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Collection Name Laux, David: Files

Withdrawer

MJD 3/2/2012

File Folder CHINA - FOREIGN RELATIONS - U.S. - WEINBERGER'S
1983 TRIP (5)

FOIA

F00-174/2

Box Number 18

TUCKER

60

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
132648	NSC/S PROFILE	RE 8305097	1	7/22/1983	B1
132646	MEMO	COLIN POWELL TO MILITARY ASSISTANT RE CHINA VISIT	1	7/22/1983	B1
132650	MEMO	DAVID LAUX TO JOHN POINDEXTER RE CHINA TRIP	1	ND	B1
132651	MEMO	SAME AS 132646	1	7/22/1983	B1
132652	CABLE	TOKYO 14153	1	7/25/1983	B1
132654	MEMO	TO SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RE MEETING W/AMBASSADOR HUMMEL (W/ATTACHED TALKING POINTS)	4	ND	B1
132656	MEMO	TO RICHARD ARMITAGE RE VISIT TO BEIJING	7	7/19/1983	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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132646 MEMO

1 7/22/1983 B1

COLIN POWELL TO MILITARY ASSISTANT RE
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132650 MEMO

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ND

B1

DAVID LAUX TO JOHN POINDEXTER RE CHINA
TRIP

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132651 MEMO

1 7/22/1983 B1

SAME AS 132646

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132652 CABLE

1 7/25/1983 B1

TOKYO 14153

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DRAFT PRESS GUIDANCE - 7/20/83

Q. What do you mean by "matters of mutual interest?" What topics will be discussed?

A. The topics to be discussed will be worked out mutually with the Chinese. The purpose of the visit is to broaden our bilateral relations with China, and it reflects the great value Secretary Weinberger places on personal contacts with defense leaders of key countries, including a number of countries--like China--with whom we have no formal military security ties.

Q. What topics will Secretary Weinberger seek to discuss with the Chinese?

A. Secretary Weinberger hopes his talks with China's military and political leaders will include discussions of the global military balance, regional security matters, and a continuation of the military-to-military exchanges that began in 1980.

Q. Will Taiwan arms sales be discussed?

A. The Taiwan arms sales question was examined in detail during discussions preceding the US-PRC Joint Communiqué of August 17, 1982, and Secretary Weinberger does not expect to reopen that matter in his discussions with China's leaders.

(FYI):

In the Joint Communiqué, Taiwan arms sales were described as an issue rooted in history--one that would require some time to resolve. Both sides pledged to make every effort to

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adopt measures and create conditions conducive to a thorough settlement of this issue. In the communique, the Chinese government stated that its fundamental policy was to strive for reunification with Taiwan by peaceful means. Noting that, the United States stated that its arms sales to Taiwan would not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the levels of those supplied in recent years since normalization, and that it intended to gradually reduce the sales of arms to Taiwan, leading over time to resolution of this issue.

Q. Will the Secretary be discussing weapons sales to China with the Chinese?

A. The Secretary has no plans to raise arms sales in his discussions with China's leaders. You will recall that when former Secretary of State Haig went to Beijing in 1981, he announced a policy that made China eligible to purchase military items, including weapons, from the United States on the same basis as other friendly, non-allied countries. That policy has not changed.

Q. What about technology transfer questions, then? Will these come up in Secretary Weinberger's talks with the PRC?

A. As I indicated earlier, the agenda for discussions is still being worked out. The Department of Defense certainly has an interest in technology transfer questions. It should be noted, however, that the lead agencies within the U.S. government on export matters are Commerce and State, not Defense.

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Q. Besides Defense Minister Zhang, who else will Secretary Weinberger be meeting with in China?

A. The agenda (and the itinerary) for the visit are still being worked out. I have no information for you on that at this point.

Q. Will the Secretary visit Japan or Korea during his trip, either before or after the China visit?

A. Secretary Weinberger will stop briefly in Japan enroute to China, where he would expect to meet with his colleague, Minister Tanikawa, and other Japanese officials to discuss his travels in Asia and to discuss mutual security issues.

Q. Where else will the Secretary stop during his trip?

A. The itinerary is still be worked. I have nothing for you on that.

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

7/20/83

Memo For David Lang

Since the EA informal
was cancelled, Thought
I'd get this to you via
courier.

Allen



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Thoughts on a China Itinerary

Freeman and Loeffke's proposed schedule for the CWW visit has some weaknesses, which hopefully I have corrected in the following version:

Sunday, 25 September

1:00 pm	Arrive Beijing. Met by Defense Minister Zhang Aiping; honors ceremony and small welcoming reception (at airport) for selected members of delegation.
2:00 pm	Initial discussions of agenda/expectations with Defense Minister Zhang.
3:30 pm	Conference with key Embassy and DAO staff (at residence or in bubble) to discuss objectives, agenda, requirements, etc. Wives visit Behai Park or Temple of Heaven. Return separately to guest house.
7:00 pm	Welcome banquet hosted by Defense Minister Zhang at Great Hall of the People.
10:00 pm	Return to guest house.

Monday, 26 September

9:00 am	Meet with Defense Minister Zhang and Chief of General Staff Yang Dezhi to discuss objectives in military-to-military relations, need for agenda of exchanges, DOD role in technology transfer process, and prerequisites of DOD technical assistance and/or FMS cash sales. Wives tour hospital and Summer Palace grounds.
12:30 pm	Lunch with Foreign Minister Wu (Acting Han?)
2:30 pm	Visit Imperial Palace Museum
4:00 pm	Continue talks with Zhang Aiping at guest house (or reserve for meetings with other PRC officials).
6:30 pm	Embassy reception at Residence.
9:00 pm	Return to guest house.

Tuesday, 27 September

8:00 am Depart for Great Wall

11:00 am Delegation visit 6th Armored Division; wives visit Ming Tombs. Lunch at respective locations and return separately to guest house.

3:00 pm Meeting with Deng Xiaoping to discuss strategic perspective of relations, assessments of global and regional security issues.

7:00 pm Return banquet hosted by Secretary and Mrs. Weinberger, at Great Hall.

10:00 pm Return to guest house.

Wednesday, 28 September

9:00 am Meeting with Zhang Aiping and representative of NDSTC (Chen?) at guest house, to discuss vectors of support to PRC military modernization DOD will consider.

10:30 am Meeting with Premier Zhao Ziyang.

12:30 pm Lunch at guest house.

2:30 pm Arrive Beijing Airport. Press conference and departure ceremony.

4:30 pm Arrive Xian Airport. Met by Lanzhou MR commander and staff.

7:00 pm Banquet hosted by Lanzhou MR.

Thursday, 29 September

8:30 am Visit Qin diggings.

11:00 am Depart Xian Airport. Departure ceremony (or PLA officials accompany to Wugong).

11:30 am Arrive Wugong Aircraft Facility. Met by plant manager and key staff. Brief welcome followed by lunch.

1:30 pm Tour of Wugong facility. Wives can visit schools and medical facilities.

3:30 pm Depart for Hong Kong.

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The Freeman/Loeffke schedule has too few meetings with those responsible for the defense relationship and too many oriented toward the tech transfer question--e.g. the meetings with Chen and Fang Yi. I see this as Chas' influence.

The up-front focus ought to be, as we've said many times, at getting agreement with the Chinese on the mechanisms that can be set in place to give the defense relationship durability. The key elements to this are: development of a positive, personal relationship between Zhang (and Yang) and CWW; a clear statement of our willingness to play a constructive role in China's military modernization; definition of the kinds of exchanges we want to pursue; and, agreement on a near-term agenda of exchanges (developed in side meetings after Monday's meeting).

Any meetings with top PRC officials are likely to revolve around global and regional security issues, if only because that's fairly safe ground--we can talk past each other if necessary or agree if possible. But the guy we want to talk to is Deng. The meeting with Deng has to come late enough in the visit for him to know how well the preliminary discussions are going, and early enough for him to be an influence on final outcomes. The meeting with Zhao can take place early (courtesy call tone) or late (debrief; stress positive aspects).

Freeman/Loeffke recommend meeting with Yang Shangkun, the vice chairman of the Military Commission. I see him sitting in on the meeting with Deng, but see no reason for a separate meeting; his influence is more party than government.

They also recommend meetings with Chen of NDSTC and Fang Yi. I'd recommend that CWW not meet with Fang at all and meet with Chen only if early meetings give us clear markings on where we want to go. I've left room for a meeting with Chen, however, just in case.

My version calls for Embassy to host a reception on Monday. If Hummel isn't back, it might be more appropriate to leave that out and schedule Peking Opera or acrobatics entertainment. But we shouldn't move up the return banquet--we want that to take place after his meeting with Deng.

I see the need for only a couple of mandatory side meetings:

- RLA should meet with Zhang Tong of FAB (and I'd like to see Yang Dezhi or Xu Xin at that one) to work out a future agenda; and
- Richard Perle should engage Chen of NDSTC in a general discussion of tech transfer and DOD's role in it to ensure that (1) the PRC understands our system and (2) that we haven't left them with false expectations.

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132656 MEMO

7 7/19/1983 B1

TO RICHARD ARMITAGE RE VISIT TO BEIJING

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MEMORANDUM

TO: David Gries

DATE: 6 July 1983

FROM: Richard H. Solomon
The Rand Corporation

SUBJECT: PERSPECTIVES ON A VISIT TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA BY THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, SEPTEMBER 1983

THE CONTEXT

Chinese Motivations. After two years of considerable tension in U.S.-PRC relations, ostensibly over the Taiwan arms sales issue, the PRC leadership now has a variety of mutually reinforcing reasons to want to improve its dealings with the United States. They have taken a significant step in this direction by inviting Secretary of Defense Weinberger to visit the PRC in late September:

-- After two rounds of "normalization" discussions with the Soviet Union, the Chinese leadership has found Moscow unresponsive to PRC demands for some reduction in the Soviet military buildup against China. A primary Chinese motivation behind the invitation to Secretary Weinberger is to "remind" the Soviet leadership that the PRC has other foreign policy and defense options, and thus to prod Moscow into a more accommodating position in the forthcoming third round of bilateral talks. It is likely that Chinese leaders have rationalized the Weinberger visit to domestic doubters (among them the PLA) on the grounds that it has value in dealing with the Soviets; and we should assume that the Chinese will seek to capture the "swing" position in the strategic triangle by trying to develop positive relations with both Moscow and Washington at a time when Soviet-American relations are strained.

There is a minor risk for the U.S. that the SecDef's visit will induce the Soviets to be more forthcoming to the Chinese (although some reduction in the Soviet military presence in Indochina or Afghanistan would serve American purposes); but the most likely Soviet response will be a further hardening toward the Chinese, a posture which will only help to discredit the PRC policy of seeking to normalize relations with the USSR through bilateral diplomacy.

-- The results of the recent visits to China of Presidential Science Advisor Keyworth and Secretary of Commerce Baldrige have raised Chinese expectations that the Administration is prepared to be more forthcoming in transferring technologies to the PRC, and that Defense Department cooperation is needed to facilitate such transfers. The Chinese have been told that it will help their cause if they are able to develop positive working relations with Secretary Weinberger.

In recent years Deng Xiaoping and other leaders have almost pleaded with senior U.S. officials for a more responsive U.S. position on technology transfers--in part because a more forthcoming U.S. attitude will help Deng justify to domestic audiences his policy of active dealings with the United States. Conversely, however, an uncertain or resistant U.S. posture will reinforce the view of doubters in the PRC leadership about the utility to China of active ties to the U.S.

-- The Chinese may be concerned about contemporary signs of a more flexible U.S. posture toward the Soviet Union, and indications that Soviet-American diplomacy may be activated in 1983-84. The Chinese may hope to heighten tensions between Moscow and Washington by inviting the Secretary of Defense to China. At the same time, they would want to avoid "falling behind" in the politics of the strategic triangle or seeing U.S.-PRC relations become further degraded in a context of improving U.S.-Soviet relations. A Chinese foreign policy of "balance" requires concurrent improvements in relations with both Moscow and Washington; otherwise, they will lose leverage in both "superpower" capitals.

-- The Chinese are sensitive to the American domestic political mood as it affects U.S.-PRC relations. Having earlier looked to the possibility of a change of administration in 1984, they now see signs of a Reagan Administration strengthened by the economic recovery and increasing flexibility in foreign affairs. They now have few reasons to hold back in dealings with the Administration. Indeed, after testing the limits of President Reagan's China policy through the negotiations on Taiwan arms sales, and having seen current signs of flexibility on technology transfers, they probably wish to move into a new period of more positive and active relations. While they are unlikely to want to move as close to the United States as they seemed to do in 1980, neither do they want to allow the relationship to continue to deteriorate as a result of second-order problems in the bilateral relationship.

Soviet Responses: As noted earlier, there is some risk for the United States that the Weinberger visit will enable General Secretary Andropov and other Soviet leaders who may favor a more flexible posture toward the Chinese to induce the military and other hardliners to support confidence building gestures toward Beijing (as Brezhnev and Andropov seemed to call for in the fall of 1982); but a more likely response will be a hardening of position toward the Chinese--thus further undercutting the recent movement toward an easing of Sino-Soviet tension, and discrediting those in the PRC leadership who want more "balance" in Chinese foreign policy between the U.S. and USSR.

During the decade of the 1970s the Soviets reacted to the normalization of U.S.-PRC relations by seeking to advance the diplomacy of detente while also warning the U.S. against military cooperation with the PRC (most recently in the 1981 Gromyko letter to then-Secretary of State Haig),

and by rationalizing to themselves their military buildup in the Far East and adventures in Africa, the Middle East, Southwest Asia, and Indochina (actions they would have undertaken in any event).

It seems most likely that a similar Soviet pattern of response can be anticipated in reaction to the Weinberger visit: pursuit of arms control and other negotiations with the U.S.; and a hardening toward the Chinese. But there is some risk that Moscow will use the SecDef's visit as one of a number of rationalizations for a breakdown in the INF talks and further increases in missile deployments in Europe and the Soviet Far East.

Japanese Responses: Under Prime Minister Nakasone the Japanese reaction to the SecDef's visit is likely to be more supportive than it would have been under Suzuki, although there will remain nervousness in Tokyo that the U.S. may come to see China as a significant security partner. This concern is likely to provide added incentive for the Japanese to modernize the JSDF, and to be more responsive toward U.S. concerns that Japan improve her military capabilities within the context of the Mutual Security Treaty.

The Japanese will also be concerned about provocation of the Soviet Union through U.S.-PRC actions, and about embroilment in the rivalries of the great powers; but current concerns in Tokyo about the Soviet SS-20 buildup, as well as Moscow's unyielding position on the Northern Territories issue, will justify to the Japanese heightened U.S.-PRC security cooperation. It is essential, however, that Tokyo be fully "consulted" and briefed on the purposes and results of the SecDef's trip.

OBJECTIVES OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE'S VISIT TO CHINA

The objectives and agenda for the Secretary's visit should reflect not only the current state of U.S.-PRC relations and policy goals of the two sides, but also the pattern of Sino-American contacts in the defense area of recent years. These are best characterized by groping uncertainty on both sides about how far and how fast to develop security cooperation, and an underlying lack of conceptual agreement about the objectives of U.S.-PRC collaboration in the defense field.

Since 1979 there has been a steady inflation of U.S. rhetoric about willingness to sell (or to allow allies to sell) advanced technology and weapons to China, culminating in Secretary of State Haig's announcement in June 1981 that the United States would consider sales of arms to the PRC on a case-by-case basis. Yet the rhetoric has not been matched either by significant technology transfers or weapons sales, or by the development of a political and bureaucratic consensus within the U.S. government on the purposes and nature of a defense relationship with China.

Secretary Weinberger's trip should be used as a vehicle for developing such a conceptual consensus as well as bureaucratic guidelines for managing the security dimensions of the U.S.-PRC relationship.

On the Chinese side, Beijing has done a great deal of "window-shopping" in the West for new arms, but has purchased little. This uncertainty reflects divisions of opinion and politics within the PRC leadership over a program for defense modernization, as well as limitations of finances, economic resources and skilled manpower needed to successfully absorb foreign technology. The sorry fate of the Spey engine deal with the British attests to the difficulties the Chinese face in using foreign technology to modernize their defenses.

The Secretary's trip should re-initiate a dialogue with the Chinese, first begun in 1980, designed to develop a consensus about the most useful (and politically acceptable) forms of collaboration in the defense area.

The Objectives of the Trip:

- o Re-establish a strategic dialogue with the Chinese, with obvious focus on shared concerns about the continuing global Soviet military buildup and Moscow's unyielding efforts to encircle the PRC. The Chinese leadership doubts that the Administration takes the PRC seriously as an element in American strategic planning. They will resist presentations which suggest that China is vulnerable to Soviet military pressures with the counter-argument that the U.S. and Europe are the "real" targets of Soviet expansionism and that China is not directly vulnerable to Soviet pressures. Efforts should be made to cast the dialogue so as to identify areas of shared U.S. and Chinese concern about the Soviet military threat.
- o Explore the conceptual basis for U.S.-PRC security cooperation. Such a dialogue was begun in 1980 by Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and Under Secretary William Perry. Despite the positive political mood of the relationship at that time, and shared concerns about the recent Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Moscow's support for the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, there was little follow-through by the leaderships on either side. Insights were gained by U.S. officials and professional military officers about problems in such areas as the PRC's defense industrial base, air and ground defense, and naval capabilities. The reporting of these exchanges provides a valuable background for re-establishing a technical dialogue designed to identify areas of useful defense collaboration.

To be useful for American purposes, however, the U.S. side should think through before the Secretary's trip both the policy purposes to be served by heightened contacts with the Chinese in the defense field, and guidelines about how far to go in various forms of cooperation. It will be counterproductive to re-establish a defense dialogue if it only exposes a lack of common purposes or an unwillingness on the U.S. side to follow through on publicly-expressed intentions to sell technology or weaponry to the PRC.

- o Establish some momentum in the technology transfer area. One source of political pressure on Deng Xiaoping against his policy of active ties to the U.S. has been the impression that the U.S. government is either unwilling or bureaucratically unable to follow through on expressed intentions to implement technology transfer decisions. Deng and other senior officials have rather clearly communicated to high-level U.S. visitors their frustration and political vulnerability on this issue. The recent Administration decision to shift China to the "v" category for technology transfer decisions was received with exaggerated enthusiasm by some Chinese officials. Demonstrations of both the willingness and ability to follow through on this decision will be important for sustaining the credibility of the U.S.-PRC relationship. One or two visible and "symbolic" decisions on the part of the U.S. government will carry considerable political weight in China; although conversely, an inability or unwillingness to be forthcoming is likely to generate a political backlash within the PRC leadership.
- o Activate on-going DoD-PLA exchanges. The Secretary's visit to China should lay the basis for on-going senior contacts between the two military organizations on a range of defense topics.

Purposes in U.S.-PRC Defense Collaboration. U.S.-PRC security collaboration, including technology transfers, should be designed to have the following characteristics:

- o To increase Soviet uncertainties about being able to successfully conduct military operations against either the U.S. or PRC without some form of joint response--to force Moscow to dissipate its military resources in anticipation of a coordinated, multi-front response to its initiatives.
- o To develop a constituency in the PRC with an interest in sustaining a positive U.S.-China relationship--in part to inhibit the PRC from resorting to military pressures against Taiwan.
- o To provide some increment of assistance to the U.S. in dealing with the Soviet military challenge (in such areas as air defense, regional logistics, intelligence collection, and constraining Moscow's ability to "swing" its forces in the Far East to other theaters).

Such collaborative actions should be designed to minimize the following characteristics:

- o They should not constitute a gratuitous provocation to the Soviets, but to convey the message that (a) there is a stable "floor" to U.S.-PRC security cooperation which can be heightened in response to increases in the Soviet challenge to our shared interest, and (b) that we are not inclined to increase such security collaboration in the absence of Soviet provocation.
- o They should not enhance China's capability to threaten our allies and friends, including Taiwan.

An Agenda for the Secretary's Trip. Given the previous discussion in this memo, the outlines of an agenda for Secretary Weinberger's trip to the PRC should include the following topics:

- o Discuss in general terms U.S. strategic policy with particular emphasis on the Soviet challenge and U.S. planning for Asia (including our purposes in encouraging Japan to modernize its defenses in coordination with the U.S.).
- o Give a briefing on our current assessment of the Soviet strategic threat and new force deployments in Asia (with emphasis on the SS-20 and "Backfire" bomber problems). The objective should be to highlight the disparity between Moscow's arms control diplomacy and its growing theater nuclear threat in Asia, and thus frustrate the Soviet objective of using the INF talks to drive a wedge between the U.S., Japan, and China.
- o Conduct a "tour of the horizon" of U.S. objectives in various parts of the globe, with emphasis on the Middle East, Europe, and Latin America. There will be ample opportunity to argue with the Chinese on their critical interpretations of various aspects of our foreign and defense policies.
- o Review areas of U.S.-PRC policy coordination, especially regarding Afghanistan and the Subcontinent, and Indochina.
- o Discuss areas where we believe the U.S. and PRC share an interest in heightening defense collaboration. Issues include defense against the "Backfire" bomber threat; heightening China's capabilities for dealing with the Soviet ground attack threat (anti-armor capabilities); defense against Soviet chemical-biological warfare capabilities; ways of improving assistance to those fighting Soviet or proxy interventions (as in Afghanistan and Cambodia). Such a review should establish the conceptual basis for discussion of specific technology transfer items.

- o Discuss ground rules and approaches to heightening U.S.-PRC collaboration in China's defense modernization effort. This discussion might begin with a review of the findings of the 1980 exchanges on this subject. We should avoid a simplistic "yes or no" discussion of specific items of technology without a broad assessment of how the U.S. can most usefully contribute to the PRC's defense modernization effort.

Some of the major findings of the Brown-Perry exchanges of 1980 include the following:

- In the long run, technology transfers are best facilitated by the PRC training technical manpower in the U.S.
- The U.S. can do a great deal at marginal cost to increase the effectiveness of China's defense industrial base. This is a more effective approach to assisting in defense modernization than sales of turnkey plants (which, as in the Spey engine case, do not readily fit into China's existing economic structure).
- In the short run, the U.S. can help to make China's existing weapons platforms (airframes, tanks, artillery) more effective by subsystem improvements --engines, avionics, gun tubes, munitions--than by total system redesign.
- There are certain areas where whole system purchases from abroad can make a significant difference to PRC defenses, as in communications and intelligence, logistics, or weapons such as an ATGM.

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MEMORANDUM

TO: David Gries

DATE: 6 July 1983

FROM: Richard H. Solomon
The Rand Corporation

SUBJECT: PERSPECTIVES ON A VISIT TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA BY THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, SEPTEMBER 1983

THE CONTEXT

Chinese Motivations. After two years of considerable tension in U.S.-PRC relations, ostensibly over the Taiwan arms sales issue, the PRC leadership now has a variety of mutually reinforcing reasons to want to improve its dealings with the United States. They have taken a significant step in this direction by inviting Secretary of Defense Weinberger to visit the PRC in late September:

-- After two rounds of "normalization" discussions with the Soviet Union, the Chinese leadership has found Moscow unresponsive to PRC demands for some reduction in the Soviet military buildup against China. A primary Chinese motivation behind the invitation to Secretary Weinberger is to "remind" the Soviet leadership that the PRC has other foreign policy and defense options, and thus to prod Moscow into a more accommodating position in the forthcoming third round of bilateral talks. It is likely that Chinese leaders have rationalized the Weinberger visit to domestic doubters (among them the PLA) on the grounds that it has value in dealing with the Soviets; and we should assume that the Chinese will seek to capture the "swing" position in the strategic triangle by trying to develop positive relations with both Moscow and Washington at a time when Soviet-American relations are strained.

There is a minor risk for the U.S. that the SecDef's visit will induce the Soviets to be more forthcoming to the Chinese (although some reduction in the Soviet military presence in Indochina or Afghanistan would serve American purposes); but the most likely Soviet response will be a further hardening toward the Chinese, a posture which will only help to discredit the PRC policy of seeking to normalize relations with the USSR through bilateral diplomacy.

-- The results of the recent visits to China of Presidential Science Advisor Keyworth and Secretary of Commerce Baldrige have raised Chinese expectations that the Administration is prepared to be more forthcoming in transferring technologies to the PRC, and that Defense Department cooperation is needed to facilitate such transfers. The Chinese have been told that it will help their cause if they are able to develop positive working relations with Secretary Weinberger.

In recent years Deng Xiaoping and other leaders have almost pleaded with senior U.S. officials for a more responsive U.S. position on technology transfers--in part because a more forthcoming U.S. attitude will help Deng justify to domestic audiences his policy of active dealings with the United States. Conversely, however, an uncertain or resistant U.S. posture will reinforce the view of doubters in the PRC leadership about the utility to China of active ties to the U.S.

-- The Chinese may be concerned about contemporary signs of a more flexible U.S. posture toward the Soviet Union, and indications that Soviet-American diplomacy may be activated in 1983-84. The Chinese may hope to heighten tensions between Moscow and Washington by inviting the Secretary of Defense to China. At the same time, they would want to avoid "falling behind" in the politics of the strategic triangle or seeing U.S.-PRC relations become further degraded in a context of improving U.S.-Soviet relations. A Chinese foreign policy of "balance" requires concurrent improvements in relations with both Moscow and Washington; otherwise, they will lose leverage in both "superpower" capitals.

-- The Chinese are sensitive to the American domestic political mood as it affects U.S.-PRC relations. Having earlier looked to the possibility of a change of administration in 1984, they now see signs of a Reagan Administration strengthened by the economic recovery and increasing flexibility in foreign affairs. They now have few reasons to hold back in dealings with the Administration. Indeed, after testing the limits of President Reagan's China policy through the negotiations on Taiwan arms sales, and having seen current signs of flexibility on technology transfers, they probably wish to move into a new period of more positive and active relations. While they are unlikely to want to move as close to the United States as they seemed to do in 1980, neither do they want to allow the relationship to continue to deteriorate as a result of second-order problems in the bilateral relationship.

Soviet Responses: As noted earlier, there is some risk for the United States that the Weinberger visit will enable General Secretary Andropov and other Soviet leaders who may favor a more flexible posture toward the Chinese to induce the military and other hardliners to support confidence building gestures toward Beijing (as Brezhnev and Andropov seemed to call for in the fall of 1982); but a more likely response will be a hardening of position toward the Chinese--thus further undercutting the recent movement toward an easing of Sino-Soviet tension, and discrediting those in the PRC leadership who want more "balance" in Chinese foreign policy between the U.S. and USSR.

During the decade of the 1970s the Soviets reacted to the normalization of U.S.-PRC relations by seeking to advance the diplomacy of detente while also warning the U.S. against military cooperation with the PRC (most recently in the 1981 Gromyko letter to then-Secretary of State Haig),

and by rationalizing to themselves their military buildup in the Far East and adventures in Africa, the Middle East, Southwest Asia, and Indochina (actions they would have undertaken in any event).

It seems most likely that a similar Soviet pattern of response can be anticipated in reaction to the Weinberger visit: pursuit of arms control and other negotiations with the U.S.; and a hardening toward the Chinese. But there is some risk that Moscow will use the SecDef's visit as one of a number of rationalizations for a breakdown in the INF talks and further increases in missile deployments in Europe and the Soviet Far East.

Japanese Responses: Under Prime Minister Nakasone the Japanese reaction to the SecDef's visit is likely to be more supportive than it would have been under Suzuki, although there will remain nervousness in Tokyo that the U.S. may come to see China as a significant security partner. This concern is likely to provide added incentive for the Japanese to modernize the JSDF, and to be more responsive toward U.S. concerns that Japan improve her military capabilities within the context of the Mutual Security Treaty.

The Japanese will also be concerned about provocation of the Soviet Union through U.S.-PRC actions, and about embroilment in the rivalries of the great powers; but current concerns in Tokyo about the Soviet SS-20 buildup, as well as Moscow's unyielding position on the Northern Territories issue, will justify to the Japanese heightened U.S.-PRC security cooperation. It is essential, however, that Tokyo be fully "consulted" and briefed on the purposes and results of the SecDef's trip.

OBJECTIVES OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE'S VISIT TO CHINA

The objectives and agenda for the Secretary's visit should reflect not only the current state of U.S.-PRC relations and policy goals of the two sides, but also the pattern of Sino-American contacts in the defense area of recent years. These are best characterized by groping uncertainty on both sides about how far and how fast to develop security cooperation, and an underlying lack of conceptual agreement about the objectives of U.S.-PRC collaboration in the defense field.

Since 1979 there has been a steady inflation of U.S. rhetoric about willingness to sell (or to allow allies to sell) advanced technology and weapons to China, culminating in Secretary of State Haig's announcement in June 1981 that the United States would consider sales of arms to the PRC on a case-by-case basis. Yet the rhetoric has not been matched either by significant technology transfers or weapons sales, or by the development of a political and bureaucratic consensus within the U.S. government on the purposes and nature of a defense relationship with China.

Secretary Weinberger's trip should be used as a vehicle for developing such a conceptual consensus as well as bureaucratic guidelines for managing the security dimensions of the U.S.-PRC relationship.

On the Chinese side, Beijing has done a great deal of "window-shopping" in the West for new arms, but has purchased little. This uncertainty reflects divisions of opinion and politics within the PRC leadership over a program for defense modernization, as well as limitations of finances, economic resources and skilled manpower needed to successfully absorb foreign technology. The sorry fate of the Spey engine deal with the British attests to the difficulties the Chinese face in using foreign technology to modernize their defenses.

The Secretary's trip should re-initiate a dialogue with the Chinese, first begun in 1980, designed to develop a consensus about the most useful (and politically acceptable) forms of collaboration in the defense area.

The Objectives of the Trip:

- o Re-establish a strategic dialogue with the Chinese, with obvious focus on shared concerns about the continuing global Soviet military buildup and Moscow's unyielding efforts to encircle the PRC. The Chinese leadership doubts that the Administration takes the PRC seriously as an element in American strategic planning. They will resist presentations which suggest that China is vulnerable to Soviet military pressures with the counter-argument that the U.S. and Europe are the "real" targets of Soviet expansionism and that China is not directly vulnerable to Soviet pressures. Efforts should be made to cast the dialogue so as to identify areas of shared U.S. and Chinese concern about the Soviet military threat.
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