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File Folder CHINA - FOREIGN RELATIONS - REAGAN TRIP -
BRIEFING MATERIALS (9)

FOIA

F00-174/2

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13

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
128240	MEMO	WILLIAM MARTIN/DAVID LAUX TO ROBERT MCFARLANE RE MEETING W/MICHAEL DEEVER	2	3/22/1984	B1
128241	MEMO	ROBERT MCFARLANE TO MICHAEL DEEVER RE MEETING	2	ND	B1
128242	AGENDA	PRESIDENT'S TRIB TO CHINA	10	3/21/1984	B1
128243	NOTE	TO DAVID LAUX RE ATTACHED	1	4/4/1984	B1
128244	REPORT	RE EAST ASIA	9	4/2/1984	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

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October 21, 1983

Reagan China Trip

Briefly, the primary problems and concerns regarding the proposed Reagan visit to the P.R.C. are as follows:

1. Reagan must not issue any new interpretation, official statement or joint communique which agrees with the P.R.C. interpretation of the August 17th Joint Communique on arms sales to Taiwan or the sovereignty issue.
2. The true meaning of the Taiwan Relations Act should be defended and reinforced, especially where it appears to contradict the August 17th Communique, i.e., quantity and quality of arms sales, gradual reduction of sales, etc..
3. Reagan must not agree with or provide a favorable response to the P.R.C.'s so-called "peaceful reunification" proposals. This is a matter which should be left to the Chinese. It is not in the United States' interests, nor its responsibility, to get involved in this internal matter.
4. During his visit to U.S., Premier Zhao should be put on notice that the U.S. would strongly oppose the "Taiwan Issue" being put on the agenda for discussion during Reagan's April visit. Since this is a political, election year visit, the P.R.C. realizes this provides it with the maximum opportunity of political leverage to extract concessions. It is extremely important we keep the "Taiwan Issue" off the agenda for discussion in April.

Elaboration on Above Topics

1. No New Communiques or Interpretations of T.R.A. --

- a. Reagan must not issue any statements which appear to contradict his own interpretation of the August 17 Joint Communique or appear to agree with Peking's interpretation.
- b. Although such statements do not have any legal authority or obligation, they fundamentally undermine interpretation and perceptions of policy and, therefore, make it much easier for a future President (especially a liberal Democrat) to cease arms sales. Some White House advisors feel that such public statements are irrelevant as long as Reagan is loyal to the R.O.C. and because any future President could terminate arms sales if he wanted regardless of the T.R.A.

However, the ability of a future Congress or President to enforce the T.R.A. is made more difficult, if not impossible, should unilateral Administration interpretations contradict the T.R.A.'s meaning and erode its political support/context/foundation. Therefore, the goal should be as follows:

- (1) Pressure the P.R.C. to continue to agree to disagree with our different interpretations of August 17th Communique; and
- (2) Make certain Reagan does not issue any new statements, no surprises, on this issue while in Peking.

2. The Taiwan Relations Act is Inviolable --

a. The T.R.A. is Supreme -- The Taiwan Relations Act is and should continue to be regarded as the supreme law guiding U.S.-R.O.C. relations, especially as regards the policy on arms sales. The T.R.A., as public law, supercedes a joint communique in terms of legal authority, national policy and obligations. Reagan must treat the T.R.A. as inviolable, and continue to uphold and defend it.

b. Quantity and Quality -- The T.R.A. obligates the U.S. to maintain the "capacity" to "resist" any resort to force or other forms of coercion that could jeopardize the security or the social or economic system of the people of Taiwan. That "capacity" requires a readiness "to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability." (TRA Sec. 2b, 6 and Sec. 3a).

Therefore, the Administration is not empowered to unilaterally impose restrictions, qualitatively or quantitatively, on arms sales to Taiwan. The fact that Reagan has increased the quantitative dollar amount of arms sales to Taiwan over previous Carter Administration totals is a significant act and ~~precedent~~ denies which refute "quantitative" reductions.

c. Gradual Reduction is Based on Peaceful Reunification -- The August 17 Communique states that the U.S. "appreciates the Chinese policy of striving for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question" and further states that arms sales to Taiwan will be reduced contingent upon a "final resolution".

On this issue the U.S. and P.R.C. have opposite interpretations. Reagan stated in a February 26, 1983 interview with Human Events (6 months after August 17, 1982) that arms sales to Taiwan would not be necessary if both Mainland and Taiwan "can get together peacefully". Reagan elaborated by stating, "And that's all that was meant in the communique. Nothing was meant beyond that. We're not going to say, 'Well, just as time goes by, we're going to reduce arms to them' (Taiwan)".

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Therefore, the President has clearly stated that arms sales will terminate only after a peaceful reunification of Taiwan and the Mainland, not before. Reagan (must not) give any ground on this peaceful "linkage" concept. The term "final resolution" should also be interpreted in this context.

3. Reagan (Must Not) Favorably Acknowledge PRC's "Peaceful Reunification" Proposals.

a. The P.R.C. will likely insist that its peaceful reunification overtures to the ROC is a sufficient demonstration of "progress" to resolve the matter peacefully. Therefore, the U.S. must reciprocate by terminating arms sales. Despite Reagan's above mentioned Human Events statement, the President's April 5, 1982 letter to Premier Zhao and the August 17th Communique both put the U.S. in the dangerous position of tending to agree with the P.R.C.'s "peaceful" propaganda initiatives.

The more the U.S. favorably acknowledges the P.R.C.'s "peaceful reunification" proposals, the more we strengthen the Communists' viewpoint and undermine our own interpretation. Red China will insist that peaceful progress, not reunification, creates the necessary condition for the U.S. to terminate arms sales.

Therefore, we can expect the P.R.C. will try to force Reagan to clarify his position on this issue. It is important Reagan keep to his Human Events interpretation and not give up any more ground on this issue.

b. Reagan should regard these "peaceful reunification" proposals as an internal matter between the Chinese people and, therefore, he is not obligated to make any comment on them, and it would be inappropriate for him to do so. Taking such a position would be consistent with the August 17th Communique in which the U.S. states that it has "no intention... of interfering in China's internal affairs."

Therefore, the U.S. should remain a neutral on this issue and make neither favorable nor unfavorable comments on any "reunification" proposal initiated by either side.

4. Political Context, Dangers and Opportunities of the Reagan and Zhao Visits --

a. The only major objective of Reagan's visit is political, i.e., good media attention during an election year. The P.R.C. clearly realizes that this provides it the maximum opportunity of political leverage to extract concessions from REagan. Clearly, the P.R.C. has the political advantage. Reagan can not afford politically to have an "unsuccessful" visit and he will be heavily pressured by the communists to demonstrate his "friendship" by compromising on Taiwan. Should the P.R.C. not be "sufficiently" placated, it could give Reagan a subtle, but definite, rebuke and thus cause his visit to backfire politically.

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b. While the U.S. has no corresponding political leverage, the Premier Zhao visit will provide an opportunity to set the stage for the Reagan April visit. The U.S. should make the following clear to Premier Zhao:

- (1) The P.R.C. should not expect Reagan to make any concessions on Taiwan during his April visit;
- (2) Any pressure to the contrary will "spoil" a Reagan visit and will be interpreted as inappropriate, impolite and confrontational; and
- (3) Should the P.R.C. ignore this warning, the U.S. may reconsider how far and how fast it will respond to requests for U.S. technology, weapon sales, etc..

Therefore, it is imperative that we keep the "Taiwan issue" off the agenda for discussion during Reagan's visit. Zhao must be put on notice accordingly.

Dave Long 12/9/83

Harry Terman felt that it
was particularly important that
you see this and understand it -



Memorandum



ACTION



BRIEFING



INFORMATION

FOR: Don Anderson

DATE: April 2, 1984

FROM: Stephen Canner

SUBJECT: Background Papers for the President's Visit to China

In our talks with the Chinese during the fourth meeting of the Joint Economic Committee, several subjects came up repeatedly which are not provided for in your briefing materials for the President's trip. For example, the Chinese complained about annual review of China's MFN status and their ineligibility for the Generalized System of Preferences. They also raised the question of China's membership in the Asian Development Bank.

You may also want to provide papers on the following topics which are of concern in U.S.-China relations: China's membership in the GATT (they may be on the verge of deciding if so, they may seek U.S. support), OPIC's mission this fall, discrepancies in bilateral trade statistics (i.e., Chinese claim they have a deficit vis-a-vis the U.S., we show a surplus), and a proposal by Bechtel to arrange financing for a major hydroelectric project. The latter is a good example of the kind of private sector participation we have encouraged for Chinese modernization efforts.

It may be that Olmer will have the detailed brief on these subjects, but I think the President should know that these subjects, which are apropos China's modernization, are likely to arise and deserve a 3x5 card.

bcc: Bill Brown
Dave Laux

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128240 MEMO

2 3/22/1984 B1

WILLIAM MARTIN/DAVID LAUX TO ROBERT
MCFARLANE RE MEETING W/MICHAEL DEEVER

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128241	MEMO ROBERT MCFARLANE TO MICHAEL DEEVER RE MEETING	2	ND	B1

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A





B



RESIDENT'S CHINA TRIP

MARCH 1984

As of March 21, 1984

SUNDAY	MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY	SATURDAY
				1	2	3
	5	6	7	8	9	10
11	12	13	14	15	16	17 St. Patrick's Day
18	19	20	21 Public Announce- ment (Speakes) 3:00 Press Backgrounder (Wolfowitz)	22	23 Deaver/McFarlane Mtg. Major Public State- ments (from State) (Fudan, Great Hall, 2 toasts) 3:00 IG (China)	24
25	26	27	28 Final Public Statements (from State)	29	30	31

PRESIDENT'S CHINA TRIP

APRIL 1984

As of March 22, 1984

SUNDAY	MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY	SATURDAY
1 April Fools Day	2	3 Draft Briefing Book Due (from State)	4	5	6 NSC Revised Briefing Book given to Pres./Sr. Staff	7 Pres. Reviews Briefing Book
8	9	10	11	12 1:00 NSC Mtg (90 min.) General Subjects <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Political/Diplomatic • Military/Strategic • Economic • Trade • Energy • Cultural * Video Received	13 Shultz Briefing	14 Pres. Reviews China Film
15	16 1:00 Meeting-by-Meeting Review (60 min.)	17 1:00 Deng Meeting/Sensitive Subjects (60 min.)	18 NSC Distributes Final Briefing Book to Pres./Sr. Staff	19 President leaves for Ranch	20	21
22 9:20 AF1 Departs Pt. Mugu 1:00 AF1 Arrives Hickam AFB Arrival Ceremony with Remarks 4:55 St. Andrew's Cathedral Service & Holy Communion	23 Morning: China Briefing Afternoon: China Briefing, CINCPAC Briefing	24 10:30 Departure Ceremony with Brief Remarks 11:00 AF1 Departs en route Agana, Guam Cross International Dateline	25 3:25 AF1 Arrives Guam, Arrival Ceremony w/Brief Remarks 4:10 Reception w/Gov. Bordallo & Trust Territory Leaders, Runway West Rest.	26 2:05 Arrive Beijing from Guam, No Remarks 3:00 Welcoming Ceremony, No Remarks 3:15 Mtg. w/Li Xiannian (30 min.) 7:00 Private Dinner hosted by Li w/Zhao Yang Yuan Hall (toast 5 min.)	27 9:30 First Mtg. w/Zhao (90 min.) 1:30 Major Address at Great Hall (15-20 min.) 2:00 Second Mtg. w/Zhao (60 min.) 3:15 Mtg. w/Hu (60 min.) 7:00 Official Welcoming Banquet at Great Hall (toast 10 min.)	28 9:05 CCTV Intv. (5 min.) Open. Stmts., Q&A to follow (40 min.) 10:30 Mtg. & Wkg. Lch w/Chmn. Deng (2 1/2 hrs.) 1:30 Visit to Great Wall 7:00 Recept. f/Amer. Comm./Rmrks 5min 7:35 Recip. Banquet Gr. Wall Hotel (toast 10 min.)
29 11:30 Depart Beijing 1:05 Arrives XI'AN 1:40 Tour Gaoling Country Free Mkt. 2:25 Qin Shi Huang Mausoleum to view Terra Cotta Soldiers 4:35 AF1 Departs XI'AN 6:00 Arrive Beijing, evening free	30 9:00 Sign. Cere./Gr. Hall 9:30 Farewell: Li & Zhao Great Hall 10:55 Foxboro-Shanghai JT Venture (Bfg. Tour) 2:55 Fudan Univ. Recept. (20 min. speech) 7:00 Banquet host. by Shanghai Mayor, Formal Remarks	1 9:15 Visit to Rainbow Township (briefing) 9:40 Child Care Center (tour & perf.) 10:35 Depart Shanghai Cross Intl. Dateline 3:20 Arrive Fairbanks, Alaska	2 11:15 Depart Fairbanks 9:55 Arrive Andrews AFB	3	4	5



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128242	AGENDA PRESIDENT'S TRIB TO CHINA	10	3/21/1984	B1

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128243	NOTE TO DAVID LAUX RE ATTACHED	1	4/4/1984	B1

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Potential Problems/Opportunities Regarding the Reagan Visit to the P.R.C. in April 1984.

Since this is a political election year visit, it will provide the P.R.C. its maximum opportunity of political leverage to pressure Reagan into making concessions on arms sales/sovereignty issues affecting Taiwan. Reagan must hold firm and refuse to compromise on any of the following areas which would greatly undermine Taiwan:

I. No Compromise on P.R.C. Interpretation of August 17th Joint Communiqué:

- A. Any compromise which dilutes U.S. interpretation of Joint Communiqué and/or agrees with Peking, will set a dangerous precedent undermining the ability of a future President to continue arms sales to Taiwan.
- B. U.S. (must) stand firm to continue to agree to disagree with P.R.C. on our different interpretations of August 17th Communiqué.
- C. Reagan must not issue any new statements, no new surprises -- August 17th Communiqué disposed of matter, i.e., not necessary to bring it up again.

II. T.R.A. Must be Defended, Supercedes Joint Communiqué.

- A. The Taiwan Relations Act is the law of the land and supercedes any joint communiqué in terms of U.S. legal obligation "to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability."
- B. TRA sets no limits on "qualitative or quantitative" arms sales to Taiwan, nor their "gradual reduction." Reagan must not contradict T.R.A. by agreeing to any policy statement which would set such limits or commit to a date for termination of such sales.
- C. Gradual reduction of arms sales is based on Peaceful Reunification. Reagan must hold firm on his interpretation of ending arms sales (Human Events interview, February 26, 1983) which he said would only occur if Taiwan and the Mainland "can get together peacefully." Therefore, arms sales can terminate only after a peaceful reunification, not before.

III. Reagan Must Not Favorably Acknowledge P.R.C.'s "Peaceful Reunification" Proposals.

- A. U.S. acknowledgement of P.R.C.'s "peaceful reunification" propaganda undermines above Reagan interpretation and legitimizes Peking's view that peaceful progress, not reunification, obligates U.S. to end arms sales.
- B. U.S. should remain neutral. Reunification is an internal matter between Chinese alone.

IV. Keep "Taiwan Issue" Off Agenda For Discussion During P.R.C. Visit.

- A. U.S. should stress to Premier Zhao during his January visit that Reagan will not make any concessions affecting Taiwan and that the "Taiwan issue" should be kept off the agenda for discussion in April.
- B. Zhao should be advised that if the P.R.C. ignores this warning, the U.S. will consider it a confrontational attitude and may reconsider how far and how fast it will respond to requests for U.S. technology, weapons sales, etc..