability to reload ABM launchers and to refire the

interceptor missile in a period of time shorter than previously noted.

Soviet deployment of an ABM territorial defense contrary to the ABM Treaty would have profound implications for Western security and the vital East-West strategic balance. A unilateral Soviet territorial ABM capability acquired in violation of the ABM Treaty could erode our deterrent and leave doubts about its credibility. Such a capability might encourage the Soviets to take increased risks in crises, thus degrading crisis stability.

SS-25

The SS-25, a clear and irreversible violation of the Soviet Union's SALT II commitment, also has important political and military implications. Testing and deployment of this missile violates a central provision of the SALT II Treaty, which was intended to limit the number of new ICBMs. The Treaty permits only one new type of ICBM for each Party. The Soviets have informed us that their one new type will be the SS-X-24, which is now undergoing testing, and have falsely asserted that the SS-25 is a permitted modernization of the silo-based SS-13 ICBM.

Under the pretext of permitted modernization, the Soviets, since the last compliance report, have deployed a prohibited second new type of missile, the SS-25, which is mobile and could be made more lethal. The SS-25 also could be modified to carry more than a single warhead. Most worrisome is the technical argument by which the Soviets sought to justify the SS-25, for it might be applied to additional prohibited new types of ICBMs in the future.

Telemetry Encryption and Concealment of Missile/Launcher Association

Two other Soviet violations impede our ability to verify the Soviet Union's compliance with its political commitments. Soviet use of encryption impedes U.S. verification of Soviet compliance and thus contravenes the provision of the SALT II Treaty which prohibits use of deliberate concealment measures which impede verification of compliance by national technical means. A new finding of this report is that current Soviet activities violate the provision of the Treaty which prohibits use of deliberate concealment measures associated with testing, including those measures aimed at concealing the association between ICBMs and launchers during testing. These deliberate Soviet concealment activities impede our ability to know

whether a type of missile is in compliance with SALT II requirements. They could also make it more difficult for the United States to assess accurately the critical parameters of any future missile.

Since the SALT I agreement in 1972, Soviet encryption and concealment activities have become more extensive and disturbing. These activities, Soviet responses on these issues, and Soviet failure to take the corrective actions which the United States has repeatedly requested, are indicative of a Soviet attitude contrary to the fundamentals of sound arms control agreements. Soviet encryption and concealment activities present special obstacles to maintaining existing arms control agreements, undermine the political confidence necessary for concluding new treaties, and underscore the necessity that any new agreement be effectively verifiable. Soviet noncompliance, as documented in current and past Administration reports and exemplified by the encryption and concealment issues, has made verification and compliance pacing elements of arms control today.

Chemical, Biological and Toxin Weapons

The Soviet Union's violations of its legal obligations under the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Geneva Protocol have important political and military implications. The Soviets had a program of biological and toxin weapons before they signed the multilateral Treaty. Upon signing the Treaty, the Soviets not only did not stop their illegal program but they expanded facilities and were instrumental in the use of prohibited agents.

The Soviet Union has a prohibited offensive biological warfare capability which we do not have and against which we have no defense. This capability may include advanced biological agents about which we have little knowledge. Evidence suggests that the Soviets are expanding their chemical and toxin warfare capabilities in a manner that has no parallel in NATO's retaliatory or defensive programs. Even though there has been no unambiguous evidence of lethal attacks during 1985, previous activities have provided testing, development and operational experience.

Nuclear Testing

With respect to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, Soviet testing at yields above the 150 kiloton limit would allow development of advanced nuclear weapons with proportionately higher yields than the yields of weapons that the U.S. could develop under the Treaty. The U.S. Government judges that Soviet

test activities constitute likely violations of the 150 kiloton limit.

Other Issues

Military significance is evidently not necessarily the determining factor in Soviet decisions or actions which violate their arms control commitments. The Soviet Union has also violated or probably violated arms control obligations and commitments from which at present it appears to reap little military gain. The following cases are relevant in this regard:

- the use of remaining facilities at former SS-7 ICBM sites since the February 1985 compliance report (SALT I Interim Agreement);
- exceeding the strategic nuclear delivery vehicle limits (SALT II);
- probable deployment of the SS-16 (SALT II); and
- underground nuclear test venting (Limited Test Ban Treaty).

The 1981 Soviet violation of the military exercise notification provisions of the Helsinki Final Act involved an action contrary to the confidence building measures included in that agreement.

Soviet deployments of Backfire Bombers to Arctic staging bases are inconsistent with the Soviet Union's political commitment to the SALT II Treaty. In addition, while there are ambiguities concerning the data, there is evidence that the production rate of the Backfire Bomber was constant at slightly more than 30 per year until 1984, and slightly less than 30 per year since then. These Soviet Backfire Bomber activities will continue to be monitored and assessed.

THE SOVIET RESPONSE

At the same time as the Administration has reported its concerns and findings to the Congress, the United States has had extensive exchanges with the Soviet Union on Soviet noncompliance in the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC), where SALT-related issues (including ABM issues) are discussed, and through other appropriate diplomatic channels. I expressed my personal concerns directly to General Secretary Gorbachev during my recent meeting with him in Geneva.

All of the violations, probable violations and ambiguous situations included in this report and previously reported on have been raised with the Soviets, except certain sensitive issues. The Soviet Union has thus far not provided explanations sufficient to alleviate our concerns on these issues, nor has the Soviet Union taken actions needed to

correct existing violations. Instead, they have continued to assert that they are in complete compliance with their arms control obligations and commitments.

U.S. POLICY

In contrast with the Soviet Union, the United States has fully observed its arms control obligations and commitments, including those under the SALT I and SALT II agreements. As I stated in my message to the Congress on June 10 of this year concerning U.S. interim restraint policy:

In 1982, on the eve of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), I decided that the United States would not undercut the expired SALT I agreement or the unratified SALT II agreement as long as the Soviet Union exercised equal restraint. Despite my serious reservations about the inequities of the SALT I agreement and the serious flaws of the SALT II agreement, I took this action in order to foster an atmosphere of mutual restraint conducive to serious negotiation as we entered START.

Since then, the United States has not taken any actions which would undercut existing arms control agreements. The United States has fully kept its part of the bargain. However, the Soviets have not. They have failed to comply with several provisions of SALT II, and we have serious concerns regarding their compliance with the provisions of other accords.

The pattern of Soviet violations, if left uncorrected, undercuts the integrity and viability of arms control as an instrument to assist in ensuring a secure and stable future world. The United States will continue to pursue vigorously with the Soviet Union the resolution of our concerns over Soviet non-compliance. We cannot impose upon ourselves a double standard that amounts to unilateral treaty compliance.

On June 10, I invited the Soviet Union to join the United States in an interim framework of truly mutual restraint on strategic offensive arms and to pursue with renewed vigor our top priority of achieving deep reductions in the size of existing nuclear arsenals in the ongoing negotiations in Geneva. I noted that the U.S. cannot establish such a framework alone and that it would require the Soviet Union to take positive, concrete steps to correct its noncompliance, to resolve our other compliance concerns, to reverse its unparalleled and unwarranted military buildup, and actively to pursue arms reduction agreements in the Geneva negotiations.

In going the extra mile, I have made clear that as an integral part of this policy, we will also take those steps required to assure our national security and that of our Allies that were made necessary by Soviet noncompliance.

Thus, as I indicated to the Congress on June 10, "appropriate and proportionate responses to Soviet noncompliance are called for to ensure our security, to provide incentives to the Soviets to correct their noncompliance, and to make it clear to Moscow that violations of arms control obligations entail real costs."

As we monitor Soviet actions for evidence of the positive, concrete steps needed on their part to correct these activities, I have directed the Department of Defense to conduct a comprehensive assessment aimed at identifying specific actions that the United States could take to augment as necessary the U.S. strategic modernization program as a proportionate response to, and as a hedge against the military consequences of those Soviet violations of existing arms control agreements which the Soviets fail to correct. We will carefully study this report as soon as it has been completed.

As we press for corrective Soviet actions and while keeping open all programmatic options for handling future milestones as new U.S. strategic systems are deployed, we will continue to assess the overall situation in light of Soviet actions correcting their non-compliance, reversing their military buildup, and promoting progress in Geneva.

I look forward to continued close consultation with the Congress as we seek to make progress in resolving compliance issues and in negotiating sound arms control agreements.

The findings on Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements follow.

THE FINDINGS

Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty

Treaty Status

The 1972 ABM Treaty and its Protocol ban deployment of ABM systems except that each party is permitted to deploy one ABM system around the national capital area or, alternatively, at a single ICBM deployment area. The ABM Treaty is in force and is of indefinite duration. Soviet actions not in accord with the ABM Treaty are, therefore, violations of a legal obligation.

1. The Krasnoyarsk Radar

- **Obligation:** To preclude creation of a base for territorial ABM defense, the ABM Treaty provides that radars for early warning of ballistic missile attack may be deployed only at locations

along the periphery of the national territory of each party and that they be oriented outward. The Treaty permits deployment (without regard to location or orientation) of large phased-array radars for purposes of tracking objects in outer space or for use as national technical means of verification of compliance with arms control agreements.

- **Issue:** The January 1984 and February 1985 reports examined the issue of whether the Krasnoyarsk radar meets the provisions of the ABM Treaty governing phased-array radars. This report reexamines this issue.

- **Finding:** The U.S. Government reaffirms the conclusion in the February 1985 report that the new large phased-array radar under construction at Krasnoyarsk constitutes a violation of legal obligations under the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 in that in its associated siting, orientation, and capability, it is prohibited by this Treaty. Continuing construction and the absence of credible alternative explanations have reinforced our assessment of its purpose. Despite U.S. requests, no corrective action has been taken. This and other ABM-related Soviet activities suggest that the U.S.S.R. may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.

2. Mobility of ABM System Components

- **Obligation:** The ABM Treaty prohibits the development, testing or deployment of mobile land-based ABM systems or components.

- **Issue:** The February 1985 report examined whether the Soviet Union has developed a mobile land-based ABM system, or components for such a system, in violation of its legal obligation under the ABM Treaty. This report reexamines this issue.

- **Finding:** The U.S. Government judges that the evidence on Soviet actions with respect to ABM component mobility is ambiguous, but that the U.S.S.R.'s development and testing of components of an ABM system, which apparently are designed to be deployable at sites requiring relatively limited site preparation, represent a potential violation of its legal obligation under the ABM Treaty. This and other ABM-related Soviet activities suggest that the U.S.S.R. may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.

3. Concurrent Testing of ABM and Air Defense Components

- **Obligation:** The ABM Treaty and its Protocol limit the Parties to one ABM deployment area. In addition to the ABM systems and components at

that one deployment area, the Parties may have ABM systems and components for development and testing purposes so long as they are located at agreed test ranges. The Treaty also prohibits giving components, other than ABM system components, the capability to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory" and prohibits the Parties from testing them in "an ABM mode." The Parties agreed that the concurrent testing of SAM [surface-to-air missile] and ABM system components is prohibited.

- **Issue:** The February 1985 compliance report examined whether the Soviet Union has concurrently tested SAM and ABM system components in violation of its legal obligation since 1978 not to do so. It was the purpose of that obligation to further constrain testing of air defense systems in an ABM mode. This report reexamines this issue.

- **Finding:** The U.S. Government reaffirms the judgment made in the February 1985 report that the evidence of Soviet actions with respect to concurrent operations is insufficient fully to assess compliance with Soviet obligations under the ABM Treaty. However, the Soviet Union has conducted tests that have involved air defense radars in ABM-related activities. The large number, and consistency over time, of incidents of concurrent operation of ABM and SAM components, plus Soviet failure to accommodate fully U.S. concerns, indicate the U.S.S.R. probably has violated the prohibition on testing SAM components in an ABM mode. In several cases this may be highly probable. This and other ABM-related activities suggest the U.S.S.R. may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.

4. ABM Capability of Modern SAM Systems

- **Obligation:** Under the ABM Treaty, each party undertakes not to give non-ABM interceptor missiles, launchers or radars "capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, and not to test them in an ABM mode. . . ."

- **Issue:** The February 1985 classified report examined whether the Soviet Union has tested a SAM system or component in an ABM mode or given it the capability to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory in violation of their legal obligation under the ABM Treaty. This report reexamines this issue.

- **Finding:** The U.S. Government reaffirms the judgment made in the

February 1985 report that the evidence of Soviet actions with respect to SAM upgrade is insufficient to assess compliance with the Soviet Union's obligations under the ABM Treaty. However, this and other ABM-related Soviet activities suggest that the U.S.S.R. may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.

5. Rapid Reload of ABM Launchers

- **Obligation:** The ABM Treaty limits to 100 the number of deployed ABM interceptor launchers and deployed interceptor missiles. It does not limit the number of interceptor missiles that can be built and stockpiled. The Treaty prohibits the development, testing or deployment of "automatic or semi-automatic or other similar systems for rapid reload" of the permitted launchers.

- **Issue:** The February 1985 classified report examined whether the Soviet Union has developed, tested or deployed automatic, semi-automatic, or other similar systems for rapid reload of ABM launchers in violation of its legal obligation under the ABM Treaty. This report reexamines this issue.

- **Finding:** The U.S. Government judges, on the basis of the evidence available, that the U.S.S.R.'s actions with respect to the rapid reload of ABM launchers constitute an ambiguous situation as concerns its legal obligations under the ABM Treaty not to develop systems for rapid reload. The Soviet Union's reload capabilities are a serious concern. These and other ABM-related activities suggest that the U.S.S.R. may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.

6. ABM Territorial Defense

- **Obligation:** The ABM Treaty allows each party a single operational site, explicitly permits modernization and replacement of ABM systems or their components, and explicitly recognizes the existence of ABM test ranges for the development and testing of ABM components. The ABM Treaty prohibits, however, the deployment of an ABM system for defense of the national territory of the parties and prohibits the parties from providing a base for such a defense.

- **Issue:** The February 1985 report examined whether the Soviets have deployed an ABM system for the defense of their territory or provided a base for such a defense. This report reexamines this issue.

- **Finding:** The U.S. Government judges that the aggregate of the Soviet Union's ABM and ABM-related actions

(e.g., radar construction, concurrent testing, SAM upgrade, ABM rapid reload and ABM mobility) suggests that the U.S.S.R. may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.

SALT II Treaty

Treaty Status

SALT II was signed in June 1979 and has not been ratified. In 1981 the United States made clear to the Soviet Union its intention not to ratify the SALT II Treaty. Prior to this clarification of our position in 1981, both nations were obligated under customary international law not to take actions which would defeat the object and purpose of the signed, but unratified, Treaty. Such Soviet actions prior to 1981 are violations of legal obligations. Since 1981, the United States has observed a political commitment to refrain from actions that undercut the SALT II Treaty so long as the Soviet Union does likewise. The Soviets have told us they also would abide by these provisions. Soviet actions inconsistent with this commitment are violations of their political commitment with respect to the SALT II Treaty.

1. The SS-25 ICBM

- **Obligation:** In an attempt to constrain the modernization and the proliferation of new, more capable types of ICBMs, the provisions of SALT II permit each side to "flight test and deploy" just one new type of "light" ICBM. A new type is defined as one that differs from an existing type by more than 5 percent in length, largest diameter, launch-weight or throw-weight or differs in number of stages or propellant type. In addition, it was agreed that no ICBM of an existing type with a post-boost vehicle and a single reentry vehicle would be flight-tested or deployed whose reentry vehicle weight is less than 50 percent of the throw-weight of that ICBM. This latter provision was intended to prohibit the possibility that single warhead ICBMs could quickly be converted to MIRVed systems.

- **Issues:** The January 1984 and February 1985 reports examined the evidence: whether the Soviets have tested or deployed a second new type of ICBM (the SS-25) which is prohibited; whether the reentry vehicle (RV) on that missile, if it is not a new type, is in compliance with the provision that for existing types of single RV missiles, the weight of the RV be equal to at least 50 percent of total throw-weight; and

whether encryption of SS-25 flight test telemetry impedes verification. This report reexamines these issues.

• **Findings:**

a. *Second New Type—Testing and Deployment:* The U.S. Government judges, based on convincing evidence about the SS-25, that the throw-weight of the Soviet SS-25 ICBM exceeds by more than 5 percent the throw-weight of the Soviet SS-13 ICBM and cannot therefore be considered a permitted modernization of the SS-13 as the Soviets claim. The SS-25 is a prohibited second “new type” of ICBM and its testing, in addition to the testing of the SS-X-24 ICBM, thereby is a violation of the Soviet Union’s political commitment to observe the “new type” provision of the SALT II Treaty. The deployment of this missile during 1985 constitutes a further violation of the SALT II prohibition on a second “new type” of ICBM.

b. *RV-to-Throw-weight Ratio:* The U.S. Government reaffirms the conclusion of the January 1984 report regarding the SS-25 RV-to-throw-weight ratio. That is, if we were to accept the Soviet argument that the SS-25 is not a prohibited “new type” of ICBM, it would be a violation of their political commitment to observe the SALT II provision which prohibits the testing of such an existing ICBM with a single reentry vehicle whose weight is less than 50 percent of the throw-weight of the ICBM.

c. *Encryption:* The U.S. Government reaffirms its judgment made in the January 1984 report regarding telemetry encryption during tests of the SS-25. Encryption during tests of this missile is illustrative of the deliberate impeding of verification of compliance in violation of the U.S.S.R.’s political commitment.

Despite U.S. requests for explanations and corrective actions with regard to the SS-25 ICBM-related activities, Soviet actions continue unchanged, and the Soviet Union has proceeded to deployment of this missile.

2. Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicle Limits

• **Obligation:** The Soviet Union’s political commitment to abide by SALT II is interpreted by the U.S. Government as including an obligation not to increase the number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs) in its arsenal. The Soviet Union had 2,504 SNDVs when it signed SALT II.

• **Issue:** The February 1985 classified report examined the issue of whether the Soviet Union has abided by its commitment not to exceed the level of 2,504 SNDVs. This report reexamines this issue.

• **Finding:** The U.S. Government interprets the Soviet commitment to abide by SALT II as including the existence of a cap on SNDVs—at a level of 2,504 existing at the time SALT II was signed. The Soviet Union has deployed SNDVs above the 2,504 cap in violation of its political commitment under SALT II. Such activity is indicative of a Soviet policy inconsistent with this political commitment.

3. SS-16 Deployment

• **Obligation:** The Soviet Union agreed in SALT II not to produce, test or deploy ICBMs of the SS-16 type and, in particular, not to produce the SS-16 third stage or the reentry vehicle of that missile.

• **Issue:** The January 1984 and February 1985 reports examined the evidence regarding whether the Soviets have deployed the SS-16 ICBM in spite of the ban on its deployment. This report reexamines this issue.

• **Finding:** The President’s February 1985 Report to Congress which noted that the evidence is somewhat ambiguous and we cannot reach a definitive conclusion, found the activities at Plesetsk to be a probable violation of the U.S.S.R.’s legal obligation and political commitment under SALT II. Soviet activity in the past year at Plesetsk seems to indicate the probable removal of SS-16 equipment and introduction of equipment associated with a different ICBM.

4. Backfire Bomber Intercontinental Operating Capability

• **Obligation:** At the signing of SALT II, the U.S.S.R. gave the U.S. assurances about the BACKFIRE bomber’s intercontinental operating capability. The Soviet statement of June 16, 1979, read, in pertinent part, as follows:

The Soviet side informs the US side that the Soviet “Tu-22M” airplane, called “BACKFIRE” in the USA, is a medium-range bomber, and that it does not intend to give this airplane the capability of operating at intercontinental distances. In this connection, the Soviet side states that it will not increase the radius of action of this airplane in such a way as to enable it to strike targets on the territory of the USA. Nor does it intend to give it such a capability in any other manner, including by in-flight refueling. . . .

This unilateral statement is an integral part of the SALT II agreement and the U.S. considers it to be incorporated in the Soviet Union’s political commitment to abide by SALT II.

• **Issue:** The February 1985 classified report addressed the issue of

whether temporary deployments of BACKFIRE bombers to Arctic bases constitute actions inconsistent with Brezhnev’s June 16, 1979, statement not to give the BACKFIRE an increased radius of action and the capability of operating at intercontinental distances. This report reexamines this issue.

• **Finding:** The U.S. Government judges that the temporary deployment of BACKFIREs to Arctic bases is cause for concern and continued careful monitoring. By such temporary deployment of BACKFIREs, the Soviet Union acted in a manner inconsistent with its political commitment in the June 1979 BACKFIRE statement not to give Backfire the capability to strike targets on the territory of the United States.

5. Backfire Bomber Production Rate

• **Obligation:** At the signing of SALT II, the U.S.S.R. gave the U.S. assurances about the BACKFIRE bomber’s production rate. The Soviet statement read, in pertinent part, as follows: “. . . the Soviet side states that it will not increase the production rate of this airplane as compared to the present rate.” Soviet President Brezhnev, according to Secretary Vance’s SALT II transmittal letter to the Senate, “confirmed that the Soviet BACKFIRE production rate would not exceed thirty per year.” President Carter stated that the United States enters into the SALT II Agreement on the basis of the commitments contained in the Soviet statement and that it considers the carrying out of these commitments to be essential to the obligations under the Treaty. The U.S. considers the Soviet unilateral statement to be an integral part of the SALT II Agreement and, as such, to be incorporated in the Soviet Union’s political commitment to abide by SALT II.

• **Issue:** The February 1985 report examined the question of whether the Soviet Union has produced more than 30 BACKFIREs per year and increased the production rate since signing SALT II. This report reexamines this issue.

• **Finding:** The U.S. Government judges that the Soviet Union is obligated to produce no more than 30 BACKFIRE bomber aircraft per year. There are ambiguities concerning the data. However, there is evidence that the Soviet BACKFIRE production rate was constant at slightly more than 30 per year until 1984, and decreased since that time to slightly below 30 per year.

6. Encryption of Ballistic Missile Telemetry

• **Obligation:** Provisions of SALT II ban deliberate concealment measures

that impede verification by national technical means. The Treaty permits each party to use various methods of transmitting telemetric information during testing, including encryption, but bans deliberate denial of telemetry, such as through encryption, whenever such denial impedes verification.

- **Issue:** The January 1984 compliance report examined whether the Soviet Union has engaged in encryption of missile test telemetry (radio signals) so as to impede verification. This issue was reexamined in the February 1985 compliance report and is examined again in this report.

- **Finding:** The U.S. Government reaffirms the conclusion in the February 1985 report that Soviet encryption practices constitute a violation of a legal obligation under SALT II prior to 1981 and a violation of their political commitment since 1982. The nature and extent of such encryption of telemetry on new ballistic missiles, despite U.S. requests for corrective action, continues to be an example of deliberately impeding verification of compliance in violation of this Soviet political commitment.

7. Concealment of Missile/Launcher Association

- **Obligation:** Article XV of the SALT II Treaty prohibits "deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty." This obligation is further clarified in a Common Understanding that states that Article XV applies to all provisions of the Treaty and "includes the obligation not to use deliberate concealment measures associated with testing, including those measures aimed at concealing the association between ICBMs and launchers during testing."

- **Issue:** This report examines for the first time the issue of whether the Soviets have concealed the association between an ICBM and its launcher during testing in violation of their obligation not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification.

- **Finding:** The U.S. Government judges Soviet activities related to the SS-25 to be a violation of the Soviet Union's political commitment to abide by the SALT II Treaty provision prohibiting concealment of the association between a missile and its launcher during testing.

SALT I Interim Agreement

Treaty Status

The SALT I Interim Agreement entered into force for the United States

and the Soviet Union in 1972. Dismantling procedures implementing the Interim Agreement were concluded in 1974. The Interim Agreement, by its own terms, was of limited duration and expired as a legally binding document in 1977. The applicability of the Interim Agreement to the actions of both parties has, however, been extended by the parties by a series of mutual political commitments, including the President's May 31, 1982, statement that the United States would refrain from actions which would undercut existing strategic arms agreements so long as the Soviet Union shows equal restraint. The Soviets have told us they would abide by the SALT I Interim Agreement and SALT II. Any actions by the U.S.S.R. inconsistent with this commitment are violations of its political commitment with respect to the Interim Agreement and its implementing procedures.

Use of "Remaining Facilities" at Former SS-7 Sites

- **Obligation:** The SALT I Interim Agreement and its procedures prohibit the Parties from using facilities remaining at dismantled or destroyed ICBM sites for storage, support, or launch of ICBMs. Any Soviet actions inconsistent with this commitment are violations of a political commitment with respect to the Interim Agreement and its implementing procedures.

- **Issue:** The February 1985 report examined whether the U.S.S.R. has violated the SALT I Interim Agreement prohibition against using facilities remaining at dismantled former SS-7 ICBM sites for the storage, support or launch of SS-25 ICBMs. This report reexamines this issue.

- **Finding:** The U.S. Government judges that Soviet use of former SS-7 ICBM facilities in support of the deployment and operation of the SS-25 mobile ICBMs is in violation of the SALT I Interim Agreement. Should the Soviets use "remaining facilities" in the future at other former SS-7 sites where the SS-25 is now in the process of being deployed, such use will also constitute Soviet violation of its political commitment under the SALT I Interim Agreement.

Biological Weapons Convention and 1925 Geneva Protocol

Chemical, Biological, and Toxin Weapons

- **Treaty Status:** The 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (the BWC) and the 1925 Geneva Protocol are multilateral treaties to which both the United States and the Soviet Union are parties. Soviet actions not in accord with these treaties and customary inter-

national law relating to the 1925 Geneva Protocol are violations of legal obligations.

- **Obligations:** The BWC bans the development, production, stockpiling or possession, and transfer of microbial or other biological agents or toxins except for a small quantity for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes. It also bans weapons, equipment and means of delivery of agents or toxins. The 1925 Geneva Protocol and related rules of customary international law prohibit the first use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices and prohibits use of bacteriological methods of warfare.

- **Issues:** The January 1984 and February 1985 reports examined whether the Soviets are in violation of provisions that ban the development, production, transfer, possession and use of biological and toxin weapons and whether they have been responsible for the use of lethal chemicals. This report reexamines this issue.

- **Finding:** The U.S. Government judges that ongoing Soviet activities confirm and strengthen the conclusion of the January 1984 and February 1985 reports that the Soviet Union has maintained an offensive biological warfare program and capability in violation of its legal obligation under the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972.

Allegations concerning the use of lethal chemicals or toxins in Kampuchea, Laos, or Afghanistan have subsided in 1985. However, there is no basis for amending the February 1985 conclusion that, prior to this time, the Soviet Union has been involved in the production, transfer, and use of trichothecene mycotoxins for hostile purposes in Laos, Kampuchea, and Afghanistan in violation of its legal obligation under international law as codified in the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972.

Threshold Test Ban Treaty

Nuclear Testing and the 150 Kiloton Limit

- **Treaty Status:** The Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) was signed in 1974. The Treaty has not been ratified but neither party has indicated an intention not to ratify. Therefore, both Parties are subject to the obligation under customary international law to refrain from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of the TTBT. Soviet actions that would defeat the object and purpose of the TTBT are therefore violations of their legal obligations. The United States is seeking to negotiate

improved verification measures for the Treaty. Both Parties have separately stated they would observe the 150 kiloton threshold of the TTBT.

- **Obligation:** The Treaty prohibits any underground nuclear weapon test having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons at any place under the jurisdiction or control of the Parties beginning March 31, 1976. In view of the technical uncertainties associated with estimating the precise yield of nuclear weapon tests, the sides agreed that one or two slight, unintended breaches per year would not be considered a violation.

- **Issue:** The January 1984 and February 1985 reports examined whether the Soviets have conducted nuclear tests in excess of 150 kilotons. This report reexamines this issue.

- **Finding:** While ambiguities in the pattern of Soviet testing and verification uncertainties continued in 1985, the U.S. Government reaffirms the February 1985 finding that Soviet nuclear testing activities for a number of tests constitute a likely violation of legal obligations under the Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974, which banned underground nuclear tests with yields exceeding 150 kilotons. These Soviet actions continued despite U.S. requests for corrective measures.

Limited Test Ban Treaty

Underground Nuclear Test Venting

- **Treaty Status:** The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (Limited Test Ban Treaty—LTBT) is a multilateral treaty that entered into force for the United States

and the Soviet Union in 1963. Soviet actions not in accord with this treaty are violations of a legal obligation.

- **Obligations:** The LTBT specifically prohibits nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. It also prohibits nuclear explosions in any other environment "if such explosions cause radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted."

- **Issue:** The February 1985 report examined whether the U.S.S.R.'s underground nuclear tests have caused radioactive debris to be present outside of its territorial limits. This report reexamines this issue.

- **Finding:** The U.S. Government reaffirms the judgment made in the February 1985 report that the Soviet Union's underground nuclear test practices resulted in the venting of radioactive matter on numerous occasions and caused radioactive matter to be present outside the Soviet Union's territorial limits in violation of its legal obligation under the Limited Test Ban Treaty. The Soviet Union failed to take the precautions necessary to minimize the contamination of man's environment by radioactive substances despite numerous U.S. demarches and requests for corrective action.

Helsinki Final Act

Helsinki Final Act Notification of Military Exercises

- **Legal Status:** The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooper-

ation in Europe was signed in Helsinki in 1975. This document represents a political commitment and was signed by the United States and the Soviet Union, along with many other States. Soviet actions not in accord with that document are violations of their political commitment.

- **Obligation:** All signatory States of the Helsinki Final Act are committed to give prior notification of, and other details concerning, major military maneuvers, defined as those involving more than 25,000 troops.

- **Issue:** The January 1984 and February 1985 reports examined whether notification of the Soviet military exercise "Zapad-81" was inadequate and therefore a violation of the Soviet Union's political commitment under the Helsinki Final Act. This report reexamines this issue.

- **Finding:** The U.S. Government previously judged and continues to find that the Soviet Union in 1981 violated its political commitment to observe provisions of Basket I of the Helsinki Final Act by not providing prior notification of exercise "ZAPAD-81." While the U.S.S.R. has generally taken an approach to the confidence-building measures of the Final Act which minimizes the information it provides, Soviet compliance with the exercise-notification provisions was improved in 1983. In 1984, the Soviets returned to a minimalist approach providing only the bare information required under the Final Act. The Soviet Union continued this approach during 1985. ■

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