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DRAFT ARMS CONTROL SPEECH

February 24, 1983

The Value of Dialogue

We currently are witnessing an unprecedented level of public attention to issues of nuclear weapons and arms control -- some of which traditionally have been relegated to the province of specialists. This new broadened Western public interest is a healthy sign, since the security and disarmament policies of all democratic governments depend on the support of informed publics.

The NATO countries cherish and protect the hard-won freedoms which allow us to assemble and speak out freely on these issues but the very vitality of the debate in the west is in sharp contrast to the continuing suppression of truly free and open discussion in the East. In the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe public discussion of these fundamental issues remains tightly controlled and manipulated by governments intent only on propagating the official viewpoint, as the continuing brutal suppression of independent peace movements there amply demonstrates.

The Policy of Nuclear Deterrence

The United States shares the concern of peoples everywhere over nuclear war. President Reagan has said what we all know to be true "there are no winners in a nuclear war -- only losers." We do not believe that such a war, once begun, could be easily limited or contained. Our strategy therefore has never been one of nuclear war fighting; but rather of deterrence and prevention of war, nuclear or conventional. Accordingly, we and our NATO allies have shaped defense and arms control policies which we believe will guarantee the safety of all of our nations and ensure that nuclear weapons are never used either in anger or in error.

And these policies have worked. They have kept the peace in Europe for over thirty five years, an accomplishment of great historic significance in view of Europe's stormy past, and its position as the most heavily armed continent in the world and the center of East/West confrontation and competition. Since NATO began there have been over a hundred armed conflicts and wars outside Europe. Truly, as NATO Secretary General Luns has said "NATO is the real peace movement."

Arms Control Objectives

One lesson we have learned clearly from past experience is that we must identify our security and arms control policy

objectives clearly and with reason. And we must pursue them with steadfastness and unity. We must ensure in particular that arms control agreements which we propose to conclude with the Soviet Union will genuinely enhance mutual security, and that once negotiated, they will secure popular support.

The United States objectives on arms control are simple to describe, fair-minded and straight-forward:

-- we will insist on agreements which make a real and definable contribution to increasing the security of the United States and its Allies, while at the same time reducing the risk of war.

-- we will insist on agreements which will reduce the number and the destructive potential of both conventional and nuclear forces. We will fail miserably in our responsibilities to ourselves and future generations if we merely legitimize the current, or even higher, levels of nuclear and conventional arms.

-- we will insist on balanced agreements which do not concede a Soviet monopoly of certain types of weapons systems, but which provide real equality of arms to both sides. Equality is a necessary condition for effective deterrence and the

preservation of peace. For where the Soviets have unchallenged advantages, they have no incentive to reduce.

-- we will insist on sound agreements which preclude circumvention. It is not enough for example to permit the Soviets to withdraw mobile intermediate range nuclear missiles behind some artificial line which they can readily recross or to remove the weapons from one region only so that they can be employed against friends and allies in another. Nor can we settle for cosmetic reductions such as the elimination only of some obsolete and unreliable Soviet missiles.

-- And we demand that agreements be verifiable. This is the only way to promote the confidence necessary to make the deep cuts which we desire, and to assure the sustainability of the agreements reached. Effective verification is particularly important given the closed nature of the Soviet system.

In short we do not seek nuclear or conventional superiority over the Soviet Union and the nations of the Warsaw Pact. We do seek balanced, equitable, verifiable agreements which provide greater security for all nations.

US Commitment to Arms Control

In this connection we have set into motion during the past year and a half a dynamic program of initiatives in the field of arms control and disarmament. In each case, these new initiatives were based on a thorough review and evaluation of the past history of the subject and based in the proposition that arms control and disarmanent efforts are an intregral element of foreign and security policy. President Reagan has outlined comprehensive policies in all major arms control areas. The US has put forward concrete, realistic and achievable proposals in the bilateral discussions with the Soviets in Geneva on intermediate range nuclear forces (INF), and strategic nuclear arms reductions (START). We have proposed a fresh approach to the mutual and balanced forces reductions (MBFR) talks in Vienna and are continuing the process of discussion and negotiation in Madrid stemming from the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. In addition, the US has revised and revitalized its unilateral and multilateral programs for preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons; eliminating the menace of chemical weapons; studying the feasibility of imposing further limits on the military use of outer space; and developing new and more effective measures to assure confidence and minimize the risks of war by miscalculation.

The Importance of Modernization

At the same time, we have undertaken a policy of modernizing our nuclear and conventional forces since both arms control and modernization are essential and mutually supportive elements of an overall security policy. This modernization is necessary because of the aging quality of current forces and the resulting erosion in their reliability and effectiveness. But more important, it reflects the need to redress the dangerous military imbalances created by the unprecedented Soviet military buildup of the past two decades. This buildup has been particularly dangerous in the nuclear area. And it has coincided with an increasingly aggressive and expansionistic Soviet foreign policy.

The Soviet Nuclear Buildup

o Since 1972 the Soviets have developed and deployed at least 10 different variants of three types of ICBMs, the SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19 and they now are testing two new ICBMs. These weapons now pose a major threat to the survivability of our land-based ICBM force. In the same period the United States deployed no new types of ICBMs and only a single variant of the existing Minuteman. The MX will be the first new US intercontinental ballistic missile in 16 years.

o In the area of naval forces, the Soviets, a traditional

land power, built a huge blue water navy. They added in this period over 60 missile-firing submarines in four new or improved classes. They now are deploying two new types of missile submarines--the Typhoon and the Delta III--while the commissioning of the first US Trident submarine in 1982 marked the end of a fifteen year period during which the United States did not build a single new ballistic-missile-firing submarine.

o In the air, the newest US B-52 bomber is over 20 years old. In contrast, Soviets have in the last five years produced more than 250 modern Backfire bombers that have inherent intercontinental nuclear capabilities, and are now developing a heavy bomber, the Blackjack, even larger than the B-1.

o In most significant measures used to judge strategic nuclear systems--total number of systems, total number of ballistic missiles, total destructive potential--the Soviets now surpass the United States. Soon they could equal and surpass us in number of warheads, the one area where the United States traditionally has had an advantage.

The Central Importance of the SS-20

On of the most destabilizing aspects of this Soviet military buildup has been the deployment of the SS-20 intermediate range

nuclear missiles, most of which are aimed at Western Europe. Some 333 of these Soviet SS-20 missiles have been deployed since 1977. Combined with the remaining intermediate range SS-4 and -5 Soviet missiles first deployed in the late 1950's the total warheads on these Soviet missiles comes to over 1,2 compared with about 600 in the mid 1970's. The US and its allies have no comparable capability. Moreover, the Soviets have also been modernizing their shorter range nuclear missiles, introducing newer weapons (the SS-22 and SS-X-23) for their more antiquated shorter range missiles (SS-12 and SCUD-B). These developments have given the Soviets in numbers and capabilities an overwhelming superiority in nuclear forces targeted on Europe. Moreover, this growing Soviet threat to Europe clearly has political as well as military purposes -- the deliberate fostering of a sense of insecurity among the peoples of western Europe, and of pressure for accommodation to Soviet power.

The Soviet Union claims that it is merely "modernizing" its force and undertaking to maintain an alleged nuclear balance in Europe. The Soviets made this claim in December 1979 when the SS-20 count was 140. Then made it again in the fall of 1980 when the number of SS-20s was 200. And yet again in the fall of 1981 when there were 250 SS-20s. And they are making it again today when the count is 333 with a total of 1,000

warheads. Not a single US LRINF missile has been deployed during this time. How can we reconcile the Soviet claims that a balance exists with the continuing dramatic growth in the numbers of these Soviet missiles and warheads.

The NATO Response

In order to maintain a credible deterrent, NATO agreed in December 1979 on a two-track approach. NATO would modernize the Alliance's INF by the deployment of 108 Pershing IIs and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) beginning in December 1983, while pursuing US/Soviet negotiations on arms control involving those forces. This deployment was not thrust by the United States upon the Europeans. Rather it represents a considered joint allied response. This decision has been repeatedly reconfirmed by the NATO Alliance, most recently by the NATO Foreign Ministers in December 1982.

For three years now the Alliance has pursued both of these tracks. It has done so in the face of a massive Soviet propaganda campaign which has tried by cajolery and by threats to overturn it; and despite the attempts of well meaning but mistaken westerners who believe that one track can be pursued without the other.

For almost a year after the NATO decision, the Soviet Union refused even to come to the negotiating table, insisting that NATO first renounce its plans to deploy our deterrent forces. Only when they finally realized that NATO was resolute did they agree to talk. Only if they are convinced that the countries of NATO will remain resolute can we expect them to negotiate seriously.

The Geneva INF Talks

The Geneva INF talks have been conducted in a professional and businesslike atmosphere. Progress has been achieved by the two delegations in understanding each other's position and illuminating the ways to possible solutions. What is not yet clear is whether the Soviet Union is willing to accept an agreement based on the principles of balance and equality rather than dominance.

...US Proposals

The United States proposals at the INF talks in Geneva have been dramatic, bold and straight-forward. President Reagan has proposed that the Soviet Union join with the United States in banishing from the whole world the entire class of US and Soviet land-based intermediate range nuclear missiles. The

American concept of equality thus is defined with precision -- zero on both sides for the most destabilizing intermediate ground-based nuclear missiles. This remains the best and most moral concept and the President has conveyed his willingness to meet anywhere and anytime with Soviet Party Chief Andropov to sign such an agreement. But, as the President has also made clear the US offer is not a "take it or leave it" proposition. The US negotiators are prepared to explore in Geneva any serious Soviet proposal consistent with the principles to which the Alliance subscribes. These are equality of rights and limits for the US and USSR; non-inclusion of the UK and French systems; no shifting of the INF threat from Europe to Asia; and the need for effective verification. However, the Soviets have yet to advance in Geneva a proposal which addresses these concerns.

...Soviet Proposals

The Soviet Union, in response, urges the elimination only of the United States weapons of comparable military significance. Early in the negotiations, the Soviets proposed that the USSR and NATO -- by which they mean the US, UK and France -- each reduce to a level of 300 "medium range" missiles and aircraft in or "intended for use in" Europe. The Soviets propose subtracting the number of such French and UK systems (255 by

their count) from the US ceiling while also barring deployment of US intermediate range missiles. The latest Soviet position announced by Mr. Andropov on December 21, 1982 indicates that the Soviet Union is ready to reduce the number of missiles in Europe to the number deployed by the UK and France. This would still permit Soviet retention of 162 SS-20 systems with 486 warheads, while the US would have no comparable weapons in Europe.

This Soviet approach is not new. Nor is it equitable. It is a claim for hegemony not equality. It gives the Soviets a monopoly of intermediate range missiles in Europe. It would eliminate virtually all dual-capable U.S. aircraft from Europe, thus severely weakening the U.S. contribution to NATO's conventional deterrence and defense. As for including the nuclear arsenals of Great Britain and France, these exist to protect the ultimate sovereignty of those nations, and are thus strategic in character. They are not under American control. They are entirely defensive in character. And given their numbers, they could not be used for any act of conceivable aggression against the Soviet Union. There is no basis therefore for the claim that such arsenals have any role in bilateral negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States on intermediate range nuclear forces.

The Soviets selective inclusion of British and French systems also ignores significant advantages they enjoy in other categories of nuclear weapons threatening Western Europe. The Soviets have tried to justify their monopoly of intermediate range nuclear missiles by saying that their is an overall "balance" of land-based intermediate weapons if all systems, including nuclear capable aircraft, are counted. This is egregiously false. Objective estimates of the overall balance -- including the ones prepared by the prestigious International Institute for Strategic Studies in London -- show a major Soviet advantage. If the West were to accept the Andropov proposal, it would be codifying a permanent Soviet INF monopoly. The political and military consequences of this could be enormous.

Moreover, the Andropov proposals would not require the Soviet Union to reduce or even constrain Soviet systems in the Far East. Because of their long range and transportability, Soviet SS-20s deployed in the Soviet East pose a potential threat to NATO as well as a direct threat to our friends and allies in Asia.

A Soviet monopoly of intermediate range nuclear forces also could lead the Soviet Union to believe--however mistakenly--that the United States might not respond to Soviet nuclear

intimidation or in the event of an actual attack on NATO troops in Western Europe.

The Soviets however cannot break the links that bind us to our NATO allies. The very presence of 350,000 American military personnel in Europe who are part of the NATO security forces provides in President Reagan's words "the living guarantee" of our commitment to the peace and security of Europe. We will not permit the Soviets to decouple the U.S. strategic forces from the defense of Europe.

The START Negotiations

The INF negotiations also must be viewed in conjunction with the START negotiations since the weapons with which they deal are closely related. NATO has agreed that the INF negotiations should be conducted within the framework of the negotiations on strategic forces (START). Although these two talks are separate, they are closely coordinated and we desire to move both negotiations forward as quickly as possible.

The United States position was outlined by President Reagan at Eureka College on May 9, 1982. Its essence is that of equal ceilings at much lower levels of force--ceilings that would strengthen deterrence and promote stability by significantly

reducing ballistic missile forces on both sides, with particular emphasis on constraining the number of warheads and destructive potential of the most destabilizing land-based systems. While its focus is on reducing significantly the most destabilizing ballistic systems, the U.S. has made clear that it is prepared to accept equal limits on other elements of its strategic forces, such as heavy bombers. As the President has stated, "Nothing is excluded."

The U.S. proposes a two-phased approach. The first phase would involve a reduction in ballistic missile warheads to equal levels, at least one-third below current numbers. Both ground-based and submarine-launched missiles are included in this proposal. No more than half of these warheads would be on land-based missiles. In the second phase we will seek equal ceilings on other elements of U.S. and strategic forces, including equal limits on ballistic missile throwweight at less than current U.S. levels.

The Soviet Union has charged that these START proposals call for unequal reductions and indeed even for "unilateral Soviet disarmament." This is clearly not the case. Each side now has approximately 7,500 ballistic missile warheads. Under the U.S. proposal, each side would have to reduce to more than 5,000, of which no more than 2,500 would be on ICBMs. True the Soviet

Union would have to dismantle more ICBMs, while we might have to dismantle more submarine-based missiles. But this is precisely the point. There is nothing inequitable about an equal ceiling which strengthens deterrence and stability.

Coupled with the elimination of the entire category of U.S. and Soviet land-based intermediate range missiles, as proposed in the INF talks, such a result in START would enable the United States to maintain an overall level of strategic nuclear capability sufficient to deter conflict, safeguard our national security, and meet our commitments to allies and friends.

The Soviet Union has proposed reductions in START that would not go as far as the U.S. proposals and would not significantly reduce the most destabilizing ballistic missile systems. Nonetheless we are encouraged that the USSR is prepared to accept reductions going beyond those proprosed in the SALT II negotiations.

Verification is Essential

In both START and INF the United States has made it clear that verification measures capable of assuring compliance are indispensible. For those provisions that cannot be measured effectively by national technical means of verification, we

will be pursuing cooperative measures, data exchanges, and collateral constraints that should provide the necessary confidence in compliance. We have been encouraged by the Soviet Union's indication that it will be prepared where necessary to consider cooperative measures going beyond national technical means. But we have yet to see specific Soviet proposals in this area.

Confidence Building Measures

In our arms control negotiations, we also have proposed a series of confidence building measures (CBMs), the purpose of which is to decrease the risk of nuclear war through accident or misunderstanding. They include advanced notification of all US and Soviet test launches of intercontinental and sea-launched ballistic missiles, as well as the land-based ballistic missiles currently being discussed in the INF talks. We have also proposed notification of major military exercises. the President has instructed our ambassadors to both START and INF negotiations to seek a broad-ranging exchange of basic data about both sides nuclear forces. In so doing, we hope to clear away some of the suspicion between our two countries.

Hindrances to Effective Arms Control

Finally, a few words about certain proposals which I would call missteps on the road to effective arms control.

...No-First-Use

One is the proposal for a no-first-use policy. While this is superficially attractive, it has numerous defects. Simple declaratory statements have no meaning when the capacity to violate the declaration is retained. NATO already has long followed a policy -- one it has recently reiterated -- that none of its weapons will ever be used "except in response to attack". In any event a no-first-use pledge is unverifiable and unenforceable. Its credibility is belied by the nature of Soviet military doctrine, and by the ominous Soviet preponderance of conventional and nuclear forces, which present an obvious threat of first use.

...Freeze Proposals

Another arms control proposal which has been widely publicized is a mutual freeze on the testing, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. A freeze at existing levels would lock the US and NATO into a position of military disadvantage and vulnerability and thus would make significant arms reductions more--not less--difficult. A

nuclear freeze also is currently unverifiable, raising considerable doubts that the Soviets would actually abide by it. It would delay, not hasten, the deep cuts we all seek.

Progress is Up to the Soviets

In conclusion let me stress that the United States is negotiating flexibly and in earnest in Geneva and in other arms control fora. If this seriousness of purpose is reciprocated by the Soviet side the prospects for a significant arms control reductions are good. It is the Soviets who have created the current military imbalances and it is up to them now to negotiate in good faith arms control agreements which will restore true equality. As we move forward in this process an essential element will be the unified support of the Alliance.

1028a

Call Fulton

NO

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C. 20520

CONFIDENTIAL

February 25, 1983

TO: EUROPEAN SECURITY SUBGROUP

FROM: EUR/P - Steven Steiner SES

SUBJECT: Report on Fourth Meeting, February 24

The following actions were reviewed at the February 24 meeting:

1. Calendar: Updated version of the calendar is attached. We still need your comments concerning whether events connected with deployment should be included. (Action: PM and OSD)

2. Press Access to Deployment Sites: We hope to have a cable ready for your comment and clearance by Monday COB.

3. Speakers and Opportunities: All persons on the USG list have been contacted and asked to do their part. USIA agreed to provide a list showing commitments already made and those which we are now trying to arrange. PM, EUR and OSD agreed to provide for USIA a list of USG experts already slated for travel to Europe in connection with SCG, HLG, NPG and other meetings. This information will be cabled to posts to seek their advice on possible public appearances.

4. Speakers Packet: There was a discussion of revising the package to take into account the INF comments in the President's speech and the dual key issue. On the latter, it was decided that the brief existing guidance is appropriate and should be included in the packet. In regard to the American Legion speech, consensus at this level was to include in the packet a copy of the speech and the INF guidance prepared on February 23 and 24. The full packet is being provided to USIA for printing and distribution on Friday 2/25. USIA will take care of reproduction and overseas distribution, and will provide 200 copies to DOD for our military commands and 100 copies for State.

6. Covering Cable: The cable which covers and explains the packet, in the form of a message from Ambassador Dailey to all of our ambassadors in Europe, is attached for your comment and clearance. Comments/clearance would be appreciated by COB, Tuesday, March 1. (Action: George Rueckert, EUR/P, 632-0850 or 632-0682)

7. "Do's and Don't's": The advisability of putting together a proposed list of "do's and don't's" on the INF issue was discussed. State agreed to take this on and decided to incorprate these in the covering cable for the speaker's packet, rather than send as a separate cable. (Action: George Rueckert, EUR/P, 632-0850 or 632-0682)

8. Private Sector Europeans: USIA has put together a list, based on suggestions from posts, of private sector Europeans who might speak and write supportively on security issues. EUR/P has requested comments and possible additions from EUR country desks and will try to provide any further comments to USIA by COB today.

9. British ITV Program on INF: Ambassador Dailey has sent a memo to Assistant Secretary Catto requesting DOD assistance. Memos are being prepared requesting interviews with the Vice President and Under Secretary Eagleburger. (Action: EUR/P, Steve Steiner)

10. Sample Speeches: A draft speech is attached for your comment and clearance. Appreciate response to George Rueckert, EUR/P, Ext. 20850 by Tuesday COB. This is the longer, more detailed, version of a sample speech. Susan Koch, OSD, has action on the shorter version.

11. Soviet Military Power: All agencies have had extensive comments and have submitted these to DIA. We would appreciate receiving a revised draft ASAP. (Action: OSD and PM)

12. Other Documents: The clearance process has been completed on the revised GIST on INF, and PM is submitting this to PA for editing. PM will also move forward now on the abridged Qs and As on INF prepared by USIA. (Action: PM/SNP, Judyt Mandel)

13. Asian Concerns: There was a discussion of whether we need a separate sheet of themes reflecting the global nature of our INF arms position and the concerns of Asian countries. It was agreed that the global nature of our approach has been covered very well in the President's American Legion speech and in our speakers packet and that a separate sheet is not needed. It was also pointed out that the relevant State bureaus--EA, EUR and PM--are briefing the Japanese Embassy on a regular basis.

14. UK and French Systems: It was noted that at the recent London meeting on INF public handling UK FCO official Gilmore presented nine suggested points for handling this issue. PM/TMP Stoffer reported that he has discussed this with the British and boiled down these nine points to five essential themes, which he has cleared interagency and included in the speakers packet.

15. UK Publications: Charlie Sorrels of ACDA distributed several UK publications on INF which he obtained in London last week. The British Government has distributed these to a regular mailing list of 6,000 persons in the UK and has made them available in Government offices and British embassies as well. It was agreed that we will try in our work to capitalize on the excellent format used by the British and that we will scrutinize British material to determine whether to send some or all of it to our posts and commands. Comments are requested on this material at next week's meeting. (Action: ACDA - C. Sorrels)

16. Briefing Team/Charts: Charts have been prepared for a congressional briefing package and a team has been formed to be ready for such briefings. PM will give us a status report on this at the meeting next week. (Action: PM/TMP - Peter Swiers and OSD)

17. Reductions Fact Sheet: It was agreed that we will examine existing materials on the reductions since the 1960's in our overall nuclear arsenal and determine whether a simple, concise one-page fact sheet with a graph or chart could be prepared. This would include mention of the 1,000 warheads which we have removed from Europe as part of the 1979 decision, and too the fact that modernization will be on one-for-one replacement basis. PM/SNP Mandel agreed to examine the feasibility.

18. Italian TV: USIA reported that RAI II is doing a special series on security and defense issues beginning in May and running for six weeks. La Stampa Editor Arrigo Levi will be the narrator. It was agreed that we will want to extend our full cooperation, working with USIA and Embassy Rome.

19. Raising NATO's Profile: The group's advice was sought on how we might raise the NATO profile in regard to the INF issue. Please provide your comments at the next meeting.

NEXT MEETING: Since we are back on the regular schedule, the next meeting will take place at 10:00 am on Thursday, March 3 in the EUR Conference Room 6226.

NOTE: I am also enclosing a memorandum from the Director of EUR/CE pointing out the need to include as addressees in our cables on security issues our consulates in Germany, our posts in Switzerland and our Polads in Europe.

CALENDAR OF EVENTS PERTAINING TO ARMS CONTROL

The following calendar includes three categories of events which could be relevant to our INF and other arms control interests: (1) useful opportunities, such as public forums where we can get our case across; (2) meetings with European leaders or among Europeans where we can seek supportive statements; and (3) events which are likely to cause us difficulties, such as demonstrations by anti-nuclear groups.

	EVENT	POSSIBLE ACTION
FEBRUARY		
2/1	FRG Disarmament Commissioner Ruth to visit Moscow	Reaction to any public mention by Soviets
	McGeorge Bundy to speak in Bonn on "no first use"	Guidance to posts
2/1-4/15	Committee on Disarmament (CD) Spring session, Geneva	Emphasize all U.S. arms control initiatives
2/2	START talks resume	Rowny press briefing
2/2-2/14	Senator Tower in Europe -- FRG, Geneva (at same time as Vice President), USSR, Sweden, UK and Iceland	Provide briefing and materials
2/7-10	HLG Meeting in San Diego	
2/7-19	US Visit of Dutch Defense Minister	Stress Allied unity
2/8	CSCE Review Conference resumes, Madrid	Good demonstration of Allied unity
2/10-11	NATO Conference of National Information Officers, NATO Hdqrs.	Seek greater Allied coordination on public handling of overall security approach
2/10-11	USIA Conference on new directions in US foreign policy, Georgetown University	

	EVENT	POSSIBLE ACTION
2/11-13	Wehrkunde Conference, Munich; Navy Secretary Lehman, NSC Advisor Clark, Under Secretary of State Schneider and Asst. Secretary Burt	
2/10	Vice President returns	Brief the President, then meet the press
2/13-14	SCG Meeting at NATO Hdqrs., followed by press conference by SCG Chairman Burt	Seek prompt, favorable coverage in Allied capitals
2/14-16	Bilateral meeting of US and Soviet UN Associations, Moscow--Scowcroft, Brown, Stoessel, etc. (discussion to include INF and other arms control)	Department is providing a briefing
2/15-16	London meeting of US PAOs, USAF & Pol-Mil officers from our NATO embassies	Seek improved coordination of INF public handling
2/15-16	EC Political Directors Meeting, Bonn	
2/16	Burt Satellite Interview with Iceland	
2/16	British Council of Churches Debate on Nuclear Policy	U.S. Embassy Officer will provide briefing on arms control policy
2/16-18	French FM Cheysson to Visit Moscow	
2/16-18	US working visit of Norwegian PM Willoch	Seek supportive statement
2/17	Burt Backgrounder at White House following Willoch-Reagan Meeting	
2/17	US Visit of Luxembourg Foreign Minister	Show Allied unity, European support
2/17	HFAC Hearings on Arms Control	
2/18-20	Nuremberg "Peace Tribunal", FRG	

	EVENT	POSSIBLE ACTION
2/21-22	EC Foreign Ministers Meeting, Brussels	
2/22	Presidential Speech to American Legion	
2/22-3/13	Strategic & Theater Arms Negotiations The U.S. Position	
2/23	Visit of Portuguese Socialist leader Soares; call on Vice President	
2/24-3/9	NATO Wintex-Cimex Exercise	Guidance to rebut charges of "nuclear warfighting"
2/24	Burt Satellite interview with Icelandic media	
2/25-3/9	Queen Elizabeth to visit West Coast, with Foreign Minister Pym accompanying	Obtain maximum press coverage; seek Pym public statements on security?
2/26-27	Copenhagen Seminar on "Western Security and the Soviet Union: Agenda for the 80s", sponsored by USNATO, USEC and Copenhagen University	Provide Washington speaker?
2/28	Eagleburger and Burt to address 40-60 senior Canadian business executives brought to Washington by Canadian Institute of International Affairs	Encourage Canadians to help promote NATO unity.
Late Feb.	Possible high-level speech on arms control	Seek approval
Late Feb.	Possible high-level briefings for selected European correspondents	Seek approval

	EVENT	POSSIBLE ACTION
MARCH		
	Soviet Prime Minister Tikhonov to visit Greece (tentative)	
	Papandreou to visit Canada (tentative)	
Early March	Peace Demonstration in New York--World Peace Council to seek visas	Have press line ready on any visa refusals
3/1	Burt Backgrounder for resident Norwegian, Danish and Icelandic Journalists (tent.)	
3/1	Italian Group to Visit Moscow for Arms Control Discussions	Have Embassy Rome brief and debrief them.
3/1	EC Foreign Ministers Political Cooperation Meeting, Bonn	
3/2	Nitze to provide mid-round INF briefing to NAC	Press statement after briefing; emphasize Allied consultations
3/4-9	Chairman of Joint Chiefs Vessey to visit Norway	
3/6	FRG elections	
3/7	EC Foreign Ministers meeting, Brussels	
3/7-9	Conference on "Intellectual and Organizational Trends in the Western Alliance", sponsored by Italian Center for International Relations, Rome	
3/7-10	USIA security issues tour for five top Belgian editors and correspondents	
3/8-9	Nuclear Freeze groups to demonstrate at U.S. Congress	Use public statements and appearances during this period to emphasize that that we seek real reductions.

MARCH (Continued)	EVENT	POSSIBLE ACTION
3/8-9	Italian FM Colombo to visit Washington	Renewed statement of Italian and Allied support on INF
3/11	HLG Meeting in Brussels	
3/14	SCG Meeting	
3/14-15	EC Foreign Ministers Meeting, Brussels	
3/14-16	High Official Working Visit of Dutch Prime Minister Lubbers	
3/15-17	U.S. visit of Dutch PM Lubbers and Foreign Minister van der Broek	Show Allied unity; possible joint press conference
3/21-22	European Council Meeting, Brussels	
3/21-4/10	Atlantic Security	
3/22-23	Spring NPG in Portugal	
3/24-26	Conference sponsored by Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, American Council on Germany and the Atlantic Bridge, Berlin	Provide high level participation?
3/24-26	German-American Conference in Berlin	High-level State Department representatives might address conference
3/25	Possible Burt Address in London	
3/26-27	Ditchley Conference, UK on "The Atlantic Partnership: Cooperation and Diversity" Asst. Secy. Burt to participate	Provide high level USG speaker
3/31	End of INF and MBFR rounds	Have our Amb. brief NAC & then meet with press. Also prepare inter-round public affairs plan to fill gap.

MARCH (Continued)	EVENT	POSSIBLE ACTION
Late March	Aspen-type seminar, French Alps	French want senior USG participation
Late March	Possible Burt trip to Scandinavia with public appearances.	
Late March	Publication of UK Defense White Paper	

	EVENT	POSSIBLE ACTION
APRIL		
	"World Peace Conference," Uppsala, Sweden, sponsored by Scandanavian Protestant Churches	Stress US pursuit of peace
	SCG Meeting	
	HLG Meeting	
	End of START round	Possible high level public report on state of arms control
	Likely House vote on a nuclear freeze resolution	
	Series of SFRC Hearings on US/Soviet Relations, to include Rostow as witness.	Provide Senior USG official?
4/1	Ambassador Rowny's meeting with NAC	
Easter 1-4	CND March from Burfield and Aldermarston to Greenham Common and back	
Easter week	Peace marches in Europe	Stress US approach to peace
Easter week	Possible Foley Codel to Moscow, with 15-20 Members of Congress	Brief on security issues and provide materials
4/11-12	Visit of Canadian FM MacEachen (tent.)	Theme of Alliance Solidarity
4/12-13	EC Political Directors meeting, Bonn	
4/25-26	EC Foreign Ministers meeting, Luxembourg	
4/25-29	USIA security issues tour for 15 leading West European foreign and defense affairs journalists	

APRIL (continued	EVENT	POSSIBLE ACTION
4/27-28	Copenhagen Seminar on INF, sponsored by Danish Commission on Security and Disarmament; papers to be published	Provide high level USG speaker (at least DAS)
Late April/ Early May	USIS Stockholm to program START Deputy Goodby and INF Deputy Glitman in Sweden	

MAY	EVENT	POSSIBLE ACTION
	SCG Meeting	
	HLG Meeting	
	Possible Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers meeting	Do analysis of possible WP initiatives, have press line ready and consider preempting them
	NPG and NATO Defense Ministerial	
	Possible US visit of Romanian Foreign Minister	Seek balanced statement including ref to Soviet arms
	Conference sponsored by Movement on European Disarmament, West Berlin	
May-June	Former ACDA Director Rostow to speak in USSR as Ampart	
5/4-5	EC Political Directors meeting, Bonn	
5/7	4th CND Festival, London	
5/9-10	Secretary to OECD Ministerial, Paris	
5/11-14	Bilderberg Conf., Chateau Montebello, Canada	DepSec Dam to speak
5/14-15	EC Foreign Ministers informal "Gymnich" weekend	
5/15	Berlin "Peace Conference," in connection with 50th Anniversary of Hitler's rise to power.	
5/18-20	European Institute for Security Matters Conf. Luxembourg	Need high level USG speaker.
5/21	CND "peace pentacost" march to Upper Heyford	
5/24	EC Foreign Ministers meeting, Bonn	

MAY (Continued)	EVENT	POSSIBLE ACTION
5/28-30	Williamsburg Summit	Seek demonstration of Allied unity in security as well as economic area
5/31-6/1	EC Political Directors meeting, Bonn	
End of May	INF talks resume, Round V	Nitze meet President and consult in Europe
End of May	END protest, Berlin	

	EVENT	POSSIBLE ACTION
SPRING		
(no date yet)	US Catholic Bishops Pastoral Letter to be issued	
	Possible Italian elections	
	Spanish Prime Minister Gonzalez to Washington	Stress Western unity and Spain as example of expansion of democracy
	START talks resume	Rowny to see President, brief press
	SCG meeting	

JUNE	EVENT	POSSIBLE ACTION
	Possible press tour of Greenham Common led by UK MOD Heseltine	
6/6-7	European Council Meeting, Bonn	
6/9-10	Secretary to NAC Ministerial, Paris	Obtain full Allied support on arms control and other East-West issues
6/18	Pope's Visit to Poland (Tentative)	
6/25	Vice President to take part in US/FRG Tricentennial Celebration in Krefeld and to visit other European countries.	

JULY	EVENT	POSSIBLE ACTION
7/11-16	Fourth Seminar on International Security Affairs, Geneva	Seeking senior US speaker probably private sector
7/28	Greenham Common Air Tatoo, with 200-300,000 public visitors expected	Emphasize Alliance then provide arms control handouts
AUGUST		
8/6	Hiroshima Anniversary	
8/19-21	America DAGs in Helsinki 40th Anniversary League of Finish-American Societies	
SEPTEMBER		
	Expected release of Dutch Defense White Paper	
Late Sept/ early Oct	Annual Party of Conferences in UK, possible prelude to general elections	
OCTOBER		
	Anti-nuclear demonstration in Belgium	
10/29	Anti-nuclear demonstration in The Hague	

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MEMORANDUM

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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ACTION

February 25, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

THROUGH: RICHARD T. BOVERIE (not seen (not available))

FROM: SVEN KRAEMER SK

SUBJECT: Ambassador Dailey Proposal on Pre-Briefing Possible Interim INF Proposals

In a memorandum (Tab A) to you and other SPG principals, Ambassador Peter Dailey recommends that to prepare the press positively for any movement that the President may make from his zero INF proposal, and to assure that any interim agreement resulting in fewer missiles should be perceived as brilliant negotiating by the President, we should now be preparing selected editorial boards and press people.

In a related recommendation, Ambassador Dailey stated (at an interagency meeting yesterday morning in Charles Wick's office on gaining support for INF deployments) that we should consider any agreement which permitted some US INF missiles to be a victory. In this connection, he mentioned the criteria cited by the President in his American Legion speech in a such a way as to suggest that these criteria might make any agreement which permitted some US INF missiles to be proper.

Ambassador Dailey's proposal and interpretation is no doubt intended to be completely supportive both of the zero-zero policy and of deriving maximum mileage from any potential shift in the US position. However, in the present press climate, it could well have the opposite effect. Discussion of any pre-briefings to press concerning a potential proposal we do not have and which would be hard to imagine as satisfying the four criteria, would only build anticipation concerning a change and imply a lack of resolve in the President's current policy. There is no subtle way to avoid such a counterproductive implication if such briefings are prepared or undertaken.

As I pointed out to the group in Mr. Wick's office yesterday in supplementing/focusing Ambassador Dailey's remarks there, the President's four criteria -- (1) equal rights and limits, (2) no

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Declassify on: OADR

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consideration of UK and French systems, (3) no shifting of threat to Asia, and (4) effective verification -- are critical criteria still rejected by the Soviet Union and against which any potential non-zero proposal would have to be measured. Thus not any proposal, but only proposals that meet these tough and long-standing criteria could receive Presidential endorsement or could be interpreted by the USG, Allies, the press, etc., as being other than a defeat or a compromise of principles for the President.

To the best of my knowledge, the US does not have such a proposal in mind, and we are, instead, supporting our current proposal, while waiting for the Soviets to come up with a serious proposal. Furthermore, at highest-level direction, NSC staff were recently directed to tell the INF IG co-chairman not to undertake an examination of alternative INF proposals at this time. With the Allies we have also stood fast.

A final point is that it appears, in the light of previous leaks on this subject, risky to circulate such a proposal simultaneously to all SPG members.

Robert Linhard, Robert Sims, and Dennis Blair concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you discuss this matter directly with Ambassador Dailey, reviewing the problems involved and refocusing the issue on the merits of both our existing zero-zero proposal and of the four specific criteria by which any alternative position whether Soviet, or US, must be judged.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab A Incoming Correspondence from Ambassador Dailey

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520
February 23, 1983

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Arms Reduction Policy Credibility and Current INF Negotiations

The current stalemate in the INF negotiations gives us time to set the stage to claim a major victory in President Reagan's arms reduction program when and if negotiations are concluded. To claim such a victory we must make a major effort to educate editorial boards, key journalists and other influential figures to make sure that they are led to this proper conclusion.

At the current level of understanding of the President's arms reduction policy, a compromise of the zero option on the President's part could be interpreted by influential columnists and the press as a defeat for the President, i.e. "Reagan capitulates on U.S. Zero Option Policy."

However, any movement that the President makes from his zero option proposal would lead to fewer missiles being deployed by the Soviets and the U.S. than are currently in place or planned.

With the press having a firm understanding that the President's policy is one of "overall" arms reduction, strategic, intermediate and other then his compromise on INF resulting in fewer missiles for both sides would be perceived as brilliant negotiating by the President.

If we are going to get this kind of result from the press, we must begin now to have selected people briefing editorial boards and key members of the press. We must be very careful not to brief in a way that would imply a lack of resolve in the President's current policy. But we must prepare the ground in a subtle way so that any conclusion on the President's zero option or something less than that would be a victory not a defeat.

If this concept is approved, we will submit a schedule of proposed backgrounders and organizations to be briefed.

APPROVE_____DISAPPROVE_____

Peter H. Dailey, Chairman
Interagency Committee on
Security and Arms Control

cc: SPG Principals

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EUR:RDBLACKWILL

S/S:
EUR:JDOBBINS
EUR/EDP:DLOWENFELD (SUBS)
NSC::RLINHARD

EUR/RPM:JHAWES
PM/TMP:HSTOFFER
PA:JKELLY
OSD/ISP:RHAMNER

IMMEDIATE LONDON

EXDIS

E.O. 12065: DECL:OADR

TAGS: INF, MNUC, UK, PARM, MARR

SUBJECT: INF: HESELTINE VISIT TO GREENHAM COMMON
REF: LONDON 4424

1. S - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. PER PARA 5 OF REFTEL, WE CONCUR WITH EMBASSY THAT THIS SHOULD BE AN AGREED POLICY INITIATIVE. EMBASSY IS AUTHORIZED TO BEGIN WORKING WITH MOD IN DEVELOPING THE ADMINISTRATIVE GROUNDWORK. PLEASE KEEP US CLOSELY INFORMED AS PLANS PROCEED.

3. COMPREHENSIVE GUIDANCE ON ENTIRE ISSUE OF ACCESS TO INF BASING SITES WILL FOLLOW BY SEPTEL.

4. IN REGARD TO GREENHAM COMMON PRESS VISIT, WE WOULD APPRECIATE AMONG OTHER THINGS FURTHER INFORMATION ON SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF PRESS PARTY ENVISAGED BY MOD. OUR VIEWS ON THIS AND OTHER ASPECTS WILL BE CONVEYED IN SEPTEL, PER PARA 3 ABOVE. 44

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Department of State TELEGRAM

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EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: INF, MNUC, UK, PARM, MARR
SUBJECT: INF: HESELTINE VISIT TO GREENHAM COMMON

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. JOHN LEDLIE (WHO NOW HEADS THE STAFF-LEVEL INF PUBLIC AFFAIRS EFFORT AT MOD) TOLD US MARCH 1 THAT HESELTINE HAS NOW DEFINITELY DECIDED TO GO TO GREENHAM IN CONNECTION WITH A VISIT TO THE BASE FOR 50-60 BRITISH, U.S., AND INTERNATIONAL JOURNALISTS IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE. LEDLIE SAID MOD WAS AWARE THAT THERE WAS SOME OPPOSITION TO THIS IDEA IN WASHINGTON; THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD EVIDENTLY TAKEN THIS FACT INTO ACCOUNT. BUT HE HAD DECIDED THAT THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS BENEFIT ARGUED PERSUASIVELY FOR A VISIT. HIS ORDERS TO LEDLIE AND COMPANY WERE TO "GET CRACKING" WITH DETAILED PLANNING.

3. WE TOLD LEDLIE THAT WE HAD NO GUIDANCE ON WASHINGTON'S VIEWS OF A POSSIBLE HESELTINE VISIT TO GREENHAM, BUT THAT THERE WAS CONTINUING CONCERN ABOUT THE IMPACT IN OTHER BASING COUNTRIES OF OPENING GREENHAM TO THE PRESS. WE UNDERTOOK TO SEEK WASHINGTON'S VIEWS ON THE HESELTINE PLAN.

4. EMBASSY COMMENT: WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THE TIMING AND SYMBOLISM FOR A HESELTINE VISIT TO GREENHAM WOULD BE VERY BENEFICIAL IN ESTABLISHING THE BRITISH AND NATO ASPECTS OF INF DEPLOYMENTS. IN ANY EVENT, THE FEELING AMONG MINISTERS, AS PRESENTED TO US, WAS THAT AT THE END OF THE DAY THE DECISION ON WHETHER OR NOT THE SECRETARY OF STATE VISITED AN RAF BASE IN BRITAIN IN PURSUANCE OF OUR JOINT POLICY OBJECTIVES WAS A DECISION FOR THE BRITISH SIDE TO TAKE.

5. NEVERTHELESS, IT WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE BEST IF WE COULD TAKE THIS STEP AS AN AGREED POLICY INITIATIVE. WE THEREFORE RECOMMEND THAT DEPARTMENT WELCOME THE HESELTINE INITIATIVE AND PROVIDE US AUTHORITY TO BEGIN WORKING WITH MOD IN LAYING THE ADMINISTRATIVE GROUNDWORK..

6. ACTION REQUESTED: GUIDANCE. STREATOR

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OVP:PHUGHES (SUBSTANCE)
OSD:SKOCH
JCS:RWILLIAMS
S/S:CHILL
EUR/EPD:PDAILEY
ACDA/PA:HGRADY
NSC:SKRAMER
PM/SNP:JMANDEL
NSC:DBLAIR
PA:RSMALLEY
EUR:JDOBBINS
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HQ THIRD USAF MILDENHALL UK
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 058000

FOR AMBASSADORS FROM AMB. DAILEY, INFORM CONSULS

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: SCOM, PARM, INF
SUBJECT: INF PUBLIC AFFAIRS PACKET

REF: USNATO 980

1. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AS YOU ARE AWARE, I HAVE BEEN ASKED BY THE PRESIDENT TO DEVELOP OUR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY STRATEGY ON EUROPEAN SECURITY AND ARMS REDUCTION ISSUES WHILE A MORE PERMANENT WASHINGTON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY APPARATUS IS BEING PUT INTO PLACE. I KNOW THAT SUCCESSFUL MANAGEMENT OF THE INF ISSUE IS ONE OF YOUR HIGHEST PRIORITIES, AND I WANT TO BE AS HELPFUL TO YOU AS POSSIBLE IN THIS REGARD. AS PART OF OUR BROADER

STRATEGY FOR PRESENTING OUR POLICY ON ARMS CONTROL AND SECURITY ISSUES TO EUROPEAN PUBLICS MORE EFFECTIVELY, STATE, DEFENSE, ACDA, USIA AND THE NSC STAFF HAVE PREPARED A COMPREHENSIVE SPEAKERS PACKET ON INF ARMS CONTROL AND MODERNIZATION. THIS WILL BE POUCHED TO YOU THE WEEK OF MARCH 7. WASHINGTON INTENDS TO SUPPLEMENT THIS PACKET WITH ADDITIONAL MATERIAL AS SOON AS THIS BECOMES AVAILABLE, INCLUDING DRAFT SPEECH MATERIAL AND A COMPENDIUM OF SOVIET STATEMENTS ON INF WHICH SHOW INCONSISTENCIES OF SOVIET POSITIONS. I
HOPE THAT THIS MATERIAL WILL BE HELPFUL-AND WELCOME YOUR SUGGESTIONS OF ADDITIONAL ITEMS WHICH WE MIGHT USEFULLY PROVIDE.

3. WE WELCOME USNATO'S SUGGESTION (REFTEL A NOTAL) FOR REGULAR MONTHLY DISTRIBUTION OF BRIEF TALKING POINTS-ON INF. WE DO INDEED INTEND TO SUPPLEMENT THE PACKET OF BRIEFING MATERIALS WITH PERIODIC CABLES ADDRESSING NEW SOVIET PUBLIC AFFAIRS INITIATIVES AS THEY APPEAR AND PROVIDING ADDITIONAL MATERIAL ELABORATING ON SPECIFIC POINTS OF THE WESTERN INF POSITION WHICH NEED TO BE ADDRESSED IN GREATER DETAIL.

IT IS NOT OUR INTENTION IN PROVIDING THE SPEAKERS' PACKET TO MAKE EVERYONE EXPERT IN NUCLEAR AFFAIRS OR TO ENCOURAGE YOU AND YOUR STAFF TO SPEAK PUBLICLY ON THE INTRICACIES OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND ARMS REDUCTIONS. BUT MOST OF THE CURRENT PUBLIC DEBATE ON NUCLEAR POLICY IS CONDUCTED AT HIGH LEVELS OF GENERALITY BY WELL-READ LAYMEN. WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS CRUCIAL THAT OUR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND MILITARY PERSONNEL STATIONED ABROAD FEEL COMFORTABLE ADDRESSING THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES THAT SUPPORT OUR NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL POLICY AND ENUNCIATE OUR GENERAL POSITION IN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC DISCUSSIONS. WHILE THE MOST TECHNICAL QUESTIONS MUST BE LEFT TO THE EXPERTS, NON-EXPERTS MUST PLAY A CENTRAL ROLE IN EXPLAINING OUR VIEWS. THE CENTRAL AUDIENCE, AFTER ALL, IS THE NON-TECHNICAL PUBLIC AT LARGE.

4. THE INF SPEAKERS PACKET PROVIDES US OFFICIALS WITH A BROAD RANGE OF INFORMATION ON INF ISSUES AND U.S. POLICY WHICH WILL BE USEFUL IN ADDRESSING EUROPEAN AUDIENCES. IT ALSO WILL PROVIDE POSTS WITH PUBLICLY USEABLE BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE WESTERN AND SOVIET POSITIONS ON KEY INF ARMS CONTROL AND MODERNIZATION ISSUES. THE PACKET ADDRESSES SOVIET PUBLIC CRITICISM OF US POLICIES. IT ALSO INCLUDES KEY PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENTS; SUGGESTED THEMES AND APPROACHES TO BE USED IN DISCUSSING US ARMS CONTROL POLICY AND ALLIED POSITIONS; AN INF CHRONOLOGY; QS AND AS ON THE MAJOR ISSUES AND FACT SHEETS. THE PACKAGE ALSO PROVIDES INFORMATION ON OTHER ARMS CONTROL ISSUES INCLUDING START, MBFR, CSCE, CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, NON-PROLIFERATION, CBMS, AND NUCLEAR TESTING LIMITATIONS, AS WELL AS ON THE NATO FORCE COMPARISON PAPER -- WHICH SHOULD BE DRAWN ON IN DISCUSSIONS OF THE EAST-WEST FORCE BALANCE.'

5. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT POSTS VIEW OUR INF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY EFFORTS AS A HIGH PRIORITY PROGRAM OF THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE REQUIRING AN IMAGINATIVE, CREATIVE AND ENERGETIC COUNTRY TEAM EFFORT UNDER YOUR LEADERSHIP. IT IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT FOR SPEAKERS TO PUT OUR INF PROPOSALS WITHIN THE BROADER FRAMEWORK OF US FOREIGN POLICY,OUR PURSUIT OF PEACE, AND OUR DESIRE FOR SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS IN WEAPONRY. SPEAKERS SHOULD TRY TO AVOID BECOMING BOGGED DOWN IN DISCUSSIONS OF TECHNICAL DETAILS RELATING TO INF SYSTEMS. I HOPE THAT YOU WILL MAKE THE PACKET AND ALL SUBSEQUENT MATERIAL IN THISINF INFORMATION SERIES AVAILABLE TO INTERESTED US OFFICIALS AS A GUIDE FOR

PUBLIC AND PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS WITH HOST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, MEDIA, ACADEMICS AND GENERAL PUBLIC. THE CONTENTS OF THE SPEAKER PACKET ARE NOT HOWEVER TO BE PUBLICLY DISTRIBUTED. NOR SHOULD SPEAKERS PUBLICLY MENTION THE INF PACKET. NATO POSTS SHOULD PROVIDE COPIES TO HOST GOVERNMENT SCG REPS FOR BACK;ROUND USE BY INDIVIDUAL ALLIED GOVERNMENTS. WE IN WASHINGTON ARE VERY MUCH AWARE OF THE NEED FOR INDIVIDUAL, CAREFULLY TAILORED PRESENTATIONS TO FIT THE PARTICULAR SITUATION PREVAILING IN EACH COUNTRY. WE ALSO BELIEVE THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE HOST GOVERNMENT TAKE THE LEAD IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS PRESENTATIONS ON THE INF ISSUE WITH POSTS PROVIDING AS MUCH SUPPORT AS POSSIBLE TO HOST GOVERNMENT EFFORTS.

6. YOU WILL WANT OF COURSE TO HIT HARDEST AT THOSE THEMES OF GREATEST CURRENCY AND INTEREST IN THE HOST COUNTRY. HOWEVER FOR YOUR GENERAL GUIDANCE, WE ARE PROVIDING IN PARA 7 BELOW SOME SUGGESTED THEMES WHICH HAVE PROVEN PARTICULARLY EFFECTIVE IN PAST PUBLIC AFFAIRS PRESENTATIONS. IN AD;DITION, IN PARA 8 BELOW IS A SUGGESTED "ROADMAP" FOR APPROACHING THE INF ISSUE. THIS REFLECTS OUR OWN JUDGMENT THAT THE BEST WAY TO LEAD OFF A DISCUSSION OF INF IS TO STRESS-THT THIS IS AN ALLIANCE ISSUE.

7. SUGGESTED THEMES FOR GENERAL SECURITY DISCUSSION

I. THE PRESIDENT'S STRATEGY FOR A MORE PEACEFUL WORLD.

-- PRESIDENT HAS CHANGED FOCUS OF ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS. WE ARE NO LONGER SPEAKING ONLY OF LIMITING INCREASES OR CAPPING AT PRESENT UNACCEPTABLY HIGH LEVELS. THE OBJECTIVE NOW IS SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS IN THE NUMBER OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

-- THE PRESIDENT HAS PRESENTED IN THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TALKS (START) AND INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES (INF) NEGOTIATIONS THE MOST COMPREHENSIVE ARMS REDUCTION PROGRAM EVER OFFERED BY ANY GOVERNMENT. HE HAS PROPOSED TO REDUCE STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS ON BOTH SIDES BY ONE THIRD, AND TO COMPLETELY ELIMINATE US AND SOVIET LONGER-RANGE LAND-BASED INF MISSILES.

-- THE PRESIDENT'S INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES PROPOSAL, STRONGLY SUPPORTED BY THE ALLIES, AIMS TO ELIMINATE AN ENTIRE CLASS OF US AND SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM THE FACE OF THE EARTH. THIS MAKES-ANY PURSUIT OF A FREEZE IRRELEVANT.

IF THE PRESIDENT'S SOLUTION IS ACCEPTED, THERE WOULD BE NO LAND-BASED LONGER-RANGE INTERMEDIATE NUCLEAR FORCES-MISSILES ON EITHER SIDE; ABANDONMENT OF THIS-PROPOSAL TO ELIMINATE AN ENTIRE CLASS OF NUCLEAR SYSTEMS WOULD MEAN MORE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, NOT FEWER. OUR PROPOSAL -IS A MORAL ONE, WHICH OFFERS THE SAFEST AND MOST STABLE OUTCOME FOR ALL CONCERNED. --

-- THERE WOULD BE NO NEED FOR NATO TO DEPLOY ANY MISSILES OF THIS CLASS, IF THE SOVIETS AGREED TO DISMANTLE THEIR SS-4S, SS-5S, AND SS-20S. --

-- SOVIETS AGREED TO ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS ON INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES ONLY AFTER NATO SHOWED ITS RESOLVE TO DEPLOY IN THE ABSENCE OF AN ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT. THE ONLY ARGUMENT WE HAVE HEARD AGAINST OUR PROPOSAL IS THAT THE SOVIETS DO NOT-LIKE IT. IT IS THE SOVIETS, NOT THE WEST, WHO ARE INSISTING UPON MAINTAINING THIS CLASS OF WEAPONS.

-- HOPE FOR ARMS REDUCTIONS HINGES ON CONTINUED NATO UNITY AND STRONG DEFENSE. PROSPECTS FOR ARMS REDUCTIONS DEPEND ON CONTINUED NATO ADHERENCE TO BOTH PARTS OF THE TWO PART 1979 DECISION.

II. PEACE

-- THE WEST IS WORKING FOR PEACE: (1) DIPLOMACY AROUND THE WORLD (MIDDLE EAST, SOUTHERN AFRICA) (2) EFFECTIVE REDUCTION OF WEAPONS OF VARIOUS KINDS; (3) DETERRENCE.

PROGRESS TOWARD GREATER SECURITY AND STABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND ARMS REDUCTION-AGREEMENTS IS MADE POSSIBLE BY THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE WEST'S PRUDENT DETERRENCE POLICY.
DETERRENCE IS THE ESSENTIAL FOUNDATION FOR PEACE.

-- NATO IS A DEFENSIVE ALLIANCE. THE ALLIES WILL NEVER BE THE FIRST PARTY TO EMPLOY MILITARY FORCE IN A CONFLICT. (CITE REAGAN NOV. 18, 1981 SPEECH.)

III. ALLIANCE UNITY

-- STRONG ALLIANCE HAS KEPT PEACE IN EUROPE FOR ALMOST 35 YEARS. ONE-SIDED DISARMAMENT OR ABANDONING THE POLICY OF DETERRENCE WOULD INCREASE RISK OF WAR. SOVIET EFFORTS TO INTIMIDATE THE ALLIES (RECALL RECENT THREATS AGAINST JAPAN, AND THREATS TO EXPAND NUCLEAR ARSENAL TARGETTED ON WESTERN EUROPE) WILL NOT SUCCEED.

-- ALLIANCE UNITY IS BASED ON MORE THAN RECOGNITION OF ACOMMON SECURITY THREAT. NATO'S FUNDAMENTAL STRENGTH IS THAT IT IS VOLUNTARY ALLIANCE OF DEMOCRACIES. ALLIANCE UNITY REFLECTS OUR COMMON ADHERENCE TO CERTAIN FUNDAMENTAL VALUES -AND PRINCIPLES--E.G., FREE AND OPEN SOCIETIES AND GOVERNMENT BY THE ACTUAL CONSENT OF THE GOVERNED. ALLIANCE UNITY IS THE BASIS OF ALLIANCE STRENGTH AND IS THEREFORE THE BASIS OF A SECURE PEACE.

-- THE TWO-PART INF DECISION WAS AN ALLIANCE DECISION. INF POLICY HAS BEEN COORDINATED CONTINUOUSLY AMONG THE ALLIES.

8. SUGGESTED "ROADMAP" FOR DISCUSSING INF

A. NATO UNITY: NATO IS A DEFENSIVE ALLIANCE AND THE REAL PEACE MOVEMENT. THE ALLIANCE'S STRATEGY IS TO DETER ANY AGGRESSION AGAINST NATO COUNTRIES BY MAKING CLEAR THAT THE AGGRESSOR HIMSELF WOULD PAY AN UNACCEPTABLY HEAVY PRICE FOR HIS AGGRESSION. NATO'S UNITY AND ITS DETERRENT FORCES HAVE THEREBY KEPT THE PEACE AND MAINTAINED THE FREEDOM OF WESTERN EUROPE FOR ALMOST THIRTY FIVE YEARS.

B. SOVIET GOALS: CENTRAL SOVIET OBJECTIVE IS TO DESTROY WESTERN UNITY AND NATO AND TO EXERCISE PREDOMINANT INFLUENCE OVER EUROPE.

-- SS-20 BUILD-UP IS A THREAT DIRECTED PREDOMINANTLY AT WESTERN EUROPE, DESIGNED TO INTIMIDATE EUROPEANS AND CUT THEM-OFF FROM THE U.S. IT ALSO THREATENS MUCH OF ASIA, THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA.

C. NATO RESPONSE: ESSENTIAL MEANING OF NATO DECISION OF 1979 ON INTERMEDIATE NUCLEAR-FORCES (INF) WAS TO REAFFIRM THE UNITY OF THE ALLIANCE AND THE LINK BETWEEN U.S. FORCES IN EUROPE AND THE U.S. STRATEGIC UMBRELLA. THE DECISION HAS TWO PARTS: TO MODERNIZE OUR OWN FORCES IN RESPONSE TO THIS SOVIET BUILD-UP AND TO TRY TO BRING DOWN THE LEVELS ON BOTH SIDES THROUGH

U.S./SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS. THESE TWO PARTS ARE INSEPARABLY LINKED.

D. U.S. ARMS CONTROL PROPOSAL: U.S. PROPOSES TO ELIMINATE THIS ENTIRE CLASS OF US AND SOVIET WEAPONS

-- DETERMINED NEGOTIATING EFFORT

-- READY TO HEAR OUT AND CONSIDER ALL SERIOUS PROPOSALS FROM SOVIETS PRESENTED AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE

-- GLOBAL APPROACH -- WON'T LET SOVIETS PLAY THESE SYSTEMS OFF AGAINST OUR FRIENDS IN ASIA

-- IMPORTANCE OF U.S.-SOVIET EQUALITY AND DANGERS OF IMBALANCE; WE WILL REDRESS IMBALANCES WITH DEPLOYMENTS IF NECESSARY, BUT PREFER REDUCTIONS.

-- FALSITY OF SOVIET BALANCE CLAIMS:

O CONTINUED THEIR SS-20 BUILD-UP WHILE THEY CLAIMED THERE WAS ALREADY A BALANCE AND KEPT BUILDING EVEN AFTER THEY ANNOUNCED A "MORATORIUM;"

O SOVIET "OFFER" TO REDUCE ACKNOWLEDGES IMPLICITLY THAT THEY HAVE CREATED IMBALANCE;

O SOVIET VIEW OF EUROPEAN SECURITY: USSR DEPLOYS SYSTEMS WHICH THREATEN WESTERN EUROPE BUT INSISTS THAT SIMILAR US SYSTEMS CANNOT BE DEPLOYED IN WEST.

E. NATO MODERNIZATION AND REPLACEMENT PROGRAM: IT IS IMPORTANT TO ARMS CONTROL PROSPECTS THAT MODERNIZATION PART OF NATO DECISION STAY ON TRACK. YOU SHOULD EMPHASIZE THAT THE PERSHINGS AND CRUISE MISSILES ARE ESSENTIALLY A REPLACEMENT FOR EXISTING WEAPONS

-- IT WAS NATO'S RESOLVE THAT BROUGHT SOVIETS TO NEGOTIATING TABLE. CONTINUED NATO ADHERENCE TO THE DECISION WILL PERSUADE THEM TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY.

-- US SYSTEMS PLAY UNIQUE ROLE IN PROVIDING SECURITY FOR ENTIRE ALLIANCE, INCLUDING NON-NUCLEAR ALLIES. FRENCH AND UK SYSTEMS ARE FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE, AND CANNOT PROVIDE THE VITAL LINK BETWEEN AMERICAN POWER AND EUROPEAN SECURITY WHICH US SYSTEMS PROVIDE. DAM

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

March 4, 1983

Dm — Pls return

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TO: EUROPEAN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY SUBGROUP

FROM: EUR/P - Steven E. Steiner SES

SUBJECT: Report on Fifth Meeting, March 3, 1983

At the March 3 meeting the following actions were discussed and agreed:

1. INF Speakers Packet: USIA reported that it will not have the packets ready from the printers until Monday, March 14. The delay is due to the fact that the packet has grown in size to approximately 130 pages. It will be made available to State, DOD and other agencies in the numbers requested on March 14, and will be pouched to posts on the same date.

2. Covering Cable: State/EUR reported that the covering cable for the packet, namely the guidance message from Ambassador Dailey to all ambassadors in Europe, was cleared and sent on March 1. Copies were distributed at the meeting.

3. Press Access to INF Basing Sites: State/EUR passed out a draft message containing comprehensive guidance for all posts and military commands. Clearance was requested by COB Friday, March 4.

4. INF GIST: The clearance process has been completed on the revised GIST on INF and State/PM will submit it to PA for editing and printing at the beginning of next week. PA reported that they will be able to produce this quickly in final form.

5. USIA Qs and As: State/PM reported that there were substantive problems with the Qs and As, which need to be expanded somewhat in length to meet our concerns. This will be ready early next week. USIA urged that this be handled expeditiously so that we can make these available for Wireless distribution in Europe. State agreed to try to expedite this.

6. INF Press Packet: The need was stated to have a press packet on INF containing materials which can be handed out to media and public. (The INF speakers packets are strictly for the background use of U.S. and Allied officials.) USIA reported that they have put together such a packet and sent it to posts. They promised to bring copies to the next meeting, on March 10, so that other agencies may determine whether additional materials are needed.

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7. Size of Arsenal: State/PM reported that it is working with Bill Kahn of OSD to ascertain whether we can put together an improved one-page sheet reflecting the decrease in our overall nuclear arsenal since the peak period of the 1960s and the withdrawal of 1,000 warheads from Europe as part of the 1979 decision. OSD pointed out that its NATO office is also putting together such a sheet. It was agreed to examine these materials, as well as the information on this in the INF speakers packet, to determine whether we can make available more information. It was agreed at the same time, however, that we need to ensure that this is consistent with the present strengthening of our forces and that references to modernization are accompanied by appropriate reference to Soviet weapons programs and to US arms control proposals.

8. Sample Speech: OSD and JCS said they have some problems with the sample speech circulated by State and asked whether it might be better simply to develop further themes rather than a sample speech. It was their view that our posts would not be likely to draw upon the speech in any substantial manner. USIA responded that posts have indeed expressed considerable interest in obtaining Washington-approved sample speech material. State, ACDA and others agreed with USIA on the need for such material. State/EUR noted that we will circulate within a few days a new draft of the speech incorporating comments from other agencies, and suggested that OSD and JCS reserve judgment until they have seen the new draft.

9. British ITV Program on INF: State/EUR briefed on the status of our efforts to be helpful to Max Hastings in putting together the pro-NATO program on INF. It was noted that Under Secretary Eagleburger has agreed to an interview with Hastings. NSC (Dennis Blair) undertook to inquire concerning the status of our request for an interview with the Vice President, and DOD agreed to continue its efforts to obtain an interview with a senior military figure.

10. White Paper: State/EUR reported that we have done a first cut of a proposed White Paper on INF. EUR promised to get this to other agencies for consideration within the next few days and asked that others work with us on this project.

11. Speakers and Opportunities in Europe: USIA reported that DASD Ron Lehman, EUR/SOV Director Tom Simons and Sandy Vershbow of SOV have already been lined up for speaking appearances in Europe, and that PM/TMP Deputy Director Swiers has also been offered as a speaker. Further, Ambassadors Nitze and Glitman have made themselves available for selected forums in Europe, particularly on weekends and during breaks in the INF talks. In regard to the private sector, a program has also been developed for Bill Stearman. USIA is requested to provide proposed forums for appearances for senior State officials during their coming trips to Europe.

State also reiterated its request for a written description of the programs arranged to date and those which USIA is presently trying to arrange.

12. "Do's and Don'ts": State expressed the view that it is not necessary at this time to prepare a special "do's and don'ts" list on INF, particularly since the covering cable for the INF packet goes over this ground. Others agreed.

13. Briefing Teams: PM has informed us that it has in fact an interagency team available to supplement Ambassador Dailey's briefings of Members of Congress and others who are travelling to Europe. The materials prepared for the briefings are being reviewed interagency and should be fully cleared next week. NSC staff member Kraemer suggested that the charts associated with the briefings have lower classifications than those being considered now. It was also suggested that a "murder board" be established for a test briefing before any briefings are given to Members of Congress. PM is convening a working group meeting next week for final review of these materials.

14. NATO Force Comparison Paper: USIA stated that in connection with the preparation of the INF speakers packet, which includes the NATO force comparison paper, the Agency needs 700 new copies of the paper. DOD and State/PA agreed to work with USIA to fulfill these needs.

15. Calendar: A revised calendar related to INF and other arms control issues is attached. Please continue to provide current information.

NEXT MEETING: The next meeting will be held at 10:00 a.m., Thursday, March 10, in the EUR Conference Room 6226.

Revised 3/4/83

CALENDAR OF EVENTS PERTAINING TO ARMS CONTROL

The following calendar includes three categories of events which could be relevant to our INF and other arms control interests: (1) useful opportunities, such as public forums where we can get our case across; (2) meetings with European leaders or among Europeans where we can seek supportive statements; and (3) events which are likely to cause us difficulties, such as demonstrations by anti-nuclear groups.

	EVENT	POSSIBLE ACTION
MARCH		
	Soviet Prime Minister Tikhonov to visit Greece (tentative)	
	Papandreou to visit Canada (tentative)	
Early March	Peace Demonstration in New York--World Peace Council to seek visas	Have press line ready on any visa refusals
3/1	Burt Backgrounder for resident Norwegian, Danish and Icelandic Journalists (tent.)	
3/1	Italian Group to Visit Moscow for Arms Control Discussions	Have Embassy Rome brief and debrief them.
3/1	EC Foreign Ministers Political Cooperation Meeting, Bonn	
3/2	Nitze to provide mid-round INF briefing to NAC	Press statement after briefing; emphasize Allied consultations
3/2-4	Jacques Andreani, Political Director French Min. of External Relations visits Washington.	

	EVENT	POSSIBLE ACTION
MARCH		
3/2-6	Burt on West Coast	
3/2-8	Blackwill in London	
3/4	Secretary meets UK Foreign Secretary Pym in San Francisco	
3/4-9	Chairman of Joint Chiefs Vessey to visit Norway	
3/6	FRG elections	
3/7	EC Foreign Ministers meeting, Brussels	
3/7-9	Conference on "Intellectual and Organizational Trends in the Western Alliance", sponsored by Italian Center for International Relations, Rome	
3/7-10	USIA security issues tour for five top Belgian editors and correspondents	
3/8-9	Nuclear Freeze groups to demonstrate at U.S. Congress	Use public statements and appearances during this period to emphasize that that we seek real reductions.
3/8-9	Italian FM Colombo to visit Washington	Renewed statement of Italian and Allied support on INF
3/9	President Mets with Italian FM Emilio Colombo	
3/11	HLG Meeting in Brussels	

	EVENT	POSSIBLE ACTION
MARCH		
3/14	SCG Meeting	
3/14-15	EC Foreign Ministers Meeting, Brussels	
3/14-16	High Official Working Visit of Dutch Prime Minister Lubbers	
3/15-17	U.S. visit of Dutch PM Lubbers and Foreign Minister van der Broek	Show Allied unity; possible joint press conference
3/18-27	Dam Trip to Europe	
3/21-22	European Council Meeting, Brussels	
3/20-4/3	Proposed Visit by Rick Burt to Turkey, Greece and Cyprus	
3/21-4/10	Atlantic Security	
3/22-23	Spring NPG in Portugal	
3/24-26	Burt Attends Ditchley Conf. in England	
3/24-26	Conference sponsored by Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, American Council on Germany and the Atlantic Bridge, Berlin	Provide high level participation?
3/24-26	German-American Conference in Berlin	High-level State Department representatives might address conference
3/25	Possible Burt Address in London	
3/26-27	Ditchley Conference, UK on "The Atlantic Partnership: Cooperation and Diversity" Asst. Secy. Burt to participate	Provide high level USG speaker
3/30	Amb. Rowny's Briefing of the NAC	
3/31	End of INF and MBFR rounds	Have our Amb. brief NAC & then meet with press. Also prepare inter-roun[illegible]ublic

MARCH (Continued)	EVENT	POSSIBLE ACTION
Late March	Aspen-type seminar, French Alps	French want senior USG participation
Late March	Possible Burt trip to Scandinavia with public appearances.	
Late March	Publication of UK Defense White Paper	

	EVENT	POSSIBLE ACTION
APRIL		
	"World Peace Conference," Uppsala, Sweden, sponsored by Scandanavian Protestant Churches	Stress US pursuit of peace
	SCG Meeting	
	HLG Meeting	
	End of START round	Possible high level public report on state of arms control
	Likely House vote on a nuclear freeze resolution	
	Series of SFRC Hearings on US/Soviet Relations, to include Rostow as witness.	Provide Senior USG official?
4/1	Ambassador Rowny's meeting with NAC	
Easter 1-4	CND March from Burfield and Aldermarston to Greenham Common and back	
Easter week	Peace marches in Europe	Stress US approach to peace
Easter week	Possible Foley Codel to Moscow, with 15-20 Members of Congress	Brief on security issues and provide materials
4/11-12	Visit of Canadian FM MacEachen (tent.)	Theme of Alliance Solidarity
4/11-15	Defense Symposium for Civilian Dignitaries Rome.	Theme of "NATO and Nuclear Arms." Amb. Brement, USG Rep.
4/12-13	EC Political Directors meeting, Bonn	
4/25-26	EC Foreign Ministers meeting, Luxembourg	

	EVENT	POSSIBLE ACTION
APRIL		
4/25-29	USIA security issues tour for 15 leading West European foreign and defense affairs journalists	
4/26	President's Meeting with NATO SG Joseph Luns	
4/27-28	Copenhagen Seminar on INF, sponsored by Danish Commission on Security and Disarmament; papers to be published	Provide high level USG speaker (at least DAS)
Late April/ Early May	USIS Stockholm to program START Deputy Goodby and INF Deputy Glitman in Sweden	

	EVENT	POSSIBLE ACTION
MAY		
	SCG Meeting	
	HLG Meeting	
	Possible Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers meeting	Do analysis of possible WP initiatives, have press line ready and consider preempting them
	NPG and NATO Defense Ministerial	
	Possible US visit of Romanian Foreign Minister	Seek balanced statement including ref to Soviet arms
	Conference sponsored by Movement on European Disarmament, West Berlin	
May-June	Former ACDA Director Rostow to speak in USSR as Ampart	
5/4-5	EC Political Directors meeting, Bonn	
5/7	4th CND Festival, London	
5/9-10	Secretary to OECD Ministerial, Paris	
5/11-14	Bilderberg Conf., Chateau Montebello, Canada	DepSec Dam to speak
5/14-15	EC Foreign Ministers informal "Gymnich" weekend	
5/15	Berlin "Peace Conference," in connection with 50th Anniversary of Hitler's rise to power.	
5/18-20	European Institute for Security Matters Conf. Luxembourg	Need high level USG speaker.
5/21	CND "peace pentacost" march to Upper Heyford	
5/24	EC Foreign Ministers meeting, Bonn	

MAY (Continued)	EVENT	POSSIBLE ACTION
5/28-30	Williamsburg Summit	Seek demonstration of Allied unity in security as well as economic area
5/31-6/1	EC Political Directors meeting, Bonn	
End of May	INF talks resume, Round V	Nitze meet President and consult in Europe
End of May	END protest, Berlin	

	EVENT	POSSIBLE ACTION
SPRING		
(no date yet)	US Catholic Bishops Pastoral Letter to be issued	
	Possible Italian elections	
	Spanish Prime Minister Gonzalez to Washington	Stress Western unity and Spain as example of expansion of democracy
	START talks resume	Rowny to see President, brief press
	SCG meeting	

	EVENT	POSSIBLE ACTION
JUNE		
	Visit of FRG Chancellor in his capacity as EC President	
	Possible press tour of Greenham Common led by UK MOD Heseltine	
6/6-7	European Council Meeting, Bonn	
6/6-9	Plenary Session of the Assembly of the Western European Union. Paris.	
6/9-10	Secretary to NAC Ministerial, Paris	Obtain full Allied support on arms control and other East-West issues
6/18	Pope's Visit to Poland (Tentative)	
6/23-24	Friedrich Ebert Foundation German-American Security Conference	Possible Burt attendance
6/25	Vice President to take part in US/FRG Tricentennial Celebration in Krefeld and to visit other European countries.	

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JULY	EVENT	POSSIBLE ACTION
7/11-16	Fourth Seminar on International Security Affairs, Geneva	Seeking senior US speaker probably private sector
7/28	Greenham Common Air Tatoo, with 200-300,000 public visitors expected	Emphasize Alliance then provide arms control handouts
AUGUST		
8/6	Hiroshima Anniversary	
8/19-21	America DAGs in Helsinki 40th Anniversary League of Finish-American Societies	
SEPTEMBER		
	Expected release of Dutch Defense White Paper	
Late Sept/ early Oct	Annual Party of Conferences in UK, possible prelude to general elections	
OCTOBER		
	Anti-nuclear demonstration in Belgium	
10/29	Anti-nuclear demonstration in The Hague	

Revised
3/03/83
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