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4

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
136983	HANDWRITTEN NOTES	RE SHAPING EUROPEAN ATTITUDES IG	6	9/3/1981	B1
		R 8/23/2016 M442/1			
136984	CABLE	STATE 248086	4	9/4/1981	B1
		R 8/23/2016 M442/1			
136986	CABLE	USNATO 05418	5	9/7/1981	B1
		R 8/23/2016 M442/1			
136987	CABLE	STATE 239116	2	9/7/1981	B1
		R 8/23/2016 M442/1			
136988	CABLE	USNATO 05419	2	9/7/1981	B1
		R 8/23/2016 M442/1			
136991	CABLE	STATE 239043	6	9/5/1981	B1
		R 8/23/2016 M442/1			
136992	CABLE	USNATO 05437	2	9/8/1981	B1
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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

September 1, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR CAREY LORD
SVEN KRAEMER
BILL STEARMAN
DICK PIPES
PAULA DOBRIANSKY

FROM: DENNIS *DEAN*

SUBJECT: Pamphlet entitled "Peace and Nuclear Deterrence"

Under the auspices of the IG on Shaping European Attitudes, we are writing a pamphlet describing NATO fundamental deterrence policy. This will be a slick publication designed for wide distribution in NATO countries.

Attached is the first draft of the text. Please give me any comments and I will see that they are incorporated into the next draft.

Next meeting of the IG will be this
Thursday, 3 Sept. at 1000. All are welcome

DEAN

*A reasonable & persuasive
analysis of the situation
for change*

NP

*TO
D. Blair*

** Suspect report*

V.11
DCG has 01-
as part of package
PEACE
and Nuclear Deterrence
PS and Dan Robert
Charles

064 001-
as part of package
Review for choice

Throughout modern history, Europe has been the battle-ground where mankind's most intense, extended and destructive conflicts have been waged. Twice in this century, war has devastated the continent, leaving forty million Europeans dead. Yet since 1945, Europe has enjoyed a period of peace and prosperity unparalleled in the experience of mankind, despite the presence of a heavily-armed hostile power. How was this peace secured? How has it been maintained?

Collective Defense and Nuclear Deterrence

In the middle of the twentieth century the ever quickening pace of European warfare was brought to a halt by two innovations -- collective defense, and nuclear deterrence. In those early post-war years the free nations of Western Europe, along with the United States and Canada, formed an alliance based upon the principle that a threat to one was a threat to all. The objective of their Alliance was purely defensive. Their strategy was one of deterrence. These nations sought to work ⁹together to minimize the risk of war, by maximizing the risk to any potential aggressor of engaging war. In particular, the United States, though three thousand miles away, proclaimed that it would regard an attack on its European Allies as an attack on itself, and committed its full military power to deter such an attack.

19th C was
rather
quick!

This historic departure from
its tradition.

NATO's Three Pillars

To sustain its strategy of deterrence, the Alliance has depended upon three interrelated types of forces. First are

NATO's conventional forces. The role of these forces is to meet any aggression at the level it occurs, and, if possible, to contain and defeat it at that level. Second are America's intercontinental range nuclear forces. Third, the Alliance has nuclear weapons deployed in Europe to form a bridge between NATO's conventional forces and American-based intercontinental range systems. The presence of these nuclear systems in Europe prevents a potential aggressor from believing that there are circumstances in which a victory over NATO's conventional forces would not lead NATO to escalate to the use of nuclear weapons.

NATO is an Alliance of nations separated by 4,000 miles of ocean. Its adversary's forces are deployed throughout an area contiguous to the Alliance, bordering directly on NATO's most populous, developed and vulnerable region. Geography, therefore, provides the Warsaw Pact significant advantages. The Soviet Union can project force into Central Europe more easily and more quickly than can the United States. In consequence, NATO has never been able to provide itself with a sufficiently conventional forces to ensure its defense, and has had to rely on nuclear deterrence to compensate for conventional force imbalances and geographic disadvantages.

in? In the Alliance's early years, NATO's nuclear weapons were deployed to Europe for the simple reason that there existed no aircraft or missiles which could reach the Soviet

Union from the United States. With the advent of intercontinental missiles and bombers, NATO began to place greater reliance, for the nuclear element of its deterrent, upon weapons based in the US. Even during the period when the United States enjoyed a wide margin of superiority in intercontinental systems, and when such systems were largely invulnerable to Soviet preemptive strikes, the Alliance maintained a significant number of nuclear weapons in Europe in order to provide the link between European-based conventional and American-based nuclear forces.

The Changing Strategic Environment

Since the mid-1960's the Soviet Union has been engaged in a steady and comprehensive build-up of its armed forces. This buildup continued through a period when the West pursued policies of detente, the United States cut its military budgets, and NATO undertook virtually no nuclear force modernization. Whatever Soviet motivations for this buildup, its actions of the past fifteen years have had a direct impact on the Alliance's ability to implement its deterrent strategy.

Soviet force improvements have occurred at all levels and in all areas. Major improvements have occurred in the conventional forces facing Europe, the Far East, and the oil rich regions of Southwest Asia. Major improvements have occurred in Soviet airborne and seaborne forces capable of projecting Soviet power into regions further afield. Major improvements have occurred in Soviet intercontinental nuclear

regimen?

Navy?

forces, and nuclear forces targeted on Europe. In this latter area, the Soviets have developed, and are rapidly deploying new generations of short range, medium range, and long range nuclear missiles, as well as several new types of nuclear capable aircraft.

Thus, at the conventional level, the Soviet Union threatens Europe directly, as well as indirectly, with ability to project force into other regions of vital interest to Europe, such as the Persian Gulf. The growth in the Soviet conventional threat has placed a heavier burden on NATO's nuclear deterrent to keep the peace. Yet, at the same time, in intercontinental nuclear forces, the Soviet Union has achieved parity and is approaching a capability to destroy the bulk of American nuclear forces based in the United States. Thus, while modern deterrence is becoming more crucial for the Alliance, the contribution of US strategic forces to that deterrence is becoming less credible. This in turn makes it crucial for the Alliance to have a sound and credible theater nuclear force.

Yet the Soviets have no higher priority than building up their own theater nuclear capabilities. The deployment of the SS-20, a long range, mobile, multi-warheaded missile, gives the Soviet Union a capability to hit, accurately and in great number, targets located anywhere in Western Europe, from locations deep within the Soviet Union, far beyond the

range of any European based systems.

→ excluded from
SALT

NATO's Response

The comprehensive nature of the growing Soviet threat requires a comparably comprehensive NATO response if the Alliance is to sustain its deterrent strategy and maintain a stable peace. NATO must, at the conventional level, improve its capability to meet and confine conflict for as long as possible. To do so NATO must maintain and where possible increase current force levels while ^{ensuring?} reasserting that traditional superiority in the quality of its military equipment, and in the training, and morale of its forces, with which the West has hitherto compensated for Warsaw Pact's manpower advantages. ?

Secondly, the United States and its Allies must take steps to ensure the survivability of both intercontinental and European based nuclear forces. Vulnerable nuclear systems invite preemptive attack. Given Soviet advances in accuracy, neither distance, nor hardness, nor depth can provide adequate protection against nuclear attack. Greater capability for mobility and dispersion, therefore, are needed to enhance the survivability of our nuclear forces.

Thirdly, for NATO to maintain, in the face of the Soviet buildup, the credibility of its threat to escalate a conflict to the nuclear level, if all else fails, it must shore up the

link between the intercontinental and European based nuclear systems. The Soviet Union must never be allowed to assume that there exists any level of European conflict at which it could conclude hostilities victoriously. To allow a gap to emerge in the spectrum of nuclear deterrence would foster such a dangerous illusion.

The steps NATO has taken to sustain its deterrent strategy include US and Allied conventional force improvement, now underway, and the planned deployment in the United States of a more survivable intercontinental missile system. Another step was the Alliance's decision of December 1979 to modernize its long range nuclear forces by deployment of 464 ground launched cruise missiles and the replacement of 108 Pershing ballistic missiles with a model of greater range.

This decision to modernize NATO's long range nuclear forces was a particularly important part of the overall NATO response to the Soviet buildup. The new systems will be mobile, and they will disperse in times of crisis, thus enhancing the survivability of ~~nato's~~ ^{NATO's} nuclear forces and reducing the dangers of a Soviet preemptive attack. The very existence of these systems will force any aggressor to disperse his forces more widely, and adopt less efficient modes of conventional attack even at the early stages of any conflict. These systems can reach into the Soviet Union. Thus their deployment to Europe will force upon the Soviet leadership the realization that Soviet territory cannot act as a sanctuary, from which

long range missiles like the SS-20, or aircraft like the Backfire, could threaten Western Europe with nuclear destruction. Finally, these systems, like other NATO nuclear systems, will be based in a number of member countries. They thus reinforce the concept of shared risk, shared effort, and shared security upon which the Western alliance is based.

Finally, as a result of NATO demonstrating the resolve to modernize its TNF, the Soviet Union has been persuaded to put on the negotiating table its nuclear forces that threaten the Allies. Without modernization, there would be no prospect of limiting the Soviet nuclear threat to Europe.

Conclusion

As nuclear weapons have expanded man's capacity for war, so they have reinforced the imperative for peace. The sources of conflict in Europe - differing social and economic systems, territorial ambitions, competition for influence and resources -- remain unabated. Yet NATO's strategy of deterrence has halted a trend toward increasingly violent conflict in Europe, conflict which came close to destroying European civilization twice during this century. Dialogue between East and West must be pursued, in an effort to build a more constructive relationship, one which does not depend upon force as the ultimate guarantor of peace. Achievement of such an order will be a long and difficult task, however, (requiring many generations). In the interim, the peace of Europe can only be built upon a Western

That is not a sound concept!

2?

8.

capacity for defense, and a collective will to resist aggression and intimidation backed by military threat.

Alpha & Reactions

...

6/15.

- subliminal effect of sov. propaganda

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

September 1, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR CAREY LORD
SVEN KRAEMER
BILL STEARMAN
DICK PIPES
PAULA DOBRIANSKY

FROM: DENNIS *DEB*

SUBJECT: Pamphlet entitled "Peace and Nuclear Deterrence"

Under the auspices of the IG on Shaping European Attitudes, we are writing a pamphlet describing NATO fundamental deterrence policy. This will be a slick publication designed for wide distribution in NATO countries.

Attached is the first draft of the text. Please give me any comments and I will see that they are incorporated into the next draft.

Next meeting of the IG will be this
Thursday, 3 Sept. at 1000. All are welcome

↳ ~~RD interested in going~~ *DEB*

~~(inform Schweitzer)~~

V.I.I.
DCG has 01-
as part of package
PEACE
PS and Dan Robert
Charles
Review for choice

Throughout modern history, Europe has been the battle-ground where mankind's most intense, extended and destructive conflicts have been waged. Twice in this century, war has devastated the continent, leaving forty million Europeans dead. Yet since 1945, Europe has enjoyed a period of peace and prosperity unparalleled in the experience of mankind, despite the presence of a heavily-armed hostile power. How was this peace secured? How has it been maintained?

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the use of nuclear weapons. *At the same time, the TNF force is not limited solely to enhancing deterrence in peacetime. Every component of NATO forces should be capable of contribution to an overall NATO deterrence in peacetime and perform a viable wartime role if that deterrence fails. In fact, we consider these 2 functions inextricably linked. Thus, the TNF*

NATO is an Alliance of nations separated by 4,000 miles of ocean. Its adversary's forces are deployed throughout an area contiguous to the Alliance, bordering directly on NATO's most populous, developed and vulnerable region. Geography, therefore, provides the Warsaw Pact significant advantages. The Soviet Union can project force into Central Europe more easily and more quickly than can the United States. In consequence, NATO has never been able to provide itself with a sufficiently conventional forces to ensure its defense, and has had to rely on nuclear deterrence to compensate for conventional force imbalances and geographic disadvantages. *Linkage between the European conventional defense of US strategic deterrence but also play a significant role in the execution of nuclear options against the S. U. It is precisely these reasons that NATO is pursuing current LR TNF modernization.*

However, we are not prepared to accept permanently the growing margin of WTD conventional advantage over NATO. In fact, the commitment to NATO's conventional capability has played an important role in the adoption of LTDP in 1978.

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Union from the United States. With the advent of intercontinental missiles and bombers, NATO began to place greater reliance, for the nuclear element of its deterrent, upon weapons based in the US. Even during the period when the United States enjoyed a wide margin of superiority in intercontinental systems, and when such systems were largely invulnerable to Soviet preemptive strikes, the Alliance maintained a significant number of nuclear weapons in Europe in order to provide the link between European-based
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capacity for defense, and a collective will to resist aggression and intimidation backed by military threat.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET ATTACHMENTS~~

September 3, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR BILL STEARMAN
RICHARD PIPES
SVEN KRAEMER
PAULA DOBRIANSKY
CARNES LORD

FROM: DENNIS C. BLAIR

SUBJECT: Shaping European Attitudes IG, September 3, 1981

The IG was chaired by Steve Steiner of EUR, with representatives from USICA, NSC and CIA. The subject was the "Western Offensive," the term coined for the loose collection of public affairs and diplomatic efforts being mounted this fall to affect allied public opinion. Following is the status of the various elements of this effort:

-- Reinforced NAC on September 15. Amb. Bennett and Assistant Secretary Eagleburger will propose a three-pronged approach to NATO publics: first, emphasis on Western values and the superiority of the Western societies; second, an educational campaign on the Soviet military buildup; third, an educational campaign on the nature and scope of Soviet covert actions. Attached is the proposed State cable to USNATO to request the reinforced NAC formally. NSC clearance is requested by Friday, 4 September at 1500. Please telephone any comments to me before that time.

-- Threat materials package for allies. John King of RPM gave a status report on the various components of the package we have promised to the allies. The Weinberger global military power paper is being revised by DOD based on NSC and other comments; the "peace and nuclear deterrence" pamphlet is in its second draft based on NSC and other comments; the collection of recently declassified CIA graphics is in interagency clearance (copies attached); the JCS paper on the NATO/Warsaw Pact is in interagency clearance (copy attached); the paper on the Soviet LRTNF buildup is presently in DOD and will be placed in interagency clearance. Give me any comments on the JCS paper or the CIA graphics.

-- NATO White Paper. We are requesting the NATO international staff to do an unclassified NATO paper on the military balance,

SECRET ATTACHMENTS

CAS 5/15/12

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to be completed by the Ministerials in December. The cable to start this effort is out for interagency clearance (copy attached). Please telephone comments to me by noon tomorrow.

-- Coordinated multilateral US/European public relations effort on Western values. USICA has vague ideas about such an effort, spearheaded by a large committee, but has not provided a specific proposal.

Other topics discussed in the meeting as follows:

Bilateral meeting with German representatives on information and cultural policies. October 13-16 a high-level German delegation will be in Washington hosted by USICA. We intend to raise the subjects both of the recent anti-American drift in Germany and how to combat it, and the longer run problem of German educational materials with a misleading and damaging image of the United States. NSC involvement in this conference has been requested. We will provide details after further consultations with USICA.

Afghanistan. The "truth squad" is leaving for Europe this weekend where it has a round of meetings set up with government, media and other public figures in several West European countries.

Challenging the Soviets on CBW. The work in this area is being guided by a separate IG, but this effort ties in with the Western offensive. Secretary Haig intends to make this a major part of his Berlin speech on September 13, in addition to the more positive theme of Western values.

Consultation with allies. In contrast ^{to} ~~with~~ the perception in Europe that the United States is preparing to go it alone against the Soviets stands the good record of this administration on alliance consultation. ERW is an exception to the trend. For example, this administration has consulted fully with allies concerning dealings with the Soviets, covering even planning for summit meetings. Not too long ago, the spectre of US-USSR dealings over the heads of allies was a common fear in Western Europe.

European Conferences and Seminars. Attached is the latest listing compiled by Dick Gilbert at USICA. If you intend to participate in any of these clambakes or any others, please inform Gilbert so that he can identify gaps and opportunities for US representation.

Summary of action requested:

-- Comments on attached three cables by noon Friday, September 4.

-- Comment on "NATO-Warsaw Pact Military Balance" paper and Soviet threat graphics as appropriate.

Sep 3, 1981

Shaping European Attitudes to
Steve Steiner chairs 13683 ✓
Julia Moore - just came from NATO
int'l. information staff

CBS series: Italy and Germany
have asked for help
in counteracting the effects of
slowing it this fall

Thursday CoB dinner needed on
the last set of cables
- Cable on White Paper

(?)

Sep. 15 - Proposed date for
reinforced NR. Not confirmed
Approach: 1- "Moral rearmament"
emphasis - values

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR M4421 #13683
BY RW NARA DATE 8/23/16
2, 3 - Expose Sov. Retreat
and covert action

27

* Clinical report on the two cables
by Friday Nov 1500

No rep from DoD

John King - Papers last task

- JCS paper on NATO/WP Balance
- Peace and Deterrence
- CIA graphics

(TAF matter being held by
DoD)

- Warrington Paper

NATO White Paper cable -

puts NATO in motion to
have paper by December

* Need copies of the declassified
disinformation papers -
one is secret and one unclear

29

USCA pitch to get Hergt speech
by Thursday noon (10 Sep)

Western Offensive!

(Teng)
USICA - Increasing size of NATO
section

Possibility of a coordinated ~~West~~
effort beyond NATO ("Western
values") - multilateral

Oct 15-16 German reps coming
to talk on info and cult. policies
(Ambassador level, sub-cabinet
ups)

* NSC role?

How to counter current German
to media trends and the
slant of German educational
materials

Behrens & Hambruschke
co-chairman of the German
delegation

Putting a "political content" on
the Fulbright program

? - The careful selection of the
Western values theme - P.E.
material prosperity may not find
the resonance in Europe

Be aware of the differences
between European and US doctrines
and hit the right theme

Soen - ① The CBW possibilities
(Steve on the last time)
② Kampelmann Sprecher
(State/ICJ response was met
it was pushed)

Afghanistan: Can be played two ^{to} ways - ① ~~Start~~ in trouble;
② ~~Start~~ on the march

—H—
Get data set together
in the Alliance

—H—
USICA - Some additional ^{perception} problems
"Please ^{on} ^{your} w. the & W.P.O. (West. Pol. officer)
house" ① ~~Does~~ not interested in consultation

ENC - exaggerated

② US the war-warmer, USSR the
peacemaker

Suggestion to counteract the
negative connotations with the public
"positive presentational elements"

—H—
Consultation -

In contrast to perception,
US has consulted w. NATO on
seminars, breaking the condemnation
syndrome of earlier years

Ask Gilbert - latest iteration of
of the summer schedule

11 Sept - Sec State mty w.
some 14 European
journalists

5

21

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 3, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR MARK PALMER

FROM: DENNIS C. BLAIR

SUBJECT: Comments on NATO Pamphlet Entitled
"Peace and Nuclear Deterrence"

Here are NSC Staff comments on the draft you gave me for review.

Recommend deletion of first two sentences. Reason: for maximum effectiveness, we feel this pamphlet should emphasize the positive aspects of deterrence, rather than emphasizing the horrors of war. The possibility of destructive war is always in the background, but need not be the opening thought in this essay.

Page 1, Second paragraph, first sentence -- delete phrase "ever quickening pace of European warfare" and replace with "series of European wars which had twice devastated the continent of Europe, and eventually involved much of the rest of the world." Reason: Historical accuracy. The pace of European warfare was "quicker" in the middle 19th century than the middle 20th.

First page, second paragraph, end of paragraph - add new sentence, "This commitment, an historic departure from the US tradition of avoiding entangling peacetime alliances, remains valid. The United States has officially acknowledged its vital interest in the integrity of Western Europe." Reason: emphasis, even over emphasis on key point of concern to Europeans.

Second page, second paragraph, fourth sentence -- rewrite sentence as follows, "In consequence, NATO therefore needs to supplement its conventional forces with a nuclear deterrent to compensate for conventional force imbalances and geographic disadvantages." Reason: positive, rather than negative formulation of the idea.

Page three, second paragraph, second sentence - delete phrase, "whatever Soviet motivations for this buildup, its" and replace with "these Soviet." Reason: the present introductory phrase weakens this key idea.

Page four, second paragraph, third through fifth sentences -- delete present sentences and rewrite as follows, "As the Soviet Union achieved parity in intercontinental nuclear

29
forces, modern theater nuclear deterrence became more crucial for the alliance. This makes it crucial for the alliance to have a sound and credible theater nuclear force." Reason: we have never officially acknowledged a weakening in the credibility of the US strategic nuclear commitment to Europe, and should not do so in this official document. The credibility of the commitment is a political judgment; the hardware can be modernized as necessary.

Page seven, third paragraph - delete entire paragraph and rewrite as follows, "As nuclear weapons have expanded man's capacity for war, so they have reinforced the need to deter war. The sources of conflict in Europe - Soviet attempts to increase its power and influence - remain undiminished. Yet NATO strategy of deterrence has succeeded. Dialogue between East and West will be continued in order to seek a peaceful resolution of outstanding issues. At the same time, the peace of Europe will continue to depend upon a Western capacity for defense, and a collective will to resist aggression and intimidation backed by military threat." Reason: the present language reads like something from a left-wing or even Soviet peace tract. The suggested language emphasizes the realistic deterrence approach to security, rather than some Marxian vision of ultimate tranquility.

EOB575

*****C O N F I D E N T I A L*****E COPY

136984³⁰

OP IMMED
DE RUEHC #8086 2480428
O 042352Z SEP 81 ZEX
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 0000

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS IMMEDIATE
USNMR SHAPE BE FOR INTAFF IMMEDIATE
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//POLAD IMMEDIATE
USLOSACLANT NORFOLK VA//POLAD IMMEDIATE
USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES IT//INTAFF IMMEDIATE
CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE//POLAD IMMEDIATE
CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE//POLAD IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 238086

E.O. 12065:GDS 9/04/87(GOMPERT, DAVID C.)

TAGS: NATO, MPOL

SUBJECT: (C) SHAPING EUROPEAN ATTITUDES: NATO WHITE
PAPER ON SOVIET MILITARY THREAT

REFS: (A) STATE 158218 DTG 170442Z JUN 81
(B) USNATO 4918 DTG 061926Z AUG 81

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. WE HAVE DECIDED TO PROCEED WITH THE NATO WHITE PAPER PROJECT (PARA 7, REF A) AND WISH TO START IT MOVING IN NATO CHANNELS. WE EXPECT THAT THIS PROJECT, WHICH WILL INCLUDE MATERIAL ON THE BALANCE, WILL THUS FULFILL AND SUBSUME THE NEED TO PRODUCE THE NATO PAPER ON THE MILITARY BALANCE (REF B), AND THAT THE NATO STAFF EFFORT CAN BE SHIFTED EASILY TO THE WHITE PAPER PROJECT. THE WHITE PAPER WOULD ALSO FULFILL SYG LUNS'S PROMISE AT THE DPC MINISTERIAL RESTRICTED SESSION TO PROVIDE THE ALLIES WITH A PAPER ON THE MILITARY BALANCE WHICH COULD BE DECLASSIFIED AND USED WITH PUBLICS.

3. IN RAISING THIS PROJECT AT NATO, YOU MAY WISH TO

SIT:
EOB: PIPES, RENT
WHSR COMMENTS:

PAGE 01

SECSTATE WASHDC 8086

DTG: 042352Z SEP 81
TOR: 248/0528Z

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CSN: HCE804

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DECLASSIFIED
NLRR M44211 #136984
BY RW NARA DATE 8/23/16

FILE

CONSIDER A THREE-STEP PROCESS:

A. APPROACH SYG LUNS AND PROPOSE THE PREPARATION OF AN UNCLASSIFIED NATO WHITE PAPER, TO BE SUBMITTED FOR FOREIGN AND DEFENSE MINISTERS' APPROVAL DURING THE NATO MINISTERIALS IN DECEMBER.

B. WITH THE SYG'S AGREEMENT AND SUPPORT, THEN INTRODUCE THE PROJECT TO YOUR COLLEAGUES AT THE FIRST PERMREPS LUNCHEON ON SEPTEMBER 9. A DISCUSSION OF THIS PROJECT SHOULD HOPEFULLY TAKE PLACE AS PART OF A PERMREPS REVIEW OF THE LARGER PROBLEM OF THE PUBLIC'S MISPERCEPTION OF THE WEST'S SECURITY SITUATION AND THE NEED FOR A MAJOR ALLIED EFFORT TO CORRECT IT (OF WHICH THE WHITE PAPER WOULD BE A PART). YOU SHOULD SEEK AGREEMENT AMONG YOUR COLLEAGUES THAT:

-- THE WHITE PAPER SHOULD BE AUTHORIZED BY THE NAC AND SHOULD BE BASED ON THE TERMS OF REFERENCE SUGGESTED IN PARAGRAPH 6 BELOW;

-- THE ALLIES SHOULD PROVIDE THE NATO STAFF WITH MATERIAL TO BE USED IN PREPARING THE PAPER (THE U.S. HOPES TO PROVIDE SOME INPUT LATER IN SEPTEMBER);

-- THE WHITE PAPER SHOULD BE READY FOR APPROVAL BY FOREIGN AND DEFENSE MINISTERS IN DECEMBER, AND;

-- THE POSSIBILITY OF REPEATING THE PROJECT THEREAFTER ON AN ANNUAL BASIS SHOULD BE REVIEWED.

C. AFTER AGREEMENT AT THE PERMREPS LUNCHEON, THE U.S. COULD THEN INTRODUCE THE WHITE PAPER PROJECT AT A NAC (POSSIBLY THE REINFORCED NAC WHICH MAY BE SET FOR 9/15) (SEPTEL) IN WHICH THE LARGER PROBLEM OF PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF THE DEFENSE PROBLEM IS TO BE ON THE AGENDA. THE COUNCIL WOULD SET THE TERMS OF REFERENCE (SEE PARA. 6 BELOW) FOR PREPARING THE PAPER AND A SCHEDULE FOR REVIEWING IT.

4. THE WHITE PAPER WOULD ULTIMATELY BE AUTHORIZED FOR RELEASE BY FOREIGN AND DEFENSE MINISTERS AT THE DECEMBER 1981 NAC MINISTERIALS. LATER ON, BASED ON THE SUCCESS OF THE PROJECT, MINISTERS MIGHT AGREE TO CONSIDER UPDATING AND RELEASING THE WHITE PAPER ANNUALLY.

5. FYI: WE HAVE DISCUSSED THE WHITE PAPER PROJECT

INFORMALLY WITH THE FRG, UK AND FRANCE. THEY ARE AWARE THAT WE WILL RAISE THIS PROJECT AT NATO AND ARE PREPARED TO LEND THEIR SUPPORT. WE HAVE AGREED INFORMALLY WITH THE FRENCH THAT IN ADDRESSING THE MILITARY BALANCE, THE WHITE PAPER WOULD NOT INCLUDE FRENCH FORCES, BUT THIS EXCLUSION WOULD BE NOTED IN A FOOTNOTE. END FYI. BEFORE RAISING THE PROJECT WITH LUNS, YOU MAY WISH TO BRIEF YOUR FRG, UK AND FRENCH COLLEAGUES AND REAFFIRM THEIR SUPPORT.

6. SUGGESTED TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE STUDY ARE:

— THE PURPOSE OF THE NATO WHITE PAPER IS TO PRESENT TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC NEWLY UNCLASSIFIED DATA ON THE MILITARY BALANCE AND THE GLOBAL SOVIET MILITARY CHALLENGE, BOTH CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR.

— THE ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE IS FOR THE ALLIES TO USE THE WHITE PAPER TO GAIN BROADER PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR ALLIED SECURITY POLICY AND DEFENSE PROGRAMS.

— THE WHITE PAPER WOULD PROVIDE NUMBERS AND CAPABILITIES OF SOVIET/PACT CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR FORCES AND COMPARE THEM TO EQUIVALENT NATO INTEGRATED DEFENSE SYSTEM CAPABILITIES SO THAT A PERSPECTIVE ON THE MILITARY BALANCE IS ACHIEVED. (COMMENT: WE ARE SENSITIVE TO THE POTENTIAL DIFFICULTIES IN TRYING TO REACH A NATO-AGREED ASSESSMENT ON THIS ISSUE.)

— THE WHITE PAPER WOULD BE BASED EXCLUSIVELY ON FACTUAL EVIDENCE. TO ENHANCE ITS CREDIBILITY (AND EASE THE PROBLEM OF GETTING AN AGREED ASSESSMENT), THE WHITE PAPER SHOULD AVOID POLITICAL RHETORIC, GENERALIZATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR STRATEGY OR DEFENSE IMPROVEMENTS. IT SHOULD CONTAIN AS MUCH VISUAL MATERIAL (GRAPHICS AND PHOTOGRAPHS) AS POSSIBLE.

— THE WHITE PAPER WOULD BE PREPARED BY THE NATO STAFF (IS AND IMS). IT WOULD INCORPORATE THE PROPOSED NATO PAPER ON THE MILITARY BALANCE (REF B) INTO A MORE COMPREHENSIVE PAPER. THE WHITE PAPER WOULD BE RELATIVELY SHORT; WE ENVISION A DOCUMENT NOT LONGER THAN 50 PAGES.

7. CONTRIBUTIONS: WITHIN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS, THE U.S. WILL PRESENT TO THE ALLIES AT NATO A COMPREHENSIVE PACKAGE OF NEWLY UNCLASSIFIED EVIDENCE OF THE SOVIET

CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR BUILDUP (OF WHICH THE SECDEF PAPER ON GLOBAL SOVIET POWER WILL BE THE CENTERPIECE) TO SERVE AS A CONTRIBUTION TO THE WHITE PAPER. YOU SHOULD ENCOURAGE THE ALLIES TO MAKE SIMILAR CONTRIBUTIONS TO THIS EFFORT.

8. MC-161 (PARA 7, REF A): FYI. BECAUSE OF THE HIGH POTENTIAL FOR BUREAUCRATIC DISPUTE AND DELAY, WE HAVE DECIDED NOT TO PURSUE THE IDEA OF HAVING NATO PRODUCE AN UNCLASSIFIED VERSION OF MC-161. END FYI. YOU SHOULD SUGGEST THAT WHERE POSSIBLE THE NATO STAFF MAY WISH TO DRAW FROM MC-161 IN PREPARING THE WHITE PAPER.

9. PREPARATION AND REVIEW: BECAUSE OF ITS ULTIMATELY POLITICAL OBJECTIVE, THE NATO WHITE PAPER IS TO BE CONSIDERED A COUNCIL RATHER THAN A DPC DOCUMENT AND SHOULD BE APPROVED BY FOREIGN AND DEFENSE MINISTERS. FOR PRACTICAL PURPOSES, HOWEVER, AFTER PRESENTATION TO THE NAC AND ITS AUTHORIZATION, YOU SHOULD SUGGEST THAT THE PROJECT COULD BE REMANDED TO THE DPC AS A DEFENSE-RELATED MATTER; THE DRC OR EWG MIGHT BE THE BEST GROUP TO COORDINATE AND REVIEW THE PREPARATION OF THE DOCUMENT BY THE NATO STAFF. THE CHAIRMAN OF THE EWG WOULD, OF COURSE, HAVE TO WORK OUT THE MODALITIES OF GAINING FRENCH ASSOCIATION WITH THE DOCUMENT BEFORE DPC/NAC REVIEW. NATIS WOULD HAVE TO BE CONSULTED ON PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION AND PUBLICITY QUESTIONS, BUT IT WOULD BE THE NAC WHICH DECIDES ON THE ULTIMATE DISPOSITION OF THE WHITE PAPER.

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Shaping European
Attitudes

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 9866
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INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 9623
ALL NATO CAPITALS

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 USNATO 05418

E.O. 12065: GDS, 9/7/86 (GLITMAN, MAYNARD W) OR-M
TAGS: NATO, MPOL, SOPN, XG
SUBJECT: (C) WESTERN POLITICAL OFFENSIVE/SHAPING
EUROPEAN ATTITUDES
REFS: (A) STATE 239043 DTG 051806Z SEP 81
(B) STATE 238086 DTG 042352Z SEP 81 NOTAL
(C) STATE 158218 DTG 170442Z JUN 81 NOTAL
(D) USNATO 4918 DTG 061926Z AUG 81 NOTAL

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M442/1 #136986

BY RW NARA DATE 8/23/16

1. (~~SECRET~~-ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SUMMARY: WE AGREE FULLY WITH THE PREMISES UNDER-
LYING WASHINGTON'S APPROACH, BUT WE WOULD SUGGEST
A MODIFIED STRATEGY FOR ACCOMPLISHING US OBJECTIVES.
REQUEST INSTRUCTIONS BY OOB SEPTEMBER 8. END SUMMARY.

3. WE AGREE ENTIRELY WITH THE FUNDAMENTAL PURPOSE
UNDERLYING REF A. SOVIET PROPAGANDA HAS OCCUPIED CENTER
STAGE FOR FAR TOO LONG, WHILE THE WEST HAS REMAINED
PASSIVE OR DEFENSIVE AT BEST. BELOW WE PROVIDE COM-
MENT ON THE THEMES PRESENTED IN REF A FOR A WESTERN
POLITICAL OFFENSIVE AND OUTLINE SOME SUGGESTED MODIFI-
CATIONS TO THE REF B PROCEDURAL APPROACH; IN PARTICULAR
WE FAVOR THE PUBLICATION OF A NATO BROCHURE THAT WOULD
GO BEYOND THE NOTIONS OF THE SOVIET THREAT AND THE NATO
WARSAW PACT BALANCE.

4. THEMES. WE SUPPORT EMPHASIZING WESTERN VALUES,

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EOB: PIPES, RENT
WHSR COMMENTS:

PAGE 01

USMISSION USNATO 5418

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INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AND THE OPENNESS OF WESTERN SOCIETIES IN CONTRAST TO THE EAST'S TRADITION OF REPRESSION, BUT CAUTION THAT ECONOMIC THEMES SHOULD BE GIVEN SOMEWHAT LESS PROMINENCE. AN EFFORT TO MOVE NATO ALONG IN A PERIOD OF WIDESPREAD ECONOMIC DIFFICULTY IS SOMETHING NEW FOR ALL OF US. AT A TIME WHEN THE US IS DEMONSTRATING THAT IT IS POSSIBLE TO SHIFT PRIORITIES FROM SOCIAL PROGRAMS TO DEFENSE, AND URGING OTHERS TO CHANGE THEIR BUDGETARY PRIORITIES IN THE SAME DIRECTION, IT MIGHT BE PRUDENT TO SOFT PEDAL SOCIAL/ECONOMIC THEMES UNTIL WE HAVE TESTED THE WATER SOMEWHAT.

5. ON SOVIET ACTIVITIES, WE AGREE THAT HEIGHTENING PUBLIC ATTENTION TO SOVIET COVERT ACTION AND MANIPULATION CAN BE ONE OF OUR MOST IMPORTANT EFFORTS. WE BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT THE WAY TO DO THAT IS BY ACTIVELY EXPOSING SPECIFIC ACTIVITIES ON A REAL TIME BASIS. WHAT GETS ATTENTION IS WHAT IS HAPPENING AND BEING PUBLICIZED NOW, WHEN IT CAN GET INTERNATIONAL MASS MEDIA ATTENTION AND A MEASURE OF PUBLIC EXCITEMENT. ATTENTION TO THIS CAN HAVE POSITIVE FEEDBACK NOT ONLY IN TERMS OF RESTRICTIONS ON SOVIETS, BUT ON ALL AREAS OF OUR RELATIONS WITH EUROPEANS AS WELL.

6. WE BELIEVE THAT ARMS CONTROL WILL HAVE TO BE ONE OF THE WEST'S MAJOR THEMES IN THIS CAMPAIGN. INDEED, THE FACT OF ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS THEMSELVES, ONCE THEY ARE UNDER WAY, WILL PROVIDE A CONTINUING FORUM TO GO ON THE OFFENSIVE, E.G., VERIFICATION ISSUES CAN DEMONSTRATE THE CONTRAST BETWEEN OPEN WESTERN SOCIETIES AND THE CLOSED SOCIALIST CAMP.

7. HOW TO PROCEED. WE, TOO, FORESEE A LONG, SUSTAINED CAMPAIGN, WITH LOCI FOR ACTION IN CAPITALS AND AT NATO, AND A SERIES OF PAPERS, REPORTS, ETC., SPREAD OUT OVER SEVERAL MONTHS. SINCE HOST CAPITALS WILL BE CONDUCTING THEIR OWN EFFORTS, THERE WILL NECESSARILY BE A DIVERSITY OF APPROACHES, BUT WE SHARE WASHINGTON'S VIEW ON THE NEED TO PROVIDE SOME COHERENCE AND COORDINATION TO THESE EFFORTS. IN THIS REGARD, WE SEE THREE DISTINCT PRODUCTS, PLUS ANY NUMBER OF PAPERS THAT THE US COULD FEED INTO CAPITALS.

- 1) SECRETARY WEINBERGER'S REPORT ON THE SOVIET MILITARY THREAT. IT WILL SET THE SCENE FOR THE WEST'S CAMPAIGN AND HOLD THE STAGE FOR SOME TIME.

- 2) A BALANCE PAPER. WE HAVE SOME PROBLEMS WITH THE "WHITE PAPER" CONCEPT AS SET OUT IN REPTTEL B.

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WE AGREE THAT A PAPER SHOULD BE SUBMITTED FOR FOREIGN AND DEFENSE MINISTERS' APPROVAL AT THE DECEMBER 1981 MINISTERIAL MEETINGS. HOWEVER, RATHER THAN LAUNCH WHAT COULD APPEAR TO BE A NEW AND DIFFERENT EFFORT, WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO CO-OPT THE ON-GOING DRC EFFORT. THE ONLY MODIFICATION NECESSARY WITH THIS APPROACH WOULD BE TO SECURE FRENCH ASSOCIATION WITH THE DOCUMENT (REF D). THE ISSUE OF OUT-OF-AREA COVERAGE WILL ARISE WHICHEVER APPROACH--WHITE
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ALL NATO CAPITALS

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 USNATO 05418

PAPER OR BALANCE PAPER--WE TAKE. WE BELIEVE OUR CHANCES OF WINNING ON THIS WOULD BE IMPROVED IF WE WORKED FROM THE DRC PAPER (WHICH ALREADY MAKES REFERENCE TO SOVIET NAVAL DEPLOYMENTS IN THE INDIAN AND PACIFIC OCEANS). THIS PAPER WOULD PICK UP FROM THE DOD REPORT AND DEMONSTRATE BOTH NATO'S RELATIVE MILITARY/SECURITY STRENGTHS AND DEFICIENCIES VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIETS.

- 3) A NATO BROCHURE TO ADD SOME PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICAL ARGUMENTATION TO THE ESSENTIALLY FACTUAL THREAT AND BALANCE PAPERS. TO THE EXTENT THAT WE ARE DEALING WITH A GENERATIONAL PROBLEM, WE HAVE TO GO BACK TO BASICS TO EDUCATE THOSE WHO TAKE FOR GRANTED NATO'S RAISON D'ETRE. SINCE MUCH OF THE CURRENT CLIMATE OF OPPOSITION IS EMOTIONAL IN NATURE, WE NEED TO PROVIDE ARGUMENTS WHICH GO BEYOND COLD FACTS. THUS, WE SHARE WASHINGTON'S VIEW (REF C) THAT "AWARENESS OF THE THREAT WILL NOT DO THE JOB BY ITSELF. OTHER COMPONENTS OF THE PROGRAM SHOULD FOCUS ON EXPLAINING THE RATIONALE FOR OUR OWN DEFENSE EFFORTS, COUNTERING SOVIET PROPAGANDA AND ENHANCING AWARENESS OF OUR COMMON VALUES." THEREFORE, WE SEE UTILITY IN HAVING A NATO PRODUCT THAT WOULD BE AN ADJUNCT TO INDIVIDUAL EFFORTS BY CAPITALS AND TO THE THREAT AND BALANCE PAPERS. WE ENVISAGE A HIGHLY PROFESSIONAL PRODUCT OF ABOUT 20 PAGES WITH PRINCIPAL ELEMENTS THAT WOULD:

- - PROVIDE A SYNOPSIS OF WESTERN VALUES--WHAT THE ALLIANCE IS DEFENDING AND WHY.
- - OUTLINE THE THREAT, BUT PITCH THE PRESENTATION

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EOB: KEMP, PIPES, RENT

WHSR COMMENTS:

PAGE 01

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AS MUCH AT THE POLITICAL THREAT (THE NATURE OF OUR ADVERSARY AS A TOTALITARIAN SOCIETY, SOVIET USE OF MILITARY FORCE FOR INTIMIDATION) AS AT THE MILITARY THREAT.

- - EXPLAIN HOW NATO DEFENDS ITSELF, OUTLINING NATO'S STRATEGY (WITH EMPHASIS ON DETERRENCE) AND THE MILITARY RATIONALE FOR NATO'S DEFENSE AND DETERRENCE POSTURE. THE RATIONALE AND ROLE FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS INCLUDING TNF WOULD BE A MAJOR ELEMENT OF THIS COMPONENT OF THE BROCHURE.

- - STRESS NATO'S CONSCIENTIOUS AND COMPREHENSIVE EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE MEANINGFUL ARMS CONTROL. THE SEPARATE CHAPTERS OF THE BROCHURE MIGHT EACH BE WRITTEN BY DIFFERENT INDIVIDUALS, OR PERHAPS BY SEPARATE NATIONAL OR INTERNATIONAL TEAMS. THE TEAM COULD INCLUDE RESPECTED ACADEMICS AND ELDER STATESMAN. A POSSIBLE DATE FOR THEIR PRODUCT COULD BE THE SPRING OF 1982, FOLLOWING PUBLICATION OF THE BALANCE PAPER.

8. ACTION REQUESTED. IF WASHINGTON SEES MERIT IN OUR SUGGESTED MODIFICATIONS TO ITS APPROACH, WE WILL NEED TO KNOW THIS IN TIME FOR THE 8 SEPTEMBER PERM-REPS' LUNCH.

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INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 5820

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E.O. 12065: RDS-3 9/7/01 (PALMER M)
TAGS: SOPN IG

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M4421 #136987
BY RW NARA DATE 8/23/14

SUBJECT: WESTERN POLITICAL OFFENSIVE/SHAPING EUROPEAN
ATTITUDES

REF: (A) STATE 239043; (B) USNATO 05418

1. (~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. MISSION IS AUTHORIZED TO PROCEED WITH BASIC APPROACH DE-
SCRIBED REF (A) AS MODIFIED BY YOUR SUGGESTIONS IN REF
(B). WE HAVE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL COMMENTS.

3. AGREE THAT ECONOMIC THEMES NEED TO BE HANDLED WITH
CAUTION. AT SAME TIME IT IS ESSENTIAL TO EMPHASIZE BASIC
UNDERLYING STRENGTHS OF WESTERN ECONOMIES, PROSPECT FOR
RENEWED GROWTH, AND FUNDAMENTAL NEED TO BUILD CONSENSUS
BEHIND INCREASED DEFENSE SPENDING.

4. AGREE THAT REGULAR EXPOSURES OF CURRENT SOVIET "ACTIVE
MEASURES" IS MOST EFFECTIVE APPROACH. WE HAVE ORGANIZED
INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE HERE FOR PRECISELY THAT PURPOSE. OUR
SUGGESTION THAT NATO AND INDIVIDUAL GOVERNMENTS ORGANIZE
THEMSELVES IS ALSO AIMED AT GETTING OUT STEADY FLOW OF
MATERIALS ON CURRENT ACTIVITIES. AT SAME TIME, WE BELIEVE

IT IMPORTANT TO LAUNCH THIS EFFORT WITH UNCLASSIFIED

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ROB: PIPES, RENT
WHSR COMMENTS:

PAGE 01

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PAPER WHICH DESCRIBES OVERALL SOVIET EFFORT AND SOME RECENT AND ON-GOING CAMPAIGNS, AND THUS PROVIDES A CONTEXT FOR FUTURE INDIVIDUAL RELEASES. THIS IS PURPOSE OF US PAPER WE WILL DELIVER AT REINFORCED NAC. HOWEVER, AS THIS WILL REQUIRE MORE DETAILED CONSIDERATION, WE PROPOSE THAT SEPT 22ND NAC BE DEVOTED TO IT. WE ARE PREPARED TO HAVE EXPERTS ON SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES PRESENT FOR SEPT 22ND NAC TO PROVIDE EVEN MORE SENSITIVE INFORMATION THAN IS CONTAINED IN SECRET-LEVEL STUDY WE WILL PRESENT AT EARLIER REINFORCED NAC.

5. AGREE THAT ARMS CONTROL MUST BE MAJOR THEME. BUT IT MUST BE CLEARLY SEEN WITHIN OVERALL DEFENSE CONTEXT AND NOT AS END IN ITSELF. YOUR SUGGESTION ON LINKING VERIFICATION TO CLOSED NATURE OF SOVIET SOCIETY IS EXCELLENT AND SHOULD BE DEVELOPED FURTHER.

6. REF (A) PERHAPS INSUFFICIENTLY EMPHASIZED NECESSITY FOR WESTERN POLICY INITIATIVES VERSUS PAPERS, REPORTS, ETC. BOTH ARE IMPORTANT -- THE LATTER TO EDUCATE, THE FORMER TO PROVIDE A SENSE OF DIRECTION AND LEADERSHIP. AT PERMREPS DISCUSSION YOU SHOULD STRESS THAT WE ARE WELL AWARE THE BEST PR EFFORT IN THE WORLD WILL HAVE A HARD TIME SELLING AN UNINSPIRING PRODUCT. MUCH OF OUR SUCCESS WILL DEPEND ON OUR ABILITY TO TAKE THE OFFENSIVE IN TERMS OF POLICIES.

7. AGREE WITH YOUR SUGGESTION THAT DRC PAPER BECOME NATO PAPER ON THE BALANCE. ALSO AGREE THAT WE NEED ADDITIONAL PAPER ON VALUES, PHILOSOPHY, ETC., ALONG LINES YOU SUGGEST. BELIEVE IT SHOULD BE RELEASED 1-2 MONTHS AFTER DECEMBER MINISTERIAL BALANCE PAPER TO MAXIMIZE IMPACT, BUT NO LATER. STOESEL
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INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 9625

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Z.O. 12065: RDS-1, 9/7/91 (GLITMAN, MAYNARD W) OR-M
TAGS: SOPN, XG
SUBJECT: WESTERN POLITICAL OFFENSIVE: APPROACH FOR
REINFORCED NAC, SEPTEMBER 15
REF: STATE 239043

1. (~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. AT RESTRICTED NAC CALLED FOR OTHER PURPOSES SEP-
TEMBER 7, CHARGE DREW ON PARAS 2 AND 6 REFTEL IN
SEEKING AGREEMENT TO REINFORCED NAC SEPTEMBER 15.

3. ALLIES EXPRESSED CONCERN LEST APPROPRIATE PAR-
TICIPATION COULD NOT BE ARRANGED ON SUCH SHORT NOTICE.
ROSE (UK) AND VAN USSEL (BELGIUM) NOTED THAT SEPTEMBER
14-15 HAD BEEN EARMARKED FOR A MEETING OF THE EC COUNCIL
OF MINISTERS, AN EVENT THAT WOULD SURELY ENGAGE THE
SERVICES OF POLITICAL DIRECTORS. ROSE STATED FLATLY
THAT THE UK POLITICAL DIRECTOR CANNOT ATTEND A NAC ON
SEPTEMBER 15 AND ASKED WHETHER THE U.S. COULD CONSIDER
AN ALTERNATIVE, E.G., SEPTEMBER 16, 17, OR 18. VAN
VOORST (DUTCH CHARGE) ADDED THAT THE DUTCH PARLIAMENT
WILL BE FORMALLY OPENED ON SEPTEMBER 15 AND THAT HE
COULD THUS NOT GUARANTEE ATTENDANCE FROM THE HAGUE.
OLCAY (TURKEY) OBJECTED IN MORE GENERAL TERMS TO THE
SHORT LEAD TIME GIVEN BY THE U.S. AND WAS PESSIMISTIC
ABOUT PARTICIPATION FROM ANKARA. VIBE (NORWAY) CAST
HIS VOTE WITH THE DUBIOUS AFTER THE MEETING, REMINDING
US THAT NORWEGIAN ELECTIONS ARE SCHEDULED FOR SEP-
TEMBER 14.

SIT:
EOB: PIPES, RENT
WHSR COMMENTS:

PAGE 01

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4. CHARGE NOTED THAT THE SPECIAL CONSULTATIVE GROUP IS TO MEET ON SEPTEMBER 16 AND THEN URGED ALLIED REPS TO DETERMINE WHETHER THEIR AUTHORITIES COULD NOT ACCOMMODATE U.S. REQUEST FOR REINFORCED NAC ON SEPTEMBER 15. IF POLITICAL DIRECTORS WERE TIED UP IN THE MORNING, PERHAPS NAC COULD BE SCHEDULED IN THE AFTERNOON. (VAN USSEL SUBSEQUENTLY TOLD CHARGE THAT, SINCE POLITICAL DIRECTORS WERE MEETING IN BRUSSELS ON 14-15, AN AFTERNOON NAC SEEMED VERY POSSIBLE.) CHARGE ASKED THAT RESPONSES BE IN HAND IN TIME FOR THE PERMREPS' LUNCHEON ON SEPTEMBER 8 IF AT ALL POSSIBLE.

5. ACTION REQUESTED: REQUEST INSTRUCTIONS BY 2008 SEPTEMBER 8 ON WHETHER ASSISTANT SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER HAS ANY FLEXIBILITY ON THE DATE, ENABLING HIM TO SHIFT, FOR INSTANCE, TO SEPTEMBER 17 OR 18, SHOULD ALLIES BE UNABLE TO ACCOMMODATE US ON THE 15TH.

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TO ALL NATO CAPITALS IMMEDIATE

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ALSO FOR PAO'S
E.O. 12065: GDS 9/5/87 (EAGLEBURGER, LAWRENCE S.)

TAGS: SOPN, XG

SUBJECT: WESTERN POLITICAL OFFENSIVE: APPROACH FOR RE-
INFORCED NAC, SEPT 15

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NLRR M4421 #136991

BY RW NARA DATE 8/23/16

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. YOU ARE INSTRUCTED TO APPROACH APPROPRIATE SENIOR
OFFICIALS TO PROPOSE THAT SEPT. 15TH NAC BE DEVOTED TO
DISCUSSION OF NEED FOR THE WEST TO COUNTER SOVIET PROPAGAN

DA, TO SHIFT THE TERMS OF THE DEBATE AND TO LAUNCH A POSI-
TIVE POLITICAL OFFENSIVE. WE WANT SOVIETS TO START READIN
OFF OUR AGENDA. ASST. SEC. EAGLEBURGER WILL JOIN AMB.
BENNETT FOR THIS REINFORCED NAC AND YOU SHOULD ENCOURAGE
POLITICAL DIRECTOR LEVEL ATTENDANCE BY YOUR HOST GVERN-
MENT. WE UNDERSTAND SEVERAL GOVERNMENTS ALREADY PLAN TO
SEND SENIOR OFFICIALS. - - - - -

3. YOU SHOULD TOUCH ON THE THEMES BELOW TO ILLUSTRATE
KINDS OF IDEAS WE WILL BE SUGGESTING FOR COMMON CONSIDERA-
TION. OUR PURPOSE IS TO ENCOURAGE THE BEGINNING OF A
SERIOUS PROCESS AND TO SOLICIT OTHERS' THINKING, SUGGES-
TIONS, AND EFFORTS RATHER THAN ACCEPTANCE OF PARTICULAR
U.S. PROPOSALS. MUCH OF THIS EFFORT WILL HAVE TO BE MADE

BY INDIVIDUAL GOVERNMENTS FOR THEIR OWN PUBLICS.

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EOB: PIPES, RENT
WHSR COMMENTS:

PAGE 01

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4. REQUEST USNATO'S COMMENTS ON FOLLOWING SUGGESTED APPROACH FOR AMBASSADOR BENNETT AND ASST. SEC. EAGLE-BURGER'S USE AT SEPT 15TH NAC. (BEGIN PRESENTATION): WE ARE ALL CONSCIOUS OF THE NEED FOR THE WEST TO GO ON THE POLITICAL OFFENSIVE AND TO PROVIDE OUR PEOPLES WITH A NEW SENSE OF CONFIDENCE AND PURPOSE. WE ARE PLEASED THAT THIS MEETING COULD BE HELD TO LAUNCH SUCH A MAJOR EFFORT. TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE, WE NEED BOTH TO EDUCATE AND TO INSPIRE: A) TO INSPIRE A RENEWED APPRECIATION THAT THE WEST HAS VALUES THAT ARE WORTH DEFENDING, AND POSITIVE POLICIES WHICH WILL SHAPE A SECURE AND MORE PROSPEROUS FUTURE; AND B) TO EDUCATE WESTERN PUBLICS ABOUT THE NATURE OF THE SOVIET THREAT. RATHER THAN SIMPLY REACTING CONSTANTLY TO SOVIET INITIATIVES AND ATTACKS, WE PROPOSE TO SEIZE THE INITIATIVE THROUGH MUCH MORE ACTIVE EDUCATIONAL EFFORTS AND MORE PERSISTENT POLICY PROPOSALS.

5. WE ALREADY HAVE UNDERTAKEN THIS COMBINATION OF STEPS IN A NUMBER OF MAJOR AREAS: AFGHANISTAN, CSCE/CDE AND TNF. OUR EFFORTS TO FOCUS PUBLIC ATTENTION ON WESTERN INITIATIVES AND POLICIES IN EACH OF THESE AREAS, AND TO EDUCATE OUR PEOPLE ABOUT SOVIET INTRANSIGENCE AND THREATS MUST CONTINUE AND BE INTENSIFIED. ALL THREE SHOULD BE AT THE CENTER OF OUR NEW WESTERN CAMPAIGN.

6. THERE ARE A NUMBER OF OTHER AREAS IN WHICH WE NEED GREATER EFFORTS. WE PROPOSE THREE SPECIFIC ITEMS FOR DISCUSSION AT THIS NAC AND FOR SUSTAINED PROGRAMS IN THE MONTHS AHEAD: FIRST, A MAJOR EFFORT TO FOCUS MUCH GREATER ATTENTION ON WESTERN VALUES AND THE VIGOR OF OUR SYSTEMS AS THE WAVE OF THE FUTURE VERSUS THE DULL, REPRESSIVE, INEFFICIENT AND ESSENTIALLY BACKWARD SYSTEMS OF THE EAST; SECOND, A MAJOR EDUCATIONAL CAMPAIGN ON THE SOVIET MILITARY BUILDUP, THE NECESSITY TO TAKE STEPS TO RESTORE THE EAST-WEST BALANCE, AND ON ARMS CONTROL, TO SHOW THE REAL PURPOSES OF SOVIET PROPOSALS AND THE SERIOUSNESS OF OURS; AND THIRD, A SIMILAR CAMPAIGN ON THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF SOVIET COVERT ACTIONS, DISINFORMATION, PROPAGANDA, AND THE NEED TO RESTRAIN SUCH SOVIET ACTIVITIES.

7. VALUES. WE NEED TO INSTILL THROUGHOUT THE WEST A

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NEW PHILOSOPHICAL AND MORAL COMMITMENT TO OUR CIVILIZATION. WE WANT A NEW SENSE OF EXCITEMENT ABOUT THE PERMANENT PEACEFUL REVOLUTION, THE CHANGE AND

INNOVATION WHICH ONLY OUR PLURALISTIC, DEMOCRATIC SYSTEMS MAKE POSSIBLE. THIS CAN BE A PRIMARY VEHICLE FOR A POSITIVE FOREIGN POLICY. THEMES HERE SHOULD INCLUDE: THE UNPRECEDENTED PROSPERITY WHICH WESTERN DEMOCRATIC SYSTEMS AND OPEN ECONOMIES HAVE PRODUCED FOR THE GREAT MAJORITY OF OUR PEOPLE; THE PROSPECT OF A WHOLE NEW ERA OF PERSONAL AND SPIRITUAL GROWTH AS WELL AS ECONOMIC GROWTH OF THE WHOLE SOCIETY; THE DEVELOPING WORLD; FREEDOM TO WORK, WRITE, INNOVATE, TRAVEL, ASSOCIATE, DISSENT, DEMONSTRATE, ORGANIZE UNIONS, CHANGE POLITICAL LEADERS; FREEDOM FOR MINORITIES; FREEDOM TO EXCEL AND KEEP THE FRUITS OF ONE'S LABORS; ASSISTANCE FOR THE POOR AND HANDICAPPED, UPWARD SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC MOBILITY (AND THEREFORE NO RIGID CLASS STRATIFICATIONS); AND ALL THIS CONTRASTED WITH THE EAST WHICH PROCLAIMS ILLUSORY "ECONOMIC RIGHTS" AND DELIVERS ECONOMIC HARDSHIP, POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS OPPRESSION AND AN ABUNDANCE ONLY OF ARMAMENTS. IN SUM, THAT WE ARE THE FUTURE IF ONLY WE HAVE THE WILL TO DEFEND OUR INTERESTS AND MOVE AHEAD. THESE IDEAS ARE NOT ONLY RELEVANT TO UNDERSTANDING WHY WE MUST DEFEND THE WEST, BUT THEY ALSO CREATE AN OBJECTIVE COMMON INTEREST WITH THE THIRD WORLD. THE MOST DYNAMIC SOCIETIES OUTSIDE THE WEST ARE THOSE THAT EXPLOIT THE POTENTIAL OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN A CLIMATE OF INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM.

THIS WAS THE CENTRAL MESSAGE OF SECRETARY HAIG'S SPEECH IN BERLIN SEPTEMBER 13, AND WE BELIEVE IT IS A KEY AREA FOR FURTHER THINKING HERE IN NATO AND BY EACH OF US INDIVIDUALLY. THE POWER OF IDEAS IS NO LESS THAN THE POWER OF WEAPONS, AND WE HAVE THE BEST POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND MORAL IDEAS OF ALL. BUT WE NEED TO DO MUCH MORE WITH THEM.

8. MILITARY THREAT AND BALANCE. THE EFFORT TO EDUCATE OUR PUBLICS ABOUT THE MILITARY THREAT AND TO BUILD CONSENSUS FOR GREATER DEFENSE SPENDING SHOULD BE A MIX OF PRIVATE, GOVERNMENT, AND COMMON NATO EFFORTS. WHILE THIS WILL NEED TO BE A CONTINUING EFFORT, OUR NEAR-TERM OBJECTIVE SHOULD BE TO BUILD TOWARD RELEASE OF A NATO WHITE PAPER ON THE SOVIET THREAT AND THE MILITARY BALANCE AT THE NAC MINISTERIAL IN DECEMBER (DETAILS SEPTTEL).

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TO CONTRIBUTE TO THAT PROCESS, THE U.S. IS UNDERTAKING SEVERAL STEPS. THE FIRST AND MOST IMPORTANT IS THE PUBLIC RELEASE IN THE US IN THE NEAR FUTURE BY SECRETARY WEINBERGER OF HIS REPORT ON THE SOVIET MILITARY THREAT.

THIS IS AN OBVIOUS AND ESSENTIAL FIRST STEP AS WE DEVELOP A COMMON REPORT ON THE MILITARY BALANCE. AS THE UNITED STATES HAD MUCH OF THE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION WE BELIEVED IT VALUABLE FOR US TO DECLASSIFY AND MAKE AVAILABLE THE FACTS.

9. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THIS EDUCATION EFFORT SHOULD BE PRIMARILY EITHER AN AMERICAN OR A NATO PROGRAM. EACH COUNTRY MUST DEVELOP ITS OWN MATERIALS, SHAPING THEM IN WAYS BEST SUITED TO EACH OF OUR NEEDS. AS INPUT INTO THESE NATIONAL EFFORTS AND THEREFORE NOT FOR NEAR-TERM PUBLIC USE BY THE U.S. ALONE, WE PLAN TO PROVIDE TO YOU OVER THE NEXT SEVERAL WEEKS A NUMBER OF MATERIALS DISCUSSING: A) THE GENERAL MILITARY BALANCE; B) TNF; AND C) THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NUCLEAR FORCES AND PEACE.

WE HOPE THAT THE SOVIET MILITARY THREAT AND THE NEED FOR US TO CORRECT DEFENSE IMBALANCES AND MAINTAIN A CREDIBLE DETERRENT WILL BECOME A CENTRAL THEME OF ALL OUR POLITICAL LEADERS' SPEECHES AND OF OUR EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS IN THE MONTHS AHEAD. WE PLAN A SEPARATE PRESENTATION OUTLINING THE SPECIFICS OF THIS PART OF OUR SUGGESTED OVERALL EFFORT LATER THIS MONTH. (FYI. YOU WILL SHORTLY RECEIVE A CABLE ON THE SPECIFICS OF THIS PART OF THE PROGRAM.)

10. SOVIET ACTIVITIES AND RECIPROCITY. THE CAMPAIGN TO EDUCATE THE PUBLIC ABOUT SOVIET COVERT ACTIONS, DISINFORMATION, AND PROPAGANDA MUST PROCEED FROM RECOGNITION OF THE FACT THAT THE USSR HAS GOTTEN AWAY WITH AN UNACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF SUCH ACTIVITIES AND HAS ENJOYED A DOUBLE STANDARD. IN THE USSR, THE ACTIVITIES OF WESTERNERS ARE SEVERELY RESTRICTED, WHEREAS IN THE WEST, THE SOVIETS HAVE MUCH GREATER FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AND ACCESS TO INFORMATION MEDIA. ALTHOUGH A NUMBER OF GOVERNMENTS HAVE TAKEN STEPS TO LIMIT SOVIET ACTIVITIES, WE THINK THE TIME HAS COME TO LAUNCH A MAJOR EFFORT TO EXPOSE AND PUBLICIZE SOVIET ACTIVITIES; THIS IS BECAUSE WESTERN PUBLICS MUST THOROUGHLY UNDERSTAND THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIONS IN ORDER TO PERMIT US TO

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TAKE THE NECESSARY STRONGER STEPS TO INSTITUTE GENUINE RECIPROCITY TO RESTRAIN THEM.

11. TO BUILD PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING OF SOVIET ACTIVITIES WE ARE PROVIDING YOU TODAY WITH TWO DOCUMENTS. ONE IS A CLASSIFIED STUDY OF SOVIET "ACTIVE MEASURES" AND THE OTHER IS AN UNCLASSIFIED VERSION. AGAIN, WE HOPE THESE MATERIALS AND OTHER INFORMATION YOU HAVE WILL BE USED

BY EACH GOVERNMENT TO PRODUCE ITS OWN INFORMATION CAMPAIGN. WE DO PLAN TO PUBLISH OUR OWN UNCLASSIFIED PAPER IN EARLY OCTOBER. WE HOPE THAT OTHERS WILL BE ABLE TO RELEASE SIMILAR INFORMATION. WE BELIEVE THAT THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES SHOULD MAKE SOVIET ACTIVITIES AND OUR RECIPROCITY PROGRAMS AN IMPORTANT, CONTINUING SUBJECT FOR ACTION. THE UNITED STATES HAS BEGUN TO TAKE MEASURES TO ESTABLISH GREATER RECIPROCITY WITH THE SOVIET UNION. OUR BASIC PURPOSE IS TO USE RECIPROCITY AS LEVERAGE IN INDUCING THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT TO MODIFY THE TIGHT RESTRICTIONS PLACED ON OUR PERSONNEL AND OUR DIPLOMATIC OPERATIONS IN THE SOVIET UNION. A SECONDARY INTENT IS TO DENY THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT THE UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE THEY ENJOY BY VIRTUE OF THE FREE AND UNRESTRICTED ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH THEY CONDUCT THEIR OPERATIONS IN THE WEST, AS OPPOSED TO THE CLOSED AND CONTROLLED SETTING WITH WHICH WE MUST DEAL IN THE SOVIET UNION. SOME OF THE ACTIONS WE HAVE TAKEN INCLUDE TIGHTENED TRAVEL CONTROLS ON SOVIET PERSONNEL, AND REDUCTION OF SOVIET COMMERCIAL AND DIPLOMATIC STAFF. HOWEVER, MANY MORE ACTIONS MUST STILL BE TAKEN. WE BELIEVE NATO COULD BUILD UP A SUBSTANTIAL DATA BASE ON SOVIET ACTIONS IN WESTERN COUNTRIES AS A WHOLE AS WELL AS INFORMATION ON THE SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF WESTERN COUNTERMEASURES. WE PROPOSE TO GO INTO THIS SUBJECT IN GREATER DETAIL AT THE NAC ON SEPTEMBER 22.

12. OVERALL, WE MUST BE LOOKING FOR NEW INITIATIVES WHICH FOCUS INTERNATIONAL ATTENTION ON THE WESTERN AGENDA, AND TACTICAL DEVICES TO HIGHLIGHT OUR POLICIES AND VISION. PRESIDENT REAGAN PLANS TO SEND A LETTER TO PRESIDENT BREZHNEV IN ADVANCE OF THE UNGA AND THE BROAD THEME OF THIS LETTER WILL BE MADE PUBLIC. IF THEY DEEM IT APPROPRIATE OTHER NATO LEADERS MIGHT CONSIDER SENDING SIMILAR LETTERS. WE ARE PREPARED TO DISCUSS POSSIBLE THEMES, RECOGNIZING THAT THE LETTERS WOULD BE INDIVIDUAL EFFORTS.

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THE SOVIETS HAVE USED SUCH HIGH-LEVEL LETTERS CONTINUALLY AND OFTEN TO GOOD EFFECT. TAKING THE INITIATIVE TO SEND LETTERS FROM WESTERN LEADERS WILL PROVIDE BOTH THE SOVIETS AND OUR PUBLICS WITH A HIGH-PROFILE DEMONSTRATION OF OUR APPROACH, INVITING AND CHALLENGING THE SOVIETS TO JOIN IN AN EFFORT TO SET EAST-WEST RELATIONS ON A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE AND DURABLE BASIS.

WE ARE EAGER TO HEAR YOUR VIEWS AND SUGGESTIONS. WE ATTACH THE VERY HIGHEST PRIORITY TO THIS EFFORT TO TAKE THE POLITICAL INITIATIVE AND WANT TO WORK CLOSELY WITH YOU ON IT.

13. OUR IDEA IS THAT BY THE TIME OF THE DECEMBER MINISTERIAL WE WOULD HAVE GENERATED ENOUGH MOMENTUM THAT THEY COULD PROCLAIM WE HAVE IN FACT SHIFTED THE PUBLIC DEBATE TO THE WESTERN RATHER THAN THE SOVIET AGENDA.

14. FOR PARIS: YOU SHOULD POINT OUT TO THE FRENCH THAT WE UNDERSTAND CHEYSSON'S MAIN POINT IN HIS RESPONSE TO SECRETARY HAIG THAT MUCH OF THIS MUST BE DONE NATIONALLY. WE ARE NOT SEEKING TO IMPOSE A STRAITJACKET ON SUCH NATIONAL EFFORTS. RATHER, WE ARE SEEKING TO INFUSE THE WEST WITH A GENERAL SENSE OF CONFIDENCE AND PURPOSE -- WHICH IS ALSO FRENCH OBJECTIVE IN FACT, WE WELCOME CONSIDERATION OF INDIVIDUAL IDEAS AND INITIATIVES. STOESSEL
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E.O. 12065: RDS-1 09-08-11 (GLITMAN, MAYNARD W.)OR-M
TAGS: SOPN, XG, NATO
SUBJECT: REINFORCED NAC ON WESTERN POLITICAL OFFENSIVE/
- SHAPING EUROPEAN ATTITUDES
REFS: (A) STATE 239115
- (B) USNATO 5419

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. DURING FURTHER DISCUSSION OF SCHEDULING SUBJECT MEET-
ING AT SEPTEMBER 8 PERMREPS' LUNCH, SYG LUNS SAID THAT A
NAC COULD NOT BE SCHEDULED FOR THE FIFTEENTH. HE WILL BE
IN THE HAGUE FOR THE OPENING OF THE DUTCH PARLIAMENT AND
HAD AN IMPORTANT APPOINTMENT WITH PRIME MINISTER VAN AGT.
DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL DA RIN WILL BE ON LEAVE. HE
RECOGNIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE MEETING AND EXPRESSED
INTEREST IN BEING PRESENT.

3. IN RESPONSE TO CHARGE'S INQUIRY LUNS SAID IT WOULD NOT
BE POSSIBLE FOR HIM TO BE BACK FOR AN AFTERNOON SESSION
ON THE FIFTEENTH. THE 17TH WAS OUT BECAUSE MANY OF THE
PERMREPS WOULD BE ATTENDING ONE OF THE REFORGER EXERCISES
IN GERMANY. THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE, THEREFORE, WAS A
MEETING LATE ON THE 16TH. CHARGE EXPRESSED DISAPPOINT-
MENT THAT THE 15TH WAS NOT POSSIBLE BUT SAID HE WOULD
INFORM HIS AUTHORITIES OF THE OUTCOME OF THE LUNCH
DISCUSSION.

4. ROSE (UK) AND SEVERAL OTHER PERMREPS SAID THAT THEY

SIT:
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WHSR COMMENTS:

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HAD BEEN PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE 15TH BUT WOULD NOW HAVE TO CHECK AGAIN WITH POLITICAL DIRECTORS TO SEE WHETHER THE 16TH WAS ACCEPTABLE TO THEM. ALL WERE AWARE OF NEED TO SETTLE ON THIS AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE.

5. IN SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATION ROSE TOLD CHARGE THAT UK POLITICAL DIRECTOR BULLARD COULD NOT MAKE THE 16TH AND THAT HE EXPECTED OTHER POLITICAL DIRECTORS WOULD BE IN A SIMILAR SITUATION. ACCORDINGLY HE FELT A CHOICE WOULD HAVE TO BE MADE BETWEEN WHETHER TO HAVE LUNS CHAIR THE MEETING ON THE 16TH WITHOUT FULL REPRESENTATION FROM CAPITALS OR TO HAVE PERMREP DEAN SVART CHAIR THE MEETING ON THE 15TH IN THE ABSENCE OF LUNS. ROSE SAID UK WOULD RAISE THIS ISSUE AT SEPTEMBER 9 NAC.

6. COMMENT: IF INDEED THE CHOICES ARE AS STATED BY ROSE WE WOULD OPT FOR HOLDING THE MEETING ON THE 15TH WITH MAXIMUM REPRESENTATION FROM CAPITALS DESPITE THE FACT NEITHER LUNS NOR DA RIN WILL BE PRESENT TO CHAIR. REQUEST GUIDANCE. GLITMAN
BT

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