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File Folder PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 1982 (NOVEMBER 1982)

FOIA

M11-443

Box Number 4

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114

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
142799	MEMO	RE CENTRAL AMERICA (PP. 5-6 ONLY) <i>R 9/5/17 M443/5</i>	2	ND	B1
142800	MEMO	STEVE STEINER TO INTERAGENCY GROUP RE REPORT ON 11/18 MEETING <i>R 9/5/17 M443/5</i>	1	11/30/1982	B1
142801	MEMO	STEVE STEINER TO INTERAGENCY GROUP RE REPORT ON 12/2 MEETING <i>R 9/5/17 M443/5</i>	2	12/7/1982	B1
142802	MEMO	STEVE STEINER TO INTERAGENCY GROUP RE REPORT ON 12/16 MEETING <i>R 9/5/17 M443/5</i>	2	ND	B1
142803	MEMO	STEVE STEINER TO INTERAGENCY GROUP RE REPORT ON 12/9 MEETING <i>R 9/5/17 M443/5</i>	3	12/14/1982	B1
142804	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS 142803 <i>R 9/5/17 M443/5</i>	3	12/14/1982	B1

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SUBSTANTIVE APPROACH

On the substance, we believe that in approaching Europeans (and to some extent, others) on Central American issues we should:

1. Move the debate away from excessive focus on El Salvador to a more global approach, showing Europeans there are greater stakes involved.

2. Show how our policy in Central America is consistent with general Western political objectives; as in Poland, we are not trying to dictate particular political formula but to:

- seek peaceful solutions;
- ensure that people of Central America have say over own future; and
- ensure pluralistic society and religious freedom.

3. Contrast this with Soviet style imperialism:

- massive invasion and occupation of once nonaligned Afghanistan;
- responsibility for repression and for reimposing a failed system in Poland;
- use of Cuban and other proxies in Horn of Africa, Angola, Yemen and now Central America; and
- trying to force a particular system on Salvadoran and other peoples, through military supply effort and promotion of violence and destruction.

4. Show the totalitarian danger facing Central America:

- Soviet, Polish, Afghan, Cuban and Southeast Asian examples;
- Steady dismantling of pluralism in Nicaragua, including assaults on free press, interference with Church and harassment of private sector;

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BY RW NARA DATE 9/5/17

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- Massive refugee flow from such regimes, for example about 3 million Afghans -- almost 1/5 of population.

5. Show the death and destruction wreaked by the extreme left in El Salvador (without whitewashing the extreme right):

- sabotaging elections, permitting no freedom of choice;
- destroying the economy -- eg, CBS Evening News 3/10 said conservative estimate gives war damage at \$70 million, GNP shrunk by 25% in last 3 years and unemployment up 30%.

6. Point out US stake in Caribbean security -- sea lines of communication, U.S. shipping, oil; 50% of essential supplies from U.S. to Europe in time of tension would have to pass through Florida Straits.

7. Show fundamental differences between Polish and Salvadoran situations:

- West not sending arms to Poland;
- There was no violence in Poland;
- El Salvador holding free elections (not permitted in Poland, postponed indefinitely in Nicaragua);
- El Salvador permits free trade unions and peasant associations, private sector, pluralism (8 parties in election), while effort at free trade union brought massive repression in Poland.

Similarity, however, is that Soviets and allies opposing popular political processes and dictating own formula in both cases.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the basic thrust of these substantive points and ask ARA Steering Group, working with EUR and others, to develop these and other themes into complete speakers packet.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

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November 15, 1982

TO: Interagency Group on European Public Diplomacy

FROM: EUR/P - Steve Steiner *SES*

SUBJECT: Report on 11/4 Meeting and 11/18 Agenda

Report on 11/4 Meeting

1. Poland. Herspring, Carlson, Clear and Steiner briefed on actions being taken in support of Polish workers on November 10 and December 13. The question was raised as to what US TV networks may be planning, and whether we could get some archival footage for use in regard to December 13 anniversary. PA (Kane) undertook to look into this and to contact PBS. EUR will provide background briefings for the press on Poland as we approach December 13, possibly one within the next few days. It was emphasized that we should try to get qualified speakers on Poland to make appearances in Europe, and we should include references to Poland in speeches made both here and in Europe by senior US officials. USIA agreed to help with programming. Suggested points to be made will be distributed at 11/18 meeting.

2. Forced Labor in USSR. The interim report was transmitted to Congress on November 5, and subsequently released to the press. Copies will be made available at 11/18 meeting. At the 11/4 meeting, it was agreed that we will do what we can quietly to encourage US media coverage of the hearings in Frankfurt on November 18-19; USIA will try to ensure the same overseas. It was also agreed that one of the issues on which we will wish to place more focus for the full report due to Congress in January is that of Southeast Asian laborers in the USSR. We will also wish to look into the relationship between forced labor in the USSR and de facto discrimination against minorities, including the role of sentencing for "economic crimes."

Agenda for 11/18

1. Poland Follow-up
2. Forced Labor in USSR - next steps
3. Repression in USSR, GDR, etc.

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Dept. of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
BY *CV* MARA, DATE *9/5/12*



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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

November 30, 1982

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BY

NLRR

M443/5 #142800

NARA DATE

9/5/17

TO: Interagency Group on European Public Diplomacy

FROM: EUR/P - Steve Steiner *SES*

SUBJECT: Report on 11/18 Meeting; Agenda for 12/2

Report on 11/18 Meeting

1. Poland. PA (Kane) reported on contacts with PBS concerning possible TV films on Poland to be shown on or about 12/13. USIA reported that a list of potential speakers on Poland was offered to posts, but there was no reading yet on the responses. USIA added that there will be 5-6 qualified speakers going to Europe in the near future, and that Paula Dobriansky of the NSC staff will undertake such public affairs activities during her current European trip. (She has agreed to give the group a read-out on her return.) Guidance points on Poland were distributed, and it was stressed that all agencies should stay in close touch with State concerning public handling of Poland due to the fluid situation in that country.

2. Repression in GDR. Ed O'Donnel (EUR/CE) expressed the importance of treating the peace movement in the GDR on a factual basis, making clear for example that the movement is basically anti-NATO as well as anti-Warsaw Pact and is not an all-out opposition movement. It should also be noted that the members of the movement are opposing the militarization of GDR society. O'Donnel undertook to prepare a guidance paper giving the basic facts on the movement.

Agenda for 12/2

1. Steve Shaffer of USIA/REU will give a briefing on the results of USIA's October survey in Europe on attitudes towards arms control.

2. The remainder of the meeting will be devoted to a discussion of how to follow up vis-a-vis Europe on the President's democracy initiative, which must be worked out on a priority basis. As noted at earlier meetings on this issue, we would particularly appreciate your views on how we can: a) do more in regard to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe; b) concentrate more on how to expand democracy to areas where it does not now exist and how the transition can be made from left-wing or right-wing regimes; and c) how we can promote greater study of the democratic process.

Forced Labor in USSR. This issue, too, needs priority treatment, as we are only a month away from the Congressional deadline for our final report. At the last meeting (11/23) on this issue, several subgroups were formed -- eg, on the applicability of various conventions; on the Vietnamese aspects; and on Soviet efforts to get more voluntary labor to Siberia. The larger group will meet again in the EUR Conference Room (6226) on Tuesday, December 7 at 11:00 a.m. We would appreciate receiving at that time a report on the efforts of the subgroups.

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

BY

NARA DATE 9/5/17

December 7, 1982

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TO: Interagency Working Group on Public Diplomacy

FROM: EUR/P - Steve Steiner SES

SUBJECT: Report on 12/2; Agenda for 12/9

Report on 12/2 Meeting

The entire meeting was devoted to discussion of how to carry out vis-a-vis Europe the President's Democracy Initiative. The urgency of reaching consensus was stressed, as USIA's first budget submission was due in less than a week.

Discussion covered the following:

- actions in regard to European parliamentarians and the Council of Europe;
- putting new life into SAIS/Bologna, while encouraging them to expand some of their focus from American studies to more universal studies on democracy;
- putting more focus on how to expand democracy, including providing studies and training in building democratic infrastructure and in the democratic process and on how to make the transition from non-democratic to democratic institutions;
- placing more emphasis on programs related to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, as well as on Western European countries where democracy still remains relatively new; also, Yugoslavia should be added to relevant programs designed for Western Europe;
- developing programs in labor area;
- whether to establish a center for democracy or for democratic studies, e.g., in Europe (Spain?);
- programs for gaining greater understanding among the "Successor Generation" in Europe, including not only USG programs but also pressing private groups (e.g., Atlantic Associations) and other governments to put priority on such groups.

In regard to institutional exchanges with Europe, Jim Gadsden (EUR/RPE) reported that we have had no contact yet with the European Parliament in regard to the Democracy Initiative, but have some actions underway with the Council of Europe. The Council is hosting a Strasbourg Conference of Parliamentary Democrats next October and is particularly interested in OECD parliamentary participation. There are two preparatory events leading up to the Strasbourg Conference: a preparatory meeting in January (and another possibly in March) to prepare agenda and procedures; and a Colloquium on the Concept of Democracy to be held in March, which Council of Europe

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President Areilza hopes will produce a paper for the larger meeting in October. Dick Hecklinger (P) reported that we will encourage the leaders of the bipartisan Democracy Project^{co} to take part in these meetings. (A further suggestion would be to brief Codel LANTOS, the US Delegation to the exchange with the European Parliament in January, on how they might be helpful in regard to the Democracy Initiative.) Finally, it was reported by USIA that Associate Director for Programs Thompson is working on a similar project; it was agreed that a member of his staff would brief the next meeting 12/9) of this group on the project.

There was also detailed discussion of establishing a "New Center for the Study of the USSR and Eastern Europe." It was emphasized that this should be open to Russian and other ethnic groups from the USSR and to Eastern Europeans and that a welcome mat should be out for motivated blue collar representatives (e.g., Polish Solidarity) as well as members of the intelligentsia.

In regard to programs for youth and for the "Successor Generation," USIA reported that it is attempting to bring these two areas together under the Democracy Initiative. This is being done through the "Full Cycle" program in which we will: encourage the formation of alumni groups of exchange programs such as Fulbright, organize meetings of these groups, ask their help in targeting younger persons from their countries who should be brought into these programs and work with these groups to establish ten leadership seminars in Europe patterned after the Georgetown Leadership Seminar. The AFL-CIO Youth Desk will also be brought into this program.

It was reported that a labor package is also being put together with a global focus, and that Walter Raymond of the NSC will be convening an interagency group to pursue this.

It was agreed that the near term schedule for pursuing the democracy initiative will be as follows:

1. USIA is to revise the submissions examined by the group, incorporate new ideas on which agreement was reached and make their initial submission to OMB within a week.
2. Other agencies will have an opportunity to comment again before the package goes to Congress. Further, OMB has indicated to USIA that it will permit changes in the initial submission.
3. The program will be discussed further at the "Shaping" meeting this week, i.e., December 9, then in more detail at the same meeting on December 16.

Agenda for 12/9

1. Follow-up on Democracy Initiative.
2. Report on European public views on arms control (USIA-Shaffer)
3. Status report on NATO Force Comparison paper and Soviet "Whence the Threat to Peace." (EUR/RPM - Halgus)



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

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TO: Interagency Working Group on European Public Diplomacy

FROM: EUR/P - Steve Steiner SES

SUBJECT: Report on 12/16 Meeting; Agenda for 12/21 Meeting

SPECIAL NOTE: The next meeting will take place on Tuesday, December 21, 2:00 p.m. in the EUR Conference Room (6226). The room has been reserved from 2-3:30 p.m. in case we need the extra time. We will use this meeting to have the briefing and discussion which we were not able to have on December 16: namely, the briefing by Al Richman of State/PA on American attitudes on key arms control questions and comparative notes by Steve Shaffer of USIA/REU on European perspectives. We will then focus on how we should fine tune our approach on both sides of the Atlantic.

Also at the Tuesday 12/21 meeting, Paula Dobriansky of the NSC staff will provide a briefing on her just-completed trip to Europe, where she made several public appearances. This will provide a valuable additional contribution to the discussion based on the reports by Messrs. Richman and Shaffer.

Report on 12/16 Meeting

Entire session was taken up with comments by and the question and answer session with Professor Franz Alting van Gesau, Director of the JFK Institute at Tilburg University in The Netherlands. Professor van Gesau, who is also Chairman of the Dutch Government's Advisory Committee on Arms Control, gave his reflections on public opinion in The Netherlands on security questions and on the state of the Dutch "peace" movement. Among his observations:

- The Dutch "peace movement" is no longer interested in a dialogue with the Dutch or other governments. It has gone past that point and is now considering taking its actions exclusively in the streets. It claims to want a dialogue with the Dutch government and claims the Dutch government is unresponsive. But this is simply a propaganda point to legitimize "going to the streets."

- The U.S. can only help indirectly in the debate in Europe, as each Allied government must take the lead in its own country. We should, however, provide materials to assist Allied governments and supportive private groups, provide speakers for appropriate forums and keep European sensitivities in mind in our own public statements.

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- There is an historic contradiction in European attitudes toward the U.S. Under the Carter Administration, for example, we were faulted for lack of firm leadership. Now, we are sometimes faulted for putting "too much pressure" on the Allies.

- We have allowed the debate in Europe to focus too much on weaponry. Our focus in Europe should be more political, emphasizing the differences of the systems in East and West. Europeans are aware of Soviet weapons. We need to heighten European perceptions that it is not so much the weapons themselves that are dangerous, but the greater propensity that the Soviets--given their internal system and international conduct--might use them. In other words, we should emphasize the totalitarian threat posed by the USSR.

- At the same time, we should emphasize Western strengths, not weaknesses. Playing up only Soviet strengths can make European publics fearful and fatalistic.

- We should work with selected media, private organizations and European governments to improve the dialogue, and encourage Allied governments to show "more civil courage" in taking the case to their publics.

- On the "peace" movement, we should expose its links to the USSR, emphasizing particularly the political links (as financial links are harder to establish). And we should expose how Soviet political campaigns are conducted in the West and how sincere public concerns about nuclear issues are exploited. USG materials such as USIA's "Soviet Propaganda Alerts" are helpful in this regard, but at least in the case of The Netherlands the U.S. does not seem to be giving them sufficient distribution.

Agenda for Tuesday 12/21: Discussion of European and American public concerns on arms control issues--Richman, Shaffer, Dobriansky, etc.--as noted above.

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Steve Steiner's Attitudes Meeting 9

- All — gave a rundown on U.S. public attitude towards freeze.
- Steve Shaeffer on European attitudes
 - Widespread support for NATO
 - Lack of confidence in NATO's deterrence.
 - Little support for increased defense expenditures
 - Most think USSR is superior or there is a balance
 - Last summer majorities or near-majorities supported a freeze
 - Distrust of both US and USSR motives in arms talks: ploys for deployments.

- Blair makes point that the ¹⁰ cynicism on the part of the public about both superpowers' motives makes it tougher for us to beat the sincerity rap.

- Ann: Need to play to public perceptions - "land-based nuclear weapons-free zone"

"Lisensely pace" of the talks progress - no summit breaks - lack of media focus.

Paula

- Interest in Poland waning
 - Timed well
 - Succession in USSR
 - Sanctions
- Sanctions came up in every country

Step - A question on debate
in the summer - most
Europeans that the poor
benefitted more from détente
than their countries.



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

14 DEC 1982

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TO: Interagency Working Group on European Public
Diplomacy

FROM: EUR/P - Steve Steiner

SUBJECT: Report on 12/9; Agenda for 12/16

Report on 12/9 Meeting

1. Democracy Initiative: Implementation of the Democracy Initiative in regard to Europe was discussed briefly, as a follow-up to the detailed discussion of December 2. It was noted that the budget process is now underway. We would hope for further discussion of this subject on December 23

2. USIA Polling Data: Steve Shaffer of USIA/REU briefed on recent polling data taken by USIA, in cooperation with Gallup affiliates in Europe, concerning public attitudes in Europe on arms control questions. Countries polled were the UK, FRG, France, Italy and The Netherlands. Summary conclusions are as follows:

- A large proportion of the public in Europe remains unaware of the arms control talks which are underway. The talks still seem to be largely invisible, while the "peace" movement in Europe is highly visible. For example, a two-thirds majority in the UK is unaware of the INF talks. There is also widespread ignorance, especially in the FRG, of the Soviet monopoly in INF.

- There remains considerable skepticism concerning both US and Soviet arms control positions. The sincerity of both countries is widely questioned. For example, a majority in Italy and a large plurality in the UK and France believe that the US is not making a genuine effort in arms control. Opinion is more or less evenly divided in the Netherlands. In the FRG, a plurality still sees us as making a serious effort. Doubts concerning Soviet sincerity are higher, but skepticism concerning the U.S. is on the increase.

- Opposition to INF deployment, even when linked to arms control, is widespread and increasing.

- European publics would favor the zero option over the Soviet position in INF and reductions over a freeze in INF and START, but the problem remains that too few know our position.

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NLRR M443/5 #142803

BY DW NARA DATE 9/5/17

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INF: Pessimism concerning the outcome of the INF talks is increasing, and the credibility of our zero outcome proposal seems to have declined. For example, pessimism in the UK has increased 19% in the year since the President's November 1981 proposal. At the same time there is greater doubt concerning the deterrent capability of US INF deployments. The situation is the worst in Italy, where 60% are now unconditionally opposed to deployment--an increase of 14% since July. Unconditional opposition has increased 10% in Germany, to 42%. There is no significant change since July in the other three countries, where unconditional opposition remains at about 40%.

START: A majority in France, the UK and Italy remain unaware of the talks. Among those who do know of the talks, only one in five see success as likely. Both the US and USSR are seen as rigid. When given a direct choice, the public supports reductions over a freeze, but too many people remain unaware of our position. For example, almost one-half of educated West Germans do not know whether we favor a freeze or reductions. The problem lies in this ignorance, not in any perception that the Soviets have been constructive. Further, most do see the Soviets as having more ICBMs.

"Peace" Movement: This was the first poll by USIA taking a look at Western European perceptions of the movement. Summary findings were as follows:

- The movement is widely known, and opinion toward it is largely favorable, with the most frequent attribution being "sincere."
- Few think it is Communist-dominated. (The highest here is 20% in the FRG.)
- Prevailing opinion is that the movement has little practical effect. In Italy, about one-half believe it will help to reduce the chances of nuclear war, but only about one-third think so in the other countries.
- The demonstrations in Fall 1981 had a very negative effect on attitudes toward INF deployment, but this was short-lived.

Next Steps: USIA will now study this data in more detail and try to do profiles of those who support and oppose our positions, so that we can better target our audiences. The next polls will bring in Belgium as well as those included this time, so that all INF basing countries are covered. USIA has intended to do another such poll once the situation clarifies on MX, perhaps in February or March. It was suggested at the meeting, however, that this be done no later than

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January. Finally, we will compare this with our findings on U.S. public opinion in order to get a better sense of where we should place our emphases on each side of the Atlantic. This will be part of the discussion at this Thursday's meeting.

3. NATO Force Comparison Paper: Joe Halgus of EUR/RPM briefed on our follow-up efforts to the NATO release of this past May. We consider it important to bring out a new document in the coming year, even if we are not able to get the Alliance to produce a complete update. The U.S. supports a Dutch suggestion that in the future the Alliance release two versions of the study: an update of the one already released and a shorter glossy version targeted for the wider public. Our objective will be to get at least the shorter version out in 1983, including photos and some updated charts, and then to have a full update of the study released in 1984

Agenda for 12/16

1. Prof. Alting van Gesau, President of the JFK Institute at Tilburg University in The Netherlands, has agreed to address the group on the Dutch "peace" movement -- including the question of Soviet influence.

2. Al Richman of State/PA will give a briefing on U.S. public opinion on arms control issues, as a complement to the USIA briefing of last week.

NOTE: The working group on the forced labor issue will meet again this coming Friday, 12/17, from 10:00 - 12:00 in the EUR Conference Room (6226). This refers to the larger group, as the subgroups have been holding their own meetings during the past two weeks and are expected to have draft papers ready for the larger group by Friday.

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T. Dennis Blair
United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

14 DEC 1982

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TO: Interagency Working Group on European Public Diplomacy

FROM: EUR/P - Steve Steiner *SES*

SUBJECT: Report on 12/9; Agenda for 12/16

FILE:
PUBLIC
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Summary of discussion 2 weeks ago. Steve

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BY *RW* NARA DATE 9/5/17

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

S/S

November 24, 1982

TO: D - The Deputy Secretary
FROM: PA - John Hughes *JH*
SUBJECT: Nuclear Freeze Referenda

Pursuant to your request, we reviewed the final returns on the various November 2 nuclear freeze votes throughout the country.

EXIT POLLS

Findings from the November 2 nationwide network "exit polls" are instructive. ABC and CBS, who independently conducted these as voters left the polling places, recently shared some of their results with us.

CBS found a 57-29 percent majority favored a "nuclear arms freeze with the Soviet Union," with 14 percent expressing no opinion. ABC reported a 57-43 percent majority of opinion-holders favored an "immediate freeze on nuclear weapons."

These findings are fairly similar to the 59-41 percent average margin recorded on the various freeze ballots and are considerably lower than the roughly 70-25 percent pro-freeze margin obtained in polls taken last summer.

Democrats, liberals, and residents of large cities were the groups most supportive of a freeze (about 65% in favor). Republicans, conservatives, Southerners and rural residents were the least supportive (about 50% in favor). Also, females supported the freeze somewhat more than men, adults 18-29 more than adults 45 or over, and Catholics and Jews more than Protestants.

Domestic economic worries of the voters clearly predominated over concerns about a nuclear freeze. Fifty-three percent said a candidate's position on "Reagan economics" was "very important" in deciding how they would vote, compared to 13 percent who said a candidate's position on a "nuclear freeze" was "very important" (9% of these pro-freeze vs. 4% anti-freeze).

No more than one-fifth of any voter group felt that the nuclear freeze issue was "very important" in determining their vote. Every group was much more concerned about "Reagan economics" than about the freeze. CBS asked voters which of nine issues was "most important in deciding how you would vote for [the] House."

Nuclear freeze ranked eighth, after unemployment, social security, the President's policies, government spending, inflation, military strength, and abortion, in that order.

Additional details of the ABC and CBS polls are attached at Tab C including complete question wordings and results for various population groups.

REFERENDA RETURNS

Almost 19,000,000 voters expressed a position on one of the freeze referenda, of which 59 percent supported the freeze. Freeze resolutions carried in all but three elections: in Arizona, the freeze lost by 41-59 percent; in Stone County, Arkansas by 40-60 percent; and in Mesa County (Grand Junction), Colorado by 47-53 percent. (At Tab B is a breakdown of the votes on each freeze referendum.)

A freeze proposition won by more than 65 percent in all the major cities where it was on the ballot, except Denver (62-38%) and Miami (Dade County, 58-42%). Chicago, Philadelphia, and Pitkin County (Aspen), Colorado shared the largest overall percentage difference, 75-25 percent.

About 25 percent of those who voted nationwide in general took a position on the nuclear freeze. Despite the relatively large size of this vote, it may not be an appropriate sample on which to base conclusions for the entire country. Referenda were concentrated for the most part in the East, North Central, and Far Western regions, i.e., in states and localities where proponents succeeded in placing the various propositions on the ballot. They failed to do so elsewhere (including surprisingly in New York State). On the other hand, Massachusetts freeze supporters had little trouble placing the referendum on the state ballot even at the last minute.

population groups.

EDITORIAL VIEWS

Most papers that commented on the referenda results were sympathetic to the outcome, while a few expressed concern. Attached at Tab A is a survey of these editorial positions.

Attachments:

- Tab A -- Editorial Comment
- Tab B -- Referenda Results
- Tab C -- ABC/CBS Exit Polls

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EDITORIAL COMMENT ON THE FREEZE VOTE

SUMMARY:

To date, we have received comment on the freeze vote from 14 papers: nine were basically sympathetic to the vote and five expressed concern. Both the pro and the anti-freeze editorials called for the President's attention to the nuclear issue: the pro-freeze papers wanted him to work vigorously to reduce the nuclear threat; the anti-freeze papers urged him to speak out against the Soviet military threat.

END SUMMARY

Papers sympathetic to the vote emphasized the following themes:

- The people have sent a message to the President that they want him to work vigorously to reduce the threat of nuclear extinction (Buffalo News, Hartford Courant, Cleveland Plain Dealer, Philadelphia Inquirer);
- SALT II is a logical base to regain the confidence of the American public and its allies (Denver Post, Dallas Times Herald, New York Times);
- The new House may reverse the last freeze vote thus forcing the Administration to listen (Christian Science Monitor, Miami Herald).

Two papers critical of the vote blamed, in part, the Administration. The Washington Times called the vote "a triumph of demagoguery and a default of presidential leadership." The San Diego Union urged the President to "speak directly to the heart-felt concerns of his own countrymen ... and the sooner the better." Both of these conservative papers felt the voters needed to hear "more specific communications from the great communicator" about the Soviet military threat.

Three other conservative papers considered the vote dangerous, threatening peace at any price: "The 'nuclear freeze' foolishness is a most dangerous disease that is spreading in our country, threatening death and subjugation, not assuring peace and freedom" (Chattanooga News-Free Press). Others with a similar comment were the Detroit News and the Miami Diario Las Americas.

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Returns of November 2 Nuclear Freeze Referenda*

<u>State or Locality</u>	<u>For Freeze</u>	<u>Against</u>	<u>% For</u>	<u>% Against</u>
<u>Arizona</u>	272,313	306,272	41	59
<u>Arkansas</u>				
- <u>Independence Co.</u>	4,800	4,314	53	47
- <u>Izard Co.</u>	2,143	2,038	52	48
- <u>Stone Co.</u>	1,246	1,893	40	60
<u>California</u>	3,778,331	3,414,987	52.5	47.5
<u>Colorado</u>				
- <u>Denver</u>	93,630	56,981	62	38
- <u>Mesa Co. (Grand Junction)</u>	12,008	13,355	47	53 (84%)
- <u>Pitkin Co. (Aspen)</u>	3,031	1,062	75	25
<u>Connecticut</u>				
- <u>Hamden</u>	7,761	3,567	68	32
- <u>Manchester</u>	11,264	4,261	73	27
- <u>Meriden</u>	7,039	2,996	70	30
- <u>New Haven</u>	12,051	4,672	72	28
- <u>North Branford</u>	1,796	1,031	63.5	36.5
- <u>Norwalk</u>	8,217	6,327	56.5	43.5
- <u>Southbury</u>	3,312	2,049	62	38
- <u>Torrington</u>	4,821	3,474	58	42
- <u>Wethersfield</u>	4,939	4,590	52	48
<u>District of Columbia</u>	77,521	23,369	70	30
<u>Florida</u>				
- <u>Dade Co. (Miami)</u>	165,475	119,985	58	42
<u>Illinois</u>				
- <u>Chicago</u>	404,173	135,325	75	25 (81%)
- <u>Cook Co.</u>	358,387	182,303	66	34 (85%)
- <u>Winetka</u>	2,159	1,582	58	42 (72%)
<u>Massachusetts</u>	1,319,442	471,968	74	26
<u>Michigan</u>	1,583,570	1,213,534	57	43
<u>Minnesota</u>				
- <u>Albert Lea</u>	3,702	2,495	60	40
- <u>Bemidji</u>	2,893	1,488	66	34

* - Based on at least 95 percent of returns counted unless otherwise noted.

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Missouri				
- <u>Columbia</u>	9,718	6,683	59	41
- <u>Springfield</u>	20,758	19,415	52	48
<u>Montana</u>	162,164	121,536	57	43
Nebraska				
- <u>Kearney</u>	3,358	3,301	50.4	49.6
Nevada				
- <u>Washoe Co. (Reno)</u>	31,934	21,657	60	40
<u>New Jersey</u>	1,216,407	631,915	66.5	33.5
New York				
- <u>Suffolk Co.</u>	123,979	55,756	69	31
<u>North Dakota</u>	128,356	92,100	58	42
<u>Oregon</u>	606,143	378,780	61.5	38.5
Pennsylvania				
- <u>Bulter Co.</u>	19,134	16,040	54	46
- <u>Erie Co.</u>	44,679	24,457	65	35
- <u>Philadelphia Co.</u>	231,787	75,149	75.5	24.5
<u>Rhode Island</u>	161,852	112,011	59	41
Washington				
- <u>Medina</u>	818	656	55	45
- <u>Okanagan Co.</u>	12,835	6,775	65	35
- <u>Thurston Co.</u>	27,756	15,673	64	36 (618)
Totals	10,947,702	7,657,742	58.8%	41.2%

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ABC Exit Poll (22,960 Voters)

(1) Opinion on Nuclear Freeze:

"Are you personally for an immediate freeze on nuclear weapons or personally against it?"

For - 57%, Against - 43%

(2) Importance of Nuclear Freeze Issue in Voting:

"Were any of these items very important to you in choosing which candidate to vote for?"

Opposed to Reagan economics	28%
Support of Reagan economics	25) (53%)
Long experience in government	24
Political party of candidate	17
SUPPORT OF NUCLEAR FREEZE	9)
OPPOSED TO NUCLEAR FREEZE	4) (13%)

107%

		(1) Nuclear Freeze Opinion		(2) Nuclear Freeze Issue Cited as "Very Important" in Voting	
		For	Against	Support Freeze	Oppose Freeze
<u>Total Public</u>		57%	43%	9%	4%
<u>Sex:</u>	Male	51	49	8	5
	Female	63	37	10	3
<u>Age:</u>	18-30	63	37	10	3
	31-59	56	44	8	3
	60+	51	49	13	7
<u>Party:</u>	Dem.	65	35	Not Available	
	Rep.	46	54		
	Other	54	46		
<u>City Size:</u>	Large	65	35	14	4
	Small	57	43	11	5
	Suburb	56	44	8	4
	Town	55	45	8	5
	Rural	54	46	7	4
	Farm	53	47	7	4

CBS Exit Poll (6,140 Voters)

(1) Opinion on Nuclear Freeze:

"Please mark an "X" to show if you favor or oppose ...
a nuclear arms freeze with the Soviet Union."

Favor - 57%, Oppose - 29%, No opinion - 14%

(2) Importance of Nuclear Freeze Issue in Voting:

"Which of these issues was most important in deciding
how you voted for U.S. House? Check up to two boxes."

Unemployment	38%
Social security	26
Ronald Reagan's policies	24
Government spending	19
Inflation	15
Military strength	11
Abortion	6
NUCLEAR FREEZE	5
The environment	3
No answer	<u>13</u>

160%

(1) Nuclear Freeze
Opinion
No

(2) Nuclear Freeze Issue
Cited "Most Important"

		<u>Favor</u>	<u>Oppose</u>	<u>Opinion</u>	
<u>Total Public</u>		57%	29%	14%	58
<u>Sex:</u>	Male	55	33	12	4
	Female	59	25	16	6
<u>Age:</u>	18-29	61	30	9	6
	30-44	60	29	11	5
	45-59	56	31	13	4
	60+	52	26	22	5
<u>Party:</u>	Dem.	61	24	15	4
	Rep.	51	37	12	6
	Other	60	29	11	4
<u>Philosophy:</u>	Liberal	65	22	13	9
	Moderate	60	27	13	4
	Conserv.	48	39	13	3

(1) Nuclear Freeze Opinion

(2) Nuclear Freeze Issue Cited "Most Important"

		<u>Favor</u>	<u>Oppose</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>	
<u>Religion:</u>	Catholic	62%	25%	13%	6%
	Prot.	52	34	14	3
	Jew	74	19	7	6
<u>Region:</u>	Northeast	60	28	12	7
	Mid-West	60	25	15	3
	South	47	33	20	2
	West	59	32	9	8
<u>Income:</u>	Less than \$10,000	53	22	25	5
	\$10,000-\$19,999	59	30	12	5
	\$20,000-\$29,999	62	30	8	3
	\$30,000-\$49,999	59	32	9	4
	\$50,000+	60	34	6	6

Drafted: PA/OAP:ARichman:sch/ip
x. 22257 11/23/82



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

S/S

November 26, 1982

TO: The Deputy Secretary
FROM: PA - John Hughes *JH*
SUBJECT: Congressional Poll Indicates House Will Be
Much More Supportive of Freeze Than Senate

I thought you might be interested in the findings from the following pre-election survey question asked by CBS/New York Times of all Congressional candidates.

"Do you favor or oppose ... a mutual 'nuclear freeze' with the Soviet Union at present levels of strength?"

	<u>98th Congress</u>		<u>97th Congress</u>	
	<u>Favor</u>	<u>Oppose</u>	<u>Favor</u>	<u>Oppose</u>
<u>House of Representatives</u>	55%	45%	49%	51%
Party:				
Democrat	75	25	72	28
Republican	22	78	20	80
Region:				
East	73	27	66	34
Midwest	60	40	56	44
South	33	67	26	74
West	58	42	49	51
<u>Senate</u>	36%	63%	35%	65%
Party:				
Democrat	63	37	61	39
Republican	13	87	13	87

Drafted: PA/OAP: *AR* *richman*:sch
x. 22257 11/26/82

Cleared: PA - Mr. Kelly (subs) *S*
PA/OAP - Mr. Pernick *S*