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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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COHEN, WARREN

5

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
31399	MEMO	ALLEN TO THE VP, MEESE, BAKER, DEEVER, RE FIRST PART... <b>R 2/1/2008 NLRRF02-019</b>	2	6/3/1981	B1
31435	PAPER	THE US-CHINA RELATIONSHIP: A REVIEW <b>R 2/1/2008 NLRRF02-019</b>	5	ND	B1
31436	PAPER	RE CHINA-US RELATIONSHIP <b>R 2/1/2008 NLRRF02-019</b>	7	ND	B1

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

6/1

Ed Thomas:

There is not going to be a delegation to  
Mme. Sun Yat-sen's funeral.

Those interested in doing so may sign the  
book of condolences at the Chinese Embassy.  
Tomorrow, June 2, is the last day to do so.  
Guests may appear between 10 a.m. and 5 p.m.

  
Janet Colson

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

1 June 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR BUD NANCE

FROM: ED THOMAS

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read "Ed Thomas", is written over the printed name "ED THOMAS".

Would you please review the attached clipping and give me your comments.

Thank you.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

01 JUN 1981

May 30, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR EDWIN MEESE III

FROM: HERBERT E. ELLINGWOOD *HE*

RE: Attached Clipping

Demos and Rose Shaharian, I and others would offer to go to Madam Sun Yat-Sen's funeral, if that is desired. Possibly Dr. Billy Graham's wife, Ruth, would go also. Obviously, this is in addition to the Vice President or other officials who might be designated.

Attachment



# Sun Yat-Sen's Widow Dies at 90 in China, State Funeral Planned

PEKING (AP) — Soong Ching-ling, widow of revolutionary leader Sun Yat-sen and the woman who for years symbolized cooperation with the Communist Party, died today at the age of 90, the government announced. She will be given a state funeral.

The official Xinhua press agency reported that Soong died of chronic leukemia at her residence in Peking.

She fell seriously ill May 14, and on her deathbed China admitted her to the Communist Party and elevated her to its highest post — honorary chairman of the People's Republic.

Soong Ching-ling was one of three famous sisters. Two of them chose the West after the Communists took over the mainland in 1949. Soong remained in China and played an important role for Mao Tse-tung's Communist regime.

One of the sisters, Mei-ling, is Madam Chiang Kai-shek, widow of the Chinese Nationalist leader who died in 1975. Madam Chiang, who is in her 80s, lives in New York.

The oldest of the three sisters, Ai-ling, was married to the wealthy Chinese banker and a pre-Communist Chinese finance minister, H.H. Kung. She died in New York in 1973.

A brother, the Harvard-educated T.V. Soong, was a premier of China in the World War II era. He died in San Francisco in 1971.

All were the children of Charles Jones Soong, the adopted son of U.S. Southern Methodists. He was graduated from Vanderbilt University in Nashville, Tenn., intending to return to China to spread the Christian gospel. He went into business in Shanghai instead and amassed a fortune.

Soong was born in 1890; the exact date is not known.

As a student at Wesleyan College for women in Macon, Ga., she became enthralled by the 1911 revolution in China to oust the emperor. The leader of the rebellion was Dr. Sun Yat-sen. She wrote impassioned essays about the birth of a new China.

On her way home from college, she stopped in Tokyo to visit the exiled Sun and offered her services. He later sent word to her in Shanghai that he needed her. They were married in 1915. He was 48 and just divorced, and she was in her 20s. Her parents, scandalized by the union, sought to annul the marriage.

Soong worked closely with Sun until his death in 1925, and then she took up his cause.

She became active in the Chinese government and the Nationalist Party but split after Chiang Kai-shek took its leadership and fought the Communists, who had been part of the national union established by Sun.

She bolted the Nationalist government in 1927, the year Chiang married her sister, Mei-ling. Soong went to Europe for two years, spending a large part of her time in the Soviet Union.

During World War II, she joined her two sisters in Chungking in a show of unity.

After the Communists took over China in 1949, she became a member of the government, although she was not a member of the Communist Party.

It wasn't until her final illness in early May of this year that she was made an honorary member of the party. Communist officials said she had applied for membership many times but was rejected because she had voiced skepticism about all Chinese politicians and expressed a view the party was not perfect.

Over the years, however, she lent prestige to the Communist Party as the widow of a man revered both on the mainland and by the rival Nationalists on Taiwan.

Soong's with Sun was childless. She lived in her widowhood in Communist-governed China as she was accustomed to in her early years as the daughter of a wealthy man.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

1 JUN 1981

6/1

FILE

Ed Thomas:

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Mme. Sun Yat-sen's funeral.

Those interested in doing so may sign the  
book of condolences at the Chinese Embassy.  
Tomorrow, June 2, is the last day to do so.  
Guests may appear between 10 a.m. and 5 p.m.

Janet Colson

1 June 1981

TO: HERB ELLINGWOOD

FROM: ED THOMAS

Do you still wish me to forward this memo  
to Ed Meese re: your attending the funeral?

no per Joyce Keith  
2/6/81

F: China

JUN 3 1981

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 2, 1981

Mr. President:

You will be interested in this article which appeared in the Peking paper, "GUANGMING RIBAO" on Sunday. The article denounces the Taiwan Relations Act.

It is an "opening shot" for bargaining purposes, staking out a position before the Haig trip.

The unnamed "officials" who are castigated in the article include, apparently, Ed Meese and me.



Richard V. Allen

cc: ✓ Ed Meese  
Jim Baker  
Mike Deaver



GUANGMING RIBAO DENOUNCES U.S.-TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT

04311444 BEIJING XINHUA DOMESTIC SERVICE IN CHINESE 1256 GMT  
31 MAY 81

("TEXT" OF GUANGMING RIBAO 31 MAY ARTICLE BY CHEN ZU--"THE  
U.S.-"TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT")

(TEXT) SINCE THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION WAS INAUGURATED,  
IT HAS REPEATEDLY STATED THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL OBSERVE THE  
"SOLENN OBLIGATIONS" SET FORTH IN THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE ON THE  
ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN CHINA AND THE  
UNITED STATES AND WILL DEVELOP ITS RELATIONS WITH CHINA. HOWEVER,  
THERE ARE SOME OFFICIALS WHO HAVE OCCASIONALLY UTTERED THE  
DISCONCERTING STATEMENT CALLING FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE "TAIWAN  
RELATIONS ACT," PASSED BY THE U.S. CONGRESS. BOTH THE CHINESE  
GOVERNMENT AND THE CHINESE MEDIA WELCOME THE FORMER AND FIRMLY  
OBJECT TO THE LATTER. WE ARE WAITING TO SEE WHAT WILL EVENTUALLY  
BE THE CASE.

IN MID-MAY, SOME WHITE HOUSE OFFICIALS AGAIN PLAYED THE  
TUNE OF THE "TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT." ONE U.S. OFFICIAL SAID THAT  
THE UNITED STATES WILL IMPLEMENT THE "TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT" IN AN  
ALL-ROUND WAY; ANOTHER SAID THAT THIS WAS "STANDARD U.S. POLICY."  
AT THE U.S. HOUSE HEARINGS SESSIONS, SOMEONE WAS SO IMPUDENT AS  
TO PEDDLE THE "TWO CHINAS" PROPOSAL, ALLEGING THAT THE "TAIWAN  
RELATIONS ACT" PROVIDES A "SUFFICIENT FOUNDATION FOR STRENGTHENING  
STATE TO STATE RELATIONS" BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND TAIWAN.

AMERICAN OFFICIALS HAVE SAID THAT "THERE IS NO INCOMPATIBILITY"  
BETWEEN THE PRINCIPLES SET FORTH IN THE COMMUNIQUE ON THE ESTABLISHMENT  
OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AND THE U.S.-"TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT."  
THIS ARGUMENT IS OBVIOUSLY INTENABLE. A NUMBER OF WELL-KNOWN  
U.S. PAPERS AND PERSONAGES ALSO DISAGREE WITH IT.

THE U.S.-"TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT" IS A U.S. LAW PASSED BY THE  
U.S. CONGRESS AND TOOK EFFECT AFTER THE U.S. PRESIDENT SIGNED IT  
INTO LAW ON 10 APRIL 1979. THIS LAW IN A NUMBER OF ASPECTS  
VIOLATES THE PRINCIPLES OF THE AGREEMENT ON ESTABLISHING DIPLOMATIC  
RELATIONS BETWEEN CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES AND HAMPERS AND  
UNDERMINES THE SMOOTH DEVELOPMENT OF SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS.

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NLRR F02-019/1431380

BY L05 NARA DATE 7/12/08



FIRST, THE U.S.-"TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT" FLAGRANTLY INTERFERES IN CHINA'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS.

IT IS CLEARLY SPECIFIED IN THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS THAT "THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA RECOGNIZES THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AS THE SOLE LEGAL GOVERNMENT" AND "TAIWAN AS A PART OF CHINA." ACCORDING TO THIS PRINCIPLE, THE FUTURE OF TAIWAN AND THE WAY TO SOLVE THE TAIWAN PROBLEM CAN ONLY BE VIEWED AS THE DOMESTIC AFFAIRS OF CHINA AND CAN ONLY BE DECIDED BY THE CHINESE PEOPLE THEMSELVES, INCLUDING THE TAIWAN PEOPLE.

HOWEVER, ARTICLES II AND III OF THE U.S.-"TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT" OPENLY STATES THAT THE UNITED STATES "CONSIDERS ANY EFFORT TO DETERMINE THE FUTURE OF TAIWAN BY NONPEACEFUL METHODS, INCLUDING BOYCOTTS AND EMBARGOES AS A THREAT TO THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF THE WESTERN PACIFIC AREA AND A MATTER OF GRAVE CONCERN TO THE UNITED STATES;" THAT THE UNITED STATES "WILL MAINTAIN THE ABILITY TO RESIST ANY ACT RESORTING TO FORCE OR ANY OTHER FORCIBLE FORM THAT MAY ENDANGER THE SECURITY OF THE PEOPLE IN TAIWAN OR THEIR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC SYSTEMS;" AND THAT THE U.S. "PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS SHOULD DECIDE ON ANY PROPER ACTION TO DEAL WITH SUCH DANGER IN ACCORDANCE WITH CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURES."

(TEXT) DO THE U.S. PRESIDENT AND THE U.S. CONGRESS HAVE ANY RIGHT TO BE "CONCERNED" WITH AND EVEN TO DECIDE THE FUTURE OF TAIWAN, WHICH IS CHINESE TERRITORY? WHAT HAS THE METHOD OF SOLVING THE TAIWAN ISSUE TO DO WITH THE UNITED STATES? WHAT RIGHT DOES THE UNITED STATES HAVE TO TAKE THIS ACTION? CAN THE LAW OF A FOREIGN COUNTRY STIPULATE WHICH ECONOMIC SYSTEM SHOULD BE ADOPTED BY THE STATE OF HAWAII OF THE UNITED STATES AND WHAT KIND OF RELATIONS THE STATE SHOULD MAINTAIN WITH THE MAINLAND UNITED STATES?

OUR SINCERE HOPE OF REALIZING THE UNIFICATION OF TAIWAN WITH THE MOTHERLAND THROUGH PEACEFUL MEANS IS BENEFICIAL TO OUR COUNTRY AND NATION. HOWEVER, CHINA CANNOT PROMISE A FOREIGN COUNTRY THAT IT WILL ADOPT A CERTAIN MEANS FOR SOLVING THE TAIWAN ISSUE. MOREOVER, THE MEANS OF SOLVING THE ISSUE CANNOT BE UNILATERALLY DECIDED BY BEIJING. THAT IS BECAUSE IT ALSO DEPENDS ON THE TAIPEI SIDE. IF WE UNDERTAKE SUCH A COMMITMENT, IT WILL ONLY HINDER THE REALIZATION OF THE GOOD DESIRE FOR THE PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF THE TAIWAN ISSUE.



SECOND, THE "TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT" OF THE UNITED STATES STIPULATES CONTINUED SALES OF WEAPONS TO TAIWAN.

THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE PRC AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA SAYS: "THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA RECOGNIZES THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PRC AS THE SOLE LEGAL GOVERNMENT OF CHINA. WITHIN THIS CONTEXT, THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES WILL MAINTAIN CULTURAL, COMMERCIAL, AND OTHER UNOFFICIAL RELATIONS WITH THE PEOPLE OF TAIWAN." THE CHINESE SIDE HAS REPEATEDLY POINTED OUT THAT WEAPONS ARE NOT COMMODITIES IN GENERAL; THAT THE SALE OF WEAPONS IS HANDLED BY THE GOVERNMENT AND THAT PROVIDING WEAPONS TO TAIWAN MUST NOT BE REGARDED AS THE MAINTAINING OF UNOFFICIAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE PEOPLE OF TAIWAN AFTER THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES.

HOWEVER, THE "TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT" OF THE UNITED STATES STIPULATES: "THE UNITED STATES WILL PROVIDE TAIWAN WITH A QUANTITY OF DEFENSIVE MATERIALS AND SERVICE NEEDED TO MAINTAIN A SUFFICIENT DEFENSIVE CAPABILITY." THE U.S. "PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS SHOULD DECIDE THE NATURE AND QUANTITY OF SUCH DEFENSIVE MATERIALS AND SERVICE ACCORDING TO THEIR JUDGMENT OF THE NEEDS TAIWAN AND ACCORDING TO LEGAL PROCEDURES." ACCORDING TO THE STIPULATION MENTIONED ABOVE, THE UNITED STATES, IN THE NAME OF "FULFILLING ITS COMMITMENT MADE IN THE PAST," CONTINUED TO SELL MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO TAIWAN IN 1979; IN THE FIRST HALF OF 1980, THE U.S. CONGRESS AGAIN APPROVED THE SALE OF A NEW QUANTITY OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO TAIWAN; SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THIS YEAR, PLANS FOR U.S. SALES OF NEW FIGHTER AIRCRAFT TO TAIWAN HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED.

(TEXT) THE AMERICAN PEOPLE KNOW THAT PRODUCTS SUCH AS AIRCRAFT AND TANKS ARE ABSOLUTELY NOT FOR CIVILIAN USE AND THAT THEIR BUYERS ARE NOT TAIWAN PEOPLE BUT THE TAIWAN AUTHORITIES. THE ARMS TRADE IS NOT CIVILIAN TRADE AT ALL. FURTHERMORE, LARGE SHIPMENTS OF U.S. ARMS TO TAIWAN CAN ONLY ENCOURAGE THE TAIWAN AUTHORITIES' SEPARATIST TENDENCY AND OBSTRUCT THE PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION OF TAIWAN AND THE MOTHERLAND, AND THEY ARE BOUND TO PRODUCE AN UNFAVORABLE INFLUENCE ON THE SECURITY AND STABILITY OF THE WESTERN PACIFIC REGION.

THIRD, THE U.S. "TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT" REGARDS TAIWAN AS A "COUNTRY" IN AN ATTEMPT TO CREATE "TWO CHINAS" OR "ONE CHINA, ONE TAIWAN" AND TURN BACK THE WHEEL OF HISTORY.



THE COMMUNIQUE ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

BETWEEN CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES EXPLICITLY DECLARES: "THE

GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ACKNOWLEDGES THE

CHINESE POSITION THAT THERE IS BUT ONE CHINA AND TAIWAN IS PART

OF CHINA." BUT THE U.S. "TAIWAN RELATIONS ACTS" STIPULATES:

WHEN U.S. LAWS MENTION OR DEAL WITH FOREIGN NATIONS, COUNTRIES,

GOVERNMENTS OR SIMILAR ENTITIES, THE MEANING OF THESE TERMS SHOULD

INCLUDE TAIWAN, AND SUCH LAWS ALSO APPLY TO TAIWAN." "THE

PRESIDENT IS AUTHORIZED TO GIVE THE TAIWAN INSTITUTIONS AND THEIR

CONCERNED PERSONNEL THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITY NECESSARY FOR THE

EFFECTIVE PERFORMANCE OF THEIR DUTIES..." AND SO ON AND SO FORTH.

ALL THESE STIPULATIONS AND SUCH ACTIONS AS CONTINUED U.S. ARMS

SALES TO TAIWAN AND GIVING "PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITY" TO THE

REPRESENTATIVES OF THE TAIWAN INSTITUTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

ACTUALLY REGARD TAIWAN, AN INALIENABLE PART OF CHINA'S SACRED

TERRITORY, AS A "COUNTRY," AN INDEPENDENT POLITICAL ENTITY.

SUCH ACTS BY THE UNITED STATES, IN CREATING "TWO CHINAS" OR "ONE

CHINA, ONE TAIWAN" COMPLETELY BREAK ITS PROMISE THAT THE UNITED

STATES ACKNOWLEDGES THAT "THERE IS BUT ONE CHINA AND TAIWAN IS

PART OF CHINA."

IT MUST BE EMPHATICALLY POINTED OUT THAT THE "TAIWAN RELATIONS

ACT" IS ONLY A U.S. DOMESTIC LAW. THE RELEVANT ARTICLES OF THE

UN CHARTER AND ARTICLE 27 OF THE 1969 VIENNA CONVENTION ON TREATIES

AND LAWS EXPLICITLY STIPULATE: THE LAWS OF A COUNTRY SHALL NOT

OVERRIDE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN COUNTRIES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW. THE

LAW OF A COUNTRY SHALL BECOME INVALID WHEN IT CONTRAVENES AN

AGREEMENT THAT COUNTRY HAS SIGNED WITH ANOTHER COUNTRY. THEREFORE,

THE PROVISIONS OF THE "TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT" RUNNING COUNTER TO THE

JOINT COMMUNIQUE ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

BETWEEN CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES ARE NULL AND VOID. IF THE

U.S. GOVERNMENT WANTONLY VIOLATES THE SOLEMN INTERNATIONAL

AGREEMENT IT SIGNED WITH CHINA ON THE PRETEXT OF THIS DOMESTIC LAW

PASSED BY THE CONGRESS, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WILL NATURALLY

RAISE THIS QUESTION: HOW MUCH VALUE DO THE AGREEMENTS REACHED OR TO

BE REACHED BY VARIOUS COUNTRIES WITH THE UNITED STATES HAVE AFTER

ALL?



THE QUESTION OF SINO-U.S. RELATIONS IS A MATTER CONCERNING WORLD STRATEGY AS A WHOLE. SOME AMERICAN PERSONAGES OF INSIGHT LONG AGO POINTED OUT THAT IF THE UNITED STATES' RELATIONS WITH CHINA ARE IMPAIRED BY THE TAIWAN QUESTION, IT WILL NOT BE POSSIBLE FOR THE UNITED STATES TO HAVE A SUCCESSFUL WORLD STRATEGY, AND IT WILL BE DIFFICULT FOR IT TO COPE WITH THE SOVIET CHALLENGE.

THE TAIWAN QUESTION IS A MAJOR MATTER THAT HAS A BEARING ON CHINA'S TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY AND THE FEELINGS OF THE 1 BILLION CHINESE PEOPLE. THE "TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT" HAS BECOME AN OBSTACLE TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF SINO-U.S. RELATIONS. CHINESE PUBLIC OPINION STRONGLY DEMANDS THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT PROCEED FROM THE OVERALL STRATEGIC SITUATION, SERIOUSLY HONOR ITS SOLENN COMMITMENTS, CONTINUE TO DEVELOP SINO-U.S. RELATIONS ON THE BASIS OF THE PRINCIPLES OF THE COMMUNIQUE ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES, AND STOP THE MOMENTUM IN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AND AMONG THE AMERICAN PEOPLE OF OBSTINATELY WANTING TO "IMPLEMENT" THE "TAIWAN RELATIONS ACTS" "IN AN ALL-ROUND WAY."

(ENDALL)

31 MAY 1919Z MR/KK



~~SECRET~~

F: China

OUTSIDE THE SYSTEM

MEMORANDUM

3399

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 3, 1981

04 JUN 1981

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT  
✓ EDWIN MEESE III  
JAMES A. BAKER III  
MICHAEL K. DEEVER

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F02-D19/1 #31399  
BY QV NARADATE 2/1/08

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN

SUBJECT: First Part of Analysis of US-Chinese Bilateral  
Relations (C)

Attached is the first section of our analysis of the record of secret bilateral talks between Americans and Chinese starting in 1971 and going up to the Nixon visit in February 1972. (C)

The following is a summary of the analysis:

Before we frame China policy for this Administration, and before Secretary Haig goes on his June trip to China, it is essential that key leaders of this Administration inform themselves of the essentials of the bilateral talks which we have had with the Chinese since 1971. (C)

This paper is perhaps too long, but it is readable and I recommend 10 minutes be taken to read the full text. There is a consistency and flow to it which cannot be captured in tick-mark key judgments. Having said that, here are the key judgments:

- From the beginning of our talks in 1971, the Taiwan issue was up front. The Chinese said many of the same things then in 1971 they are saying now.
- The Chinese have insisted that the U.S. cannot use the Soviet threat to make China give too much on Taiwan.
- China has serious domestic constraints on how far it can go on Taiwan.
- The U.S. (Nixon and Kissinger) endorsed five principles on Taiwan which went far in meeting Chinese requirements (see pages 4 and 5).

~~SECRET~~

Review on 5/26/87

~~SECRET~~

- China emphasized a peaceful solution to the Taiwan question back in 1971, but would not renounce use of force.
- The U.S. indicated to the Chinese that normalization would take place in Nixon's second term, 1972-1976. ~~(S)~~

The tone of these early sessions was largely determined by the Chinese. The talks were on their home turf -- they set the meeting times, provided the hospitality and put the foreign barbarians on the defensive. Kissinger, who later turned out to be a tough bargainer, in these earlier sessions was accommodating. He was much impressed by the personality of Zhou En-lai (Chou En-lai) and was unfamiliar with the success story of Taiwan. China was then viewed as a newly discovered important strategic asset. U.S. negotiators did not have in mind comparisons between China's turmoil and backwardness and Taiwan's progressive achievements. Taiwan was considered "an obstacle." ~~(S)~~

We are, I presume, determined to alter this trend, but we have to do so in light of the historic record described here. ~~(U)~~



THE US-CHINA RELATIONSHIP: A REVIEW

This is the first part of a review of the US-China relationship based on an examination of the heretofore most secret documentary record of bilateral talks. The purpose is to trace the origins of the relationship, to try to determine the nature of the expectations and commitments that have evolved, and finally to assess the current state of play as it relates to future expectations. (S)

The Setting

A convergence of developments made possible the breakthrough that the U.S. and the PRC achieved in the early 1970s after two decades of animosity, including combat during the Korean War. After the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, which China interpreted as a threat to itself, China began to emerge from its isolation of the Cultural Revolution and to put its own house in order after convulsive internal struggles. A Party Congress was held in April 1969, the first in more than a decade of upheaval (Great Leap and Cultural Revolution as well as the collapse of the Sino-Soviet alliance); in its wake Beijing began dispatching ambassadors to their posts as a demonstration of China's reentry into the international community. After the Sino-Soviet border crisis of spring-summer 1969 was brought under control, the Chinese positioned themselves in a notably flexible way to enhance their political and diplomatic leverage and thus to offset Soviet pressures in the Sino-Soviet cold war that had developed. (S)

For its part, the new Nixon Administration was intent on exploring a new relationship with China, particularly with an eye to a post-Vietnam War situation. Within days of his inauguration the President instructed Henry Kissinger to encourage this process. The Sino-Soviet border clashes in March 1969 sharpened the Administration's perception of the geopolitical opportunities. In addition, the Administration hoped that an opening to China would put pressure on Hanoi to accept a negotiated settlement. (S)

Thus, both sides had reason to look to a breakthrough toward developing a new relationship. One premise was a mutual interest in containing Soviet pressures as the US reduced its military presence in Asia in line with the Nixon Doctrine enunciated in mid-1969. Another premise was their interest in transforming their long frozen adversary relationship and to remove the "two Chinas" anomalies that bedeviled international politics. These two premises, interacting in complex ways, were integral parts of the logic of the political evolution that began in the early 1970s, and they remain so today as that process continues. Another continuing dimension, though difficult to identify with precision on the Chinese side, has been the changing strength of the domestic base from which each side moves the process along. (S)



Opening Lines of Communication

An early signal of Chinese interest in opening a serious dialogue came in November 1968 when the PRC proposed resuming the Warsaw Ambassadorial Talks a month after the new Administration was in office. Reasserting a longstanding demand, the Chinese insisted that the two sides address the fundamental issue, i.e., Taiwan, and not haggle over side issues -- a reference to U.S. attempts over the years to improve the atmosphere by trade, cultural and other exchanges. This meeting was called off by the Chinese at the last moment for unspecified reasons. In the coming months, however, the U.S. signaled through statements and unilateral moves to relax trade and travel restrictions that it was interested in exploring a new relationship with China. At the same time, the Administration used intermediaries, the Romanians and especially the Pakistanis, as a channel to communicate this interest. (S)

Central to this carefully orchestrated effort to open a dialogue was U.S. willingness to address the fundamental issues posed by the Taiwan question. At the Warsaw Talks, revived in early 1970, the U.S. proposed that communication be raised to a more authoritative level and in a more secure setting; the Chinese indicated willingness to receive a Presidential special envoy. By spring 1971, after "ping pong diplomacy" had helped improve the public atmosphere, the President had received an invitation to visit Beijing, to be preceded by a secret visit by Kissinger. The Chinese indicated in clear terms that the top priority issue was U.S. withdrawal from Taiwan. The U.S. was clear in its own mind on this and proceeded accordingly; indeed, a Kissinger memo to the President acknowledged that a resolution of the Taiwan question could not be in the context of "two Chinas." In effect, for the first time after years of sterile exchanges the two sides had a meeting of the minds on the basic direction their negotiations would move. (S)

In the high-level dialogue that ensued, which included Kissinger trips in July and October 1971 and the Nixon visit the following February, the rancor of the years seemed almost to dissipate. The strategic imperatives drawing the two sides together could not alone account for the accommodating spirit that pervaded their difficult negotiating sessions. Nor was it sentimental affinity; rather, the U.S. struck a highly responsive chord in declaring that it was motivated by American self-interest and would treat China as an equal having its own interests (Mao was moved to remark to Nixon that he preferred rightists and had "voted" for Nixon). The accommodating approach by both sides was evident not only in their sincere efforts to take account of one another's international interests, but perhaps more tellingly in their understanding of the other side's domestic constraints. (S)



### The Soviet Angle

The Chinese were willing to recount the background of their dispute with the Soviets, but they were reticent about addressing the Soviet angle as a factor in the emerging US-China relationship. They seemed particularly concerned to resist any suggestion that the Soviet factor and the Taiwan question could be linked. Thus, when General Haig arrived in January 1972 to make advance preparations for the President's visit he delivered a reassessment of Soviet intentions as directed at an encirclement of China; in view of this, he said, the Nixon visit had acquired an immediate significance beyond the long-term considerations originally motivating it. Haig also presented a new U.S. version of the draft communique's section on Taiwan, urging the Chinese to give serious reconsideration to their approach in view of U.S. domestic opposition to the whole enterprise. (S)

Zhou brushed aside the suggestion that there had been a change of Soviet strategy, and he took exception to Haig's statement that China's viability was endangered. No country should rely on external forces to maintain its independence, Zhou said, or else it would become a protectorate. Though Zhou did not spell this out, such a concern had been at the root of the failure of the Sino-Soviet alliance. (S)

The Chinese accepted the President's offer to provide a highly secret intelligence briefing on Soviet forces deployed against China, which Kissinger delivered to Marshal Ye Jianying. Kissinger also told the Chinese that he and the President, anticipating a Chinese intervention in the Indo-Pakistani war that winter, had decided that if China came under attack from the Soviets as a result, the U.S. "would take whatever measures were necessary to prevent it." After Kissinger delivered the detailed intelligence report, Ye remarked that it was "an important indication of the sincere desire" of the U.S. to improve relations with China. (S)

### The Goal of Normalization

The coming 1972 elections loomed over the negotiations, with Nixon explaining that he could do more than he could say at that time and that it was the direction of events that now counted. Nixon and Kissinger pressed the point that an explicit U.S. undertaking at that time risked aborting the whole initiative; they raised the expectation, however, that the momentum of events would lead to normalization during a second Nixon term. The Chinese for their part disclaimed any demand for the U.S. to set a specific time frame, though they picked up on the references to a Nixon second term. At one point Zhou En-lai, musing on the fragility of an obligation by a President whose successors might not follow through, said if the Chinese had to wait six years they would use "other means" to liberate Taiwan -- a rare reference to the use of force. Kissinger replied that the U.S. was not asking them to wait six years. (S)



As Kissinger observed, there was a tension in the negotiations between the Chinese thrust for clarity and a U.S. need for ambiguity on the terms of normalization. He explained the U.S. need as essentially one of domestic politics. The Chinese, for their part, repeatedly stressed their people's "very strong feelings" about the Taiwan question, presumably meaning that there was strong resistance in the leadership to compromise on fundamentals. Zhou at one point remarked to the President that the Chinese Foreign Minister and the U.S. Secretary of State (Rogers) both had limitations, suggesting that they could not take the large view in negotiating. Noting that both the U.S. and the Chinese had their domestic difficulties -- and that the Foreign Minister represented the Chinese people's feelings -- Zhou said it was possible to persuade the people because of Mao's prestige. Mao stood way above the fray and could override resistance. (S)

The Chinese, while generally willing to leave ample time for the evolution of events, were concerned to get the U.S. committed to explicit objectives such as acceptance of Beijing's fundamental principle that Taiwan was a part of China. The Chinese showed extreme sensitivity to anything that even hinted at the prospect that Taiwan could be severed from China's sovereignty. For example, they objected to a U.S. statement in the draft communique favoring "an equitable and peaceful" resolution of the Taiwan question, arguing that the term "equitable" might be subject to the interpretation that a plebescite could be held on Taiwan on the question of self-determination. Thus, not only were they rejecting requests for a commitment to peaceful means as an infringement of their sovereignty, but they were intent on foreclosing any possibility -- whether peaceful or not -- that Taiwan could be juridically independent of the PRC.\* (S)

Consistent with the projected goal of normalization, the U.S. went far toward meeting China's requirements on the "crucial" question of Taiwan. In the February 1972 talks, the President endorsed five principles that Kissinger had agreed to accept the previous year:

- There is only one China, of which Taiwan is a part, and there would be no further U.S. statements that the status of Taiwan remained undetermined.

\* Chinese sensitivity was also reflected in their displeasure over a State Department spokesman's remark in April 1971 that the status of Taiwan remained undetermined. Kissinger repeatedly emphasized that no more had been heard from Washington in that vein and disavowed any such position. (S)



- The U.S. would not support a Taiwan independence movement.
- The U.S. would discourage Japan from establishing a military presence as American troops withdrew.
- The U.S. would support any peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question.
- The U.S. would seek normalization of relations, recognizing that the Taiwan question was an obstacle to completing the process. (S)

Bargaining on the Taiwan section of the joint communique was intense and protracted, in effect running from Kissinger's extended October 1971 trip to the last day of the Nixon February 1972 visit. The result was a notable compromise that could not have been achieved had the two sides not raised the mutual expectation that a process had been set in motion toward normalization. Though Zhou, in the private talks, explicitly expressed China's desire to realize a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue, the Chinese remained adamant against forswearing other means, and the U.S. did not press the matter. But despite their insistence that the PRC's claim to sovereignty over Taiwan was unconditional, the Chinese agreed to sign a joint communique in which the U.S. conditioned its ultimate objective of withdrawing all its forces from Taiwan on the prospect of a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. (S)

As will be noted in the next part of this review, domestic difficulties on both sides undercut the momentum that had rapidly developed in the new relationship. Even apart from the domestic dimension, however, there were difficulties inherent in the process that would have required the greater clarity of commitment that the U.S. side had resisted. A very big effort had been made by the two sides to establish convergent expectations of the direction they were moving, but the modalities by which they were to carry through on this had been left purposely vague. What did it mean, for example, to expect normalization during a Nixon second term if the status of the U.S. treaty with the Nationalist government were not agreed upon? The Chinese, while providing what Nixon called "running room" by not requiring a U.S. commitment on the matter, said they would require abrogation of the treaty as a condition for normalization. The U.S., on the other hand, looked to a historical evolution leading to a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question, thus rendering the treaty issue moot. But in the absence of a peaceful settlement among the Chinese themselves (and could that be expected in the coming five years?), it appeared that normalization could not be reached without either China renouncing the use of force or the U.S. abrogating the treaty and withdrawing its forces. It was this dilemma that posed a challenge to negotiations for the remainder of the decade. (S)

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BY CH NARA DATE 2/1/08

# 1. Technology Transfer Levels for China

Background: China is now in Category "P," which places it theoretically slightly above the USSR but well below India. This system has not worked well and new policy is necessary. These factors should be considered in drafting the decision memorandum:

- A. China's reliability and importance as a strategic asset;
- B. Enhancement of American business competitiveness in the China market;
- C. Decreasing government intervention in the licensing process;
- D. International repercussions of altering U.S. licensing procedures. (S)

Problem: Present several options for NSC decision. These options would start from maintenance of current status to upgrading China to friendly non-allied status which would permit expanded sales of dual-use technology and equipment to China. (S)

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2. Arms Sales to Taiwan

Background: Since this Administration has taken office, no arms sales have been made to Taiwan. Peking has registered strong objections to any future sales. The Administration is, however, committed to resume sales -- by campaign statements and by a sense of obligation. Taiwan wants advanced weaponry, including an anti-ship missile and a new aircraft. These are largely for psychological reasons. Its military needs, according to CIA, do not require an advanced aircraft. (S)

Problem:

- A. What level of sales should be made to Taiwan?
- B. When should such sales commence and how should they be integrated into our policy toward the PRC?
- C. What should we say and what should we not say in Peking to the PRC on this question? (S)

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3. China/Cambodia/Vietnam

Background: Chinese Vietnamese border incidents have intensified recently, but intelligence reports no hard evidence of a buildup for a major confrontation. Cambodian resistance is picking up. Pol Pot's forces have had limited success militarily, and a non-communist group under Son Sann has developed some political momentum. Vietnam is in poor shape economically and ASEAN is increasing pressure on Vietnam by calling for a U.N.-sponsored meeting on Cambodia and by supporting Cambodian resistance through Thailand. (S)

Problem: China could pressure the U.S. to take a more active role in supporting Cambodian resistance as part of our worldwide policy of confronting the Soviet Union and its surrogates' aggression.

- A. How far should the U.S. go in supporting Cambodian resistance and what should we say or should we not say to China on this?
- B. What position should the U.S. take if Vietnam-China hostilities expand either into intensified protracted warfare or larger scale incursions and invasions in the border area?

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3. China/Cambodia/Vietnam (Continued)

- C. What will U.S. position be if Vietnam strikes a knockout blow at Cambodian resistance centers in Thailand?
- D. Can a division of labor be achieved with China continuing its military support for Pol Pot while the U.S. and ASEAN build up Son Sann politically? (8)

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4. China/Taiwan

Background: China and Taiwan are continuing with a troubling political confrontation but with gradually increasing commercial and personal ties. Although the situation in the Taiwan Straits remains calm, each side has overcommitted military forces against the other, and Taiwan, and Peking to a much lesser extent, are projecting military needs in terms of the threat from the other. The larger threat is the Soviet Union and more concentration is necessary on that aspect. China and Taiwan have complementary economies in some respects as well as common needs for more energy resources. Peking, for its own reasons, has sought US help on "reunification." Taiwan remains opposed to this. ~~(S)~~

Problem:

- A. What should be the US role in this complicated situation?
- B. Are there positive moves the US can make in constructing a framework for future cooperation?
- C. What should the US say with respect to reunification, keeping in mind our principles:

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- No use of force by either side;
- No coercion on Taiwan to participate;
- Protection of US basic interests in this area. (S)

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## 5. Security Relationship with Peking

The reopening of US-Chinese relations in 1971 was in large part due to parallel interest in checking Soviet power. This has remained a key ingredient in the relationship today. China has tied down 25 percent of Soviet ground forces - its military is, however, backward and China has recently subordinated defense to civilian needs in budgeting. In part for symbolic reasons China would like to increase military cooperation with the US. (S)

### Problem:

- A. How far should the US go during Secretary Haig's trip to sustain momentum of military relationship first started by Kissinger in intelligence briefings, and expanded under Ford and Carter?
- B. Should the US consider weapons and weapons technology sales to China?
- C. How would this increase China's capability against the USSR?
- D. To what extent would such sales provide US additional leverage in China?
- E. What would be the reaction of our allies and friends, especially Japan, ASEAN and Taiwan?
- F. Can moves short of military sales be made which would still enhance our security relationship? (S)