

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: Blair, Dennis: Files
Folder Title: Public Diplomacy 1981
(August 1981)
Box: RAC Box 4

To see more digitized collections visit:
<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: reagan.library@nara.gov

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name BLAIR, DENNIS: FILES

Withdrawer

CAS 5/16/2012

File Folder PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 1981 (AUGUST1981)

FOIA

M11-442

Box Number 4

HAENNI

3

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
136975	DRAFT PAPER	RE ORGANIZATIONS	6	ND	B1
136976	PAPER	RE SOVIET PROPAGANDA <i>R 8/23/2016 M442/1</i>	10	ND	B1
136977	DISTRIBUTION LIST	<i>PAR 3/21/2017 M442/1</i>	1	ND	B1
136978	MEMO	DAVID GOMPert TO MG BOVERIE ET AL RE THREAT MATERIALS (INCLUDES ATTACHED LIST) <i>PAR 3/21/2017 M442/1</i>	3	8/7/1981	B1
136979	CABLE	STATE 222652 <i>R 8/23/2016 M442/1</i>	4	8/20/1981	B1
136980	CABLE	STATE 229562 <i>R 8/23/2016 M442/1</i>	4	8/27/1981	B1
136981	CABLE	STATE 229563 <i>R 8/23/2016 M442/1</i>	4	8/27/1981	B1
136982	CABLE	STATE 229567 <i>R 8/23/2016 M442/1</i>	4	8/27/1981	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

BLAIR, DENNIS: FILES

Withdrawer

CAS 5/16/2012

File Folder

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 1981 (AUGUST1981)

FOIA

M11-442

HAENNI

Box Number

4

3

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
136975	DRAFT PAPER RE ORGANIZATIONS	6	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

SOVIET PROPAGANDA AND THE PEACE MOVEMENT IN NORTHERN EUROPE

136976

There are indications that the Soviet Union is giving high priority to Scandinavia in its propaganda campaign directed against NATO. This Soviet activity aims to exploit traditional aspirations for peace and recent manifestations of popular anxiety in the North European countries about security issues, including nuclear weapons policies, particularly in the context of NATO's Theatre Nuclear Forces Modernisation Plan.

The Russians are keen to seize on opportunities for turning to their advantage what they perceive as a revival of public interest in the region in the concept of a Nordic Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NNWFZ). This is not a new idea; it was originally formulated as long ago as 1963 by Finland's President Kekkonen. However, his proposals were received in Denmark, Norway and Sweden with only polite interest (in 1966 the then Social Democratic Danish Foreign Minister, Per Haekkerup, described the plan as 'superfluous'). Even then the idea was not new, having been part of a concerted Soviet/Polish/East German campaign for a nuclear-free zone and a Baltic 'Sea of Peace' dating from 1957. Although it met with little response at the time, the idea has been one to which Soviet propaganda has frequently returned.

It would seem that it is only in the last two years, with the growing debate on nuclear weapons in Europe as a whole, that the proposal for a NNWFZ has commanded renewed attention in the two NATO member countries of Northern Europe -

/Norway

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR M442/1 #136976
BY RW NARA DATE 8/23/12

Norway and Denmark. The Russians appear to be keen to benefit from this interest, but in official statements or contacts, Soviet leaders try not to promote the proposal too hard with the possible exception of its ritual mention in meetings with President Kekkonen.

Clearly, the Soviet Union is not willing to be rushed into any commitments about non-stationing of nuclear weapons in that part of its own territory which would logically have to be included in any Nordic Nuclear-Free Zone, particularly the strategically vital Kola Peninsula. This response was typified by Brezhnev's replies to questions in the Finnish newspaper Suomen Sosialidemokraatti published on 26 June. The Soviet President welcomed the idea of a NNWFZ, and gave assurances that the USSR would not use nuclear weapons against countries participating in a formal nuclear-free zone. However on the question of how the zone proposal might apply to nuclear weapons on Soviet territory, Brezhnev was more cautious, saying only that the Soviet Union was 'prepared to discuss with the countries concerned certain additional obligations with regard to the part of its territory adjoining the zone'.

Brezhnev's statements, presented by Soviet spokesmen as an important new initiative, have still not been clarified by an authoritative Soviet source, but several signals in the Soviet media have shown that the Russians are being less than straightforward.

For instance, a commentary by the Soviet news agency Novosti on 7 July, carried in the Danish newspaper Informatic

/suggested

suggested that a NNWFZ should include Schleswig-Holstein (part of the FRG), the 'territorial waters of West Germany', 'the coastal regions of Norway' and even Greenland. A further Novosti commentary distributed in West Berlin on 23 July, and reported in the Finnish, Norwegian, Swiss and American press, stated quite bluntly that though the Soviet Union supported the establishment of a NNWFZ 'the Kola Peninsula could not form a part of it'. This is in line with the position explicitly taken by the Soviet Union in the past, that a Nordic Zone would apply only to the Nordic countries, by which they mean Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Finland.

In its propaganda aimed at these countries, however, the Soviet Union is not constrained by such reservations. Here, there is no hesitation in calling for the NNWFZ and for trying to persuade the public in the Nordic countries of the advantages of such a plan. The Russians are, of course, well aware of the dangers to NATO's overall security of a NNWFZ, if implemented. Such an arrangement would prevent the Norwegians and the Danes from allowing nuclear weapons on their soil even in time of war, thus seriously damaging NATO's strategy of flexible response. Once applied to the Northern Flank of NATO, the idea of a Nuclear-Free Zone for the whole of Europe would doubtless gain further supporters, leaving Western Europe vulnerable to the threat from the new generation of Soviet medium-range missiles (SS 20s) currently being deployed - a threat to which NATO would have no deterrent at an equivalent level.

/The

The possibility of inflicting this kind of damage on NATO without recourse to hostilities has powerful attractions in Soviet politico/strategic planning. The current propaganda battle is already being waged on several fronts.

A steady stream of Soviet press and radio comment aimed at the Northern countries of Europe seeks to show that the smaller NATO members are being used by the United States merely for convenience, without taking account of their own national interests. This theme was dominant in Soviet comment on the issue of Norwegian prestocking of NATO non-nuclear equipment and weapons. The Russians have also sought to promote the deliberate lie that the US is secretly storing nuclear weapons in Denmark and Norway.

In addition to this conventional propaganda, the Russians have sought to reinforce these same themes by means of covert methods, including the use of forgeries. Norway and Denmark featured prominently among targets for forged documents concerning nuclear issues in Europe which surfaced in late 1980-early 1981. One such forgery operation, carefully timed in mid-December 1980, just before Norwegian Foreign Minister Knut Frydenlund was due to go to Moscow for talks with the Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko, involved ostensibly an official telegram from the then US Secretary of State, Mr Muskie to the American Embassy in Oslo. The text purported to order pressure to be put on Norway to alter its peacetime nuclear arms policies and to promote opposition to the NNWFZ idea. A copy of the alleged telegram was apparently sent from Sweden to the home of the Norwegian Minister for Consumer

/Affairs

Affairs, Mrs Sissal Rönbek (who has recently encountered criticism from other Norwegian politicians for her support for a Soviet-supported 'peace' demonstration, as well as to the Labour Party headquarters. It was subsequently denounced by the Norwegian Foreign Ministry as 'a provocation'.

A different forgery operation has involved the circulation of old US Defence Department operational contingency plans dating back to the early 1960s, embellished and expanded to look like up-to-date 'war plans' showing targets for attack by US nuclear weapons. These and other documents on the US military role in Europe have also been combined into a cheaply printed booklet entitled 'Top Secret Documents on the American Forces Headquarters in Europe - Holocaust Again for Europe'. Copies of this pamphlet were posted from various locations in England to politicians, journalists and other public figures in Norway and Denmark (as well as the Netherlands and the UK) in February 1981. Like the supposed State Department telegram, these military documents too bore the hallmark of the forgery experts working in 'Service A' of the KGB First Chief Directorate.

Another side to Soviet methods used in the attempt to influence public opinion was demonstrated in Denmark at the end of January when a Soviet 'disarmament expert' from the Institute for World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Vladimir Baranovsky, conducted a propaganda tour of Danish schools and colleges to debate the defence policies of his host's country. His activities were questioned in the 'Folketing', Denmark's Parliament. Baranovsky was invited by the Danish Cooperation Committee for Peace and Security,

/one

one of the main anti-NATO movements in the country, which was established (along with many other national European Security and Cooperation Committees) after the so-called 'European Assembly of Peoples' held in Brussels in 1972. The inspiration behind this gathering was the World Peace Council, the most important of the Soviet-controlled international front organisations.

These 'fronts' serve as the unofficial instruments of Soviet foreign policy, and the WPC itself is taking a dominant role in the current 'peace offensive' directed against NATO's TNF modernisation. (It was recently disclosed in the Danish press (Berlingske Tidende, 1 February 1981) that a leading member of the Danish Cooperation Committee, Mrs Meta Ditzel, who is also a member of the WPC, had been in contact with Stanislav Shchebotok, a First Secretary at the Soviet Embassy in Copenhagen from 1973 until 1977, when he hurriedly left as he was on the point of being expelled. Shchebotok was later posted to Norway, where some of his current activities in Oslo in the service of the KGB were revealed in the newspaper Verdens Gang (3 January 1981).

Since the beginning of 1981, the Soviet 'front' organisations led by the WPC appear to have been making Northern Europe a special target for their activities. There have been two major conferences - at Aalborg in Denmark, 23-24 May and at Stockholm, 6-8 June 1981. All these meetings, as well as a number of smaller gatherings, have followed the Soviet line on Nordic security questions and advocated a NNWFZ that would include only the Western countries of the region.

/One of

Western European Department
CONFIDENTIAL

One of the WPC's latest ventures is the Copenhagen to Paris 'Peace March' of which it is one of the main sponsors. This set out from the Danish capital on 22 June, and consists of some 500 marchers, supported by other demonstrators on the way; it draws together a number of movements from West European and Scandinavian NATO countries. Many of the participants have no overt links with Communist or Soviet-inspired organisations, but in a few cases such links have been exposed.

A recent example of the Soviet exploitation of 'peace' organisations concerned the Norwegian movement 'Art for Peace' which was reported in the press to have been in receipt of money from the Soviet car retailing firm Konela Norge Bil A/S. Morgenbladet (18 June 1981) reported that in addition to selling Soviet-made Lada cars, this firm is involved in many other activities on behalf of the Russians. 'Art for Peace' was the organiser of a 'Peace Party' at Folkets Hus in Oslo on 4 June, using money provided directly by the Soviet Embassy. Another group, 'No to the Atom Bomb', which shares premises with 'Art for Peace', was, according to Morgenbladet, discovered to have misused the data system of Oslo University with a view to enrolling new members.

Despite strenuous efforts on the part of the Soviet-propaganda apparatus, there is increasing evidence that the Russians are finding difficulty in convincing Scandinavian public opinion of the soundness of the unilateral disarmament policies being advocated. Doubts about such policies seem certainly justified in view of the heavy concentration of Soviet military strength facing the Nordic countries, and Norway in particular, on the Kola Peninsula.

/This

CONFIDENTIAL

This issue came to notice again in mid-June when ...) Soviet supersonic 'Backfire' nuclear bombers were observed by Norwegian defence forces in international air space north of the Lofoten islands, further south along the coast of North Norway than they have previously been known to venture. Stockholm Radio on 14 June broadcast an interview with the Norwegian Chief of Defence Staff, General Hamre, who concluded that nuclear armed 'Backfires' were probably now being stationed in the Kola Peninsula 'in the immediate vicinity of Norway, Finland, and even Sweden - and this is in the midst of discussions on a northern zone free from nuclear weapons.'

As well as providing a base for the 'Backfire' bombers in addition to forty major airfields used by the Soviet Airforce, the Kola Peninsula houses at least two bases for the latest Soviet ground-launched medium-range nuclear missiles. Its principal city, Murmansk, is the home port of the Soviet Navy's Northern Fleet, the largest of the four Soviet fleets. The area also contains one of the largest concentrations of the Soviet Army, including units trained in amphibious operations.

Editorial comment in the Scandinavian press is also becoming increasingly sceptical about the arguments for a NNWFZ and unilateral disarmament in general.

A leading Danish daily newspaper, Jyllands Posten, on 24 May commented on the 'various methods practised by the USSR and other similar regimes' to promote the aims of their policy saying that these 'include infiltration of apparently trustworthy organisations and movements, inter alia in Denmark'.

/The paper

The paper added 'those whom the KGB and others utilize should adopt a more critical attitude to the false information given them by the East bloc powers'.

Another national daily, Berlingske Tidende (18 June 1981), referring to the 'Peace Walk' said that 'an effort is being made to misuse the will for peace and to exploit well-meaning pacifists'. The Danish Social Democratic paper Aktuelt wrote on 27 June that 'in view of the mass of nuclear arms that the USSR is storing in the Kola Peninsula and the Baltic, the proposed legalised nuclear-free zone, where there are at present no nuclear weapons, would seem to be a gigantic trick'.

The same paper, on 1 August, commented ironically that 'had the Soviet newspaper Sovetskaya Rossiya not stated that the USSR wanted 'a return to normal cooperation for mutual benefit' and called for 'detente and disarmament' there would be reason to believe that a threat was inherent in the USSR filling the Baltic with naval forces'. The paper noted that many of the warships recently sent to the Baltic, through Danish waters, were equipped to carry nuclear weapons, though it was not known whether live warheads were actually being carried. The paper concluded 'The Soviet Union no longer makes a secret of the fact that its propaganda was aimed at achieving isolated three-sided talks between herself and the two small NATO countries. It should be easy for all to see that solely propaganda is involved'.

Similar comment has appeared in the Norwegian and the Swedish press. The Norwegian Aftenposten (16 June) remarked that the Soviet aircraft flying over Lofoten 'reveal a reality which peace walks cannot alter'. The Swedish daily Dagens

/Nyheter

CONFIDENTIAL

Nyheter reporting on 25 June the USSR Supreme Soviet's 'Appeal.. to Parliament and People's of the World', which claimed that the Soviet Union threatens no-one, is not attempting military supremacy and has not initiated the spiralling arms race, commented: 'that, at any rate, sounds as false as can be!'

In a further demonstration that Scandinavian public opinion has not been taken in by the Soviet propaganda campaign, the Danish paper Berlingske Tidende, 24 June, reported that about 30 Danes from the non-Socialist parties, including four candidates for the Folketing were to attempt a peace mission through Eastern Europe to Moscow by bus, as a counter-weight to the Copenhagen to Paris Peace Walk. The group told the paper that 'a nuclear-free North is absurd unless the USSR evacuates the world's biggest nuclear arsenal in the Kola Peninsula and removes the six nuclear-armed GOLF-class submarines from the Baltic'. Needless to say, the group was refused entry visas by the Russians.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

August 3, 1981

TO: (See Distribution List)

FROM: EUR - Debi Graze

SUBJECT: Challenging the Soviets on Afghanistan

Attached is the material on Afghanistan Mark Palmer sent by cable to all diplomatic posts (State 197921). The paper was written in an unclassified form which may be handed out to interested members of Congress and their staff, academics, newspaper/ media acquaintances, embassy staff, etc. You are encouraged to give the paper wide distribution.

Distribution List

ICA - Mr. Schneider
Mr. Catherman
Mr. Baldyga
Mr. Cohen
Mr. Froebe
Mr. Gilbert

NSC - Mr. Blair
DOD/ISP - Mr. Huff

S/P - Mr. Kaplan
Mr. Douglas
Mr. Schneider
Col. Pappageorge

INR - Mr. Kux

Mr. Howells

EUR - Ms. Vogelgesang

EUR/P - Mr. Steiner

EUR/SOV - Mr. Simons

Mr. Rueckart

EUR/RPM - Mr. Thomas

Mr. Lehovich

Mr. Caldwell

Mr. King

PM - Dr. Azrael

Mr. Dobbins

Col. Harris

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLRRM442 # 136977

BY RW NARA DATE 3/21/17

AFGHANISTAN

This material on Afghanistan is divided into four sections, which make these basic points:

--Trends inside and outside Afghanistan don't favor the Soviets: it is a mistake to assume Afghanistan is lost. Afghan resistance will continue and international pressure has been sustained. By persevering, we can ensure the Soviets will have major incentives to agree to a political solution and withdraw.

-- The Soviets own "proposals" are merely designed to get others to do what they haven't succeeded in doing for themselves: namely impose a solution on the Afghan people which clearly is unacceptable to them.

-- The EC-10 proposal is a good-faith effort to find a peaceful resolution of the Afghanistan crisis, not a propaganda ploy. Initial Soviet intransigence must not deflect us from pursuing this realistic and promising approach.

-- Peace, youth, church and women's groups, some of the press, and some governments who mounted major campaigns against American, British or Foreign actions in the developing world in the past, now are strangely silent and apathetic in the face of Soviet imperialist aggression in Afghanistan. There is a moral imperative to speak out much more vigorously on Afghanistan, and to support the EC-10 proposal. Public support can make an essential contribution to persuading the Soviets to accept a political solution and withdraw.

1. Soviet Occupation a Failure

-- Those who maintain that the Soviets will never leave Afghanistan may underestimate the staying power of both the Afghan people and international resistance. While the Soviets are renowned for their tenacity, they may have met their match in the Afghan people. The ability of the Islamic world, the non-aligned and the West to keep up pressure for Soviet withdrawal has been tested for two years, and their persistence to date is encouraging.

A. Inside.

-- The struggle of the Afghan freedom fighters will go on for many years regardless of what the outside world does. The Soviets themselves have tacitly

acknowledged this prospect in internal propaganda in which they compare the Afghan situation to that of the suppression of the "Basmachi" movement in Central Asia in the 1920s and 1930s. Armed resistance in that case lasted for more than a decade.

-- The Soviets have failed to win over a significant number of Afghan collaborators in the government or the army willing to serve their purposes. The initially narrow political base of the present puppet regime has shrunk even further over the past 18 months and the Afghan Army continues to hemorrhage. The failure of the Soviets to reconstruct a viable Afghan army means they must bear almost the complete burden of providing security. The dearth of Afghan civilians willing to participate requires the Soviets to play an even more dominant role in civilian administration.

-- Without Afghan institutions to which they can gradually turn over security and political responsibilities, the Soviets face an open-ended military occupation of the country. Already, in part because of the lack of Afghan collaborators to administer and hold territory, the Soviets have been forced to cede almost all of the countryside to the nationalists, engaging only in punitive forays in reaction to nationalist military actions.

-- The lack of any resistance leader with a broad national following would complicate negotiations surrounding a Soviet withdrawal, but is paradoxically a source of strength in the present stage of armed resistance. The Soviets cannot hope to capture or defeat a decentralized enemy: their opponent is the Afghan people themselves. It is the near universality of this enmity which makes it unsafe for Soviets and regime officials to walk on the streets of Kabul or any other city. In sum, both politically and militarily the Soviets control less of the country today than a year ago, and their prospects for reversing this situation is not good.

B. Outside.

-- Soviet expectations that Pakistan would crumble under threats and pressure have not been fulfilled. If anything, the Soviet invasion has helped President Zia to maintain the stability of his country and has greatly diminished enthusiasm among minority Baluch and Pushtun tribesmen for greater autonomy from central government

control. While a subversive potential exists because of the porous border, the population on the Pakistan side does not appear receptive to Afghan/Soviet trouble-making. Our new security relationship has reinforced Pakistan's ability to continue to resist Soviet pressure to accommodate to the "realities" of the Soviet strategic position in the area.

-- The Islamic world also seems likely to continue to oppose the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. The key Islamic supporters of the nationalist cause appear willing to stay the course. At the U.N. this fall we expect another strong expression of opposition to the Soviets' occupation by a large majority of the non-aligned and other member states. And the fact that the EC-10 has made a major initiative on Afghanistan the focus of their political efforts also demonstrates the diplomatic situation is not moving in the Soviets' direction.

C. Conclusion

-- The Soviet Union has made a major investment of resources and prestige to its Afghanistan adventure, and there is as yet no persuasive evidence that Moscow is willing to withdraw on terms acceptable to the Afghan people and the international community. At the same time, the Soviets have major incentives to find a political solution both in the deteriorating situation inside Afghanistan and the broad, continuing impact on their relations with most of the rest of the world. It is the single largest source of tension in East-West relations today. Anti-colonial and anti-imperial struggles frequently have taken some years to win. But in the end the vast majority have succeeded. Nationalism is probably the strongest political force of our era, and opposition to imperialism is nearly universal. Both work against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and both are not likely to disappear. It is clear that with sufficient and persistent pressure the Soviets can be persuaded to withdraw.

2. The Soviet Position on a Settlement

A. Background

The basic Soviet position on a "political settlement" has not changed since the invasion. Moscow has continually insisted that:

-- There must be a cessation of "external interference" in Afghanistan emanating from Pakistan and, to a lesser extent, Iran and supported by the Chinese and Western powers, especially the U.S.

-- The cessation and non-resumption of "external interference" must be assured through "reliable" international guarantees.

-- Once these conditions have been met, the USSR would be willing to discuss with the DRA the withdrawal of its "limited military contingent".

These conditions for a settlement were the basis of the May 14, 1980 proposals of the DRA, which were drafted in Moscow. These proposals call for:

-- Bilateral "normalization" talks between the DRA and Iran and the DRA and Pakistan in which Iran and Pakistan would agree to concrete but unspecified steps to stop "external interference" against Afghanistan from their territories.

-- Once agreement has been reached in these bilateral talks, other international powers, including the U.S. and the USSR, would provide "guarantees" that intervention would not be resumed.

-- Upon implementation of these actions, the USSR would begin consultations with the DRA on withdrawal of Soviet forces.

The Soviet Union continues to insist, in public and in private, that the May 14, 1980 DRA proposals are the only acceptable basis of a settlement. On several occasions, Soviet actions or spokesmen have seemed to imply flexibility or at least shifts in emphasis in the Soviet proposals. But these hints of flexibility have always proven to be tactical adjustments designed to portray the Soviet Union as seriously interested in a settlement, while containing no real changes or movement toward a realistic solution. Examples:

In January 1980 the Soviets seemed to be suggesting that Moscow might be willing to relax its insistence on bilateral "normalization" negotiations in order to permit a meaningful role for Secretary General Waldheim's "personal" representative, Perez de Cuellar. But when Pakistan rightly insisted on a substantive U.N. role and negotiations, Moscow and Kabul quickly reverted to the demand that any settlement be based on the May 14 proposals.

-- At the 26th Party Congress, Brezhnev suggested that "international aspects" of the Afghanistan question could be discussed either separately or in connection with broader questions of Persian Gulf security. This formulation appears to have been primarily designed to address cosmetically the regional states' rejection of Brezhnev's Persian Gulf proposals because of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. Elsewhere in the same speech, Brezhnev reiterated the May 14 proposals were the only permissible basis of an Afghan settlement.

-- In a May 22 speech at Tbilisi, Brezhnev said the USSR would consider a phased withdrawal of its troops, implying that withdrawals might begin before complete implementation of all provisions of the May 14 proposals. However, he also made it clear that the DRA proposals remained the only acceptable basis for a settlement and that Soviet troops would be withdrawn only with the approval of the DRA.

-- We have pressed the Soviets to state whether Brezhnev's remarks at the Congress and at Tbilisi represent a change in the Soviet position. The Soviets have re-emphasized in the exchanges and elsewhere that they continue to insist on the substance of the May 14 DRA proposals.

B. Substantive Points

-- None of the variations of the Soviet Union proposal on Afghanistan addresses the central requirements for a settlement acceptable to the Afghan people themselves and for the expeditious total withdrawal of Soviet troops.

-- The May 14 proposal is based on the assumption that the source of "international interference" in Afghanistan is Pakistan and Iran aided by China and the West -- an absurd argument in view of the tenacious and broad-based popular Afghan insurgency which 85,000 Soviet combat troops cannot suppress. The fact that the Babrak Karmal clique came to power as a result of a Soviet invasion and the persistence of the resistance also makes a mockery of Soviet claims that the DRA meets the requirement of self-determination for the Afghan people.

-- Implementation of the May 14 proposals would mean recognition, first by Pakistan and Iran and later by other nations, of the Soviets' puppet regime in

Kabul. This would place the international community in the position of doing what the Soviets have been unable to do -- imposing an unpopular and illegitimate government on the Afghan people.

-- Even if the Soviet conditions for an "external" settlement were met, withdrawal of Soviet forces would take place only with the "agreement" of the DRA. Given the total insurgency and illegitimacy of the DRA, a continuing Soviet troop presence would be required to ensure its survival. Thus, the restoration of Afghanistan's non-aligned status would be indefinitely blocked. Significantly, Moscow has never pledged the total withdrawal of its forces or provided a timetable for even a partial withdrawal in any variant of the May 14 proposal.

3. International Initiatives for a Settlement

The international community has refused to accept the Soviet proposals. At the same time, there have been numerous efforts by international organizations, concerned governments, and individual statesmen to set forth balanced proposals which could lead to an acceptable settlement. Examples:

-- The UN General Assembly has passed overwhelmingly two resolutions calling for withdrawal of foreign forces and the restoration of Afghanistan as a neutral, non-aligned nation free of external domination. The second of these resolutions (Nov. 1980), which was supported by 111 UN member states, expressed hope that the Secretary General would appoint a special representative to promote negotiations on the basis of the principles set forth in the resolution. The Soviets and their allies in the U.N. opposed both resolutions and have consistently blocked their implementation.

-- The Organization of Islamic Countries has on four separate occasions passed resolutions calling for withdrawal of foreign troops and restoration of Afghanistan as a non-aligned, Islamic nation. At its May 1980 meeting, the OIC appointed a special committee to take the initiative in organizing negotiations. Augmented in the January, 1981 meeting, the Committee comprises the Foreign Ministers of Pakistan, Iran, Tunisia and Guinea, as well as the Secretary General of the Islamic Conference. However, both the Soviets and their Afghan puppets refused to receive members of the

committee as representatives of the Islamic Conference, insisting that they would agree only to the bilateral negotiations proposed by the Soviets/DRA.

-- The UN Secretary General's "Personal" Representative: Faced with Soviet and Afghan refusal to receive a U.N. special representative appointed under the resolution passed by the UNGA, Secretary General Waldheim in January 1981 decided to appoint a "personal" representative for Afghanistan. Although the Soviets and their Afghan puppets did receive the Waldheim's representative, Perez de Cuellar, Moscow and Kabul have still not agreed to a meaningful role for the U.N. nor have they agreed to the trilateral format for negotiations insisted upon by Pakistan. Although Perez de Cuellar is scheduled to return to the area this summer, there would appear to be little prospect that Moscow and Kabul will agree to an acceptable format for negotiations.

-- The Giscard Proposal: In January 1980, French President Giscard proposed a conference to discuss international interference in Afghanistan. Although the proposal was couched in balanced language designed to avoid isolation or humiliation of the USSR, Moscow rejected the proposal on the grounds that the puppet regime in Kabul would not be invited to participate as the sole legitimate representative of the Afghan people.

-- The EC Proposal: At its June meeting, the European Council put forth a proposal which elaborated upon the earlier French proposal for an international conference. The proposal called for a two stage conference, the first stage of which would involve a meeting of the Permanent Members of the UN Security Council, Pakistan, Iran, India, and representatives of the U.N. and the Islamic Conference.

The first stage of the conference would discuss and arrive at ways of preventing external interference in Afghanistan. A second stage of the conference, to which representatives of Afghan opinion would be invited, would reach agreement on implementation of agreements worked out during the first stage and on all other matters designed to assure Afghanistan's independence and non-alignment.

-- US and Other Bilateral Initiatives: These multilateral initiatives have been supplemented by numerous bilateral diplomatic approaches to the Soviets

by the U.S. and other countries. In our exchanges with the Soviets, the U.S. has consistently stressed its desire to arrive at an acceptable political solution which would remove a major impediment to the improvement of East/West and U.S./Soviet relations. We have suggested to the Soviets inter alia that we begin serious discussions of modalities for a phased withdrawal of Soviet troops and transitional arrangements which would deal with legitimate Soviet concerns. On every occasion, our bilateral approaches to the Soviets have been turned aside with the Soviet insistence that only the wholly unrealistic May 14 proposals can serve as the basis of a settlement. Bilateral efforts by the U.K., France, and other countries to engage the Soviets in serious discussions of an acceptable political settlement also have not succeeded to date.

B. Substantive Points

-- The international community has consistently sought a solution to the Afghanistan crisis and there has been no lack of proposals which might have led to an acceptable settlement. It is the Soviets and their Afghan puppets who have turned aside every multilateral and bilateral initiative, while insisting on their own unacceptable and discredited proposals for a settlement.

-- This defiance of the desires of virtually the entire international community has rightly earned Moscow the condemnation of an overwhelming majority of the UN General Assembly on two occasions and the censure of virtually every other legitimate international body. The international community cannot and will not relax its insistence that the Soviet Union live up to its obligations under the U.N. Charter and international law. To acquiesce in Soviet domination of Afghanistan would be to legitimize the use of force by a great power and would lower the barriers against such behavior in the future.

-- The EC proposal for an international conference remains on the table. Also the Afghanistan question will again be on the UNGA agenda this fall and we hope there will be another UNGA resolution calling for Soviet withdrawal, and supported by a large majority as in the past. All nations which oppose Soviet domination in Afghanistan must work together to support these initiatives and ensure that the Soviet Union continues to pay the full political price for its occupation of Afghanistan.

27

The Soviet Union has had some success with a major propaganda drive to deflect attention from Afghanistan and to persuade the international community that it is the United States which wants a return to the Cold War, and the U.S. which is unwilling to negotiate about matters of critical international concern. This is of course a typical inversion of reality for it is the Soviets who refuse to come to the negotiating table on such matters of universal concern as their invasion and occupation of Afghanistan and Vietnam's colonization of Kampuchea.

-- If there has been higher East-West tension in the past two years, such aggressive acts were largely responsible for it. The U.S. has demonstrated through concrete acts that we are willing to try to resolve problems underlying East-West tension. For example, we are committed to begin negotiations on long-range theater nuclear forces before the end of this year and we are preparing carefully for a resumption of the SALT talks.

-- Now it is time for the Soviet Union to make a concrete contribution. Afghanistan is the most pressing problem and could provide a great improvement in East-West relations. If the Soviet Union is really committed to improve that relationship and to help build a more peaceful and cooperative world, they should accept the EC-10 initiative, agree to a political settlement which threatens no one but does restore Afghanistan's sovereignty and non-aligned status, and withdraw their forces.

4. Public Role - A Single Standard.

-- Many leading citizens and groups seem to have fallen victim to an insidious double standard. Alleged past American, British or French malfeasance produced sustained protest, lasting many years at high intensity. Now Soviet aggression gives rise to brief outbursts of criticism and token action that soon die down and give way to calls for accommodation. This is not only morally and intellectually hypocritical, but it abandons the victims of Soviet imperialism to a silence that permits the Russians to believe they can carry out their designs insulated from international pressure.

-- The Afghan people themselves are not giving in. They are showing extraordinary perseverance and

courage. And Islamic, Non-Aligned and Western governments are not falling into this trap. They are continuing to make the return of Afghan independence and non-alignment a critical concern. But many peace, youth, church, women's and other groups, some of the press and some governments are strangely silent and apathetic.

-- During the Vietnam War, tens of thousands of persons filled the streets and squares of the world to defend the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong (whose claims to moral righteousness and being an economic/democratic/peace-loving model were seriously compromised then and have become even more transparent now with the repression inside Vietnam, economic failures and invasion of Kampuchea). Yet when the innocent people of Afghanistan are occupied by the Red Army, when whole villages are destroyed by Soviet helicopter gunships and bombs, when there are repeated reports of the use of gas warfare no such growing moral outrage seems to be present. Demonstrations have been frequently limited to small numbers of Afghan emigres or sympathetic Moslems from other countries; media attention has been limited.

-- In cases such as Afghanistan, as the world has learned to its sorrow, silence is equivalent to complicity. And the costs of complicity are enormous: we are witnessing the extension of the Soviet Empire into new areas, heretofore left to determine their own destinies at least in part. Silence is a betrayal of the most basic values of anti-colonialism and the search for justice and peace. Groups, newspapers and individuals which profess these principles must focus substantially more attention on the Soviet occupation forces in Afghanistan.

Specific Steps

We call upon all persons of intellectual integrity and moral courage to condemn the systematic violations of human rights and international law in Afghanistan. The basic points are simple, and few in number:

-- Insist upon the full withdrawal of the occupying army, and self-determination for Afghanistan. Require Soviet participation in the conference on Afghanistan proposed by the EC-10 to find a political solution.

-- Demand the cessation of the criminal use of gas by the Soviet Army in Afghanistan and Soviet cooperation with the U.N. commission of investigation.

- 11 -

-- Condemn the refusal of the Soviet Union to allow freedom of movement for international observers and qualified journalists in the occupied parts of Afghanistan.

-- Emphasize that the Soviet attacks on the Afghan people and threats against Pakistan are the single greatest threat to peace and improvement in East-West relations.

-- Provide aid to the two million Afghan refugees in Pakistan, and call attention to their plight.

-- Insist upon the application of the Helsinki Final Act and U.N. Charter to Afghanistan.

20
FBIS P1

USSR: PRAVDA'S PETROV COMMENTS ON AFGHANISTAN SETTLEMENT

TAKE 1--PETROV PRAVDA ARTICLE

LDO42212 MOSCOW TASS INTERNATIONAL SERVICE IN RUSSIAN 2118 GMT
4 AUG 81

("TEXTZ OF ALEKSEY PETROV 5 AUGUST PRAVDA ARTICLE: "THE
MANEUVERS OF THE OPPONENTS OF A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT")

KTEXT) IN WESTERN POLITICAL CIRCLES A NOISY PROPAGANDA
CAMPAIGN HAS BEEN UNLEASHED AROUND THE SO-CALLED INITIATIVE OF
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES' COUNCIL ON CONVENING AN INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON AFGHANISTAN, WHICH WAS APPROVED AT THE RECENT OTTAWA
MEETING OF THE LEADERS OF SEVEN LEADING CAPITALIST STATES.

PERHAPS THE WEST, INCLUDING THE UNITED STATES, HAS RECOGNIZED
THE LACK OF PROSPECTS OF THE POLICY OF INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL
AFFAIRS OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE, OF WHIPPING UP TENSION AROUND EVENTS
IN AFGHANISTAN AND HAS FINALLY PAID HEED TO THE PEACE7LOVING
CALLS MADE BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF
AFGHANISTAN (DRA) AND THE SOVIET UNION AND HAS DECIDED TO GIVE
UP THE AGGRESSIVE ACTIONS WITH REGARD TO THE DRA AND BEGIN LOOKING
FOR PATHS OF POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. PERHAPS POSITIVE CHANGES HAVE
TAKEN PLACE IN THE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES,
WHICH PROMISE AN IMPROVEMENT IN THE POLITICAL CLIMATE IN SOUTHWEST
ASIA.

UNFORTUNATELY THE REAL ACTIONS OF THE WEST, AND PARTICULARLY OF
THE UNITED STATESN WITH REGARD TO THE DRA AS WELL AS OTHER WORLD
FLASH POINTS BEAR WITNESS TO THE REVERSE. WASHINGTON'S IMPERIAL
AMBITIONS, GUIDED BY THE PRINCIPLES OF FORCEFUL PRESSURE AND,
MAINLY, OF ARMED INTERVENTION IN THE AFFAIRS OF OTHER COUNTRIES,
NOT ONLY HAVE NOT WEAKENED BUT, WITH THE ARRIVAL OF THE REAGAN
ADMINISTRATION IN THE WHITE HOUSE, HAVE CONTINUALLY GAINED SCOPEM

THE PRESENT ADMINISTRATION'S PRACTICAL ACTIONS SHOW EVER MORE
CLEARLY AN OPEN COURSE OF DIRECT OR INDIRECT MILITARY INTERVENTION
IN VARIOUS AREAS OF THE GLOBE. IN EL SALVADOR THIS IS EXPRESSED
IN THE USE OF HUNDREDS OF U.S. MILITARY ADVISERS, IN MASSIVE SUPPLIES
OF ARMS TO THE REACTIONARY JUNTA TO CRUSH THE PEOPLES LIBERATION
MOVEMENT. IN AFGHANISTAN THIS IS SEEN IN THE DISPATCH OF ARMED
MERCENARIES TO FIGHT AGAINST THE LEGAL GOVERNMENT OF A SOVEREIGN
STATE.

31

THE ORGANIZERS OF THE AGGRESSION AGAINST THE DRA SPARE NEITHER FUNDS NOR WEAPONS. THE STATEMENT BY REAGAN IN THE SECOND MONTH OF HIS PRESIDENCY ABOUT THE INTENTION TO GIVE MILITARY AID TO THE AFGHAN COUNTERREVOLUTIONARIES HAD A SINISTER CONNOTATION. IT IS BEING REALIZED IN SUCH SPECIFIC STEPS AS THE ALLOCATION THIS YEAR OF ALMOST \$100 MILLION TO TRAIN AND EQUIP BANDITS IN SPECIAL CAMPS IN PAKISTAN; THE ATTEMPT BY SECRETARY OF STATE HAIG DURING HIS RECENT BEIJING VISIT TO TRANSFORM CHINA INTO A TRANSSHIPMENT BASE FOR U.S. WEAPONS SUPPLIED TO THE AFGHAN COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATIONS; AND THE ACTIVE INVOLVEMENT OF BRITAIN IN FINANCING AND DELIVERING ARMS. BRITAIN HAS ALREADY CONTRIBUTED MORE THAN 2 MILLION POUNDS TO THE GENERAL FURNACE OF OFFERINGS.

EGYPT, SAUDI ARABIA AND CERTAIN OTHER COUNTRIES ARE TAKING PART IN THE ANTI-AFGHAN OPERATIONS. IT IS NOTEWORTHY THAT LITERALLY DAYS AFTER THE MEETING OF THE SEVEN IN OTTAWA, REFERRING TO RELIABLE INFORMATION FROM WASHINGTON, AFP REPORTED THAT THE U.S. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WAS COORDINATING THE ACTIONS OF ALL THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE ANTIAFGHAN ALLIANCE, IN PARTICULAR IN SUPPLYING WEAPONS TO COUNTERREVOLUTIONARIES.

BOTH IN EL SALVADOR AND IN AFGHANISTAN THERE IS MANIFEST IN VARIOUS FORMS BASICALLY ONE METHOD OF UMSM STRATEGY: THE STRIVING TO SOLVE PROBLEMS BY MILITARY FORCE.

UMS. RULING CIRCLES ARE STRIVING TO MAINTAIN AND, WHERE POSSIBLE TO BUILD UP TENSION EVEN FURTHER AT ANY PRICE TO PROPAGATE THEIR MILITARY COLONIALISM. IN THIS SENSE THE AGGRESSION AGAINST AFGHANISTAN IS ONLY A PART OF A VAST PLAN FOR THE DESTABILIZATION OF THE SITUATION THROUGHOUT THE REGION FROM SOUTH ASIA TO THE PERSIAN GULF. PAKISTAN HAS BEEN SELECTED AS THE BASE FOR IMPLEMENTING THIS PLAN.

ALTHOUGH U.S. PAKISTANI RELATIONS ARE NOT FORMALLY SEALED BY TREATY, THERE IS A DIRECT CONSPIRACY HERE, THE SAME AS WITH AS-SADAT. IN THE COMING 5-YEAR PERIOD WASHINGTON PLANS TO PROVIDE THE ISLAMABAD REGIME WITH \$3 BILLION IN MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID, WITH A CONSIDERABLE PART OF THE FUTURE WEAPONS SUPPLIED TO PAKISTAN DESTINED FOR INTERVENTION AGAINST AFGHANISTAN.

(MORE)

5 AUG 0030Z JA/MT

32
FBIS 02

TAKE 2--01 (PETROV PRAVDA ARTICLE)

X// INTERVENTION AGAINST AFGHANISTAN.

LD042223

(TEXT) THE PENTAGON IS ALSO COUNTING ON ACQUIRING MILITARY BASES IN PAKISTAN AND IS SHOWING PARTICULAR INTEREST IN AIR BASES AND NAVAL PORTS WHICH CAN BE USED FOR THE DEPLOYMENT OF "RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCES." THIS ALLIANCE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND ISLAMABAD WILL PRESERVE AND EXACERBATE NOT ONLY THE UNSTABLE SITUATION AROUND AFGHANISTAN BUT ALSO IN THE NEIGHBORING REGIONS.

ANOTHER LINK IN THE U.S. PLAN IS TO APPLY THE APPROPRIATE PRESSURE ON IRAN TO PREVENT THE NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN IT AND AFGHANISTAN AND TO FAN ANTI-SOVIET FEELINGS IN IRAN.

FINALLY, ONE MORE AIM IS BEING PURSUED. BY BROADENING ITS MILITARY COOPERATION WITH PAKISTAN THE UNITED STATES IS TRYING TO PUT INDIA IN A DIFFICULT POSITION, TO ENCIRCLE ONE OF THE LEADING STATES OF THE NONALIGNED MOVEMENT AND TO UNDERMINE ITS PEACEFUL AND INDEPENDENT FOREIGN POLICY COURSE.

IN ORDER TO IMPLEMENT ITS EXPANSIONIST ASPIRATIONS, THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES ARE MERCILESSLY SPECULATING ON THE SO-CALLED "AFGHAN QUESTION." THE UNBRIDLED ANTI-SOVIET CAMPAIGN IS CONTINUING. COCK AND BULL STORIES ARE BEING INVENTED ABOUT THE PRESENCE OF THE LIMITED CONTINGENT OF SOVIET TROOPS IN THE DRA.

IT IS NOT THE NORMALIZATION OF THE SITUATION IN SOUTHWEST ASIA BUT ITS FURTHER AGGRAVATION, NOT A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT OF THE PROBLEMS LINKED WITH AFGHANISTAN BUT THE ESCALATION OF ARMED INTERFERENCE IN THE AFFAIRS OF SOVEREIGN STATES--THAT IS WHAT WASHINGTON AND SEVERAL WESTERN EUROPEAN CAPITALS ARE STRIVING FOR. IT IS PRECISELY THESE CONSIDERATIONS, PRIMARILY, WHICH ARE GUIDING THE WEST'S RULING CIRCLES IN THEIR APPROACH TO EVENTS AROUND AFGHANISTAN.

THE UNITED STATES' AGGRESSIVE PLANS ALSO PREDETERMINE THEIR BRAZEN UNRECEPTIVENESS TO ALL CONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSALS MADE BY THE DRA GOVERNMENT FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT OF EVENTS AROUND AFGHANISTAN. IN ITS STATEMENT OF 14 MAY Q980 THE DRA GOVERNMENT PROPOSED HOLDING BILATERAL TALKS WITH PAKISTAN AND IRAN IN THE COURSE OF WHICH MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENTS WOULD BE WORKED OUT.

33

A COMPONENT PART OF THE SETTLEMENT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE GUARANTEES ON THE PART OF THIRD STATES. AMONG THE POSSIBLE GUARENTORS ARE THE USSR AND THE UNITED STATES. THE UNITED STATES' GUARANTEES SHOULD ENVISAGE OBLIGATIONS NOT TO CARRY OUT ANY SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY, INCLUDING SUCH ACTIVITY FROM THE TERRITORY OF OTHER COUNTRIES AGAINST AFGHANISTAN. THE QUESTION OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE CONTINGENT OF SOVIET TROOPS FROM AFGHANISTAN NATURALLY SHOULD BE RESOLVED IN THIS CONTEXT.

IN THE TIME THAT HAS ELAPSED SINCE THESE PROPOSALS WERE PUT FORWARD, THE AFGHAN SIDE HAS DEMONSTRATED MAXIMUM GOODWILL, AND HAS BEEN STRIVING TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF PAKISTAN'S WISHES. IN PARTICULAR IT AGREED TO A DIALOGUE WITHOUT ANY PRELIMINARY CONDITIONS AND EXPRESSED READINESS TO HOLD MEETINGS WITH OFFICIAL DELEGATIONS OF PAKISTAN AND IRAN IN THE PRESENCE OF K. WALDHEIM, UN SECRETARY GENERAL, OR HIS REPRESENTATIVE. HOWEVER, AS IS NOTED IN THE STATEMENT OF THE DRA FOREIGN MINISTRY OF 13 MAY THIS YEAR, THERE WAS NO CONSEQUENT REACTION FROM THE PAKISTAN AND IRANIAN AUTHORITIES, AND THE MAIN REASON FOR THIS IS THE POLICY OF THE AGGRESSIVE NATO IMPERIALIST CIRCLES, IN PARTICULAR THE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES.

WHAT IS OFFERED IN THE "INITIATIVE" OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES COUNCIL, APPROVED IN OTTAWA, AND BASED ON BRITAIN'S PROPOSALS? THE PROPOSALS BASICALLY AMOUNT TO HOLDING AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE IN TWO STAGES. AT FIRST IT IS PROPOSED TO DISCUSS QUESTIONS OF "ENDING OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE," AND AT THE SECOND "TO GUARANTEE THE FUTURE OF AFGHANISTAN AS AN INDEPENDENT AND NONALIGNED STATE."

THIS "INITIATIVE," LIKE PREVIOUS PROPOSALS FROM SOME WESTERN STATES, HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH A REALISTIC APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. LET US BEGIN WITH THE POINT THAT THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE PROPOSED BEGINNING TALKS WITHOUT THE PARTICIPATION OF THE DRA AND ONLY AT THE SECOND STAGE TO ADMIT--IT IS UNCLEAR WHICH?--"REPRESENTATIVES OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE." A TYPICALLY IMPERIAL APPROACH: TO DECIDE THE DESTINY OF A PEOPLE BEHIND THEIR BACK, IGNORING THE LEGAL GOVERNMENT OF A SOVEREIGN STATE, AND NOT ALLOWING IT TO BE REPRESENTED AT A CONFERENCE WHICH IS TO DISCUSS PROBLEMS RELATING TO THE NATIONAL INTERESTS OF THE COUNTRY IN QUESTION.

KMORE)

IVKE 8--01 (RELEA. BEVADA VSLICFE)

LEIE OS

FBI 03

TAKE OF 3--01 KPETROV PRAVDA ARTICLE)

X// COUNTRY IN QUESTIONM

LDO42246

(TEXT) SUCH A STAND IS NOT ACCIDENTAL. IT ONCE AGAIN CONFIRMS THAT THE RULING CIRCLES OF THE WEST DO NOT INTEND TO RECOGNIZE THE DRA GOVERNMENT, WHICH RESTS ON THE SUPPORT OF ITS PEOPLEM BUT ONE CANNOT HOPE FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT OF THE SITUATION CONCERNING AFGHANISTAN WHILE LEAVING AFGHANISTAN ITSELF OUT OF THE TALKS.

IN THE OPINION OF FOREIGN OBSERVERS, THE QUESTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION OF AFGHANISTAN AS A NEUTRAL AND INDEPENDENT STATE, WHICH WAS PROPOSED FOR THE AGENDA OF THE SECOND ROUND OF THE CONFERENCE, VIRTUALLY IMPLIED A DISCUSSION OF THE "FUTURE FATE OF THE INTERNAL AFGHAN REGIME." IT IS NOT PERMISSIBLE FOR ANYBODYN INCLUDING THE INITIATORS OF THE EUROPEAN PROPOSALS, TO DECIDE FOR THE AFGHANS WHAT RULE IS APPROPRIATE TO IT, AND WITH WHOM AND HOW TO BE ONFRIENDLY TEMRMS WITH IT. THIS IS WHAT THE VENTURE OF AN ZINTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE" IN ESSENCE BOILS DOWN TO. CAN ONE SEE ANYTHING OTHER THAN THE MOST BLATANT VIOLATION OF THE ELEMENTARY ETHICS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS CARRINGTON'S ASSERTION THAT "THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT IS NOT ACCEPTABLE TO THE AFGHAN PEOPLE"?

THE PEOPLE OF AFGHANISTAN MADE THEIR CHOICE 3 YEARS AGO WHEN THEY SUPPORTED THE APRIL REVOLUTION. THEREFORE NEITHER CARRINGTON NOR ANYBODY ELSE BUT THE AFGHANS THEMSELVES ARE TO DECIDE WHO IS TO RULE THEIR SOVEREIGN STATE.

THERE IS A BLASPHEMOUS RING IN THE ASSERTION THAT THE DRA ALLEGEDLY NEEDS SOME KIND OF "NEUTRALIZATION." BECAUSE OF ITS TRADITIONSN HISTORIC REASONS, AND ITS NATIONAL PECULIARITIES AFGHANISTAN ALWAYS HAS BEEN A NONALIGNED COUNTRY AND, UNDOUBTEDLY, WILL REMAIN AS SUCH." BM KARMAL, THE DRA LEADER (RUKOVODITEL), STATED THIS IN AN INTERVIEW WITH THE INDIAN PAPER EXPRESS. SOMETHING ELSE IS CLEAR: THE PEACE-LOVING COURSE OF KABUL IS NOT TO THE LIKING OF THE EXTERNAL FORCES WHO, ON THE ONE HAND, ARE CONTINUING THEIR ARMED INTERFERENCE BY AIMING AT THE OVERTHROW OF THE PEOPLES SYSTEM AND THE LEGAL GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN BY FORCE AND, ON THE OTHER HAND, ARE ASSUMING THE GUISE OF "PEACEMAKERSZ AND ARE TRYING TO CLOAK THEIR UNSEEMLY PLANS AND ACTIONS.

31

THE UNDERLYING PURPOSE OF THE "EUROPEAN PROPOSALS" IS OBVIOUS. THEIR AUTHORS WANT TO LEAD THE PROCESS OF SETTLEMENT AWAY FROM THE DISCUSSION AND ELIMINATION OF THE BASIC, MAIN REASONS FOR THE TENSION OVER AFGHANISTAN. DELIVERATELY THRUSTING INTO THE FOREGROUND THE QUESTION OF THE PRESENCE OF A LIMITED SOVIET TROOP CONTINGENT ON AFGHAN TERRITORY, THE WESTERN CAPITALS AND BEIJING ARE KEEPING COMPLETELY SILENT ABOUT THE OBJECTIVE MOTIVES BY WHICH THE SOVIET UNION WAS GUIDED IN MAKING THE DIFFICULT DECISION TO RESPOND POSITIVELY TO THE REPEATED REQUESTS FROM THE AFGHAN LEADERSHIP FOR ASSISTANCE.

THE POSITION OF THE SOVIET UNION REGARDING THE NORMALIZATION OF THE SITUATION OVER AFGHANISTAN IS CLEAR AND DEFINITE. AS WAS NOTED AT THE 26TH CPSU CONGRESS, "ONLY THE INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE AFGHAN PROBLEM, AND NOT INTERNAL AFGHAN AFFAIRS MAY BE DISCUSSED" IN THE PROCESS OF A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT OF THE SITUATION OVER AFGHANISTAN. IT IS ALSO CLEAR THAT OUR COUNTRY WILL NEVER AGREE TO DISCUSS BEHIND THE BACK OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE AND THEIR GOVERNMENT ANY QUESTIONS WHATSOEVER RELATING TO AFGHANISTAN.

THE SOVIET LEADERS HAVE STRESSED REPEATEDLY THAT THE MAIN CONDITION FOR A SOLUTION TO THE AFGHAN CRISIS IS A COMPLETE, UNCONDITIONAL CESSATION AND GUARANTEED NONRESUMPTION OF ARMED AND ANY OTHER INTERFERENCE IN THE AFFAIRS OF AFGHANISTAN. SPEAKING IN TBILISI IN MAY THIS YEAR COMRADE L.I. BREZHNEV, GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND CHAIRMAN OF THE USSR SUPREME SOVIET PRESIDUM, DECLARED: "AN AGREEMENT ON A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT WOULD ONCE AGREED TO BY THE AFGHAN SIDE, PERMIT THE SETTING OF DATES AND THE ORDER OF WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET FORCES FROM AFGHANISTAN. THERE SHOULD BE A RELIABLE AND GUARANTEED NONRESUMPTION OF INTERVENTION AGAINST AFGHANISTAN. THE WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS COULD BE CONDUCTED CONCURRENTLY WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ACCORDS REACHED."

THE SOVIET UNION IS READY FOR NEGOTIATIONS, BUT FOR CONSTRUCTIVE NEGOTIATIONS, PERMEATED WITH A SPIRIT OF SOBER APPROACH.

(ENDALL)

5 AUG 0050Z ABB/NB



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

August 7, 1981

EO 13526
3.5(c)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
MEMORANDUM

TO: DOD - MG Boverie
NSC - MG Schweitzer/Mr. Kraemer
PM - Mr. Dean
[Redacted]
ICA - Mr. Catherman

FROM: EUR - David C. Gompert

SUBJECT: Threat Materials/Assessment Initiatives -- Status Report

Several of you suggested to me that it would be useful for us to circulate a detailed status report of materials in preparation in hopes that this would help clear up some of the confusion that seems to persist.

I request that you review the attached status report for accuracy and completeness and provide your comments to EUR's action officer, LTC Joe Halgus (EUR/RPM, tel. 632-2127).

It is essential that we move quickly if we are to meet our commitments to the Allies. The Europeans need our TNF threat material now. We want to release the other materials early in September to help launch a general public offensive on the Soviet threat plus Western efforts to deal with it. So we believe all of the materials should be completed, reviewed interagency, and ready for release no later than September 1st.

After getting your comments, we may decide to recommend a DOD/State co-chaired meeting to sort out any differences.

Attachment: Status Report.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
GDS 8/7/87

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLR/M442 #136778
BY RW NARA DATE 3/21/17

ITEM AND ACTION OFFICE

METHOD OF USE

STATUS AND DEADLINE

Conventional Threat
Assessment Package (Global, European emphasis, presents NATO/Warsaw Pact balance)

Unclassified

Action: DIA

TNF Briefing

Action: CIA

Special graphics, charts, and other visual materials to substitute for satellite photography.

Action: CIA

NATO White Paper
(Global portrayal of Soviet/Warsaw Pact threat, conventional and nuclear; presents force balance)

- Brief NATO Permreps using material.
- Give Permreps copies for in-country use.
- Provide copies to US Embassies in Allied capitals for followup action; Embassies subsequently pass to military commands.
- Review/circulate in SCG.
- Present to Permreps for Allied use in capitals.
- Provide copies to US Embassies who subsequently give to military commands.
- Submit to NATO Permreps as supplemental material to the conventional threat assessment package and unclassified TNF briefing.
- Pass to US Embassies and subsequently military commands.
- White Paper would supersede Luns's request that the IS prepare an unclassified paper on the conventional force balance.
- NATO White Paper would be approved by Ministers in December.
- NATO Staff would use US-provided material (Items 1-3) as basis for White Paper.

Second draft already prepared by DIA and passed to NIO. NIO will pass to State/PM for IG review by August 21.

By end of August: Pass to USNATO.

Briefing prepared and cleared except for DOD.

By end of August: Pass to USNATO.

By end of August: Pass to USNATO.

US hopes to make proposal for NATO White Paper first to SYG Luns. After he approves, we hope to have US Permrep make proposal for White Paper.

September 8: Propose at Permreps Lunch.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

ITEM AND ACTION OFFICE

METHOD OF USE

STATUS AND DEADLINE

5. Cover memorandum for presentation of Threat Materials to NATO

Unclassified

Action: EUR, PM, ICA

6. DOD Threat Briefing (Soviet global threat, conventional and nuclear forces; no balance figures)

Unclassified

Action: DIA

- Memorandum would include introduction, summary of materials package contents, possible objectives, ways to use materials, potential support from USICA and US Embassies, role of NATO.

- Presentation on Soviet threat by SecDef, aimed at US audiences.
- Copies of briefing passed to Defense Attaches after SecDef briefing; DAO's will pass to NATO MOD's.

EUR has prepared and submitted for clearance the introduction objectives, and role of NATO sections. PM will write contents summary as soon as all material is available. USICA is preparing section on ways to use materials and USICA support -- to be submitted by August 21.

Cover memo and Items 1-3 to be submitted to NATO by end August.

Threat briefing prepared by DOD.

Presentation by SecDef on or October 1.

EOB714

*****~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~*****E COPY

IN

OP IMMED
DE RUEHC #2652 2330606
O 202349Z AUG 81 ZEX
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

FILE:
SHAPING
EUROPEAN
ATTITUDES

TO ALL NATO CAPITALS IMMEDIATE

INFO SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000
USNMR SHAPE BE//FOR INTAFF// IMMEDIATE
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE/POLAD/ IMMEDIATE
USLOSACLANT NORFOLK VA/POLAD/ IMMEDIATE
USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES IT//INTAFF// IMMEDIATE
CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE//POAD// IMMEDIATE
CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE//POLAD// IMMEDIATE

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ STATE 222652

PARIS ALSO FOR USOECD, BRUSSELS ALSO FOR USEC
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 8/20/01 (HOLMES. H. ALLEN)

TAGS: NATO, MPOL, EGEN, ECON, EFIN

SUBJECT: ECONOMIC POLICY AND DEFENSE SPENDING

REF: USNATO 4823 DTG 311543Z JUL 81

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR M4421 #136979
BY RU NARA DATE 8/23/16

1. (C) DEPARTMENT AGREES WITH USNATO (REPTTEL) THAT
U.S. MUST REBUT THE SUGGESTION THAT THE POOR
PERFORMANCE OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIES IS A CONSEQUENCE OF
U.S. POLICIES. ADDRESSEES SHOULD MAKE USE OF THIS
CABLE TO PUT ISSUE OF IMPACT OF U.S. INTEREST RATES ON
EUROPEAN ECONOMY INTO PERSPECTIVE. POSTS SHOULD SEEK
TO DIVORCE DEFENSE SPENDING ISSUE FROM THIS DEBATE AND
TO ADVOCATE THE NEED FOR GREATER DEFENSE SPENDING
EFFORTS IN LIGHT OF THE BUILDUP OF SOVIET MILITARY
POWER. OUR EFFORTS ALONG THIS LINE WILL BE BOLSTERED
WHEN WE PROVIDE ALLIED CAPITALS OUR THREAT ASSESSMENT
PACKAGE AS PART OF THE "SHAPING EUROPEAN ATTITUDES"
PROJECT.

ALLEGATIONS THAT U.S. ECONOMIC POLICIES ARE RESPONSIBLE
FOR ALLIED ECONOMIC PROBLEMS ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY
ANALYSES OF RESPECTED ECONOMISTS. IN ADDITION, THE

SIT:
EOB: RENT, SCHWEITZER
WHSR COMMENTS:

PAGE 01

SECSTATE WASHDC 2652

DTG:202349Z AUG 81
TOR: 233/0615Z

PSN:017914
CSN:HCE135

*****~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~***** COPY

ALLIES SHOULD APPRECIATE THAT PROPOSED INCREASES IN U.S. MILITARY SPENDING LEVELS WHICH RESPOND TO THE NEED

TO MAINTAIN AN EFFECTIVE NATO DETERRENT IN THE FACE OF A GROWING SOVIET THREAT INVOLVE VERY SIGNIFICANT SACRIFICE ON THE PART OF THE UNITED STATES PUBLIC.

2. (U) THE FOLLOWING Q'S AND A'S ARE FOR YOUR USE IN RESPONDING TO QUERIES AMONG OUR NATO ALLIES ON THIS SUBJECT:

Q: DOES THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION REALIZE THE ADVERSE IMPACT HIGH U.S. INTEREST RATES ARE HAVING ON ITS NATO ALLIES IN EUROPE?

A: AS WE HAVE REPEATEDLY EMPHASIZED IN OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH OUR ALLIES, WE ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE CURRENT LEVELS OF INTEREST RATES AND ABOUT THEIR IMPACT AT HOME AND ABROAD. U.S. INTEREST RATES PRIMARILY REFLECT THE FINANCIAL MARKET'S BELIEF THAT HIGH INFLATION RATES ARE LIKELY TO PERSIST FOR SOME TIME. HIGH INTEREST RATES ARE CAUSING SEVERE PROBLEMS IN MANY SECTORS OF THE U.S. ECONOMY, SUCH AS SAVINGS INSTITUTIONS AND HOUSING, BUT THIS ADMINISTRATION IS DETERMINED TO SOLVE THE PERSISTENT INFLATION PROBLEM WHICH WILL IN TURN HELP LEAD TO THE FALL OF INTEREST RATES. INTEREST RATES WILL DROP AS THE MARKET BECOMES CONVINCED THAT THE ADMINISTRATION'S ECONOMIC RECOVERY PROGRAM IS PROVING EFFECTIVE. THE CONGRESS HAS RECENTLY ENACTED THE MOST IMPORTANT PART OF THE PRESIDENT'S PACKAGE. IT IS NOW TIME TO GIVE IT A CHANCE TO WORK. FURTHERMORE, WE DO NOT ACCEPT THE ARGUMENT THAT HIGH U.S. INTEREST RATES ARE THE CAUSE OF ECONOMIC STAGNATION IN EUROPE.

Q: WHAT ARE SOME OF THOSE OTHER FACTORS THAT IN YOUR VIEW ARE THE CAUSE OF THE RECENT ECONOMIC PROBLEMS IN EUROPE?

A: HIGH GOVERNMENT DEFICITS, OVERLY EXPANSIONISTIC MONETARY POLICIES IN SOME CASES, SUPPORT FOR NON-COMPETITIVE INDUSTRIES, PERSISTENT LARGE DEFICITS ON CURRENT ACCOUNT, AND POLITICAL UNCERTAINTIES ALL CONTRIBUTE IN VARIOUS COMBINATIONS TO THE GENERAL ECONOMIC MALAISE IN EUROPE.

Q: ARE YOU THEN SAYING THE EUROPEANS HAVE NO ONE TO BLAME BUT THEMSELVES FOR THEIR CURRENT ECONOMIC PROBLEMS?

41
*****CONFIDENTIAL***** COPY

A: ALL OF US HAVE MADE POLICY ERRORS. ADDITIONALLY, HIGH ENERGY PRICES HAVE BEEN A KEY FACTOR. IF NOTHING ELSE HAS BEEN LEARNED IN THE LAST 10 YEARS, IT SHOULD

BE OBVIOUS TO ALL THE EXTENT TO WHICH OUR ECONOMIES HAVE BEEN INTERDEPENDENT. IT HAS TAKEN US 15 TO 20 YEARS FOR OUR ECONOMIC PROBLEMS — HIGH INFLATION, HIGH UNEMPLOYMENT, LOW GROWTH — TO REACH THEIR CURRENT LEVELS. WE AND OUR ALLIES ARE IN BASIC AGREEMENT ON WHAT THE PROBLEMS ARE AND WHAT STEPS MUST BE TAKEN. THIS HAS BEEN CONFIRMED AT VARIOUS OECD HIGH-LEVEL MEETINGS AND MOST RECENTLY AT THE OTTAWA SUMMIT. WE AND OUR PARTNERS AGREE THAT ECONOMIC POLICY MUST BE MORE ATTENTIVE THAN IN RECENT YEARS TO THE LONGER TERM PERFORMANCE OF OUR ECONOMIES. WE SHOULD AVOID, WHERE POSSIBLE, RESPONDING TO PRESSURES FOR "QUICK FIXES." THE FIGHT TO BRING DOWN INFLATION AND REDUCE UNEMPLOYMENT MUST BE OUR HIGHEST PRIORITY, AND THESE LINKED PROBLEMS MUST BE TACKLED AT THE SAME TIME.

Q: ARE YOU THEN ADVOCATING THE USE OF ONE SET OF ECONOMIC POLICIES OVER ANOTHER?

A: NO, IN THE SENSE THAT EACH OF OUR COUNTRIES HAS CERTAIN UNIQUE INSTITUTIONS AND PROBLEMS, WHICH DETERMINE THE SPECIFIC POLICY TOOLS IT CAN APPROPRIATELY USE. HOWEVER, WE DO FEEL STRONGLY THAT CONTROLLING INFLATION IS A PRECONDITION FOR RESTORING VIGOROUS GROWTH AND REDUCING UNEMPLOYMENT.

Q: IF A NECESSARY SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF HIGH INFLATION IS REDUCED LEVELS IN THE GROWTH OF GOVERNMENT SPENDING, WILL NOT INCREASED DEFENSE SPENDING THWART YOUR GOAL OF REDUCING INFLATION? FURTHERMORE, DO YOU ACCEPT THE LINKAGE SOME AUTHORITIES ARE ATTEMPTING TO MAKE BETWEEN DOWNWARD MOVEMENTS IN U.S. INTEREST RATES AND INCREASES BY EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS IN DEFENSE SPENDING?

A: WE WOULD LIKE TO ANSWER THE SECOND QUESTION FIRST. WE REJECT ABSOLUTELY ANY ATTEMPT TO LINK DOWNWARD MOVEMENTS IN INTEREST RATES TO INCREASES IN EUROPEAN DEFENSE SPENDING. SUCH A LINKAGE WOULD BE A SHARP DEPARTURE FROM THE NATO PHILOSOPHY THAT NATIONAL DEFENSE BUDGETS MUST RESPOND TO THE OBJECTIVE MILITARY THREAT.

WE DO NOT SEE THE GOALS OF OVERALL REDUCED RATES OF

*****C O N F I D E N T I A L*****E COPY

GROWTH IN GOVERNMENT SPENDING AND INCREASING EXPENDITURES FOR DEFENSE AS MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE. AS NOTED IN THE OTTAWA CHAIRMAN'S SUMMARY ON POLITICAL ISSUES, WE NEED A STRONG DEFENSE, AND IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS WE WILL BE FIRM IN INSISTING ON A BALANCE OF

MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND POLITICAL RESTRAINT. IN TOUGH ECONOMIC TIMES, WHEN A REDUCTION IN THE GROWTH OF GOVERNMENT BUDGETS IS NECESSARY, IT IS INDEED DIFFICULT TO STRIKE AN APPROPRIATE BALANCE BETWEEN THE NEED FOR A STRONG DEFENSE AND THE OTHER LEGITIMATE FUNCTIONS GOVERNMENTS PERFORM. HOWEVER, THE STRATEGIC IMBALANCES THAT HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO DEVELOP OVER THE PAST TEN YEARS ARE OF SUCH A CONSEQUENCE THAT A RENEWED COMMITMENT TO A STRENGTHENED DEFENSE IS NECESSARY IF WE ARE TO FULFILL OUR SECURITY OBLIGATIONS AND BE ABLE TO NEGOTIATE WITH OUR ADVERSARIES FROM A POSITION OF STRENGTH.

HAIG

BT

EOB024

~~SECRET~~

*****E COPY

IN

136980

OP IMMED /PRIORITY
DE RUEHC #9562 2392059
O P 272036Z AUG 81
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 0000

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0000
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0000
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0000
USMISSION USNATO PRIOR 0000

~~SECRET~~ STATE 229562

EXDIS
E.O. 12065:GDS 8/25/87 (HAIG, ALEXANDER M., JR.)

TAGS: SOPN, XG

SUBJECT: LETTER TO GENSCHER ON WESTERN CAMPAIGN

1. (~~SECRET~~-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. EMBASSY SHOULD DELIVER THE FOLLOWING LETTER FROM
THE SECRETARY TO GENSCHER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THERE WILL
BE NO REPEAT NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.
BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR HANS-DIETRICH:

YOUR SUGGESTION AT CANCUN THAT WE LAUNCH A MAJOR EFFORT
TO PROMOTE OUR POLICIES AND COUNTER SOVIET PROPAGANDA
IS AS TIMELY AS IT IS WELL-FOUNDED. IN MY VIEW, THE
STRONG POLITICAL DECLARATION ADOPTED BY THE SEVEN HEADS
OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT AT THE OTTAWA SUMMIT PROVIDES
AN EXCEPTIONAL BASIS FOR THE KIND OF BROAD-GAUGED
EFFORT WHICH YOU HAVE SUGGESTED.

TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE, WE NEED BOTH TO EDUCATE AND TO
INSPIRE. WE MUST BE CANDID ABOUT THE SOVIET THREAT,
AND GO ON THE POLITICAL OFFENSIVE WITH POSITIVE WESTERN
PROPOSALS. TO TURN AROUND A SOMEWHAT DEFENSIVE AND

SIT: RVA COL VP JP
EOB: PIPES
WHSR COMMENTS:

PAGE 01

SECSTATE WASHDC 9562
RECALLED

DTG:272036Z AUG 81
TOR: 240/0015Z

PSN:026121
CSN:HCE093

~~SECRET~~

*****E COPY

FILE:

"STARTING
EUROPEAN
ATTITUDES"

JR- The start
of the stepped-up
prop-agit
campaign

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M442/1 #136980

BY RW NARA DATE 8/23/16

~~SECRET~~

*****E COPY

44

RESPONSIVE WESTERN POSTURE, WE NEED TO PURSUE THE SAME COMBINATION OF PRESSURE AND PROMISE WHICH THE SOVIETS HAVE DEVELOPED TO SUCH A FINE ART.

WE ALREADY HAVE UNDERTAKEN THIS COMBINATION OF STEPS IN A NUMBER OF MAJOR AREAS: AFGHANISTAN, CSCE/CDE AND TNF. OUR EFFORTS TO FOCUS PUBLIC ATTENTION ON WESTERN INITIATIVES AND POLICIES IN EACH OF THESE AREAS, AND TO EDUCATE OUR PEOPLE ABOUT SOVIET INTRANSIGENCE AND THREATS, MUST BE CONTINUED AND INTENSIFIED. IN ADDITION, TO HELP ON THE EDUCATIONAL SIDE, WE INTEND TO MAKE PUBLIC A NUMBER OF STUDIES ON THE SOVIET MILITARY THREAT, SOVIET COVERT ACTIVITY, AND ACTIVITIES OF SOVIET PROXIES AND SURROGATES IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD.

AS ESSENTIAL AS THESE EXISTING PROGRAMS ARE, THEY WILL NOT BE SUFFICIENT BY THEMSELVES TO INFUSE OUR PUBLICS WITH A NEW SENSE OF PURPOSE AND CONFIDENCE. OUR PUBLICS OF COURSE DIFFER, AND WE WILL EACH NEED TO SHAPE OUR EFFORT SO AS TO MAKE IT MOST EFFECTIVE AT HOME. AND THIS MUST BE A CONTINUING PROCESS. BUT I HAVE TWO SUGGESTIONS FOR PARALLEL ACTIONS FOR THE NEAR TERM.

I PROPOSE WE CONSIDER RECOMMENDING THAT THE SEVEN HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT WHO MET AT OTTAWA SEND PRIVATE LETTERS TO BREZHNEV, WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THE BROAD THEMES ADDRESSED IN THE LETTERS WOULD BE MADE PUBLIC. LOOKING TOWARD THE UNGA, THE LETTERS WOULD STRESS THAT THE INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES DESIRE A CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND A REDUCTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS WHICH ARE SO PROMINENT TODAY. THEY WOULD REITERATE THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO TAKE APPROPRIATE STEPS TO MEET LEGITIMATE SOVIET CONCERNS, BUT THAT PROGRESS IN EAST/WEST RELATIONS DEPENDS UPON THE WILLINGNESS OF THE USSR TO EXERCISE GREATER RESTRAINT IN ITS INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR.

SPECIFICALLY, WE WOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT THE SOVIET UNION MUST RESTRAIN AN ARMS BUILD-UP WHICH HAS ALREADY GONE FAR BEYOND REQUIREMENTS FOR LEGITIMATE SELF DEFENSE, AND DEMONSTRATE GENUINE SERIOUSNESS ABOUT ARMS CONTROL. EQUALLY IMPORTANT WOULD BE A SOVIET DECISION TO ENTER INTO SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS TO ADDRESS GEOPOLITICAL PROBLEMS WHICH THREATEN PEACE AROUND THE WORLD, INCLUDING THE PRESENCE OF FOREIGN TROOPS IN AFGHANISTAN AND KAMPUCHEA, AND TO TAKE STEPS TO CEASE EXTERNAL STIMULATION OF VIOLENCE AND INSTABILITY IN -

PAGE 02

SECSTATE WASHDC 9562
RECALLED

DTG:272036Z AUG 81
TOR: 240/0015Z

PSN:026121
CSN:HCF093

~~SECRET~~

*****E COPY

~~SECRET~~

*****E COPY

AFRICA, CENTRAL AMERICA AND ELSEWHERE. THE LETTERS WOULD STATE THAT THE WEST IS READY TO SEEK SOLUTIONS TO THESE PROBLEMS BUT THAT THE USSR MUST NOW DECIDE WHETHER IT IS WILLING TO PARTICIPATE IN BUILDING A MORE RESTRAINED AND HUMANE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. -

THE SOVIETS HAVE USED SUCH HIGH-LEVEL LETTERS CONTINUALLY AND OFTEN TO GOOD EFFECT. TAKING THE INITIATIVE TO SEND LETTERS FROM WESTERN LEADERS WOULD PROVIDE BOTH THE SOVIETS AND OUR PUBLICS WITH A HIGH-PROFILE DEMONSTRATION OF OUR APPROACH, INVITING AND CHALLENGING THE SOVIETS TO JOIN IN AN EFFORT TO SET EAST-WEST RELATIONS ON A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE AND DURABLE BASIS. --

MY OTHER SUGGESTION IS THAT WE FIND WAYS TO FOCUS MUCH GREATER ATTENTION ON WESTERN VALUES. WE HAVE FOR TOO LONG PERMITTED THE SOVIET UNION TO PORTRAY ITSELF AS REVOLUTIONARY AND PROGRESSIVE, WHEN WE ARE THE MOST INNOVATIVE AND GENUINELY PROGRESSIVE SOCIETIES. WE MUST DEMONSTRATE HOW THE WESTERN VALUES OF INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AND INITIATIVE MEET MATERIAL AND SPIRITUAL - NEEDS BETTER THAN TOTALITARIAN REGIMES. AND WE MUST TRANSLATE THESE VALUES INTO SPECIFIC PROPOSALS IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA WHICH COULD HELP CREATE A BETTER - WORLD.

THIS WILL BE THE OVERALL THEME OF A SPEECH I AM GIVING IN BERLIN NEXT MONTH. I AM CONSIDERING FLOATING A GENERAL IDEA TO HELP ELIMINATE THE HUMAN DIVISIONS ON THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT. I MIGHT SUGGEST THAT AT AN APPROPRIATE STAGE A CONFERENCE BE HELD AS PART OF THE CSCE PROCESS TO EXAMINE THE LIMITATIONS ON FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT IN EUROPE, AND TO PROPOSE MEANS OF DEALING WITH THEM. THIS WOULD COMPLEMENT OUR EXISTING PROPOSAL FOR A CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT, BUT WOULD NOT BE LINKED TO IT OR TO THIS STAGE OF CSCE, AND TIMING WOULD BEPURPOSEFULLY "IN THE FUTURE" IN ORDER NOT TO

COMPLICATE OUR MADRID STRATEGY. YOU MAY HAVE ADDITIONAL SUGGESTIONS ON WAYS TO EMPHASIZE FREEDOM.

I WOULD WELCOME YOUR VIEWS ON THIS GENERAL APPROACH, AND PARTICULARLY YOUR REACTION TO THE SUGGESTION FOR LETTERS TO BREZHNEV. CLEARLY WE HAVE LIMITED TIME IF THIS IS TO BE DONE BEFORE OUR MEETINGS WITH GROMYKO AT THE UNGA. I ALSO HAVE WRITTEN TO PETER AND CLAUDE.

~~SECRET~~

*****E COPY

~~S E C R E T~~

*****E COPY

46
IF I CAN HEAR FROM EACH OF YOU BY SEPTEMBER 1ST, I THEN
WOULD APPROACH THE OTHER THREE ON THE LETTER. WE ALSO
NEED TO DISCUSS OUR GENERAL EFFORT WITH THE OTHER
ALLIES. I SUGGEST A REINFORCED NAC IN MID-SEPTEMBER.
I WOULD PLAN TO HAVE LARRY EAGLEBURGER JOIN TAP BENNETT
TO LAUNCH THIS IMPORTANT AND POSITIVE OFFENSIVE.

WITH BEST WISHES,
ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR.

END TEXT.
HAIG
BT

~~S E C R E T~~

*****E COPY

EOB026

~~SECRET~~

*****E COPY

IN

OP IMMED /PRIORITY
DE RUEHC #9563 2392105
O P 272036Z AUG 81
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0000

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0000
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0000
AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY 0000
USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0000

~~SECRET~~ STATE 229563

EXDIS

E.O. 12065: GDS 8/25/87 (HAIG, ALEXANDER M. JR)

TAGS: UK, SOPN

SUBJECT: LETTER TO CARRINGTON ON WESTERN CAMPAIGN

1. (~~SECRET~~-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. EMBASSY SHOULD DELIVER THE FOLLOWING LETTER FROM
THE SECRETARY TO CARRINGTON AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THERE
WILL BE NO REPEAT NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.
BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR PETER:

YOU AND I HAVE DISCUSSED THE PRESSING NEED TO DO A MUCH
BETTER JOB OF PROMOTING OUR POLICIES AND COUNTERING
SOVIET PROPAGANDA. I ALSO HAVE DISCUSSED THIS WITH
HANS-DIETRICH AND CLAUDE. I WANT TO SHARE WITH YOU
HERE SOME SUGGESTIONS ABOUT LAUNCHING A MAJOR EFFORT.
IN MY VIEW, THE STRONG POLITICAL DECLARATION ADOPTED
BY THE SEVEN HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT AT THE
OTTAWA SUMMIT PROVIDES AN EXCELLENT BEGINNING FOR THE
KIND OF BROAD-GAUGED EFFORT WHICH WE NEED TO UNDERTAKE.

TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE, WE NEED BOTH TO EDUCATE AND TO

SIT: "RVA" COL VP VP
EOB: PIPES RENT
WHSR COMMENTS:

PAGE 01

SECSTATE WASHDC 9563
RECALLED

DTG:272036Z AUG 81
TOR: 240/0019Z

PSN:026128
CSN:HCE097

~~SECRET~~

*****E COPY

136981

47

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M4421 #136981

BY RW NARA DATE 8/23/16

~~S E C R E T~~

*****E COPY

48

INSPIRE. WE MUST BE CANDID ABOUT THE SOVIET THREAT, AND GO ON THE POLITICAL OFFENSIVE WITH POSITIVE WESTERN PROPOSALS. TO TURN AROUND A SOMEWHAT DEFENSIVE AND RESPONSIVE WESTERN POSTURE, WE NEED TO PURSUE THE SAME COMBINATION OF PRESSURE AND PROMISE WHICH THE SOVIETS HAVE DEVELOPED TO SUCH A FINE ART.

WE ALREADY HAVE UNDERTAKEN THIS COMBINATION OF STEPS IN A NUMBER OF MAJOR AREAS: AFGHANISTAN, CSCE/CDE AND TNF. OUR EFFORTS TO FOCUS PUBLIC ATTENTION ON WESTERN INITIATIVES AND POLICIES IN EACH OF THESE AREAS, AND TO EDUCATE OUR PEOPLE ABOUT SOVIET INTRANSIGENCE AND THREATS, MUST BE CONTINUED AND INTENSIFIED. IN ADDITION, TO HELP ON THE EDUCATIONAL SIDE, WE INTEND TO MAKE PUBLIC A NUMBER OF STUDIES ON THE SOVIET MILITARY THREAT, SOVIET COVERT ACTIVITY, AND ACTIVITIES OF SOVIET PROXIES AND SURROGATES IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD.

AS ESSENTIAL AS THESE EXISTING PROGRAMS ARE, THEY WILL NOT BE SUFFICIENT BY THEMSELVES TO INFUSE OUR PUBLICS WITH A NEW SENSE OF PURPOSE AND CONFIDENCE. OUR PUBLICS OF COURSE DIFFER, AND WE WILL EACH NEED TO SHAPE OUR EFFORT SO AS TO MAKE IT MOST EFFECTIVE AT HOME. AND THIS MUST BE A CONTINUING PROCESS. BUT I HAVE TWO SUGGESTIONS FOR PARALLEL ACTIONS FOR THE NEAR-TERM.

I PROPOSE WE CONSIDER RECOMMENDING THAT THE SEVEN HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT WHO MET AT OTTAWA SEND PRIVATE LETTERS TO BREZHNEV, WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THE BROAD THEMES ADDRESSED IN THE LETTERS WOULD BE MADE PUBLIC. LOOKING TOWARD THE UNGA, THE LETTERS WOULD STRESS THAT THE INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES DESIRE A CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND A REDUCTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS WHICH ARE SO PROMINENT TODAY. THEY WOULD REITERATE THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO TAKE APPROPRIATE STEPS TO MEET LEGITIMATE SOVIET CONCERNS, BUT THAT PROGRESS IN EAST/WEST RELATIONS DEPENDS UPON THE WILLINGNESS OF THE USSR TO EXERCISE GREATER RESTRAINT IN ITS INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR.

SPECIFICALLY, WE WOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT THE SOVIET UNION MUST RESTRAIN AN ARMS BUILD-UP WHICH HAS ALREADY GONE FAR BEYOND REQUIREMENTS FOR LEGITIMATE SELF DEFENSE, AND DEMONSTRATE GENUINE SERIOUSNESS ABOUT ARMS CONTROL. EQUALLY IMPORTANT WOULD BE A SOVIET DECISION TO ENTER INTO SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS TO ADDRESS GEOPOLITICAL PROBLEMS WHICH THREATEN PEACE AROUND THE

PAGE 02

SECSTATE WASHDC 9563
RECALLEDDTG: 272036Z AUG 81
TOR: 240/0019ZPSN: 026128
CSN: HCE097

~~S E C R E T~~

*****E COPY

~~SECRET~~

*****E COPY

49

WORLD, INCLUDING THE PRESENCE OF FOREIGN TROOPS IN AFGHANISTAN AND KAMPUCHEA, AND TO TAKE STEPS TO CEASE EXTERNAL STIMULATION OF VIOLENCE AND INSTABILITY IN AFRICA, CENTRAL AMERICA AND ELSEWHERE. THE LETTERS WOULD STATE THAT THE WEST IS READY TO SEEK SOLUTIONS TO THESE PROBLEMS BUT THAT THE USSR MUST NOW DECIDE WHETHER IT IS WILLING TO PARTICIPATE IN BUILDING A MORE RESTRAINED AND HUMANE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

THE SOVIETS HAVE USED SUCH HIGH-LEVEL LETTERS CONTINUALLY AND OFTEN TO GOOD EFFECT. TAKING THE INITIATIVE TO SEND LETTERS FROM WESTERN LEADERS WOULD PROVIDE BOTH THE SOVIETS AND OUR PUBLICS WITH A HIGH-PROFILE DEMONSTRATION OF OUR APPROACH, INVITING AND CHALLENGING THE SOVIETS TO JOIN IN AN EFFORT TO SET EAST-WEST RELATIONS ON A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE AND DURABLE BASIS.

MY OTHER SUGGESTION IS THAT WE FIND WAYS TO FOCUS MUCH GREATER ATTENTION ON WESTERN VALUES. WE HAVE FOR TOO LONG PERMITTED THE SOVIET UNION TO PORTRAY ITSELF AS REVOLUTIONARY AND PROGRESSIVE, WHEN WE ARE THE MOST INNOVATIVE AND GENUINELY PROGRESSIVE SOCIETIES. WE MUST DEMONSTRATE HOW THE WESTERN VALUES OF INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AND INITIATIVE MEET MATERIAL AND SPIRITUAL - NEEDS BETTER THAN TOTALITARIAN REGIMES. AND WE MUST TRANSLATE THESE VALUES INTO SPECIFIC PROPOSALS IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA WHICH COULD HELP CREATE A BETTER WORLD.

THIS WILL BE THE OVERALL THEME OF A SPEECH I AM GIVING IN BERLIN NEXT MONTH. I AM CONSIDERING FLOATING A GENERAL IDEA TO HELP ELIMINATE THE HUMAN DIVISIONS ON THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT. I MIGHT SUGGEST THAT AT AN APPROPRIATE STAGE A CONFERENCE BE HELD AS PART OF THE CSCE PROCESS TO EXAMINE THE LIMITATIONS ON FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT IN EUROPE, AND TO PROPOSE MEANS OF DEALING WITH THEM. THIS WOULD COMPLEMENT OUR EXISTING PROPOSAL FOR A CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT, BUT WOULD NOT BE LINKED TO IT OR TO THIS STAGE OF CSCE, AND TIMING WOULD BE PURPOSEFULLY "IN THE FUTURE" IN ORDER NOT TO COMPLICATE OUR MADRID STRATEGY. YOU MAY HAVE ADDITIONAL SUGGESTIONS ON WAYS TO EMPHASIZE FREEDOM.

I WOULD WELCOME YOUR VIEWS ON THIS GENERAL APPROACH, AND PARTICULARLY YOUR REACTION TO THE SUGGESTION FOR LETTERS TO BREZHNEV. CLEARLY WE HAVE LIMITED TIME IF THIS IS TO BE DONE BEFORE OUR MEETINGS WITH GROMYKO AT

PAGE 03

SECSTATE WASHDC 9563
RECALLEDDTG:272036Z AUG 81
TOR: 240/0019ZPSN:026128
CSN:HCE097

~~SECRET~~

*****E COPY

56

~~SECRET~~

*****E COPY

THE UNGA. I ALSO HAVE WRITTEN TO HANS DIETRICH AND
CLAUDE.
IF I CAN HEAR FROM EACH OF YOU BY SEPTEMBER 1ST, I THEN
WOULD APPROACH THE OTHER THREE ON THE LETTER. WE ALSO
NEED TO DISCUSS OUR GENERAL EFFORT WITH THE OTHER
ALLIES. I SUGGEST A REINFORCED NAC IN MID-SEPTEMBER.
I WOULD PLAN TO HAVE LARRY EAGLEBURGER JOIN TAP BENNETT
TO LAUNCH THIS IMPORTANT AND POSITIVE OFFENSIVE.

WITH BEST WISHES,
ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR.

END TEXT.
HAIG
BT

~~SECRET~~

*****E COPY

EOB025

~~SECRET~~

*****E COPY

IN 51

OP IMMED /PRIORITY
DE RUEHC #9567 2392358
O P 272039Z AUG 81
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0000

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0000
AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY 0000
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0000
USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0000

~~SECRET~~ STATE 229567

EXDIS

E.O. 12065: GDS 8/25/87 (HAIG, ALEXANDER M. JR)

TAGS: FR, SOPN

SUBJECT: LETTER TO CHEYSSON ON WESTERN CAMPAIGN

1. (~~SECRET~~-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. EMBASSY SHOULD DELIVER THE FOLLOWING LETTER FROM
THE SECRETARY TO CHEYSSON AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THERE WILL
BE NO REPEAT NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.
BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR CLAUDE:

YOU AND I HAVE DISCUSSED THE PRESSING NEED TO DO A MUCH
BETTER JOB OF PROMOTING OUR POLICIES AND COUNTERING
SOVIET PROPAGANDA. I ALSO HAVE DISCUSSED THIS WITH
HANS-DIETRICH AND PETER. I WANT TO SHARE WITH YOU HERE
SOME SUGGESTIONS ABOUT LAUNCHING A MAJOR EFFORT. IN MY
VIEW, THE STRONG POLITICAL DECLARATION ADOPTED BY THE
SEVEN HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT AT THE OTTAWA
SUMMIT PROVIDES AN EXCELLENT BEGINNING FOR THE KIND OF
BROAD-GAUGED EFFORT WHICH WE NEED TO UNDERTAKE.

TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE, WE NEED BOTH TO EDUCATE AND TO
INSPIRE. WE MUST BE CANDID ABOUT THE SOVIET THREAT,

SIT: "RVA" JP COL VP
EOB: PIPES RENT
WHSR COMMENTS:

PAGE 01

SECSTATE WASHDC 9567
RECALLED

DTG: 272039Z AUG 81
TOR: 240/0449Z

PSN: 026410
CSN: HCF144

~~SECRET~~

*****E COPY

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M4421 #136982

BY LN NARA DATE 8/23/16

~~SECRET~~

*****E COPY 52

AND GO ON THE POLITICAL OFFENSIVE WITH POSITIVE WESTERN PROPOSALS. TO TURN AROUND A SOMEWHAT DEFENSIVE AND RESPONSIVE WESTERN POSTURE, WE NEED TO PURSUE THE SAME COMBINATION OF PRESSURE AND PROMISE WHICH THE SOVIETS HAVE DEVELOPED TO SUCH A FINE ART.

WE ALREADY HAVE UNDERTAKEN THIS COMBINATION OF STEPS IN A NUMBER OF MAJOR AREAS: AFGHANISTAN, CSCE/CDE AND TNF. OUR EFFORTS TO FOCUS PUBLIC ATTENTION ON WESTERN INITIATIVES AND POLICIES IN EACH OF THESE AREAS, AND TO EDUCATE OUR PEOPLE ABOUT SOVIET INTRANSIGENCE AND THREATS, MUST BE CONTINUED AND INTENSIFIED. IN ADDITION, TO HELP ON THE EDUCATIONAL SIDE, WE INTEND TO MAKE PUBLIC A NUMBER OF STUDIES ON THE SOVIET MILITARY THREAT, SOVIET COVERT ACTIVITY, AND ACTIVITIES OF SOVIET PROXIES AND SURROGATES IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD.

AS ESSENTIAL AS THESE EXISTING PROGRAMS ARE, THEY WILL NOT BE SUFFICIENT BY THEMSELVES TO INFUSE OUR PUBLICS WITH A NEW SENSE OF PURPOSE AND CONFIDENCE. OUR PUBLICS OF COURSE DIFFER, AND WE WILL EACH NEED TO SHAPE OUR EFFORT SO AS TO MAKE IT MOST EFFECTIVE AT HOME. AND THIS MUST BE A CONTINUING PROCESS. BUT I HAVE TWO SUGGESTIONS FOR PARALLEL ACTIONS FOR THE NEAR TERM.

I PROPOSE WE CONSIDER RECOMMENDING THAT THE SEVEN HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT WHO MET AT OTTAWA SEND PRIVATE LETTERS TO BREZHNEV, WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THE BROAD THEMES ADDRESSED IN THE LETTERS WOULD BE MADE PUBLIC. LOOKING TOWARD THE UNGA, THE LETTERS WOULD STRESS THAT THE INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES DESIRE A CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND A REDUCTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS WHICH ARE SO PROMINENT TODAY. THEY WOULD REITERATE THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO TAKE APPROPRIATE STEPS TO MEET LEGITIMATE SOVIET CONCERNS, BUT THAT PROGRESS IN EAST/WEST RELATIONS DEPENDS UPON THE WILLINGNESS OF THE USSR TO EXERCISE GREATER RESTRAINT IN ITS INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR.

SPECIFICALLY, WE WOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT THE SOVIET UNION MUST RESTRAIN AN ARMS BUILD-UP WHICH HAS ALREADY GONE FAR BEYOND REQUIREMENTS FOR LEGITIMATE SELF DEFENSE, AND DEMONSTRATE GENUINE SERIOUSNESS ABOUT ARMS CONTROL. EQUALLY IMPORTANT WOULD BE A SOVIET DECISION TO ENTER INTO SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS TO ADDRESS GEOPOLITICAL PROBLEMS WHICH THREATEN PEACE AROUND THE

PAGE 02

SECSTATE WASHDC 9567
RECALLEDDTG:272039Z AUG 81
TOR: 240/0449ZPSN:026410
CSN:HCE144

~~SECRET~~

*****E COPY

~~SECRET~~

*****E COPY

WORLD, INCLUDING THE PRESENCE OF FOREIGN TROOPS IN AFGHANISTAN AND KAMPUCHEA, AND TO TAKE STEPS TO CEASE EXTERNAL STIMULATION OF VIOLENCE AND INSTABILITY IN AFRICA, CENTRAL AMERICA AND ELSEWHERE. THE LETTERS WOULD STATE THAT THE WEST IS READY TO SEEK SOLUTIONS TO THESE PROBLEMS BUT THAT THE USSR MUST NOW DECIDE WHETHER IT IS WILLING TO PARTICIPATE IN BUILDING A MORE RESTRAINED AND HUMANE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

THE SOVIETS HAVE USED SUCH HIGH-LEVEL LETTERS CONTINUALLY AND OFTEN TO GOOD EFFECT. TAKING THE INITIATIVE TO SEND LETTERS FROM WESTERN LEADERS WOULD PROVIDE BOTH THE SOVIETS AND OUR PUBLICS WITH A HIGH-PROFILE DEMONSTRATION OF OUR APPROACH, INVITING AND CHALLENGING THE SOVIETS TO JOIN IN AN EFFORT TO SET EAST-WEST RELATIONS ON A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE AND DURABLE BASIS.

MY OTHER SUGGESTION IS THAT WE FIND WAYS TO FOCUS MUCH GREATER ATTENTION ON WESTERN VALUES. WE HAVE FOR TOO LONG PERMITTED THE SOVIET UNION TO PORTRAY ITSELF AS REVOLUTIONARY AND PROGRESSIVE, WHEN WE ARE THE MOST INNOVATIVE AND GENUINELY PROGRESSIVE SOCIETIES. WE MUST DEMONSTRATE HOW THE WESTERN VALUES OF INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AND INITIATIVE MEET MATERIAL AND SPIRITUAL NEEDS BETTER THAN TOTALITARIAN REGIMES. AND WE MUST TRANSLATE THESE VALUES INTO SPECIFIC PROPOSALS IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA WHICH COULD HELP CREATE A BETTER WORLD.

THIS WILL BE THE OVERALL THEME OF A SPEECH I AM GIVING IN BERLIN NEXT MONTH. I AM CONSIDERING FLOATING A GENERAL IDEA TO HELP ELIMINATE THE HUMAN DIVISIONS ON THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT. I MIGHT SUGGEST THAT AT AN APPROPRIATE STAGE A CONFERENCE BE HELD AS PART OF THE CSCE PROCESS TO EXAMINE THE LIMITATIONS ON FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT IN EUROPE, AND TO PROPOSE MEANS OF DEALING WITH THEM. THIS WOULD COMPLEMENT OUR EXISTING PROPOSAL FOR A CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT, BUT WOULD NOT BE LINKED TO IT OR TO THIS STAGE OF CSCE, AND TIMING WOULD BE PURPOSEFULLY "IN THE FUTURE" IN ORDER NOT TO COMPLICATE OUR MADRID STRATEGY. YOU MAY HAVE ADDITIONAL SUGGESTIONS ON WAYS TO EMPHASIZE FREEDOM.

I WOULD WELCOME YOUR VIEWS ON THIS GENERAL APPROACH, AND PARTICULARLY YOUR REACTION TO THE SUGGESTION FOR LETTERS TO BREZHNEV. CLEARLY WE HAVE LIMITED TIME IF THIS IS TO BE DONE BEFORE OUR MEETINGS WITH GROMYKO AT

PAGE 03

SECSTATE WASHDC 9567
RECALLEDDTG:272039Z AUG 81
TOR: 240/0449ZPSN:026410
CSN:HCE144

~~SECRET~~

*****E COPY

~~SECRET~~

*****E COPY

THE UNGA. I ALSO HAVE WRITTEN TO PETER AND
HANS-DIETRICH.

IF I CAN HEAR FROM EACH OF YOU BY SEPTEMBER 1ST, I THEN
WOULD APPROACH THE OTHER THREE ON THE LETTER. WE ALSO
NEED TO DISCUSS OUR GENERAL EFFORT WITH THE OTHER
ALLIES. I SUGGEST A REINFORCED NAC IN MID-SEPTEMBER.
I WOULD PLAN TO HAVE LARRY EAGLEBURGER JOIN TAP BENNETT
TO LAUNCH THIS IMPORTANT AND POSITIVE OFFENSIVE.

WITH BEST WISHES,
ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR.

END TEXT.
HAIG
BT

~~SECRET~~

*****E COPY