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Withdrawer

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File Folder PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 1981 (10/1/1981-1/5/1982)

FOIA

M11-442

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
137020	CABLE	USNATO 06033 <i>R 8/23/2016 M442/1</i>	8	10/2/1981	B1
137021	CABLE	LONDON 20763 <i>R 8/23/2016 M442/1</i>	1	10/24/1981	B1
137022	CABLE	STATE 289758 <i>R 8/23/2016 M442/1</i>	2	10/29/1981	B1
137025	CABLE	STATE 306059 <i>R 8/23/2016 M442/1</i>	2	11/17/1981	B1
137033	CABLE	BONN 24034 <i>R 8/23/2016 M442/1</i>	3	12/4/1981	B1
137035	MEMO	WILLIAM CLARK TO THE VICE PRESIDENT RE YOUR TRIP TO EUROPE; FEBRUARY 1982 <i>R 8/23/2016 M442/1</i>	5	ND	B1
137038	NOTES	HANDWRITTEN NOTES RE SHAPING ATTITUDES <i>R 8/23/2016 M442/1</i>	4	12/10/1981	B1
137039	NOTES	HANDWRITTEN NOTES RE SHAPING ATTITUDES <i>PAR 3/21/2017 M442/1</i>	3	ND	B1
137041	MEMO	RE EXAMPLES <i>PAR 3/21/2017 M442/1</i>	4	12/15/1981	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
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- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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137042	CABLE	STATE 335811 <i>R 8/23/2016 M442/1</i>	3	12/19/1981	B1
137043	NOTES	HANDWRITTEN NOTES RE SHAPING ATTITUDES <i>R 8/23/2016 M442/1</i>	2	1/15/1982	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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FM USMISSION USNATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0560

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 9713
USNMR SHAPE BE
USICA WASHDC

FILE: SHAPING
SU ROPTAN
ATT: ZIMES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 USNATO 06033

SHAPE FOR INTAFF
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 10-01-01 (GLITMAN, MAYNARD W.)OR-M
TAGS: NATO, MPOL, PARM, UR
SUBJECT: (C) WESTERN POLITICAL OFFENSIVE: OCT. 1 SPC
REFS: (A) STATE 262134, DTG 302127Z OCT 81
- (B) USNATO 5890, DTG 251742Z SEP 81
- (C) USNATO 5888, DTG 251719Z SEP 81

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR M4421 #137020
BY RW NARA DATE 8/23/16

2. SUMMARY. AT ITS OCTOBER 1 MEETING ON THE WESTERN POLITICAL OFFENSIVE, THE SPC: (A) AGREED TO HOLD A REINFORCED MEETING OF THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE OCTOBER 23 ON RECIPROCITY AND "ACTIVE" MEASURES, WITH FOLLOW-UP WORK BY POLADS, UNDER SPC OVERSIGHT, ON A REPORT TO MINISTERS; (B) CONFIRMED THE UNDERSTANDING THAT A FORCE COMPARISON WHITE PAPER WILL BE PREPARED BY THE DRC, WITH THE NPG STAFF GROUP CONTRIBUTING THE MATERIAL ON NUCLEAR FORCES; (C) AGREED TO COMMISSION A SPECIAL ISSUE OF THE NATO REVIEW WITH ARTICLES BY PROMINENT WESTERN FIGURES DESIGNED TO ENHANCE PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING OF NATO'S POLICIES AND OBJECTIVES; (D) INSTRUCTED THE INTERNATIONAL STAFF TO CONTINUE WORK ON A COMPILATION OF "QUOTABLE QUOTES", AS UNCLASSIFIED BACKGROUND MATERIAL ON ALLIED SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL POLICY, BUT TO NOT TO COVER LRINF AND SALT ISSUES. END SUMMARY.

- RECIPROCITY/ACTIVE MEASURES

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3. DURING OCTOBER 1 MEETING, SPC AGREED WITH RESPECT TO SOVIET "ACTIVE MEASURES"/RECIPROCITY ELEMENT OF US INITIATIVE ON WESTERN POLITICAL OFFENSIVE THAT:

- (A) ALLIES WILL SUBMIT CONTRIBUTIONS ON NATIONAL RECIPROCITY PRACTICES TO POLADS BY OCTOBER 15;
- (B) A POLITICAL COMMITTEE MEETING, REINFORCED BY EXPERTS PARTICIPATING IN SOVIET/EE EXPERTS MEETING AND, ON A DISCRETIONARY BASIS, INTELLIGENCE EXPERTS, WILL BE HELD OCTOBER 23 TO DISCUSS RECIPROCITY AND SOVIET "ACTIVE MEASURES". IN ADDITION TO POLADS' COMPILATION OF NATIONAL RECIPROCITY PRACTICES, MEETING WILL HAVE US SECRET PAPER ON SOVIET "ACTIVE MEASURES" AS REFERENCE DOCUMENT.
- (C) THE FORM OF REPORT(S) TO THE COUNCIL AND MINISTERS ON SOVIET "ACTIVE MEASURES" AND RECIPROCITY WILL BE DETERMINED AT THE OCTOBER 23 MEETING.

3. GIVEN HEAVY SPC WORKLOAD IN PERIOD LEADING UP TO MINISTERIAL, MOST REPS STRONGLY PREFERRED PROPOSAL ADVANCED BY FRENCH REP THAT POLADS -- RATHER THAN SPC -- CARRY FORTH WORK IN CONNECTION WITH OCTOBER 23 MEETING AND FOLLOW-UP. WHILE ISOLATED ON DESIRE TO HAVE DIRECT SPC ROLE, WE SECONDED CANADIAN SUGGESTION THAT SPC KEEP CLOSE TABS ON THIS AND VARIOUS NATO ACTIVITIES CONNECTED WITH WESTERN POLITICAL OFFENSIVE; NO OBJECTION WAS RAISED TO THIS PROPOSAL FOR SPC OVERSIGHT. WE ALSO MANAGED TO DEFLECT EFFORT ADVANCED BY CHAIRMAN LANKES AND NORWEGIAN AND DANES TO SEPARATE WORK ON "ACTIVE MEASURES" AND RECIPROCITY. SPC AGREED THAT SPECIAL COMMITTEE SHOULD ADDRESS "ACTIVE MEASURES" ISSUE AT THE TECHNICAL LEVEL AND PERHAPS PLAY SUPPORTING ROLE IN WAKE OF OCTOBER 23 MEETING. (UK REP HAS SUGGESTED THAT PAPER WORK ON "ACTIVE MEASURES" COMING OUT OF OCTOBER 23 MEETING AND SUBSEQUENT POLADS FOLLOW-UP MIGHT BE REVIEWED AT NOVEMBER 17-18 SPECIAL COMMITTEE MEETING, PRIOR TO SUBMISSION TO NAC/MINISTERS. WHILE THERE IS GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT OCTOBER 23 MEETING WOULD FOCUS PRIMARILY ON RECIPROCITY, IT IS RECOGNIZED THAT MEETING ALSO WILL ADDRESS "ACTIVE MEASURES" IN LIGHT OF THE FUNCTIONAL AND CONCEPTUAL LINKAGE BETWEEN THE TWO SUBJECTS -- A POINT UNDERSCORED BY US REP AND STRONGLY SUPPORTED, INTER ALIA, BY ITALIAN DCM (FERRARI). WE THUS ANTICIPATE THAT REPORT TO MINISTERS WILL COVER BOTH RECIPROCITY AND SOVIET "ACTIVE MEASURES" IN A MANNER THAT LINKS THE TWO.

4. PER REF A, US REP CIRCULATED PAPER ON SOVIET IMPOSI-

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TION OF TIGHTER CONTROLS ON FOREIGNERS AND NOTED THAT WE
WOULD BE RELEASING REVISED, UNCLASSIFIED "ACTIVE MEASURES"
PAPER ON OCTOBER 7. AFTER NOTING HE UNDERSTOOD US PAPER
WOULD BE IDENTIFIED AS US DOCUMENT, CANADIAN REP SAID
OTTAWA WAS CONTEMPLATING RELEASE OF A SIMILAR PAPER RELAT-
ING CANADIAN EXPERIENCES WITH SOVIET "ACTIVE MEASURES".
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 USNATO 06033

NATO WHITE PAPER

5. THE SPC QUICKLY CONFIRMED ITS UNDERSTANDING THAT A NATO FORCE COMPARISON WHITE PAPER WILL BE PREPARED BY THE DEFENSE REVIEW COMMITTEE, WITH THE NPG STAFF GROUP PROVIDING THE MATERIAL ON NUCLEAR FORCES (AS DESCRIBED PARA 4 REF B). FRENCH REP REITERATED FRENCH POSITION THAT FRENCH FORCES SHOULD BE MENTIONED NOWHERE IN THE DOCUMENT. THE CHAIRMAN POINTED OUT THAT FIRST DRAFT OF THE WHITE PAPER, PREPARED BY THE INTERNATIONAL STAFF, RECOGNIZES EXPLICITLY "THAT NO ACCOUNT OF FRENCH FORCES CAN . . . BE TAKEN IN THIS COMPARISON."

POLITICAL/DEFENSE RATIONALE

6. THERE WAS A CONSENSUS THAT THE NEED FOR PERSUASIVE ARGUMENTATION TO IMPROVE UNDERSTANDING OF NATO'S POLICIES AND OBJECTIVES COULD NOT BE FULFILLED BY DRAFTING AN AGREED ALLIANCE PAPER, WHICH WOULD BE A DIFFICULT AND LENGTHY PROJECT AND PROBABLY RESULT IN PRODUCT WHICH, AS FRENCH REP PUT IT, PUBLICS WOULD FIND UNREADABLE. INSTEAD THERE WAS AGREEMENT TO THE SUGGESTION OF THE UK REP THAT A SET OF ARTICLES BY PROMINENT AUTHORS AND PUBLIC FIGURES BE COMMISSIONED FOR PUBLICATION IN A SPECIAL ISSUE OF THE NATO REVIEW. THE SPC WOULD SUGGEST A LIST OF POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTORS AND SUBJECTS FOR TREATMENT AND THEN LEAVE

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MANAGEMENT OF THE PROJECT TO THE NATO INFORMATION SERVICE. US REP STRESSED THAT TO BE EFFECTIVE THE PAMPHLET SHOULD BE AN ATTRACTIVE, PROFESSIONAL PRODUCT. UK REP SAW POSSIBILITY OF INCLUDING CARTOONS BY PROFESSIONAL POLITICAL CARTOONISTS. ITALIAN REP SAID ARTICLES SHOULD BE "CONCISE AND INTELLECTUALLY STIMULATING".

7. IT WAS AGREED THAT DELEGATIONS WOULD SUBMIT SUGGESTIONS FOR CONTRIBUTORS AND SUBJECTS TO THE SPC CHAIRMAN. OFFERING AN INDICATIVE LIST OF SUBJECTS OR THEMES FOR ARTICLES, UK REP SUGGESTED THE FOLLOWING: WESTERN VALUES, WHY NATO?, DETERRENCE AND THE PURPOSE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND WESTERN AND SOVIET ATTITUDES TOWARDS ARMS CONTROL. CANADIAN REP AGREED ON THE IMPORTANCE OF A PIECE DEBUNKING SOVIET ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS. FRG REP SUGGESTED, AND CHAIRMAN AGREED, THAT AN ARTICLE ON TNF SHOULD BE ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL ITEMS. US REP SAID THIS MIGHT, ALTERNATIVELY, BE SUBSUMED UNDER BROADER CONSIDERATION OF SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL. NETHERLANDS REP RECOMMENDED PROMINENT TREATMENT OF SOVIET ACTIVITIES.

8. THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT TO US REP'S PROPOSAL OF EARLY SPRING AS A TARGET DATE FOR PUBLICATION.

9. ACTION REQUESTED: WASHINGTON'S RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CONTRIBUTORS AND SUBJECTS TO BE TREATED.

INTERNATIONAL STAFF BIBLIOGRAPHY OF MATERIALS AND
COMPILATION OF QUOTES ON "PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE NUCLEAR
AGE"

10. THERE WAS AGREEMENT THAT THE INTERNATIONAL STAFF SHOULD CONTINUE WORK ON THE BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SOURCES AND THE COMPILATION OF QUOTES REPORTED REF C. DISCUSSION TURNED ON THE QUESTION OF THE SCOPE OF THE COMPILATION.

11. UK REP SUGGESTED THAT THE IS CONCENTRATE ON COMPILING "QUOTABLE QUOTES" ON NATO'S GENERAL SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL POLICY, FOLLOWING THE OUTLINE CIRCULATED WITH ITS FIRST DRAFT, BUT EXCLUDING MATERIAL ON SALT AND LRTNF. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE LATTER MIGHT BE PROVIDED AT SOME LATER DATE BY THE SPC. CHAIRMAN PROPOSED KEEPING LRTNF MATERIAL

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IN AND ASKING THE SCG TO VET IT, AND FRG REP PROPOSED SOLICITING A CONTRIBUTION FROM THE SCG.

12. NORWEGIAN REP, SPEAKING ON INSTRUCTIONS, PROPOSED THAT MATERIAL BE INCLUDED ON THE RATIONALE FOR NATO AND THE ALLIED INTEREST IN GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE EAST. HE ALSO CRITICIZED ELEMENTS OF THE MATERIAL ON LRTNF INCLUDED IN THE INTERNATIONAL STAFF'S FIRST DRAFT, SPECIFICALLY PASSAGES WHICH HE SAID OSLO BELIEVED FOCUSED TOO MUCH ON THE EURO-STRATEGIC BALANCE AND IMPLIED THE POSSIBILITY OF A NUCLEAR WAR LIMITED TO EUROPE.

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13. US REP POINTED OUT THAT THE DEVELOPMENT OF PUBLIC POSTURE MATERIAL ON TNF WAS RELATED ORGANICALLY TO THE DEVELOPMENT AND SUPPORT OF A NEGOTIATING POSITION, AND URGED THEREFORE THAT THIS BE LEFT TO THE SCG. EVEN SELECTING PASSAGES FROM SCG DOCUMENTS FOR INCLUSION IN AN SPC COMPENDIUM INVOLVED ISSUES OF EMPHASIS AND TIMELINESS THAT WERE BETTER LEFT TO THE SCG. CHAIRMAN RELUCTANTLY CONSENTED THAT IN FURTHER DEVELOPING ITS COMPENDIUM OF QUOTATIONS AND EXCERPTS THE INTERNATIONAL STAFF WOULD NOT RPT NOT INCLUDE MATERIAL ON LRTNF.

- COMMENT: IN PRIVATE DISCUSSION FOLLOWING MEETING, FRG REP CONTINUED TO ARGUE FOR INCLUSION OF LRTNF MATERIAL IN COMPILATION IN THE INTEREST OF COMPLETENESS. WHILE WE HAVE FORESTALLED THIS FOR THE PRESENT, WE THINK IT LIKELY THAT FRG WILL RAISE THE ISSUE AGAIN AS WORK ON THE COMPILATION PROCEEDS. END COMMENT.

14. UK REP PROPOSED INCLUSION OF A SECTION OF QUOTES ON WESTERN VALUES FROM SUCH SOURCES AS JUDGE GRIFFIN BELL'S SPEECH AT THE OPENING OF THE CSCE CONFERENCE IN MADRID.

15. UNDERSTANDING WAS RECONFIRMED THAT INTERNATIONAL STAFF COLLATION WOULD NOT BE FOR PUBLICATION OR PUBLIC DISTRIBUTION BUT FOR ALLIED GOVERNMENTS TO DRAW UPON AS THEY MIGHT SEE FIT, AND THAT IT WOULD REMAIN A COLLECTION OF QUOTATIONS FROM ALREADY AVAILABLE MATERIAL WITH NO

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ORIGINAL DRAFTING. GLITMAN
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E.O. 12065: N/A

TAGS: ENSD

SUBJECT: SOVIET ABSENCE FROM INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC DIAEOGUE

, DURING HIS OCTOBER 15 ADDRESS TO THE PHILADELPHIA
WORLD AFFAIRS COUNCIL PRESIDENT REAGAN MADE FOLLOWING
COMMENT ON SOVIET NON-PARTICIPATION AT CANCUN SUMMIT:

BEGIN TEXT

PERHAPS THE BEST PROOF THAT DEVELOPMENT AND ECONOMIC
FREEDOM GO HAND-IN-HAND CAN BE FOUND IN A COUNTRY WHICH
DENIES FREEDOM TO ITS PEOPLE--THE SOVIET UNION. FOR THE
RECORD, THE SOVIETS WILL NOT ATTEND THE CONFERENCE AT
CANCUN. THEY SIMPLY WASH THEIR HANDS OF ANY RESPONSIBILITY,
INSISTING ALL THE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF THE WORLD RESULT
FROM CAPITALISM AND ALL THE SOLUTIONS LIE WITH SOCIALISM.

THE REAL REASON THEY'RE NOT COMING IS THEY HAVE NOTHING TO
OFFER. IN FACT, WE HAVE JUST ONE QUESTION FOR THEM: WHO'S
FEEDING WHOM? I CAN HARDLY REMEMBER A YEAR WHEN SOVIET
HARVESTS HAVE NOT BEEN BLAMED ON "BAD WEATHER." AND I'VE
SEEN A LOT OF HARVEST SEASONS, AS THE PRESS KEEPS REMINDING
ME. THEY'VE HAD QUITE A LONG LOSING STREAK FOR A

GOVERNMENT WHICH STILL INSISTS THE TIDES OF HISTORY ARE
RUNNING IN ITS FAVOR. ...

NOW, THAT'S WHY THIS ISN'T A QUESTION OF EAST VERSUS WEST,
OF THE UNITED STATES VERSUS THE SOVIET UNION. IT'S A
QUESTION OF FREEDOM VERSUS COMPULSION, OF WHAT WORKS
VERSUS WHAT DOESN'T WORK, OF SENSE VERSUS NONSENSE. AND
THAT'S WHY WE SAY: TRUST THE PEOPLE, TRUST THEIR
INTELLIGENCE, AND TRUST THEIR FAITH, BECAUSE PUTTING
PEOPLE FIRST IS THE SECRET OF ECONOMIC SUCCESS EVERYWHERE
IN THE WORLD. END TEXT

2. WE NOW WANT TO FOLLOW-UP TO DRIVE HOME THE PRESIDENT'S
POINT THAT THE SOVIETS ARE FAILING TO CARRY THEIR FAIR
SHARE OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
COOPERATION. ACTION ADDRESSES SHOULD IN POST DISCRETION
USE FACT SHEET AS APPROPRIATE FOLLOWING CONCLUSION OF
CANCUN SUMMIT IN UNDERSCORING CONTINUED SOVIET

INDIFFERENCE TO LDC PROBLEMS AND NON-PARTICIPATION IN
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC DIALOGUE.

3. FACT SHEET

BEGIN TEXT

-- IN 1980 THE USSR GAVE LITTLE MORE THAN ONE-TENTH OF
ONE PERCENT OF ITS GNP TO ECONOMIC AID DISBURSEMENTS TO
ALL LDCS.

-- OF THAT AID, OVER 90 WENT TO ITS COMMUNIST ALLIES
(CUBA, VIETNAM, MONGOLIA, NORTH KOREA AND AFGHANISTAN).

-- IN TERMS OF TRADE, ONLY 10-15 OF SOVIET EXPORTS GO
TO NON-COMMUNIST LDCS, AND ABOUT HALF OF THOSE EXPORTS
CONSIST OF MILITARY SALES.

-- THROUGH PREFERENTIAL AGREEMENTS AS IN THE CASE OF
SUGAR WITH CUBA, THE SOVIET UNION HAS EFFECTIVELY CUT
OFF ITS MARKET TO OTHERS.

-- THE LDCS HAVE A TRADE DEFICIT WITH THE SOVIET UNION;
FOR EXAMPLE, IN 1979, THE LDCS PURCHASED \$4.7 BILLION
MORE THAN THE USSR WAS PREPARED TO BUY FROM THEM.

-- OVER THE ENTIRE QUARTER CENTURY, FROM 1954 TO 1979
THE SOVIET UNION HAS EXTENDED A TOTAL OF ONLY \$65 BILLION
IN FOREIGN AID, AND OF THAT SUM, ONLY \$18 BILLION WAS

ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE. (FYI. DURING THE SAME PERIOD,
THE US HAS EXTENDED APPROXIMATELY \$168 BILLION IN
FOREIGN AID, OF WHICH \$100 BILLION WAS ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
AND APPROXIMATELY \$68 BILLION MILITARY ASSISTANCE

-- IN SOME RECENT YEARS, INTERSTAND REPAYMENTS OF AID
TO THE USSR HAVE ACTUALLY AMOUNTED TO MORE THAN
DISBURSEMENTS.
-- THE SOVIET UNION HAS REFUSED TO SUPPORT ANY ASSISTANCE
EFFORTS OF THE MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS CHARTERED
UNDER UN AUSPICIES.

-- THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS ALLIES HAVE CREATED ON THE
ORDER OF 10 MILLION REFUGEES FROM INDOCHINA THROUGH
AFGHANISTAN TO THE HORN OF AFRICA AND ACROSS TO CUBA AND
CENTRAL AMERICA. THEY HAVE CONSISTENTLY REFUSED TO
HELP WITH THE ENORMOUS ECONOMIC AND HUMAN TRAGEDY FOR
WHICH THEY BEAR THE RESPONSIBILITY. END TEXT CLARK
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PAGE 01 LONDON 0763 DTG: 240848Z OCT 81 PSN: 041736
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DEFENSE FOR SECRETARY WEINBERGER
E.O. 12065: GDS 10/23/87 (STREATOR, E.J.) OR-M
TAGS: OVIP, MPOL, UK, NATO
SUBJECT: SECRETARY WEINBERGER'S LONDON VISIT: WESTERN
- POLITICAL OFFENSIVE IN ACTION
REF: (A) LONDON ICA 221214Z OCT, (B) LONDON ICA 221743Z

1. SUMMARY: (C) SECRETARY WEINBERGER'S LONDON VISIT
REFLECTED THE WESTERN POLITICAL OFFENSIVE IN ACTION.
HIS THREE SEMI-PUBLIC APPEARANCES COUPLED WITH HIS PRIME
TIME NATIONAL TV AND RADIO INTERVIEWS HELPED ENORMOUSLY
TO ALLAY LOCAL FEARS AND APPREHENSIONS ABOUT U.S.
POLICIES. THERE IS NO SUBSTITUTE FOR PERSONAL EXPOSURE.
IT SHOWS WHAT A PRESIDENTIAL VISIT COULD DO. END SUMMARY.

2. (LOU) SECRETARY WEINBERGER'S VISIT TO LONDON FOLLOWING
THE NPG MINISTERIAL MEETING WAS A RESOUNDING PUBLIC
RELATIONS SUCCESS. IN HIS THREE SEMI-PUBLIC APPEARANCES --
A MAJOR DEFENSE POLICY ADDRESS TO CHATHAM HOUSE, INFORMAL
MEETING WITH MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT, AND A LUNCH WITH
BRITISH LEADERS -- HE EMPHASIZED THE SOVIET CHALLENGE,
PREACHED PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH AND EXTOLLED ALLIANCE
UNITY. OTHER THEMES INCLUDED THE NEED TO REDRESS THE
MILITARY IMBALANCE, THE DETERRENCE ROLE OF STRATEGIC,
TNF, AND OTHER MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS, AND OUR SUPPORT
FOR THE NEED TO ENGAGE SIMULTANEOUSLY IN MEANINGFUL ARMS
REDUCTION TALKS.

3. (LOU) CHATHAM HOUSE. SECRETARY WEINBERGER'S MAJOR
DEFENSE POLICY ADDRESS TO A PACKED HOUSE ON OCTOBER 22
WAS EXTREMELY WELL-RECEIVED (REFTELS FORWARDED THE FULL
TEXT AND ENSUING QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS). FOLLOWING
HIS ADDRESS, THERE WERE A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS ON
EUROPEAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS, NEUTRALISM, POTENTIAL U.S.
ISOLATION AND ALLEGED U.S. WILLINGNESS TO LIMIT A NUCLEAR
WAR TO EUROPE THAT ALLOWED THE SECRETARY TO SET THE
RECORD STRAIGHT. WE HAVE HEARD WIDE PRAISE FOR THE
SECRETARY'S ADDRESS AND AGILE HANDLING OF QUESTIONS.
ONE OF THE TOUGHEST CONSTRUCTIVE CRITICS OF U.S. POLICY --
AND ITS PUBLIC PRESENTATION -- FCO UNDER SECRETARY
JULIAN BULLARD TOLD AMBASSADOR HOW EFFECTIVE THE
SECRETARY HAD BEEN. LEN DOWNEY OF THE WASHINGTON POST,

DAVID FAIRHALL OF THE GUARDIAN AND BILL TUOHY OF THE
L.A. TIMES WERE ALSO LAVISH IN THEIR PRAISE, AS WAS LORD
HARLECH, FORMER BRITISH AMBASSADOR TO WASHINGTON, WHO
INTRODUCED THE SECRETARY'S ADDRESS. DEFENSE SECRETARY
JOHN NOTT, WHO WAS PRESENT, ALSO TOLD THE DCM THE SPEECH
WAS "FIRST RATE".

4. (LOU) PARLIAMENT. LATE AFTERNOON ON OCTOBER 22,
SECRETARY WEINBERGER SPOKE INFORMALLY IN AN OVERFLOWING
COMMITTEE ROOM AT PARLIAMENT TO OVER 100 MEMBERS
OF BOTH COMMONS AND LORDS. LORD CHALFONT, CHAIRMAN
OF THE ALL PARTY DEFENSE STUDY GROUP, CHAIRED THE
SESSION, WHICH WAS JOINTLY SPONSORED BY THE BRITISH-
AMERICAN PARLIAMENTARY GROUP. THE QUESTION PERIOD,
WHICH FOUND THE UNILATERALISTS BICKERING WITH THE
CHAIRMAN OVER EQUAL TIME, AGAIN PERMITTED THE SECRETARY
TO EXPLAIN U.S. POLICIES TO A KEY GROUP OF PARLIAMENTARIANS.

5. (LOU) MEDIA INTERVIEWS AND AMBASSADOR'S LUNCH.
LATER ON OCTOBER 22, IN NATIONAL TV AND RADIO INTERVIEWS
AT PRIME TIMES THE SECRETARY SPOKE TO CURRENT CONCERNS
REACHING THE WIDEST AUDIENCE WE HAVE YET TOUCHED
DIRECTLY ON THE ADMINISTRATION'S DEFENSE AND FOREIGN
POLICIES. ON OCTOBER 23 OVER LUNCH AT THE AMBASSADOR'S
RESIDENCE FOR A CROSS-SECTION OF FIFTEEN BRITISH GOVERN-
MENT, PARLIAMENTARY, BUSINESS, MEDIA AND TRADE UNION
LEADERS THE SECRETARY AGAIN MADE A SPECIAL POINT OF
ADDRESSING CURRENT EUROPEAN FEARS AND APPREHENSIONS
OVER THE DIRECTION OF U.S. POLICY. AGAIN, WE HEARD MANY
FAVORABLE COMMENTS. SIR ANTHONY ACLAND, FCO UNDER
SECRETARY, TOLD DCM THAT HE AND SIR MICHAEL PALLISER,
FCO PERMANENT UNDER SECRETARY, HAD AGREED THAT WEINBERGER'S
EFFORTS WERE THE MOST EFFECTIVE EFFORT TO DATE BY THE
ADMINISTRATION TO PROMOTE UNDERSTANDING OF U.S. POLICIES
IN THE U.K.

6. (C) NEED FOR MORE VISITS. THE SECRETARY'S YEOMAN
WORK HAS AIDED IMMENSELY IN OUR EFFORT TO EDUCATE PUBLIC
OPINION HERE. HIS EFFORTS WILL PAY HEAVY DIVIDENDS IN
THE WEEKS AHEAD. THE VISIT SHOWS THERE IS NO SUBSTITUTE
FOR PERSONAL EXPOSURE. IT DEMONSTRATES HOW USEFUL A
PRESIDENTIAL VISIT WOULD BE IN OUR CAMPAIGN TO STRENGTHEN
BT

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AMEMBASSY BELGRADE IMMEDIATE 0000

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~~SECRET~~ STATE 289758

E.O. 12065:RDS-1 10/28/01 (GOMPERT, DAVID C.)

TAGS: NATO, MPOL

SUBJECT: WESTERN POLITICAL OFFENSIVE: PUBLIC AFFAIRS
PROGRAMS AND MATERIALS ON EAST-WEST FORCE COMPARISONS,
LRTNF AND THE SOVIET THREAT

REFS: (A) USNATO 6020 DTG 011817Z OCT 81
(B) STATE 260414 DTG 291420Z SEP 81
(C) ANKARA 6878 DTG 181309Z SEP 81
(D) USNATO 4105 DTG 251239Z JUN 81
(E) USNATO 6228 DTG 00082137Z OCT 81
(F) USNATO 6262 DTG 091608Z OCT 81
(G) USNATO 6271 DTG 091916Z OCT 81

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. WE HAVE RECEIVED A NUMBER OF SUGGESTIONS (REFTELS)
CONCERNING OUR PACKAGE OF MATERIALS ON THE SOVIET
THREAT, TNF PUBLIC POLICY AND THE NATO WHITE PAPER.
BASED ON THESE SUGGESTIONS, WE HAVE MADE THE FOLLOWING
DECISIONS CONCERNING THESE VARIOUS PROJECTS:

A. FORCE BALANCE PAPER: WE HAVE DECIDED TO ELIMINATE
OUR FORCE BALANCE PAPER FROM THE PACKAGE OF
UNCLASSIFIED THREAT MATERIALS (REF B). INSTEAD, WE
WISH TO SEE MATERIAL FROM THIS PAPER INCORPORATED IN
THE NATO WHITE PAPER BEING PREPARED BY THE DRC. WE
HAVE THUS PROVIDED ASG NICHOLLS WITH COPIES OF THE
CHARTS AND OTHER MATERIALS USED IN OUR FORCE BALANCE
PAPER, AS WELL AS WITH THE PACKET OF CIA SUPPLEMENTARY
GRAPHICS. WE WOULD INTEND FOR ASG NICHOLLS TO USE
THESE MATERIALS AS NEEDED IN THE NATO WHITE PAPER.

B. NATO WHITE PAPER: WE HAVE CONSIDERED THE OPTIONS

PRESENTED IN REF (G) CONCERNING THE TIMING AND MANNER
OF RELEASE FOR THIS PAPER. ALTHOUGH WE WOULD STILL
HOPE FOR MINISTERIAL APPROVAL OF THE WHITE PAPER IN
DECEMBER, WE HAVE CONCLUDED THAT, FOR PRESENTATIONAL
REASONS, IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO RELEASE A
HIGH-QUALITY, UNCLASSIFIED GLOSSY BROCHURE AROUND THE
END OF FEBRUARY; SELECTED, HIGHLY NEWSWORTHY FORCE
COMPARISON FIGURES COULD BE INCLUDED IN THE DECEMBER
DPC COMMUNIQUE TO DRAW ATTENTION TO THIS EFFORT AND
CREATE ANTICIPATION. WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE
TO PUBLISH A LOWER QUALITY ADVANCE PAPER IN DECEMBER,
SINCE IT WOULD DETRACT FROM THE IMPACT OF THE FINAL
BROCHURE AND WOULD NOT RECEIVE ADEQUATE ATTENTION IN
VIEW OF THE JUST-INITIATED TNF NEGOTIATIONS AND OTHER
MATTERS OF HIGH INTEREST TO BE DISCUSSED IN THE
MINISTERIALS. ON A RELATED POINT, WE HOPE THE UK WILL
NOT OPPOSE THE TERM "WHITE PAPER" SINCE, DESPITE ITS
SPECIAL MEANING IN THE UK, THE TERM CLEARLY SIGNIFIES
FOR MOST PEOPLE THAT THE DOCUMENT IN QUESTION HAS BEEN
SANCTIONED AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS AND REPRESENTS AN
OFFICIAL POSITION ON QUESTIONS OF HIGH POLICY AND
IMPORT.

C. TNF PUBLIC POLICY: WE DO NOT BELIEVE IT WOULD BE
PHYSICALLY POSSIBLE TO PRODUCE A TNF BALANCE PAPER
(BROCHURE) WITHIN THE TIMEFRAME INDICATED IN REF (E).
SUCH A BROCHURE SHOULD INCLUDE THE TNF BALANCE IN OUR
TERMS -- AND THUS MUST AWAIT COMPLETE DEVELOPMENT OF
OUR NEGOTIATING APPROACH. (AS NOTED BELOW, WE DO HAVE
A PAPER REFUTING SOVIET CLAIMS.) WE DO BELIEVE,
HOWEVER, THAT IT WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL FOR INFORMATION
ON THE TNF BALANCE AND THE SOVIET TNF THREAT TO BE
AVAILABLE TO THE PUBLIC PRIOR TO THE OPENING OF THE TNF
NEGOTIATIONS. IN THIS REGARD, WE WILL MAKE AVAILABLE

TO THE ALLIES THROUGH THE SCG AN UNCLASSIFIED PAPER
REFUTING SOVIET CLAIMS ON THE TNF BALANCE AND AN
UNCLASSIFIED VERSION OF THE HLG THREAT ASSESSMENT WITH
ASSOCIATED GRAPHICS. WE ARE WORKING ON A PUBLIC
PRESENTATION PAPER ON U.S. NEGOTIATING OBJECTIVES WHICH
WILL ALSO BE WORKED WITH THE ALLIES THROUGH THE SCG,
AND THEN BE MADE PUBLIC AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME. WE MAY
ALSO PROVIDE THE SCG APPROPRIATE GRAPHICS FROM THE CIA
PACKET (MENTIONED IN PARA A ABOVE) AND OTHER U.S.
MATERIALS AS THEY MAY BE AVAILABLE. WE BELIEVE THIS
APPROACH OFFERS THE BEST MEANS OF PROVIDING TIMELY
INFORMATION TO THE PUBLIC IN A WAY WHICH DOES NOT
ATTACH A "MADE-IN-USA" LABEL TO THE PROGRAM OR OVERLY
INVOLVE NATO (COMMENT: WE WOULD PREFER TO SEE NATO'S
ORGANIZATIONAL WEIGHT SAVED FOR THE WHITE PAPER).
FURTHERMORE, THIS PARTICULAR EFFORT WILL HELP MAINTAIN
THE MOMENTUM OF THIS PART OF THE WESTERN POLITICAL
OFFENSIVE; IT FOLLOWS RELEASE OF THE SECDEF BOOKLET AND
WILL SERVE AS A GOOD PREFACE TO THE MINISTERIALS AND
THE FEBRUARY RELEASE OF THE NATO WHITE PAPER. LASTLY,
THIS APPROACH WILL PLACE MAXIMUM DISCRETION IN THE
HANDS OF SCG MEMBERS TO UNDERTAKE PUBLIC AFFAIRS
EFFORTS TAILORED TO THEIR NATIONAL NEEDS AS WELL AS TO
THE CREATION OF AN APPROPRIATE PUBLIC SETTING FOR THE
OPENING OF THE TNF NEGOTIATIONS.

D. COVER MEMORANDUM FOR THE THREAT MATERIALS PACKAGE:
ALTHOUGH WE INTENDED THE COVER MEMORANDUM (REF B) TO BE
A REFERENCE GUIDE RATHER THAN AN INSTRUCTION MANUAL FOR
ALLIES' NATIONAL CAMPAIGNS, WE ARE AGREEABLE TO THE
IDEA OF HAVING USNATO AND EMBASSIES DECIDE HOW BEST TO
USE THE MATERIAL IN THE MEMORANDUM. THERE WILL NO
LONGER BE AN UNCLASSIFIED THREAT MATERIALS PACKAGE AS
OUTLINED IN REFTEL (B) SINCE THE MATERIALS WE HAD

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PLANNED TO INCLUDE IN THE PACKAGE HAVE NOW BEEN SUBSUMED INTO OTHER PROGRAMS AS NOTED ABOVE. THE CONTENTS OF THE COVER MEMORANDUM, IT SHOULD BE NOTED HOWEVER, ARE VALID FOR ALL PUBLIC AFFAIRS ASPECTS OF THE WESTERN POLITICAL OFFENSIVE, AND WE WOULD EXPECT TO SEE EMBASSIES USE IT AS APPROPRIATE TO ASSIST HOST GOVERNMENTS IN PROMOTING NATIONAL CAMPAIGNS.

E. ROLE OF NATO: WE MAY NOT HAVE MADE OURSELVES CLEAR IN THE COVER MEMORANDUM CONCERNING THE ROLE OF NATO IN THIS PROGRAM. WE FULLY AGREE THAT NATO SHOULD NOT GO FORMALLY BEYOND THE ROLE OUTLINED IN REF (D).

3. IN ADDITION TO THE SPECIFIC GUIDANCE PROVIDED

ABOVE, THERE ARE SOME GENERAL POINTS WE WISH TO MAKE ABOUT THE WESTERN POLITICAL OFFENSIVE AND ITS ROLE IN EDUCATING THE PUBLIC ON THE SOVIET THREAT:

A. WE WISH TO SEE A SUSTAINED EFFORT OVER A PERIOD OF SEVERAL MONTHS TO EDUCATE THE GENERAL PUBLIC IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES ON THE NATURE OF THE SOVIET THREAT. THE SECDEF BOOKLET, THE VARIOUS TNF THREAT MATERIALS, AND THE FORTHCOMING NATO WHITE PAPER ARE TO BE MAJOR "TOOLS." THE TIMING FOR RELEASE OF THESE ITEMS IS GEARED TO CREATE A GROWING BODY OF PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE ON THIS SUBJECT AND TO SUSTAIN MOMENTUM FOR THIS PART OF THE WESTERN POLITICAL OFFENSIVE.

B. WE FULLY RECOGNIZE THAT FOR SOME ALLIED COUNTRIES THE CONDUCT OF A NATIONAL PUBLIC AFFAIRS CAMPAIGN ON THE SOVIET THREAT MAY BE POLITICALLY DIFFICULT, IF NOT UNPALATABLE. IN THIS CASE, WE WILL LOOK TO EMBASSIES TO HELP PROMOTE WHATEVER PROGRAM MIGHT BE FEASIBLE THROUGH CONTACTS IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR (JOURNALISTS, UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS, POLITICAL GROUPS, ETC.). WE CANNOT EMPHASIZE STRONGLY ENOUGH THAT AN EDUCATIONAL EFFORT OF SOME SORT MUST BE MADE. EMBASSIES SHOULD GET THE MATERIAL TO THE PUBLIC BY ANY DISCREET MEANS THAT DO NOT DETRACT FROM THE STATE OF OVERALL RELATIONS WITH THE HOST GOVERNMENT AND DO NOT RELIEVE PRESSURE ON THE HOST GOVERNMENT TO UNDERTAKE THIS IMPORTANT EDUCATIONAL EFFORT.

C. NATO CAN SERVE AS A LOCUS FOR PLACING PRESSURE ON HESITANT ALLIES TO FOLLOW UP WITH THEIR OWN CAMPAIGNS. THIS WOULD BE AN INFORMAL CORRIDOR EFFORT AND SHOULD INVOLVE AS MANY ALLIES AS POSSIBLE TO OVERCOME OR FIND A WAY AROUND THE TIMIDITY OF ANY INDIVIDUAL GOVERNMENT IN CARRYING OUT A NATIONAL EDUCATIONAL EFFORT.

D. WE MUST MAKE A MAJOR EFFORT TO TURN AROUND THOSE GOVERNMENTS WHICH DO NOT ATTEMPT TO EDUCATE THEIR PUBLICS ABOUT THE FACTS OF THE SOVIET MILITARY BUILDUP. IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT WE OVERCOME THEIR NEGATIVE ATTITUDE.

HAIG
BT

~~SECRET~~

SCHMIDT: ARMS CONTROL POLICY POSSIBLE WITH USSR

LDO51606 Hamburg DPA in German 1526 GMT 5 Nov 81

[Text] Bonn, 5 Nov (DPA) -- Chancellor Helmut Schmidt is firmly convinced that a trust-worthy arms control policy can be reached with the Soviet Union. In a German television interview today, the chancellor said the Soviets are not easy but rather crafty negotiating partners and would naturally exploit any loopholes in treaties and agreements. "But negotiations and results are possible." He said both the nuclear test-ban treaty and the nuclear weapon nonproliferation treaty had been carefully adhered to by the Soviet Union.

The chancellor, who will also speak with Leonid Brezhnev about disarmament matters in Bonn at the end of November, criticized Moscow for arming with SS-20 medium-range missiles and Backfire bombers. This arming posed a considerable threat to the balance and thus also a political threat. Schmidt added that the Soviet leaders knew this to be his stand-point.

Schmidt again called for cooperation and military balance between East and West as common factors for the safeguarding of peace. He was, and would remain, a supporter of the philosophy of military balance, which one could also call "the balance of mutual deterrence". In the area of medium-range missiles, Schmidt again urged renunciation by both sides on the lines of the zero option.

DIE ZEIT CRITICAL OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY PROCESS

DW051429 Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 6 Nov 81 p 3

[Theo Sommer article: "No Concept for Geneva Yet"]

[Text] Together with the autumn leaves, the first illusions of the new team in Washington are also falling 9 months after Ronald Reagan's inauguration. The colorfulness of the Indian summer is fading in nature and politics alike. Gusts of reality's wind are sweeping yellowed leaves and withered ideas through Pennsylvania Avenue.

The initial enthusiasm of the conservative economists has yielded to softer tones. Budget Director Stockman and Secretary of the Treasury Reagan have lately been putting strong doubts on record that the supreme goal of the administration -- a balanced budget by 1984 -- can really be attained. What continues to be valid in military policy is that the United States must become number one again in the world: the financial dilemma, however, has Reagan's procurement decisions not going dramatically beyond the plans left by Jimmy Carter. In foreign policy the election campaign rhetoric of strength and uncompromising attitude are still reverberating, yet flexible and much more undogmatic than anybody would have dreamed 6 months ago.

The European visitor looking around in the U.S. capital a year after Ronald Reagan's election victory returns home with highly mixed feelings. There are three major impressions:

First and positive: The influence of the extreme right has declined and the weight of the center-right group is increasing.

Second and unpleasant: Europe is not particularly highly valued in Reagan's Washington. Nobody is particularly favorably disposed toward the overseas allies. The peace movement in the old world finds little understanding. Pacifism is equated with defeatism, and anybody advocating European interests is quickly suspected of neutralism.

Third and negative: The foreign policy decision-making mechanism in President Reagan's government apparatus is still the weakest link.

From the very beginning the Reagan administration had a dual spirit.

Oneside was that of the California conservatives, the other that of the internationalist conservatives.

NETHERLANDSPARTIES STILL HAGGLING OVER TAXES, SPENDING

PM051435 Amsterdam DE VOLKSKRANT in Dutch 3 Nov 81 pp 1, 7

[Text] The Hague -- Informateurs De Galan and Halberstadt are attempting to make their proposals for repairing the split in the second Van Agt cabinet acceptable to the ministers most closely involved. They are doing so on the basis of new suggestions they received on Monday [2 November] from outgoing Prime Minister Van Agt, Minister Van der Stee (finance) and Democrats '66 [D'66] parliamentary group leader Brinkhorst.

The crux of the matter is now that Christian Democratic Appeal [CDA] ministers Van Agt and Van der Stee are now raising objections to the informateurs' idea of financing a job creation policy by means of a temporary tax measure. The informateurs are calling it a "solidarity levy," which would be raised in the last 9 months of next year and would precede the proposed investment levy.

Through the levy the national authorities would have 1 billion guilders to use to create a program for job creation. At the end of next year funds yielded by the investment levy, through which a small fraction of employees' wages would be withheld in order to pay for investments, would then be sufficient to pay also for the specific job creation program.

The CDA ministers had been considering an increase in the value added tax to bring in more money, rather than the arrangement proposed by the informateurs. The solidarity levy would come to the government via taxation on wages and income, whereas value added tax increases would be paid by the consumer in higher prices for food and consumer goods.

Labor Party [PVDA] circles are pointing out that there now seems to be political agreement on the necessity of a job creation program, for which at least 1 billion guilders will be necessary next year. This is seen as a gain. Today Minister den Uyl (Social Affairs and Employment) and Interior Minister van Thijn will again meet with their party colleagues, PVDA informateurs De Galan and Halberstadt. D'66 Economic Affairs Minister Terlouw will also have talks with the informateurs today.

D'66 parliamentary group leader Brinkhorst made the proposal to De Galan and Halberstadt on Monday that only half of the solidarity levy should be raised and that the other 500 million guilders should come from cutting some of the expenditure on the wet [as published] investment account and the remainder borrowed in the money markets. The government is already doing this in order to make up the difference between income and expenditure.

After his 2-hour talks with the informateurs, Brinkhorst said that "the chances that this cabinet will reach its full potential have grown." He expected that they would make final proposals either today or tomorrow. They had now received all the objections and counterproposals to their own plan, Brinkhorst said. The D'66 parliamentary group leader thought that the final proposals from De Galan and Halberstadt should first go to the ministers involved and that the parliamentary groups should be involved only if it seemed that the government accord was being "stretched."

The chance that the parliamentary parties of the government coalition would again be asked for their views has grown in the last few days, since at least two of the three coalition parties have adopted the position that the government accord is being changed. Some CDA members have already been insisting that this is the case. Today the parliamentary groups will be meeting again, after Monday's short consultations between informateurs, ministers and parliamentary group leaders. On Monday, People's Party for Freedom and Democracy parliamentary group leader Wiegel stressed in a reaction to the informateurs' proposals that the CDA and D'66 must stand their ground and must consign any tax increases to the waste basket.

The Californians wanted an America that was strong militarily; and they brought along with them a fear of negotiating with the Soviet Union. The reluctance to get involved in remote conflicts also extended to their own allies, who were supposed to submit or, if they refuse to do so, get lost. The United States would in any event survive in a strong fortress America.

This reflects a high-spirited and even arrogant isolationism, an attitude which today rather is referred to as unilateralism, though it is the same thing. To paraphrase Schiller -- both are rooted in the conviction that the might is strongest when all by himself. Thus no time-consuming consultations with the allies, and certainly no negotiations with the communist antagonist because one always is outsmarted -- as in Vietnam where Kissinger's diplomacy of negotiations procured international legitimacy for the infernal regime in Hanoi; or as in the SALT talks, which lulled both Nixon and Carter into feeling secure even though the Soviets simultaneously implemented the greatest armament program in their history.

The internationalists also believed that the United States must restore its military strength. But unlike the Californians, they were not convinced that the world-political problems could be solved by military means alone. But above all they were not afraid of negotiations with the Soviets. They wanted to talk with Moscow patiently, persistently and with determination so as to promote their own concepts of world political order.

During the past few months, a compromise gradually took shape; military strength -- yes (to the extent it can be financed), but at the same time negotiations with the Kremlin and coordination with the allies. Much of what sounded shrill in the beginning now sounds comparably moderate. The administration has proven that it is capable of learning. If this is not yet appreciated everywhere, then it is probably due to the fact that relapses into rhetoric and the language of absoluteness repeatedly drown out what has manifested itself in daily life regarding the readiness to assimilate and the ability for self-correction. The list of problems in which the Americans have done some relearning during the past year is long and impressive.

El Salvador, submitted at the beginning of the year as a test case for East-West relations and as the litmus paper of Atlantic solidarity, has disappeared from the list of priorities.

The initial statements of sympathy for the regime of white supremacy in the South African union threatened to stall the Namibia solution sought by the Western group of five. They have nearly died down by now, and Washington again fully backs the Western mediation attempt.

The original neglect of, and even disregard for, the Third World has yielded to new efforts toward understanding -- even if with a fundamental reserve. Reagan participated in the Cancun North-South summit meeting; he agreed to a continuation of the dialogue; and he has ceased to cast suspicious glances at the International Monetary Fund. In this respect, too, the Reagan administration has come closer to the European position -- perhaps only because of the irrefutable realization that the United States is dependent on the Third World for many important raw materials and this cannot just cold-shoulder the Third World. But even this is something.

The Reagan team originally wanted to agree to arms-control talks and disarmament negotiations only after the military strength of the United States was restored. Later they said after the measures necessary for restoring the military strength have been initiated. In the meantime the Americans have yielded to the European urging for an early opening of the negotiations on nuclear medium-range weapons in Europe. The U.S.-Soviet talks on this subject will start in Geneva on 30 November. Meanwhile, Washington is also seriously preparing for the resumption of the SALT talks. They are scheduled to begin in the spring of 1982 -- without any preconditions; without any linkage of Afghanistan or Soviet good behavior in Africa, Asia and Latin America; and also without any reluctance. Eugene Rostow, the head of the Disarmament Agency and a declared hawk, recently put it this way: The Soviet-American relationship currently is so tense that, if we wish to remain true to ourselves, we must seize every opportunity to negotiate in favor of peace, no matter how slight the chances might be.

For a time it looked as though Reagan did not want to talk with the Soviets at all. For 8 months the U.S. Embassy in Moscow was deserted. Then the President began writing letters to Brezhnev, and last week Arthur Hartman, the new ambassador in Moscow, declared when presenting his credentials: We are against unproductive confrontation, against the arms race and against silence between our governments. We will work for a constructive East-West relationship, for true arms control and for the solution of disputes through negotiations. Granted, the Reagan people insist on strict mutuality, yet they no longer create the impression that they prefer confrontation to cooperation (this is why, despite resistance in the beginning, they ultimately did not place any obstacles in the way of the West Europe-Soviet barter deal of natural gas for pipes).

Reagan's people no longer talk so loudly about the Russian danger and about the great window of vulnerability through which the Soviets could move into world domination with one single, disarming surprise strike against U.S. intercontinental missiles. Nor do they like to talk about concepts that would have to be interpreted as meaning that the Pentagon is aiming at making nuclear wars wageable and ultimately even winnable. Lately they are plainly saying that what matters to them is the endurance and ability to survive of their nuclear weapons systems, their communications systems and their chains of command. We are not striving for strategic superiority, I was told in the Pentagon, and we do not want to catch up with the Russians weapon by weapon. We also do not want an arsenal with which nuclear wars could be waged, but rather we want to shift nuclear war into the sphere of our foreign policy. All we want is to prevent any conceivable Soviet option of a first strike against us; besides nobody is thinking of localizing nuclear arms conflicts to Europe. In that respect Reagan's feelings are in no way different from Brezhnev's -- or from those of Desmond Ball who just proved in a publication by the London International Institute for Strategic Studies that the limitableness or controllability of any conflict using nuclear weapons is pure illusion.

All this may calm the European visitor in Washington. He is bound to be alarmed, however, when he realizes how little Europe counts in the United States at the moment. The advocate of the European allies in Reagan's Washington is Secretary of State Alexander Haig. Nevertheless, one is told in no uncertain terms in the upper floors in the State Department that it is becoming increasingly difficult to stand as a champion of the trans-Atlantic allies.

A high-ranking U.S. diplomat told me that nobody in Washington is now influenced by the argument that this or that is not so popular in Europe, that this displeases the French, irritates the Germans and irks the Dutch. The argument rather had the opposite effect for some time now.

In what way?

Too many people here advocate the view that the Europeans want to gradually get out of their responsibility and out of the alliance. This applies above all to the Federal Republic. Isn't it moving away? Doesn't it dream of a new German nationalism? Does it not make itself believe that there is a German alternative, a German solution, to the European security problem?

I cannot help saying that what is sprouting here is the rotten seed sown time and again by correspondents like John Vonnegut of the New York TIMES in their reports, which naturally are carefully read in Washington. What the Americans feel is European and specifically German nagging has an additionally irritating effect; events such as Helmut Schmidt's talks in which he frankly explained to a dozen U.S. correspondents what he thinks is wrong with U.S. policy. We don't need any hectoring or lecturing, is what they say in Washington -- no sermons or reproof, please.

What about the peace movement in West Europe? Most Americans consider it to be staged by the communists. Only a few people consider it so profoundly as Henry Kissinger, who said the other day: Current strategies are so horrible that the evolvement of pacifism is not at all irrational. If your own defense is coupled with the chance of suicide, even if this theoretically involves a probability of a mere 10 percent, this causes despair and loss of confidence in the governments which base their policies on such probability ratings. Less complicated thinkers only see Soviet wirepullers and European cowardice. Their outrage quite often expresses itself in the pained cry: then they should go it alone.

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Brilliant conservative columnist William Safire expressed these feelings in a startling way: A wave of isolationism is sweeping across Europe, he wrote. The idea is gaining a foothold that Europe can indeed manage along ...many Europeans do not want Europe to be defended in Europe. Safire bitterly asks: Can we defend a Europe which does not want to be defended? He recalls that about 332,000 U.S. soldiers are stationed in the Old World -- as the tripwire which is supposed to guarantee the automatic participation of the United States in the defense of Europe. His question: But is the Europeans do not wish any serious defense -- what do we need the tripwire for?

Unless the responsible people in Europe give signals to the contrary soon, William Safire says, people in the United States will soon consider ideas which hitherto had been absolutely inconceivable. The hint is clear that there is a possibility that the American right will now adopt the old idea of leftist-liberal Senator Mansfield of bringing the boys home from Europe.

Safire reports that a prominent senator was recently asked why a new motion a la Mansfield had not been submitted in the Senate long ago -- at least as a threat to the Europeans. The senator replied: This would not work as a threat. The damn motion probably would find a majority.

Question: Have the Europeans, including the Federal Government, done enough to convincingly counteract such notions?

The real question is much more difficult to answer. Can U.S. foreign policy be influenced at all from outside, considering its personnel staffing and administrative organization today.

Doubts are premissible. The foreign policy decision-making mechanism is the weakest link in Ronald Reagan's government apparatus. The National Security Council of the White House is weakly staffed intellectually. This begins with Richard Allen, the chief, and continues down the line to the lower echelons. The council has failed in the task of preparing clear options and alternatives for the President. Just as before, prior to the establishment of the National Security Council, Washington's foreign policy again has become a matter of conflict between the State Department and the Department of Defense.

The Pentagon -- Caspar Weinberger, his deputy Carlucci -- at the top is staffed with technicians who only gradually develop political tact. To go by the judgment of a U.S. diplomat, Weinberger is a simplistic unilateralist. Allen is only playing a secondary role: His staff is rather hard up. Al Haig in the State Department is an Atlantic advocate but he is not considered a team player; either out of ambition or as a result of stress, he time and again shows vulnerable spots. His style does not earn him just friends. A crisis around him erupts every 4 weeks; because, when Reagan was shot and wounded he was stupid enough to cry "I'm giving the orders now"; because he publicly criticizes decisions of the President (such as the one on the production of neutron weapons); because he publicly laments the guerrilla campaign waged against him in the White House. The latter complaint, by the way, is just a few days old -- the reaction to the rumor that Weinberger was slated to become Secretary of State. Reagan denied it, fortunately enough; otherwise the Europeans would not have been very happy.

The upshot of it all: The gearwheels in the foreign policy decision-making mechanism are not meshing. This is particularly evident in the preparations for the U.S.-Soviet negotiations on the limitation of nuclear medium-range weapons in Europe. A clear and American concept was still nonexistent just 4 weeks prior to the opening of the Geneva talks.

The Pentagon supported the idea that an American draft treaty in favor of the zero solution be submitted right after the opening of negotiations -- suggesting the scrapping of all SS-20 missiles in exchange for reunification of the NATO decision. A clever consideration is behind it: In doing this, one would chime in with the European leftists, while being rather certain that the Soviets would immediately reject the suggestion as unacceptable; thus the deployment of 572 counterarmament weapons could go on unhindered. "We must keep the matter plain and simple", says the Pentagon. "We must keep the imagination of the broad public busy. We must help Schmidt, Van Agt, Spadolini and Margaret Thatcher. If the Soviets will remove their entire potential, the SS-20 as well as the SS-22 short-range missile (which can hit 85 percent of the NATO targets also within reach of the SS-20), plus the SS-23 -- why not?"

The State Department is of a completely different opinion. It fears that such a suggestion about a zero solution will lead negotiations right away into a dead end street, condemning them to failure. Washington's diplomats would rather prefer a gradual or phased plan. They know that if they don't negotiate seriously, the counterarmament arms will never be deployed. They consider "seriously negotiating" not the making of a suggestion they consider it making a suggestion which would reduce the Soviet threat. They fear that the suggestion of a zero solution would not lead to such an agreement. The Soviets would say yes, but then they would begin the horse trading, zero for what systems? Or they could pretend to agree while extending negotiations -- how could Western counterarmament then make progress in 1983-84? Or they could say, zero, okay, but in such a case a European zone free of nuclear arms would be the better solution....

The State Department does not want to insist on any unfruitful zero solution. It would rather negotiate for a few weeks -- six weeks seem to be envisaged for the time being -- with the Russians on partial solutions; it wants to deal with the issue bit by bit so that successes will become visible bit by bit, thus forcing the Russians to take part in a serious dialogue.

The National Security Council has not considered this issue so far. It is still unclear what Ronald Reagan will decide in the end.

This is not a satisfactory situation. The Western alliance is one again lacking leadership. As always, it is now important that the November storms will not blow away long-term projects, ideas and suggestions of the Reagan administration together with the early spring dreams and the later leaves of autumn.

PAPER SUPPORTS HAIG ON NUCLEAR STRATEGY

DW061009 Frankfurt FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 6 Nov 81 p 12

[Commentary signed R.M.: "Warning Shot"]

[Text] If Haig says something about nuclear strategy, the general knows what he is talking about. It ought to be basically welcomed by the Europeans when he points out some aspects of nuclear deterrence to the Foreign Relations Committee, thus stressing the doctrine of deterrence once again. The public realizes with interest that the "flexible response" concept contains a bottom step which was so far unknown: In the event of an overwhelming conventional attack, NATO is supposed to fire a nuclear warning shot -- such as letting the nuclear warhead of a medium-range weapon explode at a great altitude. You can imagine this to be a somewhat ghastly successor to the shot across the bow. Haig did not add what material effects this explosion should have, we could imagine a blackout of communications and electronic networks. The Secretary of State obviously wanted to use an extreme example to disprove the Soviet denial of the flexible response concept and the Soviet statement that once nuclear war has been opened, there will be no limitation of its escalation. However, this attempt by Haig could confuse Western opinion.

BRIEFS

PRC AGREEMENT -- Deutsche Welle and Beijing Radio intend to exchange journalists. An agreement to this effect was signed today by Klaus Schuetz, director of the Federal Republic's foreign broadcasting station, and Chinese ambassador in Bonn Zhang Tong, Deutsche Welle reports. The Cologne radio station has been broadcasting in Chinese since 1965, while Beijing Radio began its German program 5 years earlier. [Text] [Hamburg DPA in German 0938 GMT 4 Nov 81 LD]

INDIAN ENVOY TO VISIT -- Indian External Affairs Minister Narasimha Rao will pay an official visit to Bonn on 16 November to discuss bilateral and international questions with Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher and to attend the opening of the Nehru exhibition in Bonn, it was learned here today. [Excerpt] [Hamburg DPA in German 1814 GMT 3 Nov 81 LD]

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E.O. 12065: GDS 11/11/87 (MCCORMACK, R.L.) OR-P
TAGS: MPOL, UK, MNUG
SUBJECT: WESTERN POLITICAL OFFENSIVE: U.K. PUBLIC OPINION

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: RECENT U.K. POLL RESULTS SHOW A TREND
IN PUBLIC OPINION AGAINST OUR NUCLEAR/DEFENSE POLICY.
BUT THE TREND SEEMS TO BE NATIONALIST RATHER THAN
UNILATERALIST, THUS A SIGNIFICANT DOUBT ABOUT U.S. POLICY
AND THE U.S. CONNECTION IS MATCHED BY STRONG SUPPORT FOR
RETENTION OF THE U.K. INDEPENDENT DETERRENT AND CONTINUED
MEMBERSHIP IN NATO. THIS CABLE REPORTS THE POLL RESULTS.
BY SEPTEL, WE DESCRIBE WHAT WE ARE DOING TO REVERSE THE
TREND. END SUMMARY.

3. THE RESULTS OF A LONDON OBSERVER/NATIONAL OPINION POLL
SURVEY WERE PUBLISHED IN THE OBSERVER NOVEMBER 8. THEY
SHOWED THAT

- -- 53 PERCENT OF THE SAMPLE THOUGHT U.S. BASES SHOULD
BE REMOVED FROM BRITAIN.
 - -- 57 PERCENT THOUGHT PRESIDENT REAGAN'S POLICIES
WERE MAKING A NUCLEAR WAR MORE LIKELY, AND
 - -- 41 PERCENT THOUGHT BRITAIN SHOULD STAY OUT OF
CONFLICT IF THE SOVIETS ATTACKED WESTERN EUROPE.
 - -- A SLIM PLURALITY (35 PERCENT TO 29 PERCENT) THOUGHT
THE SOVIETS MORE LIKELY THAN THE AMERICANS TO START A
NUCLEAR WAR.
- AT THE SAME TIME HOWEVER:
- -- 67 PERCENT FAVORED RETENTION OF THE U.K. NUCLEAR
DETERRENT AND
 - -- 73 PERCENT FAVORED THE U.K. REMAINING IN NATO.

4. IN COMMENTING ON THE POLL, LONDON OBSERVER DEFENSE
CORRESPONDENT IAN MATHER WRITES, "THE WIDESPREAD HOSTILITY
TO AMERICAN NUCLEAR BASES, WHICH IS PERHAPS THE POLL'S
MOST SURPRISING FINDING, APPEARS TO REFLECT UNEASE WITH
AMERICAN INTENTIONS RATHER THAN ANY GENERAL REVULSION
AGAINST NUCLEAR WEAPONS." WE NOTE THAT THE FIFTY-SEVEN
PERCENT WHO ACCORDING TO THE POLL BELIEVE PRESIDENT
REAGAN'S POLICIES MAKE WAR WITH THE SOVIET UNION MORE
LIKELY CONTRASTS UNFAVORABLY WITH AN APRIL 1981 MARPLAN
POLL, IN WHICH FIFTY-FIVE PERCENT OF THE BRITISH RESPONDENTS
AGREED WITH THE REAGAN-THATCHER ATTITUDE OF "GREATER
VIGILANCE" TOWARD THE SOVIETS. STREATOR

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BY CU NARA, DATE 5/21/12

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E.O. 12065 RDS-1 11/17/11 (STREATOR, E.J.) OR-M
TAGS:
SUBJECT: WESTERN POLITICAL OFFENSIVE; FIGHTING BACK

REFS: A. LONDON 22117, B. STATE 297396.

1. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THE ANTI-NUCLEAR MOVEMENT HERE REPRESENTS A COMPLEX SURGE OF EMOTION, REASON, AND CHATTER. WHILE MOST ACTIVISTS ARE DRAWN FROM THE CONVINCED LEFT, THEY ARE MAKING INROADS ON THE CONCERNED PUBLIC AT LARGE (REFTEL A).

2. WE BELIEVE THAT IN ALL THIS THERE REMAINS A RESERVOIR OF MODERATE OPINION OPEN TO REASONED ARGUMENT. THUS, AN EFFECTIVE U.S. COUNTER CAMPAIGN MEANS GETTING U.S. VIEWS TO THE BROADEST POSSIBLE AUDIENCE, AND VISITING U.S. OFFICIALS CAN PLAY A SIGNIFICANT ROLE. WE SEEK TO EXPLOIT SUCH VISITS FOR THE WIDEST POSSIBLE MEDIA EXPOSURE, COMBINED WITH BOTH LARGE AND SMALL GROUP DISCUSSIONS OF OFFICIALS, MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES AND PARLIAMENTARIANS. DURING THE EAGLEBURGER VISIT LATER THIS MONTH WE HAVE ARRANGED SEVERAL DINNER/DISCUSSION MEETINGS WITH A WIDE RANGE OF POLITICAL AND OPINION LEADERS. AND WE PLAN FOR GENE ROSTOW, WHO WILL BE HERE TO GIVE A CHURCHILL LECTURE TO THE ENGLISH SPEAKING UNION, TO MEET WITH THE PARLIAMENTARY SELECT COMMITTEE ON DEFENSE, AND GIVE INTERVIEWS FOR BOTH BBC AND ITV. SECRETARY WEINBERGER, ALAN HOLMES, AND OTHERS HAVE ALSO GIVEN GENEROUSLY OF THEIR TIME.

4. FOR OUR PART, WE ARE INCREASING OUR CONTACTS WITH ANTI-NUCLEAR GROUPS (REF B), LIKE THE CAMPAIGN FOR NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, THE NATIONAL PEACE COUNCIL, STUDENT AND RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS. SUCH CONTACTS ARE USEFUL FOR INSIGHTS INTO THE ANTI-NUCLEAR MOVEMENT, BUT WE ARE CONSCIOUS THAT 1) NO MINDS WILL BE CHANGED AND 2) THAT THE FACT OF MEETINGS OR QUOTATIONS OUT OF CONTEXT CAN BE USED AGAINST US.

4. FINALLY, WE ARE TAKING OUR MESSAGE DIRECTLY TO THE PUBLIC. THE AMBASSADOR GAVE HIS FIRST MAJOR PUBLIC ADDRESS OCTOBER 29 ON DEFENSE AND NUCLEAR ISSUES TO A CROWDED MEETING OF THE EUROPEAN ATLANTIC GROUP. TWO FURTHER SPEECHES ARE PLANNED. MEANWHILE, WE HAVE MET WITH STUDENT GROUPS IN LONDON, BRIGHTON AND SCOTLAND, WITH THE CONSERVATIVE MONDAY CLUB AND VARIOUS PROFESSIONAL GROUPS, VIZ, THE ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, THE ARMY AND NAVY STAFF COLLEGES AND THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STRATEGIC STUDIES (IISS). THE IISS WAS ALSO VENUE FOR A WELL-RECEIVED ADDRESS ON THE PRESIDENT'S STRATEGIC PROGRAMS BY THE P.M. DEPUTY DIRECTOR BOB BLACKWILL.

5. WE PLAN TO CONTINUE THESE PROGRAMS THROUGH THE NEW YEAR, CONCENTRATING AGAIN ON PROGRAMING U.S. OFFICIALS FOR THE BROADEST POSSIBLE CONTACTS AND MEDIA

ACCESS.

6. THE BRITISH HAVE ALSO UNDERTAKEN A MAJOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS CAMPAIGN. LORO CARRINGTON'S CHURCHILL MEMORIAL LECTURE OCTOBER 27 WAS THE LATEST STEP IN THE BRITISH COUNTER CAMPAIGN. LONDON 18465 GAVE A WRAP-UP OF BRITISH EFFORTS TO BOLSTER PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR DEFENSE AND THEREBY STRENGTHEN WESTERN RESOLVE. STREATOR

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TO ALL NATO CAPITALS IMMEDIATE

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FOR AMBASSADORS BENNETT, EAGLEBURGER, AND OTHERS
E.O. 12065: RDS-3 11/16/81 (PALMER, MARK)

TAGS: XG, SOPN, PROP
SUBJECT: SOVIET AND COMMUNIST PARTY INVOLVEMENT IN THE
EUROPEAN PEACE MOVEMENT
, (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. WE BELIEVE THAT THE FORTHCOMING NATO MINISTERIAL IN
BRUSSELS PRESENTS A GOOD OPPORTUNITY TO BRING TO THE
ATTENTION OF THE ALLIES INTELLIGENCE REPORTS WHICH SHOW
HOW THE SOVIET UNION IS EXPLOITING THE EUROPEAN PEACE
MOVEMENT. THESE REPORTS SUGGEST A PATTERN OF SOVIET
INVOLVEMENT. WE WOULD ACCORDINGLY LIKE TO POOL THE
INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO THE ALLIANCE TO SEE IF IT CAN
BE USED TO EXPOSE AND BLUNT SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES
TO UNDERMINE THE LRTNF MODERNIZATION PROGRAM.

3. TO BUILD POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR EXPOSING AND RESTRICTING
SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES, WE BELIEVE IT WOULD FIRST BE USEFUL

TO EXPRESS OUR VIEW TO NATO PERHREPS AND OTHER SENIOR
EUROPEAN OFFICIALS THAT THE RECENT DANISH CASE IS NOT AN
EXCEPTION BUT PART OF A PATTERN OF SOVIET ACTIVE
MEASURES. WE HAVE THEREFORE PREPARED POINTS ON SOME
OTHER SPECIFIC CASES WHICH CAN BE USED ON CLASSIFIED
BASIS. WE SUGGEST THESE POINTS BE MADE AT THE PERHREPS
RESTRICTED SESSION. THIS WILL SET THE STAGE FOR
LANGUAGE IN THE NATO MINISTERIAL COMMUNIQUE. OTHER
POSTS SHOULD USE POINTS WITH KEY POLITICAL FIGURES.
POINTS ARE DIVIDED INTO CATEGORIES, THOSE WHICH CAN BE
USED NATO-WIDE; OTHERS WHICH CAN ONLY BE USED WITH
SPECIFIED COUNTRIES.

4. WE REALIZE THAT THE SPATE OF ANTI-NUCLEAR
DEMONSTRATIONS WHICH HAVE TAKEN PLACE DURING THE PAST
SEVERAL WEEKS CANNOT BE ATTRIBUTED TO SOVIET
MACHINATIONS. WE RECOGNIZE THAT ATTEMPTS TO ASCRIBE THE
PEACE PROTESTS SIMPLY TO SOVIET INSPIRATION WOULD BOTH -
WEAKEN THE CREDIBILITY OF ALLIED POLITICAL LEADERS IN
THEIR RESPECTIVE COUNTRIES AND CONVEY UNINTENDED
INSENSITIVITY ON OUR PART TO THE GENUINE CONCERNS OF
EUROPEAN PUBLICS.

5. BY THE SAME TOKEN, WE CANNOT DISMISS THE FACT THAT
MOSCOW CONTINUES TO TRY TO MANIPULATE ANTI-NUCLEAR
SENTIMENT IN EUROPE THROUGH LOCAL COMMUNIST PARTIES, THE
SOVIET-DOMINATED WORLD PEACE COUNCIL (WPC) AND OTHER
MEANS. THE PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN AGAINST LRTNF WAS ONE OF
THE MAIN TOPICS ON THE AGENDA OF THE WPC PRESIDENTIAL
COMMITTEE MEETING IN HAVANA IN APRIL. IN ADDITION TO A
RELIABLE REPORT DISCUSSING WPC PLANS FOR THIS FALL'S
ANTI-TNF OFFENSIVE, THERE IS EVIDENCE THAT IT IS
ALLOCATING SEED MONEY FOR ANOTHER WAVE OF EUROPEAN
PROTEST RALLIES IN 1982. WHILE IT HAS BEEN DISPENSING
MONIES TO CERTAIN GROUPS, MOSCOW HAS PROVIDED SUPPORT TO
THE PEACE DEMONSTRATIONS BY PROVIDING RENTAL SPACE FOR
MEETINGS AND BY OFFERING PRINTING FACILITIES FOR THE
PREPARATION OF PROPAGANDA MATERIALS. IN THIS CONTEXT,
THE EXPULSION OF THE SOVIET DIPLOMAT FROM DENMARK
SHOULD NOT BE VIEWED AS AN UNRELATED DEVELOPMENT, BUT AS
THE MOST VISIBLE MANIFESTATION OF A CONCERTED EFFORT TO
INFILTRATE AND EXPLOIT THE EUROPEAN ANTI-NUCLEAR
MOVEMENT.

6. IN ADDITION TO POINTS IN PARAS 4 AND 5 ABOVE, THE
FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL SPECIFICS CAN BE CITED IN A
NATO-WIDE CONTEXT AT THE RESTRICTED SESSION.

-- FRG: THE CPSU HAS PLACED THE HIGHEST PRIORITY

ON ERODING GERMAN SUPPORT FOR NATO'S MODERNIZATION
PROGRAM. GERMAN COMMUNIST PARTY (DKP) MEMBERS HAVE BEEN
INSTRUCTED TO USE STATEMENTS BY HIGH-LEVEL US OFFICIALS
TO IMPRESS UPON THE GERMAN PUBLIC THAT WE ARE NOT
INTERESTED IN PRESERVING PEACE. THEY HAVE ALSO PROVIDED
VARIOUS FORMS OF LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR THE LOCAL PEACE

MOVEMENT INCLUDING MEETING HALLS, PRINTING FACILITIES,
AND LOUDSPEAKER VANS.

-- THE NETHERLANDS: LEADERS OF THE COMMUNIST
PARTY OF NETHERLANDS (CPN) WENT TO MOSCOW AND EAST
BERLIN, FREQUENTED THE SOVIET AND DDR EMBASSIES, AND
RECEIVED MANY SOVIET AND EAST GERMAN EXPERTS IN
DISARMAMENT PROPAGANDA. LEADERS OF THE PROTESTANT
INTERCHURCH PEACE COUNCIL AND THE CATHOLIC PAX CHRISTI
HAVE ESTABLISHED TIES TO RELIGIOUS FRONT GROUPS IN THE
GDR, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, POLAND, AND THE USSR. THE
CHRISTIANS FOR SOCIALISM, WHICH HAS A MEMBERSHIP THAT IS
85 PERCENT COMMUNIST, IS AFFILIATED WITH THE INTERCHURCH
PEACE COUNCIL.

-- ITALY: THE PCI, UNDER HEAVY PRESSURE FROM THE
SOVIETS, INSTRUCTED ITS REGIONAL SECRETARIES TO INITIATE
DEMONSTRATIONS AND MARCHES AGAINST THE TNF BASING IN
COMISO, SICILY.

-- BELGIUM: OFFICERS OF THE NATIONAL ACTION
COMMITTEE FOR PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT, THE BELGIAN
AFFILIATE OF THE WPC, AND THE BELGIAN COMMUNIST PARTY
DISCUSSED PLANS TO ORGANIZE THE OCTOBER 25 RALLY AS
EARLY AS LAST MARCH AND REPORTED ON THE STATUS OF THEIR
PREPARATIONS TO GDR PARTY OFFICIALS IN EAST BERLIN AND
TO A GDR EMBASSY OFFICER IN BRUSSELS.

7. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS RELEASABLE ONLY TO THE
COUNTRIES DESCRIBED:

-- DENMARK: THERE HAS BEEN VERY HEAVY INFILTRATION
BY THE SOVIETS. THE NATIONAL LEAGUE FOR COOPERATION
BETWEEN DENMARK AND THE USSR HAS BEEN PROMINENT IN THE

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DISARMAMENT MOVEMENT SINCE THE MID-1970'S. THE USSR FINANCIALLY SUPPORTS THE LEAGUE TO THE TUNE OF ONE MILLION KRONER PLUS PER YEAR. IT HAS MEMBERS ACTIVE IN ALL PEACE ORGANIZATIONS. THE COMMITTEE FOR COOPERATION ON PEACE AND SECURITY IN DENMARK, THE DANISH AFFILIATE OF THE WPC, IS THE UMBRELLA ORGANIZATION FOR A NUMBER OF DANISH PEACE GROUPS. OVER ONE THIRD OF ITS MEMBERS ARE CP MEMBERS. SOVIET INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH OVER ONE THIRD OF THE REST. THE

ORGANIZATION WORKS CLOSELY WITH THE SOVIETS AND EAST GERMANS.

-- FRANCE: THE MOVEMENT FOR DISARMAMENT, PEACE AND LIBERTY (MPDL), A COMMUNIST FRONT GROUP, HAS ORGANIZED SUPPORT FOR WEST EUROPEAN DISARMAMENT IN THE AREAS ALONG THE FRANCO-GERMAN BORDER. IT IS COORDINATING THIS EFFORT WITH A WEST GERMAN ENVIRONMENTAL GROUP, THE FEDERAL ASSOCIATION OF CITIZENS INTERESTS FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, WHICH INCLUDES COMMUNIST ELEMENTS. HAIG
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GENEVA FOR USINF
E.O. 12065: GDS 11/24/87 (LISSFELT, MARK C.) OR-P
TAGS: PEPR, SU, GE, SOPN
SUBJ: BREZHNEV VISIT: COUNTERPRODUCTIVE PRESS-CONFERENCE PERFORMANCE BY SOVIET SPOKESMAN

1. (C) SUMMARY: THE PROPOSAL ON INF MADE BY BREZHNEV IN HIS NOVEMBER 23 TOAST HERE (SEPTTEL) WAS GREETED BY THE MEDIA WITH PROBING QUESTIONS IN A PRESS CONFERENCE THE FOLLOWING DAY. SOVIET SPOKESMAN ZAMYATIN PROVOKED SOME OVERT HOSTILITY FROM PRESS REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH HIS OFTEN-INTEMPERATE PRESENTATION, WHICH INCLUDED AN ATTACK ON FRG SPOKESMAN BECKER. WE SEE THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PRESS CONFERENCE AS BASICALLY TWOFOLD: FIRST, MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES HERE ARE IN NO SENSE SWALLOWING THE LATEST BREZHNEV PROPOSALS HOOK, LINE AND SINKER. SECONDLY, IN THE CRUCIAL BATTLE FOR FRG PUBLIC OPINION ON INF, ZAMYATIN HAS INFLECTED A CLEAR REVERSE ON HIS OWN SIDE. END SUMMARY.

2. (U) FRG PRESS SPOKESMAN BECKER OPENED A PRESS CONFERENCE NOVEMBER 24 ON THE FIRST UNDER-FOUR-EYES

MEETING BETWEEN BREZHNEV AND SCHMIDT BY STATING THAT: BOTH MEN HAD EXPRESSED THEIR OPINIONS FRANKLY, AND REGARDED THIS FRANKNESS AS A POSITIVE FACTOR; THE PERSONAL RAPPORT WAS EXTREMELY GOOD; SCHMIDT HAD SOUGHT TO MAKE CLEAR TO BREZHNEV THAT BREZHNEV DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE AMERICAN WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE IN GOOD FAITH, AND SCHMIDT HAD SOUGHT TO PLAY AN "INTERPRETER ROLE" IN THIS RESPECT; SCHMIDT HAD "TAKEN NOTE" OF THE OFFER MADE BY BREZHNEV IN HIS DINNER TOAST THE NIGHT BEFORE TO REMOVE "SEVERAL HUNDRED" MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES IF INF TALKS WERE SUCCESSFUL; AND SCHMIDT HAD STATED THAT WHAT WAS NEEDED BY THE WORLD WAS A "PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE."

3. (LOU) BECKER'S CAREFUL PRESENTATION WAS FOLLOWED BY A TIRADE BY ZAMYATIN WHICH CLEARLY TOOK THE ASSEMBLY BY SURPRISE. THE SOVIET UNION UNDERSTOOD THE INTENTIONS OF THE U.S. LEADERSHIP ALL TOO WELL ZAMYATIN SAID; NEVER HAD ZAMYATIN SEEN AN AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION WHICH SO OVERTLY DECLARED THE SOVIET UNION WAS ITS ENEMY; BECKER'S STATEMENT THAT THE SOVIETS DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE INTENTIONS OF THE U.S. WAS "INACCURATE."

4. (U) THIS LAST STATEMENT WAS GREETED BY A MUFFLED BUT UNMISTAKABLE CHORUS OF BOOS FROM THE MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES, WHO CLEARLY INTERPRETED IT AS AN UNWARRANTED ATTACK ON BECKER AND A VIOLATION OF THE NORMAL STANDARDS OF BEHAVIOR FOR SUCH PRESS CONFERENCES. BECKER, IN REPLY, STRESSED HIS GOOD WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH ZAMYATIN, BUT ALSO STATED THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE CONFERENCE WAS TO ALLOW BOTH SIDES TO EXPRESS THEIR VIEWS; THEREFORE, HE SAID, IT WAS INAPPROPRIATE FOR EITHER SPOKESMAN TO DESCRIBE THE VIEWS OF THE OTHER AS "INACCURATE."

HIS MOUTH, ZAMYATIN PROCEEDED TO RAM THE OTHER IN BY MISINTERPRETING A COMPLIMENT REGARDING BREZHNEV'S HEALTH AS A BACKHANDED ATTACK ON HIS CHIEF. THE NEGATIVE EFFECT OF THE INAPPROPRIATE TIRADE -- WHICH NOT MERELY EMPHASIZED BREZHNEV'S GOOD HEALTH BUT IMPLIED THAT OFFENSE HAD BEEN OFFERED BY BECKER IN EVEN RAISING THE TOPIC -- WAS OBVIOUS. BECKER QUIETLY REPLIED THAT THE REMARK HAD BEEN INTENDED AS A COMPLIMENT. WITH THAT, BT

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 BONN 23239

ZAMYATIN WAS TWO DOWN.

6. (LOU) THE QUESTION PERIOD FOLLOWED, WITH ALL QUESTIONS BUT ONE DEVOTED TO ARMS CONTROL, AND MOST OF THEM DIRECTED AT ZAMYATIN. THE QUESTIONING WAS PROBING IN NATURE, WITH THE CORRESPONDENTS CLEARLY TRYING TO SEE JUST WHAT BREZHNEV WAS REALLY OFFERING IN HIS LATEST PROPOSAL. ONE REPORTER ASKED WHAT WOULD BE DONE WITH THE SS-20'S WHICH BREZHNEV OFFERED TO WITHDRAW UPON ACCEPTANCE OF HIS MORATORIUM PROPOSAL. WOULD THEY BE DESTROYED, OR JUST "PUT IN THE ICEBOX?" ZAMYATIN'S REPLY OF "NOT IN YOUR ICEBOX, ANYWAY" RECEIVED NONE OF THE APPARENTLY-INTENDED LAUGHTER. THE QUESTION WAS ASKED AGAIN BY ANOTHER REPORTER. ZAMYATIN'S REPLY WAS EVASIVE. WHEN ZAMYATIN LAUNCHED INTO THE STANDARD SOVIET PRESENTATION ON THE NEED TO INCLUDE ALL EUROPE-BASED SYSTEMS IN THE INF CALCULATION, HE CITED THE SIX POLARIS SUBMARINES COMMITTED TO NATO. BECKER REPLIED THAT HE, FOR ONE, COULD NOT SEE HOW THE SUBMARINES COULD BE INCLUDED IN THE EQUATION. SINCE IN THE SALT TREATIES THE SOVIETS HAD THEMSELVES AGREED THAT THESE SUBMARINES WERE PART OF THE U.S. STRATEGIC FORCES. ZAMYATIN'S REPLY WAS THAT HE WOULD "HAVE TO LOOK INTO THAT."

7. (C) COMMENT: THROUGH HIS EVASIVE ANSWERS TO IMPORTANT QUESTIONS ABOUT THE BREZHNEV PROPOSAL, HIS AGGRESSIVE TONE AND HIS ATTACKS ON BECKER, ZAMYATIN CLEARLY INFLICTED A SETBACK ON HIS OWN SIDE IN THE BATTLE FOR FRG PUBLIC OPINION ON INF. IF THE MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES WERE EAGER TO LEARN MORE ABOUT THE LATEST SOVIET POSITION, THEIR QUESTIONS SHOWED THAT THEY WERE IN NO WAY READY TO ALLOW THE WOOL TO BE PULLED OVER THEIR EYES. THE IMPRESSION CONVEYED TO US BY ZAMYATIN'S PERFORMANCE WAS THAT THE SOVIETS REALIZE THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN WITH HIS SPEECH HAS GAINED THE INITIATIVE IN THE INF DEBATE AND ARE, RATHER DESPARATELY, UNSURE HOW TO GET IT BACK.
BURNS
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EOB:

PRESIDENT'S PROPOSALS ANNOUNCED, WE DO NOT THINK THAT THIS IS THE TIME TO ENGAGE IN A POLEMICAL EXCHANGE, THOUGH WE WILL BE PREPARED TO REBUT THE SOVIET CLAIMS POINT BY POINT. THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSALS REPRESENT A SERIOUS ATTEMPT TO MAINTAIN PEACE AND SECURITY; HIS SPEECH CLEARLY RESTATES OUR COMMITMENT TO THE DEFENSE OF THE WEST, AND IT DEMONSTRATES OUR PEACEFUL INTENTIONS THROUGH PRACTICAL, VERIFIABLE ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS.

END TEXT. CLARK
BT

OP IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #2791 3282056
O 242008Z NOV 81 ZEX
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO ALL NATO CAPITALS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE 3378

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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 312791
E.O. 12065: N/A

TAGS: PARM, UR, GW

SUBJECT: SOVIET BOOKLET, "THE THREAT TO EUROPE"

1. THERE FOLLOWS A BRIEF INITIAL STATEMENT/REBUTTAL OF THE JUST-RELEASED SOVIET BOOKLET, "EUROPE IN DANGER." DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN WILL BE HANDING OUT THIS STATEMENT ON AN "IF ASKED" BASIS AT NOON BRIEFING NOVEMBER 24 OR AFTER. ALL ACTION - ADDRESSEES SHOULD PROVIDE THIS STATEMENT TO HOST GOVERNMENTS, NOTING THE "IF ASKED" BASIS FOR ITS USAGE. (WE UNDERSTAND THAT, SO FAR, THE BOOKLET HAS NOT RECEIVED EITHER MUCH ATTENTION OR CREDIBILITY, AND WE WOULD NOT WANT TO DRAW FURTHER ATTENTION TO IT.) OUR STATEMENT IS DESIGNED TO COMPLEMENT RATHER THAN SUBSTITUTE FOR REACTIONS BY OTHER GOVERNMENTS (AS THE FRG HAS ALREADY DONE). WE INTEND TO ANALYZE THE BOOKLET MORE CLOSELY AND MAY, IF NECESSARY, PROVIDE MORE DETAILED REBUTTALS TO LESSEN THE IMPACT THE BOOKLET MIGHT HAVE ON EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION, IF ANY. - SO FAR, THE BOOKLET HAS BEEN DISTRIBUTED ONLY IN THE FRG -- CLEARLY DESIGNED FOR THE BREZHNEV VISIT -- BUT ADDRESSEES SHOULD BE ALERT TO ITS APPEARANCE IN HOST COUNTRIES AND NOTIFY US BY IMMEDIATE CABLE.

BY SOVIET STANDARDS, WE FIND THE BOOKLET TO BE A FAIRLY SKILLFUL COMPENDIUM OF ARGUMENTATION ON DEFENSE ISSUES, ALTHOUGH IT IS BASICALLY ONE-SIDED AND SELF-SERVING. WITH ITS EMPHASIS ON RHETORIC RATHER THAN FACTS, IT IS CLEARLY A PROPAGANDA PIECE AND WE WILL TREAT IT AS SUCH.

WE NOTE THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS PUBLISHED AND DISTRIBUTED IN GERMANY A BOOKLET ENTITLED "EUROPE IN DANGER." THIS BOOKLET WAS OBVIOUSLY PREPARED BEFORE PRESIDENT REAGAN'S SPEECH OF NOVEMBER 18; ITS ARGUMENTATION IS LARGELY RHETORICAL, ONE-SIDED AND DEVOID OF MEANINGFUL FACTS AND FIGURES. IT AVOIDS A REAL DISCUSSION OF THE KEY ISSUE -- NAMELY THE ENORMOUS MILITARY STRENGTH OF THE USSR. IN THIS REGARD, WE NOTE THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE CHOSEN NOT TO DISPUTE THE FACTS AND FIGURES CONTAINED IN SECRETARY WEINBERGER'S BOOKLET, "SOVIET MILITARY POWER." IN ANY CASE, WITH THE INF NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT TO GET UNDERWAY, AND WITH THE

File: "Shaping
European
Attitudes"

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INCOMING
TELEGRAM

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ACTION EUR-12

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INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-10 SCL-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00
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PM-09 PA-01 ACDA-12 SP-02 SPRS-02 /089 W
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BOTH COUNTRIES. SHE HAD NOT KNOWN ABOUT THESE PROJECTS
BUT PROMISED HER SUPPORT. TUCH

DB
JR

FILE: SHAPING
EUROPEAN
ATTITUDES

R 011215Z DEC 81
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
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USICA

E.O. 12065: N/A
SUBJECT: HAMM-BRUECHER FOLLOW-UP
REFERENCE: STATE 309392 (NOTAL)

1. HAMM-BRUECHER'S IMPRESSIONS AND ACTIVITIES RELATING TO HER TRIP TO THE US WERE WIDELY REPORTED HERE (SEE MEDIA REACTION REPORTS OF OCTOBER 30 AND NOVEMBER 5). SHE EMPHASIZED IN HER COMMENTS THE FRG'S DETERMINATION TO CLOSE THE GAP IN THE "DEFICIT IN GERMAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS," THE EXTENT OF WHICH WAS CONFIRMED DURING HER TRIP, AND SHE REITERATED THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WAS MAKING DM 44 MILLION AVAILABLE IN 1982 TO GIVE SUBSTANCE TO THE PROCESS (WHICH IS APPROXIMATELY TWICE THE ENTIRE USICA BUDGET FOR THE FRG BUT DOES NOT INCLUDE THE CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF MONEY THE FRG FEDERAL PRESS OFFICE SPENDS ON ITS ACTIVITIES IN THE US).
2. WE FOLLOWED UP HERE WITH AN EXCHANGE OF CORRESPONDENCE (COPIES FORWARDED TO EU/GILDEA) AND A WORKING LUNCH TO WHICH THE AMBASSADOR INVITED HAMM-BRUECHER. WE EMPHASIZED TO HER THAT FOR OUR PROGRAM IN THE FRG WE MUST NOW CONCENTRATE OUR LIMITED RESOURCES FOR SPECIFIC AND TIGHTLY DIRECTED PROJECTS DESIGNED TO BRIDGE THE GAP IN INFORMATION AND UNDERSTANDING (AS OPPOSED TO HAVING SUCH GENERALIZED CONFERENCES AS THOSE IN THE PAST THAT HAVE DEALT WITH "THE PROBLEMS OF THE SUCCESSOR GENERATION" OR "ANTI-AMERICANISM"), AND WE OUTLINED SOME OF OUR PLANS DIRECTED TOWARD, AMONG OTHERS, UPPER LEVEL HIGH SCHOOL TEACHERS AND STUDENTS. WE ALSO GAVE HER A LIST OF FEDERAL, STATE AND PRIVATE FRG ORGANIZATIONS WITH WHICH WE ARE WORKING AS AN INDICATION OF OUR INTEREST IN CARRYING OUT AS BROAD A PROGRAM OF CULTURAL AND INFORMATIONAL EXCHANGES AS POSSIBLE. SHE STATED SHE APPROVED OF OUR APPROACH AND PROMISED ASSISTANCE AND ADVICE.
3. IN CONNECTION WITH HER COMMENTS ON THE HAIG AND EAGLEBURGER SPEECHES (REFTEL PARAS 7 AND 8), WE ALSO CALLED TO HER ATTENTION THE SPEECH THE AMBASSADOR WAS GOING TO MAKE ON DECEMBER 1 WHICH SPECIFICALLY STRESSES WESTERN IDEALS AS A COHESIVE FORCE IN OUR LONG TERM RELATIONSHIP AND SUGGESTS THAT THE STUDY OF HISTORY BE EMPHASIZED IN THE EDUCATION OF YOUNG PEOPLE.
4. WE FURTHER TOLD HER ABOUT THE VOLUNTARY VISITORS TOURS WE PARTIALLY FINANCE AND ORGANIZE FOR YOUNG POLITICAL LEADERS (FROM THE JUSOS, JUDOS AND JUNGE UNION) AND ABOUT THE SEMINAR WE ARE PLANNING IN BERLIN IN EARLY SPRING AT WHICH WE HOPE TO BRING TOGETHER YOUNG LAWMAKERS FROM

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AL 5/21/12

Jim - Comments ?

FILE: SHAPING
EUROPEAN
ATTITUDES

TO: The Secretary

FROM: EUR - Lawrence S. Eagleburger
PA - Dean Fischer

SUBJECT: *Sustaining Our Momentum in Europe - -*
Engaging the Private-Sector in US-European Dialogue

The President's speech on November 18 marked a high point in our efforts to develop a government-wide program aimed at building a more productive US-European dialogue. With its enthusiastic reception, we have gone a long way toward regaining the political high-ground in Europe. We want now to build on this momentum with further speeches, media appearances, conferences, publications and exchanges.

In planning follow-on activities, however, we are painfully aware of our discouraging lack of resources and the fact that government initiatives alone are not enough. We need to persuade select private-sector organizations and leaders to become fully engaged in our public affairs efforts in Europe.

In encouraging greater private-sector attention to US-European relations, we do not seek to create major new institutions. Rather, we wish to revitalize the whole spectrum of Atlantic links which over the years have been allowed to atrophy and which do not seem relevant to the successor generation. Our goal is to rekindle a broad public consensus for the indivisibility of US-European interests and the vital role deterrence plays in maintaining peace; and to underline the image of American as a responsible and reliable world power.

Working with ICA, we are undertaking a coordinated program to reach out to select American leaders representing the media,

W

Congress, foreign policy experts and the religious community. Our key objectives are to harness existing private-sector programs to compliment our own Western Offensive and to generate the additional resources for new efforts.

Your own involvement in revitalizing the Atlantic dialogue is crucial. As our efforts progress, we will ask you to participate in a number of important activities.

Recommendations:

As our first step, however, we recommend you approve the following:

-- Ad Hoc Advisory Group: that you help launch our effort by designating a small, informal team of advisors able to reach out to targeted American and European audiences and to generate needed resources. If you agree, we will give you proposed list and letters to send them^m, urging that they join us in the effort to revitalize trans-Atlantic ties.

2. Conference on Trans-Atlantic Dialogue. that one of the first acts of this core group will be to help the Department organize a major conference in Washington to bring together 500 leaders of American public opinion to focus private-sector attention on this issue. Concurrent to this conference, we will work with members of your ad hoc group to design and carry out a program for improving US-European dialogue among selected audience groups -- e.g. labor, young political leaders,

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3. Resources: that you agree to support a major fund-raising effort aimed at select US corporations and foundations organized by the US General Advisory Committee on Public Diplomacy. Your involvement would probably be limited to signing personal letters to select individuals and perhaps taking part in one or two small meetings.

4. Successor Generation: that you agree to appoint _____ as the USG Coordinator for dealing with Europe's successor generation problems. As you know from your meeting with State Minister Hamm-Bruecher, the Germans are particularly concerned with this problem and have asked us to appoint a senior coordinator for US-German exchange. We believe however, that appointing an overall coordinator for US-European Alliance youth affairs would have more impact and encourage other governments as well as to work with us on this problem.

check w/
CB

Office
Hamm

1 Once we announce this we propose sending our coordinator to Brussels to raise the issue of the Successor Generation at NATO and to lobby each Allied government to appoint its own coordinator and cooperate on youth programs.

5. Research Studies: that available internal research capabilities and funds for outside study be directed at long-term analysis of future political, economic and social trends in Europe and their implications for US-European relations and NATO.

6. European Strategic Studies Centers That you authorize

us to explore ways to promote the development of independent,
strategic studies centers throughout the Alliance, particularly
in southern Europe.

7. US International Education Efforts. A major stumbling
bloc in building stronger US-European ties is the lack of
foreign affairs training and language skills of our own
citizens. Although a long-term undertaking, we recommend the
Department explore ways to promote international education
efforts with the Department of Education and relevant domestic
non-government organizations (NGO).

Recommendation

That you authorize us to proceed with these efforts to
engage the private-sector in a trans-Atlantic dialogue.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment:

Suggested List of Ad Hoc Advisory Group

Drafted by EUR/P:JAMoore:74A

x21288 12/2/81

Clearances: EUR - Mark Palmer

PA

INR/WEA

H

TC /ECA

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Security	LSE speech in Munich -- "Preserving Western Independence and Security" Burt in Brussels - "NATO and Nuclear Deterrence"
CBW	Burt letter to the editor of New York Times Burt testimony and UN <u>note verbale</u> issued in conjunction with Qs and As and UN <u>note verbale</u> , both followup to Haig Berlin speech <u>Wall Street Journal</u> series and guidance on criticism for lack of CBW arms control progress Fact sheet assorted press articles -- U.S. and foreign
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North-South	Fact sheet on Soviet aid GIST on US aid/trade relationship Reagan Cancun statement Reagan speech in Philadelphia just before Cancun Haig at UNGA
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El Salvador	GIST 5/81 explaining US position

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Shaping European Attitudes

- Mark Palmer - 1000 12/3/81

Paper on involving private sector

Youth coordinator

(Wick has been asked to be the US-FRG coordinator for approaching the success organization)

Old Youth Coordinator

In part, the unstructured approach, with a lot of funding of youth groups. If we were to do it now, it would have to have a policy and guidelines

Coordinating group to be set up, first to take stock, then to take best advantage of it.

- Even's plan on materials ²⁵

- Palmer will gather package
and send a summary
cable out

- The research data from opinion
polls - could be used

- - Also the job of implications
of the polls is not done
by ICA

- Heavy Trip - VP - Reid Field
- - Waterkunde conference

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137033

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DOMESTICALLY SENSITIVE THEMES OF SECURITY POLICY

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(FOCAL THEMES AND ARGUMENTS OF THE "PEACE MOVEMENT")

I. BASIC PROBLEMS OF SECURITY POLICY

1. PHILOSOPHY OF BALANCE

- FUNDAMENTAL DOUBTS IN THE PEACE-PRESERVING FUNCTION OF THIS PHILOSOPHY,
- ASSUMPTION THAT THE U.S. IS STRIVING FOR SUPERIORITY (REJECTION OF SALT II, WEINBERGER'S STATEMENTS)

2. PHILOSOPHY OF DETERRENCE

- DOUBTS ABOUT THE VALIDITY OF THE DOCTRINE OF DETERRENCE AS BASIS FOR THE PRESERVATION OF PEACE,
- SEARCH FOR NEW BASES FOR THE PRESERVATION OF PEACE (UNILATERAL DISARMAMENT, "SOCIAL DEFENSE").

3. DANGERS OF THE ARMS RACE

- THE FEAR THAT THE ARMS RACE WILL LEAD TO WAR,
- LACK OF UNDERSTANDING AS TO THE FUNCTION OF ADDITIONAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE LIGHT OF ALREADY EXISTING "OVERKILL" CAPACITY,
- THE UNREASONABLENESS OF ARMS EXPENDITURES IN VIEW OF PRESSING DOMESTIC SOCIAL PROBLEMS AND IN VIEW OF THE MISERY IN THE THIRD WORLD,
- THE ACCUSATION THAT NATO'S DUAL DECISION WILL SPEED UP THE ARMS RACE.

4. SPECIAL THREAT TO EUROPE, SPECIALLY TO THE FRG

BT

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CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 03 BONN 24034

EXDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-4 12-04-1991 (SENSE, ROBERT A.) OR-P
TAGS: GE, PARM, PINT, PROP, SOPN
SUBJECT: FRG FOREIGN OFFICE ANALYSIS OF GERMAN PEACE
MOVEMENT THEMES

1. (CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. IN THE CONTEXT OF OUR ONGOING DISCUSSIONS WITH THE FOREIGN OFFICE ON HOW BEST TO APPLY THE WESTERN POLITICAL OFFENSIVE IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC, THE FOREIGN OFFICE PLANNING STAFF HAS PROVIDED US WITH THE PAPER BELOW. IT HIGHLIGHTS MAJOR THEMES, PERCEPTIONS, AND PRESUMPTIONS IN THE CURRENT THINKING WITHIN THE GERMAN PEACE MOVEMENT IN ORDER TO EXPLAIN HOW THE MOVEMENT VIEWS AND REACTS TO CERTAIN U.S. SECURITY POLICY INITIATIVES. PLANNING STAFF OFFICIALS SUGGEST THAT WE SHOULD BE AWARE OF THE SENSITIVE ISSUES OUTLINED BELOW, AND MAY WANT TO KEEP THEM IN MIND WHEN PREPARING SPEECHES AND PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON U.S. SECURITY POLICY WHICH WILL REACH GERMAN AUDIENCES.

FOLLOWING IS AN INFORMAL EMBASSY TRANSLATION OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE PAPER:

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BY RW DATE 8/23/16

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EXDIS

- THE POSSIBILITY OF THE REGIONALIZATION OF A
- NUCLEAR WAR IN EUROPE AND THE SUSPICION THAT THIS
- IS PART OF AMERICAN STRATEGY,
- THE CLAIM THAT (ALL) GERMAN INTERESTS ARE CON-
- TRARY TO THE INTERESTS OF THE SUPERPOWERS;
- NEUTRALIST, "LEFTIST-NATIONAL" TRENDS.

II. CONCRETE THEMES IN CONNECTION WITH THE PLANNED

ARMS BUILDUP ("NACHRUSTUNG")

1. SECURITY REPERCUSSIONS OF THE STATIONING OF

PERSHING II AND CRUISE MISSILES

- WITH RESPECT TO THE USSR: THE FEAR OF
- PROVOKING A SOVIET PRE-EMPTIVE STRIKE
- BECAUSE THE USSR IS THREATENED BY THE ARMS
- BUILDUP, ESPECIALLY BY THE REDUCTION OF
- ADVANCE WARNING PERIODS); THE ASSERTION THAT
- WESTERN ARMS BUILDUP AND THE SS-20'S CANNOT
- BE COMPARED (AS THE THREAT BY THE SS-20'S
- IS NOT FUNDAMENTALLY NEW, WHEREAS THE

PERSHING II AND CRUISE MISSILES CREATE A
QUALITATIVELY NEW THREAT).

WITH RESPECT TO THE US: THE FEAR THAT THE
STATIONING OF NEW INTERMEDIATE-RANGE ROCKETS
UNDER AMERICAN AUTHORITY DRAWS THE FRG INTO
AN AMERICAN POLICY OF CONFRONTATION VIS-A-VIS
THE USSR; A FEELING OF POWERLESSNESS VIS-A-VIS
AMERICAN DECISIONS.

2. ALTERNATIVES TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ARMS

BUILDUP

- UNILATERAL RENUNCIATION OF ARMS BUILDUP,
- RENUNCIATION OF ARMS BUILDUP UNTIL RESULTS
- OF GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS ARE KNOWN (SPD.
- SUBDISTRICTS),
- SEA DEPLOYMENT,
- RETURN TO THE DOCTRINE OF MASSIVE RETALIATION
- (GAUS),
- SOVIET MORATORIUM PROPOSAL.

3. CONCRETE DEPLOYMENT PROBLEMS

- CAMPAIGN AGAINST DEPLOYMENT SITES,
- OPPOSITION IN OR BY OTHER EUROPEAN NATO
- COUNTRIES (BELGIUM, NETHERLANDS)

III. THE DISCUSSION OF THE AFORE-MENTIONED THEMES
RESULTS IN CHARGES AGAINST THE REAGAN ADMINISTRA-
TION WHICH MAY BE SUMMARIZED AS FOLLOWS:

THE UNITED STATES:

- SEES "GOALS THAT ARE MORE IMPORTANT THAN PEACE",
- SEEKS SUPERIORITY OVER, RATHER THAN EQUILIBRIUM
- WITH, THE USSR,
- APPROACHES POLITICAL PROBLEMS WITH MILITARY WAYS
- OF THINKING,

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ZEN/AMCONSUL HAMBURG POUCH
ZEN/AMCONSUL STUTTGART POUCH

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 BONN 24034

EXDIS

-
- - FAILS TO SEE THAT NUCLEAR WAR IS PARTICULARLY
- MORALLY OBJECTIONABLE (HERE AMERICAN AND SOVIET
- STATEMENTS ON THE POSSIBILITY AND RESULTS OF
- NUCLEAR WAR ARE BEING COMPARED),
-
- - ADVANCES FROM A STRATEGY OF DETERRENCE TO A
- STRATEGY OF WAR (NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS MILITARY
- RATHER THAN EXCLUSIVELY POLITICAL WEAPONS;
- "INTEGRATED BATTLE FIELD"; PD 59),
-
- - DEEMS POSSIBLE A REGIONALLY LIMITED NUCLEAR WAR,
- - SEES ALL INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS SOLELY UNDER THE
- ASPECT OF THE EAST-WEST CONFLICT.
- END INFORMAL TRANSLATION. BURNS
- BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

VP Trip

79

Themes

- 1 - European unity
- 2 - Challenge Europe to look beyond its borders, challenge the West to do so
- 3 - Economic situation is better here than to the East (could be tied to 1)
- 4 - US economic policy - explain justify free trade
- 5 - Democratic values

Places

- Bell weather for Presidential trip - riots, etc.
- The swing into Poland (?)
- Madrid?

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
(RDS-12/7/87)

EYES ONLY FOR THE SECRETARY

TO: The Acting Secretary

FROM: EUR - H. Allen Holmes, Acting

European Trip by the Vice President

Attached for your signature is a memo to the Vice President outlining a week-long itinerary for his possible European trip in late February. The proposed itinerary would reinforce some of our main foreign policy and public diplomacy objectives in Europe.

Recommendation:

That you sign the attached memorandum to the Vice President.

Attachment:

Memorandum to the Vice President.

Drafted by EUR/P:JAMoore:100A
x21288 12/7/81

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
(RDS-12/7/87)

CLASSIFIED

Declassify on: July 21, 1997

DATE

CIS 8/1/12

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
(RDS-12/7/81)

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE VICE PRESIDENT
From: William P. Clark
Subject: Your Trip to Europe: February 1982

Your European trip can serve several important foreign policy objectives at a difficult stage in our relations with Europe. You could use the trip to underline our commitment to peace and security in Europe, and to serious arms control negotiations, and to reinforce the indivisibility of US-European social, economic and political interests, and to project the image of America as a responsible and reliable world power.

We have shaped a suggested itinerary around our key substantive concerns. For the late February time-frame, we suggest the following itinerary and approach:

Germany: A speech before the Wehrkunde Conference (February 12-14) in Munich could be the primary public event of your German itinerary. This is a prestigious annual meeting of US-European political-military experts and would provide an excellent platform for a major speech on security issues. A visit to Germany also should include a stop in Bonn for meetings with the Federal President, Chancellor and Foreign Minister, and a press conference. A third stop in Germany could be a visit to

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NLRR M4421 # 137035
BY RW NARA DATE 8/23/16

Berlin, with a visit to the Berlin Wall and meetings with officials.

At the moment, the atmosphere of German-American relations suffers somewhat from a malaise brought about by many factors, including generational change in the FRG and widespread misconception of U.S. policies. There exists, however, a deep reservoir of good will for the U.S., and the President's November 18 speech has helped us to regain considerable ground. Your trip would provide a major opportunity to focus public attention on the underlying strength of the German-American relationship.

Italy: With your visit to Bonn, you will have completed the round of Paris, London and Bonn. The Italians have traditionally felt that they belong in this elite group and strongly object to any hints of a special 4-power "directorate" within the Alliance. Consequently, a visit to Italy--where you could meet with top Italian officials and the Pope--is desirable. The Italians continue to provide strong support for the NATO INF decision, and their continued involvement is crucial to keeping the Germans on board with modernization. They also have agreed, with other European participants, to a role in the Sinai peacekeeping force. Your visit would indicate our appreciation of their efforts and of their important role in

the Mediterranean and the Alliance.

Belgium vs. the Netherlands: Either country could usefully be included in your schedule, but on balance we strongly recommend that you stop in Belgium. By February, Belgium should have a new government with which we will want to reinforce the importance we attach to the Belgian contribution to NATO, particularly the continuation of Belgium's INF deployment preparations. In addition, Belgium will be the EC President (January-June 1982) and responsible for maintaining the increasingly important US-EC consultative mechanism. Finally, a visit to Belgium will allow you to call at NATO, SHAPE and the EC Commission.

Alternatively, you could stop in the Netherlands. We have major problems with anti-nuclear sentiment throughout Western Europe, but this is especially pronounced in the Netherlands. You would probably face hostile demonstrations, but this cannot be ruled out in other NATO countries as well. The Dutch Government has postponed a promised decision on INF deployment and is seeking to reduce its other NATO nuclear tasks. We have attempted to show the Dutch that their relationship with us is affected by these actions, primarily by giving more attention to neighboring Belgium which is moving to deploy INF. A visit would fit in with the celebration in 1982 of the Bicentennial of US-Dutch

relations, but is not indispensable in that context since the President already has agreed to host the Queen for a State Visit in April.

European Parliament-Strasbourg, France: Although we have serious trade and economic problems with Europe, these should not overshadow productive political relations with the EC. In this context, it would be extremely useful for you as President of the Senate to address the European Parliament (EP) in Strasbourg during February 15-20. This body, reflecting the growing anti-nuclear sentiments of its broad constituency, is increasingly concerned with East/West relations and security issues. A major speech by you highlighting our cooperation on such questions as Poland and Afghanistan, acknowledging the European Parliament's efforts on these issues, and underlining US efforts to promote serious arms control and improved US/Soviet relations--would contribute to US-European cooperation on these issues. Your appearance also would build on a recent series of high-level exchanges including the November US-EC consultations in Washington, the Secretary's December 11 call on President Thorn by the Secretary, Baldrige, Block and Trade Representative Brock, and the upcoming US Congress-EP exchange scheduled for January in Brussels and the Hague -- led on the US side by Congressman Lantos.

Norway: Our relationship with the new Conservative government is off to an excellent start. The President telephoned Prime Minister Willoch soon after he took office, and the Prime Minister instructed Foreign Minister Stray to come to the U.S. immediately thereafter. You received Stray during his visit last month, and a trip by you to Norway would help strengthen the ties we have already developed with the new government of this pivotal NATO country. Further, in the wake of the President's speech and the Soviet Submarine incident in Sweden, this should be a ripe time for a high level visit to Scandinavia.

Poland/Romania:

A stop in Eastern Europe would also be important, both in its own right and in terms of its effect on Western European opinion. We recommend --

We want to work closely with your staff to make this trip a major success. We need your views on the overall schedule and then will help with concrete planning. In particular, we would like to begin work on two major speeches for you to consider delivering in Europe.

Shaping attitudes

137038

12/10/81

- Any further comments on the
library paper Debbie put together

- VP trip

-- ~~see~~ - Take an economic theme - perhaps
Strasbourg

Dick - Strasbourg has more liberal
heart than nat'l. parliaments
Good place to play hard on
human rights in USSR
+ CBW (John C.)

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NLRR M4421#137038

BY

PN

NARA DATE

9/23/16

Phil - What about European/EC unity?

- Quick stop w. one of the US
units stationed in Germany

Dick - New troop locations in H.
Germany instead of Bavaria

- 47
- E. Europe - What about Hungary?
 - looks like it will be put forward as a possibility - go to E. Europe
 - Don't make it a Poland or nothing issue
 - Perhaps mention some of the issues

Phil - Fit the stops to the themes of the trip

Pappageorge - Belgrade proceeding
security w. INF maps

Youth Project:

Will be focus of next week's meeting - ICA and youth org. meeting

Hopefully next week's meeting will leave "foreign diplomatic practices" paper

March 21 - "Afghan New Year"
"Afghan Nat'l Day"

Afghanistan Day - EP is getting
up a petition. Looking for a
proclamation 14-18 Dec.

2 full-time folks in State
IG meeting next week ^(Tuesday) to
get it going

Congressman Dan Rostenkowski has
drafted US Congress resolution.

J. Henderson - Mtg. w. Europeans,
none of whom had received any
U.S. materials from PCA.

Conference in Germany w/ US rep.

Jack Maltzer - We have been
concentrating on the Left, not
speaking to the choir. Know
The guys Tolan is talking about,
and puts them in perspective.

Mark - A lack of aggressiveness in
getting the word around - ~~exp~~ need

to increase people's aggressiveness

Shaping 10th rider

(10)

Discussion (CIA report) on a sort of news-
letter to "correct" Sov. disinformation
and prop. claims (in Project Truth?)

Sov. Crime and Punishment: Tomorrow
the second version to review
Terry Cameron report.

John L: Mechanics of release. How
to identify it — how to do it. As
a DECLASS CIA document, or published
by the Congress or what? Should it
appear to be pulled out of the
admin reluctantly
Some arguing for the CSC Commission
putting it out

More contact with centres in Europe.
Bureau is doing it.

Vlad, Don't take monkey off Alice's back

~~speech~~ cable 11.
on dealing with our citizens;
Dick says we need training for
the people who may do it - so
as not to get rattled. Possible
use of private sector folks

Press speech prior to Bush & Bonn
Draft due today
ACDA - Reston / Grey have doubts
Sounds academic to me (I to Mark)

Graphics ?

20 November target for speech

Would be given in Trump

Approval needed only 2-3 days prior

Reciprocity discussion in NATO
Anglo-Saxons vs the world

Reciprocity - everyone agreed on the principle, but when practical concerns raised, "Western society is more open, we cannot limit so strongly" and economic considerations also tended to

- Consensus that the idea will be mentioned at the December Ministerials, but in general terms

Active Measures.

- Most wanted to refer it to the experts ^{special} committee
- Dalk attempted to move it to the political level - pointed out that during détente active measures had actually increased
- Game plan now is for security socs to study it, but then to take it back into political considerations ^{then}
- But will not be ready by December

*Jeremy Azrael
by hand
Dec 16, 1981*

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EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

NLRR M442 #137041

BY lw NARA DATE 3/21/17

15 December 1981

(7)

MEMORANDUM

EXAMPLES OF SOVIET POLITICAL INTIMIDATION

WESTERN AND NORTHERN EUROPE

FRG, 1979-1981.

1. In July 1979, Novosti's Bonn correspondent told a confidant of Brandt that if the Socialist International adopted an anti-Soviet stance, "this will have negative effects on MBFR and will also cause 'other problems'." (S WN NF)
2. In October 1979, Bondarenko of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and late Premier Kosygin's son-in-law Gvishiani told the FRG ambassador in Moscow that if the West Germans go along with the proposed INF deployment, "the Soviets will divide your country into squares and target every square." (C)
3. Also in October 1979, Novosti's Bonn correspondent (same as above) told a confidant of Brandt that "there would be 'bad consequences' for the FRG if a positive NATO decision is reached (on INF)...everyone could just as well forget the 1980 CSCE follow-on conference in Madrid if NATO followed the American demands." (S WN NF)
4. In December 1979, according to an SPD member, "several Soviet diplomats...said that if NATO approved the decision for (INF) modernization, the USSR would be compelled to take countermeasures affecting Berlin and inner-German relations." (S WN NF)
5. In his November 1981 interview with Der Spiegel, Brezhnev stated that: "In order to neutralize (NATO's) mobile missiles it would be necessary to deal retaliative strikes of great yield at the supposed areas of their deployment. This is a grim fact, but it is a fact." (U)

This memorandum was prepared by of the Office of Soviet Analysis, NFAC, at the request of Dr. Jeremy Azrael, senior advisor on Soviet affairs to the Director, Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State. Comments may be addressed to Chief, Strategic-Internal Branch, Current Support Division, SOVA, on

SOVM81-10022X

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

Spain, 1981.

6. A Soviet memorandum delivered to the Spanish Foreign Ministry in September warned that entry into NATO would have "negative consequences" for detente and military aspects of the situation in Europe, and that the USSR and its allies "would be obliged to draw appropriate conclusions and consider the possibility of corresponding steps." (C EXDIS)

Norway, 1980.

7. In November, Kostikov wrote in Pravda that Norwegian positioning of US/NATO heavy equipment would jeopardize not only Norwegian security, but that of all Northern Europe. (U)
8. In a December interview in Sweden, APN correspondent Baranikas stated that Moscow would retaliate against Norwegian bases with nuclear weapons if pre-positioned war material were used for nuclear-capable artillery or aircraft. (U)

Finland, 1979-1980.

9. In November 1979, Komissarov implied in an article in Suomen Kuvalehti that Moscow would invoke its Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance with Finland to stop NATO missiles attacking the USSR through Swedish and Finnish airspace. (U)
10. In January 1980, Novosti's managing director for Finland told a Finnish journalist that a NATO cruise missile attack through Finnish airspace would compel the Soviets to invoke their mutual treaty, which ensures that Finland defend Soviet territory against such a threat. (S WNINTEL NF ☐)
11. In November 1980, APN correspondent Baranikas wrote in Dagens Nyheter that the USSR would defend against nuclear missiles while they were still in Finnish and Swedish airspace, even though this might cause nuclear explosions over these countries. (U)

EAST EUROPECzechoslovakia, 1968.

12. In the fall of 1968, the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine was propagated to justify the Warsaw Pact invasion and occupation. (U)

Poland, 1980-81.

13. In December 1980, at the Warsaw Pact summit, Poland's allies alluded to the Brezhnev Doctrine by pledging their "fraternal solidarity and support to Poland." (U)
14. At the 26th Party Congress in February 1981, Brezhnev noted that Poland "can firmly rely on its friends and allies. We will stand up for socialist Poland, fraternal Poland, and will not leave her in the lurch." (U)

SOUTH ASIAPakistan, 1980-81.

15. In February 1980, Gromyko warned Pakistan in a speech to the Indian Parliament that continued aid to the Afghan resistance threatened to jeopardize its continued existence as an independent state. (U)
16. During the past two years, Soviet diplomats have implied that Pakistani support for the Afghan insurgents could lead to military pressure along the Afghan-Pakistani border, Soviet support for Pakistani dissidents and insurgents, and Soviet backing of moves against Pakistan by India.
(S WN NF)

US-MIDDLE EASTEgypt, 1981.

17. In October after the Sadat assassination, the USSR condemned US military moves and official statements as "inadmissible" attempts to exert "gross pressure" on Egypt. Moscow claimed that what was happening "around" Egypt "cannot but affect the interests of the Soviet Union's security." (U)

Iran, 1979.

18. In a Pravda interview in November 1979, Brezhnev warned against US or other foreign interference in Iran's "purely internal affairs", claiming that such interference would be regarded as affecting Soviet security interests. (U)

US-LATIN AMERICACuba, 1981.

19. Soviet leaders publicly cautioned the US to desist from efforts to curb Cuban support for insurgents in Central America, alluding to "dangerous consequences" as well as Moscow's support for Havana should the US move against Cuba. (U)

56

FAR EASTJapan, 1978.

20. The Soviets exerted comprehensive efforts to head off Sino-Japanese rapprochement, warning of unspecified dire consequences if Japan signed a treaty containing an "antihegemony" clause. (U)
21. In June 1978, such efforts were highlighted by Ambassador Polyanskiy's warning that a Japanese treaty with China would force the USSR to draw the appropriate conclusions and reevaluate its policy toward Japan. (U)

China, 1979.

22. Moscow threatened China during February and March about the possibility of Soviet military intervention if the Chinese did not end their military campaign against Vietnam. (S NF)

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Department of State

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

PAGE 01
ACTION EUR-12

BRUSSE 17008 171752Z

1362

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-10 CIAE-00 EA-12 DODE-00
H-01 IO-15 NEA-07 NSC-05 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00
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USEC

USICA FOR PGM/GF, PGM/P, AND VOA

E. O. 12065: N/A

TAGS: EP, AFG, SU, PINS, EPR, SOPN

SUBJECT: EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT WELCOMES AFGHAN RESISTANCE
LEADERS AND CONSIDERS RESOLUTION PROCLAIMING MARCH 21 AS
AFGHAN SOLIDARITY DAY

REF: BRUSSELS 15593

1. TWO HUNDRED AND THIRTY-EIGHT MEMBERS OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT HAVE NOW SIGNED THE RESOLUTION SPONSORED BY LORD BETHELL TO DESIGNATE MARCH 21 AS AFGHANISTAN SOLIDARITY DAY (REFTEL). THE RESOLUTION IS THEREFORE ADOPTED BY THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT.
2. FOR DEPARTMENT, EUR/RPE AND H: PLEASE INFORM CONGRESSMAN PRITCHARD AND MARK PALMER IN EUR. VEST

FILE: SHAPING
EUROPEAN
ATTITUDES

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137042 FILE:
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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FOR CHIEF OF MISSION FROM UNDER SECRETARY STOESEL
E.O. 12065: RDS-2 (12/14/01) (KUX, DENNIS)

TAGS: PROP, UR

SUBJECT: WESTERN POLITICAL OFFENSIVE: COUNTERING SOVIET
ACTIVE MEASURES
INFORM CONSULS
REF: STATE 28758

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NLRR 11/42/1 #137042

BY *DN* NARA DATE 1/23/10

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY: THIS TELEGRAM SPELS OUT HOW THE ADMINISTRATION PROPOSES TO IMPLEMENT THE DIPLOMATIC AND PUBLIC INFORMATION ASPECTS OF ITS PROGRAM OF COUNTERING SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES DISCUSSED IN EARLIER MESSAGES. END
SUMMARY

3. AS ONE IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN THE USG'S CAMPAIGN TO MAINTAIN THE POLITICAL OFFENSIVE IN RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION, WE WANT TO INTENSIFY EFFORTS TO HEIGHTEN THE AWARENESS OF NATIONS AND PUBLICS REGARDING THE SOVIET UNION'S USE OF "ACTIVE MEASURES" AS A POLICY INSTRUMENT TO UNDERMINE THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE US AND ITS FRIENDS AND GENERALLY WEAKEN THE WESTERN SYSTEM.

4. THE ADMINISTRATION BELIEVES THAT A VIGOROUS, CREDIBLE DIPLOMATIC AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS EFFORT TO SPOTLIGHT SOVIET MISCONDUCT WHEN IT IS EXPOSED - AS IT OFTEN IS - WILL HELP TO REDUCE THE ADVANTAGE THE SOVIETS CAN GAIN FROM ACTIVE MEASURES CAMPAIGNS.

5. IN WASHINGTON, THE INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP ON ACTIVE MEASURES WITH PARTICIPATION BY STATE, CIA, THE FBI, USICA AND THE NSC HAS OVERALL RESPONSIBILITY FOR COORDINATING THE DIPLOMATIC AND PUBLIC INFORMATION COUNTER-OFFENSIVE. EACH GEOGRAPHIC BUREAU IN STATE WILL BE ESTABLISHING A CONTACT POINT ON ACTIVE MEASURES. THE STRATEGY OUTLINED BELOW WAS DEVELOPED ON THE BASIS OF SEVERAL MONTHS EXPERIENCE OF THE WORKING GROUP -WHICH INCLUDED THE CLASSIFIED INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STUDY ON

ACTIVE MEASURES RELEASED IN AUGUST, THE STATE DEPARTMENT OCTOBER UNCLASSIFIED SPECIAL REPORT, AND DISCUSSIONS IN OCTOBER - NOVEMBER AT NATO AND IN EIGHT WEST EUROPEAN CAPITALS BY AN INTERAGENCY ACTIVE MEASURES TEAM.

6. THE STRATEGY SEEKS TO ACCOMPLISH OUR GOALS AS FOLLOWS:

A. RAPID AND COMPREHENSIVE FIELD REPORTING ON ACTIVE MEASURES INCIDENTS WHEN THEY SURFACE OR APPEAR TO SURFACE (THIS IS DISCUSSED IN GREATER DETAIL BELOW).

B. FOLLOWING QUICK ANALYSIS OF FIELD REPORTS, A DECISION BY THE WORKING GROUP ON WHETHER TO EXPLOIT THE INCIDENT AS A TARGET OF OPPORTUNITY. NORMALLY IN SUCH CASES, USICA WILL HAVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PREPARING WIRELESS FILE, USINFO, OR OTHER PRESS MATERIAL, HOPEFULLY WITHIN 48 HOURS OF THE REPORTED ACTIVE MEASURES INCIDENTS. (RECENT EXAMPLES WOULD BE THE EARLY NOVEMBER EXPULSION OF A KGB OFFICER FROM DENMARK FOR UNACCEPTABLE COVERT ACTIVITIES AND THE SURFACING OF A FORGED LETTER FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN TO THE KING OF SPAIN).

C. RE LONGER-TERM TRENDS, THE WORKING GROUP WILL COORDINATE:

--PERIODIC CLASSIFIED TREND REVIEWS OF ACTIVE MEASURES DEVELOPMENTS TO BE PREPARED BY THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. THESE WILL PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS IN NATO AND FRIENDLY GOVERNMENTS IN DIPLOMATIC AND

INTELLIGENCE LIAISON CHANNELS AS APPROPRIATE. (COMMENT: THE RECEPTION TO THE CLASSIFIED STUDY FINISHED IN SEPTEMBER WAS POSITIVE BOTH BILATERALLY AND IN NATO WHERE THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE (INTERNAL SECURITY) IN ITS MID-NOVEMBER SESSION APPROVED THE REPORT WITH MINOR MODIFICATIONS AND - AS THE US URGED - RECOMMENDED THAT THE NATO POLITICAL COMMITTEE FURTHER CONSIDER THE POLITICAL AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS RAMIFICATIONS.)

--PERIODIC UNCLASSIFIED USG REPORTS. THESE WILL EITHER REVIEW TRENDS IN ACTIVE MEASURES ACTIVITIES OR FOCUS ON SPECIFIC TOPICS IN GREATER DETAIL, I.E., FORGERIES, FRONT GROUPS, KGB EXPULSIONS, ETC.

D. FOLLOW-THROUGH WORK, PRIMARILY IN THE FIELD, WILL INVOLVE:

--AGGRESSIVE PLACEMENT WORK BY USIA OFFICERS OF WIRELESS FILE, USINFO OR OTHER PRESS ORIENTED MATERIAL AND ANY SPECIAL STUDIES SUPPLIED BY STATE;
--BACKGROUNDING BY STATE OF THE US AND FOREIGN PRESS IN WASHINGTON WHEN NEWSWORTHY ITEMS APPEAR;

--PERIODIC CONSULTATION IN NATO, WITH FRIENDLY GOVERNMENTS AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICES TO ENCOURAGE FRIENDLY GOVERNMENTS TO REACT MORE VIGOROUSLY IN PUBLICIZING SOVIET MISDEEDS, AND TO IMPLEMENT THE PRINCIPLE OF RECIPROCITY MORE FIRMLY IN DIPLOMATIC DEALINGS WITH THE SOVIETS. (SEPARATE MESSAGE WILL DEAL WITH THIS QUESTION).

7. WE REALIZE THAT THIS STRATEGY IS ONE FOR THE LONGER TERM. WHILE DRAMATIC SPY STORIES ATTRACT HEADLINES, EXPOSING THE NITTY GRITTY OF ACTIVE MEASURES IS LESS EYE-CATCHING BUT STILL, IN OUR VIEW, NEWSWORTHY, PROVIDED WE FOLLOW A PERSISTENT, NON-POLEMIC APPROACH SUPPORTED BY CONTINUING FLOW OF FACTUAL MATERIAL ON WHAT THE SOVIETS AND THEIR PROXIES ARE UP TO. WE RECOGNIZE THAT NOT ALL MANIFESTATIONS OF UNHELPFUL ATTITUDES (I.E., THE

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PEACE MOVEMENT IN VARIOUS WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES) ARE SOVIET INSPIRED. MOSCOW NONETHELESS ATTEMPTS TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THESE SITUATIONS BY MANIPULATING AND AMPLIFYING ANTI-WESTERN ATTITUDES THROUGH VIGOROUS ACTIVE MEASURES EFFORTS.

8. AS EXPLAINED ABOVE, THE SUCCESS OF OUR STRATEGY WILL DEPEND HEAVILY ON FIELD REPORTING. IN MANY CASES WE WILL NOT KNOW WHAT HAS HAPPENED UNLESS YOU TELL US - AND IN CONSIDERABLE DETAIL. SPOT REPORTING ON SPECIFIC ACTIVE MEASURES INCIDENTS IS ESSENTIAL TO THE EFFORT. PERIODIC ANALYSIS OF HOW SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY GOALS ARE SUPPORTED BY ACTIVE MEASURES TECHNIQUES IS ALSO OF GREAT INTEREST.

9. ACTIVE MEASURES REPORTING SHOULD BECOME AN IMPORTANT COUNTRY TEAM RESPONSIBILITY WITH EACH MISSION UNDER YOUR LEADERSHIP DEVELOPING AN APPROPRIATE MECHANISM TO COORDINATE REPORTING AND TO ASSURE A DIVISION OF LABOR AMONG COUNTRY TEAM ELEMENTS. TO FACILITATE WASHINGTON DISTRIBUTION OF REPORTING ON ACTIVE MEASURES, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT MESSAGES ARE PROPERLY TAGGED (PROP, AND UR AT A MINIMUM) AND THAT THE SUBJECT LINE ON ALL REPEAT ALL MESSAGES BEGIN: SOVIET (OR SOVIET PROXY) ACTIVE MEASURES: MESSAGES ON ACTIVE MEASURES WHETHER PREPARED BY USIA OR STATE OFFICERS SHOULD BE TRANSMITTED AS STATE TELEGRAMS WITH USIA AS AN INFO ADDRESSEE AND SLUGGED: ATTN PMG/G. THIS IS NECESSARY TO ENSURE FULL AND RAPID DISTRIBUTION IN WASHINGTON.

10. THE FOLLOWING TOPICS ILLUSTRATE WHAT TYPE OF REPORTING WE WOULD FIND USEFUL:

FORGERIES: FORGED DOCUMENTS ARE A STAPLE ELEMENT OF SOVIET DIRTY TRICKS. WE ARE AWARE OF AT LEAST 6 EFFORTS WHICH HAVE SURFACED IN THE LAST TWO MONTHS. SOME LIKE THE SO-CALLED HOLOCAUST DOCUMENT AND FIELD MANUAL 30-31B HAVE BEEN USED REPEATEDLY, AND WE PLAN TO PROVIDE BACKGROUND MATERIAL AND GUIDANCE FOR HANDLING THESE RECURRENT FRAUDS. WHEN AN APPARENT NEW FORGERY SURFACES, WE NEED COMPLETE REPORTING INCLUDING ITS TEXT AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING ITS SURFACING SO THAT WE CAN PROMPTLY PROVIDE INSTRUCTIONS FOR AUTHORITY; AT THE SAME TIME IN SOME CASES IDENTIFICATION OF ITS PROBABLE SOURCE. AFTER THE INITIAL CABLE REPORT, THE FORGERY ITSELF OR A COPY TOGETHER WITH THE ENVELOPE OR RELATED MATERIALS SHOULD BE SENT TO WASHINGTON VIA PARS OR ADDRESSED TO INR/INC FOR TRANSMISSION TO PARS TO ASSURE PROPER TECHNICAL ANALYSIS.

DISINFORMATION: DISINFORMATION IS ANOTHER ACTIVE MEASURES STAPLE AND CAN TAKE MANY FORMS. A TYPICAL EXAMPLE WAS A REPORT ON RADIO MOSCOW OF "MASS PROTEST DEMONSTRATIONS" ON THE OCCASION OF THE VISIT OF THE NAMIBIA CONTACT GROUP TO LUANDA, ANGOLA IN OCTOBER 1981. NO SUCH DEMONSTRATIONS OCCURRED. WE NEED PROMPT REPORTING WHEN INSTANCES OF POSSIBLE DISINFORMATION OCCUR. OF SPECIAL INTEREST ARE CASES WHEN THIS TYPE OF ACTIVE MEASURE FIRST SURFACES IN NOMINALLY NON-COMMUNIST MEDIA. THE CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH DISINFORMATION FIRST APPEARS AND ANY INDICATIONS OF ITS PROBABLE ORIGIN ARE OF SPECIAL INTEREST. RUMOR CAMPAIGNS AND MEDIA REFERENCES TO DOCUMENTS WHICH ARE NOT AVAILABLE FOR EXAMINATION ARE TYPICAL VARIANTS OF DISINFORMATION TECHNIQUES. REPORTING ON THE CREDIBILITY ACCORDED SPECIFIC DISINFORMATION EFFORTS IS ALSO IMPORTANT.

EXPULSIONS OF BLOC OFFICIALS: THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE EXPULSION OF SOVIET BLOC OFFICIALS OFTEN SHED SIGNIFICANT LIGHT ON ACTIVE MEASURES OPERATIONS. THE FREQUENCY OF THESE OCCURRENCES -- 161 PUBLICIZED EXPULSIONS OF SOVIET OFFICIALS BETWEEN JANUARY 1980 AND SEPTEMBER 1981, FOR EXAMPLE -- IS A GRAPHIC MEASURE OF THE SCOPE OF SOVIET MISCONDUCT, MUCH OF IT IN THE ACTIVE MEASURES AREA. IF QUIET EXPULSIONS AND UNPUBLICIZED PREMATURE DEPARTURES ARE INCLUDED THE NUMBER WOULD BE MUCH LARGER. MOREOVER, THESE EVENTS AND FREQUENTLY RELATED ARREST OF LOCAL COLLABORATORS ARE A PRIME SOURCE OF INFORMATION ON "AGENT OF INFLUENCE" OPERATIONS, MEDIA MANIPULATIONS, FRONT OPERATIONS AND OTHER DIFFICULT TO TRACK TYPES OF ACTIVE MEASURES. AN EXAMPLE IS THE RECENT DANISH EXPULSION OF A SOVIET "DIPLOMAT" FOR TRYING TO SUBORN MEDIA AND FUND FRONT ORGANIZATIONS TO SPUR THE DANISH PEACE MOVEMENT.

MEDIA MANIPULATIONS: IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO HAVE MORE INFORMATION -- BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION ON EDITORS, FINANCES, ETC., -- ON OSTENSIBLY NON-COMMUNIST PUBLICATIONS THAT LEND THEMSELVES, WITTINGLY OR UNWITTINGLY, TO PASSING SOVIET DISINFORMATION. WE WOULD LIKE TO WORK TOGETHER WITH FIELD MISSIONS TO DEVELOP BETTER METHODS TO PUBLICIZE THESE VEHICLES OF ACTIVE MEASURES OPERATIONS.

FRONT GROUPS: THE SOVIET UNION, AS A STANDARD PRACTICE, USE INDIGENOUS ORGANIZATIONS TO CARRY OUT ACTIVITIES ON ITS BEHALF. THE MEANS USED TO INFLUENCE THESE FRONTS RANGE FROM STRAIGHT-FORWARD, IF UNADMITTED,

CONTROL TO SUBTLE MANIPULATION OF UNWITTING LEGITIMATE NON-COMMUNIST ORGANIZATIONS. WE HAVE ADEQUATE INFORMATION ON MAJOR SOVIET-DOMINATED MASTER FRONTS SUCH AS THE WORLD PEACE COUNCIL AND THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF JOURNALISTS, AND WILL PROVIDE MORE BACKGROUND TO THE FIELD. WE LACK, HOWEVER, A FULL UNDERSTANDING IN MOST COUNTRIES OF NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS THAT ARE INDIRECTLY CONTROLLED BY THE SOVIET UNION OR ARE FREQUENTLY SUSCEPTIBLE TO MOSCOW'S INFLUENCE. REPORTING THAT ILLUMINATES THE STRUCTURE OF THESE ORGANIZATIONS, THEIR CONTRIBUTION TO SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THE

HOST COUNTRY, AND HOW THE SOVIETS MANIPULATE THEM IS NEEDED.

11. OUR ANALYSIS OF THE ACTIVE MEASURE PHENOMENA SHOWS THAT CONTROL IS USUALLY BY THE SOVIET UNION. THE PRIMARY FOCUS IN OUR EFFORTS TO COUNTER THESE ACTIVITIES IS THEREFORE ON THE SOVIETS. NEVERTHELESS, EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND CUBA PLAY A CLOSELY ORCHESTRATED ROLE IN MANY ACTIVE MEASURES CAMPAIGNS. CUBA HAS A LEADING ROLE IN ACTIVE MEASURES DIRECTED AT THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT AND LATIN AMERICA. IT WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE, THEREFORE, TO IGNORE THESE PROXY EFFORTS. ESPECIALLY IN LATIN AMERICA, REPORTING ON ACTIVE MEASURES SHOULD HIGHLIGHT THE CUBAN ROLE FOLLOWING THE PROCEDURES NOTED ABOVE.

12. ACTIVITIES DESCRIBED IN THIS MESSAGE FOR COUNTERING SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES ARE COMPLEMENTARY TO THOSE UNDERTAKEN BY THE INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP ON PROJECT TRUTH HEADED BY USIA. THE SOVIET PROPAGANDA ALERT AND FAST RESPONSE ALERT SERVICE PROVIDED BY USIA WILL DEAL WITH PUBLIC ANTI-US CHARGES AND PROPAGANDA. THE ACTIVITIES COVERED IN THIS MESSAGE WILL DEAL WITH SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES WHICH ARE OFTEN COVERT IN CHARACTER. OUR PUBLIC RESPONSE TO SOME SOVIET ACTIVE

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MEASURES MAY BE BY MEANS OF THE PROJECT TRUTH FAST
RESPONSE ALERT SERVICE AS WELL AS THE MECHANISMS NOTED
IN THIS CABLE. HAIG
BT

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Shaping Attitudes 16 - 1/15/82

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Poland Day -

- ICFTU on board (Not so much in the INR analysis)
- Pres, O'Neill, others will appear
- Church groups involved

- The more direct Sov response
to Sov Mil. Power is out
"Power Where The Threat To Peace"

6th Revision of White Paper received
today

Wait to see how much play this
gets, then decide whether or not
to rebut. White Paper due out
in mid-Feb.

The truth about the arms race —
worth setting the record straight

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BY RW NARA DATE 6/23/16

Soviet Diplomatic Conduct

✓

John L. Parnet out 2 papers
possible models —

Brits put out a Soviet Affairs
notes - have been for some time.
They have stature among experts
—

Considering starting a similar
set of notes to spread around
to embassies, etc. Could also be
an article in PoC. —

in Report Yalta / report Brezhnev
Doctrine (?)