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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name BLAIR, DENNIS: FILES

Withdrawer

CAS 5/16/2012

File Folder PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 1981 (MARCH 1981 - JUNE 1981)

FOIA

M11-442

Box Number 4

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
136901	CABLE	RE TACTICS <i>D</i> 3/21/2017 <i>M442/1</i>	3	3/17/1981	B1
136903	CABLE	STATE 098311 <i>R</i> 8/23/2016 <i>M442/1</i>	2	4/17/1981	B1
136904	CABLE	STATE 098311 <i>R</i> 8/23/2016 <i>M442/1</i>	4	4/17/1981	B1
136906	NOTES	RE INTERAGENCY MEETING RE SHAPING EUROPEAN ATTITUDES <i>R</i> 8/23/2016 <i>M442/1</i>	8	ND	B1
136919	MEMO	BLAIR TO ALLEN RE INTERAGENCY GROUP MEETING <i>R</i> 8/23/2016 <i>M442/1</i>	2	5/8/1981	B1
136922	CABLE	BONN 10462 <i>R</i> 8/23/2016 <i>M442/1</i>	3	5/27/1981	B1
136947	MEMO	RICHARD GILBERT TO INTERAGENCY PUBLIC AFFAIRS WORKING GROUP RE MATERIALS FOR JUNE MEETING <i>PAR</i> 9/22/2017 <i>M442/1</i>	1	6/15/1981	B1
136927	CABLE	BONN 11170 <i>R</i> 8/23/2016 <i>M442/1</i>	4	6/9/1981	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

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B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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136901 CABLE

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Foreign Opinion Note

International Communication Agency, United States of America
Washington, D. C. 20547

Office of Research



April 16, 1981

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FRENCH AND WEST GERMANS HAVE MARKEDLY DIFFERENT VIEWS FROM AMERICANS ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS

Americans are far apart from West Germans and French in their views on comparative East-West military strength, the benefits of detente, and how to deal with the Soviet Union. These findings emerge from surveys conducted in February in the three countries.

Many French and West Germans Pessimistic About East-West Balance

Public perceptions of the Eastern bloc's military superiority are far more widespread in France and West Germany than in the United States. Large proportions in West Germany (68% to 27%) and in France (51% to 14%) think that the Soviet bloc countries have a military edge over the West. Americans, by contrast, are more evenly divided in their views. A plurality (44%) think the East is ahead but one-third (33%) believe the West is superior.

In all three countries, however, majorities or large pluralities think the West is superior in economic strength and scientific and technical development.

Americans Most Likely to Favor a Firm Policy Toward the USSR

The spread between opinion in the U.S. and that in France and West Germany on perceptions of East-West military power is even more marked on the question of how their governments should respond to the Soviet threat. A majority (57%) of Americans favor a policy of "firmness" toward the Soviet Union. About half as many (33%) advocate "conciliation." By contrast, majorities in West Germany (67%) and France (52%) favor the conciliatory approach, with only a third or less backing a policy of "firmness."

These differences on policy toward the USSR may in part be explained by divergent views on detente. Far more West Germans (65%) and French (54%) than Americans (34%) believe that the West has benefited as much as the East from detente. About a third (30%) of Americans think the East has benefited more than the West whereas fewer West Germans (19%) and French (16%) hold that view.

Many French Believe Soviet Global Influence Has Increased, But
Many Also Mistrust Soviet Foreign Policy

Additional questions asked only in France revealed that while the French are evenly divided about whether U.S. "influence" in the world had increased or decreased in the past decade (31% to 34%), almost half the public believes Soviet influence has increased; only 14 percent think it has declined. Twice as many (32% to 14%) also believe West European influence has increased as think the opposite.

At the same time, fully 61 percent say they mistrust Soviet foreign policy. Only 12 percent -- far fewer than one might have expected in a country where 20 percent vote Communist -- say they trust Soviet policy. The French are most trustful of West Germany (50% to 21%) and divided in their confidence in U.S. foreign policy (37% to 35%).

* * * *

The studies were conducted by Brule Ville Associates in France and Gallup Institutes in the U.S. and West Germany in February 1981.

Department of State PH's Am

TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 OF 02 STATE 098311
ORIGIN EUR-12

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STATE 098311

9735 EUR7287

REPRESENTATIVES FROM STATE, USICA, AND CIA AT LEAST
ONCE A MONTH TO:

-- REVIEW THE POLITICAL/PSYCHOLOGICAL SITUATION
IN EUROPE, INCLUDING SOVIET PROPAGANDA EFFORTS;

-- DEFINE POLICY PRIORITIES FOR THE NEAR-TERM AND
TARGET RESOURCES ON THEM;

-- ENSURE THERE IS ADEQUATE GUIDANCE ON KEY POLICIES
FOR STATE, ICA AND OTHER USG REPRESENTATIVES IN
EUROPE TO USE IN BACKGROUNDING KEY GROUPS INCLUDING
PRESS, CHURCH, LABOR, BUSINESS AND YOUTH;

-- LOOK FOR NEW WAYS TO COMMUNICATE OUR OWN IDEAS
AND TO RESIST THE INROADS OF SOVIET PROPAGANDA;

-- ASSESS THE IMPACT OF COMPLETED ACTIVITIES AND
COORDINATE THE SUBSTANCE OF UPCOMING EVENTS.

4. OUR FIVE POLICY PRIORITIES FOLLOW.

FIRST, EAST-WEST RELATIONS. THROUGH PUBLIC AND
DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS WE SHOULD BE MAKING MAJOR EFFORTS
TO BUILD WESTERN CONSENSUS BEHIND THE NEW ADMINISTRATION'S
APPROACH TO EAST-WEST RELATIONS. OUR NEAR-TERM
OBJECTIVE IS TO HAVE THE NATO MINISTERIAL IN MAY
DEMONSTRATE SOLIDARITY WITH US. THE MINISTERIAL
COMMUNIQUE SHOULD BE A USEFUL STATEMENT OF ALLIANCE
VIEWS ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS. WE ALSO WILL BE PROVIDING
POSTS WITH ADDITIONAL UNCLASSIFIED POINTS TO USE
IN SETTING FORTH U.S. OVERALL APPROACH. IT IS IMPORTANT
THAT WE CONTINUE TO DEMONSTRATE WESTERN FIRMNESS IN
THE FACE OF PERSISTING SOVIET PRESSURES ON POLAND,
OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN AND OTHER AGGRESSIVE ACTIONS.

SECOND, TNF. STRENGTHENING ALLIED SUPPORT FOR TNF
MODERNIZATION IS A POLITICAL AND SECURITY IMPERATIVE.
THE U.S. IS COMMITTED TO THE TWO-TRACK APPROACH.
STATE 087929 PROVIDES UNCLASSIFIED POINTS TO MAKE ON
OUR POLICY AND STATE 087813 DATA ON SOVIET FORCES.
CLEARLY WE NEED TO TAILOR OUR MESSAGE AND PROGRAMS
TO FIT THE CONDITIONS IN SPECIFIC COUNTRIES.

THIRD, WESTERN DEFENSE EFFORTS. AGAIN THE UPCOMING
NAC AND DPC MINISTERIALS WILL PROVIDE PUBLIC FOCUS.
WE WOULD APPRECIATE POSTS VIEWS ON THE KIND OF SPECIAL
MATERIALS WHICH MIGHT HELP TO GENERATE PUBLIC SUPPORT
FOR GREATER EUROPEAN DEFENSE EFFORTS. IT WILL TAKE
TIME TO GAIN FULL EUROPEAN SUPPORT.

FOURTH, PERSIAN GULF/MIDEAST. WE ARE WORKING ON
UNCLASSIFIED GUIDANCE FOR EUROPEAN POSTS ON THE
IMPERATIVE TO STRENGTHEN PERSIAN GULF SECURITY AND
TO FORGE WESTERN COOPERATION TO THIS END, AS PART
OF A STRATEGY TO DEAL WITH THE GULF AND MIDEAST.
IN THE MEANTIME, YOU MAY DRAW ON STATEMENTS MADE BY
SECRETARY HAIG DURING HIS RECENT TRIP TO THE MIDDLE
EAST AND EUROPE, AND CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY BY PH
DIRECTOR BURT AND DAS CONSTABLE - ALL CARRIED IN
WIRELESS FILE.

FIFTH, CENTRAL AMERICA/CARIBBEAN. WE SHOULD CONTINUE
TO USE DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS AND THE ACTIVE ICA PROGRAM
TO STRESS OUR SPECIAL PRIORITIES WITH EL SALVADOR,
NICARAGUA AND CUBA. SINCE OUR EL SALVADOR POLICY HAS
DRAWN THE MOST CRITICAL FIRE, WE SHOULD KEEP THE SPOTLIGHT
ON BOTH (1) THE SCOPE OF COMMUNIST SUPPORT FOR
TERRORISM IN THE AREA AND (2) OUR COMMITMENT TO POLITICAL
AND ECONOMIC REFORM AND ELECTIONS.

ORIGIN OFFICE PP-02
INFO PHP-01 EUR-03 PMA-01 PMD-01 REA-01 RPE-01 EEC-01 BEN-01
SI-01 IND-01 REEF-01 UKD-02 NE-02 GDR-01 FRG-01 SOV-01
AS-01 CE-01 SOML-01 SOBI-02 PO-02 IT-02 PA-01 CAN-02
MA-01 FR-02 VE-02 SP-01 PMS-01 PL-02 HU-02 PH-01 EE-02
BAG-02 YO-02 RO-02 GR-01 TU-01 CY-01 SE-01 /058 A1

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-15 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSCE-00
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TO ALL EUROPEAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS IMMEDIATE

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FOR AMBASSADORS AND PAOS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 (4/16/01) (EAGLEBURGER, LARRY S)

TAGS: XG, SOPM

SUBJECT: SHAPING EUROPEAN ATTITUDES

1. IT IS CLEAR FROM POST REPORTING, MEDIA REACTION AND
SURVEY DATA THAT WE FACE MAJOR PROBLEMS WITH WESTERN
EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION. WE MUST MAKE MAJOR NEW EFFORTS
TO GAIN SUPPORT FOR U.S. POLICIES AND TO COUNTER HOSTILE
SOVIET PROPAGANDA. WE NEED TO ELEVATE POLICY PERSUASION
AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS TO A HIGH PRIORITY AT ALL EUROPEAN
POSTS, PARTICULARLY IN NATO MEMBER COUNTRIES. ALL ELEMENTS
OF YOUR MISSION SHOULD DEVOTE ATTENTION TO THIS EFFORT.
OTHERWISE, IT WILL PROVE INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT TO
GENERATE GREATER DEFENSE EFFORTS IN EUROPE AND COOPERATION
IN MEETING THE SOVIET THREAT OUTSIDE OF EUROPE. IN THIS
REGARD, THE DEPARTMENT AND USICA WANT TO INFORM POSTS
ABOUT STEPS WE ARE TAKING IN WASHINGTON TO STRENGTHEN
AND SUPPORT YOUR EFFORTS.

2. WE ASSESS THE EUROPEAN VIEW OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S
FOREIGN POLICY AS A MIX OF RELIEF AT THE REASSERTION
OF U.S. LEADERSHIP AND CONCERN THAT AN UNDULY BELLICOSE
APPROACH COULD LEAD TO UNWANTED CONFRONTATION WITH
MOSCOW. WE RECOGNIZE AND MUST DEAL WITH THE FACT THAT
THE PROBLEM MAY WELL GET WORSE BEFORE IT GETS BETTER.
UNTIL WE GAIN A GREATER UNDERSTANDING FOR OUR OVERALL
APPROACH, SPECIFIC ACTIONS TO DEAL WITH THE SOVIETS
AND THEIR PROXIES WILL BRING ADVERSE REACTIONS FROM
MANY IN EUROPE. BUT WE ARE MAKING SOME PROGRESS.
EUROPEANS CLEARLY RECOGNIZE THAT THE U.S. HAS CHANGED
AND THAT WE ARE DETERMINED TO RESTORE OUR STRENGTH AND
TO RESIST SOVIET EXPANSIONISM. IN THIS SENSE, THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL CLIMATE HAS IMPROVED. IT REMAINS
IMPERATIVE, HOWEVER, THAT WE WORK ACTIVELY AND
ASSERTIVELY TO COMMUNICATE WHERE WE ARE GOING AND THAT
THESE DIRECTIONS SERVE COMMON ALLIED INTERESTS.

3. TO SUPPORT THIS EFFORT TO GET OUR MESSAGE ACROSS
IN EUROPE, WE HAVE ESTABLISHED A NEW INTERAGENCY
COORDINATING MECHANISM. WE ARE BRINGING TOGETHER

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BY RN NARA DATE 8/23/10

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

PAGE 02 OF 02 STATE 098311

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WE ALSO NEED PUBLIC AND DIPLOMATIC FOCUS ON THE NATURE OF OUR OPPONENTS. WE CANNOT ACCEPT A CONFUSION IN ATTITUDES WHICH PROVIDES RATIONALIZATIONS AND ACCOMMODATIONS FOR AN AGGRESSIVE TOTALITARIAN STATE ENGAGED IN THE SUPPRESSION OF HUMAN FREEDOM (THE USSR) WHILE APPLYING CRITICISM AND WITHDRAWING SOLIDARITY FROM A FREE DEMOCRATIC NATION WITH WHICH EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES SHARE VALUES AND ASPIRATIONS (THE U.S.). WE MUST CHANGE PUBLIC ATTITUDES WHICH FIND STATES LIKE CHILE MORE NOXIOUS THAN CUBA, AND WHICH PROPOSE THAT WE CONFRONT THE FORMER AND COOPERATE WITH THE LATTER. WE WOULD PLACE PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON THE PATTERN OF TERRORISM AND MILITARY FORCE BY THE SOVIETS AND THEIR PROXIES, POINTING TO KAMPUCHEA IN 1978, AFGHANISTAN IN 1979, EL SALVADOR IN 1980 AND CONTINUING SOVIET PRESSURE ON POLAND.

IN PARTICULAR, WE NEED TO STRESS THAT THE SOVIET EMPIRE MUST RESORT TO THE USE OF FORCE BECAUSE ITS IDEAS HAVE LOST WHATEVER POWER THEY MAY HAVE HAD, AND BECAUSE IT IS THREATENED IN FUNDAMENTAL WAYS BY THE UNIVERSAL STRIVING FOR NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE AND INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY.

5. OBVIOUSLY THE NATURE OF OUR POLICIES WILL BE MOST IMPORTANT IN SHAPING EUROPEAN ATTITUDES. WE ARE TAKING EUROPEAN ATTITUDES INTO ACCOUNT AS WE DECIDE OUR POLICIES, EVEN AS WE SEEK TO SHAPE THOSE ATTITUDES IN DIRECTIONS WE WANT.

WE ALSO ARE CONSCIOUS OF THE NEED TO COMMUNICATE CLEARLY THAT OUR INDIVIDUAL POLICIES ARE PROCEEDING FROM A SOUND AND CONSISTENT STRATEGY. OVER THE NEXT FEW WEEKS AND MONTHS THERE WILL BE A NUMBER OF MAJOR SPEECHES SETTING FORTH OUR OVERALL APPROACH. POSTS SHOULD USE THEM IN INTENSIVE EFFORTS TO CONVEY OUR STRATEGY.

6. WE WILL WELCOME YOUR SUGGESTIONS AT ALL STAGES OF THIS EFFORT. WE SOLICIT YOUR VIEWS ON A CONTINUING BASIS ON THE MOOD IN EUROPE, ON THE QUALITY OF OUR EFFORTS, AND ON SPECIAL MATERIALS FOR WHICH YOU PERCEIVE A NEED. SUGGESTIONS FROM THE FIELD BASED ON YOUR FIRST-HAND KNOWLEDGE ARE VITAL IF OUR COLLECTIVE EFFORTS ARE TO BE FRUITFUL. FOR OUR PART, WE WILL TRY TO PROVIDE THE POLICY GUIDANCE AND SUPPORT TO DO THE JOB. WE DO NOT EXPECT THE TASK TO BE ACCOMPLISHED QUICKLY OR EASILY BUT WE DO INTEND TO BEGIN NOW TO BRING NEW VIGOR TO OUR EFFORTS.

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FOR AMBASSADORS AND PAOS
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TAGS: XG, SOPN

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2. WE ASSESS THE EUROPEAN VIEW OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S FOREIGN POLICY AS A MIX OF RELIEF AT THE REASSERTION OF U.S. LEADERSHIP AND CONCERN THAT AN UNDULY BELLCLOSE APPROACH COULD LEAD TO UNWANTED CONFRONTATION WITH MOSCOW. WE RECOGNIZE AND MUST DEAL WITH THE FACT THAT THE PROBLEM MAY WELL GET WORSE BEFORE IT GETS BETTER. UNTIL WE GAIN A GREATER UNDERSTANDING FOR OUR OVERALL APPROACH, SPECIFIC ACTIONS TO DEAL WITH THE SOVIETS AND THEIR PROXIES WILL BRING ADVERSE REACTIONS FROM MANY IN EUROPE. BUT WE ARE MAKING SOME PROGRESS. EUROPEANS CLEARLY RECOGNIZE THAT THE U.S. HAS CHANGED AND THAT WE ARE DETERMINED TO RESTORE OUR STRENGTH AND TO RESIST SOVIET EXPANSIONISM. IN THIS SENSE, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CLIMATE HAS IMPROVED. IT REMAINS IMPERATIVE, HOWEVER, THAT WE WORK ACTIVELY AND

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ASSERTIVELY TO COMMUNICATE WHERE WE ARE GOING AND THAT THESE DIRECTIONS SERVE COMMON ALLIED INTERESTS.

3. TO SUPPORT THIS EFFORT TO GET OUR MESSAGE ACROSS IN EUROPE, WE HAVE ESTABLISHED A NEW INTERAGENCY COORDINATING MECHANISM. WE ARE BRINGING TOGETHER REPRESENTATIVES FROM STATE, USICA, AND CIA AT LEAST ONCE A MONTH TO:

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-- ENSURE THERE IS ADEQUATE GUIDANCE ON KEY POLICIES FOR STATE, ICA AND OTHER USG REPRESENTATIVES IN EUROPE TO USE IN BACKGROUNDING KEY GROUPS INCLUDING PRESS, CHURCH, LABOR, BUSINESS AND YOUTH;

-- LOOK FOR NEW WAYS TO COMMUNICATE OUR OWN IDEAS AND TO RESIST THE INROADS OF SOVIET PROPAGANDA;

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MESSAGE CENTER

Good stuff -
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Dennis -
Was right.
Hang on to
this - excellent
draft.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 07879

STATE FOR EAGLEBURGER AND BURT; DEFENSE FOR IKLE AND PERLE

E.O. 12065:N/A

TAGS: UK, NATO, PARM, MPOL, MNUC

SUBJECT: SHAPING PUBLIC OPINION: HMG FIGHTS BACK AGAINST
THE CAMPAIGN FOR NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT (CND)

REFS: A. LONDON 7726 (NOTAL), B. STATE 98311

1. WE BELIEVE MOD DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY QUINLAN'S MANY
U.S. COLLEAGUES WILL ENJOY THE FOLLOWING APR 24 TIMES
ARTICLE ABOUT HIS STERLING EXPLANATION OF NUCLEAR
DETERRENCE THAT APPEARED IN THIS YEAR'S WHITE PAPER (REF A).

2. THE TIMES ARTICLE, ENTITLED "THE MINISTRY FIGHTS BACK:

ACTION USDP(15) (M)
INFO USDRE(3) DJS(*) SJCS(1) J3(5) SAGA(1) J5(2) C3S(5)
USRMCLC(1) NSC(5) SECDEF:(*) SECDEF(7) ARPA(1)
USDP(15) ASD:MRAL(2) USDRE(3) ASD:PA(1) GC(1)
ASD:PA&E(1) ATSD:AE(1)
+CSA WASHINGTON DC
+CNO WASHINGTON DC
+CSAF WASHINGTON DC
+ANMCC
+CMC CC WASHINGTON DC

TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED 70

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* UNCLASSIFIED *

PAGE 01
281103Z APR 81
SECT 01 OF 02

B

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MESSAGE CENTER

WHITE PAPER REPLY TO THE CND, BY THE UBIQUITOUS PETER
HENNESSY FOLLOWS:

BEGIN TEXT.

- THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE (STAFF 231,400 ANNUAL
EXPENDITURE 12,174 MILLION POUNDS) DEVOTED A SPECIAL
SECTION OF ITS DEFENCE WHITE PAPER TO COMBATING DIRECTLY
THE ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF A NUCLEAR-FREE BRITAIN ADVANCED
BY THE CAMPAIGN FOR NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT (MEMBERSHIP
17,000 AND RISING AT A RATE OF 400 A WEEK, ANNUAL BUDGET
100,000 POUNDS).

- MR JOHN NOTT, SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENSE, STRONGLY
RECOMMENDED WHAT HE CALLED THE WHITE PAPER'S "NUCLEAR
ESSAY", THOUGH HE ADMITTED AT A WHITEHALL PRESS CONFERENCE
THAT HE HAD NOT WRITTEN IT.

- THE MINISTER WAS CONCERNED TO REASSURE "YOUNG PEOPLE
NATURALLY WORRIED ABOUT THE DARKENING SCENE" THAT A
NUCLEAR-ARMED BRITAIN COULD HELP TO PREVENT WAR. "ARE
WE REALLY GETTING OUR MESSAGE ACROSS -- THE MESSAGE OF
DETERRENCE?" MR. NOTT WONDERED

- IN A CURIOUS WAY THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEBATE IN BRITAIN
IS TURNING INTO A DIALOGUE BETWEEN TWO PLEASANT, FLUENT
ROMAN CATHOLIC INTELLECTUALS, MGR. BRUCE KENT, GENERAL
SECRETARY OF THE CAMPAIGN FOR NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, AND
MR. MICHAEL QUINLAN, DEPUTY SECRETARY (POLICY AND PROGRAMS),
THE MINISTRY'S RESIDENT DETERRENCE THEORIST AND AUTHOR
OF THE WHITE PAPER ESSAY WHICH IS OFFICIALLY ENTITLED
"NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND PREVENTING WAR."

- THE THEME OF MR. QUINLAN'S TREATISE, WRITTEN IN HIS
DISTINCTIVE CRISP STYLE, A GREAT IMPROVEMENT ON THE
LEADEN PROSE THAT USUALLY AFFLICTS SUCH DOCUMENTS, IS THAT
FOR ALL THE HORROR OF THEIR POWER, DEMONSTRATED AT
HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI, NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND MUTUAL
DETERRENCE BETWEEN WEST AND EAST HAVE HELPED TO KEEP THE
PEACE IN EUROPE SINCE 1945. HE SAYS: "THE SCALE OF

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14

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
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THAT HORROR MAKES IT ALL THE MORE NECESSARY THAT REVULSION BE PARTNERED BY CLEAR THINKING. IF IT IS NOT, WE MAY FIND OURSELVES HAVING TO LEARN AGAIN, IN THE APPALLING SCHOOL OF PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE, THAT ABHORRENCE OF WAR IS NO SUBSTITUTE FOR REALISTIC PLANS TO PREVENT IT.

- "PLANNING DETERRENCE MEANS THINKING THROUGH THE POSSIBLE REASONING OF AN ADVERSARY AND THE WAY IN WHICH ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION MIGHT APPEAR TO HIM IN ADVANCE . . . IN ESSENCE WE SEEK TO ENSURE THAT, WHATEVER MILITARY AGGRESSION OR POLITICAL BULLYING A FUTURE SOVIET LEADER MIGHT CONTEMPLATE, HE COULD NOT FORESEE ANY LIKELY SITUATION IN WHICH THE WEST WOULD BE LEFT WITH NO REALISTIC ALTERNATIVE TO SURRENDER.

- "NO SAFER SYSTEM THAN DETERRENCE IS YET IN VIEW, AND IMPATIENCE WOULD BE A CATASTROPHIC GUIDE IN THE SEARCH. TO TEAR DOWN THE PRESENT STRUCTURE, IMPERFECT BUT EFFECTIVE, BEFORE A BETTER ONE IS FIRMLY WITHIN OUR GRASP WOULD BE AN IMMENSELY DANGEROUS AND IRRESPONSIBLE ACT."

- EVEN IF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WERE STRIPPED FROM BRITISH SOIL, MR. QUINLAN CONCLUDES, THE NATION'S GEOGRAPHICAL POSITION, CRUCIAL FOR NATO, MEANS IT WOULD STILL BE A TARGET FOR THE SOVIET UNION IN TIME OF WAR. THE CHOICE OF "RED OR DEAD" WAS BOGUS.

- READING MR. QUINLAN'S ESSAY AT CND'S HEADQUARTERS IN FINSBURY PARK, NORTH LONDON, THIS WEEK, MGR. KENT FOUND IT FLATTERING FOR THE CAMPAIGN TO BE THE OBJECT OF SUCH AN EXERCISE. HE FOUND IT AN INADEQUATE RESPONSE TO ARGUMENTS FOR DISARMAMENT, HOWEVER, AS IT OFFERED
BT

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
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PRIORITY
P 281103Z APR 81

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5574 SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO NATO COLLECTIVE USICA WASHDC
BT

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 LONDON 07879

NO HOPE.

- MGR. KENT FOUND IT EXTRAORDINARY THAT MR. QUINLAN'S
ESSAY CONTAINED NO MENTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL
SESSION ON DISARMAMENT OF 1978, OR OF ALTERNATIVE
DEFENSE SYSTEMS SUCH AS CIVIL RESISTANCE OR ECONOMIC
BLOCKADE. HE AGREED THAT A NUCLEAR-FREE BRITAIN
WOULD STILL BE A TARGET AS LONG AS THE COUNTRY REMAINED
A MEMBER OF NATO; BUT CND WAS SEEKING A DISSOLUTION
OF BOTH NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT.

- MGR. KENT IS KEEN TO DEBATE THE NUCLEAR ISSUE PUBLICLY
WITH MR. NOTT. HOWEVER, MR. NOTT HAS DECLINED THE
INVITATION, EXPLAINING IN A LETTER: "I DO NOT ...
THAT PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING WOULD BE GENUINELY ADVANCED

ACTION USDP(15) (I,M)
INFO DJS(*) SJCS(1) J3(5) SAGA(1) J5(2) C3S(5) USRMCL0(1)
NSC(5) SECDEF:(*) SECDEF(7) ARPA(1) USDP(15)
ASD:MRAL(2) USDRE(3) ASD:PA(1) GC(1) ASD:PA&E(1)
ATSD:AE(1)
+CSA WASHINGTON DC
+CNO WASHINGTON DC
+CSAF WASHINGTON DC
+ANMCC
+CMC CC WASHINGTON DC

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***** PAGE 01
* UNCLASSIFIED * 281103Z APR 81
***** SECT 02 OF 02

16

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
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BY CONFRONTATIONS BETWEEN INDIVIDUALS WHOSE RESPONSIBILITIES AND VIEWPOINTS DIFFER AS WIDELY.

- CIVIL SERVICE RULES PREVENT MR. QUINLAN FROM DEBATING DIRECTLY WITH MGR. KENT, EVEN IF HE SO WISHED.. COULD THE RULES BE WAIVED, THE RESULT WOULD BE FASCINATING. MR. QUINLAN GREATLY IMPRESSED HIS FELLOW GUESTS AT A LAMBETH PALACE DINNER LAST YEAR ARRANGED BY THE ARCH-BISHOP OF CANTERBURY, DR. ROBERT RUNCIE, WITH HIS CHRISTIAN'S DEFENSE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

- MR. QUINLAN AND MGR. KENT DO MEET, HOWEVER, UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE CHRISTIAN CONFERENCE ON APPROACHES TO DISARMAMENT. ANOTHER ATTENDER IS THE ANGLICAN, SIR ARTHUR HOCKADAY, SECOND PERMANENT SECRETARY TO THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, ANOTHER SEASONED DETERRENCE THEORIST, WHO OCCUPIED MR. QUINLAN'S SEAT AS HEAD OF WHAT THE WHITEHALL GHOULS CALL THE "HOLOCAUST DESK" BETWEEN 1973 AND 1976. END TEXT.

3. APR 24 TIMES CARRIED AS WELL A THOUGHTFUL ARTICLE ON THE NUCLEAR DEBATE BY EDITORIAL WRITER GEOFFREY SMITH ENTITLED "DEFENSE: MR. FOOT'S DOUBLE-THINK". INTER ALIA, IT EMPHASIZES THAT AN ISSUE -- IN THIS CASE THE REVIVAL OF CND -- DOES NOT HAVE TO COMMAND MAJORITY SUPPORT IN ORDER TO HAVE A MAJOR POLITICAL IMPACT AND ADVOCATES THAT THE ONLY SURE WAY OF PREVENTING THE CURRENT DRIFT IS TO DEFEAT THE UNILATERALISTS ON THE MERITS OF THE ARGUMENT. IT NOTES THIS IS WHAT GAITSKELL DID TWENTY YEARS AGO WHEN UNILATERALISM BECAME THE FOCAL POINT FOR THE BROAD DISCONTENTS OF THE LEFT.

4. CONCLUDING PARAGRAPHS, WHICH FOLLOW, UNDERLINE SMITH'S VIEW OF "MR. FOOT'S DOUBLE-THINK":

- THE POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY COMES FROM THE NEED OF LABOR LEADERSHIP TO FIGHT AND WIN A DRAMATIC BATTLE WITH THE LEFT. THAT WAS HOW HUGH GAITSKELL ESTABLISHED HIS ASCENDANCY IN THE PARTY AND HIS REPUTATION IN THE COUNTRY. ALL THE SIGNS ARE, HOWEVER, THAT THE PRESENT

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17

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
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LABOR LEADERSHIP WILL SEEK TO FUDGE THE ISSUE SO FAR
AS POSSIBLE. THAT MAY SEEM THE NATURAL COURSE FOR MR.
FOOT AS A UNILATERALIST LEADING A PARTY THAT VOTED AT ITS
LAST ANNUAL CONFERENCE TO STAY IN NATO BUT TO HAVE A
DEFENCE POLICY THAT WOULD HARDLY BE COMPATIBLE WITH
MEMBERSHIP -- ESPECIALLY AS HE HAS TO MANAGE A MULTILATER-
ALIST SHADOW CABINET AND TO KEEP THE CONFIDENCE OF A
DIVIDED PARLIAMENTARY PARTY WITH A MULTILATERALIST MAJORITY.

- YET ALL EXPERIENCE SUGGESTS THAT LEADERS WHO RESPOND
TO GREAT ISSUES SIMPLY BY TRYING TO HOLD THEIR PARTIES
TOGETHER SUCCEED NEITHER IN UNITING THEIR PARTIES NOR IN
IMPRESSING THE COUNTRY. STREATOR
BT

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

2481

DECLASSIFIED

Sec. 3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2006
BY NARA CA DATE 5/16/12

May 5, 1981

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INFORMATION

SHAPING
EUROPEAN
ATTITUDES

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: WILLIAM L. STEARMAN

SUBJECT: European Correspondents in Washington

My weekly report of May 1 mentioned my suggestion (at the ICCUSA meeting) that we make more use of local European correspondents in getting our message across to Europe. You noted your agreement and asked if we could do something. The following are some suggestions which I believe rate NSC or Cabinet-level discussion:

-- Senior officials, including Cabinet members, should periodically meet with the group of select correspondents (representing Europe's most prestigious papers) now headed by Jan Reiffenberg (whom you know). This is a discreet and serious group which really merits more attention than it's been getting from this Administration.

-- There should be more State and DOD briefings of European correspondents -- in fact of all friendly or potentially friendly foreign correspondents.

-- State should occasionally host receptions for foreign correspondents at which relatively senior US officials would be present.

-- All foreign correspondents should be on the mailing lists of various Government agencies for special materials useful in promoting a more thorough coverage of events and developments in this country.

In general, we should increase the awareness of all Government agencies to the importance of keeping the foreign press not only properly informed, but also properly stroked. A number of foreign correspondents in this town do almost nothing but sit at home and clip the Washington Post and New York Times for their pieces. We should try to pull them out of their isolation and keep them generally better

yes

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Review on May 5, 1987

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2

5

informed. There will be those whom we can't influence, no matter what, but where we succeed, we will be more effective than our overseas information programs (which cost a lot more).

cc: Carnes Lord

Could we bring them
into "renewed contact"
w/ our NIC people - as
we did w/ BEAN
Gambardoni?

Rev

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INCOMING 20
TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 BONN 09063 061632Z
ACTION EUR-12

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INFO OCT-01 INR-10 SS-15 CIAE-00 ICA-15 DODE-00 H-01
NSC-05 NSAE-00 L-03 CSCE-04 TRSE-00 PM-09 PA-02
ACDA-12 SP-02 SPRS-02 /093 W

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USINFO WASHDC
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 6969
USMISSION USNATO
AMCONSUL STUTTGART

UNCLAS BONN 09063

USICA

USICA FOR PGM/FW, EU, PGM/RC; SECSTATE FOR GEHRRN;

E.O. 12065: N/A
SUBJECT: NATO MULTI-NATIONAL JOURNALISTS TOUR -
EVIDENCE OF EFFECTIVENESS

REF: USICA 20237

SUMMARY: THERE ARE A NUMBER OF INDICATIONS THE TOUR HAD POSITIVE IMPACT. ONE WAY OF MEASURING EFFECTIVENESS IS TO COMPARE FOUR RECENT ARTICLES WRITTEN BY ONE OF THE THREE GERMAN PARTICIPANTS, SIEGSMUND VON ILSEMANN OF THE STUTTGARTER ZEITUNG - TWO PRIOR TO HIS TRIP AND TWO WHILE HE WAS IN WASHINGTON. -THE "BEFORE" AND "AFTER" INDICATES VON ILSEMANN RETURNED HOME WITH A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF AMERICA'S POLICIES AND PROBLEMS. END SUMMARY.

1. IN APRIL 10, ARTICLE, "STRIFE AMONG PARTNERS." VON ILSEMANN REPORTS ON THE NATO NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP MEETING IN BONN, NOTING "THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NPG ITSELF IS A HISTORY OF CONFLICTING INTERESTS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE." HE CONTINUES, "AMERICA, HUMBLING IN VIETNAM AND ALSO IN IRAN, IS NOW ALSO AFRAID OF LOSING ITS EARLIER SUPERIORITY IN THE MILITARY SPHERE." VON ILSEMANN REFERS TO THE "THREAT OF 'SPLENDID ISOLATION'" DEPICTED BY SOME AMERICAN POLITICIANS, AND THEN HE COUNTERS IT: "INDEED WE NEED THE USA BUT IT IS ALSO TRUE THAT WASHINGTON IS DEPENDENT ON ITS PARTNERS."

2. IN ARTICLE APRIL 22, "THE SENSE OF DETERRENCE" -- I.E. BEFORE DEPARTURE FOR U.S. -- VON ILSEMANN CONTINUES TO WRITE ABOUT THE "FAILURE OF DETERRENCE AS A POLITICAL PRINCIPLE." IN EVALUATING THE RELATIONS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST, HE SAYS "THE SYSTEM OF INSTITUTIONALIZED MISTRUST" DOES NOT OFFER ANY POLITICAL ADVANTAGE. FOR EUROPEANS, HE ADDS, THE CREDIBILITY GAP (GLAUBWUERDIGKEITSLUECKE) MAY BE A BIGGER PROBLEM THAN THE ARMAMENTS GAP. HE CONCLUDES THAT IT COULD GET TO A POINT WHERE CITIZENS LOSE INTEREST IN MILITARY SECURITY BECAUSE OF THE HIGH COST OF HARDWARE INVOLVED.

3. ON APRIL 25, -- DURING HIS WASHINGTON STAY -- STUTTGARTER ZEITUNG PUBLISHED TWO REPORTS BY VON ILSEMANN: ONE, "AMERICA COURTS THE EUROPEANS" FOCUSES ON THE SUBSTANCE OF BRIEFINGS WITH HAIG, WEINBERGER, AND ALLEN. ALL THREE, HE WRITES, "EMPHASIZED AMERICA'S 'HONEST INTEREST' IN ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE USSR. THEY ALSO EMPHASIZED THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH THE EUROPEAN ALLIES...REJECTING ASSERTIONS THAT THE U.S. SEEKS SUPERIORITY, WEINBERGER SAID, 'WE WANT TO BE STRONG ENOUGH TO DETER ANY ATTACK.'" THE OTHER, A COMMENTARY ENTITLED, "THE EUROPEAN BRAKEMAN"

(BREHMER EUROPA) OPENS WITH THESE WORDS: "EUROPE CAN BE SATISFIED WITH THE CONCLUSION DRAWN BY THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION AFTER ITS SIGNIFICANT FIRST HUNDRED DAYS IN OFFICE." LATER HE STATES, "THERE IS AGREEMENT NOW IN WASHINGTON ON MATTERS OF PARTICULAR SIGNIFICANCE FOR EUROPE." HE POINTS TO "MISTRUST" NEGATIVELY COLORING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS AND NOTES THAT EUROPE CAN PLAY A ROLE THROUGH ITS "MODERATING INFLUENCE" ON FOREIGN POLICY. HIS "HOPEFUL CONCLUSION" IS THAT "AMERICA HAS BEEN AWARE OF AND HAS REACTED TO EUROPEAN OBJECTIONS" DURING THE FIRST HUNDRED DAYS OF THE NEW ADMINISTRATION.

4. COMMENT: WHILE ONE SWALLOW DOES NOT A SUMMER MAKE, ESPECIALLY ALONG THE RHINE, VON ILSEMANN'S CASE TENDS TO PROVE A NUMBER OF HYPOTHESES: THAT A QUALIFIED JOURNALIST WHEN PRESENTED WITH FACTS AND REASONABLE ARGUMENTATION WILL REFLECT THESE IN HIS REPORTING, THAT THE TIME AND ENERGY SPENT BY HIGH LEVEL USG OFFICIALS IN EXPLAINING ADMINISTRATION POLICIES ARE APPRECIATED AND THE EFFECT OF THIS EFFORT MEASURABLE IN TERMS OF POSITIVE RESULTS, AND THAT INTELLIGENTLY THOUGHT OUT AND WELL ORGANIZED TOURS LIKE THIS ONE ARE WORTH THE MONEY AND EFFORT. KUDOS TO ALL WHO OBVIOUSLY WORKED HARD TO MAKE THIS A SUCCESSFUL COMMUNICATION EFFORT.

5. WE WILL WRAP UP WITH DETAILS ON THE REACTION AND REPORTING OF ALL THREE GERMAN PARTICIPANTS IN A SEPARATE FM. THEIR REPORTS TO THEIR RESPECTIVE PUBLICATIONS WERE SENT IN OUR DAILY MEDIA REACTION REPORTS. TUCH

*Return for
"shaping
European
Attitudes"
F.U*

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136906 21

"Shaping European Attitudes"

Mostly CIA, then State folks -
one CIA, one/two JAB

"Focus" - Better defense ~~minister~~-
materials

Vlad — : What use can be
made of the
Ministerials

The communiqué attitude towards
USSR reflects increased hardening
of not only government, but also
public attitudes towards USSR.

N-S language was added "by
the chemistry of the meeting"
A good balance

"Satisfaction" of allies that US is
"more robust" in recognizing
its power

T.N.F. : "Pitiful" appeals from
allies that they need

The arms-control track

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NLRR M4421 #136906
BY LW NARA DATE 8/23/10

- Ward Barnum TV

- Get out as much of the
threat as we can - journalists,
and publics need to touch
the wounds.

Jim Huff (Jed) Package on the
Soviet Buildup

SS-20- declassified picture of it is
unlikely.

Huff says DIA is providing
an UNCLASSIFIED paper for SECDEF
to take to the SPC

~~Discusses~~
DIA wants to put out some
usable materials on those
subjects

Discussions of European
govts own exposures of
Soviet anti-TNF activities
Secondary importance, but
not negligible

27

Mark Palmer - Cable starting
dialogue on European
education - US providing info

USIA activity to 30 June

- 5 major seminars
- ① - Kuake (Sp?) Belgium
+ Rogers & other
- ② early June - Clinton House
- Eagleburger
- ③ June - Hamburg
- ④ 19-20 June - Rome - Reagan foreign
policy
- ⑤ Fall - Hague - "Security and
Defense"

Refs to recent tour by
European Defense Correspondents

9/6 May - Haig - "Values" speech

Timing - ICA note that
speech texts need to
get to them before

Albach - Clark and Eagleburger
Very, very senior academicians

Starboring

ICA will act as clearing-
house for these conference
invitations ("Teng")

ICA have a "Foreign Correspondents
Press Section"
which is best point of
contact for Washington
correspondents of foreign papers

The CCACs briefed the
DRC ministers. Then went
on the road to various
capitals. One in Netherlands
then in Denmark. In
June they will be coming

to Warhington.

25

Team wonder when we
are ready to "speak with
one voice"

Rostow testifying next week
★? seen as important

Major spokesman to Europe
on arms control -

Eagleburger at Chatham House?

Burt and Stempel are testifying
today on the Hill in exec
session.

The SS-20 pleads.
Huff says it is being
worked on now

One of major (2) ²⁶
non-socialist rallying points
Alpbach - 15 years
of Congress

Usually don't include
Americans

Golden included US citizens
as special deal

Many US and European
business execs

Poncet - Maybe Genscher -
Austrians want to talk
to US Govs -

Austrian turn to West
Allen were imp't for
Clark

Gene primarily on US
domestic politics and
US int'l politics

Better pick in Alpbach
than Strasbourg

Entire time just
nearby, Clark Sat-Tue,
Angela wrote time

27

Sun - Free Mon
Sat night - (2 hr from Munich)
Open Sunday - 20th
Mon - 22nd
leave that night

78
Lead Speaker on

"Strategic and military
relationship, political
aspects."

—
Also a televised roundtable
discussion
—

MEMORANDUM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~INFORMATION

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

2512

May 8, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM:

DENNIS C. BLAIR

SUBJECT:

Interagency Group Meeting: "Shaping European Attitudes," Thursday, May 7

This IG is a State initiative to coordinate the efforts of State, ICA, DOD, and CIA in influencing public elite opinion in Europe. This meeting was co-chaired by Mark Palmer, DAS/EUR at State and Terry Catherman, EUR Director at ICA. (U)

DOD provided three packages of unclassified material on the Soviet military buildup in Europe for use by posts in Europe. Although the materials were neither comprehensive nor in smooth and glossy form, at least they provide materials which ICA can use. Embassies in Europe have been crying for authoritative unclassified information to use with press, in speeches and meetings. There was a short discussion of the importance of obtaining an unclassified picture of an SS-20. DOD representatives seemed to think it would be impossible for source security reasons. I ventured that it was a policy decision, not a technical decision. We could use imagery from an older satellite to obtain a picture of an SS-20 site. As Adlai Stevenson proved at the UN in 1962, such a picture can be valuable. The DOD rep will raise the issue. (C)

The IG turned to European efforts to publicize the Soviet threat. State is initiating an effort through NATO requesting allied governments to take more of an active role here. Once again, the declassification problem is important. Once we have information at the unclas level, we can feed it to other NATO countries for them to use. (C)

The IG next discussed seminars and conferences in Europe and the plans for US representation. It was quickly clear that there is no central coordination of US officials' participation at these functions. For example, ICA was unaware of the Strasbourg conference and Alpbach seminar to which you have been invited. ICA offered to serve as a clearing house on all West European conferences and seminars. This looks like a promising way to avoid overlap and duplication of effort. (U)

The final topic for discussion was public articulation of Administration arms control policy. ICA reps noted this as

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Review on May 8, 1987

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NLRR M442/1 #136919

BY

DW

NARA DATE

8/23/16

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30

one area in which they have many questions and few answers. All participants agreed that although the Administration was not ready to discuss specific arms control policies, it was in a position to lay out an approach to arms control. State reps undertook to identify a suitable occasion for such a statement. (C)

cc: Pipes
Dobriansky
Stearman
Schweitzer
Kraemer
Lord
Bailey
Lilley

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Department of State

INCOMING³⁾
TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 LONDON 08832 121642Z
ACTION EUR-12

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INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-15 CIAE-00 EB-00 ICA-15
DODE-00 H-01 IO-15 NSC-05 ARA-16 NSAE-00 HA-06
L-03 CSCE-04 TRSE-00 PM-09 PA-02 SIL-01 ACDA-12
SP-02 SPRS-02 /139 W

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0072
INFO NATO COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR
AMEMBASSY WARSAW
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

UNCLAS LONDON 08832

REF: LONDON 8790

E.O. 12065: N/A
TAGS: NATO ES XA
SUBJECT: DENIS HEALEY DEFENDS NATO'S
DETERRENCE STRATEGY

1. LABOR'S FOREIGN AFFAIRS SPOKESMAN DENIS HEALEY, IN A MAJOR PARLIAMENTARY STATEMENT ON MAY 7, CAME OUT STRONGLY IN FAVOR OF NATO'S DETERRENCE STRATEGY; SUPPORTED THE WESTERN POSITION IN POLAND; AND CRITICIZED U.S. POLICY ON EL SALVADOR AND SOUTHERN AFRICA.

HIGHLIGHTS OF HIS COMMENTS:

- -- NATO AND DETERRENCE: EUROPE HAS ENJOYED, AND STILL ENJOYS, 35 YEARS OF UNINTERRUPTED PEACE, THANKS TO THE EXISTENCE OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION, WHICH... IS OVERWHELMINGLY SUPPORTED BY THE LABOUR PARTY... THE LABOUR PARTY ALSO SUPPORTS THE NATO STRATEGY OF DETERRENCE. WE MUST ACCEPT THAT THE POLITICAL TENSIONS IN EUROPE SINCE 1945 HAVE BEEN SUCH AS WOULD, AT ANY OTHER PERIOD IN WORLD HISTORY, CERTAINLY HAVE LED TO WAR.

- -- ARMS CONTROL: IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THIS COUNTRY, OR ANY COUNTRY, TO CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN ITS SECURITY AT AN ACCEPTABLE COST IF THE ARMS RACE CONTINUES. THEREFORE, EFFECTIVE INITIATIVES TO CONTROL AND REVERSE THE ARMS RACE MUST BE AN INDISPENSABLE ELEMENT IN ANY GOVERNMENT'S POLICY.

- -- POLAND: THE CRISIS IN POLAND STILL LOOMS... IF THE SOVIET UNION WERE TO INTERVENE BY FORCE WE SHOULD HAVE TO SAY GOODBYE TO ANY HOPE OF DETENTE FOR A LONG TIME. BUT WHATEVER HAPPENS IN POLAND IS UNLIKELY TO LEAD TO WAR... WE HAVE A STRONG INTEREST IN GIVING ECONOMIC HELP TO POLAND.

- -- EL SALVADOR: THE OPPOSITION BELIEVE THAT THE UNITED STATES MUST FORTHWITH CEASE GIVING MILITARY AID TO THE JUNTA IN EL SALVADOR. WE KNOW FROM TOO MANY PAINFUL REPORTS THAT THE AID IS USED ONLY TO MASSACRE THE INNOCENT... I HOPE THAT THE RIGHT HON. GENTLEMAN WILL ALSO MENTION TO THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION THAT THEY MUST PUT AN END TO THE TRAINING OF TERRORISTS FOR THE DEATH SQUADS IN FLORIDA.

- -- SOUTHERN AFRICA: THE VETO CAST BY THE GOVERNMENT, ALONG WITH THE FRENCH AND UNITED STATES GOVERNMENTS, ON SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA HAS BEEN A TRAGIC DISASTER... I HOPE... THAT THE STATEMENT BY MR. CHESTER CROCKER WHEN HE WAS IN AFRICA, THAT RESOLUTION 235 WAS DEAD IN THE WATER, IS UNTRUE AND DOES NOT REPRESENT AMERICAN

POLICY.

- -- ANGOLA: I HOPE THAT THE LORD PRIVY SEAL CAN PERSUADE THE UNITED STATES ADMINISTRATION THAT IF THEY WANT TO GET CUBAN TROOPS OUT OF ANGOLA, AS WE ALL MUST, THE WAY TO DO THAT IS TO OBTAIN INDEPENDENCE FOR NAMIBIA. IF THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION WERE TO SUPPORT THE FORCES OF MR. SAVIMBE IN NAMIBIA, THAT WOULD GUARANTEE THE PERMANENT PRESENCE AND REINFORCEMENT OF CUBAN TROOPS IN ANGOLA.

2. THE FULL TEXT OF HEALEY'S REMARKS IS BEING POUCHED TO EUR/NE. STREATOR

File:

"sleeping
European
Attitudes."

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
Department of State

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

32

PAGE 01
ACTION EUR-12

BONN 09537 131411Z

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INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-15 CIAE-00 DODE-00 H-01
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AMCONSUL STUTTGART

UNCLAS BONN 09537

USICA

USICA FOR PGM/FW, EU, PGM/RC; SECSTATE FOR GEHRON

E. O. 12065: N/A

SUBJECT: NATO MULTI-NATIONAL JOURNALISTS TOUR

REFS: BONN 9063, USNATO 2885

1. AFTER PERSONAL DISCUSSIONS WITH THE THREE FRG JOURNALISTS WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE RECENT MULTI-NATIONAL JOURNALIST TOUR AND ON THE BASIS OF ARTICLES WRITTEN FOR THEIR NEWSPAPERS, WE COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE SEVEN-DAY VISIT WAS EXTREMELY SUCCESSFUL.

2. SIEGESMUND VON ILSEMANN, "STUTTGARTER ZEITUNG;" GUENTHER MACK, "DEUTSCHES ALLGEMEINES SONNTAGSBLATT;" AND RUEDIGER MONIAC, "DIE WELT," PROVIDED HOME EDITIONS WITH DETAILED EDITORIALS, COMMENTARIES, AND STRAIGHT NEWS STORIES BASED ON BRIEFINGS HELD IN WASHINGTON AND SACLANT.

3. IN A MAY 10 ARTICLE, MACK WROTE: "ALL BRIEFERS EMPHASIZED THAT THE PRESIDENT AND HIS SECRETARIES SHARE THE BASIC CONVICTION THAT THE SOVIET CHALLENGE TO THE U. S. IS SERIOUS, AND CONSIDERABLE FINANCIAL EFFORTS WILL BE MADE TO GIVE A CLEAR RESPONSE." HE WENT ON TO SAY "... THE IMPRESSION THAT THE U. S. IS INTERESTED EXCLUSIVELY IN ARMS BUILDUP IS WRONG... THE U. S. ADHERES TO THE TWO-PRONGED NATO DECISION ON THE BASIS OF WHICH ARMS MODERNIZATION IS TO BE ACCOMPANIED BY AN OFFER FOR NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS..."

4. MONIAC HAD TWO ARTICLES IN THE APRIL 25 EDITION OF "DIE WELT" INCLUDING A FRONT PAGE REPORT QUOTING SECRETARY HAIG AS SAYING THAT THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION BELIEVES... "IF WE APPEAL TO THE EUROPEANS FOR MORE SACRIFICES FOR DEFENSE, WE MUST INDICATE TO THEM THAT WE ARE DOING EVERYTHING FOR PROGRESS IN THE FIELD OF ARMS CONTROL AND ARMS LIMITATIONS."

5. VON ILSEMANN WROTE FOUR ARTICLES -- TWO BEFORE THE VISIT TO THE U. S. AND TWO LATER. AS REPORTED IN REFTEL, HE RETURNED HOME WITH A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF AMERICA'S POLICIES AND PROBLEMS.

6. MACK SUMMARIZED THE PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS OF THE GERMAN JOURNALISTS SAYING THEY LIKED THE IDEA OF "MIXING SEVERAL EUROPEAN NATIONS" ON THE TOUR IN ORDER TO GET A MORE COMPREHENSIVE VIEW OF NATO ACTIVITIES, PLANS, AND PROBLEMS. THEY WERE ALSO IMPRESSED WITH THE ARRAY OF HIGH-LEVEL BRIEFERS WHO SPOKE CANDIDLY OF PROBLEMS FACING THE U. S. AND THE ALLIANCE. TUCH

SITAPING
EUROPEAN
ATTITUDES

UNCLASSIFIED

**International
Communication
Agency**

United States of America

Washington, D. C. 20547

DOS

SHAPING
EUROPEAN
ATTITUDES



USICA

May 14, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Working Group Participants

THROUGH:

State/EUR - Mr. Palmer

FROM:

USICA/EU - Richard J. Gilbert

SUBJECT:

Inter-Agency Working Group on
Public Affairs in Europe

With the agreement of Mark Palmer and Terry Catherman, I have volunteered to take on the job of secretary and coordinator for the public affairs working group. I'll assume the role on June 8 after returning from a trip to Europe in connection with our European PAO Conference in West Berlin. For your information, my office at USICA is in Room 822 at 1750 Pennsylvania Ave. and the telephone is 724-9205.

I'll be circularizing various materials which pertain to the public affairs environment in Europe (see the attached report on the media coverage generated by a recent visit to Washington by a group of senior European defense correspondents) and will serve as a contact point with USICA for various activities in progress under this Agency's aegis. These latter would include speaking opportunities for which we require official U.S. participants or assistance in obtaining materials for our public distribution programs. At the same time, I would appreciate being informed of any European travel plans of senior officials in the various agencies when the possibility exists for them to include additional public affairs events in their programs.

Meanwhile, I will welcome the opportunity to provide members of the working group with any materials from this Agency regarding European attitudes or programs which may be of assistance.

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Jim -
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JRB

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Required!



Foreign Media Reaction

May 11, 1981

34

NATO DEFENSE JOURNALISTS TOUR

Twenty-three journalists from 15 NATO countries, visiting in the United States April 21-27 on a tour arranged by the U.S. International Communication Agency and NATO Information Service, filed stories emphasizing the sense of a "reawakened America."

The journalists quoted at some length from the variety of U.S. leaders and officials interviewed during the tour. Most of them came away from press interviews with Secretaries Haig and Weinberger with the impression that both officials were in agreement on U.S. policy lines. Some expressed the belief that there was a "unanimity among U.S. leaders."

Several of the NATO group singled out a statement they attributed to Secretary Haig that many harsh critics of America go to bed tonight "thanking God that America has awakened."

Some were especially impressed by what they saw as strong support among the American public for Government foreign policy and a popular recovery from the "humiliation" of Vietnam. A French editor said, "America is flourishing with Star-Spangled Banners." An Austrian editor spoke of a "re-awakened American self-confidence." A Spanish correspondent perceived a "united purpose to revitalize America."

Journalists who filed stories during the tour stressed what they saw as "America's honest interest" in arms limitation talks with the Soviet Union. A Norwegian editor writing a series of articles on the tour made a comparison of what he found in America with his observations in a Moscow visit. He spoke of deep suspicion between the superpowers and expressed the view that "all that is left of superpower detente is a common wish to avoid collective suicide."

95

Journalists whose articles appear in this report include:

West Germany: Ruediger Moniac, Die Welt of Bonn
Siegesmund von Ilseemann, Stuttgarter Zeitung.
Guenther Mack, Deutsches Allgemeines Sonntagsblatt

France: Pierre Beylau, Quotidien de Paris.

Britain: David Spanier, Times of London.

Italy: Renato Proni, La Stampa of Turin.

Spain: Andres Garrigo, Vanguardia of Madrid.

Austria: Hans-Georg Possanner, Die Presse of Vienna.

Norway: Jahn Otto Johansen, Dagbladet of Oslo.

Turkey: Nulifer Yalcin, Milliyet of Istanbul
Oktay Eksi, Hurriyet of Istanbul

* * * * *

The following paragraphs are excerpts from articles available as of May 8:

WEST GERMANY

Ruediger Moniac of right-of-center Die Welt of Bonn wrote May 5 of the views of Admiral Harry Train, Supreme Commander of the Allied Atlantic Command, citing him as observing that the limits to NATO's Atlantic theater of operations are no longer in line with the military realities created by the Soviets.

Moniac, on April 27, in describing the NATO tour group's interview with Secretary of State Alexander Haig, said the

96

Secretary "left no doubt that he--as did Defense Secretary Weinberger at the Nuclear Planning Group meeting in Bonn--will confront the Europeans with questions concerning their defense spending. He wrote that "Haig said he sees no transatlantic controversy..." Moniac said Secretary Weinberger used almost identical language in a similar press conference.

Seigesmund von Ilseman of independent Stuttgarter Zeitung, the same day, reported on discussions held with Secretaries Haig and Weinberger and National Security Adviser Allen, emphasizing America's "honest interest" in arms control negotiations with the USSR and the significance of close consultation with the European allies.

Von Ilseman said State Department representatives especially emphasized the "moderating influence" of European policies and Washington's "growing readiness to take European interests into consideration. Weinberger's statements were fully in line with Haig's..."

In a column April 25 von Ilseman wrote: "Europe can be satisfied with the conclusion drawn by the Reagan Administration after its significant first hundred days in office. After the confusion caused by various remarks made by key members of the Reagan Administration in recent weeks and months, there is agreement now in Washington on matters of particular significance for Europe."

Guenther Mack, in the Protestant weekly Deutsches Allgemeines Sonntagsblatt, said U.S. officials want to signal the allies that "it would be wrong to interpret friction between the Departments of State and Defense as indicating the existence of conflicting trends or even diverging political lines with Reagan's cabinet."

Mack wrote that many U.S. leaders "are apparently obsessed with the idea of American inferiority..." He said no briefer in Washington failed to refer to "linkage. The word is becoming the key to Washington's policy toward the East. It is meant to indicate to the Kremlin that Washington will not continue the detente policy if Moscow expands its zones of influence and enhances its armament..."

37

FRANCE

Independent Quotiden de Paris ran Pierre Beylau's report May 5, that "since the coming of Ronald Reagan to the White House, America is flourishing with Star-Spangled Banners. This is a way to show that the era of abandonment and humiliation is truly over....Never since the end of World War II, had the Americans felt such a need to assert their loyalty to the traditional values of the United States..."

"For Richard Allen...the only important thing is to create a balance of force as a deterrent for the Soviets....Richard Allen emphasizes that Ronald Reagan is not at all a warmongering leader and that his ultimate goal is clearly to hold discussions with the Soviet Union, but not at any price..."

"The U.S. leaders are hence unanimous in feeling that a resumption of the negotiations (on arms limits with the Soviets) is unavoidable."

GREAT BRITAIN

David Spanier, diplomatic correspondent for the Times of London reporting April 24 on the NATO journalists tour interview with Secretary Haig, cited him as saying that those who chafed at America's extra-robust words went to bed at night and said: "Thank God America has awakened..."

Spanier also cited Mr. Haig as remarking that "the United States did not pursue arms control for arms control's sake" but that "progress in controlling armament must be taken into consideration of Soviet behavior world-wide..."

ITALY

Turin's center-left La Stampa on April 24 carried as the lead item correspondent Renato Proni's account of Secretary Haig's question and answer session with the NATO group citing him as saying that he was now more optimistic about the success of

77

the coming NATO Ministerial meeting and that he was sure that those who blame America for using strong words go to bed at night thanking God that America had now awakened. The Secretary was also cited as saying that the United States was quite aware of the problem of arms control but that linkage was important.

Proni said at the end of his report on the interview that "the State Department is convinced that an effective foreign policy must be based on a robust economy....Certainly one is aware of a tremendous activity in the State Department, of a sense of urgency in the development of a new foreign policy."

Five days later, La Stampa front-paged Proni's report on the interview with Secretary Weinberger--a meeting which Proni said was convened "to indicate the main lines of American strategy aimed at preserving peace, including negotiations with Moscow, but from a stronger military position."

Proni cited Secretary Weinberger as saying, "If one is not strong at the strategic level, the risks of a conventional war increase. Such can occur in several countries--Angola, Yemen, Ethiopia, Afghanistan and perhaps one day in Poland. Our weakness encourages this type of intervention. We, therefore, are also seeking a balance in the conventional sector--for instance to defend the oil sources of European nations....America does not seek power, nor authority nor new territories."

SPAIN

Andres Garrigo, Brussels correspondent for Madrid's leading independent Vanguardia, wrote May 6 that eight days of talks with high Administration officials "erase any doubts about the intent of the Reagan Administration with respect to its European allies and its adversaries in the Warsaw Pact. We felt a warm and united purpose to revitalize America above and beyond any of the differences--exacerbated by the press--among Haig, Bush and Weinberger..."

AUSTRIA

Hans-Georg Possanner filing from Washington April 25 for prestigious Die Presse of Vienna described Secretary Haig as having used "strong rhetoric" but asserting that many who complain

39

about such language were nevertheless grateful that "America has awakened." He said that the Secretary has "seen a number of NATO ministers lately and is very optimistic after consulting with them."

He observed, "Haig is regarded as the leading moderate pragmatist of the new Administration who, better than the hawks, understands the allies' worries which range from arms control to medium-range missiles and from the Middle East to South Africa." Possanner said that Secretary Haig had emphasized "linkage," the taking of Soviet behavior into account in the U.S. approach to disarmament negotiation with the USSR.

In Die Presse of April 24, Possanner wrote that Secretary Weinberger stressed three points: "Soviet pressure on Poland has somewhat abated," that "Weinberger does not oppose disarmament negotiations with Moscow but is undecided on whether they should begin this year" and that "there are no basic differences of opinion between Mr. Weinberger and Secretary of State Haig."

Possanner said that when the Defense Secretary was asked to make a statement on the balance of power between the two superpowers he stressed "peace through strength and deterrence" and was quoted as saying: "We do not need to have inferiority complexes but we should work together with our allies. We are neither big enough nor would it be right to achieve this deterrence single-handedly." Possanner concluded that "with this statement Weinberger is again taking the allies to task."

In Die Presse April 18, following a press seminar of the Atlantic Institute for International Relations, Possanner wrote: "Reawakened American self-confidence, combined with the new Administration's determination to stop Moscow's expansionism, has met with criticism from Democratic Senator Joseph Biden and with some very serious European misgivings about the limits of military cooperation with the United States outside NATO's borders....The lack of U.S. understanding for detente, for anti-nuclear movements as a political phenomenon and for the social state of the European type is paralleled by a lack of European understanding of the American need for more strength."

NORWAY

Liberal Dagbladet of Oslo editor Jahn Otto Johansen on May 2 summed up his impressions after visiting Washington and Moscow, stating that he found that the two countries "formed mirror-like images of each other's aims and potential and these images, more than reality, now determine relations between the two powers....This is true at a high level....In the United States I found a strong suspicion that the Russians are acquiring first-strike capability and in Moscow I found an equally strong suspicion that the Americans are developing weapons that will enable them to give the Russians an ultimatum..."

Johansen noted that experts on the United States to whom he spoke in the Soviet Union "showed an impressive amount of detailed knowledge about American society but had no grasp of American politics. Their often correct information was put into a Marxian analytical model which just does not fit the United States" and the results were, in his judgment, unreal.

Similarly, in Washington he found "a widespread misjudgment of Soviet national psychology....In influential circles in Washington one no longer finds any appreciation that Moscow also has security interests and that it must be accepted as an equally strong superpower..."

Johansen on April 30 described the main lines of the new U.S. foreign policy as clear but "there is still a great deal of uncertainty in the Administration on the concrete formulation of that policy."

Johansen saw the prospects for a resumption of SALT negotiations as not promising. He said that "the power struggle among Haig, Weinberger and the White House staff is no longer as intense outwardly as it was. Assurances by key men in the White House that this matter had been badly handled and that cooperation and communication will be improved does not, however, weaken the impression that Haig's position has been considerably reduced and that both American and foreign observers are uncertain as to who carries out the President's foreign policy."

In an article April 28, Johansen noted that "the Reagan Administration has come to understand that there is a wide-

spread wish in Western Europe for serious negotiations with the Russians before implementation of NATO's TNF decision."

Reporting in Dagbladet of April 27 on a "background interview" with an unnamed official at the White House, Johansen wrote:

"Soviet leaders are seriously mistaken if they believe that the tougher and more anti-Soviet attitude in the United States is a passing phenomenon and that superpower detente will get another chance after a period of time. The Reagan Administration foreign policy reflects deep currents in American society and a stronger skepticism about the Soviets and the detente policy which most people think has been one-sided in the Soviets' favor, and there is a widespread will to make the United States stronger militarily..."

Johansen added that his "talks with prominent members of the U.S. Government and with people on a somewhat lower level in the State Department, Pentagon and the White House have confirmed my impression that all that is left of the superpower detente is a common wish to avoid collective nuclear suicide. We are down to the absolute minimum of American-Soviet relations. All else has been scraped off or will vanish. The big question is whether this is an adequate basis for averting misunderstanding which could lead to war and global conflict. Those who doubt this and feel that the super-power dialogue must be resumed on several levels are drowned out amidst unanimous confrontation rhetoric and demands for a stronger America..."

In an article April 25, Johansen quoted Secretary Haig as saying that Europeans have been concerned that "we on our side of the Atlantic are less interested in the negotiation aspect. Let me assure you that this is not the case. Both President Reagan and I feel that if we ask our citizens to make sacrifices for our defense--as we have done and must do because of the threats facing us--there must be no doubt that we are really trying to bring about arms control..."

Dagbladet of April 24 carried Johansen's report of a press conference of the NATO journalists with Defense Secretary Weinberger. He quoted the Secretary directly as saying: "The United States is prepared to start negotiations with the Soviet Union about a reduction of medium-range missiles in Europe."

Whether it is worth meeting the Russians at the negotiating table we will find out along the way, but the Reagan Administration is willing to comply with the wish from NATO countries to start negotiations soon about the new nuclear weapons.... We hope these negotiations can start this year."

TURKEY

The April 25 issue of Istanbul's liberal Milliyet carried chief diplomatic correspondent Nilufer Yalcin's report on the Haig and Weinberger interviews. She cited Secretary Haig as saying that "relations between the United States and its allies are much better now after he had talks with the allies' foreign ministers."

On the same day, independent mass-appeal Hurriyet ran an article stating that the paper's chief editor Oktay Eksi had asked Secretary Weinberger about U.S. military aid to Turkey and Greece. The paper cited Mr. Weinberger as responding, "There is no set policy concerning the ratio of military assistance to Greece and Turkey."

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 BONN 10462

EXDIS

USICA FOR EU/CATHERMAN

E.O. 12065: GDS (5-27-87 TUCH, HANS N.)

TAGS: XG, SOPN

SUBJECT: SHAPING EUROPEAN ATTITUDES

REFERENCE: (A) STATE 127341, (B) USICA 26184

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M4421 #136922

BY RW NARA DATE 8/23/16

1. EMBASSY SHARES THE DEPARTMENT'S AND USICA'S CONCERN THAT AN UNCHALLENGED AND UNABATED "PEACE MOVEMENT" -- WHICH IS GROWING IN STRENGTH AND SIGNIFICANCE IN GERMANY -- COULD POTENTIALLY HAVE SERIOUS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE NATO ALLIANCE IN GENERAL AND BILATERAL US/FRG RELATIONS IN PARTICULAR.

2. THE INTRA-SPD PARTY STRIFE OVER SUPPORT OF NATO'S MODERNIZATION OF THEATER NUCLEAR WEAPONS, COUPLED WITH THE CONSOLIDATION OF VARIOUS LEFTIST ELEMENTS INTENT ON OPPOSING THE STATIONING OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON GERMAN SOIL (AS EXEMPLIFIED BY THE "KREFELD APPELL"), ATTEST TO THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE SITUATION INSOFAR AS THE PUBLIC MOOD IS CONCERNED, ALTHOUGH SUPPORT FOR LRTNF IN THE BUNDESTAG REMAINS SOLID (SEE BONN 10358).

3. IN SETTING FORTH OUR VIEWS ON THE REFTTEL, WE START FROM THE PREMISE THAT:

-- THERE IS STILL SOLID -- ALBEIT LARGELY SILENT -- PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR NATO (SEE USICA 25915 - OPINION POLL);

-- THE SPD/FDP COALITION GOVERNMENT REMAINS FIRMLY BEHIND THE TWO-PRONG NATO LRTNF DECISION ON MODERNIZATION AND NEGOTIATION;

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EOB: PIPES RENT

WHSR COMMENTS:

PAGE 01

BONN 0462

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44

— THE "PEACE MOVEMENT" HAS SEIZED ON THE EMOTIONALLY-CHARGED "NUCLEAR WEAPONS" ISSUE TO ADVANCE AND PRESS ITS PRIMARY AND ULTIMATE GOAL OF A "SAFE" NEUTRAL GERMANY, INSULATED FROM THE THROES OF SUPERPOWER RIVALRY AND STRIFE;

— THE US IS A CONVENIENT SCAPEGOAT FOR THIS "PEACE MOVEMENT," AND ANTI-AMERICAN OVERTONES SERVE TO ATTRACT AND COALESCE DIVERGENT AND DISSIMILAR VIEWS AND GROUPS. IN OTHER WORDS, ANTI-AMERICANISM IS THE CONSEQUENCE AND NOT THE CAUSE OF THE "PEACE MOVEMENT";

— THE HARD-CORE ELEMENTS OF THE "PEACE" OR NEUTRALIST MOVEMENT ARE EMOTIONALLY COMMITTED AND HARDLY OPEN TO PERSUASION THROUGH REASON BY EITHER THE FRG GOVERNMENT OR BY US, BUT OTHER LESS EXTREME "NEUTRALISTS" ARE AMENABLE TO EFFECTIVE ARGUMENTATION AND CLEAR PRESENTATION OF THE FACTS;

— FRG AND US EFFORTS SHOULD FOCUS ON THE SILENT SUPPORTERS (TO MAKE THEM VOCAL SUPPORTERS) AND ON THE LARGE PROPORTION OF PEOPLE WHO UP TO NOW HAVE HEARD PRIMARILY FROM THE OPPONENTS OF LRTNF.

4. WITHIN THIS GENERAL CONTEXT, THE EMBASSY ENDORSES AND SUPPORTS THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS APPROACH AND PRECEPTS OUTLINED IN REFTEL A. WE RECOMMEND THE FOLLOWING:

— THIS PUBLIC DIPLOMACY EFFORT, WE AGREE, SHOULD NOT BE NOT BE A US PROPAGANDA BLITZ OR EVEN GIVE THE APPEARANCE OF A MEDIA BLITZ;

— THE INITIAL AND PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS CAMPAIGN LIES WITH THE FRG GOVERNMENT;

— SINCE THE FRG GOVERNMENT HAS NOW ACCEPTED THIS RESPONSIBILITY, WE SHOULD SUPPORT IT ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT IS ALSO OUR RESPONSIBILITY AND AIMS TO SUPPORT PUBLICLY NATO POLICIES AND PROGRAMS;

— THE US SHOULD AVOID ANY ACTION OR STATEMENT THAT COULD BE MALICIOUSLY MISINTERPRETED AS INTERJECTING ITSELF IN INTERNAL GERMAN POLITICAL AFFAIRS AND ISSUES;

— THE US CAN AND SHOULD SUPPLEMENT FRG EFFORTS WITH ITS RESOURCES: SPEAKERS (BOTH EMB OFFICERS AND AMPARTS), CONFERENCE PARTICIPATION AND PUBLICATIONS.

5. AS AN EXAMPLE, EMBASSY HAS IN THE PAST PURSUED A CONSCIOUS POLICY OF COMMUNICATING WITH PUBLICATIONS AND IMPORTANT INDIVIDUALS WHO HAVE PUBLICLY MISUNDERSTOOD OR MISREPRESENTED US POLICIES AND STATEMENTS. AS PART OF THIS EFFORT, WE HAD PLANNED TO SEND PERSONALLY ADDRESSED LETTERS TO DRS ONE AND TWO AUDIENCE MEMBERS WHO ARE SIGNERS OF THE "KREFELD APPELL," SETTING FORTH THE US STANCE ON THEATER NUCLEAR MODERNIZATION. (TEXT OF DRAFT LETTER BEING FORWARDED TO THE DEPARTMENT/

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 BONN 10462

EXDIS

USICA BY SEPTTEL; REQUEST ADDRESSEE COMMENTS BOTH ON THIS APPROACH AND ON CONTENTS OF LETTER.) WE ALSO CONTEMPLATED INCLUDING "LETTER" IN USICA WEEKLY AMERIKA DIENST PUBLICATION, SENT TO 2200 DRS AUDIENCE MEMBERS. SINCE RECEIPT REFTELS, HOWEVER, WE HAVE DELAYED MAILING LETTER UNTIL WE DETERMINE WHETHER AND HOW THIS EFFORT MIGHT COMPLEMENT OUR AND THE FRG CAMPAIGN ON THIS SUBJECT.

6. WE NOTE THAT USNATO 3340 (RESPONDING TO REFTEL A) CONTAINS A NUMBER OF COMMENTS THAT ARE RELEVANT AND PERTINENT TO THE GERMAN SCENE.

7. ONE PROCEDURAL NOTE: WE SUGGEST WASHINGTON CABLES ON THIS SUBJECT BE COORDINATED BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENT AND USICA AND SO STATE; AND THAT PRIVACY DESIGNATION BE AVOIDED WHEREVER POSSIBLE. WOESSNER
BT

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PAGE 01 OF 01 BONN 0462

DTG: 271617Z MAY 81

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**International
Communication
Agency**

United States of America

Washington, D. C. 20547

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46



USICA

June 15, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Interagency Public Affairs
Working Group

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

EO 13526 3.5(c)

FROM:

USICA/EU - Richard J. Gilbert *RJG*

SUBJECT:

Materials for June 25 Meeting

As you know, Mark Palmer has set the next meeting of the inter-agency public affairs working group for Thursday, June 25, at 10:00 a.m. in the EUR conference room (Rm. 6226) at the Department.

In preparation for that session, I am enclosing a copy of [] the report from the conference of European Public Affairs Officers in West Berlin, June 5-6. In addition to our European PAOs and others of us from USICA, the meeting was attended by Mark and Jim Huff. We'll be discussing the results of that conference on June 25 and the cable will provide some background on the content of the Berlin meeting.

In addition, I thought you might find the enclosed paper, which was prepared by Ken Adler and Doug Wertman of USICA's European research office for a recent meeting of the American Association of Public Opinion Research, relevant reading.

DISTRIBUTION:

EU-Mr. Catherman

Mr. Baldyga

Mr. Gilbert

PGM/PPE-Mr. Radday

PGM/G-Mr. Schneider

PGM/REU-Mr. Froebe

PM/TMP-Mr. Steiner

INR/INC-Mr. Kux

EUR-Mr. Palmer

EUR-Ms. Vogelgesang

EUR/SOV-Mr. German

EUR/SOV-Mr. Parris

EUR/RPM-Mr. Thomas

EUR/RPM-Mr. Lehovich

EUR/RPM-Mr. Hopper

EUR/RPM-Mr. King

NSC-Mr. Blair ✓

DOD-Mr. Huff

S/P-Mr. Kaplan

S/P-Mr. Douglas

S/P-Mr. Schneider

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(UNCLASSIFIED WHEN ATTACHMENT REMOVED)

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BY *fw* NARA DATE 9/22/17

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Department of State

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PAGE 01 BOHN 11170 01 OF 04 091119Z 3241 EUR3887
ACTION EUR-12

ACTION OFFICE PP-02
INFO PNP-01 EUR-03 PMA-01 NEEF-01 GDR-01 FRG-01 SOV-01 AS-01
CE-01 SOHL-01 PA-01 VE-02 PMS-01 PL-02 PM-01
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 04 BOHN 11170

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BRUSSELS ALSO FOR USEC; PARIS ALSO FOR OECD; GENEVA
FOR GRADY. SECDEF FOR ISA

E.O. 12065: GDS 6/9/87 (TUCH, HANS N.) OR-0
SUBJECT: EUROPEAN PAO CONFERENCE JUNE 5-6

1. ALL-EUROPEAN PAO CONFERENCE TOOK PLACE IN WEST BERLIN
ON JUNE 5 AND 6. IT WAS THE FIRST PAO CONFERENCE TO BE
INTEGRATED INTO US FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMUNITY WITH
SUBSTANTIVE PARTICIPATION OF STATE AND DEFENSE DEPARTMENT
REPRESENTATIVES. STATE 098311 "SHAPING EUROPEAN ATTITUDES"
SET THE AGENDA AND THE INTELLECTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR CON-
FERENCE DISCUSSIONS.

2. IN WHAT MANY PAOS DESCRIBED AS THE "MOST SUBSTANTIVE"
CONFERENCE THEY EVER ATTENDED, THE DISCUSSIONS CENTERED ON
THE MODALITIES FOR OUR ACTIONS, AND THE NUANCES, WITH
WHICH TO ADDRESS THE SEVEN PRIORITY THEMES (NOW ALSO
INCLUDING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM).

3. ONE THOUGHT EMERGED CLEARLY FROM THESE DISCUSSIONS:
IT IS THE NEED TO FOSTER EUROPEAN UNDERSTANDING, AND, IF
POSSIBLE, SUPPORT FOR THE US POSITION THAT THE US-SOVIET
DIALOGUE AGENDA SHOULD NOT RPT NOT BE FOCUSED EXCLUSIVELY
ON THE SUBJECT OF ARMS LIMITATION. THE DIALOGUE WITH
THE USSR MUST INCLUDE A BROAD SPECTRUM OF INTERNATIONAL
ISSUES RANGING FROM AFGHANISTAN, TO CAMBODIA, LEBANON,
EL SALVADOR AND ANGOLA. IT WAS EMPHASIZED THAT IN THE
FINAL ANALYSIS THE RESULTS FROM THE TOTALITY OF THIS
AGENDA WILL DETERMINE THE FRUITFULNESS OF ARMS
LIMITATION TALKS.

BOHN 11170 01 OF 04 091119Z 3241 EUR3887 4X

4. AT THE SAME TIME IT WAS POINTED OUT THAT WE MUST
COUNTER THE WIDELY HELD, BUT ERRONEOUS EUROPEAN
IMPRESSION THAT US-SOVIET TALKS AND CONTACTS HAVE BROKEN
DOWN OR CEASED. PAOS WERE REMINDED OF THE ONGOING TALKS
IN VIENNA, GENEVA, MADRID, THE CONTINUING CONTACTS
MAINTAINED IN WASHINGTON, AND THE FORTHCOMING TALKS
BETWEEN THE SECRETARY AND GROMYKO IN SEPTEMBER.
5. TO HELP THEM INTERPRET US POLICY WITHIN THE CONTEXT
OF THEIR PUBLIC AFFAIRS CONCERNS, CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS
WERE PROMISED FROM WASHINGTON A SERIES OF TOP-LEVEL
STATEMENTS AND DOCUMENTS. IN ADDITION TO A NUMBER OF
SPEECHES PROJECTED FOR TOP USG OFFICIALS, THE FOLLOWING IS
CURRENTLY IN PREPARATION:

- A TNE THRESHOLD PAPER.
- A NATO DOCUMENT ON DEFENSE CAPABILITIES.
- A PAPER ON SOVIET GLOBAL THREAT
- AND POSSIBLY A NATO WHITE PAPER, GOING BEYOND
THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ISSUE.

6. PAOS WERE ALSO INFORMED THAT EU HAS REQUESTED HIGH-
LEVEL USG PARTICIPATION IN THIRTEEN KEY EUROPEAN FORA
WHERE THE PRIORITY ISSUES WILL BE DISCUSSED.

7. THE CONFEREES WERE SPECIFICALLY REQUESTED TO MAKE
THEIR SUBSTANTIVE CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE FORTHCOMING
SPEECHES, PAPERS AND DOCUMENTS, BY INFORMING WASHINGTON
OF THE POINTS THEY WISH MADE AND HOW THEY SHOULD BE
MADE. PAOS WERE REPEATEDLY REASSURED BY THE EUR
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE DEPARTMENT'S RECEPTIVENESS TO
THEIR SUBSTANTIVE SUGGESTIONS, AS WELL AS ITS RECOGNITION
OF THEIR MANDATE TO BRING EVERY OFFICER IN THEIR MISSION,
FROM THE AMBASSADOR ON DOWN, ON BOARD IN THEIR PUBLIC

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BY RW NARA DATE 8/23/16

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INCOMING
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PAGE 01 BONN 11170 02 OF 04 091121Z

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BONN 11170 02 OF 04 091121Z

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ACTION EUR-12

ACTION OFFICE PP-01

INFO PMP-01 EUR-03 PMA-01 NEEF-01 GDR-01 FRG-01 SOV-01 AS-01
CE-01 SOML-01 PA-01 WE-02 PHS-01 PL-02 PM-01

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 04 BONN 11170

USICA

AFFAIRS EFFORTS. EU'S POLICY OFFICER WAS DESIGNATED BY THE AREA DIRECTOR AS THE PROPER CONDUIT FOR POLICY SUGGESTIONS AS WELL AS FOR COORDINATION OF USG SPEAKER REQUESTS. HE, IN TURN, WILL INSURE THAT THE SUGGESTIONS WILL BE GIVEN PROPER CONSIDERATION BY APPROPRIATE PERSONS, INCLUDING MEMBERS OF THE INTER-AGENCY WORKING GROUP ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY.

8. DESCRIBING THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF DOD, ITS REPRESENTATIVE HELD OUT HOPE FOR MORE DECLASSIFIED, PERTINENT MATERIALS, AUGMENTED BY GRAPHICS AND VISUALS. HE ALSO EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT AS DOD BECAME MORE ATTUNED TO THE OPPORTUNITY PRESENTED BY FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS STATIONED IN WASHINGTON, DOD WOULD AVAIL ITSELF MORE FREQUENTLY OF THIS MEANS OF COMMUNICATION.

9. WITH THE PROSPECT OF A CONSIDERABLE, TOP-LEVEL POLICY MATERIAL FLOW FROM WASHINGTON, PAOS WERE SPECIFICALLY INSTRUCTED TO GIVE THEM THEIR PERSONAL, TOP PRIORITY. THE AREA DIRECTOR REITERATED THAT NOTHING SHOULD BE PERMITTED TO INTERFERE WITH THE PAOS' PERSONAL ATTENTION TO THESE SEVEN PRIORITY THEMES.

10. DISCUSSING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MANDATE, IT WAS THE PAOS' CONSENSUS THAT THEIR WORK WILL REFLECT THEIR DEEPLY HELD FAITH IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM AND ITS ABILITY TO COME TO GRIPS WITH PROBLEMS. AS WAS POINTED OUT BY SOME CONFEREES, THIS WAS NEEDED NOT ONLY TO CONTRAST OUR SOCIETY WITH THE INABILITY OF THE CLOSED SOCIETIES TO DO SO, BUT SPECIFICALLY TO ADDRESS NOT ONLY EUROPEAN FEARS BUT ALSO EUROPEAN HOPES THAT THE US WILL MEET ITS CHALLENGE.

11. TURNING TO THE "HOW TO" OF IMPLEMENTATION THE CONFEREES OFFERED SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS, LISTED IN PARA 17.

12. DISCUSSION OF THE ECONOMIC ISSUES WITH WHICH WE ARE CONCERNED (AS THE SIXTH PRIORITY THEME) QUICKLY ESTABLISHED THE LINKAGE BETWEEN ECONOMIC GROWTH AND SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS.

13. ATTENTION WAS THEN DIRECTED TO EU'S PROGRAM AND ORGANIZATIONAL CONCERNS. CATHERMAN ADDRESSED THE QUESTION OF "REGIONALIZATION." HE DESIGNATED USNATO AND USEC PAOS AS THE FOCAL POINTS FOR COORDINATION OF SECURITY AND ECONOMIC PROGRAMMING AND FOR REGIONAL POLICY CONSIDERATIONS. WITH THE ACTION SHIFTING TO BRUSSELS, HE RAISED THE QUESTION OF THE DESIRABILITY OF MOVING RRU TO THAT CITY. HOWEVER, NO FINAL DECISION WAS TAKEN. PAOS WERE ALSO INFORMED OF PROPOSED REGIONAL SPECIALIZATION FOR LIBRARIES, WITH CERTAIN LIBRARIES ASSUMING PRIME RESPONSIBILITIES IN A GIVEN SUBJECT AREA. CATHERMAN MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE CONSIDERED LIBRARIANS FIRST AND FOREMOST AS A RESOURCE FOR THE POST TO DISCHARGE ITS RESPONSIBILITY IN REGARD TO THE PRIORITY THEMES. HE STRESSED THAT THIS WILL RESULT IN ADDED LIBRARY EMPHASIS ON DOCUMENTATION. HE ALSO REPORTED ON THE PARIS LIBRARIANS' CONFERENCE AND THE PERTINENT DECISIONS TAKEN THERE.

14. ON EXCHANGES, PAOS WERE REMINDED TO KEEP CONTROL OF THEIR IV PROGRAMS. IT WAS SUGGESTED THAT THE MOST IMPORTANT WAY TO EXERCISE THIS CONTROL IS TO TIE IV GRANTS TO THE COUNTRY PLAN. PAOS WERE ALSO REMINDED THAT ICA OFFICERS MUST PARTICIPATE IN PREDEPARTURE BRIEFINGS OF IV GRANTEEES. AS TO ACADEMIC EXCHANGES, CATHERMAN REPORTED ON THE WORK BEING DONE ON THE NEW DFS PLAN FOR THE 80'S.

15. UNDER THE HEADING OF "INNOVATION FOR THE 80'S" PAOS WERE BRIEFED ON THE AGENCY'S TECHNICAL INNOVATION AND

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INCOMING
TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 BOHN 11170 03 OF 04 091123Z 3250 EUR3890
ACTION EUR-12

ACTION OFFICE PP-01

INFO PHP-01 EUR-03 PHIA-01 NEEF-01 GDR-01 FRG-01 SOV-01 AS-01
CE-01 SONL-01 PA-01 WE-02 PHS-01 PL-02 PM-01
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INFO OCT-01 INR-10 OIC-02 CIAE-00 MMD-01 IO-15 NSAE-00
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 03 OF 04 BOHN 11170

USICA

PROBLEMS BY MGT/T'S GARRY AUGUSTON. THE PAOS EXPRESSED THEIR DEEP CONCERN AT THE CURRENT IMBROGLIO INVOLVING THE DEPARTMENT AND USICA REGARDING INSTALLATION OF ADP EQUIPMENT IN EUROPE WHICH HAS SET BACK USICA SCHEDULE FOR AT LEAST FIVE MONTHS ALREADY.

16. INTENSIVE CORRIDOR CONVERSATION CONCENTRATED ON THE DIRE NEED FOR LANGUAGE AND SUBSTANTIVE (POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, SECURITY AND AREA ISSUES) TRAINING OF OFFICERS ASSIGNED TO EUROPEAN POSTS IN GENERAL AND MORE SPECIFICALLY TO THE CRUCIAL COUNTRIES, E.G. FRG, FRANCE, USSR, ITALY AND REGIONAL OFFICES SUCH AS USNATO.

17. RECOMMENDATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS:

A. SUBSTANCE RELATED:

1. THE NEED FOR TOP-LEVEL AND EXPERT USG PARTICIPATION IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTIVITIES RELATED TO THE SEVEN PRIORITY THEMES.

2. ALL USG SPOKESMEN SHOULD WORK FROM, AND USE, SAME MATERIAL FOR PUBLIC STATEMENTS TO PRESENT CREDIBLE "ONE VOICE" EXPOSITION OF US POLICY.

3. WHERE TOP USG OFFICIALS PARTICIPATE IN EVENTS PLANNED BY PRIVATE FOREIGN INSTITUTIONS, THE NEED TO COORDINATE WITH PAOS BEFORE ACCEPTING INVITATIONS.

4. ADDITIONAL CONCENTRATION ON FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS RESIDENT IN WASHINGTON, INCLUDING

BOHN 11170 03 OF 04 091123Z 3250 EUR3890

HIGH-LEVEL BRIEFINGS. IDENTIFYING CORRESPONDENTS MERITING HIGH-LEVEL OR PRIORITY ATTENTION SHOULD BE DONE IN CONSULTATION WITH POSTS.

5. USEFULNESS OF EXPERTS, INDIVIDUALLY OR AS A TEAM, VISITING CERTAIN COUNTRIES TO ADDRESS SPECIFIC ISSUES (I.E. PRESENTATION OF EL SALVADOR ISSUE.)

6. DEVELOP THE USE OF FOREIGN "AMPARTS" WHO MIGHT ADDRESS CERTAIN ISSUES MORE EFFECTIVELY THAN THEIR US COUNTERPARTS.

7. WHERE POSSIBLE, DOCUMENTATION LEADING TO POLICY PRONOUNCEMENTS SHOULD BE AVAILABLE, ON REQUEST, TO POSTS SO THAT THEY CAN EXPLAIN NOT ONLY THE "WHAT" BUT ALSO THE BACKGROUND OF THE "WHY".

8. STUDY USEFULNESS, IN VIEW OF EUROPEAN POLITICAL REALITY, OF PAYING MORE ATTENTION TO SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL.

9. MORE YOUNG LAWMAKERS, BOTH ABROAD AND IN US SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE US-EUROPEAN DIALOGUE.

10. IMPORTANCE OF VOA USSR AND EE SERVICE REPEATING TIME AND AGAIN IMPORTANT POLICY POINTS, E.G. THE CONNECTION BETWEEN TNF AND SOVIET SS-20S.

11. US ECONOMIC POLICY PRONOUNCEMENTS NEED TO BE MORE SENSITIZED TO THE REACTION OF FOREIGN AUDIENCES.

12. MORE ATTENTION NEEDS TO BE GIVEN TO THE LINKAGE BETWEEN ECONOMIC GROWTH ISSUES AND SUPPORT FOR NATO GOALS. ACTIVITIES WITH JOINT

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INCOMING
TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 BONN 11170 04 OF 04 091123Z 3253 EUR3891
ACTION EUR-12

ACTION OFFICE PP-01
INFO PMP-01 EUR-03 PMA-01 NEEF-01 GDR-01 FRG-01 SOV-01 AS-01
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 04 OF 04 BONN 11170

USICA

- PARTICIPATION OF PRESTIGIOUS EUROPEAN ECONOMIC
- AND STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTIONS SHOULD BE
- ARRANGED.
- 13. FOCUS ON EMERGING PROBLEMS SUCH AS HOW THE
- US WILL BE EFFECTED BY THE ENTRY OF SPAIN,
- PORTUGAL AND TURKEY INTO THE EEC.

- B. ORGANIZATIONAL
-
- 1. PAOS UNANIMOUSLY RECOMMENDED THAT ECA PUT
- MORE RESOURCES INTO VOLUNTARY VISITORS BUREAU.
-
- 2. POSTS NEED REVISED BOOKLET FOR BRIEFING IVS,
- ESPECIALLY TO CLARIFY SUBJECT OF SPOUSE
- ACCOMPANYING.

- 18. CONFEREES APPRECIATED OPPORTUNITY FOR ELECTRONIC
- DIALOGUE WITH AGENCY'S NEW LEADERSHIP AND LOOK FORWARD
- TO MEETING DIRECTOR AND MRS. WICK ON THEIR FORTHCOMING
- TRIP. TUCH

WEST EUROPEAN SECURITY CONCERNS FOR THE
EIGHTIES: IS NATO IN TROUBLE?*

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American Association of Public Opinion Research at Buck Hill
Falls, Pennsylvania, May 28-31, 1981.

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national Communication Agency or the United States Government.

I. INTRODUCTION

52

This paper examines a range of public attitudes in West European NATO countries relating to security issues. It first discusses perceptions of the nature of the military threat facing West Europe and opinions about the U.S.-Soviet military balance. It then looks at public opinion concerning the best way of responding to the security problem. The paper focuses especially on the level of support for NATO and for the two major commitments to NATO made in recent years -- increased defense spending and deployment of modernized long-range theater nuclear weapons in some West European countries. In addition, this paper examines the degree of support for neutralism and other alternatives to NATO. After a brief consideration of party and age differences, it concludes with a discussion of the implications for NATO and Western security in the 1980's.

The data used in this paper -- all national samples -- come from a variety of sources. Some of the surveys were sponsored by the U.S. International Communication Agency and others by the European Community. Many of the data come from surveys reported in and often sponsored by West European newspapers and periodicals. Trends are discussed when available.

II. PERCEPTIONS OF THE SOVIET THREAT

During the past decade, the number of West Europeans who fear that another world war is coming has increased substantially. Several attitudinal factors may underlie this growing apprehension: a more widespread perception of the Soviet Union as expansionist and aggressive; concern over increasing tensions between the superpowers; and the growing opinion that the USSR has surpassed the U.S. in military power.

Perceived Danger of War Increased After Afghanistan

Fear of war increased greatly in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. This is evident from results of the Eurobarometer surveys conducted regularly by the European Community. These show that, between October 1977 and April 1980, the percentage of West Europeans who considered war "certain" or gave it a more than 50-50 chance rose in all EC countries, but especially in Britain and France (Figure 1). Other data indicate that the fear of war has since subsided but remains higher than before Afghanistan.

In April 1980, roughly 40 percent in France and the UK and about one-quarter in West Germany and the Netherlands (among those with an opinion) considered a third world war certain or probable in the next ten years. A March 1981 survey asked about degree of concern about war rather than the probability of its occurrence, and about the danger of a "Soviet attack on Western Europe" rather than about the probability of a third world war. Despite this considerable difference in question wording, the pattern of responses was similar: war fears were greater in France and the UK than in West Germany and the Netherlands.

No Widespread Fear of Soviet Aggression or Intimidation today

Despite Poland, Afghanistan and increased tensions between the superpowers, however, majorities in West Germany, the Netherlands and Norway did not see the Soviet Union as posing an imminent threat to Western Europe in March 1981. Opinion in France and Britain was about evenly divided on this question. The minorities concerned about Soviet aggression were, however, substantial. Between about one-third in West Germany, the Netherlands and Norway and nearly one-half in France and the UK expressed concern that the Soviet Union "will attack Western Europe within the next five years."

Level of concern about political intimidation, that is about the possibility that "the Soviet Union will pressure our country into adopting policies which are chiefly in the Soviet Union's interest", was roughly the same as concern over a military attack. This contrasts with the views of European allied governments, which over the past year have maintained that Soviet political -- not military -- pressures constitute the greater problem.

Comparison of these March 1981 data with responses to quite similar questions asked in May 1979 in France and West Germany show different trends.

- In France, concern about a Soviet attack doubled during the past two years (from 22% to 46%) -- even though the time-frame was narrowed from "within the next ten years" (1979) to "within the next five years" (1981). French concern about political intimidation also increased but not as greatly -- from 28 percent in 1979 to 40 percent in 1981.
- In the FRG, on the other hand, concerns about a Soviet attack or intimidation remained roughly at the 1979 level (Figure 2).

One further finding of political importance: the best-educated are considerably less concerned about the Soviet threat than the rest of the public -- except in France, where the situation is reversed. This more influential segment of the public may, therefore, be least likely to share the U.S. view that NATO defenses must be strengthened to counter the increased Soviet threat.

The Superpowers, Oil and Poland Seen as Greatest Threats

West Europeans tend to see superpower tensions, a disruption of oil supplies and events in Poland as the greatest threats to their country's overall security (out of a list of eight). Among these threats, "increased tensions between the U.S. and the USSR" ranked first in the UK, the Netherlands and Norway, while "the possibility of a cutoff in access to Middle East oil"

was seen as the greatest threat in oil-dependent France and West Germany. A "possible Soviet intervention in Poland" usually ranked second or third as "greatest threat." One in ten or fewer considered the "Soviet military presence in Afghanistan" a great threat -- about as many as believed that "the planned long-term military buildup of U.S. military forces" posed the foremost danger to their country.

Despite the low threat-rating of Afghanistan, other survey results suggests considerable concern about the Soviet presence in Southwest Asia. About half or more of the publics in four countries surveyed in March saw at least some danger that "the Soviet Union will try to cut our country's access to Middle East oil." The proportion viewing this as a "great" danger, however, was much smaller: between one-fifth in France, West Germany and the Netherlands and one-quarter in Britain.

U.S. No Longer Seen as Militarily Superior to USSR

Views of the East-West military balance are another important aspect in considering mass perceptions of the Soviet threat. The days when the United States was seen as militarily superior are long gone. In March 1981, pluralities in France, the Netherlands and Norway tended to see the two superpowers as about equal in "total military strength." Among those who saw a difference, however, far more in all five survey countries viewed the USSR as ahead than saw the U.S. in the lead. This was particularly true in Great Britain, where as many as one half viewed the USSR as superior. Relatively few in these countries (between 10% in the Netherlands and 18% in West Germany) considered the U.S. militarily superior.

Despite the heavy media attention in the last few years to the alleged superiority of Soviet compared to American military might, there is no evidence of any major recent change in West European perceptions of superpower strength. At least in the three major countries for which we have comparable data, the proportions seeing either one or the other side as ahead militarily were generally about the same in March 1981 as they were in March 1977 (Table 1). In Britain and France, however, perceptions of military equivalence increased slightly while the percentage of persons with no opinion decreased.

The big change in West European perceptions of superpower strength occurred during the early or mid-seventies. Some time in that period, most likely following the Vietnam debacle, the view of American military superiority, which had predominated in France, West Germany and Italy, and the lack of consensus about superpower strength (in Britain), changed drastically in favor of the USSR.

West Europeans Tend to Prefer U.S.-Soviet Equivalence

The finding that West Europeans no longer see the U.S. as militarily superior to the Soviet Union is not necessarily cause for concern. Leo Crespi wrote on this point in 1977. "It might be presumed," he argued, "that most people in non-Communist countries, especially countries allied with the U.S., would much prefer U.S. superiority as insurance against possible aggression on the part of the USSR. It has been a striking finding in past USIA research, more recently confirmed in surveys by the Institute for International Social Research, that this in fact is not the case."*

The IISR findings showed that in eight countries surveyed in 1974 -- including Britain, France, West Germany and Italy -- equivalence in power rather than either U.S. or Soviet superiority was the predominant preference. Earlier USIA surveys in Great Britain, France and West Germany indicated that preference for U.S. superiority, which was the preferred option in 1958, changed to preference for equivalence by 1971. (Table 2)

A very recent survey, conducted in West Germany in mid-February, again confirms this preference for equivalence. When asked what should be the West's "long-term military goal," most (75%) wanted to see a "balance with the East bloc." Only 16 percent felt the goal should be "superiority over the East bloc," while 8 percent thought one "should accept East bloc superiority."

Reasons for preferring equivalence to U.S. superiority were solicited in the 1971 study and probably still obtain today. European publics tend to feel that the chances of war are reduced when both sides are about equal. There is also some concern that imbalance will encourage the arms race and make arms control negotiations more difficult; or that it may lead the inferior power to consider a first-strike attack.

A direct relationship between perceptions of the East-West military balance and concern about potential Soviet aggression was reported in a 1979 USICA report.** It found that in Germany the public's concern about either Soviet intimidation or a Soviet attack was lowest among those who saw the two sides as about equal. The relationship between concern over potential Soviet aggression and perceptions of the military balance was weaker in France. Nonetheless, the data suggested that both in France and in West Germany, a balance of forces is more reassuring than either US/NATO or USSR/Warsaw Pact superiority. (Table 2a)

*United States Advisory Commission on Information. 28th Annual Report to Congress, May 1977, pp. 120-124.

**U.S. International Communication Agency. "French and German Perceptions of the Soviet Threat," M-29-79, August 20, 1979.

Expectations of U.S. Military Decline Attenuated

Surveys conducted during the 1970s showed a marked tendency for West Europeans to believe that the balance of military power was shifting toward the Soviet Union. This was especially the case in Britain and West Germany but occurred also in France and Italy. The March 1981 data suggest a reversal of this trend, possibly in response to the widespread publicity given to the Reagan administration's determination to redress the military balance. Among those seeing either the U.S. or the USSR as ahead militarily, the USSR now enjoys a decided advantage. Looking ahead five years, however, the proportions seeing the Soviets ahead declined in all five countries while those believing that the U.S. will then be superior remained the same or increased slightly. (Figure 3) This reversal in perceptions of future military strength was even more pronounced among the best-educated than among the general public.

Perceptions of U.S.-USSR influence in world affairs show a similar trend. When asked to "compare the influence of the U.S. and the USSR on the outcome of world events," pluralities in March 1981 saw the superpowers as equal. Among those who viewed one or the other as more influential now, the USSR was given a slight edge in Britain and France, particularly among the best-educated. Only the Norwegians, by a slight margin, thought the U.S. more influential. Looking ahead five years, however, the proportions attributing greater influence to the Soviet Union declined in all five countries, while proportions ascribing greater world influence to the U.S. (about 20% in each country) remained the same. (Figure 4)

Limited Confidence in NATO's Effectiveness

One other factor likely to influence West European attitudes on defense issues is their confidence in NATO's deterrent value. In March 1981, fewer than half in four NATO countries had a great deal or a fair amount of confidence "in NATO's ability to prevent an attack on Western Europe." Only in Norway, among the five countries for which data are available, did a majority (64 to 25%) express confidence in NATO. In Britain, France and Germany opinion on the question was about evenly divided, while in the Netherlands a modest plurality (46% to 36%) showed at least a fair amount of confidence in NATO.

This finding suggests that West European public opinion may have been affected by the frequent public statements about NATO's weaknesses, especially in connection with pleas for increased defense budgets and during recent election campaigns. The finding may also reflect a weakness in question wording, for the ability to deter aggression depends in part on the intent and rationality of the other side. Previous studies found considerably higher levels of confidence in NATO's ability to defend Western Europe against attack -- an attack which many apparently believe NATO's existence may not be able to prevent.

III. RESPONSE TO THE NATURE OF THE SECURITY PROBLEM

Having examined the way West European publics view the nature of the security problem in terms of threat perception and the U.S.-Soviet military balance, we will look at the response of these publics to the security problem in terms of their views on NATO, neutralism, defense spending, and LRTNF deployment.

NATO Membership Generally Supported

Majorities in all but France, which is a member only of the political side of NATO, favor continued NATO membership for their country. In March 1981, NATO was considered essential for their country's security by wide margins in Britain (by 70% to 15%), Norway (66% to 21%), West Germany (62% to 20%), the Netherlands (62% to 15%), and Italy (59% to 28%). In October 1980, Belgians (by a margin of 57 to 19 percent) thought NATO membership essential to their security, while Danes favored continued NATO membership by 70 to 19 percent.

In Great Britain, Italy, and Norway (where trend data are available), the level of support for NATO membership has remained constant over the past decade. In West Germany, where support for NATO has also been consistent from the late 1960s through October 1980, backing appears to have declined between October 1980 and March 1981 (from 88% to 62%), while those considering NATO not essential rose in this period from 8 to 20 percent.* (Table 3)

In France, in October 1980, a plurality (44% to 34%), at the same level as the past decade, considered NATO essential to their security. Any analysis of French public attitudes toward NATO, however, must use caution because many Frenchmen do not fully understand the nature of the French relationship to the NATO alliance. In a March 1981 survey, only 11 percent correctly said that France was a member only of the political side of NATO. Four in ten (39%) had no opinion, while about half gave an incorrect response -- including 29 percent who said that France is not a member of NATO. Since French leaders generally speak about France's membership in the Western alliance rather than in NATO, some of these latter individuals may have a general understanding of France's political relationship to the other NATO countries without specifically being aware that France belongs to NATO.

*Part of the decline may be explained by the increase in don't know responses from 4 to 19 percent which resulted largely from the fact that this question was asked of all respondents in March 1981 but only of the 91 percent aware of NATO in October 1980. However, this does not explain the more than doubling of those calling NATO not essential. Despite this March finding, support for NATO continues at a high level in West Germany.

Military Alliance with the U.S. Preferred To Alternative Security Approaches

Although most West Europeans consider NATO still essential, some would prefer some other way of providing for their country's security if possible. Given a choice of five options in a March 1981 survey, between 46 percent (in the Netherlands) and 74 percent (in West Germany) would continue some form of military alliance with the U.S. -- either NATO as it "now operates" or NATO modified to give the Europeans more say in return for paying more of the costs. Non-NATO options (an independent West European defense force and accommodation to the Soviet Union) were supported by between 15 and 20 percent, except in Norway (where only eight percent chose one of these). (Table 4)

- o NATO as it now operates was favored by majorities in West Germany (57%) and Norway (57%), by about a third in the Netherlands and Britain, and by 10 percent in France.
- o NATO changed to give Europeans a greater voice in return for sharing more of the burden was chosen by between 11 and 17 percent.
- o The French arrangement (not called this in the question) of remaining outside NATO's integrated military structure while staying in the alliance politically was preferred by one in ten or fewer, except in France (28%).
- o An independent West European defense force not allied with the U.S. was preferred by one in seven or fewer in Britain (15%), France (13%), the Netherlands (11%), West Germany (9%), and Norway (6%).
- o Relying on accommodation with the Soviet Union as the best means to ensure their country's security received very little support anywhere -- ranging from two percent to seven percent.

Neutrality Generally Rejected as an Alternative to NATO

One of the alternatives to NATO increasingly discussed in the West European press -- but not included as such in the five options given to respondents in the March 1981 survey just cited -- is neutrality. Indeed, many West Europeans find it appealing to think that their country could sit out the next war. A March 1980 survey, for example, showed that, at least in Britain and France (but not in Germany), majorities of those with an opinion want their government to "do everything possible to stay out of arguments between the U.S. and the Soviet Union" rather than "back the U.S. against the Soviet Union more than it has until now." And a December 1980 survey found that, in case war threatened between the U.S. and the USSR, a majority of the French would have their government ask the Soviet Union to let France stay out of the conflict (63%) rather than side with the U.S. (22%).

7

In a widely publicized March speech, Richard Allen, President Reagan's assistant for national security affairs, expressed his dismay about what he called "the outright pacifist sentiments which are surfacing abroad." But the understandable desire to stay out of conflict or war is not necessarily the same as support for a policy of neutrality. A March 1981 study asked the question more directly: "All things considered, do you think it is better for our country to belong to NATO, the Western defense alliance, or would it be better for us to get out of NATO and become a neutral country?"

Replies showed that neutralist sentiments are not widespread, except in France. Large majorities in Great Britain (67% to 20%), West Germany (67% to 14%), the Netherlands (62% to 17%) and Norway (74% to 15%) opted for NATO rather than for neutrality. Only in France was opinion almost equally divided between a preference for the Western Alliance (45%) and becoming neutral (40%). Sizeable minorities in West Germany (19%) and the Netherlands (21%) were undecided on this question.*

There is some reason for concern, however, in the finding that, at least in some countries, neutralist views are most popular among the best-educated, and presumably most influential, segments of the public. In West Germany and in the Netherlands, 29 and 25 percent respectively of those with some college or university education preferred neutrality to NATO. In France, on the other hand, the situation was reversed, with the best-educated less inclined toward neutralism than the general public (31% vs. 40%).

No Increase in Neutralism Apparent

There is no evidence of any recent increase in neutralist sentiment, although solid data on this issue are available only from West Germany. In fact, neutralism in the FRG appears to have declined during the 1970s, and especially during the past year. Surveys by the Allensbach Institute show that in 1973 as many favored an "attempt to be neutral" as supported remaining "militarily allied with the U.S." (41% vs. 42%). By 1978, a substantial majority (57% to 27%) favored military alliance with the U.S. over neutrality. Further, in March 1980, one-third of the West German public felt it would be better to be "neutral like Switzerland" instead of "belonging to the Western defense alliance." This March, in response to a not-too-different question, West Germans voted for NATO over neutrality by 67 to 14 percent. These German findings, which at the same time show a decline in neutralism as well as in the belief that NATO is still essential, raise questions which only further research can answer.

*Neutralist sentiment may well be highest in Greece. In March 1980, before Greek re-entry into the NATO military structure, a 58 to 12 percent majority thought it would be better for Greece to maintain a neutral position than to return to NATO.

In France, neutralist sentiment appears to be at roughly the same level as a year ago. A May 1980 study found a slim 44 to 40 percent plurality preferring a neutralist policy to strengthening ties to the West, with an additional 6 percent preferring closer ties to the Soviet Union. In view of the more drastic alternative (i.e. leaving the Western Alliance) posed in the 1981 question, the 45 to 40 percent plurality who chose the Western Alliance over neutrality last March probably represents no real decrease in French neutralism.

Limited Willingness of West European Publics to Take A Greater Share of the Burden in NATO

As we have seen, West European publics generally consider NATO still essential, favor some form of military alliance with the U.S. over other security approaches, and reject a policy of neutrality. However, they are generally unwilling to pay the costs (financial and other) of NATO membership, especially those associated with the two most important collective NATO decisions in the past several years: the 1977 NATO agreement calling for annual three percent real increases in defense spending by each member country and the December 1979 NATO decision providing for simultaneous deployment of new long-range theater nuclear forces (LRTNF) in Western Europe and for arms control negotiations which would include LRTNF.

Few Favor Increased Defense Spending

After the 1977 NATO decision, there was much disagreement between the American government and the West European allies over how well the European countries were living up to the three percent commitment. In the last two years of the Carter Administration, this became one of the major factors by which the American government judged the defense performance of its NATO allies.

While the United States has in the past few years undertaken a defense build-up (which has been accelerated further recently), only a few of the West European countries have consistently met the three percent goal. Many West European governments have defended themselves by pointing to their economic problems and to the period between the late 1960s and 1978, when their defense spending generally continued to increase and U.S. defense spending actually declined in real terms.* The Reagan Administration is

*Between 1969 and 1979, the European share of all NATO defense expenditures increased from 22.7 percent to 41.6 percent. This, of course, is in part a reflection of the winding down of U.S. involvement in Vietnam. However, the U.S. still spends a considerably greater share of its GNP (5.2%) on defense than do the West European countries, with the exception of Britain (which spends 4.9 percent of its GNP on defense). In most West European countries, defense expenditures make up between two and four percent of GNP. See the report, NATO After Afghanistan, issued by the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, October 27, 1980.

61

continuing to give great importance to having the Europeans increase their share of the defense burden, but it appears to be deemphasizing the specific budgetary percentages for judging performance.

Survey data suggest that the governments in the West European NATO countries, particularly in Italy and the smaller allies, would have great difficulty in rallying public support for increased defense expenditures. In April 1981, three in ten (at the same level as October 1980) in Great Britain favored increased defense spending. In October 1980, no more than one in five in any other West European NATO country surveyed wanted defense increases (West Germany - 22% and France - 15%). In Italy, the Netherlands, and Belgium, one in ten or fewer supported this.* (Table 5)

The prevailing view in Great Britain, West Germany, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands (shared by half or slightly fewer) was to maintain defense spending at present levels. In Italy, however, about as many preferred decreased defense spending as favored keeping spending at present levels.

About one-third or more in Italy (39%), Belgium (34%), and the Netherlands (31%) opted for decreased defense spending. Fewer felt this way in France (22%), Great Britain (20%), and West Germany (19%).

In sum, contrary to the agreement made in NATO by their governments, about seven in ten or more in Britain, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Belgium favor either keeping defense expenditures at present levels or reducing them.

In Denmark, in October 1980, a 44 to 30 percent plurality believed that defense spending should not be increased even if Denmark fell short of its NATO commitments. In addition, about as many thought aid to the developing countries "more important" (37%) as thought defense spending "more important" (32%) "if Denmark can't fund both adequately."

In February 1981, West Germans were asked whether they favored a proposal of 24 SPD deputies that a billion marks (about a half billion dollars) "be transferred from Bundeswehr funding to the development aid program." Though 56 percent preferred to keep the money in defense spending, fully 43 percent wanted it transferred.

In Britain, support for increased defense spending is the same as in October 1980, but lower than it was in 1979 and early 1980 (when about half wanted defense increases). Overall, British support for defense increases is somewhat greater now than was true in the late 1960s. In West Germany, support for defense spending has changed only a little over the past two years. Compared with a decade ago, fewer want decreases, but the portion preferring increases is about the same. (Table 5)

*The French data are from March 1980 and the British data from April 1981; in both cases the question was asked of all respondents. The others are from October 1980, when the question was asked only of those aware of NATO.

b2

American Public Much More Favorable to Increased Defense Spending

This lack of public support in West Europe for increased defense spending is in strong contrast to the current broad backing within the American public for greater defense expenditures. For example, a January 1981 poll showed 61 percent of the Americans viewing U.S. defense spending as "too little," 28 percent believing it "about right," and only seven percent calling it "too much." This widespread support for increased defense spending in the U.S. represents a shift in the U.S. in the past few years from the public mood of the previous decade.

Why The Limited West European Public Support for Defense Increases?

There are five often interrelated factors which may each, at least in part, help to explain the limited popular support in Western Europe for increased defense spending: (1) the absence of a widely-felt need for a stronger defense, since many West Europeans (as already discussed) do not feel particularly threatened by the Soviet Union; (2) economic problems and unwillingness to cut spending for social services; (3) a sense of futility, particularly in the smaller NATO members, based on the feeling that the modest contribution that their country can make will be of little importance to the overall NATO effort; (4) a willingness to rely on the U.S. defense commitment to West Europe as a substitute in part for a greater national defense effort; and (5) a preference for arms control negotiations and detente rather than strengthening their armed forces.

Economic Problems/Competition with Social Services Spending.

Serious economic problems have forced West European governments to economize and even to seek reductions in government spending. Widespread public unwillingness to accept cuts in social services has made it difficult for many of these governments to implement the increased defense spending agreed to in NATO.

When West Europeans must weigh priorities between defense spending and social services, support for defense spending frequently diminishes. In March 1980, those favoring increased defense spending were asked whether they would continue to support such increases if this might mean a decline in social services in their country. Given this choice, support for increased defense expenditures dropped significantly in the three countries where the question was asked -- Britain, West Germany, and France.

Other survey evidence confirms that support for defense outlays is softer than backing for health and social welfare expenditures. In May 1980, large majorities of the public in Great Britain, West Germany, France, and Italy (ranging from 71 to 84 percent) believed that spending on medical and social services should not be reduced even "if inflation gets much worse." By

comparison, 67 percent of the British and 47 percent of the West Germans, but only 29 percent of the French and 24 percent of the Italians, opposed a defense reduction in the face of rising inflation. Support for cutting defense spending under these conditions was about three in ten in Britain (27%) and West Germany (33%), half in France (52%), and seven in ten (70%) in Italy.

A survey last November and December also shows that when an economic crunch comes more West Germans prefer cutting defense spending rather than social services expenditures. When the West Germans were asked to select from a list which areas of the budget should be the targets for economizing, defense spending was chosen by almost half (44%), behind the first choice of cutting salaries of government employees (by 54%) and at the same level as development aid (42%). By comparison, cuts in spending for the railroads (20%), education (16%), and social benefits (6%) were selected by many fewer. In 1974, when this question was also asked, priorities were about the same -- though more (58%) favored defense cuts then. (Table 6)

Even the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan did not substantially affect the budget priorities of the British public. In March 1980 (only three months after the Soviet invasion), support was considerably greater for spending on social services than for defense expenditures. Majorities of between 59 and 68 percent believed that Britain was spending too little on education and schools, the National Health Service, or old age pensions. In contrast, far fewer (29%) thought defense outlays too little. This represented only a very small change from the results of a similar survey conducted in November 1979 shortly before the Soviet invasion.

Sense of Futility in the Smaller Countries. Particularly in the small NATO countries, as suggested by the Belgian and Danish data presented below, many feel that their country's defense commitment, beyond a certain minimum level, is not necessary. Their contribution to the total NATO defense effort seems so small and so unimportant that many in these countries believe it is futile for them to sacrifice in any way to increase slightly NATO's overall capabilities -- especially in the context of the superpower nuclear balance.

In Belgium, a plurality (by 41% to 30%) believed in June-July 1980 that what their country does for defense does not seem useful. In the same survey, while 43 percent said that their defense should best be done by military means, fully one-third (35%) thought Belgian defense should be only by non-violent means.

Further, about half (53%) of the Belgians in May 1980 considered their armed forces incapable of meeting their obligations. Yet, only one-third believed that the present situation of the Belgian armed forces had to be improved. Moreover, even among those who

avored improvement of their armed forces, there was limited support for concrete initiatives such as lengthening the term of military service for conscripts (24% in favor) or increasing defense expenditures (34% in favor). Each of these measures was opposed by half.

In Denmark, almost half (48%) last October did not think that their country was living up to its NATO obligations. In addition, a majority of 56 to 19 percent did not believe that Denmark could possibly repel an attack long enough until help could arrive from its NATO allies. In view of the perceived futility of even temporary Danish defense against an attack, a 44 to 30 percent plurality believed that defense spending should not be increased even if Denmark fell short of its NATO commitments.

Belief that Denmark is meeting its NATO obligations or not has only a limited impact on willingness to spend more for defense, but belief that Danish defense is possible does make a major difference in support for increased defense spending. In fact, three times more (37% to 13%) among those saying temporary Danish defense is possible than among those who said it is not favored defense increases to meet Denmark's NATO commitment. Nonetheless, even among those believing temporary Danish defense possible, a majority (by 52% to 37%) opposed increasing defense expenditures to meet the NATO goal.

Why Try Harder When Uncle Sam Will Do the Job?

Corresponding to the perceived futility of self-defense efforts, felt particularly in the smaller countries, is the prevalent view, in both the larger and smaller allies, that if an attack on them occurs the United States will come to their aid. Although we as yet have no direct survey evidence of a relationship between trust in the American commitment to Western Europe (and the American "nuclear umbrella") and willingness to assume a greater share of the burden in NATO, it is likely that at least some of those who resist greater defense spending are willing to rely heavily on the U.S. to do the job.

Confidence that the U.S. would come to Western Europe's defense in the case of a Soviet attack remains widespread. In March 1981, large majorities in Great Britain (74%), Norway (67%), France (66%), the Netherlands (61%), and West Germany (59%) had at least a "fair amount" of confidence that the U.S. would come to their aid. Only about one in twenty in these countries had "none at all."

West European confidence in the U.S. defense commitment to them has rebounded in the last several years from the record low in 1975 (in a survey done only weeks after the end of the Vietnam War and at a time when there was widespread questioning in the U.S. of the American role in the world). In March 1981, the level of confidence was still somewhat below the highest point. (Table 7)

Preference for Arms Control and Detente. West Europeans generally have a clear preference for arms control negotiations and conciliation to strengthening NATO and firmness. In March 1981, pluralities in France (by 50 to 18%), the Netherlands (by 44 to 21%), Britain (by 40 to 31%), and West Germany (by 35 to 21%) said that the best way for their country to improve its security was "by pushing harder for arms control negotiations to try to reduce military forces on both sides" rather than "by strengthening its military forces to help NATO maintain a balance of military power with the East." In West Germany, a quarter (25%) volunteered that both should be done simultaneously. In Norway, equal proportions (38-35%) favored pushing for arms control and strengthening NATO.

The importance of this pro-arms control sentiment was underlined by the March 1981 finding that, when presented with a list of actions which might be taken if the Soviets invaded Poland, only about one in ten in West Germany, Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, and Norway would favor suspending arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union.

The maintenance of the overall detente process -- the effort to reduce East-West tensions -- is clearly of major importance to the West European publics. When shown a list of eight possible threats to their country's security (as discussed earlier), "increased tensions between the U.S. and the USSR" was the top-ranked threat in Britain, the Netherlands, and Norway and was among the top three in West Germany and France.

Further evidence of the importance given to detente by the West European publics comes from a February 1981 survey. It found that two-thirds of the West Germans (by 67 to 28%) and half of the French (by 52 to 35 %) thought that their country should follow a policy of conciliation rather than a policy of firmness toward the Soviet Union. By contrast, more than half the Americans, when asked the same question, favored firmness to conciliation (by 57% to 34%). In addition, far more West Germans (65%) and French (54%) than Americans (34%) believed that the Western countries have benefitted as much from detente as have the Communist countries.

This difference between the West European and American publics is in line with their different attitudes toward defense spending. It is clear that the recent disagreement between the American and West European governments on the priority of strengthening military capability versus arms control negotiations is mirrored in the opinions of the general public.

66

The Reagan Administration recently recognized the importance of arms control negotiations to the West Europeans. At the early May NATO Foreign Ministers' meeting, Secretary of State Alexander Haig announced the U.S. intention to move toward LRTNF negotiations this year. The final communique, which reiterated both tracks of official NATO policy (arms control and strengthening NATO militarily), was a step toward winning broader West European public support for strengthening NATO militarily. But, as few in the general public are likely to be aware of the meeting and its results, it will require a sustained follow-through on the negotiating front to win greater popular support for defense increases and LRTNF deployment.

Widespread Opposition to LRTNF Deployment

The December 1979 NATO decision called for deployment of long-range theater nuclear forces (LRTNF) in Western Europe beginning in 1983 or 1984 and for arms control negotiations on these types of weapons. This NATO decision was a response to the continuing Soviet deployment of its SS-20 missiles, which can reach any city in Western Europe. It was tentatively planned that the deployment would take place in five NATO countries -- ground-launched cruise missiles in Great Britain, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands and both cruise missiles and Pershing II missiles in West Germany. The British, Italian, and West German governments agreed to future deployment of the weapons on their soil about at the time of the NATO decision. The Belgian and Dutch governments, however, facing strong political opposition to LRTNF at home, postponed their decision on stationing in their countries to depend upon the progress of arms control negotiations. In September 1980, the Belgian government gave a qualified acceptance of deployment in Belgium, one to depend upon arms control negotiations. The Dutch said in December 1979 that they would make their decision in December 1981.

It is clear that in the countries where stationing is planned there is much public opposition to deployment of these new nuclear weapons on their soil:

In Britain, the public, by a 50 to 41 percent margin, was opposed to its "government's decision to allow the American government to base cruise missiles on British soil," according to an April 1981 survey. This is a change from September 1980 when Britons, by a 49 to 43 percent margin, favored the government decision to accept deployment.

In Belgium, a 42 to 26 percent plurality in September 1980 opposed "the installation of American missiles on its territory." This opposition was substantially lower than a year earlier, when a 65 to 20 percent majority opposed TNF deployment in Belgium. However, the percentage of supporters increased only slightly while the undecided ranks doubled.

In the Netherlands, the public, by a 53 to 39 percent margin, last fall did not believe that "nuclear weapons should be present on Dutch soil."

In West Germany, a 60 to 25 percent majority in March 1980 opposed "the stationing of more and new nuclear weapons in the Federal Republic."

One aspect of the opposition to LRTNF deployment, at least in Britain and the Netherlands, where relevant data are available, is the more generalized opposition to all nuclear weapons among at least a segment of the population.

British support for unilateral nuclear disarmament increased temporarily following last fall's Labour Party Conference resolution advocating such a policy and a major effort by the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), which was the most extensive in Britain since the "Ban the Bomb" campaign of the early 1960s. Two surveys conducted in September 1980 showed 21 and 28 percent respectively in favor of unilateral nuclear disarmament for Britain. In October and November surveys, support for unilateral nuclear disarmament jumped to 35 and 41 percent respectively. However, by April 1981, six months after the Labour Party Conference and the major CND activities, support for Britain "to abandon nuclear weapons altogether, no matter what other countries do," had returned to about the same level (23%) as it had been in September 1980. Nevertheless, this appears to represent a solid core of opposition to all nuclear weapons. (Table 8)

In the Netherlands, last fall the public was evenly divided (48%-46%) on the general question of whether Western Europe should "possess nuclear weapons."

68

IV. ANALYSIS OF AGE AND PARTY DIFFERENCES ON SECURITY ISSUES

Attitudes on Security Issues Generally Differ Much More By Party Preference than By Age Group

This brief section is based on a preliminary and partial analysis of differences by age and party. Thus far, we have found little evidence of major and consistent age group differences on security issues. This is not to say that there are none, but we have found no basis for concluding that the younger generation is significantly different in its attitudes from its elders across the range of security issues and across Western Europe.

On the other hand, party preference tends to be strongly related to opinion on defense issues. As might be expected, supporters of parties on the left (Communists and Socialists) are generally least likely to support NATO, increased defense spending, or LRTNF deployment. These differences do not, of course, occur in every case and vary in degree among the three issues cited above.

On the question of LRTNF deployment, there are, except in West Germany, major differences by party preference -- and these differences among supporters of different parties are among the largest on any security issue:

--In Britain, while 60 percent of the Conservative supporters approved the Thatcher Government's decision to allow TNF deployment, only a third (33%) of the Labour supporters did.

--In the Netherlands, backing for stationing nuclear weapons on Dutch territory declined from right to left across the political spectrum. Two-thirds of the supporters of the conservative People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) favored stationing nuclear weapons in Holland. Supporters of Prime Minister Van Agt's Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) were evenly divided. On the left, almost two-thirds of the supporters of the leading opposition party, the Dutch Labor Party (PvdA), opposed the presence of nuclear weapons on Dutch soil.

--In Belgium, in September 1980, a majority (58%) of the voters of the Flemish Socialist Party, the government party most hostile to TNF deployment in Belgium, opposed the stationing of these nuclear weapons on Belgian soil. Pluralities (ranging from 36 to 42 percent) among the supporters of the other three government parties -- the Flemish and Walloon Social Christians and the Walloon Socialists -- also opposed deployment. Among the major parties, only the voters of the Walloon Liberal Party favored TNF deployment -- by a 55 to 19 percent majority.

b7

V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

We have found that West European expectations of war have increased since Afghanistan but that only a third to a half are concerned that the Soviet Union will attack West Europe or force political concessions in the near future. West Europeans are generally more concerned about a possible confrontation between the superpowers than about potential Soviet adventures in Poland or in Southwest Asia. Pluralities tend to view the Soviet Union as militarily equal to the United States, while large minorities see the USSR as militarily superior.

Given this mixed picture in terms of threats and the military balance, the publics in our West European allies -- with the usual exception of the French in most cases -- tend to respond in the following ways:

- they think NATO is still essential to their security and want their country to retain its membership;
- they do not favor in any large numbers alternatives to the Western Alliance, such as a purely West European defense force or neutrality;
- they tend not to have much confidence in NATO as a deterrent, but they feel that the U.S. would come to their aid in case of an attack;
- they oppose increased defense spending -- because they prefer butter (or social services) to guns, arms control negotiations to strengthening NATO militarily, conciliation to firmness;
- they feel, especially in the smaller countries, a sense of futility about the value of their modest contribution to the overall NATO defense effort;
- they generally oppose stationing cruise missiles in their country.

What does it all add up to? Is NATO in trouble?

We must first emphasize that all the data reported in this paper deal only with mass publics, not with elites. On many foreign policy issues, general public opinion acts primarily as a constraint, not as the decisive factor. Both defense spending and the deployment of long-range theater nuclear forces, however, and the broader issue of how best to avoid war, are questions which have become enmeshed in domestic politics and on which the general public may have a substantial influence.

NATO as a formal organization is not in trouble among the mass publics; membership is widely supported and neutrality is generally rejected. However, these publics have largely shown themselves unwilling to sacrifice for NATO or defense spending. This presents a troubling situation for the 1980s. There will clearly be no immediate crisis in NATO as a result of these publics' attitudes, but there should be longer term concern as the West European governments will find it hard to win support for tough NATO

76

decisions. This may make it more and more difficult for these governments to make the kind of commitments they have made in the major NATO decisions in the past several years and at the May 1981 Foreign Ministers' meeting.

The people of Western Europe want to see a strong -- but not militarily superior -- United States. They would welcome strong U.S. leadership in world affairs. At the same time, they want evidence of a continuing U.S. effort to reduce tensions and seek arms control negotiations between the superpowers. If these West European publics do not perceive the U.S. to be making a genuine effort for arms control negotiations, their governments will find it increasingly difficult to win public support for improving NATO's military capabilities.

Table 1. Perception of U.S. Versus USSR Military Strength

1957-1969 wording: "All things considered, which country do you think is ahead in total military strength at the present time -- the US or the Soviet Union?"

1977-1981 wording: "How do you think the US and the USSR compare at the present time in total military strength (CARD) -- US considerably ahead, US somewhat ahead, US and USSR about equal, USSR somewhat ahead, USSR considerably ahead?"

	Britain				France			
	US ahead	USSR ahead	Neither (Vol.)/ Equal	No Opin.	US ahead	USSR ahead	Neither (Vol.)/ Equal	No Opin.
1981:March	11%	52	27	11	16%	30	38	16
1977:March	10%	50	19	22	16%	34	27	23
1969:Oct-Nov	33%	34	13	20	40%	26	19	15
August	41%	30	12	16	44%	19	17	20
July	35%	31	13	20	39%	24	18	19
1968:December	27%	45	12	16	23%	30	30	17
1965:May-July	26%	37	15	22	25%	20	32	23
1964:February	27%	42	7	24	28%	25	25	22
1963:Jan-Feb	26%	41	7	26	24%	28	19	29
1961:June-July	15%	56	8	21	12%	43	20	25
1960:May-July	12%	55	5	28	25%	40	--	35
February	15%	59	4	22	16%	37	16	31
1958:October	26%	41	8	25	19%	29	34	18
1957:November	19%	50	6	25	17%	25	20	38

	West Germany				Italy			
	US ahead	USSR ahead	Neither (Vol.)/ Equal	No Opin.	US ahead	USSR ahead	Neither (Vol.)/ Equal	No Opin.
1981:March	18%	35	33	14				
1977:March	15%	34	35	17	24%	19	34	23
1969:Oct-Nov	41%	26	25	8	44%	13	25	18
August	41%	13	33	13				
July	35%	16	38	11				
1968:December	28%	26	35	11	31%	16	16	37
1965:May-July	41%	10	32	17	38%	14	17	31
1964:February	41%	14	30	15	35%	18	13	34
1963:Jan-Feb	50%	16	18	16	39%	19	14	28
1961:June-July	26%	38	17	19	22%	29	11	38
1960:May-July	26%	23	16	35	30%	22	21	27
February	22%	47	8	23	38%	32	5	25
1958:October	24%	23	22	31	38%	23	22	17
1957:November	38%	23	20	19	34%	22	23	21

Table 2. Preferred U.S.-Soviet Balance

1971 wording: "What would be best in your opinion—for the U.S. to be ahead in nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union to be ahead, or neither to be ahead?"
 1964 wording: "What would be best in your opinion—for the U.S. to be ahead in military strength, the Soviet Union to be ahead, or neither to be ahead?"
 1958 wording: "Would you prefer the U.S. to be militarily stronger than the USSR, weaker, or about the same in military strength?"

	Great Britain			West Germany			France		
	Oct '58	Feb '64	July '71	Oct '58	Feb '64	July '71	Oct '58	Feb '64	July '71
No. of cases	(611)	(1178)	(1240)	(610)	(1202)	(1211)	(635)	(1175)	(1263)
Prefer U.S. ahead	69%	40%	31%	73%	49%	31%	43%	22%	12%
Prefer USSR ahead	2	1	3	1	—	1	3	2	3
Prefer neither ahead	21	47	56	15	35	56	36	64	71
No opinion	8	12	11	11	16	13	18	12	15
Net Favorable to U.S. (U.S. ahead less USSR ahead plus neither)	100% 46	100% -8	101%* -28	100% 57	100% 14	101%* -26	100% 4	100% -44	101%* -62

* Totals may vary slightly from 100 per cent owing to rounding.

Table 2a. Perceptions of East-West Military Balance

	F R A N C E			G E R M A N Y		
	US/NATO Ahead	About Equal	USSR/WTO Ahead	US/NATO Ahead	About Equal	USSR/WTO Ahead
<u>"Very" or "Fairly"</u> <u>Concerned About:</u>						
Soviet Intimidation of Western Europe	42%	31%	44%	40%	35%	60%
A Soviet Attack on Western Europe	24%	23%	32%	35%	21%	35%
(No. of cases ¹)	(67)	(435)	(188)	(138)	(591)	(776)

¹Bases are those who answered question on E-W military balance and on intimidation. The bases for the Soviet attack question vary slightly.

Table 3. Essentiality of NATO

"Some people say that NATO is still essential to our country's security. Others say it is no longer essential. Which of these views is closer to your own?"¹

	Britain			France		
	Essen- tial	Not Essen- tial	No Opin.	Essen- tial	Not Essen- tial	No Opin.
1981: March ²	70%	15	15		----	
1980: October	79%	13	8	44%	34	23
1978: March	70%	10	20	39%	35	26
1977: Nov-Dec		----			----	
April	75%	13	12		----	
March	73%	8	19	44%	29	27
1976: Jul-Aug	69%	15	16	42%	35	23
1973: Apr-May ³		----		42%	34	25
1971: July	81%	12	7	54%	35	11
1969: Oct-Nov	68%	15	17	47%	37	16
1967: Dec ⁴	59%	15	26	34%	30	36
February ⁴	66%	16	18	45%	28	27

	West Germany			Italy		
	Essen- tial	Not Essen- tial	No Opin.	Essen- tial	Not Essen- tial	No Opin.
1981: March ²	62%	20	19	62%	27	12
1980: October	88%	8	4	59%	28	13
1978: March	84%	5	11	58%	22	20
1977: Nov-Dec	82%	10	8		----	
April	82%	9	9		----	
March	79%	7	14	54%	24	22
1976: Jul-Aug	85%	10	5	58%	30	12
1973: Apr-May ³	73%	13	14		----	
1971: July	84%	11	5		----	
1969: Oct-Nov	76%	13	11	66%	23	11
1967: Dec ⁴	67%	17	16	37%	12	51
February ⁴	59%	15	26	52%	11	37

1. Based on those aware of NATO (usually about four-fifths of the publics), unless otherwise noted.
2. Question asked of all respondents.
3. West German question: "Some people say that NATO is still important to West European security. Others say it is no longer important. Which of these views is closer to your own?" (West German question asked of all respondents; French question asked only of those aware of NATO.)
4. Question asked of all respondents: "Some people say that the Soviet Union does not pose a serious military threat to Western Europe and therefore there is not much need for NATO. Others disagree and say that NATO is still essential for West European security. Which of these views is closer to your opinion?"

Table 4. Preferred Security Approach, March 1981

"Regardless of how you feel about NATO, which of the statements on this card (Hand card) comes closest to your own view on how (SURVEY COUNTRY) could best provide for its security?"

	<u>UK</u>	<u>FRN*</u>	<u>FRG</u>	<u>NETH</u>	<u>NORWAY</u>
1. The NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) Alliance as it now operates among the countries of Western Europe and the United States and Canada	35%	10%	57%	31%	57%
2. NATO changed so that West Europe has more say in NATO in return for paying more of the costs	16	11	17	15	11
3. Withdraw our military forces from NATO but otherwise remain in NATO for things such as policy consultations	9	28	8	11	6
4. Establish an independent West European defense force not allied to the U.S.	15	13	9	11	6
5. Rely on greater accommodation to the interests of the Soviet Union	3	7	6	6	2
0. Don't know	24	33	5	27	18

* In France, option 3 reads: "To rely primarily on our armed forces and remain in the Western alliance."

Table 5. Desired Defense Spending

	Britain				France			
	Increase	Decrease	Keep Same	No Opin.	Increase	Decrease	Keep Same	No Opin.
1981:April ¹	28%	20	47	5		-----		
1980:October ²	30%	16	47	7		-----		
1980:March ³	48%	10	33	9	15%	22	50	13
1979:July ⁴	51%	10	31	8	19%	25	46	10
May ⁵		-----			13%	23	43	21
1972:June-July ⁶	32%	20	38	10	7%	51	32	10
1971:July ⁶	16%	26	40	18	7%	39	38	16
1968:Spring ⁷	15%	29	47	9	5%	38	47	10

	West Germany				Italy			
	Increase	Decrease	Keep Same	No Opin.	Increase	Decrease	Keep Same	No Opin.
1981:April ¹		-----				-----		
1980:October ²	22%	19	53	7	10%	39	36	16
1980:March ³	21%	13	51	15		-----		
1979:July ⁴	11%	11	54	24		-----		
May ⁵	23%	10	66	1		-----		
1972:June-July ⁶	12%	36	40	12	16%	27	17	40
1971:July ⁶	11%	36	44	9		-----		
1968:Spring ⁷	10%	33	50	7	11%	35	25	29

1. "Bearing in mind the current international situation on the one hand and Britain's economic situation on the other, do you think we should be increasing military spending, or holding it at its present level, or should we cut it?"
2. "In your opinion, should our defense spending in support of NATO be increased, decreased, or remain at the same level? (Asked only of those aware of NATO)"
3. "Do you think that the level of (SURVEY COUNTRY'S) expenditures for military purposes should be increased, decreased, or left at about their present level?"
4. "After the SALT II treaty has gone into effect, do you think that (SURVEY COUNTRY) should reduce its level of spending for defense, leave it at the present level, or increase spending for defense?" (Asked only of those aware of SALT II)
5. "Do you think that the level of (SURVEY COUNTRY'S) expenditures for military purposes should be increased, decreased, or left at about their present level?"
6. "At the present time, do you think (SURVEY COUNTRY) is spending too little, too much, or about the right amount of money for national defense?"
7. "In light of the current situation, do you personally feel that the amount of money our country is now putting into defense should be increased, reduced, or kept at about the present level?"

76

Table 6. Preferences for Cuts in Government Spending
Among the West German Public, 1974 and 1980

"The Minister of Finance has just said that the government must take steps toward economizing. If it were up to you to decide, in which areas should the government cut back first?" (Presentation of a list.)

	November/December 1980	November/December 1974
Government employees' salaries	54%	45%
Defense	44	58
Development aid	42	67
Subsidies for agriculture	38	26
Road construction	38	20
Promotion of sports	24	21
Postal service	23	29
Federal railroad	20	26
Schools, universities	16	12
Social benefits such as old-age pensions, child allowances and other welfare payments	6	3
None of these	<u>6</u>	<u>7</u>
Total*	311%	314%

*Totals add to more than 100 percent because respondents could choose as many from the list as they wanted.

Source: Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach

Table 7. Confidence in US Defense Commitment

	Britain					France				
	Great	Considerable/ fair amount	Not very much/ little	None/ very little	Don't know	Great	Considerable/ fair amount	Not very much/ little	None/ very little	Don't know
1981: March ¹	36%	38	15	4	6	19%	47	16	5	14
1980: March ¹	34%	37	17	7	5	19%	46	18	5	3
1979: July ¹	34%	34	22	6	4	18%	40	24	8	10
1978: March-April ²	35%	38	17	3	8	12%	41	19	6	22
1975: May-June ³	22%	41	22	7	8	9%	40	23	11	18
1974: Oct-Nov ⁴	51%	33	9	2	5	31%	41	3	5	14
1972: March ⁵	31%	51	11	5	3	10%	63	15	3	9
1968: Spring ⁶	39%	28	10	4	19	18%	32	24	6	20

	West Germany				
	Great	Considerable/ fair amount	Not very much/ little	None/ very little	Don't know
1981: March ¹	20%	39	23	5	14
1980: March ¹	16%	50	22	3	9
1979: July ¹	12%	41	29	6	12
1978: March-April ²	15%	46	24	4	11
1975: May-June ³	13%	36	33	8	11
1974: Oct-Nov ⁴	21%	51	18	2	8
1972: March ⁵	16%	51	16	7	11
1968: Spring ⁶	22%	31	31	10	6

1. "In the event our country's security were threatened by a Soviet attack, how much confidence do you feel we can have in the United States to come to our defense -- a great deal, a fair amount, not very much, or none at all?" (In July 1979, asked of those aware of the SALT Treaty, about 60% of the public in each country.)
2. "In the event Western Europe's security were threatened, how much confidence would you have in the United States to come to its defense -- a great deal, a fair amount, not very much, or none at all?"
3. "In the event our country's security were threatened by some other country, how much trust do you feel we can have in the United States to come to our defense -- a great deal, a fair amount, not very much, or none at all?"
4. "Let's suppose that at some time in the future the Soviet Union launched an attack against Western Europe, involving this country, without attacking the United States directly. To what extent do you think we could rely on the United States to come to our defense with military force -- a great deal, a fair amount, not very much, or none at all?"
5. "In the event our country's security were threatened by some other country, how much trust do you feel we can have in the United States to help us in our defense -- very great, considerable, little, or very little?"
6. "Just supposing the Soviet Union did launch such an attack [an attack against Western Europe, including (SURVEY COUNTRY), within the next five years], to what extent do you think we could trust the United States to come to Europe's defense -- a great deal, a fair amount, not very much, or not at all?"

74

Table 8. Support for Unilateral Nuclear Disarmament
Among the British Public, September 1980-April 1981*

	September 1980 (Marplan)	September 1980 (Gallup)	October 1980	November 1980	April 1981
Abandon Nuclear Weapons	28%	21%	35%	41%	23%
Maintain Nuclear Weapons	65	67	52	53	74
Don't Know	<u>7</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>3</u>
Total	100%	99%	101%	100%	100%

*The question wording varied from survey to survey. The questions were as follows:

September 1980 (Marplan) -- "In the absence of general nuclear disarmament, should Britain take the initiative and abandon nuclear weapons?"

September 1980 (Gallup) -- "It has been suggested that Britain give up relying on nuclear weapons for defense, whatever other countries decide. Do you think this is a good idea or a bad idea?"

October 1980 (MORI) (shortly after the conclusion of the Labour Party Conference) -- Respondents were asked whether they favored or opposed a series of policies adopted by the conference. One of these was unilateral nuclear disarmament.


November 1980 (Marplan) -- Should Britain take the lead and ban all nuclear weapons on British soil?"

April 1981 (Marplan) -- "Should Britain a) abandon nuclear weapons altogether, no matter what other countries do; b) maintain its current nuclear capability; or c) improve it by spending more money on nuclear weapons?" In the table, for comparative purposes, options b and c have been counted together.

Figure 1.
ASSESSMENT OF RISK OF WAR IN NEXT TEN YEARS

(Percent of those expressing an opinion who considered war
"certain" or "more than 50/50 chance")


% of
Public



Source: European Community Bulletin 7/8, 1980.


80

Figure 2A.
CONCERN OVER SOVIET MILITARY ATTACK ON WESTERN EUROPE



91

Figure 2B.
CONCERN OVER SOVIET POLITICAL PRESSURE ON SURVEY COUNTRY



82

Figure 3.
EXPECTED SHIFTS IN MILITARY BALANCE - MARCH/APRIL 1981




Figure 4.
INFLUENCE OF US AND USSR ON WORLD EVENTS - MARCH/APRIL 1981

