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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

**Withdrawer**

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**File Folder** USIA CONFERENCE ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY LONDON  
MARCH 3-4, 1986

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
13617	REPORT	1986 REAGAN-GORBACHEV SUMMIT PUBLIC DIPLOMACY STRATEGY [ 1 - 4 ] <b>R 5/15/2008 NLRRF06-114/13</b>	4	ND	B1
13618	REPORT	TALKING POINTS ON U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS [ 5 - 9 ] <b>R 5/15/2008 NLRRF06-114/13</b>	5		B1
13619	CABLE	140004Z FEB 86 [ 14 - 15 ] <b>R 5/15/2008 NLRRF06-114/13</b>	2	2/14/1986	B1
13620	CABLE	271655Z FEB 86 [ 16 - 17 ] <b>R 5/15/2008 NLRRF06-114/13</b>	2	2/27/1986	B1

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13616	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCDANIEL RE USIA CONFERENCE ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY [ 21 - 24 ]	4	3/18/1986	B1
		<b>R 5/15/2008 NLRRF06-114/13</b>			
13622	CABLE	051909Z MAR 86 [ 25 - 30 ]	6	3/5/1986	B1
		<b>R 5/15/2008 NLRRF06-114/13</b>			
13624	REPORT	SAME TEXT AS DOC #13617 [ 34 - 37 ]	4	ND	B1
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		<b>R 5/15/2008 NLRRF06-114/13</b>			
13627	REPORT	1986 REAGAN-GORBACHEV SUMMIT PUBLIC DIPLOMACY STRATEGY [ 45 - 47 ]	3 ONDO	ND	B1
		<b>R 5/15/2008 NLRRF06-114/13</b>			

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## 1986 REAGAN-GORBACHEV SUMMIT

Public Diplomacy Strategy

Regardless of the date ultimately set for the President's meeting with Gorbachev in the United States, the approach to the issues in our public diplomacy should build on the success achieved at the Geneva Summit. The fundamental themes should be the same: to stress the steadiness and consistency of our policy and highlight our practical proposals in all four areas of the agenda and our determination to find common ground wherever possible. Of course, appropriate adjustments of detail must be made to take account of developments, possible shifts in the Soviet position, and the line taken by Soviet spokesmen.

Overall Goals

-- To show that we retain the initiative in guiding the U.S.-Soviet relationship and prevent public pressure to make unwise or premature concessions.

-- To use the meeting to exert maximum pressure on the Soviet leadership to move toward resolution of important problems in an acceptable manner.

-- To uphold and strengthen the President's role as the preeminent leader of our Alliances.

U.S. Themes

Our public diplomacy should foster the following basic perceptions:

1. Summitry is part of a process. The Geneva Summit established a framework for dialogue. The meeting in the United States continues that dialogue at the highest level.

-- The dialogue is necessary to manage an adversarial relationship and give impetus to resolution of outstanding problems.

-- We must keep expectations realistic. Specifically, the thrust of our public diplomacy should be to keep the focus on our four-part agenda - not only arms control - and to redefine summitry so that lack of specific agreements will not be seen as failure.

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-- We aim for fair and effective agreements. Summit meetings should not be judged by the number of agreements reached, but by their contribution to managing the relationship peacefully and constructively.

2. We must deal with the full agenda; no single area can be treated in isolation. In real life, the areas are interrelated. The four areas of this agenda are:

- a. Reducing and eventually eliminating the use and threat of force in resolving international disputes
- b. Reducing and eventually eliminating weapons of mass destruction
- c. Building trust and a more cooperative working relationship
- d. Encouraging respect for human rights

3. The United States has made practical proposals in all these areas. We place no arbitrary or mechanical linkages between different areas, but recognize that progress in one facilitates progress in the others. This is simply a fact of life, not a policy determination.

4. We want the Soviets to see the truth about the U.S. While the fundamental issues between the U.S. and USSR are real, they are exacerbated by Soviet misunderstanding of the United States. Mr. Gorbachev has never visited the U.S. and has numerous misperceptions of U.S. life and U.S. policy. Therefore, one important aim of the 1986 Summit is to show Gorbachev the real U.S. This could lead eventually to a more realistic posture on his part.

5. The U.S.-Soviet Rivalry Will Not Disappear. The vast difference in our political systems, values and ideology means that we will be rivals for the foreseeable future. The challenge is to manage this rivalry in a peaceful fashion. The U.S. follows a steady policy based on realism, strength and dialogue. We are prepared to solve problems in a fair and practical fashion, without the expectation that the Soviet system will change or the Soviet Union will eventually act as an ally. We can have a peaceful world even if our systems and ideologies compete.

6. Consultations with Albin

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### Soviet Goals

Soviet objectives are to focus attention exclusively on arms control issues in order to portray themselves as the "peace party." They will continue to press an array of largely public initiatives designed to capture headlines and deflect criticism of other aspects of their policy rather than to solve problems. They will try to put the U.S. in the position of responding to their thrusts and thus put pressure on us to make concessions at the negotiations.

A primary goal of their initiatives is their long-standing effort to drive wedges between the U.S. and our allies in order to reap the economical and technical benefits of relaxation of tensions with the Europeans. The Soviets also want to enhance their standing as a global power -- an equal of the U.S. in the world's eye.

### Soviet Public Themes

We can expect Moscow to stress the following themes in its propaganda:

1. The central issue in the U.S.-Soviet relationship is arms control; all others are secondary.
2. Another Summit meeting would be meaningless unless agreement can be reached in some important area of arms control.
3. The Soviet Union is sincere in wanting a world without nuclear weapons, but U.S. policies -- particularly SDI -- block progress.
4. SDI is inconsistent with nuclear weapons reduction.
5. While the President may be sincere in his expressed desire to reduce nuclear weapons and create a non-threatening strategic defense, some of the members of his Administration are bent on achieving military superiority over the Soviet Union and developing a first-strike capability behind the cover of SDI.
6. The U.S., not the USSR, is guilty of using military force to intervene in other countries.
7. Pressure on "human rights" is both hypocritical -- since the U.S. is plagued by racism, inequality and poverty -- and also represents unwarranted interference in Soviet internal affairs. It is not acceptable as an issue in U.S.-Soviet relations or as a subject for negotiation.

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8. The Soviet Union has a vigorous new leadership which wants peace and cooperation. The U.S., dominated by its "military-industrial complex," only pays lip service to relaxing tensions and uses "dialogue" to lull its public.

9. It is up to the U.S. to change its policies in order to make a more peaceful world possible.

These propaganda themes will likely be accompanied by a show of resisting U.S. pressure for restraint in the Third World, and engaging in some public and semi-public gestures designed to show the Soviets as interested in solving regional disputes, e.g. Cyprus, the Middle East, and which actually repackage standard Soviet positions. They will, however, stop short of inviting a direct confrontation. Arms supplies to Nicaragua, Libya and Angola, for example, may be stepped up. Although some further dissidents may be released, this will be done while proclaiming that human rights is not an issue. Strident propaganda to "prove" that the U.S. is following militaristic policies and is covertly involved all over the world will continue.

#### Countering Soviet Propaganda

The best counter to Soviet propaganda will be a combination of exposing the facts about Soviet actions and policies and a vigorous presentation of positive U.S. initiatives and policies. Criticisms of Soviet actions and policies are most effective when they do not appear to be strident or examples of knee-jerk negativism, but reasoned objections to dangerous policies. Whenever possible, critiques of Soviet actions, proposals and policies should be accompanied by an explanation of what the U.S. proposes to deal with the issue. In addition, we should welcome positive Soviet initiatives as consistent with the spirit of Geneva and proof of the effectiveness of our approach.

Talking Points on  
U.S.-Soviet Relations

A. The Agenda

1. Reducing and eventually eliminating the use and threat of force in resolving international disputes. The use of force to serve national ends threatens the peace and makes reduction of arms more difficult.

2. Reducing and eventually eliminating weapons of mass destruction. Nuclear, chemical and -- if they still exist -- bacteriological weapons are the weapons potentially most destructive of human life. We must move rapidly to reduce nuclear weapons and ban chemical weapons, with effective verification. Our ultimate goal is to eliminate all weapons of mass destruction from the arsenals of all countries, but we recognize that nuclear weapons cannot be eliminated entirely until conventional weapons are at a balance and at lower levels and large countries refrain from using force to achieve national goals.

3. Building trust and a more cooperative working relationship. High levels of suspicion, fed by isolation, threaten the peace and make it much more difficult to solve practical problems. A better working relationship requires the following:

- Strict compliance with all agreements.
- More contact between the peoples of both countries and better information flow through the media in both.
- Frank discussion of our differences, coupled with a readiness to solve practical problems fairly.
- Strict reciprocity of benefit in all arrangements.

4. Encouraging respect for human rights. Governments which respect the rights of their own citizens to speak their minds, to travel and to depart their country if they wish are less likely to follow aggressive policies than those which attempt to control every aspect of their citizen's lives. Human rights is, therefore, not merely a humanitarian issue; it is also essential to a stable peace.

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## B. U.S. Proposals

1. To reduce use and threat of force: The President's proposal at the UNGA in October, 1985. We are pursuing this initiative with the Soviets in diplomatic contacts and in a series of regular consultations on regional issues, and with the parties in the affected areas.

### 2. To reduce and eliminate weapons of mass destruction:

-- Proposal at NST talks for 50% reduction in strategic offensive nuclear arms.

-- President's February, 1986, proposal for elimination, over three years, of all U.S. and Soviet LRINF systems.

-- U.S. proposal to discuss and eventually negotiate means whereby strategic defense systems, should they prove feasible, can be introduced in a cooperative manner to facilitate the reduction and ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons.

-- U.S. draft treaty at Conference on Disarmament in Geneva to ban all chemical weapons globally, with strict verification.

-- Western proposal in MBFR for initial reductions of conventional forces in Central Europe and agreement on verification measures which would subsequently permit reductions to a common and much lower ceiling.

-- In CDE, western proposals for concrete measures to reduce risk of surprise attack, war through miscalculation, and for measures to build confidence by providing for greater openness in military movements and deployments.

### 3. To enhance confidence:

-- U.S. proposals for eliminating violations of treaty and political commitments.

-- President's initiative for massive increase in people-to-people contacts and reciprocal access to media.

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-- U.S. proposals for increased cooperation in many areas, including peaceful use of space, medical research, environmental research and other scientific areas.

4. To protect human rights: U.S. has made clear that development of bilateral U.S.-Soviet relations will depend importantly on Soviet observance of their political obligations assumed in the Helsinki Final Act.

C. Countering Soviet Propaganda

The following points should be made in preempting and responding to Soviet arguments:

-- The President is realistic about the nature of the Soviet system, but is serious, firm and patient in his desire to solve concrete problems. Our proposals are designed to get at those real problems which are amenable to solution; they are subject to the give-and-take of negotiation so long as our basic principles are preserved.

-- In contrast, the Soviets are still trying to achieve the public perception of relaxation without addressing the causes of tension. There is still too much of "what's mine is mine and what's yours is negotiable" in their approach.

-- The Soviets seem to desire a world in which the West is psychologically and physically disarmed, while the Soviet leadership is free to use its military force to expand wherever it chooses and to intimidate others. They also wish to establish as a principle the regime's right to conduct whatever repression it considers expedient toward its own citizens and those in countries under its domination.

-- This is not a prescription for a peaceful world, or one in which democratic values can be preserved. Therefore, it cannot lead to improved relations with the United States.

-- If the new Soviet leadership is genuinely interested in reducing tensions and creating a less threatening world in the future, it will have to address the underlying causes of U.S.-Soviet tension and work with us to solve as many of the concrete issues as we can.

-- Summit meetings are important in providing an opportunity to discuss these issues at the highest level, and to work on ways to solve them. They are not a "favor" to either side and must not be subject to preconditions.

-- Whatever policies the Soviets follow, there will be peace between us, so long as the U.S. maintains its strength and deterrent capacity. However, we would like more than that. If

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this is also the Soviet desire, they will find us willing to address outstanding issues fairly and realistically, so that we can establish a more stable and constructive long term relationship -- as the President called for in his January 1984 speech.

Some "Don'ts"

Some arguments should be avoided because the Soviets can use them either publicly or privately to call into question U.S. seriousness or to put us at a tactical disadvantage in negotiations. For these reasons, statements along the following lines should be avoided when one is either speaking on the record or on background when the speaker can be quoted as an Administration official:

1. "Gorbachev was forced to come to Geneva."

(Instead: "The President has restored the balance of power, and this permits negotiations on a fair and constructive basis.")

2. "Our latest proposal will put Gorbachev on the spot."

(Note: Suggests we are not substantively serious; also personalizes the issue, which should be discussed on its merits.)

3. "The Soviets will never... (pull out of Afghanistan... respect human rights...open up their society...etc.)."

(Note: Our stance should be that these things are possible if the Soviet leaders should desire. Otherwise, we diminish pressure on the Soviets to move in the right direction and make our own policies seem unrealistic. Of course, we also should not predict that these things will happen.)

4. "The Soviet P.R. effort is a threat."

(Note: Ultimately, the effectiveness of Soviet propaganda will depend on whether there are any real changes in Soviet policy and actions, particularly if we do our job in making clear to the public what the facts are. We therefore have no need for any nervousness or defensiveness. It is far

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better to welcome the apparent Soviet interest in influencing Western opinion and express the hope that it will lead to a review of those policies which have damaged the Soviet image abroad.)

5. "We were surprised by the latest Soviet proposal."

(Note: We should never be surprised by Soviet tactical maneuvering or highly publicized announcements of "new" proposals. To suggest that we are surprised implies that we are not prepared to deal promptly with them -- which is not the case. It is preferable tactically -- and factually more accurate -- to point out that this is part of the familiar Soviet pattern of making periodic announcements of policies claimed to be new, but that we will give it a close look and if we find positive elements we will follow up at the negotiating table.")

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## COUNTERING MYTHS ABOUT U.S. POLICY

Partly as the result of Soviet propaganda, and partly because of genuine lack of comprehension, a number of unfounded myths are current in some sections of the U.S. public or foreign publics. They should be exposed as fallacious at every appropriate opportunity -- certainly when they are raised in questions or in published articles. We also should keep them in mind so that in our own presentations we are careful not to use expressions or arguments which appear to give them substance.

Attached are suggested talking points to deal with the following such myths:

1. Current U.S. Policy Is "Detente II"
2. The U.S. and the Soviet Union Act the Same
3. The "Arms Race" is the Primary Threat to Peace
- JM 4. "Rhetoric" Is Dangerous
- JM 5. U.S. Pursues Artificial Linkages
- SES 6. U.S. Seeks Military Superiority
- SES 7. SDI Is Enemy of Arms Reduction
- SS 8. U.S. Makes East-West Issues out of Local Conflicts
9. U.S. Views World in Ideological Terms
- SS 10. U.S. Thinks Only of Military Solutions
- SES 11. U.S. Exaggerates Soviet Threat
- JM 12. U.S. Aims to Destroy Soviet System

MYTH No. 1

"U.S. POLICY IS DETENTE II"

Response: Our policy is fundamentally different from the policy of "detente" as it was practiced in the 1970's. In fact, we have learned some bitter lessons from our experiences in the 1970's and have designed our policy to avoid the manifest deficiencies of our policy at that time. It is very important to understand the differences, since some of the elements of current policy may seem superficially similar.

In practice, if not necessarily always in theory, the detente policy of the 1970's had the following flaws:

1. Arms control was considered central and other issues secondary. This led to a neglect of U.S. defenses and de facto toleration of Soviet efforts to use military means to extend its influence abroad and to intimidate its neighbors. These Soviet actions, more than any other, brought an end to detente.

Our current policy rests on the conviction that the U.S. must retain adequate strength, military and otherwise, to deal effectively with the Soviet Union, and we have rebuilt that strength. We also have made it clear that Soviet use of military force outside its borders cannot be isolated from the prospects of arms reduction, and that arms control cannot be pursued to the neglect of other important issues in the relationship.

2. It was assumed that Soviet aggressiveness could be contained by diplomacy, trade benefits and arms control.

We have no such illusion. Soviet aggressiveness can be contained only if the Soviet leadership is convinced that attempts to use military force to extend Soviet influence in the world is risky and likely to fail. We have made clear that we will take whatever steps are feasible to support those struggling for freedom and democracy, and will do all we can to ensure that Soviet aggression does not succeed. We reject condominium or any division of the world into spheres of influence. At the same time, we are prepared to join the Soviet Union in assisting parties to regional disputes to reach peaceful accommodation, and would welcome agreements with the Soviet Union to halt the flow of arms and foreign troops into areas of conflict.

3. It was assumed that an expanding network of ties could moderate Soviet behavior, and therefore such ties were sometimes established for presumed atmospheric benefits without close regard to reciprocity.

While we recognize the importance of ties and communication in breaking down barriers to personal movement and to the flow of information, we do not believe that such ties can be expected to have a direct effect on Soviet policy. Therefore, they should be established only on the basis of strict reciprocity of benefit.



We will not pay a price for "atmosphere."

4. Criticism of the Soviet system and Soviet actions was muted on the assumption that frank criticism would offend the Soviet leadership and "spoil the atmosphere."

Our policy is based on realism, which means that we will not be silent when we find Soviet actions threatening or inconsistent with peaceful and civilized behavior. We also will not refrain from defending our values -- even at the height of "detente" the Soviet leaders proclaimed that the "ideological struggle" must continue. An improved atmosphere should only be the result of a genuine reduction of tensions in the world. So long as they exist, we will not try to pretend that the situation is other than it is in fact.

Muting our voices when Soviet actions are dangerous, aggressive or inhuman does not serve the peace or better U.S.-Soviet relations. Our differences must be clearly understood if they are to be dealt with successfully. And our publics must not be misled about the true state of affairs if they are to support the kind of policies necessary to preserve our freedoms and protect our Allies.

5. It was assumed that general declarations of intent -- such as the 1972 Declaration of Principles or the 1973 Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War -- could moderate Soviet behavior and discourage attempts to seek unilateral advantages.

We understand that general declarations of intent -- which at best are subject to contradictory interpretations and at worst can lull Western publics into a false sense of security -- are rarely constructive unless accompanied by concrete, verifiable undertakings which alleviate the underlying causes of the problem.

6. It was assumed that trade ties could act as a restraint on dangerous behavior, and that subsidized credits and guarantees were justified.

While we welcome an expansion of trade in non-strategic goods, we believe it should be conducted under market conditions and should not receive direct or indirect subsidies from the American taxpayer.



13

CONFERENCE ON U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN EUROPE  
AGENDA

Monday, March 3, 1986:

0830-0845      Registration.

0900-0915      Welcome and Introduction. (London Charge  
d'Affaires Seitz, EU-Mr. Remick)

0915-1015      U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Union: Overview of  
U.S. Goals and Objectives; Public Diplomacy  
Considerations. (Ambassador Matlock)

1015-1030      Coffee.

1030-1200      Arms Control and the Geneva Negotiations:  
Response to Gorbachev Proposals, Prospects for  
Progress at the NST Negotiations and Other Fora  
(CDE, CW, MBFR, Compliance). (NSC-Col. Robert  
Linhard, Mr. Steiner; State-Amb. Nitze; DOD-Mr.  
Sullivan)

1200-1330      Lunch (Embassy Green Room for PAOs; open for  
other participants).

1330-1430      SDI (NSC-Col. Linhard, Mr. Steiner; DOD-Mr.  
Sullivan)

1430-1530      Discussion - Regional Issues: Afghanistan and  
Other Issues. (NSC-Amb. Matlock)

1530-1545      Coffee.

1545-1630      Discussion - Human Rights and Bilateral Issues:  
Exchanges, Trade, Etc. (NSC-Amb. Matlock, PAO  
Moscow Benson)

1800-2000      Reception Hosted by London PAO Korengold for  
Conference Participants and British East/West  
Experts (Wives Invited).

Tuesday, March 4, 1986:

0900-0930      USIA Research: European Attitudes on East/West  
Issues Post-Geneva. (USIA/PG-Mr. Arnold)

0930-1100      Country Reports: How the Geneva Meeting and U.S.  
Policy Have Been Perceived in Europe. Specific  
Country Concerns. Roundtable moderated by EU-Mr.  
Remick; PAO Bonn Catherman followed by PAO Rome  
Baldyga; PAO Paris Courtney and PAO London  
Korengold will lead off.

1100-1115      Coffee.

1115-1215      Indications of How the USSR May Be Preparing for  
the Next "Summit" Meeting in the U.S. -- In  
Substantive and Propaganda Terms. (NSC-Amb.  
Matlock, PAO Moscow Benson)

1215-1345      Lunch (Open).

1345-1500      Discussion: Summit Public Diplomacy Strategy for  
Europe. (NSC-Amb. Matlock, EU-Mr. Remick)

1500-1530      Coffee.

1530-1700      Conclusions and Recommendations. (NSC-Amb.  
Matlock, EU-Mr. Remick)

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EO 12356 DECL: OADR JOHN F. KORDEK, DIRECTOR/EU

SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN EUROPE, MARCH 3-4 IN LONDON

1. USIA/EU WITH THE SUPPORT OF THE NSC WILL SPONSOR A PUBLIC DIPLOMACY PLANNING CONFERENCE IN LONDON MARCH 3-4 FOR THE NATO COUNTRY PAOS. THE CONFERENCE WILL ADDRESS HOW TO CONVEY MORE EFFECTIVELY TO OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES AND THEIR RESPECTIVE PUBLICS THE PRESIDENT'S AGENDA FOR U.S./SOVIET RELATIONS, PARTICULARLY LOOKING FORWARD TO THE PRESIDENT'S NEXT MEETING WITH GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV. PAOS AT ADDRESSEE POSTS SHOULD PLAN TO ATTEND AND BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS IDEAS FOR ACHIEVING GREATER ALLIED UNDERSTANDING OF U.S. POLICY GOALS AND OBJECTIVES, GREATER RECOGNITION OF THE DEEP-SEATED DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE U.S. AND USSR, AND GREATER ALLIED UNITY IN ADDRESSING SOVIET POSITIONS AND POSTURING. PAOS ALSO SHOULD BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THEIR MOST COUNTRIES' PARTICULAR PERSPECTIVES ON U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS AND HOW TO ADDRESS THEM MOST EFFECTIVELY, INCLUDING HOW WASHINGTON CAN BEST SUPPORT THEM IN THIS EFFORT.

2. STATE/EUR FULLY SUPPORTS THE GOALS AND OBJECTIVES OF THIS CONFERENCE AND WILL TAKE PART. UNFORTUNATELY, BUDGETARY CONSTRAINTS PRECLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF PARTICIPATION BY STATE OFFICERS ASSIGNED TO NATO POSTS IN THIS MEETING. PAOS, THEREFORE, SHOULD COORDINATE WITH THEIR STATE COUNTERPARTS AT POST BEFORE TRAVELING TO LONDON SO THAT THEY MAY REPRESENT THEIR MISSIONS' VIEWS AT THE CONFERENCE.

3. WASHINGTON PARTICIPANTS AT THE CONFERENCE WILL INCLUDE AMBASSADOR JACK F. MATLOCK, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND SENIOR DIRECTOR OF EUROPEAN AND SOVIET AFFAIRS, NSC, WHO WILL CHAIR THE CONFERENCE; MARLIN W. REMICK, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, USIA; LYNN PASCOE, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SOVIET UNION AFFAIRS, STATE; PETER M. SULLIVAN, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY TO THE DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NUCLEAR FORCES AND ARMS CONTROL POLICY (OSD/ISP); AND STEVEN E. STEINER, DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE PROGRAMS AND ARMS CONTROL, NSC.

4. A WORKING AGENDA FOR THE CONFERENCE FOLLOWS. POSTS ARE INVITED TO PROVIDE COMMENTS OR SUGGESTIONS ON THE AGENDA BY FEBRUARY 19.

MARCH 3, 1986

9:00-9:15	WELCOME AND INTRODUCTION.
9:15-10:15	U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION: THE AGENDA; ALLIED INTERESTS; RELATIONSHIP TO PUBLIC DIPLOMACY. STRATEGY FOR ACHIEVING BETTER UNDERSTANDING IN EUROPE OF U.S. POLICY.
10:15-10:30	COFFEE.
10:30-11:30	DISCUSSION -- SDI.
11:30-12:30	DISCUSSION -- ARMS CONTROL: IMPACT OF GORBACHEV'S JANUARY 15 PROPOSALS ON

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NLRR F06-114/13 \*13619  
BY Cil NARA DATE 5/15/08

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USIA

STATE FOR EUR/SOV LPASCOE

NSC FOR MATLOCK/MANDEL/STEINER

DEFENSE FOR OSD/TSP SKOCH

EO 12356 DECL: OADR JOHN F. KORDEK, DIRECTOR/EU

NEGOTIATIONS AT THE GENEVA NST TALKS. PROSPECTS FOR  
SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS.

12:30-14:00 LUNCH (OPEN).

14:00-15:00 DISCUSSION -- REGIONAL ISSUES.

15:00-15:30 DISCUSSION -- HUMAN RIGHTS: CSCE, BERN HUMAN  
CONTACTS MEETING, PROSPECTS FOR VIENNA CSCE  
REVIEW CONFERENCE.

15:30-15:45 COFFEE.

15:45-16:30 DISCUSSION -- BILATERAL ISSUES: EXCHANGES,  
TRADE, AIR SAFETY, ETC.

18:00-20:00 RECEPTION HOSTED BY LONDON PAO KORENGOLD FOR  
CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS AND BRITISH EAST/WEST  
EXPERTS.

MARCH 4, 1986

9:00-9:30 USIA RESEARCH REPORT SUMMARIZING EUROPEAN  
ATTITUDES ON EAST/WEST ISSUES POST-GENEVA.

9:30-11:00 COUNTRY REPORTS: HOW THE GENEVA MEETING AND US  
POLICY HAVE BEEN PERCEIVED IN EUROPE.

11:00-11:15 COFFEE.

11:15-12:15 INDICATIONS OF HOW THE USSR MAY BE PREPARING

-- -- FOR THE NEXT 'SUMMIT' MEETING IN THE US - IN  
SUBSTANTIVE AND PROPAGANDA TERMS.  
12:15-13:45 LUNCH (OPEN).  
13:45-15:00 DISCUSSION: SUMMIT PUBLIC DIPLOMACY STRATEGY  
-- -- FOR EUROPE.  
15:00-15:30 COFFEE.  
15:30-17:00 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

5. ACTION REQUESTED: ADDRESSEE PAOS ARE ASKED TO CONFIRM  
THEIR PARTICIPATION BY CABLE TO EU AND USIS LONDON. TRAVEL  
ITINERARIES AND HOTEL ROOM REQUIREMENTS SHOULD BE SLUGGED  
ACTION USIS LONDON INFO EU. (FYI - CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS  
WILL BE HOUSED AT THE CUMBERLAND HOTEL AT POUNDS 50 FOR A  
SINGLE AND POUNDS 65 FOR A DOUBLE ROOM). POSTS ARE  
AUTHORIZED TO ISSUE TRAVEL ORDERS FOR THIS TDY AND CHARGE  
THEIR GOE FOR TRAVEL AND PER DIEM. EU WILL REIMBURSE USIS  
POSTS FOR ONE HALF OF THE TOTAL COST OF TRAVEL AND PER DIEM.  
WHEN ACTUAL COSTS ARE KNOWN, PLEASE NOTIFY M/CBEU AND REQUEST  
REIMBURSEMENT. (EU)

WICK

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76

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USIA

STATE FOR STATE/EUR/SOV AND STATE/PA

NSC FOR MATLOCK/MANDEL/LINHARD/STEINER/SMALL

DEFENSE FOR OSD/ISP PSULLIVAN/SKOCH

EO 12356 DECL: OADR JOHN F. KORDEK, DIR., EU

SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN EUROPE  
(EAST/WEST RELATIONS)  
REFERENCE: USIA 10398

1. THE FINAL SCHEDULE FOR THE CONFERENCE FOLLOWS IN PARA  
2. FIRST DAY'S FORMAT WILL BE TO DISCUSS THE U.S. APPROACH  
TO RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION FOCUSING PARTICULARLY ON  
EUROPEAN CONCERNS AND PERCEPTIONS -- OR MISPERCEPTIONS --  
ABOUT U.S. POLICY. IN THIS CONNECTION, IT WOULD BE  
PARTICULARLY USEFUL FOR PAOS, IN CONSULTATION WITH THE  
POLITICAL SECTION OF THEIR MISSIONS, TO IDENTIFY KEY 'MYTHS'  
ABOUT U.S. POLICY WHICH NEED TO BE ADDRESSED IN OUR PUBLIC  
DIPLOMACY STRATEGY. THE SECOND DAY WILL BE DEVOTED TO  
CRAFTING SUCH A STRATEGY TAILORED TO ADDRESSING EUROPEAN  
QUESTIONS AND CONCERNS BASED ON THE FIRST DAY'S DISCUSSIONS.  
PAOS SHOULD REVIEW STATE 049461 AND STATE 056019 FOR  
BACKGROUND ON THE U.S. APPROACH TO SPECIFIC ARMS CONTROL  
ISSUES.:

2. SCHEDULE:

MARCH 3, 1986

9:00-9:15 WELCOME AND INTRODUCTION. (LONDON DCM SEITZ, EU -  
MR. REMICK).

9:15-10:15 U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION: OVERVIEW OF  
U.S. GOALS AND OBJECTIVES; PUBLIC DIPLOMACY CONSIDERATIONS.

(AMBASSADOR MATLOCK).

10:15-10:30 COFFEE.

10:30-12:00 ARMS CONTROL AND THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS:  
RESPONSE TO GORBACHEV PROPOSALS, PROSPECTS FOR PROGRESS AT  
THE NST NEGOTIATIONS AND OTHER FORA (CDE, CW, MBFR,  
COMPLIANCE). NSC - COL. ROBERT LINHARD, MR. STEINER, STATE  
- AMBASSADOR NITZE, DOD - MR. SULLIVAN.

12:00-13:30 LUNCH (FREE).

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17

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FOR EUROPE.      ONSC - AMBASSADOR MATLOCK, EU - MR. REMICK).  
15:00-15:30 COFFEE.  
15:30-17:00 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.      ONSC -  
AMBASSADOR MATLOCK, EU - MR. REMICK).      (EU)  
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USIA

STATE FOR STATE/EUR/SOV AND STATE/PA

NSC FOR MATLOCK/MANDEL/LINHARD/STEINER/SMALL

DEFENSE FOR OSD/ISP PSULLIVAN/SKOCH

EO 12356 DECL: OADR JOHN F. KORDEK, DIR., EU

13:30-14:30 SDI: (NSC - COL. LINHARD, MR. STEINER AND DOD - MR. SULLIVAN.)

14:30-15:30 DISCUSSION -- REGIONAL ISSUES: AFGHANISTAN AND OTHER ISSUES. (NSC - AMBASSADOR MATLOCK).

15:30-15:45 COFFEE.

15:45-16:30 DISCUSSION -- HUMAN RIGHTS AND BILATERAL ISSUES (EXCHANGES, TRADE, ETC.) (NSC - AMBASSADOR MATLOCK, PAO MOSCOW BENSON).

10:00-20:00 RECEPTION HOSTED BY LONDON PAO KORENGOLD FOR CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS AND BRITISH EAST/WEST EXPERTS. MARCH 4, 1986

9:00-9:30 USIA RESEARCH: EUROPEAN ATTITUDES ON EAST/WEST ISSUES POST-GENEVA. (USIA/PG - MR. ARNOLD).

9:30-11:00 COUNTRY REPORTS: HOW THE GENEVA MEETING AND US POLICY HAVE BEEN PERCEIVED IN EUROPE. SPECIFIC COUNTRY CONCERNS. ROUNDTABLE MODERATED BY EU - MR. REMICK; PAO BONN CATHERMAN FOLLOWED BY PAO ROME BALDYGA, PAO PARIS COURTNEY AND PAO LONDON KORENGOLD WILL LEAD OFF.

11:00-11:15 COFFEE.

11:15-12:15 INDICATIONS OF HOW THE USSR MAY BE PREPARING FOR THE NEXT 'SUMMIT' MEETING IN THE US - IN SUBSTANTIVE AND PROPAGANDA TERMS. (NSC - AMBASSADOR MATLOCK, PAO MOSCOW BENSON).

12:15-13:45 LUNCH (FREE).

13:45-15:00 DISCUSSION: SUMMIT PUBLIC DIPLOMACY STRATEGY

18

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USIA

LONDON FOR USIS; STATE FOR EUR/SOV: LPASCOE;

NSC FOR MATLOCK, STEINER, MANDEL

EO 12356 N/A

SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON U. S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY, MARCH 3-4 IN LONDON

REFERENCE: USIA 10398 (C)

1. WASHINGTON/LONDON ITINERARY FOR CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS AMBASSADOR JACK MATLOCK, STEVEN STEINER AND JUDYT MANDEL OF THE NSC AND LYNN PASCOE OF STATE/EUR/SOV IS AS FOLLOWS:

MARCH 1 LV DULLES AT 6:45 PM VIA PA 106  
MARCH 2 ARR LONDON (HEATHROW) AT 6:45 AM

2. STEINER AND MANDEL WILL RETURN TO WASHINGTON ON MARCH 5. THEIR LONDON/WASHINGTON ITINERARY FOLLOWS:

MARCH 5 DEP LONDON (HEATHROW) AT 1:45 PM VIA PA 107  
MARCH 5 ARR DULLES AT 5:10 PM.

3. AMBASSADOR MATLOCK WILL RETURN TO WASHINGTON ON MARCH 6. HIS LONDON/WASHINGTON ITINERARY FOLLOWS:

MARCH 6 LV LONDON (HEATHROW) AT 1:45 PM VIA PA 107  
MARCH 6 ARR DULLES AT 5:10 PM.

4. REQUEST A SINGLE ROOM FOR AMBASSADOR MATLOCK AT THE CUMBERLAND HOTEL FOR THE NIGHTS OF MARCH 2, 3, 4, 5.

5. REQUEST SINGLE ROOMS FOR STEINER, MANDEL AND PASCOE AT THE CUMBERLAND HOTEL FOR THE NIGHTS OF MARCH 2, 3, 4.

6. WILL ADVISE CONCERNING PASCOE'S ONWARD TRAVEL VIA SEPTEL. (EU)

WICK  
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Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

By CS NARA, Date 8/20/02

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FROM INF AMBASSADOR GLITMAN

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PARM, INF, NST, START, UK, UR, US

SUBJECT: UK-U.S. CONSULTATIONS ON ARMS CONTROL

REFS: (A) NST GENEVA 1691, (B) LONDON 4020

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. PER REF B. AMBASSADOR GLITMAN WILL BE IN LONDON  
MARCH 10 TO CONSULT WITH UK ON INF.

3. INF NEGOTIATING GROUP HAS PREPARED A SUMMARY OF  
EXCERPTS (SLIGHTLY SANITIZED TO DELETE DATES) OF HOW THE  
SOVIETS HAVE TREATED THE UK/FRENCH ISSUE IN THEIR  
STATEMENTS HERE SINCE INTRODUCING THE GORBACHEV PROPOSAL  
INTO THE NEGOTIATIONS JANUARY 16. WE BELIEVE IT WOULD  
BE USEFUL TO PROVIDE THE BRITISH WITH SUCH A SUMMARY IN  
ADVANCE OF THE UK-SOVIET BILATERALS.

4. ACTION REQUESTED: WASHINGTON CONCURRENCE FOR  
AMBASSADOR GLITMAN TO PROVIDE THE BRITISH WITH SUCH  
A SUMMARY DURING HIS VISIT ON MARCH 10. KAMPELMAN  
BT

#2032

NNNN

28-FEB-86 TCH: 19:44

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*Matthew*  
*F-41*

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USIA

USIA FOR EU/KORDEK; STATE FOR EUR/DOV LPASCOE;  
NSC FOR MATLOCK/MANDEL/STEINER; DEFENSE FOR  
OSD/ISP SKOCH

EO 12356: N/A

SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN  
EUROPE, MARCH 3-4 IN LONDON

REF: USIA 10398-C

1. BECAUSE A NUMBER OF YOU WILL BE COMING EARLY  
OR STAYING AFTER THE MARCH 3-4 PUBLIC DIPLOMACY  
CONFERENCE, AND MAY WANT TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF  
LONDON'S THEATER OFFERINGS, WE HAVE MADE ARRANGEMENTS  
WITH THOMAS COOK, WHO ARE LOCATED IN THE EMBASSY,  
AT 499-9000, EXT. 2707, TO ACCEPT DIRECT TELEPHONED  
REQUESTS FROM PARTICIPANTS DESIRING THEATER TICKETS.  
BOOKINGS CAN BE DONE BY PROVISION OF CREDIT CARD  
NUMBER, ADDRESS, AND EXPIRY DATE.

2. USIS LONDON REGRETS, HOWEVER, THAT IT CANNOT,  
IN MOST CASES, PROVIDE TRANSPORT TO AND FROM THE  
AIRPORT. LOCAL TRANSPORTATION IS READILY AVAILABLE  
BY TAXI. THE TUBE (WITH A TRANSFER) OR THE AIRBUS  
HAVE STOPS AT MARBLE ARCH, WHICH IS QUITE NEAR TO  
THE CUMBERLAND HOTEL, WHERE MOST CONFERENCE  
PARTICIPANTS WILL BE STAYING.

3. BE FOREWARNED ALSO THAT, UNLESS BOOKING IS  
DESIRED FOR THE PREVIOUS NIGHT, AT FULL COST,  
HOTEL ROOMS PROBABLY WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE UNTIL

4. PAO IS HOSTING COMMUNITY BREAKFAST SUNDAY  
MORNING, MARCH 2, AT PAO RESIDENCE, 139 GLOUCESTER  
ROAD, SW7 (TWO BLOCKS FROM GLOUCESTER ROAD TUBE  
STATION AND EN ROUTE BETWEEN THE AIRPORT AND THE  
CUMBERLAND HOTEL) FOR PARTICIPANTS AWAITING ACCESS  
TO THEIR ROOMS THAT DAY. FOR PLANNING, WOULD  
APPRECIATE AN ALERT IF YOU PLAN TO STOP BY.

KORENGOLD  
BT



21  
JMCNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 18, 1986

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. MCDANIEL

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*  
SUBJECT: USIA Conference on Public Diplomacy

As you know, USIA conducted a conference of PAO's in NATO countries in London March 3-4. The purpose was to discuss public diplomacy strategy for dealing with East-West issues in Allied countries.

The telegrams reporting on the conference proceedings are at Tab I. Those of us participating came away with the following impressions of European attitudes:

1. An attitude that both superpowers act very much alike (i.e., something close to the "moral equivalence" thesis) is an important sentiment in all the countries with the possible exception of France. It underlies many of our political problems in obtaining Allied consensus on specific issues, especially those involving conflict out of the NATO area.
2. The Geneva Summit had a major impact in all countries, with approval of U.S. handling of East-West issues rising everywhere. Coupled with this, however, was a rise in approval of Soviet foreign policy. In Italy, for example, Gorbachev's "approval ratings" rose more than Reagan's, although the President remains far ahead of Gorbachev. (This suggests, by the way, that we face a PR problem in Europe if the Summit this year does not materialize.)
3. At the moment, Allied cohesion on most arms control issues is solid. Our consultations on Gorbachev's January 15 proposals (which were received skeptically in Europe to begin with) succeeded brilliantly. (This shows, by the way, the value of intensive consultations, particularly when they result in some shift of the U.S. position in response to Allied comments.)
4. Nevertheless, lurking under the surface are problem areas:
  - a. Some polls indicate that skepticism toward SDI seems to be growing among the broad publics in Europe. It is difficult, however, to interpret the polling evidence since much depends on

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BY CIL NARA DATE 5/15/08



the way the question is asked. It is probably more relevant to note that SDI is not a front-burner issue in Europe, and a relatively quiet, systematic educational approach seems preferable in dealing with it since there seems no good reason to make it a high profile issue in Europe.

b. In some countries (the UK for example) there is disquiet about our refusal to enter into negotiations on a CTB. (This is not the same as pressure to join the Soviet-proposed moratorium; the British, for example, oppose that, but advocate agreeing to resume negotiations on a CTB. In general, anti-nuclear sentiment is particularly strong in Scandinavia, the Netherlands and on the left side of the political spectrum in Germany.)

5. As noted, public criticism of U.S. policy tends to be greatest in regard to regional conflicts. In most countries (France, again, is an exception), Afghanistan gets little attention, while U.S. policy in Central America is the object of widespread criticism. (The feeling was that we are limited in what we can do directly to swing the sentiment regarding Central America; for this, the most persuasive spokesmen will be persons from the area. We should think more about getting our friends in Central America to put the case more actively in Europe. As for Afghanistan, we clearly need steps to get more news of Soviet actions there into the European media.)

6. France, in many ways the exception to these general trends, presents one of the brightest pictures in Europe, in terms of public attitudes. In recent years, there has been a decided swing of French intellectual sentiment to a more anti-Soviet and pro-American position. Raymond Aron is the intellectual hero of much French youth, and the non-Communist left is bitterly critical of the Soviet Union. This is a reversal of French intellectual attitudes from those prevalent just after World War II. In the past, French intellectual currents have been the precursors of those which sweep through intellectual circles in Europe as a whole. We can only hope that this will prove true in the future as well.

Bearing in mind these general conclusions regarding the substantive job to be done, we also came away with the following impressions of USIA's capacity to deal with them in the field:

1. The meeting was definitely needed; most PAO's were not solidly familiar with important nuances of our current policy, particularly in regard to arms control issues. Their questioning reflected this, and we were able to give them solid guidance across the spectrum of East-West issues. For this, the participation of Linhard, Steiner and Mandel -- backed up by DOD representatives -- was absolutely essential. The USIA officials present were unable to cope with the questions, and indeed, had to be corrected at times on important points.



2. The PAO's, except for Korengold, were not aware of the need for factoring possible Presidential activity into their plans for local treatment of issues. (Example: the possibility of arranging, from time to time, written Presidential interviews in the local media, designed both to deal with important issues in the country in question and to be replayed elsewhere.) They were encouraged to think in advance how Washington involvement to strengthen their programs and plan media coverage pro-actively. Karna Small was particularly effective in advising on techniques and approaches which draw on White House experience, and make use of the support we can offer.

3. Few seemed to have taken a forward look at attitudes in their countries, and developed a long-term strategy to deal with it. Since some fundamental attitudes can only be changed over time, a comprehensive and persistent program is necessary. USIA will be tasking such plans shortly, and the PAO's were asked to start thinking about them.

The following specific taskings were developed at the conference, or are being discussed currently with USIA as a result of the conference:

1. The NSC staff will develop talking points on the most prevalent "myths" about U.S. policy for use in the field. A preliminary version of these points was presented at the conference, and PAO's were instructed to add myths current locally to the list so that we can provide appropriate guidance.

2. USIA, working with State Public Affairs, will refine our current list of speakers available for particular topics, and will add to this an indication of relevant foreign language capability. (In some countries there is a great need for speakers who can deal with the issues in the local language -- particularly effective for TV interviews, for example. We may not be able to help out much with Icelandic, Danish and Dutch, but we should be able to find some who can handle French, German, Spanish or Italian.)

3. We will take another look at the problem of encouraging friendly representatives from Latin America to be more active in spreading the public diplomacy message in Europe. Attention has been given to this in the past, but results so far have been meager. (It is a major problem; one of the first things the Soviets and their clients do is to organize major public efforts utilizing local people -- just look at how much more active the Sandinistas are in Europe than the Costa Ricans, Hondurans and Salvadorans. We clearly need to do more to get our friends to go out front.)

4. Detailed public affairs guidance on dealing with the Washington Summit will be issued as soon as the Summit date is

set. (A draft was sent up for approval February 28 -- package number 1644.)

5. We are now discussing with USIA the terms of tasking PAO's formally to develop local long-term strategies for dealing with the underlying misconceptions regarding U.S. handling of East-West issues.

USIA tells me that feed-back from the conference from PAO's has been very positive. Several commented to Kordek, the USIA Assistant Director for Europe, that it was the most useful of recent USIA conferences since it focussed on substantive issues rather than the nuts and bolts which usually dominate USIA conferences.

<sup>ne</sup>Small, <sup>ne</sup>Linhard, <sup>ne</sup>Mandel and <sup>ne</sup>Steiner concur.

Attachment:

Tab I -- USIA cables reporting on the conference.

cc: Walt Raymond



29

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TELEGRAM

PAGE 01

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USIA

FOR EU/KORDEN FROM EU/RENICK

EO 12356: DECL: OADR

SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY  
IN EUROPE

1. SUMMARY: THE FIRST DAY OF THE CONFERENCE ON U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN EUROPE FOCUSED ON THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS DIMENSIONS OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION, ARMS CONTROL, SDI, REGIONAL ISSUES, AND HUMAN RIGHTS. AMBASSADOR MATLOCK PROVIDED CONTEXT FOR THE DAY'S DISCUSSIONS WITH HIS REVIEW OF U.S. POLICIES TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION PREMISED ON THE BELIEF THAT EUROPEAN MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT AMERICAN POLICIES ON MANY ISSUES DERIVE FROM BASIC MISPERCEPTIONS OF U.S. APPROACHES TO THE SOVIET UNION. AMBASSADOR WITZE DISCUSSED PROBLEMS WITH THE LATEST SOVIET ARMS PROPOSALS AND PROVIDED THE RATIONALE FOR THE PRESIDENT'S RECENT RESPONSE. THE CONFERENCE CLOSED WITH A SECOND DAY'S DISCUSSION OF USIA RESEARCH ON EUROPEAN ATTITUDES ON EAST-WEST ISSUES, DISCUSSION OF HOW THE SOVIETS ARE PREPARING FOR THE NEXT SUMMIT, AND U.S. STRATEGY FOR THE MEETING. END SUMMARY.

2. U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION:

AMBASSADOR MATLOCK OPENED THE CONFERENCE WITH COMMENTS ABOUT EUROPEAN MISPERCEPTIONS OF A VARIETY OF U.S. POLICIES THAT DERIVE FUNDAMENTALLY FROM MISPERCEPTIONS ABOUT U.S. POLICIES TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION. HE NOTED THAT OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES OFTEN TAKE A PAROCHIAL VIEW OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS WHILE THE U.S. MUST HAVE A BROADER OUTLOOK. HE SAID HE FELT THE U.S. HAD MADE PROGRESS DURING THE PAST TWO-THREE YEARS IN CORRECTING SOME OF THESE MISPERCEPTIONS.

AMBASSADOR MATLOCK BRIEFLY CONSIDERED THE U.S. POSITION AS WE MOVE TOWARD THE NEXT SUMMIT MEETING. HE EMPHASIZED THE U.S. VIEW THAT U.S. AND SOVIET LEADERS CAN HAVE A SUCCESSFUL MEETING, AS PRESIDENT REAGAN AND GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV DID IN NOVEMBER, WITHOUT NECESSARILY SIGNING AN ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT. THE REAL ACHIEVEMENT OF GENEVA WAS PUTTING A FRAMEWORK IN PLACE FOR FUTURE CONTACTS AND NEGOTIATIONS, AT VARIOUS LEVELS.

SUMMIT MEETINGS SHOULD DEAL WITH THE ENTIRE RANGE OF ISSUES IN THE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP. THEY SHOULD NOT ISOLATE A

SINGLE ASPECT OF THAT RELATIONSHIP, SUCH AS ARMS CONTROL, AND GIVE IT PRIORITY OVER ALL OTHERS. THE U.S. FOUR-POINT AGENDA DEFINES THE BASIC ELEMENTS OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE USSR:

- ✓ -- ELIMINATING THE SOVIET USE OF MILITARY FORCE TO EXTEND ITS INFLUENCE.
- ✓ -- THE REDUCTION AND EVENTUAL ELIMINATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.
- ✓ -- IMPROVING THE WORKING RELATIONSHIP AND CONFIDENCE.
- ✓ -- SUPPORTING HUMAN RIGHTS. THE SOVIET HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD WILL INFLUENCE THE DEGREE OF CONFIDENCE WE CAN HAVE THAT SOVIETS WILL CARRY OUT THEIR COMMITMENTS IN OTHER AREAS.

AMBASSADOR MATLOCK TOOK ISSUE WITH SOME OF THE MOST PROMINENT MYTHS EUROPEANS AND OTHERS HOLD ABOUT THE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP, AMONG THEM: THAT THE U.S. AND SOVIET UNION AS SUPERPOWERS TEND TO ACT THE SAME; THAT THE ARMS RACE IS THE PRIMARY THREAT TO PEACE; THAT RHETORIC AND PUBLIC CRITICISM OF THE SOVIET UNION IS IN ITSELF DANGEROUS.

DURING DISCUSSION, HE POINTED OUT THAT THE U.S. ATTITUDE TOWARD SUMMIT MEETINGS HAD NOT  
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USIA

FOR EU/KORDEK FROM EU/REMICK

EO 12356: DECL: OADR

SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY  
IN EUROPE

CHANGED: THE UNITED STATES STILL WANTED A WELL-PREPARED MEETING, BUT FELT THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO PRECONDITIONS SUCH AS REQUIREMENTS FOR AGREEMENT IN ADVANCE. THERE WAS ALSO DEBATE ABOUT WHETHER THE FORTHCOMING SUMMITS WOULD LEAD WESTERN PUBLICS TO EXPECT ANNUAL MEETINGS BETWEEN U.S. AND SOVIET LEADERS TO BE A PERMANENT FIXTURE ON THE INTERNATIONAL AGENDA AND WHETHER THIS WOULD BE DESIRABLE.

3. ARMS CONTROL AND THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS:

AMBASSADOR NITZE SPOKE ON THE U.S. RESPONSE TO GORBACHEV'S JANUARY 15 PROPOSALS FOR THE ELIMINATION OF INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. HE EMPHASIZED THE VALUE OF AMERICA'S CONSULTATIONS WITH OUR ALLIES AND CALLED THEM "A COMPLETE SUCCESS." AS A RESULT OF THESE CONSULTATIONS, HE ADDED, "THE ALLIES ARE WITH US AND THE ALLIANCE IS STRONGER."

AMBASSADOR NITZE SAID HIS CONSULTATIONS WITH OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES SHOWED THAT THEIR INTERPRETATION OF THE SOVIETS' JANUARY 15 PROPOSALS COINCIDED WITH OUR OWN. THE EUROPEANS EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER THE TOTAL ELIMINATION OF INF WHILE A SOVIET PREPONDERANCE IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES STILL EXISTS. BRITISH AND FRENCH OFFICIALS REITERATED THEIR OPPOSITION TO ANY PROPOSAL THAT WOULD LEAD TO THE ABOLITION OF THEIR INDEPENDENT NUCLEAR DETERRENTS. TAKING THESE CONCERNS INTO ACCOUNT, THE PRESIDENT IN HIS RESPONSE TO MOSCOW INSISTED THAT SEVERAL STEPS MUST BE COMPLETED BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE USSR BEFORE THE BRITISH AND FRENCH DETERRENTS MIGHT BE BROUGHT INTO THE NEGOTIATING EQUATION.

CTB, ACCORDING TO AMBASSADOR NITZE, STILL PROVOKES DEBATE IN SOME QUARTERS. POWERFUL ELEMENTS IN SEVERAL EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTS CONTINUE TO ADVOCATE CTB. IT IS U.S. POLICY, SAID NITZE, TO GO ON TESTING AS LONG AS WE MUST RELY ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS. FOR A VARIETY OF REASONS, THE SOVIETS DO NOT HAVE TO RELY SO EXTENSIVELY ON TESTING.

IN REGARD TO SDI, NITZE NOTED THAT THE U.S. WILL NOT AT THIS TIME NEGOTIATE IT. THE SOVIETS, HE SAID, HAVE NOT MADE AN ATTRACTIVE

OFFER ON THE OFFENSIVE WEAPONRY SIDE, THEIR INF PROPOSALS ARE UNACCEPTABLE, AND THEY HAVE SAID NOTHING ABOUT STRATEGIC WEAPONS. WE WANT TO TALK TO THE SOVIETS ABOUT THE OFFENSIVE-DEFENSIVE RELATIONSHIP, HE SAID, AND WE WANT AN "OFFENSIVE TREATY AS SOLID AS THE ABM TREATY."

NITZE THEN TURNED TO THE WEHRKUNDE CONFERENCE, WHICH HE HAD ATTENDED OVER THE WEEKEND. HE SAID THAT MANY ALLIED SPOKESMEN THERE WERE SKEPTICAL OF THE ZERO-ZERO OPTION IN BOTH INF AND STRATEGIC FORCES. GERMAN MOD WOERNER, ACCORDING TO NITZE, FULLY SUPPORTS PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PROPOSAL. WOERNER FURTHERMORE SEES OTHER WAYS, BESIDES INF, OF "COUPLING" THE U.S. TO WESTERN EUROPE.

AMBASSADOR NITZE CONCLUDED HIS PRESENTATION WITH A COMPARISON BETWEEN THE SOVIET AND AMERICAN PROPOSALS FOR THE ELIMINATION OF INF, AND AN ANALYSIS OF GORBACHEV'S MARATHON SPEECH TO THE PARTY CONGRESS, WHICH HE FOUND PREDICTABLE AND STALE.

COL. ROBERT LINNHARD, SENIOR DIRECTOR FOR DEFENSE PROGRAMS AND ARMS CONTROL AT THE NSC, ALSO NOTED THE IMPORTANCE OF CONSULTATIONS AMONG THE ALLIES AND DESCRIBED THE NSC'S EXPLANATION OF ARMS CONTROL POLICY TO THE U.S. CONGRESS.

HE DISCUSSED THE THREE QUESTIONS ON INF MOST COMMONLY POSED BY AMERICAN REPORTERS: ARE THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSALS ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND  
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PAGE 01

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USIA

FOR EU/KORDEK FROM EU/REHICK

EO 12356: DECL: OADR

SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY  
IN EUROPE

REGIONAL CONFLICTS PRECONDITIONS TO MOVE  
FORWARD ON ARMS CONTROL? AREN'T THESE  
PROPOSALS THE SAME OLD ZERO-ZERO OPTION OF  
1982? WON'T THE ELIMINATION OF INF LEAD TO  
"DECOUPLING?" THE ANSWER TO ALL THREE  
QUESTIONS IS "NO."

PETER SULLIVAN, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY TO THE DEPUTY  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NUCLEAR  
FORCES AND ARMS CONTROL POLICY, SPOKE ON MBFR,  
CDE, AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS. IN ALL THREE,  
VERIFICATION REMAINS THE STUMBLING BLOCK TO  
AGREEMENT AND THERE CAN BE NO AGREEMENT UNTIL  
THIS ISSUE IS RESOLVED. THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT  
BEEN FORTHCOMING IN THESE DISCUSSIONS AND THEY  
WILL PROBABLY NOT BE IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

4. SDI AND NUCLEAR TESTING:

DISCUSSION WAS LED BY COL. ROBERT LINHARD AND  
STEVE STEINER, NSC, AND PETER SULLIVAN, DOD.  
STEINER REVIEWED THE WORK OF THE INTERAGENCY  
GROUP WORKING ON SDI PUBLIC HANDLING POLICY  
AND CITED MAIN ISSUES RELATING TO THE  
INITIATIVE. THE FLOOR WAS THEN THROWN OPEN FOR  
DISCUSSION. PAOS' CONCERNS CENTERED ON: U.S.-  
ALLIED DIFFERENCES OVER THE DESIRABILITY OF  
TRYING TO NEGOTIATE A CTBT; THE POSSIBLE COUNTER-  
PRODUCTIVENESS OF USING A SUGGESTED TALKING POINT  
THAT A HALT TO U.S. NUCLEAR TESTING WOULD AMONG  
OTHER THINGS LEAD TO THE LOSS OF SCIENTISTS FROM  
U.S. WEAPONS LABORATORIES; THE DIFFICULTY OF  
CONVINCING ALLIES THAT A NUCLEAR TEST BAN IS A  
POOR IDEA WHEN OUR OWN CONGRESS HAS PASSED A  
RESOLUTION FAVORING IT; PROBLEMS CREATED BY THE  
SUDDEN APPARENT SOVIET FORTHCOMINGNESS ON  
VERIFICATION AND THE NEED TO BASE OUR DEFENSE  
OF CONTINUED NUCLEAR TESTING ON THE  
REQUIREMENT (THAT WILL REMAIN VALID AS LONG AS  
DETERRENCE IS BASED ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS) TO  
TEST OUR STOCK TO ENSURE IT REMAINS RELIABLE  
AND USABLE; THE NEED FOR SENSITIVITY IN  
EXPLAINING TO PUBLICS THE SMALL BUT IMPORTANT  
NUCLEAR COMPONENT OF THE SDI RESEARCH PROGRAM;  
PUBLIC QUESTIONING OF THE PRESIDENT'S  
COMMITMENT TO SHARE SDI TECHNOLOGY WITH THE  
SOVIETS; AND U.S. OFFICIAL ATTITUDES TO THE  
EUROPEAN DEFENSE INITIATIVE.

AMBASSADOR MATLOCK, RECALLING A CABLE POSTS HAD  
PROVIDED IN LATE 1985 ON SDI, SUGGESTED  
THE TIME WAS RIPE FOR AN UPDATE WITH POSTS'  
CURRENT VIEW ON HOW PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF THE SDI  
HAD EVOLVED.

5. REGIONAL ISSUES:

MATLOCK OPENED THIS SESSION WITH A DISCUSSION  
OF THE PRESIDENT'S PLAN FOR THE PEACEFUL  
RESOLUTION OF REGIONAL CONFLICTS. HE SAID THAT  
THE U.S. DID NOT EXPECT THE SOVIETS TO REPLY  
IMMEDIATELY TO THIS PROPOSAL. HOWEVER, "OVER TIME,  
AND WITH ENOUGH INCENTIVES, THEY MAY RESPOND."

THE GROUP DISCUSSED SEVERAL OF THOSE REGIONAL  
ISSUES--AFGHANISTAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, ANGOLA--  
AND NOTED SOME OF THE PROBLEMS THESE AREAS  
PRESENT IN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY.

ALL AGREED THAT THOSE PERSONALLY INVOLVED IN  
EACH OF THESE ISSUES OUGHT TO BE IN THE  
FOREFRONT OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY EFFORTS. FOR  
EXAMPLE, GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS FROM COSTA RICA  
AND GUATEMALA SHOULD ADVOCATE THEIR OWN  
CAUSES. WHEN THE U.S. TRIES TO SUBSTITUTE  
FOR THEM IT ERODES CREDIBILITY.

ACTION:

THAT THE U.S. ENCOURAGE AND FACILITATE PUBLIC  
DIPLOMACY VISITS TO EUROPEAN COUNTRIES BY  
CREDIBLE PERSONS FROM THE REGIONS INVOLVED.

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28

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INFORMATION AGENCY

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PAGE 01

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EAST-WEST RELATIONS:

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USIA

FOR EU/KORDEK FROM EU/RENICK

EO 12356: DECL: OADR

SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY  
IN EUROPE

THIS SHOULD INCLUDE, WHEN APPROPRIATE,  
APPEARANCES ON WORLDNET.

6. HUMAN RIGHTS:

JUDYT MANDEL, NSC, DISCUSSED THREE KEY MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS POLICIES:

-- THAT THE U.S. WAS CURRENTLY "PULLING ITS PUNCHES" ON SOVIET HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES BECAUSE OF THE SUMMIT ATMOSPHERE. NOT SO, SHE SAID; HUMAN RIGHTS CONTINUE TO BE AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF THE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP. THE PRESIDENT AND OTHER USG OFFICIALS WILL CONTINUE TO SPEAK OUT ABOUT ABUSES BUT IN GENERAL TERMS, AVOIDING THE PUBLIC AIRING OF SPECIFIC CASES.

-- THAT WE HAVE SINGLED OUT THE SOVIETS AND THEIR ALLIES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS CRITICISM AND IGNORED EQUALLY BLATANT VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN COUNTRIES CLOSE TO THE U.S. ON THE CONTRARY, OUR HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY IS UNIVERSAL. WE HAVE BEEN QUITE FORTHRIGHT IN CONDEMNING ABUSES EVERYWHERE.

-- THAT A FOCUS ON HUMAN RIGHTS JEOPARDIZES MORE IMPORTANT EFFORTS TO MAKE PROGRESS ON ARMS CONTROL OR REGIONAL ISSUES. THE SOVIET HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD HAS IMPORTANT IMPLICATIONS FOR OUR ABILITY TO DO BUSINESS WITH THE SOVIETS ACROSS THE BROAD FRONT OF ISSUES THAT CONCERN US, BUT THERE IS NO "LINKAGE" BETWEEN HUMAN RIGHTS AND ARMS CONTROL MATTERS. AMBASSADOR MATLOCK NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT CONGRESS HAD MANDATED LINKAGE BETWEEN EMIGRATION AND TRADE MATTERS.

PHIL ARNOLD OF USIA'S PROGRAM BUREAU REVIEWED RECENT AGENCY RESEARCH. HE NOTED P/R'S FEELING THAT THE U.S. PRE-GENEVA MEETING PUBLIC AFFAIRS STRATEGY WORKED IN THAT EXPECTATIONS THAT THE SUMMIT WOULD OR SHOULD PRODUCE SPECIFIC AGREEMENTS WERE KEPT LOW AND SDI REMAINED A SUBSIDIARY ISSUE. HE NOTED POLL RESULTS SHOWING MAJORITIES IN KEY EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AS BELIEVING THAT U.S. ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS ARE GENUINE. DURING SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION, PAOS VOICED CONCERNS ABOUT EVIDENCE OF A CONTINUING "MORAL EQUIVALENCY" PRECONCEPTION, THE MISPERCEPTION THAT SDI IS A BARRIER ON THE ROAD TO ARMS CONTROL, AND EUROPEAN FEARS THAT THE PROTECTION OF THE U.S. NUCLEAR UMBRELLA MAY BE TAKEN AWAY WITH THE COMING OF SDI AND EVENTUAL ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. STEINER (NSC) URGED POSTS TO STRESS THAT IN FACT SDI IS NOT PROVING A BARRIER TO ARMS CONTROL DESPITE SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO LINK PROGRESS IN NEGOTIATIONS TO THE U.S. ABANDONMENT OF SDI. MANDEL (NSC) REMINDED THE GROUP THAT OUR PUBLIC AFFAIRS POSITION LOOKED BAD IN THE EARLY DAYS OF THE INF DEBATE, BUT GRADUALLY EUROPEAN AUDIENCES WERE SENSITIZED TO THE SOVIET SS-20 THREAT AND THE NEED FOR A NATO RESPONSE; SHE ARGUED THAT THERE WAS NEED FOR A STEADY, PATIENT PUBLIC AFFAIRS PROGRAM STRESSING AMONG OTHER THINGS THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE THEIR OWN VERY VIGOROUS PROGRAM OF  
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7. THE SECOND DAY OF THE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY CONFERENCE WAS LARGELY DEVOTED TO DISCUSSION OF THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS FALLOUT FROM THE NOVEMBER SUMMIT AND PROSPECTS FOR THE NEXT REAGAN-GORBACHEV MEETING. PAOS NOTED THE VERY POSITIVE EFFECTS OF THE GENEVA MEETING. THEY ALSO REVIEWED OTHER MAJOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS CONCERNS IN THEIR COUNTRIES. A CONCLUDING DISCUSSION FOCUSED ON RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION BY WASHINGTON AND FIELD POSTS ADDRESSED TO THE SEVERAL ISSUES IDENTIFIED DURING THE CONFERENCE.

8. USIA RESEARCH ON EUROPEAN ATTITUDES ON

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29

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PAGE 01

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USIA

FOR EU/KORDEK FROM EU/REHICK

EO 12356: DECL: OADR

SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY  
IN EUROPE

STRATEGIC DEFENSE RESEARCH.

9. COUNTRY REPORTS: THE REACTION TO GENEVA:

ALL PAOS AGREED THAT THE GENEVA SUMMIT WAS A BOON TO PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PERSONAL IMAGE IN EUROPE AND TO MOST-COUNTRY ATTITUDES TOWARD THE UNITED STATES. POLLS INDICATE THAT THE PRESIDENT GAINED IN APPROVAL RATINGS EVERYWHERE. THIS IMPROVEMENT VARIED FROM SLIGHT IN ITALY TO DRAMATIC IN GREAT BRITAIN. GORBACHEV ALSO BENEFITED FROM THE SUMMIT, REGISTERING ESPECIALLY SIGNIFICANT GAINS IN ITALY.

SDI, ACCORDING TO THE PAOS, CONTINUES TO CLAIM MUCH ATTENTION, ALTHOUGH IN MOST COUNTRIES POLLS SUGGEST THAT IT HAS NOW BEEN ACCEPTED BY HALF OR MORE OF THE POPULATION. U.S. POLICY TOWARD CENTRAL AMERICA, HOWEVER, REMAINS UNPOPULAR AMONG SMALL BUT VOCAL MINORITIES IN EVERY COUNTRY.

THE SOVIETS ARE HELD IN LOW REPUTE IN WESTERN EUROPE FOR THEIR POLICIES TOWARD HUMAN RIGHTS, POLAND AND AFGHANISTAN. THIS IS PARTICULARLY TRUE IN FRANCE, A COUNTRY INCREASINGLY PRO-AMERICAN BUT ONE PRE-OCCUPIED WITH DOMESTIC ISSUES.

FINALLY, THE PAOS AGREED THAT U.S. CONSULTATIONS WITH EUROPEAN ALLIES HAVE HAD A POSITIVE EFFECT ON ATTITUDES TOWARD OUR POLICIES.

10. SOVIET PREPARATIONS FOR THE NEXT SUMMIT:

AMBASSADOR MATLOCK AND MOSCOW PAO RAY BENSON OPENED THE DISCUSSION. BENSON CONSIDERED PUBLIC THEMES THE SOVIETS ARE EMPHASIZING DURING THIS PRE-SUMMIT PERIOD. HE EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT POST BUDGETS WOULD BE CUT UNDER GRAMM-RUDMAN-HOLLINGS AT A TIME WHEN MORE NEEDS TO BE DONE, AND AT THE VERY TIME WHEN THE SOVIETS ARE USING FAR MORE SOPHISTICATED PUBLIC AFFAIRS TOOLS THAN THEY HAVE USED IN THE PAST. BENSON ALSO NOTED THAT THE MOST EFFECTIVE PUBLIC AFFAIRS VEHICLE WAS STILL THE WELL-INFORMED AGENCY OFFICER MEETING AND DEBATING WITH HIS CONTACTS. MATLOCK SAID THAT U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY SHOULD STRESS THE SAME

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES IN CONNECTION WITH THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT AS WE DID IN THE LEAD-UP TO GENEVA. HE OPINED THAT, WHILE GORBACHEV IS GETTING MORE MEDIA ATTENTION, IN THE LONG RUN A FAVORABLE IMPACT ON WESTERN PUBLICS IS LIKELY TO DEPEND ON CHANGES IN SOVIET POLICY. IF THE SOVIETS ARE GETTING MORE PUBLIC RELATIONS CONSCIOUS, HE SAID, THAT COULD BE GOOD IF THE FEEDBACK THEY GET LEADS THEM TO BE MORE SENSITIVE TO WESTERN CONCERNS AND THUS TO ALTER THEIR POSITIONS ON SOME ISSUES. HE JUDGES THAT THE SOVIETS ARE EXAGGERATING THEIR WORRIES ABOUT SDI AND THEY WOULD FALL OFF THEIR PRESENT POSITION--WHICH THEY KNOW IS NOT NEGOTIABLE--WHEN THEY ARE READY FOR AN AGREEMENT ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS. MATLOCK SAID HE SENSED SOME DECLINE IN EUROPEAN PREOCCUPATION WITH SDI, AND POINTED OUT THAT THE U.S. DOES NOT HAVE TO HAVE ACTIVE EUROPEAN SUPPORT TO CARRY OUT THE PROGRAM, IN CONTRAST TO INF WHEN THE APPROVAL OF EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTS WAS ESSENTIAL. IF THE ISSUE IS QUIESCENT, HE ARGUED, WE SHOULD NOT ACT TO STIR UP A DISPUTE WHERE THERE IS NONE.

STEINER (NSC) SAID THERE WERE STILL SITUATIONS IN CERTAIN COUNTRIES WHERE APPROPRIATE SDI PROGRAMMING WOULD SEEM WORTHWHILE. HE NOTED THAT WASHINGTON WOULD SOON HAVE READY A NEW PAMPHLET EXPOSING SOVIET PROPAGANDA EFFORTS AGAINST SDI.

MATLOCK NOTED THAT RECENT U.S.-SOVIET MEDIA EXCHANGES HAD PROVEN USEFUL AND THAT WE SHOULD SEEK MORE. THE PRESIDENT'S APPEARANCES ON BT  
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INFORMATION AGENCY

TELEGRAM

PAGE 01

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USIA

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SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON U. S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY  
IN EUROPE

SOVIET TELEVISION DURING THE GENEVA MEETING AND ON NEW YEAR'S DAY SERVED TO DE-DEMONIZE HIM IN THE EYES OF THE SOVIET PUBLIC AND UNDERMINED SOVIET EFFORTS TO DRUM UP XENOPHOBIC FEELINGS. MATLOCK SAID GORBACHEV HAS ESSENTIALLY MADE TWO ACCUSATIONS AGAINST SDI, BOTH OF THEM EASILY REFUTABLE. GORBACHEV HAS SAID THAT SDI COULD BE USED TO SUPPORT A U. S. FIRST-STRIKE STRATEGY. HOWEVER, U. S. ARMS CONTROL POLICY AIMS FOR DEEP CUTS IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS. SUCH CUTS WOULD MAKE ANY SUCH STRATEGY UNTHINKABLE. SECONDLY, GORBACHEV CLAIMS THAT ONCE WEAPONS ARE DEPLOYED IN SPACE, IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO DISTINGUISH WHETHER THEY ARE OFFENSIVE OR DEFENSIVE. HOWEVER, SDI DEPLOYMENTS WOULD NOT BE A REASONABLE WAY TO OPTIMIZE THE USE OF SPACE FOR OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS. ||

11. SUMMIT PUBLIC DIPLOMACY STRATEGY FOR EUROPE:  
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A CONSENSUS EMERGED THAT PARTICULAR ATTENTION SHOULD BE PAID TO FINDING AND SPONSORING EFFECTIVE SPEAKERS FOR BOTH THE PRE- AND POST-SUMMIT PERIODS, IF POSSIBLE SPEAKERS WITH A FLUENT COMMAND OF THE HOST-COUNTRY LANGUAGE. SDI BRIEFING TEAMS HAVE BEEN VERY SUCCESSFUL, AND THE PAOS ARE INTERESTED IN HAVING MORE OF THEM.

ACTION:  
-----

- ✓ 1. WORK UNDERWAY IN USIA, STATE AND NSC SHOULD BE CONTINUED IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF LISTS OF AVAILABLE SPEAKERS.
- ✓ 2. NSC WILL DEVELOP, IN COOPERATION WITH STATE AND USIA, APPROVED TALKING POINTS TO BE USED TO REFUTE THE MORE IMPORTANT MISPERCEPTIONS OF U. S. POLICY ON EAST-WEST ISSUES.
- ✓ 3. DETAILED PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE FOR HANDLING THE RUN-UP TO THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT WILL BE DISTRIBUTED.

KORENGOLD  
BT  
\*4778

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SUBJECT: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ACTIVITIES OF  
AMBASSADOR MATLOCK

1. AS AN ADJUNCT TO HIS PARTICIPATION IN THE  
MARCH 3-4 USIA/NSC CONFERENCE ON U.S. PUBLIC  
DIPLOMACY IN EUROPE, AMBASSADOR JACK MATLOCK,  
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND SENIOR  
DIRECTOR OF EUROPEAN AND SOVIET AFFAIRS, NSC,  
CONDUCTED A NUMBER OF HIGHLY USEFUL PUBLIC  
DIPLOMACY ACTIVITIES FOR USIS LONDON. HE MET  
WITH A CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF KEY GOVERNMENT  
OFFICIALS, ACADEMICS, AND JOURNALISTS DEALING  
WITH EAST-WEST AFFAIRS, OUTLINING IN EACH  
INSTANCE U.S. EFFORTS TO IMPROVE  
SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS IN THE NEAR AND LONG  
TERM. HIS DETAILED SCHEDULE WAS AS FOLLOWS:

TUESDAY PM: DRINKS AND DISCUSSION WITH LORD

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-- BETHELL, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT  
 -- POLITICAL COMMITTEE RAPPORTEUR,  
 -- ON EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY REPORT  
 -- ON U.S./EUROPEAN COMMUNITY  
 -- POLITICAL RELATIONS.

WEDNESDAY AM: MEETINGS WITH CABINET  
 -- OFFICE DEPUTY SECRETARY  
 -- CHRISTOPHER MALLABY; TIMOTHY  
 -- RENTON, FCO MINISTER OF  
 -- STATE; DEREK THOMAS, FCO  
 -- POLITICAL DIRECTOR AND DEPUTY  
 -- UNDER SECRETARY.

LUNCH: HOSTED BY DCM RAY SEITZ. GUESTS  
 -- INCLUDED NICHOLAS ASHFORD,  
 -- DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENT, THE  
 -- TIMES; MICHAEL BRUNSON, DIPLO-  
 -- MATIC EDITOR, INDEPENDENT TELE-  
 -- VISION NEWS; PROFESSOR LAWRENCE  
 -- FREEDMAN, KING'S COLLEGE; NIK  
 -- GOWING, FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
 -- CORRESPONDENT, CHANNEL 4 NEWS;  
 -- SIR CURTIS KEEBLE, FORMER UK  
 -- AMBASSADOR TO MOSCOW DURING AMB.  
 -- MATLOCK'S TIME; MALCOLM  
 -- MAC INTOSH, CABINET OFFICER,  
 -- EAST EUROPE EXPERT; DR. ROBERT  
 -- O'NEILL, DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL  
 -- INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES.

WEDNESDAY PM: ROUND TABLE MEETING ON  
 -- U.S./USSR RELATIONS AT CHATHAM  
 -- HOUSE. PARTICIPANTS INCLUDED  
 -- NICHOLAS ASHFORD (ABOVE);  
 -- ADMIRAL SIR JAMES EBERLE,  
 -- DIRECTOR, CHATHAM HOUSE;  
 -- ROBERT KLEIMAN, RESEARCH FELLOW;  
 -- DAVID KORN, RESEARCH FELLOW;  
 -- KEITH KYLE, MEETINGS SECRETARY;  
 -- WILLIAM WALLACE, DEPUTY DIRECTOR  
 -- AND DIRECTOR OF STUDIES;  
 -- JOHN ROPER, EDITOR, INTER-  
 -- NATIONAL AFFAIRS; PAULINE  
 -- NEVILLE-JONES, FOREIGN OFFICE;

DINNER: HOSTED BY PAO ROBERT KORENGOLD.  
 -- GUESTS INCLUDED MELVIN LASKY,  
 -- EDITOR, ENCOUNTER MAGAZINE; MARK  
 -- FRANKLAND, COLUMNIST ON SOVIET  
 -- AFFAIRS FOR THE OBSERVER; DAVID  
 -- BUCHAN, EAST EUROPEAN AFFAIRS  
 -- CORRESPONDENT, FINANCIAL TIMES;

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ALFRED CAHEN, SECRETARY-GENERAL,  
WEST EUROPEAN UNION.

2. POST IS EXTREMELY GRATEFUL TO AMBASSADOR  
MATLOCK FOR HIS WHOLEHEARTED COOPERATION IN  
POST PROGRAM. WE WOULD BE HAPPY TO HAVE HIM  
RETURN AT ANY TIME.

KORENGOLD

\*\* END OF CABLE \*\*

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## 1986 REAGAN-GORBACHEV SUMMIT

Public Diplomacy Strategy

Regardless of the date ultimately set for the President's meeting with Gorbachev in the United States, the approach to the issues in our public diplomacy should build on the success achieved at the Geneva Summit. The fundamental themes should be the same: to stress the steadiness and consistency of our policy and highlight our practical proposals in all four areas of the agenda and our determination to find common ground wherever possible. Of course, appropriate adjustments of detail must be made to take account of developments, possible shifts in the Soviet position, and the line taken by Soviet spokesmen.

Overall Goals

-- To show that we retain the initiative in guiding the U.S.-Soviet relationship and prevent public pressure to make unwise or premature concessions.

-- To use the meeting to exert maximum pressure on the Soviet leadership to move toward resolution of important problems in an acceptable manner.

-- To uphold and strengthen the President's role as the preeminent leader of our Alliances.

U.S. Themes

Our public diplomacy should foster the following basic perceptions:

1. Summitry is part of a process. The Geneva Summit established a framework for dialogue. The meeting in the United States continues that dialogue at the highest level.

-- The dialogue is necessary to manage an adversarial relationship and give impetus to resolution of outstanding problems.

-- We must keep expectations realistic. Specifically, the thrust of our public diplomacy should be to keep the focus on our four-part agenda - not only arms control - and to redefine summitry so that lack of specific agreements will not be seen as failure.

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-- We aim for fair and effective agreements. Summit meetings should not be judged by the number of agreements reached, but by their contribution to managing the relationship peacefully and constructively.

2. We must deal with the full agenda; no single area can be treated in isolation. In real life, the areas are interrelated. The four areas of this agenda are:

- a. Reducing and eventually eliminating the use and threat of force in resolving international disputes
- b. Reducing and eventually eliminating weapons of mass destruction
- c. Building trust and a more cooperative working relationship
- d. Encouraging respect for human rights

3. The United States has made practical proposals in all these areas. We place no arbitrary or mechanical linkages between different areas, but recognize that progress in one facilitates progress in the others. This is simply a fact of life, not a policy determination.

4. We want the Soviets to see the truth about the U.S. While the fundamental issues between the U.S. and USSR are real, they are exacerbated by Soviet misunderstanding of the United States. Mr. Gorbachev has never visited the U.S. and has numerous misperceptions of U.S. life and U.S. policy. Therefore, one important aim of the 1986 Summit is to show Gorbachev the real U.S. This could lead eventually to a more realistic posture on his part.

5. The U.S.-Soviet Rivalry Will Not Disappear. The vast difference in our political systems, values and ideology means that we will be rivals for the foreseeable future. The challenge is to manage this rivalry in a peaceful fashion. The U.S. follows a steady policy based on realism, strength and dialogue. We are prepared to solve problems in a fair and practical fashion, without the expectation that the Soviet system will change or the Soviet Union will eventually act as an ally. We can have a peaceful world even if our systems and ideologies compete.

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### Soviet Goals

Soviet objectives are to focus attention exclusively on arms control issues in order to portray themselves as the "peace party." They will continue to press an array of largely public initiatives designed to capture headlines and deflect criticism of other aspects of their policy rather than to solve problems. They will try to put the U.S. in the position of responding to their thrusts and thus put pressure on us to make concessions at the negotiations.

A primary goal of their initiatives is their long-standing effort to drive wedges between the U.S. and our allies in order to reap the economical and technical benefits of relaxation of tensions with the Europeans. The Soviets also want to enhance their standing as a global power -- an equal of the U.S. in the world's eye.

### Soviet Public Themes

We can expect Moscow to stress the following themes in its propaganda:

1. The central issue in the U.S.-Soviet relationship is arms control; all others are secondary.

2. Another Summit meeting would be meaningless unless agreement can be reached in some important area of arms control.

3. The Soviet Union is sincere in wanting a world without nuclear weapons, but U.S. policies -- particularly SDI -- block progress.

4. SDI is inconsistent with nuclear weapons reduction.

5. While the President may be sincere in his expressed desire to reduce nuclear weapons and create a non-threatening strategic defense, some of the members of his Administration are bent on achieving military superiority over the Soviet Union and developing a first-strike capability behind the cover of SDI.

6. The U.S., not the USSR, is guilty of using military force to intervene in other countries.

7. Pressure on "human rights" is both hypocritical -- since the U.S. is plagued by racism, inequality and poverty -- and also represents unwarranted interference in Soviet internal affairs. It is not acceptable as an issue in U.S.-Soviet relations or as a subject for negotiation.

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8. The Soviet Union has a vigorous new leadership which wants peace and cooperation. The U.S., dominated by its "military-industrial complex," only pays lip service to relaxing tensions and uses "dialogue" to lull its public.

9. It is up to the U.S. to change its policies in order to make a more peaceful world possible.

These propaganda themes will likely be accompanied by a show of resisting U.S. pressure for restraint in the Third World, and engaging in some public and semi-public gestures designed to show the Soviets as interested in solving regional disputes, e.g. Cyprus, the Middle East, and which actually repackage standard Soviet positions. They will, however, stop short of inviting a direct confrontation. Arms supplies to Nicaragua, Libya and Angola, for example, may be stepped up. Although some further dissidents may be released, this will be done while proclaiming that human rights is not an issue. Strident propaganda to "prove" that the U.S. is following militaristic policies and is covertly involved all over the world will continue.

#### Countering Soviet Propaganda

The best counter to Soviet propaganda will be a combination of exposing the facts about Soviet actions and policies and a vigorous presentation of positive U.S. initiatives and policies. Criticisms of Soviet actions and policies are most effective when they do not appear to be strident or examples of knee-jerk negativism, but reasoned objections to dangerous policies. Whenever possible, critiques of Soviet actions, proposals and policies should be accompanied by an explanation of what the U.S. proposes to deal with the issue. In addition, we should welcome positive Soviet initiatives as consistent with the spirit of Geneva and proof of the effectiveness of our approach.

Talking Points on  
U.S.-Soviet Relations

A. The Agenda

1. Reducing and eventually eliminating the use and threat of force in resolving international disputes. The use of force to serve national ends threatens the peace and makes reduction of arms more difficult.

2. Reducing and eventually eliminating weapons of mass destruction. Nuclear, chemical and -- if they still exist -- bacteriological weapons are the weapons potentially most destructive of human life. We must move rapidly to reduce nuclear weapons and ban chemical weapons, with effective verification. Our ultimate goal is to eliminate all weapons of mass destruction from the arsenals of all countries, but we recognize that nuclear weapons cannot be eliminated entirely until conventional weapons are at a balance and at lower levels and large countries refrain from using force to achieve national goals.

3. Building trust and a more cooperative working relationship. High levels of suspicion, fed by isolation, threaten the peace and make it much more difficult to solve practical problems. A better working relationship requires the following:

- Strict compliance with all agreements.
- More contact between the peoples of both countries and better information flow through the media in both.
- Frank discussion of our differences, coupled with a readiness to solve practical problems fairly.
- Strict reciprocity of benefit in all arrangements.

4. Encouraging respect for human rights. Governments which respect the rights of their own citizens to speak their minds, to travel and to depart their country if they wish are less likely to follow aggressive policies than those which attempt to control every aspect of their citizen's lives. Human rights is, therefore, not merely a humanitarian issue; it is also essential to a stable peace.

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## B. U.S. Proposals

1. To reduce use and threat of force: The President's proposal at the UNGA in October, 1985. We are pursuing this initiative with the Soviets in diplomatic contacts and in a series of regular consultations on regional issues, and with the parties in the affected areas.

### 2. To reduce and eliminate weapons of mass destruction:

-- Proposal at NST talks for 50% reduction in strategic offensive nuclear arms.

-- President's February, 1986, proposal for elimination, over three years, of all U.S. and Soviet LRINF systems.

-- U.S. proposal to discuss and eventually negotiate means whereby strategic defense systems, should they prove feasible, can be introduced in a cooperative manner to facilitate the reduction and ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons.

-- U.S. draft treaty at Conference on Disarmament in Geneva to ban all chemical weapons globally, with strict verification.

-- Western proposal in MBFR for initial reductions of conventional forces in Central Europe and agreement on verification measures which would subsequently permit reductions to a common and much lower ceiling.

-- In CDE, western proposals for concrete measures to reduce risk of surprise attack, war through miscalculation, and for measures to build confidence by providing for greater openness in military movements and deployments.

### 3. To enhance confidence:

-- U.S. proposals for eliminating violations of treaty and political commitments.

-- President's initiative for massive increase in people-to-people contacts and reciprocal access to media.

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-- U.S. proposals for increased cooperation in many areas, including peaceful use of space, medical research, environmental research and other scientific areas.

4. To protect human rights: U.S. has made clear that development of bilateral U.S.-Soviet relations will depend importantly on Soviet observance of their political obligations assumed in the Helsinki Final Act.

### C. Countering Soviet Propaganda

The following points should be made in preempting and responding to Soviet arguments:

-- The President is realistic about the nature of the Soviet system, but is serious, firm and patient in his desire to solve concrete problems. Our proposals are designed to get at those real problems which are amenable to solution; they are subject to the give-and-take of negotiation so long as our basic principles are preserved.

-- In contrast, the Soviets are still trying to achieve the public perception of relaxation without addressing the causes of tension. There is still too much of "what's mine is mine and what's yours is negotiable" in their approach.

-- The Soviets seem to desire a world in which the West is psychologically and physically disarmed, while the Soviet leadership is free to use its military force to expand wherever it chooses and to intimidate others. They also wish to establish as a principle the regime's right to conduct whatever repression it considers expedient toward its own citizens and those in countries under its domination.

-- This is not a prescription for a peaceful world, or one in which democratic values can be preserved. Therefore, it cannot lead to improved relations with the United States.

-- If the new Soviet leadership is genuinely interested in reducing tensions and creating a less threatening world in the future, it will have to address the underlying causes of U.S.-Soviet tension and work with us to solve as many of the concrete issues as we can.

-- Summit meetings are important in providing an opportunity to discuss these issues at the highest level, and to work on ways to solve them. They are not a "favor" to either side and must not be subject to preconditions.

-- Whatever policies the Soviets follow, there will be peace between us, so long as the U.S. maintains its strength and deterrent capacity. However, we would like more than that. If

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this is also the Soviet desire, they will find us willing to address outstanding issues fairly and realistically, so that we can establish a more stable and constructive long term relationship -- as the President called for in his January 1984 speech.

Some "Don'ts"

Some arguments should be avoided because the Soviets can use them either publicly or privately to call into question U.S. seriousness or to put us at a tactical disadvantage in negotiations. For these reasons, statements along the following lines should be avoided when one is either speaking on the record or on background when the speaker can be quoted as an Administration official:

1. "Gorbachev was forced to come to Geneva."

(Instead: "The President has restored the balance of power, and this permits negotiations on a fair and constructive basis.")

2. "Our latest proposal will put Gorbachev on the spot."

(Note: Suggests we are not substantively serious; also personalizes the issue, which should be discussed on its merits.)

3. "The Soviets will never... (pull out of Afghanistan... respect human rights...open up their society...etc.)."

(Note: Our stance should be that these things are possible if the Soviet leaders should desire. Otherwise, we diminish pressure on the Soviets to move in the right direction and make our own policies seem unrealistic. Of course, we also should not predict that these things will happen.)

4. "The Soviet P.R. effort is a threat."

(Note: Ultimately, the effectiveness of Soviet propaganda will depend on whether there are any real changes in Soviet policy and actions, particularly if we do our job in making clear to the public what the facts are. We therefore have no need for any nervousness or defensiveness. It is far

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better to welcome the apparent Soviet interest in influencing Western opinion and express the hope that it will lead to a review of those policies which have damaged the Soviet image abroad.)

5. "We were surprised by the latest Soviet proposal."

(Note: We should never be surprised by Soviet tactical maneuvering or highly publicized announcements of "new" proposals. To suggest that we are surprised implies that we are not prepared to deal promptly with them -- which is not the case. It is preferable tactically -- and factually more accurate -- to point out that this is part of the familiar Soviet pattern of making periodic announcements of policies claimed to be new, but that we will give it a close look and if we find positive elements we will follow up at the negotiating table.")

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## COUNTERING MYTHS ABOUT U.S. POLICY

Partly as the result of Soviet propaganda, and partly because of genuine lack of comprehension, a number of unfounded myths are current in some sections of the U.S. public or foreign publics. They should be exposed as fallacious at every appropriate opportunity -- certainly when they are raised in questions or in published articles. We also should keep them in mind so that in our own presentations we are careful not to use expressions or arguments which appear to give them substance.

Attached are suggested talking points to deal with the following such myths:

1. Current U.S. Policy Is "Detente II"
2. The U.S. and the Soviet Union Act the Same
3. The "Arms Race" is the Primary Threat to Peace
4. "Rhetoric" Is Dangerous
5. U.S. Pursues Artificial Linkages
6. U.S. Seeks Military Superiority
7. SDI Is Enemy of Arms Reduction
8. U.S. Makes East-West Issues out of Local Conflicts
9. U.S. Views World in Ideological Terms
10. U.S. Thinks Only of Military Solutions
11. U.S. Exaggerates Soviet Threat
12. U.S. Aims to Destroy Soviet System

MYTH No. 1

"U.S. POLICY IS DETENTE II"

Response: Our policy is fundamentally different from the policy of "detente" as it was practiced in the 1970's. In fact, we have learned some bitter lessons from our experiences in the 1970's and have designed our policy to avoid the manifest deficiencies of our policy at that time. It is very important to understand the differences, since some of the elements of current policy may seem superficially similar.

In practice, if not necessarily always in theory, the detente policy of the 1970's had the following flaws:

1. Arms control was considered central and other issues secondary. This led to a neglect of U.S. defenses and de facto toleration of Soviet efforts to use military means to extend its influence abroad and to intimidate its neighbors. These Soviet actions, more than any other, brought an end to detente.

Our current policy rests on the conviction that the U.S. must retain adequate strength, military and otherwise, to deal effectively with the Soviet Union, and we have rebuilt that strength. We also have made it clear that Soviet use of military force outside its borders cannot be isolated from the prospects of arms reduction, and that arms control cannot be pursued to the neglect of other important issues in the relationship.

2. It was assumed that Soviet aggressiveness could be contained by diplomacy, trade benefits and arms control.

We have no such illusion. Soviet aggressiveness can be contained only if the Soviet leadership is convinced that attempts to use military force to extend Soviet influence in the world is risky and likely to fail. We have made clear that we will take whatever steps are feasible to support those struggling for freedom and democracy, and will do all we can to ensure that Soviet aggression does not succeed. We reject condominium or any division of the world into spheres of influence. At the same time, we are prepared to join the Soviet Union in assisting parties to regional disputes to reach peaceful accommodation, and would welcome agreements with the Soviet Union to halt the flow of arms and foreign troops into areas of conflict.

3. It was assumed that an expanding network of ties could moderate Soviet behavior, and therefore such ties were sometimes established for presumed atmospheric benefits without close regard to reciprocity.

While we recognize the importance of ties and communication in breaking down barriers to personal movement and to the flow of information, we do not believe that such ties can be expected to have a direct effect on Soviet policy. Therefore, they should be established only on the basis of strict reciprocity of benefit.



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1986 REAGAN-GORBACHEV SUMMIT

Public Diplomacy Strategy

Regardless of the date ultimately set for the President's meeting with Gorbachev in the United States, the approach to the issues in our public diplomacy should build on the success achieved at the Geneva Summit. The fundamental themes should be the same, to stress the steadiness of our policy. Of course, appropriate adjustments of detail must be made to take account of developments, possible shifts in the Soviet position, and the line taken by Soviet spokesmen.

Overall Goals

To position the President in the public eye so that he retains the initiative in guiding the U.S.-Soviet relationship and is protected from public pressure to make unwise or premature concessions.

U.S. Objectives

Our public diplomacy should foster the following basic perceptions:

1. Summitry is part of a process. The Geneva Summit established a framework for dialogue. The meetings in the United States continue that dialogue at the highest level.

-- The dialogue is necessary to manage an adversarial relationship.

-- If it is burdened by perceived requirements to reach agreements, a regular dialogue at the highest level will become impossible and it will be difficult to achieve good, balanced agreements.

-- We of course aim for the maximum possible agreement at all times, but summit meetings should not be judged by the degree of agreement reached since the objective is to manage our rivalry in a peaceful manner.

2. We must deal with the full agenda; no single area can be treated in isolation. The agenda is not a policy choice but is inherent in the relationship itself. In real life, the areas are interrelated. The four areas of this agenda are:

a. Reducing and eventually eliminating the use and threat of force in resolving international disputes. The use of force to serve national ends threatens the peace and makes reduction of arms more difficult.

b. Reducing and eventually eliminating weapons of mass destruction. The greatest threat to the world is posed by



46

nuclear, chemical and -- if they still exist -- bacteriological weapons. We must move rapidly to reduce nuclear weapons and ban chemical weapons, with effective verification. Our goal is to eliminate both from the arsenals of all countries, but we recognize that nuclear weapons cannot be eliminated entirely until conventional weapons are at lower levels and large countries refrain from using force to achieve national goals.

c. Building trust and a more cooperative working relationship. High levels of suspicion, fed by isolation, threaten the peace and make it much more difficult to solve practical problems. A better working relationship requires the following:

- Strict compliance with all agreements.
- More contact between the peoples of both countries and better information flow through the media in both.
- Frank discussion of our differences, coupled with a readiness to solve practical problems fairly.
- Strict reciprocity of benefit in all arrangements.

d. Encouraging respect for human rights. Governments which respect the rights of their own citizens to speak their minds, to travel and to depart their country if they wish are less likely to follow aggressive policies than those which attempt to control every aspect of their citizen's lives. Human rights is, therefore, not merely a humanitarian issue; it is also a peace issue.

*is serious about solving these problems and*

3. The United States has made practical proposals in all these areas. We place no arbitrary or mechanical linkages between different areas, but recognize that progress in one facilitates progress in the others and, conversely, problems in one can block real progress in the others. This is simply a fact of life, not a policy determination. U.S. proposals include:

a. To reduce use and threat of force: The President's proposal at the UNGA in October, 1985. We are pursuing this initiative with the Soviets in diplomatic contacts and in a series of regular consultations on regional issues, and with the parties in the affected areas.

b. To reduce and eliminate weapons of mass destruction:

- Proposal at NST talks for 50% reduction in nuclear weapons.
- President's February, 1986, proposal for elimination, over three years, of all LRINF



systems.

-- U.S. proposal to discuss and eventually negotiate means whereby strategic defense systems, should they prove feasible, can be introduced in a cooperative manner to facilitate the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons.

-- U.S. draft treaty at Conference on Disarmament in Geneva to ban all chemical weapons, with strict verification.

-- U.S. and Allied proposal in MBFR for initial reductions of conventional forces in Central Europe and agreement on verification measures which would subsequently permit reductions to a common and much lower ceiling.

c. To enhance confidence:

-- U.S. proposals for eliminating violations of treaty and political commitments.

-- U.S. and Allied proposals at the Stockholm CDE for measures to build confidence by providing for greater openness in military movements and deployments.

-- President's initiative for massive increase in people-to-people contacts and reciprocal access to media.

-- U.S. proposals for increased cooperation in many areas, including peaceful use of space, medical research, environmental research and other scientific areas.

d. To protect human rights: U.S. has made clear that development of bilateral U.S.-Soviet relations will depend importantly on Soviet compliance of the political obligations it assumed in the Helsinki Final Act.

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SUBJECT: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ACTIVITIES OF  
AMBASSADOR MATLOCK

1. AS AN ADJUNCT TO HIS PARTICIPATION IN THE  
MARCH 3-4 USIA/NSC CONFERENCE ON U.S. PUBLIC  
DIPLOMACY IN EUROPE, AMBASSADOR JACK MATLOCK,  
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND SENIOR  
DIRECTOR OF EUROPEAN AND SOVIET AFFAIRS, NSC,  
CONDUCTED A NUMBER OF HIGHLY USEFUL PUBLIC  
DIPLOMACY ACTIVITIES FOR USIS LONDON. HE MET  
WITH A CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF KEY GOVERNMENT  
OFFICIALS, ACADEMICS, AND JOURNALISTS DEALING  
WITH EAST-WEST AFFAIRS, OUTLINING IN EACH

INSTANCE U.S. EFFORTS TO IMPROVE  
SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS IN THE NEAR AND LONG  
TERM. HIS DETAILED SCHEDULE WAS AS FOLLOWS:

TUESDAY PM: DRINKS AND DISCUSSION WITH LORD  
-- BETHELL, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT  
-- POLITICAL COMMITTEE RAPPOREUR,  
-- ON EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY REPORT  
-- ON U.S./EUROPEAN COMMUNITY  
-- POLITICAL RELATIONS.

WEDNESDAY AM: MEETINGS WITH CABINET  
-- OFFICE DEPUTY SECRETARY  
-- CHRISTOPHER MALLABY; TIMOTHY  
-- RENTON, FCO MINISTER OF  
-- STATE; DEREK THOMAS, FCO  
-- POLITICAL DIRECTOR AND DEPUTY  
-- UNDER SECRETARY.

LUNCH: HOSTED BY DCM RAY SEITZ. GUESTS  
-- INCLUDED NICHOLAS ASHFORD,  
-- DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENT, THE  
-- TIMES; MICHAEL BRUNSON, DIPLO-  
-- MATIC EDITOR, INDEPENDENT TELE-  
-- VISION NEWS; PROFESSOR LAWRENCE  
-- FREEDMAN, KING'S COLLEGE; NIK  
-- GOWING, FOREIGN AFFAIRS

WEDNESDAY PM: ROUND TABLE MEETING ON  
-- U.S./USSR RELATIONS AT CHATHAM  
-- HOUSE. PARTICIPANTS INCLUDED  
-- NICHOLAS ASHFORD (ABOVE);  
-- ADMIRAL SIR JAMES EBERLE,  
-- DIRECTOR, CHATHAM HOUSE;  
-- ROBERT KLEIMAN, RESEARCH FELLOW;  
-- DAVID KORN, RESEARCH FELLOW;  
-- KEITH KYLE, MEETINGS SECRETARY;  
-- WILLIAM WALLACE, DEPUTY DIRECTOR  
-- AND DIRECTOR OF STUDIES;  
-- JOHN ROPER, EDITOR, INTER-  
-- NATIONAL AFFAIRS; PAULINE  
-- NEVILLE-JONES, FOREIGN OFFICE;

DINNER: HOSTED BY PAO ROBERT KORENGOLD.  
-- GUESTS INCLUDED MELVIN LASKY,  
-- EDITOR, ENCOUNTER MAGAZINE; MARK  
-- FRANKLAND, COLUMNIST ON SOVIET  
-- AFFAIRS FOR THE OBSERVER; DAVID  
-- BUCHAN, EAST EUROPEAN AFFAIRS  
-- CORRESPONDENT, FINANCIAL TIMES;  
-- ALFRED CAHEN, SECRETARY-GENERAL,  
-- WEST EUROPEAN UNION.

2. POST IS EXTREMELY GRATEFUL TO AMBASSADOR  
MATLOCK FOR HIS WHOLEHEARTED COOPERATION IN  
POST PROGRAM. WE WOULD BE HAPPY TO HAVE HIM  
RETURN AT ANY TIME.  
KORENGOLD  
BT