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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection Name MEESE, EDWIN: FILES

Withdrawer

DLB 6/26/2015

File Folder CHINA - GENERAL (03/27/1982-DECEMBER 1982)

FOIA

F02-019/1

Box Number CFOA 160

COHEN, WARREN

24

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
31624	MEMO	CLARK TO THE PRESIDENT <i>R 2/1/2008 NLRRF02-019</i>	1	4/21/1982	B1
31625	CABLE	080912Z APR 82 <i>PAR 12/18/2007 NLRRF2002-019/1: PAR UPHELD 11/8/2012 M381/1</i>	3	4/8/1982	B1
31626	MEMO	HAIG TO THE PRESIDENT, RE TIMING... <i>R 12/18/2007 NLRRF2002-019/1</i>	1	5/4/1982	B1
31628	CABLE	RE TAIWAN <i>R 12/18/2007 NLRRF2002-019/1</i>	5	4/24/1982	B1
31630	TALKING POINTS	FOR USE WITH SENATOR BAKER <i>R 2/1/2008 NLRRF02-019</i>	2	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 29, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR BILL CLARK

THRU: KEN DUBERSTEIN *KD*
FROM: M. B. OGLESBY, JR. *MB*
SUBJECT: Foreign Assistance and PL-480
Funding for the Peoples Republic
of China *f. L*

The attached is for your information. We can anticipate substantial flack.

cc: Ed Meese
Jim Baker
Mike Deaver

EM PRC
we can anticipate
problems with the
conservatives on this.


MEMORANDUM


THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 29, 1982

TO: KENNETH M. DUBERSTEIN

THRU: M. B. OGLESBY, JR. 

FROM: JOHN SCRUGGS 

SUBJECT: Foreign Assistance and PL-480 funding for
the Peoples Republic of China

The Administration's proposed foreign assistance bill contains a provision removing Red China from that list of nations declared to be ineligible to receive foreign aid. The bill also makes Red China eligible for PL-480 Food for Peace assistance. The legislation has been introduced in the Senate, but not in the House of Representatives.

Staff at the Republican Study Committee have contacted this office to state that many conservatives and several moderate Members of the House are very upset over these two provisions. The problem was exacerbated when a staff person at the State Department informed the Republican Study Committee that the President himself had seen and signed a decision memo regarding this policy change.

Beldon Bell at the State Department and Michelle Laxalt at AID have both been informed of these developments. The House Foreign Affairs Committee will be given a briefing on the bill by the State Department and by AID on Tuesday, March 30.

21 APR 1982
MEMORANDUM

~~SECRET~~

2434

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

31624

~~SECRET~~

April 21, 1982

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK *wpc*

SUBJECT: Chinese View of Their Relations with the United States

Issue

What are the main problems that the Chinese see in their relations with the United States?

Facts

The British went over in detail notes taken during former Prime Minister Heath's visit with Deng and other leaders earlier this week. The attached cable summarizes these views.

Discussion

Deng registers sensitivity on United States thinking and policy. Deng accuses us of having a two China or at least a one and a half China policy. Deng also complains about the lack of progress in technology transfer and says he views America as a doubtful partner.

Attachment

Tab A - Beijing Cable 4361

cc ~~Vice President~~
✓ Ed Meese
Jim Baker
Mike Deaver

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR ~~005~~ F02-011, #31624

BY C. NARA DATE 2/1/08

~~SECRET~~

Review on April 8, 2002
Derivative State cable

Prepared by:
Donald Gregg

~~SECRET~~



WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection Name

MEESE, EDWIN: FILES

Withdrawer

DLB 6/26/2015

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CHINA - GENERAL (03/27/1982-DECEMBER 1982)

FOIA

F02-019/1

COHEN, WARREN

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CFOA 160

24

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
31625	CABLE / <i>partial</i> 080912Z APR 82	3	4/8/1982	B1

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

31625

PAGE 01 OF 03 BEIJING 4361
SIT564 RECALLED-JP-01

DTG: 080912Z APR 82 PSN: 030251
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DISTRIBUTION: JP /001
WHSR COMMENT: NODIS

OP IMMED
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DE RUMJPG #4361 0980948
O 080912Z APR 82
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1571

~~SECRET~~ BEIJING 4361

NODIS
E.O. 12065: RDS-1, 04/08/02 (HUMMEL, ARTHUR W. JR.) OR-M
TAGS: PDIP, PEPR, CH, MASS, TW, UK
SUBJ: MORE ON HEATH DISCUSSIONS ON TAIWAN
REF: (A) BEIJING 04313, (B) BEIJING 01400

1. ~~S~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

BI

3. QUANG HUA TWICE SAID THAT WHAT THE CHINESE DEMAND IS
"ONLY THAT THE U.S. REDUCE AND ULTIMATELY CEASE ARMS
SALES TO TAIWAN" ECHOING FU'S FORMULATION IN JAPAN
(REF B). DENG XIAOPING SAID THAT "CHINA CAN SHOW UNDER-
STANDING FOR THE SALE OF SMALL QUANTITIES OF ARMS TO

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLRR F02-019/1 #31625

BY CJ NARA DATE 12/14/89

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03 BEIJING 4361

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TAIWAN, BUT EHRE MUST BE A TIME FRAME LEADING TO THEIR TERMINATION." HE LATER SAID THAT "CHINA IS ASKING THAT THE U. S. GRADUALLY REDUCE AND ULTIMATELY CEASE ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN," BUT THEN ADDED THAT THIS SHOULD TAKE PLACE "OVER A DEFINITE PERIOD OF TIME."

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4. ~~DENG STRESSED THAT THE QUESTION OF ARMS SALES WAS NOT THE ONLY QUESTION, OR EVEN THE MAJOR ONE, INVOLVED (IN CHINSE DOUBTS ABOUT THE U. S.). "IF IT WERE JUST THE QUESTION OF ARMS SALES, IT WOULD BE EASY TO SOLVE. THE MORE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION IS THE WHOLE THINKING AND POLICY OF THE U. S. TOWARD CHINA."~~ DENG DESCRIBED PRESIDENT REAGAN'S ATTITUDE AS THEY KEY. "IT'S HARD TO TELL WHAT HE? WILL DO." HE NOTED THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN'S SON AND DAUGHTER AS WELL AS RICHARD ALLEN, "KEEP VISITING TAIWAN," AND ASKED "WHAT ARE WE TO MAKE OF THAT?" (NOTE: ~~HEATH'S MEETING WITH DENG OCCURRED BEFORE THE LATTER'S RECEIPT OF THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER.~~) DENG SAID THAT THE CURRENT U. S. APPROACH SEEMED TO REPUDIATE NIXON'S "ONE CHINA POLICY" AND TO FAVOR ~~TWO CHINAS~~ OR AT LEAST ONE AND A HALF CHINA." HE SAID THAT "CHINA MUST HAVE CLEAR U. S. COMMITMENT (ONE ONE CHINA AND ARMS SALES) BECAUSE IT INVOLVES CHINA'S EFFORTS TO REUNIFY THE MOTHERLAND. UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, U. S. POLICY IS AN IMPEDIMENT TO REUNIFICATION BY PEACEFUL MEANS. IF IT PERSISITS, WE WILL HAVE TO REVERT TO OUR PREVIOUS POLICY OF USING FORCE TO ACCOMPLISH IT (REUNIFICATION)." CHINA DID NOT WANT TO HAVE TO DO THIS, HE IMPLIED.

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5. ~~DENG COMPLAINED BITTERLY ABOUT THE "SEVERE RESTRAINTS THE U. S. HAD PLACED ON HIGH-TECHNOLOGY EXPORTS TO THE PRC.~~ HE SAID THAT, SINCE 1972, THE U. S. HAD TRANSFERRED "NO REALLY SOPHISTICATED TECHNOLOGY" TO CHINA, AND PLACED CHINA "WAY DOWN AT THE BOTTOM OF THE LIST" AMONG COUNTRIES WITH WHICH IT TRADED, "TREATING CHINA SA AN ADVERSARY, NOT A FRIEND OR AN EQUAL." ONLY EQUAL PARTNERS WERE RELIABLE,

~~SECRET~~

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03 BEIJING 4361

DTG: 080912Z APR 82 PSN: 030251

HE SAID.

6. DENG LASHED OUT AT ALLEGED U.S. EFFORTS TO "CONTROL" TAIWAN SO IT COULDS ERVE AS AN "UNSINKABLE AIRCRAFT CARRIER." HE SAID CAUSTICALLY THAT THE U.S. HAD TOO MANY SUCH AIRCRAFT CARRIERS -- "TAIWAN, ISRAEL, SOUTH KOREA, SOUTH AFRICA" -- AND THAT THESE U.S. RELATIONSHIPS JUST MAKE THINGS EASY FOR THE SOVIETS AND HARDER TO SOLVE INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS. DENG ASKED RHETORICALLY HOW CHINA COULD TRUST A COUNTRY THAT HAD SO LITTLE STRATEGIC SENSE THAT IT WOULD PUT "TWO CHINA SCHEMES" ABOVE THE IMPERATIVE OF COOPERATION AGAINST THE SOVIETS. IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST SOVIET HEGEMONISM, HE SAID, THE U.S. MUST THEREFORE BE VIEWED AS A "DOUBTFUL PARTNER." HE EXPRESSED HIS ADMIRATION FOR FORMER PRESIDENT NIXON'S WILLINGNESS TO SUBORDINATE THE TAIWAN PROBLEM TO STRATEGIC IMPERATIVES. NIXON SPOKE FROM THE HEART WHEN HE TOLD MAO HE HAD "COME TO BEIJING IN THE NATIONAL INEREST OF THE U.S. AND FOR NO OTHER REASON," DENG SAID. HE ADDED THAT DISCUSSIONS ON TAIWAN WITH NIXON AND KISSINGER HAD ALWAYS FORCUSSSED ON "HOW TO SOLVE IT AS A PROBLEM" AND LAMENTED THAT THAT WAS "NOT THE SPIRIT" OF CURRENT DISCUSSIONS WITH THE U.S.

7. ASKED ABOUT THE SPARE PARTS ISSUE, DENG SAID "SPARE PARTS ARE NO PROBLEM AS LONG AS THE LEVEL OF SUPPLY DOESN'T EXCEED THAT UNDER THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION."

HUMMEL

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8212685

NLRR FDZ-019/1 #31626

BY LCW NARA DATE 12/18/07

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

May 4, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Alexander M. Haig, Jr. *AMH*

SUBJECT: Timing of Informal Presentation to Beijing on
Draft Communique

82 MAY 4 P10:04

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

The sequence of recent exchanges we have had with the Chinese since beginning talks on this subject is outlined below.

January 22 - March 18. The US and China exchange drafts, counterdrafts, and comments in several formal meetings to discuss draft communique language. The Chinese March 18 presentation commenting on the US draft is exceedingly negative and has not yet been formally responded to by the US.

April 5-6. The President's letters to Chinese leaders are delivered offering a visit to China by Vice President Bush.

April 14. Zhang accepts Hummel's point that the Vice President's visit should not be portrayed as an attempt solely to conclude a communique. Both sides agree, however, to try to narrow differences on the issue prior to his arrival.

April 17. Zhang formally extends an invitation for the Vice President to visit China and urges the earliest possible response to the Chinese March 18 presentation.

April 19. The NSC and the Vice President's office, clear instructions informing the Chinese the US is prepared to work formally or informally on a joint communique before or during the Vice President's visit and that while welcoming their initiatives we will seek to provide further ideas of our own.

April 20. The Chinese stress the importance making some progress on the communique before the Vice President arrives.

April 26. Zhang reiterates his desire for informal talks.

On balance, it would seem desirable to go ahead with a presentation now. The Chinese expect something; indeed, they appear to be going out of their way to ask us to talk. In any case, if we do not follow through on our offer to discuss the subject before the Vice President arrives, the issue is likely to loom larger during the visit than either side wishes.

Given the closeness of the Vice President's arrival in China (he arrives on the night of the 5th and begins discussions on the 7th), I suggest leaving the question of whether to proceed now to the discretion of the Ambassador and the Vice President.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

31628

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DECLASSIFIED

NLRR POZ-019/1 #31628

BY CU NARADATE 12/18/67

EA/C:SSHALLFORD:SSH
4/24/82 EXT.26300
P:LEAGLEBURGER

EA:TPSHOESMITH
S/S:LPBREMER III

PM:RBURT
S/S-0:

IMMEDIATE BEIJING

IMMEDIATE WELLINGTON

NODIS

MELBOURNE FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY HOLDRIDGE EYES ONLY

E.O. 12065: RDS 1, 3 - 5/01/02. {EAGLEBURGER, L. E.}

TAGS: CH, US, PEPR

SUBJECT: TAIWAN ARMS ISSUE: INFORMAL DISCUSSION

REF: BEIJING 5241

1. ~~SECRET~~ {ENTIRE TEXT}

2. WE REGRET DELAY IN PROVIDING GUIDANCE FOR INFORMAL EXCHANGE BUT ON BALANCE BELIEVE THERE IS MERIT IN SETTING THIS PROCESS IN MOTION BEFORE VICE PRESIDENT'S MEETING BEGINS MAY 7. HOWEVER, WE LEAVE TO DISCRETION OF VICE PRESIDENT AND AMBASSADOR WHETHER TO PROCEED. IF DECISION POSITIVE SUGGEST AMBASSADOR ATTEMPT ARRANGE INFORMAL MEETING ZHANG WENJIN OR ALTERNATIVELY DCM AT APPROPRIATE LEVEL. GUIDANCE FOLLOWS.

3. OUR INTENTION IS TO PROMOTE AN ATMOSPHERE OF INFORMAL EXCHANGES WHICH MAY POSITION US TO MAKE FURTHER PROGRESS FORMALLY, DURING, OR AS A RESULT OF, THE VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT. AS YOU KNOW, WE DO NOT WANT TO ENGAGE THE VICE PRESIDENT IN COMMUNIQUE DRAFTING AND WANT THE CHINESE TO SEE THE VISIT IN THE SAME LIGHT WE DO. NEVERTHELESS, WE DO NOT WANT TO MISS AN OPPORTUNITY THAT, IN THE PROCESS OF CLEARING THE AIR, THE VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT MIGHT SERVE AS A CATALYST FOR PROGRESS ON THE COMMUNIQUE.

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4. IN OPENING THE MEETING YOU SHOULD REAFFIRM THE GROUND RULES THAT THE DISCUSSIONS ARE COMPLETELY OFF-THE-RECORD, WITHOUT COMMITMENT FROM EITHER SIDE. YOU SHOULD REMIND ZHANG, AT THE OUTSET, OF OUR APPROACH TO THE VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT BUT ALSO NOTE OUR EARLIER STATEMENT THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO WORK FORMALLY OR INFORMALLY TO SEE IF THERE ARE WAYS OF NARROWING THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN US. YOU SHOULD ENCOURAGE ZHANG TO JOIN YOU IN A MUTUAL EFFORT OF GENUINE GIVE AND TAKE TO FIND SOME WAY OF ADDRESSING THE KEY AREAS OF DIFFERENCE.

5. WE HAVE COME UP WITH DIFFERENT APPROACHES, AS DESCRIBED BELOW, IN THREE SEPARATE AREAS. YOU SHOULD CONSIDER THESE APPROACHES AS YOUR PARAMETERS WITHIN WHICH TO EXPLORE FOR CHINESE FLEXIBILITY. WE WILL LEAVE IT UP TO YOU HOW YOU PRESENT THEM, BUT YOU SHOULD DO SO IN A WAY THAT MAXIMIZES CHINESE INCENTIVE TO RECIPROCATATE WITH NEW SUGGESTIONS OF THEIR OWN. WHILE OUR APPROACHES ARE TIED TO SPECIFIC COMMUNIQUE REFERENCES, THEY SHOULD BE CAST IN TERMS OF ZHANG'S SUGGESTION THAT WE LOOK FOR COMMON GROUND THAT IS ACCEPTABLE TO OUR LEADERS, RATHER THAN CONCENTRATE ON SPECIFIC DETAILS OF COMMUNIQUE LANGUAGE.

6. DEPENDING ON WHAT PROGRESS MAY BE MADE INFORMALLY ON WORDING, WE ARE PREPARED QUICKLY TO SEEK WHITE HOUSE AUTHORIZATION TO TAKE THE FORMULATIONS UP IN FORMAL CHANNELS.

7. THE FIRST APPROACH ENTAILS PROPOSING A NEW FORMULATION TO RESPOND TO CHINESE CONCERNS ON SOVEREIGNTY. YOU SHOULD BE ABLE TO MAKE THE POINT PERSUASIVELY THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS ALREADY TAKEN A CLEAR STAND ON THIS ISSUE IN THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. OUR POSITION WAS SIMILAR TO THAT TAKEN BY ALMOST ALL OTHER COUNTRIES WHICH SIGNED SUCH COMMUNIQUE WITH THE CHINESE. THE ONE FUNDAMENTAL AND VITALLY IMPORTANT POINT IS THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS CONSISTENTLY FOLLOWED A ONE-CHINA POLICY.

8. WE ARE NONETHELESS WILLING TO ENGAGE IN SOME FURTHER GIVE-AND-TAKE IN THIS AREA, IF THAT WILL HELP BOTH SIDES ACHIEVE A DOCUMENT WITH WHICH EACH CAN FEEL COMFORTABLE. FOR EXAMPLE, WE CAN ENVISAGE THE FOLLOWING SUBSTITUTE FOR PARAGRAPH 4 OF THE FEBRUARY 15 DRAFT COMMUNIQUE.

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WHICH IS CONSISTENT WITH POSITIONS TAKEN BY THE US FROM THE TIME OF THE CAIRO CONFERENCE IN 1943 AND MAINTAINED THROUGH BOTH THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE AND JOINT COMMUNIQUE ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, AS WELL AS REFLECTING THE ONE-CHINA VIEW LONG ARTICULATED BY THE PRESIDENT.

9. BEGIN TEXT: THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, IN REITERATING ALL THE FOREGOING POSITIONS, WISHES TO MAKE CLEAR THAT IT HAS NO DESIRE OR INTENTION TO INFRINGE ON CHINESE SOVEREIGNTY OR TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OR TO PURSUE A POLICY OF "TWO CHINAS" OR "ONE CHINA, ONE TAIWAN." THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES HAS NEVER CHALLENGED THE PRINCIPLE, MAINTAINED BY ALL CHINESE, THAT THERE IS ONLY ONE CHINA AND THAT TAIWAN IS A PART OF CHINA. THE UNOFFICIAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE PEOPLE OF TAIWAN WILL CONTINUE TO BE CONDUCTED IN A MANNER WHICH DOES NOT CONTRADICT THIS FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE. IT FOLLOWS FROM THIS PRINCIPLE THAT THE QUESTION OF TAIWAN IS WHOLLY AN INTERNAL AFFAIR OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE. THE SOLE, ABIDING CONCERN OF THE UNITED STATES IS THAT THE QUESTION OF TAIWAN BE SETTLED PEACEFULLY, BY THE CHINESE PEOPLE THEMSELVES. END TEXT.

10. THE SECOND APPROACH, CONSISTING OF ALTERNATIVE FORMULATIONS WHICH WOULD BE SUBSTITUTED FOR PARAGRAPH 7 OF THE FEBRUARY 15 DRAFT COMMUNIQUE, IS DESIGNED TO COME TO GRIPS WITH TWO CHINESE POSITIONS: 1) THAT THE US MUST MAKE CLEAR, AT LEAST IN PRINCIPLE, THAT IT DOES NOT SEEK TO SELL ARMS TO TAIWAN INDEFINITELY; AND 2) THAT THERE BE NO EXPLICIT LINKAGE BETWEEN DECLINING US SALES AND PROGRESS TOWARD PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OR A DECLINE IN MILITARY TENSION.

11. ON THE FIRST SCORE, THE FORMULATIONS GIVEN BELOW ARE SELF-EXPLANATORY. ON THE SECOND, WE TAKE THE CHINESE POINT THAT THE DIRECT LINKAGES EXPRESSED IN OUR PRESENT DRAFT TEND TO IMPOSE CONDITIONS WHICH ARE EITHER UNACCEPTABLE IN TERMS OF BEIJING'S PRINCIPLES ON SOVEREIGNTY OR CONDITIONED ON EVENTS BEYOND CHINESE CONTROL.

12. WE CAN DROP SUCH LINKAGE SO LONG AS WE ARE ABLE TO RETAIN LANGUAGE CLEARLY SETTING FORTH A CHINESE POLICY OF PEACEFUL APPROACH TOWARD TAIWAN THAT IS "STEADFAST", "UNCHANGING" OR CHARACTERIZED BY SOME OTHER SIMILAR LONG-TERM OR PERMANENT SENSE.

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13. WITHOUT THE LATTER POINT, HOWEVER, IT IS HARD TO ENVISAGE ACHIEVING A DRAFT WHICH WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE IN WASHINGTON. THUS, SHOULD ANY FURTHER COMMENT BE MADE THAT THE WORDS "STEADFAST POLICY" COME FROM "PEOPLE'S DAILY," YOU SHOULD REMIND THE CHINESE THAT THESE WERE THE EXACT WORDS USED BY VICE FOREIGN MINISTER ZHANG WENJIN WHEN HE EXPLAINED THE NINE-POINT PROPOSAL TO THEN DEPUTY SECRETARY CLARK ON OCTOBER 3, 1981. IF THE EXACT WORDS IN OUR DRAFT ARE NOT DESIRED, THE CHINESE NEED ONLY SUGGEST OTHERS CONVEYING THE SAME MEANING. INDEED, THE STRONG FORMULATION YOU HAVE SUGGESTED FROM LIAO CHENGZHI'S DECEMBER ARTICLE WOULD DO AS WELL.

14. ON THE MATTER OF THE "PLEDGE," WE ARE MOST ANXIOUS TO PRESERVE WHAT WE HAVE PROPOSED IN ITS PRESENT FORM. IT IS NOT UNREASONABLE, AND THE PARAGRAPH INTO WHICH WE HAVE INSERTED IT DOES NOT, IN OUR VIEW, COMPROMISE CHINA'S FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES ON THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE. IF THIS COMES UP, YOU SHOULD SEEK TO PUT THIS POINT ACROSS FIRMLY, IN A WAY WHICH DOES NOT CREATE A NEW BONE OF CONTENTION.

15. THE FOLLOWING ARE THE SUBSTITUTE PARAGRAPHS FOR OUR EXISTING PARAGRAPH 7, THAT WE HAVE IN MIND:

BEGIN TEXT: ON THE CONTRARY, ALSO UNDER THE FOREGOING CIRCUMSTANCES, THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ENVISAGES THAT ITS SALES OF ARMS TO TAIWAN WILL NOT CONTINUE INDEFINITELY AND ANTICIPATES THAT ITS SALES OF ARMS TO TAIWAN WILL GRADUALLY DIMINISH IN FUTURE YEARS.

--OR: ON THE CONTRARY, ALSO UNDER THE FOREGOING CIRCUMSTANCES, THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT STATES THAT IT DOES NOT SEEK TO PURSUE A LONG-TERM POLICY OF ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN AND THAT IT ANTICIPATES THAT THESE SALES WILL GRADUALLY DIMINISH IN FUTURE YEARS.

--OR: ON THE CONTRARY, ALSO UNDER THE FOREGOING CIRCUMSTANCES, THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT STATES THAT IT DOES NOT SEEK TO PURSUE A LONG-TERM POLICY OF ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN. INSTEAD, THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ENVISAGES THAT ITS SALES OF ARMS TO TAIWAN WILL NOT CONTINUE INDEFINITELY AND ANTICIPATES THAT THESE SALES WILL GRADUALLY DIMINISH IN FUTURE YEARS.

--OR: ON THE CONTRARY, ALSO UNDER THE FOREGOING CIRCUMSTANCES, THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ENVISAGES

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THAT ITS SALES OF ARMS TO TAIWAN WILL NOT CONTINUE INDEFINITELY AND ANTICIPATES THAT THESE SALES WILL GRADUALLY DIMINISH IN FUTURE YEARS. THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT DOES NOT SEEK TO PURSUE A LONG-TERM POLICY OF ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN. END TEXT.

16. THE THIRD AREA IN WHICH WE HAVE A NEW MODIFICATION TO FLOAT IS IN THE FINAL PARAGRAPH, WHICH HERETOFORE WE HAVE CONSIDERED A THROW-AWAY INCLUDED ONLY BECAUSE IT WAS IN THE ORIGINAL CHINESE DRAFT. OUR CHANGE WOULD MAKE THE ASSERTION THAT GOOD US-CHINA RELATIONS PROMOTE AN ATMOSPHERE CONDUCIVE TO A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE TAIWAN ISSUE. THIS WOULD HELP US DEFEND OUR COMMUNIQUE AT HOME BY SHOWING THAT THERE IS A RATIONALE FOR OUR ACTIONS. WE WOULD THINK THE CHINESE MIGHT ALSO SEE BENEFIT IN HAVING THIS TYPE OF CONNECTION MADE. YOU SHOULD MAKE CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT WHILE WE WOULD LIKE AN ADDITION ALONG THESE LINES, WE WOULD NOT INSIST ON IT.

17. BEGIN TEXT: THE DEVELOPMENT OF US-CHINA RELATIONS IS NOT ONLY IN THE INTERESTS OF THE TWO PEOPLES, BUT IS CONDUCIVE TO PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE WORLD. WITHIN THE EAST ASIA REGION, BOTH SIDES BELIEVE THAT HARMONIOUS, COOPERATIVE AND FRIENDLY RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO NATIONS WILL CONTRIBUTE TO AN ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH FURTHER PROGRESS TOWARD A PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF THE TAIWAN ISSUE CAN BE REGISTERED BY THE CHINESE PEOPLE THEMSELVES. THE TWO SIDES ARE DETERMINED TO MAKE STRONG, JOINT EFFORTS FOR THE CONTINUED DEVELOPMENT OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE CHINESE AND AMERICAN PEOPLES AND BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES.

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24 MAY 1982

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

3609

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 24, 1982

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ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK *WPC*

SUBJECT: Senator Baker's Travel to the People's Republic
of China

Issue

How to brief Senator Baker before his trip to the PRC.

Facts

The Senator leaves for the PRC on May 28. His trip follows closely on the visit of the Vice President, and will come at roughly the same time as Senator Goldwater's visit to Taiwan.

Discussion

The visit of Senator Baker should be useful in the following ways:

- To demonstrate the serious and constructive attitude which your Administration and senior members of the Senate hold toward US-PRC relations.
- To stress to the Chinese that the Taiwan Relations Act is the law of the land and that while we are seeking a solution of the Taiwan arms sales problem, the Taiwan Relations Act cannot be ignored.

Recommendation

OK No

_____ That you use the attached talking points with Senator Baker
(Tab A).

Attachment

Tab A Talking Points for Use with Senator Baker

cc Vice President

✓ Ed Meese

Jimm Baker

Mike Deaver

Ken Duberstein

Prepared By:
Donald Gregg

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Review on May 24, 2002

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TALKING POINTS FOR USE WITH SENATOR BAKER

- NLRR FOI-019/131630
BY CU NARA DATE 7/1/08

- Vice President Bush's visit was useful in reassuring the People's Republic of China (PRC) of my desire to see our relations improve while also maintaining our commitments to Taiwan.
- The Vice President held firm on the Taiwan arms sales issue in his meeting with Huang Hua. Deng Xiaoping subsequently showed more flexibility but asked for a private assurance that we will at some point end arms sales. This we are not willing to give.
- We have indicated that the level of our arms sales to Taiwan will be directly related to the level of tension in the Taiwan Strait. The Chinese would like us to drop that linkage, and we can show some flexibility, at least semantically, on this issue.
- It would be very useful for you, Senator Baker, to stress to the Chinese the fact that the Taiwan Relations Act is the law of the land and that it must be lived up to.
- We have sent reassurances to the leaders on Taiwan who reacted negatively to the publication of letters sent to the PRC leadership. These reassurances have been well received.
- Senator Goldwater, who travels to Taiwan at the end of the week, has been briefed on the Vice President's trip and also says he feels reassured. He may make some strongly pro-Taiwan statements during his visit.
- We are very close to being in a "zero sum game" as we deal with the PRC and Taiwan. Continued flexibility on Beijing's part is necessary if we are to see our relationships with Beijing develop and mature.

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TALKING POINTS FOR USE WITH SENATOR BAKER

- VICE PRESIDENT'S TRIP REASSURED PRC, & RESTATED OUR COMMITMENT TO TAIWAN.
- NO NEW CONCESSIONS WERE MADE TO THE PRC. DENG SHOWED SOME FLEXIBILITY.
- OUR ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN WILL DECREASE, AS LONG AS TENSION IN THE AREA STAYS LOW.
- ASK SENATOR BAKER TO STRESS THAT THE TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT IS LAW OF LAND.

- WE HAVE REASSURED TAIWAN. GOLDWATER ALSO GOING THERE, AND MAY MAKE SOME STRONGLY PRO-TAIWAN STATEMENTS.
- WE ARE CLOSE TO A "ZERO SUM GAME"-- FLEXIBILITY IS NEEDED PARTICULARLY IN BEIJING.

24 MAY 1982

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 24, 1982

MEETING WITH SENATOR HOWARD BAKER (R-Tennessee)

DATE: Monday, May 24, 1982

LOCATION: The Oval Office

TIME: 3:00 p.m. (15 minutes)

FROM: Kenneth M. Duberstein *for D.*

I. PURPOSE

To discuss Senator Howard Baker's upcoming trip to the Peoples Republic of China.

II. BACKGROUND

Senate Majority Leader Howard Baker will leave this Friday (May 28) for a trip to the Peoples Republic of China. He will return on June 10, and his trip will include stops in Peking, Suzhou, Shanghai, Xian, and Hong Kong. Baker is a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and has wanted to make this trip for a long time. The purpose of Baker's trip is to strengthen our relations with the Peoples Republic of China and to compliment Vice President Bush's recent trip to that country.

Baker wants to visit with you before leaving so that he can say to the Chinese that the two of you discussed his trip just prior to his departure. He would also be willing to convey any messages (probably verbal) that you might wish him to take to prominent Chinese officials. Secretary Haig will be giving Baker a letter to take to China. This will be Baker's first trip to China.

III. PARTICIPANTS

The President

* The Vice President

Alexander Haig, Secretary of State

William Clark, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Senator Howard Baker (R-Tennessee)

Staff

James A. Baker, III

Edwin Meese, III

Michael Deaver

Kenneth M. Duberstein

* Regret

IV. PRESS PLAN

White House photographer only.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

Senator Baker to arrive Northwest Gate, enter the West Lobby, and be escorted to the Oval Office for a 15-minute meeting with the President.

Attachment: Talking Points

**United States
Information
Agency**

Washington, D.C. 20547

Office of the Director

14 SEP 1982



SEP 13 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable
Edwin Meese III
Counsellor to the President
The White House

FROM: Gilbert A. Robinson *gar*
Acting Director

SUBJECT: Chinese Elite Attitudes Toward
the U.S.

I thought you would be interested in the attached summary of a recent USIA study of Chinese elite attitudes toward U.S. foreign policy, bilateral relations, and American society. Results from "surrogate" interviews in late 1981 show that:

- o Ranking Chinese leaders and working-level officials seem more comfortable with the international posture of the Reagan Administration than with that of the Carter Administration.
- o PRC leaders generally find the U.S. and Chinese global policies compatible at the present juncture, with the notable exception of policy toward Taiwan.
- o Chinese elites support the official PRC position on Taiwan, but few expect unification soon or want the issue forced to a showdown that might endanger relations with the U.S.
- o The image of American society among PRC leaders and the Chinese elite in general shows vast areas of ignorance and glaring misperceptions, particularly about the American political and social system.

Research Memorandum

International Communication Agency United States of America
Washington, D. C. 20547

Office of Research



August 26, 1982

CHINESE ELITES: WORLD VIEW AND PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S.

In mid-1981, USICA commissioned a systematic field study to gain a better understanding of Chinese perceptions of the U.S. The ensuing report describes the views of PRC urban elites toward U.S. foreign policy, bilateral relations and American society in the context of their outlook on the world-at-large.

Data were gathered from in-depth interviews with 141 Americans and foreigners with recent and sustained contacts in the PRC among middle to senior-level government officials; university administrators, faculty and students; ranking staff members at research and think-tank institutes; and professionals in the media and the arts. Respondents were asked to serve as "surrogates" for their Chinese counterparts, reporting (based on personal conversations and observations of Chinese behavior) the perceptions of Chinese elites on a range of topics.

Interviews were conducted in the U.S., PRC (Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou) and Hong Kong from September to December 1981.

Some highlights of the report's major findings follow.

U.S.-China Relations

o Chinese elites overwhelmingly endorse the course of U.S.-PRC relations over the past three years but may have exaggerated expectations of what the U.S. can do for China. PRC leaders see the U.S. connection as most advantageous for China under present world conditions. Their view of the relationship is pragmatic, hence the benefits of temporary cooperation with the U.S. take precedence over any ideological considerations.

o The prime motivation of top PRC leaders in fostering relations with the U.S. has been to strengthen China's posture relative to the Soviet Union. Despite reservations about U.S. firmness in dealing with the Russians, senior officials stress the security value of the relationship and regard a united front with the U.S., Japan and Western Europe as the most effective counterpoise to Soviet expansionism.

o Second in importance to strategic considerations--particularly among Chinese academics and scientists who have a commitment to and personal stake in the continued growth of U.S.-PRC relations--is the desire to acquire American technology and scientific training to further China's modernization goals.

o Looking ahead, a substantial number of the Chinese elite express confidence that the favorable trend in U.S.-PRC relations will continue over the long run, even though temporary disruptions may occur. However, Chinese leaders do not expect U.S.-PRC cooperation to persist into the indefinite future; most do not see a permanent confluence of U.S. and Chinese interests.

U.S. Foreign Policy

o Ranking leaders and working-level bureaucrats concerned with foreign affairs appear to be more comfortable with the international posture of the Reagan Administration than with that of the Carter Administration. They applaud the proposed increase in U.S. defense expenditures and the tougher Reagan stance toward the Soviet Union, but are dismayed by the termination of the grain embargo.

o PRC leaders generally find U.S. and Chinese global policies compatible at the present stage of world history, with the notable exception of the Taiwan issue.

o The Taiwan issue outranks by far all other bilateral policy differences and casts a shadow over the prospects for expansion of U.S.-PRC relations. PRC leaders see it as the crucial issue between the two countries and as a measure of U.S. reliability and respect for China's sovereignty. They warn that continued arms sales to Taiwan will have serious repercussions.

o The Chinese elite support the official position that Taiwan is PRC territory, that unification is a matter for the Chinese to resolve, and that U.S. involvement amounts to "foreign intervention." However, few expect unification soon or want the issue forced to a showdown which might endanger relations with the U.S.

China's World View

o The vast majority of the Chinese elite seem to have an extraordinary sense of ethnicity, cultural identity and nationalism. Despite the self-deprecation evident since the late 1970s--often heard in the lament, "China is weak and backward"--pride in China shines through, particularly in China's independence from foreign domination. China is still pictured as the "Middle Kingdom," temporarily weak but destined to resume its place as a leading nation in world affairs.

o The Chinese elite endorse in broad outline the PRC's official foreign policy doctrine: that the Soviet Union poses the principal threat to China and that China should be part of a united front composed of the U.S., Japan and Western Europe to challenge

Soviet expansionism. Most visualize the Soviet threat in terms of an encirclement of China or as a threat to China's global interests and discount the risk of any direct, imminent attack. Although antipathy is the underlying sentiment toward the Soviet Union, some, especially young Chinese, admire the Soviets for having modernized against odds and for having achieved world power through socialism.

o The PRC is widely thought by elites to have an impressive defense capability--in large part because few appreciate the sophisticated nature of military power such as that commanded by the Soviet Union. Consequently, fear of an attack on China does not rank high on the list of concerns.

American Society

o The image of American society among PRC leaders and the Chinese elite in general shows vast areas of ignorance, glaring misperceptions and exaggerations. To some Chinese, the U.S. resembles heaven. To others, it appears to be the most decadent society on earth. Uncritical admiration, bordering on adulation of the U.S., is prevalent among young Chinese. The older generation tends to have a more balanced view, but it, too, is riddled with misperceptions. At the negative extreme are the xenophobic types.

o Among the gaps in information and the misperceptions of American society, the most serious is the lack of understanding the majority of the Chinese elite have of the U.S. political and social system. Many believe the U.S. is governed by an oligarchy of wealthy bankers and industrialists, collectively described as "Wall Street." They fail to understand or appreciate the pluralism and diversity of American society and the complexity with which political influence is exercised in the system. Many are convinced that if the U.S. Government makes up its mind to do something, it can be done.

* * * * *

These highlights are based on a more detailed report prepared by Ralph N. Clough, a long-time specialist in Chinese affairs:
Chinese Elites: World View and Perceptions of the U.S. (R-15-82).

U.S. Government offices requiring additional copies of this report may request them by writing to the Chief of PGM/REA or by telephoning (202) 724-9354.

Prepared by:
Gordon Tubbs (PGM/REA)
724-9354

M-8/26/82