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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EUROPEAN AND SOVIET AFFAIRS DIRECTORATE, NSC
: RECORDS

Withdrawer

CAS 8/16/2012

File Folder PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 1983 (12 OF 19)

FOIA

M11-443

Box Number 12

HAENNI

98

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
141178	MEMO	STEVE STEINER TO EUROPEAN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY GROUP RE REPORT <i>R 9/5/17 M443/5</i>	4	3/28/1983	B1
141184	MEMO	CHARLES WICK TO LAWRENCE EAGLEBURGER <i>R 9/5/17 M443/5</i>	3	3/30/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

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B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

CONFIDENTIAL
Department of State

**INCOMING
TELEGRAM**

PAGE 01 LONDON 06437 01 OF 02 251458Z 1999 EUR0752
ACTION EUR-00

ACTION OFFICE UKB-02

INFO PMP-01 EUR-05 PMA-01 NE-02 GDR-01 SOV-01 CE-01 SOML-01
PA-01 PMS-01 PH-01 PP-01 PHD-01 /020 A2

INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-10 CIAE-00 DODE-00
H-01 NSC-01 NSAE-00 HA-00 L-03 TRSE-00 PH-09
PA-01 ACDA-12 SP-02 PRS-01 /071 W

-----245264 251500Z /53

P 251453Z MAR 83
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1431
INFO USIA WASHDC 2939
NATO COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY DUBLIN
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USNMR SHAPE BE
USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES IT
USCINCEUR VAININGEN GE
CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
CINCLANT NORFOLK VA
HQ3AFRAF MILDENHALL UK
EUROPEAN POLADS COLLECTIVE
AMCONSUL BELFAST POUCH
AMCONSUL EDINBURGH POUCH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 06437

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: INF, UK

SUBJECT: INF: MOD RATES HESELTINE VISIT TO GREENHAM
OUTSTANDING SUCCESS

1. (C) SUMMARY: DEFENSE MINISTER HESELTINE'S VISIT TO GREENHAM WENT SMOOTHLY, AND WAS HEAVILY COVERED BY THE MEDIA. WE ARE TOLD THAT HESELTINE IS "VERY HAPPY INDEED" WITH THE EVENT. END SUMMARY.

2. (U) DEFENSE MINISTER HESELTINE, ACCOMPANIED BY APPROXIMATELY 100 NEWS AND CAMERAMEN, VISITED GREENHAM COMMON MARCH 24. HESELTINE'S VISIT BEGAN WITH A PRIVATE BRIEFING BY THIRD AIR FORCE COMMANDER GENERAL CATHEY AND BASE COMMANDER COLONEL THOMPSON (REPORTED SEPTEL). HESELTINE THEN GREETED THE ARRIVING NEWSMEN, WHO ACCOMPANIED HIM ON A 30-MINUTE TOUR OF THE GLCM ALERT AND MAINTENANCE AREA. THE AFTERNOON ENDED WITH A HESELTINE PRESS CONFERENCE AT THE BASE.

3. (U) HESELTINE TOOK A VERY LOW KEY AND INFORMAL APPROACH, EXPLAINING THE REASON FOR HIS VISIT AS AN ATTEMPT TO SATISFY THE PUBLIC CURIOSITY. AS HE SAID TO NEWSMEN: "IF YOU HAVE A FENCE...PEOPLE ALWAYS WANT TO FIND OUT WHAT IS BEHIND IT." THE FACT THAT HESELTINE HAD BROUGHT HIS WIFE ALONG, AND HAD ADORNED HIMSELF IN HARD HAT, CAMOUFLAGE JACKET AND P/N-STRIPED TROUSERS, ADDED TO THE GENERAL LOW-KEY ATMOSPHERE.

4. (U) ANSWERING QUESTIONS DURING THE TOUR AND AT A SUBSEQUENT NEWS CONFERENCE, HESELTINE WAS RELAXED AND EFFECTIVE. HE NOTED THAT RAF GREENHAM COMMON HAD BEGUN ITS NATO SERVICE IN SUPPORT OF U.S. B-47 AIRCRAFT WHICH PROVIDED THE NUCLEAR UMBRELLA SOME 30 YEARS AGO. RESPONDING TO QUESTIONS ON DUAL-KEY, HE LAID STRESS ON THE NECESSITY OF TRUST, POINTING OUT THAT THE U.S. HAD SUPPLIED BRITAIN WITH THE MEANS OF MAINTAINING AN INDEPENDENT DETERRENT AS A SIGN OF THE TRUST WHICH EXISTED ON THAT SIDE OF THE ATLANTIC. ON OTHER POINTS, HESELTINE STUCK CLOSE TO LONG-STANDING HMG POSITIONS,

LONDON 06437 01 OF 02 251458Z 1999 EUR0752
EMPHASIZING DETERRENCE AND THE INEVITABILITY OF DEPLOYMENTS IN THE ABSENCE OF A GENEVA AGREEMENT.

5. (U) THE PAPERS THIS MORNING ALL RUN EXTENSIVE COVERAGE OF THE VISIT -- THOUGH IT WAS GENERALLY PUSHED OFF THE FRONT PAGES BY THE PRESIDENT'S DEFENSE SPEECH AND THE DARLINGTON BY-ELECTION RESULTS.

6. (U) COMMENTING, THE GUARDIAN STORY NOTED: "(HESELTINE'S) REMARKS WILL BE CLEARLY INTENDED TO SIGNAL TO THE SOVIET UNION THAT NATO IS STILL RESOLVED TO GO AHEAD WITH DEPLOYMENT IF A GENEVA AGREEMENT, EITHER ON PRESIDENT REAGAN'S ZERO OR A LESSER COMPROMISE, IS NOT REACHED." OTHER PAPERS REPEATED HESELTINE'S REMARKS ABOUT THE NEED TO SATISFY PUBLIC CURIOSITY. THE TELEGRAPH PLAYED UP THE SUCCESS OF HMG IN ARRANGING THE VISIT WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE WOMEN PROTESTORS OUTSIDE THE GATE. UNDER THE HEADLINE "GREENHAM COUP FOR HESELTINE" THE PAPER ALSO DEALT EXTENSIVELY WITH HESELTINE'S ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS RANGING FROM FIRST-STRIKE CAPABILITY OF GLCM (HESELTINE POINTED OUT THAT THE MISSILES WERE TOO SLOW) TO REPORTS THAT GLCM HAD RUN INTO DEVELOPMENT PROBLEMS (HESELTINE DENIED THEM) TO DUAL-KEY (SEE ABOVE).

7. (U) ALL THE EVENING NEWS PROGRAMS MARCH 24 HAD EXTENSIVE COVERAGE, WITH HESELTINE SHOWN AT THE SITE ANSWERING QUESTIONS ON DUAL-KEY AND THE INEVITABILITY OF DEPLOYMENTS. THERE WAS SOME FOOTAGE OF THE WOMEN PROTESTORS, A HANDFUL OF WHOM WERE SHOWN BEING DRAGGED AWAY FROM THE GATE AS THE PRESS BUSES TRIED TO DEPART. BUT IN GENERAL COMMENTATORS CONCENTRATED ON THE PHYSICAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE SHELTERS, SUMMARIES OF NATO POLICY, AND DISCUSSION OF DEPLOYMENT PLANS.

8. (U) U.S. PERSONNEL WERE VERY MUCH IN THE BACKGROUND THROUGHOUT THE VISIT, AND DID NOT APPEAR IN FILMED REPORTS.

DECLASSIFIED
Dept. of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
BY CL NARA, DATE 8/16/12

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INCOMING
TELEGRAM

Department of State

PAGE 01
ACTION EUR-00

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2001 EUR0753

ACTION OFFICE UKB-02

INFO PMP-01 EUR-05 PMA-01 NE-02 GDR-01 SOV-01 CE-01 SOML-01

PA-01 PMS-01 PM-01 PP-01 PHD-01 /020 A2

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H-01 NSC-01 NSAE-00 HA-08 L-03 TRSE-00 PM-09

PA-01 ACDA-12 SP-02 PRS-01 /071 W

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P 251453Z MAR 83

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1432

INFO USIA WASHDC 2940

NATO COLLECTIVE

AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

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CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE

CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK

CINCLANT NORFOLK VA

HQ3AFRAF MILDENHALL UK

EUROPEAN POLADS COLLECTIVE

AMCONSUL BELFAST POUCH

AMCONSUL EDINBURGH POUCH

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 02 OF 02 LONDON 06437

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: INF, UK

SUBJECT: INF: MOD RATES HESELTINE VISIT TO GREENHAM

9. (C) EMBASSY COMMENT: THE OVERALL IMPRESSION WAS OF A DETERMINED AND UNRUFFLED GOVERNMENT CARRYING THROUGH NATO POLICY. PICTURE COVERAGE SHOWED THAT GLCM IS VERY MUCH A REALITY. WE THINK THE VISIT WILL BE USEFUL IN THE PUBLIC DEBATE HERE. STREATOR

CONFIDENTIAL

Don FORTIER

3/26

The Judge will wish to respond. We can prepare the thank you, but if you have any suggestions it would be appreciated.

D. Morris
public dir

W



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BY W NLRR M443/5 #141178
NARA DATE 9/5/17United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520Dennis Blair
NSC

File

141178

CONFIDENTIAL

28 MAR 1983

File

TO: EUROPEAN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY SUBGROUP

FROM: EUR/P - Steve Steiner *SES*

SUBJECT: Report on March 24 Meeting

The following actions were discussed and agreed at the 3/24 meeting. Please note at end of memo the change in time for the next meeting, 3/31.

1. White Paper: EUR summarized the special meeting held on March 22 to discuss the proposed White Paper on arms control. It was agreed at that meeting that: (a) it is desirable to produce a White Paper; (b) the draft prepared by EUR is adequate as a starting basis; (c) our target audience should be educated opinion leaders who are not experts on arms control, but in a position to influence others--e.g., media, educators and students; and (d) since it will be a resource document, the present length is acceptable. It was also agreed that we would seek to have the document released by approximately the end of May. We will need to decide which agency will release it and to have a strategy ready for public handling here and in Europe. We will look to USIA to play a key role in the latter regard.

Detailed comments were provided to EUR at the 3/24 meeting. EUR will try to have a new version ready for interagency distribution at or before the March 31 meeting of this group. EUR will draft an executive summary, and we will look to ACDA to help with the glossary, and DOD to provide graphics.

JCS noted that we should be careful in our public statements on nuclear testing issues since some policy decisions have not yet been made in this area. This was agreed.

2. Speakers Packet: It was agreed that as soon as the President has given his March 31 speech we will begin to revise and update the present packet. We will want to take into account ~~INF part of the President's speech~~ and to try to eliminate or reduce technical jargon in the present packet. As we do this section by section, we will cable new sections to posts and commands. EUR and PM will take responsibility for starting this process at the beginning of April.

3. US Press Packet: PA presented a proposed packet for public use in the U.S. on INF and related issues. EUR will try to put this packet into final form and will hold it for final decision in the light of the President's March 31 speech. We will also produce a one-page cover sheet showing the contents.
(EUR action)

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2

4. Netherlands Petition: EUR circulated a petition containing over 100,000 signatures of Dutch citizens praising US-Dutch friendship. The Dutch sponsoring committee is seeking to find an appropriate way to release and publicize this at the White House in April. EUR will help to ensure that this gets as much attention as possible. USIA was alerted to provide overseas coverage.

5. New GIST on INF: PM will check with PA concerning when editing will be completed. We should then hold this for final review after March 31.

6. USIA Q's and A's: Comments of other agencies have been received by EUR. These are now being prepared in final for distribution here and cabling to posts and commands. (Here, too, we will hold for final review after March 31.)

7. Size of Arsenal: State distributed two charts and a one-page fact sheet prepared in OSD presenting unclassified information on the decrease in our overall nuclear arsenal compared to the high point in the 1960's. It was noted that OSD will soon release more information on this subject. Until that is done, this information should be used strictly for internal guidance by those in Washington who work on the issue. Once we have the new DOD release, we will send revised guidance to posts and commands.

8. Sample Speech: The sample speech was completed, cleared interagency and cabled to posts and commands on March 24. Copies were distributed at the meeting. A version in speech form will also be made available. (EUR)

9. Italian TV Series: USIA reported that the RAI series on INF will consist of six special programs shown in Italy over the period from May to July. USIA presented a draft memo from Ambassador Dailey to Assistant Secretary of Defense Catto requesting official DOD cooperation. USIA noted that DOD cooperation at the working level on the project has already been excellent.

10. UK Publications: USIA reported that USIS London has asked HMG to distribute to other Allies the excellent publications on INF which they have given to the U.S. The British responded that these are now being reprinted. Once we obtain the reprints, we will examine them in the light of the March 31 speech and then determine what we would like to have distributed to other Allies and our posts and commands, and whether we would suggest any revisions to the British.

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3

11. USIA Pamphlet: USIA reported that it is preparing a pamphlet on INF for distribution to posts in Europe, which will then prepare versions in European languages. The pamphlet is oriented toward informed lay audiences. It was asked that USIA distribute this to other agencies for comment, and that we hold off a decision on sending any such pamphlet to posts until after the March 31 speech.

12. USIA Film on Soviet Military Forces: It was asked that USIA distribute to other agencies for comment the text which accompanies the VTR on Soviet military forces.

13. Speakers and Opportunities in Europe. USIA distributed an updated summary of programs arranged and those being worked on now, and agreed to provide such a report every week. USIA has noted that adequate cooperation has been received in regard to speakers in Europe, and noted that USIA can set up briefings in Europe by expert visitors and even at a few days notice. USIA noted, on the other hand, that we are not yet doing all that we could to provide briefings to Europeans in this country, especially at the FPC. Frank Gomez, Director of the FPC, briefed the Subgroup on how we might make more effective use of the FPC. He stated that Under Secretary Eagleburger was briefing there the same day on the President's 3/23 speech, and he asked that Deputy Secretary Dam provide a briefing upon his return from Europe. He also asked for the cooperation of other agencies in providing senior level briefings for the pre-Ministerial tour of prominent journalists from NATO countries, which will be in the U.S. on 4/25-29. Finally, he asked that in addition to responding to FPC requests, other agencies also take the initiative to volunteer briefings on key issues at the FPC.

14. Briefing Teams: PM reported that a meeting was held earlier this week to move this process forward. The charts to be used in the briefings were agreed upon and are ready for submission to Visual Services; it was agreed, however, that these will be held back now for scrutiny in the light of the President's 3/31 speech. PM reported that another meeting will be held next week to do further work on the texts of the briefings which will accompany and expand on the information contained in the charts.

15. Press Access to INF Basing Sites: EUR distributed the cable from Embassy Rome which indicated that for the time being the GOI wants no press access at Comiso. The embassy supports this GOI position, and EUR recommended that we acquiesce in this at least for now. At a minimum, we should wait until we have fully assessed the results of the 3/24 press visit to Greenham Common before we decide on any next steps in regard to further press access to any INF sites. Others agreed with this.

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4

16. European coverage of 3/31 speech: It was agreed that we should facilitate the ability of European correspondents to cover the March 31 speech in Los Angeles. USIA and FPC undertook to work with the White House press office in this regard.

17. Projects Completed: EUR asked for comments or additions to the paper listing the various actions taken by this subgroup. USIA asked that, since we are working together as one group, the items now listed in the "USIA Annex" be integrated into one single report with the other projects. This was agreed.

18. USIA Polling: USIA reported that it had provided PA's polling data on U.S. attitudes towards the freeze issue to posts in Europe. In regard to USIA polls in Europe, USIA reported that it has now completed its preparatory work for a series of polls in the basing countries on INF issues. The project has now been sent to the field, where USIA will conduct the polls in the five basing countries in conjunction with Gallup Affiliates in Europe. The first of the expected five-part polling exercise will be carried out over the next four weeks, and the subgroup will be briefed by USIA at the conclusion of this first part. The data from each part of the project will be compared with each new part as we go along, and with the most recent data from those countries--which is from November 1982. USIA pointed out that, in order to take into account the President's March 31 speech, the first part of the polling will not take place until the beginning of April.

19. CBS Series: USIA reported that the VTR on the CBS series in February on the militarization of Soviet society is too short to make it worthwhile to distribute to posts. State asked, therefore, whether USIA would distribute to posts the texts of the two-part series. USIA agreed to do so. It was agreed that it would be desirable to find a prominent non-government figure to do a by-liner on militarization in the USSR, GDR and other Warsaw Pact countries. USIA agreed to try to arrange this.

20. Milan Arms Control Seminar (May 6-7): USIA agreed to prepare a cable for Ambassador Dailey to send to Ambassador Glitman asking that Glitman be the U.S. speaker at the Seminar.

21. Graphics from Presidential Speech: It was agreed that we want to make the best possible distribution among European correspondents of the graphics used by the President in his March 23 speech. FPC Director Gomez agreed to ask the White House Press Office to make these available to the FPC.

NEXT MEETING -- CHANGE IN TIME: The next meeting will be held on Thursday March 31 in the EUR Conference Room, 6226, but on a one-time basis will be at 3 P.M. rather than the usual morning time.

UNCLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JCS MESSAGE CENTER

PRIORITY
P 290747Z MAR 83
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6186
INFO USMISSION USNATO 8936

ZYUW RUFHOLA7807 0880836

USMISSION GENEVA 9009

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 BONN 07807

FOR USSTART AND USINF

E.O. 12356-N/A
TAGS: PGOV, GE
SUBJECT: LETTER FROM GEORG LEBER AND ALOIS MERTES TO
ARCHBISHOP ROACH

1. MINISTER OF STATE DR. ALOIS MERTES, CDU, HAS GIVEN
AMBASSADOR BURNS THE TEXT OF A LETTER WHICH MERTES AND
GEORG LEBER, SPD, VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE NINTH BUNDESTAG
AND FORMER DEFENSE MINISTER, HAVE SENT TO ARCHBISHOP
JOHN ROBERT ROACH, CHAIRMAN OF THE U.S. NATIONAL CONFERENCE
OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS. (MERTES AND LEBER ARE BOTH CATHOLICS.)
COMPLETE TEXT OF ENGLISH TRANSLATION, AS SUPPLIED BY
AUTHORS, FOLLOWS. EMBASSY BONN IS POUCHING GERMAN VERSION
TO EUR/CE.

2. BEGIN TEXT: BONN, 14 MARCH 1983

DR. (H.C.) GEORG LEBER (SPD)
VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE GERMAN BUNDESTAG
FORMER FEDERAL MINISTER OF DEFENSE

DR. ALOIS MERTES (CDU)
MEMBER OF THE GERMAN BUNDESTAG
STATE SECRETARY IN THE FEDERAL FOREIGN OFFICE

HIS EXCELLENCY
THE MOST REVEREND
ARCHBISHOP JOHN ROBERT ROACH
CHAIRMAN OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE
OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS OF THE UNITED STATES
1312 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE NW
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005
USA
YOUR EXCELLENCY,

IN YOUR COUNTRY AND IN OURS A LIVELY DISCUSSION IS TAKING
PLACE IN PUBLIC ABOUT THE SECOND DRAFT OF THE PLANNED
PASTORAL LETTER OF US CATHOLIC BISHOPS ON THE SUBJECT OF
"WAR AND PEACE". HAVING STUDIED THE DRAFT, WE WISH TO
EXPRESS IN THIS LETTER THE GREAT ANXIETY WE FEEL AS GERMAN
CATHOLICS AND DEMOCRATIC POLITICIANS. WE ARE WRITING TO
YOU ON NO ONE'S BEHALF, BUT WE ARE WELL AWARE THAT
NUMEROUS FIGURES WITH POLITICAL, MILITARY AND
ECCESTASTICAL RESPONSIBILITY IN EUROPE SHARE OUR ANXIETY..

A PASTORAL LETTER FROM THE AMERICAN BISHOPS, THE
POLITICAL CONCLUSIONS OF WHICH RESULT IN WAR AND

SUBJUGATION IN EUROPE BECOMING MORE LIKELY, PRESENTS A
CHALLENGE TO OUR CHRISTIAN CONSCIENCE.

I

WE ARE THUS WRITING THIS LETTER AS CHRISTIANS WHO HAVE
ALWAYS ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED IN CHURCH LIFE AND AS MEMBERS
OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE GERMAN CATHOLIC LAITY WHO
HAVE COLLABORATED IN THE LIGHT OF THE CHRISTIAN FAITH IN
FORMULATING OPINIONS ON CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS, INCLUDING
QUESTIONS OF PEACE, SECURITY AND DISARMAMENT.

WITH GRATITUDE WE WELCOME THE RELIGIOUS STATEMENTS AND THE
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SECOND DRAFT BECAUSE THEY GIVE
ENCOURAGEMENT TO ALL PEOPLE IN AMERICA AND ELSEWHERE WHO
SUPPORT PEACE IN HUMAN DIGNITY AND JUSTICE AS WELL AS THE
PREVENTION OF ALL TYPES OF WARFARE.

BUT WE ARE ALSO WRITING AS DEMOCRATIC POLITICIANS WHO,
AFTER EXPERIENCING TWO TYPES OF TOTALITARIAN RULE ON
GERMAN SOIL, WISH TO PUT INTO PRACTICE, BOTH IN THEIR
RESPECTIVE PARTIES - THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF
GERMANY AND THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC UNION OF GERMANY AS
WELL AS IN THEIR GOVERNMENT OFFICES - THE NORMS OF
CHRISTIAN ETHICS FOR A SECURE AND JUST PEACE.

WE ARE CO-AUTHORS OF THE ARTICLE "NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE
PRESERVATION OF PEACE" (FOREIGN AFFAIRS SUMMER 1982, P.
1157-1170; EUROPA ARCHIV NO. 12/1982, P. 357-368),
IN WHICH, OUT OF A SPIRIT OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR PEACE IN
EUROPE, WE EXPRESSED OUR OPPOSITION WITH ETHICAL AND
POLITICAL ARGUMENTS TO THE DEMAND OF THE SOVIET UNION ND
OF INDIVIDUAL AMERICAN FIGURES TO RENOUNCE THE DEFENCE
OPTION OF A FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS; YOUR DRAFT
MENTIONS THIS ARTICLE IN NOTE 33.

WE ASK YOU TO MAKE OUR ARGUMENTS KNOWN TO YOUR FELLOW
BISHOPS. FRATERNITY IN THE CHURCH FORBIDS RUTHLESSNESS IN BT

52

ACTION (U.6,7)
INFO CJCS(4) DJS:(*) NIDS(*) J3:NMCC(*) J5(2)
USCINCCENTLO(1) PMD-1(1) SEC:EF:(*) SECDEF(9)
USDP(15) ASD:MRAL(2) USDR(3) GC(1) ASD:PA&E(1)
ATSD:AE(2) DI-5(1) NMIC(*) DC-4A(1) AT-X(1) DIO(1)
DE(1) DB-3B(2) DB-4A(1) DB-5D(1) DB-4E3(1) DIA(1)
+CSA WASHINGTON DC
+CNO WASHINGTON DC
+CSAF WASHINGTON DC
+NATS PENTAGON WASH DC
+PTC WASH DC
+NATS PENT WASHINGTON DC
+DNA WASHINGTON DC//DDST/STNA/NATA/AOCP//
+CMC CC WASHINGTON DC
+DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD

SECTIONAL(1)

TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED 52

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TOR=8308E/0836Z

TAD=8308E/0836Z

CDSN=MAKO16

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JCS MESSAGE CENTER

PRIORITY
P 290747Z MAR 83
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8187
INFO USMISSION USNATO 8937

ZYUW RUFHOLA7807 0880836
USMISSION GENEVA 9010

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 07 BONN 07807

COMPLETELY FROM THE DRAFT AND THUS AN ESSENTIAL PART OF A
REALITY WHICH MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN ANY
RESPONSIBLE POLITICAL CONCEPT.

THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY INCLUDING WEST BERLIN
RENOUNCED ANY CONTROL OVER NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN 1954
VIS-A-VIS ITS ALLIES AND IN 1974, AT US REQUEST, BT

THE PRESERVATION OF NATIONAL INTERESTS. IT DEMANDS
FRATERNAL DIALOGUE, ESPECIALLY WHEN, DESPITE CONSENSUS
ABOUT ETHICAL NORMS, SERIOUS DISPARITIES ARISE IN
JUDGING THE FACTS, OWING TO DIFFERENCES IN GEOGRAPHICAL
POSITION, HISTORY AND ESPECIALLY IN POLITICAL AND
STRATEGIC VULNERABILITY.

II

WE WELCOME THE PUBLICITY YOU HAVE WISHED IN THE DEBATE ON
THE PLANNED PASTORAL LETTER. THE US IS ONE OF THE POWERS
AND THE ONLY SUPERPOWER OF OUR TIMES IN WHICH THE MORAL
PRINCIPLES OF RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY
TO INFLUENCE POLITICAL DECISIONS. THE AMERICAN POSITION
ON THE QUESTION OF SECURING PEACE IS OF IMPORTANCE TO THE
SURVIVAL OF WESTERN EUROPE AND ESPECIALLY OF THE
POPULATION OF THE NON-NUCLEAR AND POLITICALLY AND
MILITARILY PARTICULARLY VULNERABLE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
GERMANY WHICH RELIES IN GOOD FAITH ON AMERICAN GUARANTEES
FOR PEACE AND ITS FREEDOM. OBVIOUSLY, MANY OF YOUR
FELLOW BROTHERS ARE AWARE THAT:

- THE SECOND DRAFT HAS FAILED TO TAKE DUE ACCOUNT OF
- EITHER THE RELEVANT MORAL CRITERIA OR THE POLITICAL
- AND STRATEGIC FACTS BUT HAS PRESENTED ETHICS AND
- FACTS UP TO NOW IN A RATHER SELECTIVE MANNER;
- THE DRAFT IS BASED ON A SPECIFIC AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE
- WHICH IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE NO LESS LEGITIMATE
- PERSPECTIVES OF OTHER AMERICANS, OTHER NATIONS AND
- OTHER CONSTITUENT PARTS OF OUR UNIVERSAL CHURCH;
- THE DRAFT ABANDONS A PRINCIPLE MAINTAINED BY THE 2ND
- VATICAN COUNCIL AND ALL POPES OF THE NUCLEAR AGE
- UP TO NOW: ECCLESIASTICAL TEACHING AUTHORITY CANNOT
- SOLVE THE PARADOX WEIGHING HEAVILY ON THE RESPONSIBLE
- POLITICIANS, I.E. THAT WAR AND BLACKMAIL UNDER THE
- PRESENT INTERNATIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES CAN ONLY BE
- PREVENTED BY A DEMONSTRATION, CREDIBLE TO FRIEND AND
- FOE, OF THE CAPACITY AND RESOLUTION TO OFFER
- EFFECTIVE RESISTANCE TO A CONVENTIONAL OR NUCLEAR
- ATTACK.

III

WE REPEAT: THE CREDIBILITY OF THE US NUCLEAR DEFENCE
GUARANTEE FOR WESTERN EUROPE IS A PRECONDITION TO THE
PREVENTION OF A CONVENTIONAL OR NUCLEAR WAR IN EUROPE,
BUT ALSO TO THE PREVENTION OF POLITICAL EXPANSION BY
INTIMIDATION, PRESSURE OR BLACKMAIL. THE
SOVIET-EUROPEAN ASPECT OF THE PROBLEM IS MISSING

ACTION

(I.H)

INFO CJCS(4) DJS:(*) NIDS(*) J3:NMCC(*) J5(2)
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VIS-A-VIS ALL STATES IN THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. OUR COUNTRY IS AFFORDED PROTECTION FROM A POTENTIAL AGGRESSOR OR BLACKMAILER ONLY BY THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE AND ITS ABILITY, BASED ON THE AMERICAN PRESENCE IN EUROPE, TO ACT AS A CREDIBLE DETERRENT USING A STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE. THIS REMAINS TRUE AS LONG AS NO OTHER VIABLE ALTERNATIVE CAN BE SEEN TO SECURE PEACE AND OUR FREEDOM.

WE REGARD AS UNETHICAL A DEMAND OF A STRATEGIC NATURE WHICH MAKES WAR IN EUROPE MORE LIKELY THAN IN THE PAST. THIS IS ESPECIALLY TRUE OF THE TIME-WORN SOVIET DEMAND WHICH THE AMERICAN BISHOPS SEEM TO WANT TO MAKE THEIR OWN: RENUNCIATION OF THE DEFENCE OPTION OF A FIRST USE OF AMERICAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE CASE OF SUCCESSFUL CONVENTIONAL AGGRESSION AGAINST THE ALLIANCE ON EUROPEAN TERRITORY.

THE PRAGUE DECLARATION OF THE WARSAW PACT OF 7 JANUARY 1983 HAS REPEATED THIS DEMAND. THIS CONCURS WITH THE OBVIOUS POLITICAL AIM OF THE SOVIET UNION, TO SHAKE WESTERN EUROPE'S FAITH, AND ESPECIALLY THAT OF THE NON-NUCLEAR FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, IN AMERICAN PROTECTION AND TO MAKE IT POLITICALLY PLIABLE IN A STEP-BY-STEP PROCESS OF PREVENTIVE GOOD CONDUCT. IT IS THUS EASY TO UNDERSTAND WHY THE CENTRAL ORGAN OF THE SOCIALIST UNITY PARTY OF GERMANY IN EAST BERLIN, "NEUES DEUTSCHLAND", RECENTLY PUBLISHED THOSE PARTS OF THE SECOND DRAFT OF THE PASTORAL LETTER WHICH FAN THE FLAMES OF SOVIET PROPAGANDA AND STRATEGY AGAINST THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE. AS FAR AS WE ARE AWARE, THE FORESEEABLE CONSEQUENCE OF RENOUNCING THE OPTION OF A DEFENSIVE FIRST USE OF AMERICAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH CHRISTIAN ETHICS BECAUSE IT ENDANGERS PEACE IN FREEDOM AND ENCOURAGES PEACE BY SUBMISSION IN WHICH THE PREACHING OF THE CHRISTIAN GOSPEL WOULD PROBABLY ALSO BE IMPEDED OR SUPPRESSED. WE REGARD IT AS IRRESPONSIBLE TO CONDEMN ESSENTIAL ASPECTS OF NUCLEAR STRATEGY IF THIS IS SURE TO MAKE CONVENTIONAL WAR AND POLITICAL SUBMISSION MORE LIKELY.

LIFE WHICH IS THREATENED BY CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS SHOULD NOT BE PROTECTED ANY LESS THAN LIFE THREATENED BY NUCLEAR WEAPONS. BECAUSE A CONVENTIONAL EAST-WEST WAR WOULD MOST LIKELY BEGIN ON THE TERRITORY OF OUR DIVIDED FATHERLAND, WE DEMAND STRICT ADHERENCE TO THE ALREADY EXISTING INTERNATIONAL PROHIBITION OF THE FIRST USE OF ANY WEAPONS AT ALL. WITH THE PAST AND PRESENT FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS WE ADHERE TO WHAT FEDERAL CHANCELLOR HELMUT SCHMIDT STATED IN 1978 BEFORE THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY

"THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE OR THREAT OR FORCE EMBODIED IN THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS MUST THEREFORE APPLY TO ALL WEAPONS, BOTH NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL. WHOEVER IS THE FIRST TO TAKE UP ARMS OF WHATEVER KIND AND TO RESORT TO OR THREATEN MILITARY ATTACK VIOLATES THIS PROHIBITION. I REPEAT: THIS PROHIBITION IS COMPREHENSIVE; EITHER IT APPLIES TOTALLY OR NOT AT ALL. THOSE WHO TRY TO RESTRICT IT TO THE FIRST USE OF CERTAIN WEAPONS MUST ASK THEMSELVES WHETHER THEY WOULD CONSIDER AN ATTACK LAUNCHED WITH OTHER WEAPONS LESS PROHIBITED. SHOULD A COUNTRY WHICH IS THREATENED BY A NEIGHBOUR HEAVILY ARMED WITH CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS BE LESS PROTECTED THAN OTHERS BY THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE OF FORCE?"

IN OTHER WORDS, WE SUPPORT A COMPREHENSIVE RENUNCIATION OF THE FIRST USE OF ALL WEAPONS AND NOT A SELECTIVE NON-FIRST USE OF SPECIFIC WEAPONS. AND INDEED, THE HUMANITARIAN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ARMED CONFLICTS AND THE STRATEGIC PLANNING OF THE NATO ALLIANCE HAVE FOR A LONG TIME NOW LIVED UP TO IMPORTANT DEMANDS OF THE AMERICAN BISHOPS, E.G. THOSE CONCERNING THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN COMBATANTS AND NON-COMBATANTS AND CONCERNING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE MEANS USED AND DAMAGE INCURRED.

AS CHRISTIANS WE WILLINGLY AND EMPHATICALLY AGREE WITH THE VIEW EXPRESSED IN THE DRAFT OF THE PASTORAL LETTER THAT THE SOVIET PEOPLE AND THEIR LEADERS ARE "PEOPLE CREATED IN GOD'S IMAGE". BUT IS THIS NOT EQUALLY TRUE OF EVERYONE IN THE PAST AND PRESENT? DOES THIS BIBLICAL MESSAGE ENTITLE THOSE WHO ARE POLITICALLY RESPONSIBLE TO LESSEN THEIR DUTY TO AFFORD PROTECTION? WE ARE AGAINST EVERY FORM OF HATRED AND ENMITY, BUT AT THE SAME TIME WE ADVOCATE VIGILANCE IN THE FACE OF ALL DANGERS WHICH IN THE LONG RUN JEOPARDIZE THE FREEDOM OF OUR CITIZENS. IT IS OUR BT

ACTION

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RESPONSIBILITY TO ANALYSE OBJECTIVELY THE REVOLUTIONARY AND EXPANSIONIST AIMS WHICH ARE STILL OPENLY SUPPORTED BY THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP, IDEOLOGICAL AIMS TO WHICH THEY ALSO DEVOTE THEIR MILITARY POTENTIALS.

IV

WE ALL PERCEIVE THE DANGER TODAY WHICH COULD ARISE THROUGH UNBRIDLED PROLIFERATION AND MULTIPLICATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THROUGH TECHNICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL MISCALCULATIONS, IN SHORT THROUGH HUMAN ERROR, EVEN WITHOUT AGGRESSIVE INTENT. WE THEREFORE NEED PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES AND A STRATEGY WHICH FACES UP IN EQUAL DEGREE TO BOTH THE NATURE OF THE SOVIET THREAT AND THE NATURE OF MODERN WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION. THE WESTERN STRATEGY OF PREVENTING WAR THROUGH DETERRENCE IS NOT, IN OUR OPINION, THE IDEAL ANSWER TO THIS NEED, ALTHOUGH IN THE PRESENT SITUATION THERE ARE NO EQUALLY EFFECTIVE, LET ALONE MORE EFFECTIVE, ANSWERS TO BE FOUND. THIS STRATEGY OF THE WESTERN ALLIANCE WOULD CONFRONT THE SOVIET UNION, SHOULD IT ATTACK, WITH AN IMPONDERABLE RISK TO ITS OWN EXISTENCE. IT IS THE INCALCULABILITY OF THIS RISK THAT IN REALITY HAS PREVENTED ANY BELLIGERENCE - NOT ONLY NUCLEAR, CONVENTIONAL TOO - BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. IT MUST NOT BE OVERLOOKED THAT THIS VERY RISK OF SELF-DESTRUCTION IF WAR WERE TO BREAK OUT HAS FORCED THE POLITICAL LEADERS OF THE NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES TO PONDER THE RISKS AS NEVER BEFORE IN HISTORY. IN VIEW OF THE RATIONALITY AND WILL FOR SELF-PRESERVATION OF STATES AND SYSTEMS, THIS AFFORDS RELIABLE PROTECTION OF THE PEACE. IN ITS UNDERSTANDABLE CONCERN TO ELIMINATE AS FAR AS POSSIBLE, BY THE MOST RIGOROUS MORAL STANDARDS, THE DANGER OF NUCLEAR WAR, THE SECOND DRAFT OF THE PASTORAL LETTER HAS THE EFFECT OF UNDERMINING THE DECISIVE AND LEGITIMIZING FUNCTION OF THE POLICY OF DETERRENCE - THE PREVENTION OF ALL WAR. THE AUTHORS CONCENTRATE ON THE PROBLEM OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH WAR WOULD BE MORALLY PERMISSIBLE AND THOSE IN WHICH WAR - EVEN AS A MEANS OF DEFENCE - CAN NO LONGER BE REGARDED AS LEGITIMATE. BY POINTING TO THE DISPROPORTIONATE AND INDISCRIMINATE EFFECT OF THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THE LETTER STATES THAT TO USE OR TO THREATEN TO USE THEM IS IMMORAL. BUT THE CENTRAL TENET OF WESTERN STRATEGY IS THE THREAT OF ESCALATION. NOT EVEN THE OPTION OF THE FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, INDEED IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, NOT EVEN A GENERAL NUCLEAR RESPONSE, WHICH MIGHT RENDER IMPOSSIBLE ANY DISTINCTION BETWEEN MILITARY TARGETS AND CIVILIANS OR THEIR PROPERTY, CAN BE EXCLUDED. ON THE CONTRARY, THE CREDIBLE POTENTIAL TO ESCALATE UP TO MUTUAL DESTRUCTION ENSURES, BY ITS OWN INHERENT LOGIC,

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THE OBJECTIVE PROBABILITY AND THE SUBJECTIVE CERTAINTY THAT NO SHOT WILL BE FIRED. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF INDIVIDUAL DEMANDS MADE IN THE PRESENT TEXT WOULD CALL INTO QUESTION THE VERY BASIS OF THE STRATEGY WHICH HAS SO FAR BEEN EFFECTIVE IN PREVENTING WAR. THE UNITED STATES BISHOPS HOPE THAT MEASURES SUCH AS THE PROHIBITION OF ANY PLANNING AIMED AT THE CAPABILITY TO WAGE NUCLEAR WAR, PARTICULARLY RENUNCIATION OF THE FIRST DEFENSIVE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM FRONTIER ZONES COULD REDUCE THE DANGER OF NUCLEAR WAR. WE, THE UNDERSIGNED, HOWEVER, FEAR THAT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SUCH PROPOSALS WOULD MAKE THE RISK MORE CALCULABLE AGAIN FOR THE OTHER SIDE AND THAT WAR WOULD THUS BECOME MORE PROBABLE. THE PROPOSALS ARE OF A TECHNICAL MILITARY NATURE; THEY IGNORE THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL, ETHICAL AND THEREFORE POLITICAL NATURE OF THE PROBLEM IN ITS ENTIRETY. WE ARE CONCERNED THAT THE MORAL CONDEMNATION OF A DELIBERATE THREAT TO ENGAGE NUCLEAR DEFENCES WILL NECESSARILY MAKE MORE PROBABLE A CONVENTIONAL WAR WHOSE DEVASTATING EFFECTS WOULD BE FELT ABOVE ALL IN OUR COUNTRY. IN THE EVENT OF A CONVENTIONAL ATTACK ON WESTERN EUROPE BY THE SOVIET UNION, NEITHER ITS OWN EXISTENCE NOR THAT OF OUR ALLY, THE UNITED STATES, WOULD BE PUT AT RISK. THIS IS ALSO TRUE OF TOTAL MILITARY CONQUEST OF WESTERN EUROPE RESULTING FROM A SOVIET CONVENTIONAL ATTACK. EVEN STRENGTHENING OF CONVENTIONAL DEFENSIVE CAPABILITY, WHICH THE BISHOPS SUPPORT AS A LOGICAL CONSEQUENCE OF THEIR REASONING, CANNOT ALTER THIS. WE ALSO DOUBT VERY MUCH WHETHER THE BT

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STATES OF WESTERN EUROPE, BASED ON DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES, WOULD BE POLITICALLY ABLE TO REINFORCE THEIR CONVENTIONAL DEFENCES. THIS WOULD, ADMITTEDLY, RAISE THE CONVENTIONAL RISK TO A POTENTIAL AGGRESSOR; THE RISK OF NUCLEAR ANNIHILATION, HOWEVER, THE ONLY EFFECTIVE BARRIER AGAINST WAR, WOULD BE ELIMINATED. THE REMOVAL OF THIS RISK WOULD INCREASE THE DANGER NOT ONLY OF A CONVENTIONAL CONFLICT BUT OF A NUCLEAR EXCHANGE, TOO. ONCE HOSTILITIES OCCUR BETWEEN THE NUCLEAR POWERS THE PROBABILITY INCREASES THAT THE CONVENTIONAL CONFLICT WILL BECOME A NUCLEAR WAR - DESPITE THE RENUNCIATION OF NUCLEAR FIRST USE. THE PRIMARY CRITERION IN A MORAL ASSESSMENT OF A POLITICAL STRATEGY MUST BE THE PREVENTION OF WAR. TO SIMPLIFY THE VALUE JUDGMENT: THROUGH THE THREAT TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS - IN ITSELF IMMORAL WHEN ISOLATED FROM OBJECTIVE AND EFFECT - THE CURRENT STRATEGY ENSURES PEACE IN FREEDOM. A STRATEGY OF RENUNCIATION OF THE THREAT TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS - IN ITSELF MORAL WHEN ISOLATED FROM OBJECTIVE AND EFFECT - ENDANGERS PEACE AND OUR FREEDOM.

V

IN OUR AGE OF EVER MORE DREADFUL WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND INCONCEIVABLE WANT IN THE THIRD WORLD, THE SEARCH FOR BALANCED DISARMAMENT AND GENUINE DETENTE IS AN IMPERATIVE OF ETHICS AND COMMON SENSE.

SINCE THE 1960S U.S. ADMINISTRATIONS, ENCOURAGED AND SUPPORTED BY THEIR ALLIES, HAVE BEEN NEGOTIATING WITH THE SOVIET UNION IN AN EFFORT TO STOP THE GROWTH OF MODERN WEAPONRY ON THE BASIS OF EQUAL SECURITY FOR BOTH SIDES, TO CONCLUDE RELIABLE ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS AND FINALLY TO BRING ABOUT DISARMAMENT, WHICH MUST BE BALANCED AND VERIFIABLE IF IT IS NOT TO BE AN EMPTY WORD WITH WHICH TO DECEIVE THE NATIONS OF THE WORLD. WE SHOULD ALSO LIKE TO DRAW ATTENTION TO THE EFFORTS OF THE WESTERN DEMOCRACIES BOTH WITHIN AND OUTSIDE THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE TO ELIMINATE THE POLITICAL CAUSES OF TENSION AND ARMS ACCUMULATION. WE AGREE WITH THE HOLY SEE THAT THE REDUCTION IN THE CAUSES OF POLITICAL CONFLICT AND REDUCTIONS IN MILITARY POWER ARE VERY CLOSELY INTERTWINED.

NONE OF THE MAJOR POSTWAR POLITICAL CRISES SINCE YALTA AND POTSDAM HAS BEEN CAUSED BY THE UNITED STATES OR ONE OF ITS ALLIES, NOT EVEN IN THE AGE OF AMERICAN NUCLEAR MONOPOLY AND AMERICAN NUCLEAR SUPERIORITY; THEY HAVE ALL BEEN THE CONSEQUENCE OF SOVIET OFFENSIVES AGAINST HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW.

WE ALSO WISH TO POINT OUT THAT TIME AND AGAIN THE UNITED

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STATES AND ITS ALLIES HAVE MADE RENUNCIATIONS IN THE CONVENTIONAL, NUCLEAR AND CHEMICAL FIELDS, TO WHICH THE SOVIET UNION HAS ALL TOO OFTEN RESPONDED BY ACCELERATING ITS OWN ARMS BUILD-UP. WE WISH TO RECALL THAT NO UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS EVER CONSULTED ITS EUROPEAN ALLIES SO INTENSIVELY NOR GIVEN SUCH COMPREHENSIVE ATTENTION TO ITS ALLIES' CONCERNS PRIOR TO PARTICIPATING IN US-SOVIET NUCLEAR ARMS NEGOTIATIONS AS HAS BEEN THE CASE DURING THE LAST FEW YEARS. THE DRAFT LETTER DOES NO JUSTICE TO THE PRESENT EFFORTS BY THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE FOR A STOP TO ARMS STOCKPILING, FOR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT WHICH HAVE BEEN LOYALLY SUPPORTED BY BOTH THE PAST AND PRESENT GOVERNMENTS OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY.

A REALISTIC AND HONEST VIEW OF THE PRESENT AND FUTURE PRESCRIBES THE CONCLUSION THAT THE EXISTENCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS IRREVERSIBLE. EVEN IF ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS WERE TO BE SUCCESSFULLY ABOLISHED THROUGH VERIFIABLE DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS, THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL MEANS OF REPRODUCING THEM WOULD REMAIN. THE ABILITY TO SPLIT THE ATOM AND TO PUT ATOMIC SCIENCE TO MILITARY USE CAN NO LONGER BE ERADICATED. TOGETHER WITH THIS KNOWLEDGE, HOWEVER, THERE REMAINS DISTRUST BETWEEN RIVAL STATES: THE CERTAIN KNOWLEDGE OF EACH ONE THAT THE OTHER RETAINS NUCLEAR CAPABILITY AND THE FEAR OF BEING CONFRONTED AGAIN BY A NUCLEAR THREAT - THIS TIME WITHOUT WARNING. THE NEXT "ARMS RACE" WOULD INEVITABLY FOLLOW. BT

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VI

THE SECOND DRAFT OF THE PASTORAL LETTER CONCENTRATES ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY ON THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE AND THE RISK OF MAN'S SELF-DESTRUCTION. IT IGNORES, HOWEVER, THE POLITICAL STRATEGY, OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE, WHICH LIES AT THE ROOT OF THE DEPRESSING INCREASE IN ALL TYPES OF WEAPONS. THE DRAFT CONTAINS NO ADEQUATE JUDGMENT AND ASSESSMENT OF THE POLITICAL IDEOLOGY OF THE SOVIET UNION, WHICH LIES AT THE BASIS OF THE MILITARY POWER OF THAT STATE AND WHICH IMPOSES ITS BURDEN UPON EUROPE. FOR THIS REASON IT ALSO IGNORES THE DANGER, WHICH WE REGARD AS MUCH MORE REAL, THAT WESTERN EUROPE WILL SUBMIT ITSELF POLITICALLY TO THE EXPANSIONIST CRAVINGS OF THE SOVIET UNION, WHICH OPENLY PROFFESSES ITS TOTALITARIAN AND HEGEMONIC GOALS. NOBODY IN A RESPONSIBLE POSITION IN THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE HOLDS, AS THE DRAFT LETTER MAINTAINS, AN "OBSESSIVE PERCEPTION THAT SOVIET POLICY IS DIRECTED BY IRRATIONAL LEADERS STRIVING INSANELY FOR WORLD CONQUEST AT ANY COSTS." ON THE CONTRARY, EVERY DETAIL OF WESTERN STRATEGY IS BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE SOVIET LEADERS ARE NOT IRRATIONAL ADVENTURERS BUT THAT THEY CALCULATE ALL RISKS IN A HIGHLY RATIONAL MANNER, THAT THEY COMBINE POLITICAL RESOLVE WITH THE PRESERVATION OF NUCLEAR PEACE, I.E. WITH THE SURVIVAL OF THEIR POWER AND THEIR COUNTRY. THE DRAFT RECALLS THE ONLY USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO DATE, THAT BY THE UNITED STATES AGAINST JAPAN AT THE END OF WORLD WAR II. THIS BEGS THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: WOULD THAT WEAPON HAVE BEEN USED IF JAPAN HAD, TO THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE UNITED STATES, POSSESSED THE CAPABILITY TO WREAK NUCLEAR DESTRUCTION ON SAN FRANCISCO AND LOS ANGELES? THE DREADFUL DESTRUCTIVE POWER OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, PARADOXICALLY, HAS THE EFFECT OF PREVENTING WAR BETWEEN STATES AND ALLIANCES WHICH POSSESS IT.

VII

WE CONSIDER THE JUXTAPOSITION OF MORALS AND POLITICS UPON WHICH THE US BISHOPS' PASTORAL LETTER IS BASED TO BE UNJUSTIFIABLE AND THEREFORE ERRONEOUS, BECAUSE INTER ALIA IT IMPLIES THAT IN SHAPING THEIR STRATEGY TO SECURE PEACE IN FREEDOM THE GOVERNMENTS AND PARLIAMENTS OF THE WESTERN DEMOCRACIES DISREGARD MORAL CRITERIA. SUCH AN IMPLICATION IS UNFAIR AND ARBITRARY. IT DOES NOT CORRESPOND TO REALITY. WE WHO WRITE THIS LETTER TO YOU, MOST REVEREND ARCHBISHOP, UNDERSTAND POLITICS TO BE BOTH A CONSEQUENCE OF ETHICS AND THE PRACTICAL ART OF THE POSSIBLE.

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BUT THE PARTICULAR REQUIREMENT AND DUTY WHICH ANY POLITICIAN IS BOUND TO FACE IN HIS ACTIONS CAN BE STATED AS FOLLOWS: MORAL VALUES SUCH AS PEACE, FREEDOM AND JUSTICE ARE THEORETICALLY IN HARMONY BUT IN PRACTICAL POLITICS FREQUENTLY COMPETE WITH EACH OTHER. THE RESPONSIBLE POLITICIAN IS THEREFORE FREQUENTLY REQUIRED TO WEIGH UP EQUALLY VALID MORAL PRINCIPLES, ESTABLISH HIS PRIORITIES AND ACT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEM.

THE CATHOLIC POLITICIAN MUST ALSO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE BINDING CHRISTIAN ETHICAL STANDARDS. AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, HE MUST MAKE A PROPER ASSESSMENT OF POLITICAL CIRCUMSTANCES - A RESPONSIBILITY OF WHICH THE ECCLESIASTICAL HIERARCHY CANNOT ABSOLVE HIM.

AS POLITICIANS, WE EXPECT A GREAT DEAL FROM THE CHURCH: EXHORTATION TO EXAMINE OUR CONSCIENCES RIGOROUSLY; PROCLAMATION OF THE IMPERFECTION OF MAN AND THE BIBLICAL MESSAGE OF SALVATION: ENCOURAGEMENT TO TRUST IN GOD'S HELP; MORAL SUPPORT IN MAKING VALUE JUDGMENTS. THE RIGHT OF THE STATE TO DISPOSE OF THE LIVES OF OTHERS TO PRESERVE PEACE AND TO PROTECT ITS OWN NATION AS WELL AS ALLIED COUNTRIES WEIGHS MORE HEAVILY ON THOSE IN POWER IN THIS NUCLEAR AGE THAN EVER BEFORE. BUT THE CHURCH CANNOT TAKE FROM THE POLITICIAN HIS DUTY TO DECIDE ON HOW TO ACT WHEN FACED WITH A MORAL DILEMMA. EVEN THE CHRISTIAN WHO IS AWARE OF THE MORAL DUTIES STEMMING FROM HIS FAITH IS OFTEN NOT SPARED THE CHOICE BETWEEN A GREATER AND A LESSER EVIL. HIS INSIGHT IS NO GREATER THAN THAT OF HIS JEWISH OR AGNOSTIC BRETHREN WHO EXAMINE THEIR CONSCIENCES EARNESTLY AND OBEY THE RULES OF GENERAL ETHICS. BEFORE GOD AND HIS OWN CONSCIENCE, HE MUST - IF HE IS A CHRISTIAN - TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CONSEQUENCES OF HIS DECISION IN THE LIGHT OF HIS CHRISTIAN FAITH AND HOPE.

WE WANT PEACE, BUT PEACE IN FREEDOM. NOT ONLY DO WE NOT WISH DESTRUCTION BY WAR; WE DO NOT WISH SUBJUGATION BY

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BELOW THE THRESHOLD OF WAR EITHER. THE RIGHT AND THE DUTY
OF THE MEMBER STATES OF OUR ALLIANCE READS "NEITHER RED
NOR DEAD".

WE REGARD IT AS NECESSARY TO POINT OUT NOT ONLY THE DANGER
OF ATOMIC SUICIDE TO THE PEOPLE OF AMERICA, WHICH HAS
GUARANTEED PEACE IN EUROPE FOR 38 YEARS NOW AND HAS
SUCCESSFULLY DEFENDED WEST BERLIN AGAINST TWO BLACKMAIL
ATTEMPTS BUT ALSO TO POINT OUT THE NO LESS REAL AND MUCH
GREATER DANGER OF EUROPE'S GRADUAL POLITICAL
CAPITULATION. A MORALLY AND POLITICALLY RESPONSIBLE
JUDGMENT MUST TAKE BOTH THESE DANGERS AND THEIR CAUSES
INTO ACCOUNT, AS THE LEADERS OF THE UNIVERSAL CHURCH
HAVE ALWAYS DONE UP TO NOW.

WE THEREFORE ASK THE UNITED STATES BISHOPS TO EMPHASIZE
MORE CLEARLY IN THE FINAL VERSION OF THEIR PASTORAL LETTER
THE SPECIFIC TASKS AND ALSO THE SPECIFIC LIMITATIONS OF
THE CHURCH AND OF POLITICS AND THEREBY TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF
OUR EUROPEAN CONCERNS IN A SPIRIT OF FRATERNAL
CONSIDERATION. THE CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE ON PEACE IN THE
WORLD MUST NOT BECOME A DESTRUCTIVE ARGUMENT WITHIN THE
CHURCH.

IN GRATEFUL ATTACHMENT TO THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN THE
UNITED STATES, WHICH WAS ONE OF THE FIRST COMMUNITIES IN
YOUR COUNTRY TO EXTEND TO US THE HAND OF BROTHERLY
RECONCILIATION AND HELP AFTER WORLD WAR II, WE CONVEY TO
YOU OUR MOST SINCERE AND WARMEST GREETINGS.
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**United States
Information
Agency**

Washington, D.C. 20547

Office of the Director



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March 30, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable
Lawrence S. Eagleburger
Chairman, International Political Committee

The Honorable
Peter H. Dailey
Chairman, Public Diplomacy Committee

FROM: Charles Z. Wick *CZW*
Director

SUBJECT: Status Report No. 8 — Arms Reduction and
Security Issues (Week of March 21 - 25)

HIGHLIGHTS

Eagleburger Briefing at the Foreign Press Center:

- Under Secretary Lawrence S. Eagleburger gave a March 24 briefing at the Washington Foreign Press Center on the President's speech of the previous evening to a full house of resident foreign correspondents. The event was videotaped by ORF (Austrian TV) and ARD (West German TV) for overseas satellite transmission. In addition, the Agency supplied tapes of the briefings to CBC (Canada), TF-1 (France), Fuji TV (Japan) and TV Globo (Brazil). The Foreign Press Center reports that Under Secretary Eagleburger expertly handled many complex questions during the briefing.
- On March 22, Ambassador Peter Dailey and Director Charles Wick met with the USIA Security Issues Working Group. Ambassador Dailey, recently returned from visits to several INF basing countries, briefed the group on his views of the effect of our activities and programming. Ongoing and new initiatives and programs were then discussed.
- USIS Brussels reports that a Foreign Press Center-organized tour for six Belgian journalists was an outstanding success. Commending the Press Center for the "flawless organization and substance of the program", Brussels comments that the journalists obtained a "view of USG (arms control and security) policies which was coherent and representative of the Administration as a whole, in contrast to the disarray that is so often depicted in the press". One journalist commented that the trip will "enable me to write more authoritatively about the U.S. approach to INF for several months to come". Another found the briefings "at just the right level, by authoritative and expert officials". Brussels reports that the first two articles written by participants in the trip are accurate and positive.

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Stanislaw Kirschbaum, a Canadian professor of international relations at Glendon College, York University, has told our Consulate in Toronto that an Agency-organized regional project on strategic and theater arms negotiations in which he participated was a "beautifully planned, incredible experience". Kirschbaum wrote Ambassador Robinson to say that the tour will substantially assist him in preparing a paper on Soviet-American strategic relations which he will present at York University in May. Peter Oesterricher, Deputy Director of Britain's unilateralist Committee for Nuclear Disarmament, also had words of high praise for the tour. He said that on his return to the U.K., he would write a letter to the Soviet Ambassador, challenging the U.S.S.R. to organize a similar open visit.

A group of six European journalists, an academic and a parliamentary foreign affairs advisor are currently participating in a regional project entitled "Atlantic Security-Challenge of the 80's". At the Department of State, the group has met with James Dobbins, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Western Europe; Richard Haass, Deputy for Policy Planning, European Bureau; and Robert Dean, Deputy Director, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs; as well as with George Bader, Deputy Director for European and NATO Policy at the Department of Defense. On March 25, the group is scheduled to leave Washington for two weeks of visits to U.S. military installations.

Using excerpts from several Agency-supplied items, as well as "Soviet Military Power", USIS Bonn has produced a German-language brochure on Soviet military programs, 7,500 copies of which have been distributed to key government, media and university contacts.

Final arrangements have been made for speaking appearances by Under Secretary Eagleburger in Austria from April 26 to 30; and for Alexander Vershbow, State EUR/SOV, who will visit Belgium, the Netherlands, France, West Germany, and the U.K. from April 25 to May 6.

Upcoming press briefings at the Washington Foreign Press Center include Ambassador Richard Kennedy on nuclear non-proliferation and the International Atomic Energy Agency, on March 30. Robert McFarlane of the NSC has been asked to present a background briefing on the President's upcoming speech on arms control, scheduled for March 31. In addition, Secretary Shultz has been asked to give a breakfast backgrounder on INF to selected resident correspondents from the NATO basing countries.

The Washington Foreign Press Center has completed facilitative assistance programs for Christian Kind (Neue Zuercher Zeitung); Bridget Bloom (The Financial Times); and Andrew Walker of the BBC. Kind will meet with Under Secretaries Eagleburger and Ikle, as well as with Helmut Sonnenfeldt and James Schlesinger. Bloom and Walker met with William Hoehn, Principal Deputy Secretary, Department of Defense.

The Foreign Press Center is now working on programs for Gerry Northam (BBC); Jon Connell (London Sunday Times); and Lucien Meysels (Wochenpresse, Vienna).

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Eric Gysling, Swiss TV, will interview Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle and Eugene Rostow for a television production on U.S. defense and arms control policies planned to air in Switzerland in late April. Gysling will also interview Peter Swiers, Deputy Director, Bureau of Political/Military Affairs, Department of State.

A team from RAI-2, Italian television's second channel, will be in the U.S. from April 9 through 30 to film for an ambitious six-part series on defense issues scheduled to air in Italy starting May 30. Estimated audience is four to five million. RAI-2 contemplates separate 60 to 90-minute segments on topics such as the nuclear revolution in warfare; NATO and Europe; the threat to NATO's southern flank; differences in U.S., northern European and southern European peace groups; arms control and U.S. INF policy; and the future of weapons development and arms control. The Agency will assist this effort with interviews and other material. The RAI-2 team will return to the U.S. in mid-June, and has requested interviews with Secretaries Shultz and Weinberger for that period.

During the week, the Agency's Wireless File carried the texts of two important news conferences: that of Assistant Secretary Burt in Brussels on March 18 and Defense Secretary Weinberger in Spain on March 24; as well as a speech by Deputy Secretary Dam in Oslo on March 21.

USIA will supply packets containing the charts and photographs used by the President in his March 23 speech on U.S. defense to posts worldwide.

In response to many post requests for background information on Soviet strategic thinking, the Agency supplied through the Wireless File, a byliner by Wolfgang Leonhard entitled "Soviet Foreign Policy: Motives and Objectives".

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cc: Judge William P. Clark, Jr., SPG
Secretary George P. Shultz, SPG
Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger, SPG
Administrator M. Peter McPherson, SPG

Office of the Press Secretary

For Wire Transmission and
Release at 10:00 a.m. EST
Wednesday, March 30, 1983

TEXT OF STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

The East Room

Last week, when I addressed the American people on this Administration's defense program, I expressed our determination to reduce our reliance on the terrible power of nuclear weapons to assure the peace.

Today, I want to say a few words about this critical aspect of our security policy -- our efforts to drastically reduce the arsenals which burden the lives of our own citizens, of our friends and Allies, and, yes, of our adversaries as well.

As you know, over the last year-and-a-half, this Administration has undertaken a comprehensive and far-reaching arms control program designed to achieve deep reductions of nuclear arms, to rid the world of chemical weapons, and to cut the size of conventional forces in Europe. I will be saying more about these initiatives in my speech tomorrow.

But this morning, let me focus on one of these negotiations. I have just met with the Ambassadors of the countries of the North Atlantic Alliance. We invited them here because the citizens of their countries share with Americans a profound hope for success in the Geneva negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear missiles.

The forces being discussed in the I.N.F. negotiations directly affect the security of our Allies. As I told you last week, the Soviet Union has deployed hundreds of powerful, new SS-20 missiles, armed with multiple warheads and capable of striking the cities and defense installations of our Allies in Europe, and of our friends and Allies in Asia as well. The Soviets have built up these forces even though there has been no comparable threat from NATO. They have deployed them without let-up -- there now are more than 350 SS-20 missiles, with more than 1,000 nuclear warheads. NATO will begin deploying a specific deterrent to this threat late this year, unless, as we hope, an agreement to eliminate such weapons would make this deployment unnecessary.

The United States, with the full support of our Allies, has been negotiating in Geneva for more than a year to persuade the Soviet Union that it is a far better course for both of us to agree to eliminate totally this entire category of weapons. Such an agreement would be fair and far-reaching. It would enhance the security of the Soviet Union as well as the security of NATO. And it would fulfill the aspiration of people throughout Europe and Asia for an end to the threat posed by these missiles.

So far, the Soviet Union has resisted this proposal and has failed to come up with any serious alternative. They insist on preserving their present monopoly of these weapons. Under their latest proposal, the Soviets would retain almost 500 warheads on their SS-20 missiles in Europe alone, and hundreds more in the Far East, while we would have zero. Their proposal would actually leave them with more SS-20 missiles than they had when the talks began in 1981. In addition, the Soviets have launched a propaganda campaign aimed apparently at dividing America from our Allies, and our Allies from each other.

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From the opening of these negotiations nearly 18 months ago, I have repeatedly urged the Soviets to respond to our zero-zero proposal with a proposal of their own. I have also repeated our willingness to consider any serious alternative proposal.

Their failure to make such a proposal is a source of deep disappointment to all of us who have wished that these weapons might be eliminated -- or at least significantly reduced. But I do not intend to let this shadow that has been cast over the Geneva negotiations further darken our search for peace.

When it comes to intermediate nuclear missiles in Europe, it would be better to have none than to have some. But, if there must be some, it is better to have few than to have many.

If the Soviets will not now agree to the total elimination of these weapons, I hope they will at least join us in an interim agreement that would substantially reduce these forces to equal levels on both sides.

To this end, Ambassador Paul Nitze has informed his Soviet counterpart that we are prepared to negotiate an interim agreement in which the United States would substantially reduce its planned deployment of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles provided the Soviet Union reduced the number of its warheads on longer-range I.N.F. missiles to an equal level on a global basis.

Ambassador Nitze has explained that the United States views this proposal as a serious initial step toward the total elimination of this class of weapons, and he has conveyed my hope that the Soviet Union will join us in this view. Our proposal for the entire elimination of these systems remains on the table.

We have suggested that the negotiations resume several weeks earlier than originally planned. The Soviets have agreed to that and talks will resume on May 17th.

I hope this initiative will lead to an early agreement. We remain ready to explore any serious Soviet suggestions that meet the fundamental concerns which we have expressed.

I invited the NATO Ambassadors here today not only to review these developments but to express my appreciation for the firm support which the Allies have given to our negotiating effort in Geneva. And I can assure them of my personal commitment to the closest possible consultations with them on I.N.F.

This consultation process has already proven one of the most intensive and productive in the history of the North Atlantic Alliance. It has made the initiative announced today an alliance initiative in the best sense of that term.

Over the past months, we and our Allies have consulted intensively on the I.N.F. negotiations. I have been in frequent and close contact with other heads of governments. Vice President Bush had very productive discussions with Allied leaders on I.N.F. during his trip to Europe. Secretaries Shultz and Weinberger have exchanged views with their counterparts from Allied governments. And the NATO special consultative group has met regularly to review the negotiations and consider criteria which should form the basis for the alliance position in I.N.F. The very thoughtful views expressed by the Allies in these consultations have been a significant help in shaping this new initiative.

This process is a model for how an alliance of free and democratic nations can and must work together on critical issues. It is the source of our unity, and gives us a strength that no one can hope to match. And it gives me great confidence in the eventual success of our efforts in Geneva to create a safer world for all the Earth's people.

For Wire Transmission and
Release at 10:00 a.m. EST,
Wednesday, March 30, 1983

REPORT BY THE CHAIRMAN
NATO SPECIAL CONSULTATIVE GROUP

The NATO Allies welcome and strongly support the new American INF negotiating initiative announced by the President today. It represents a significant step designed to move the INF negotiations toward conclusion of an equal, fair and verifiable arms control agreement.

On March 25, the Special Consultative Group met in Brussels to consider suggestions for a new Alliance initiative in the INF negotiations. This was the most recent of a series of SCG meetings over the past few months, in which progress in the negotiations has been reviewed, and possibilities for further movement has been explored. The new position is a product of this thorough review and of the continuing process of close consultations between the Allies.

At the March 25 meeting, the chairman noted that U.S. suggestions for progress had been developed in light of criteria agreed by the Allies during these consultations. He expressed appreciation for the continued strong support the Allies have given to the U.S. negotiating effort in Geneva.

Allies exchanged views on the desirability of proposing at Geneva, as a first step towards final agreement on total elimination of the entire category of U.S. and Soviet longer-range, land-based INF missiles, an intermediate agreement that would provide for a specified equal level of such forces. The U.S. is prepared to agree to an equal level of warheads substantially below the number planned for deployment in the 1979 NATO decision provided the Soviet Union would reduce its warheads on land-based LRINF missiles on launchers to the same level.

Allied representatives considered that such a proposal was consistent with the criteria developed in the 1979 decision and in subsequent consultations, and with the criteria cited by the President in his speech of February 22, 1983. They agreed that the United States should put forth this proposal, which has now been presented, in the Geneva negotiations in the near future.

The SCG reaffirmed that the President's proposal of November 18, 1981, for the complete elimination of the entire category of longer-range, land-based INF missiles remains the optimal solution, and expressed the hope that this outcome can be achieved.

Allied representatives expressed their satisfaction with the close Alliance consultations on INF, and noted the important and effective contribution which the SCG makes in this regard. This progress will continue. The next SCG meeting will be held in April.

They reaffirmed that in the absence of a concrete arms control agreement, deployments will proceed as scheduled in accordance with the 1979 decision. They expressed the firm view that it is now incumbent upon the Soviet Union to respond constructively to the new proposal and to join with the United States in an intensive effort to reach a militarily significant, equitable and verifiable agreement in Geneva at the earliest possible date.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Wire Transmission and
Release at 10:00 a.m. EST,
Wednesday, March 30, 1983

New Proposal for an Interim Arms Agreement

FACT SHEET

Today, the President announced that the United States has put forward in Geneva a new proposal for an interim agreement under which the United States would substantially reduce its planned deployment of Pershing II and Ground-launched Cruise Missiles provided the Soviet Union reduced the number of its weapons on longer-range INF missiles to an equal level on a global basis. The United States views this proposal as a serious initial step toward the total elimination of this class of weapons, and hopes that the Soviet Union will join us in this view.

In December 1979, the NATO countries agreed on a two-track approach to Intermediate-range Nuclear Force (INF) issues. In response to the increasing Soviet INF threat, especially the deployment of new Soviet SS-20 missiles, the Allies agreed to deploy 108 Pershing II ballistic missiles and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) in Europe. At the same time, the Allies also called for arms control efforts to limit these and comparable Soviet INF missile systems.

On November 18, 1981, following Alliance consultations, President Reagan made a far-reaching proposal as the basis for the US position at the INF negotiations which began on November 30, 1981. This proposal called for the total elimination of the entire class of US and Soviet land-based, longer-range INF missiles, in other words zero missiles of this type on either side. The United States continues to believe that this would be the best and most moral outcome to the negotiations. Security would be enhanced for both East and West.

Unfortunately, the Soviet approach to the negotiations has been very different. They have so far been adamant in their refusal to give serious consideration to our "zero-zero" proposal, or to come up with any acceptable alternative. The Soviet position in the negotiations would preserve their present monopoly of these weapons. Under their latest proposal, the Soviets would retain 486 warheads on 162 SS-20s retained in Europe alone, while the US would have zero missiles. Hundreds of warheads on Soviet SS-20s in the Far East would be completely unconstrained.

The NATO assessment of the current Soviet position in Geneva is reflected in the NATO Defense Ministers' communique issued on March 23 following their most recent meeting in Portugal:

"The Soviet proposals have not substantially changed since the beginning of the negotiations. In fact, their most recent proposal would leave the Soviet Union with more SS-20 missiles than they had when the negotiations began, deny NATO the right to modernize its means of deterring this threat, allow them to have an unlimited number of mobile SS-20s east of the Urals which still pose a threat to NATO Europe and almost totally eliminate from the European continent United States aircraft which are indispensable to NATO's conventional defences. The result would be to preserve the Soviet monopoly in the field of land-based LRINF missiles, to erode seriously the linkage between the United States' strategic deterrent and the defence of NATO Europe and to further the Soviet long-term aim of dividing the Alliance."

The new U.S. proposal was made after extensive consultations with our NATO Allies and discussions with other friends including Japan. It was offered on March 29, at the concluding session of the negotiating round. In presenting this proposal, the U.S. asked the Soviet Union to give it careful consideration during the recess between rounds and suggested that the delegations resume negotiations several week earlier than previously envisaged. The Soviets have agreed to resumption on May 17.

The new U.S. proposal meets the criteria for an agreement laid down by the President:

- equality of rights and limits between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.
- no compensation for third country forces;
- global ceilings;
- no adverse impact on NATO's conventional defense capability; and
- effective measures for verification.

In continued discussions of this proposal, the United States will continue to be as flexible as possible in searching for agreement at Geneva within the criteria identified above.

The United States views the new proposal as an interim step toward the total elimination of US and Soviet land-based, longer-range INF missile systems. If an interim agreement is reached, the United States considers that negotiations should continue with the goal of achieving the total elimination of such systems. While offering this new initiative, the current U.S. proposal to eliminate the entire class of land-based, longer-range INF missiles remains on the table in Geneva. The United States remains convinced that zero missiles on both sides would be the best outcome on these negotiations.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

FOR RELEASE AT 4:00 pm EST

MARCH 31, 1983

PRESS BRIEFING
BY
GEORGE P. SHULTZ,
SECRETARY OF STATE
ON ARMS CONTROL

March 31, 1983

The Roosevelt Room
The White House

10:00 A.M. EST

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I thought I would make a few opening comments and then we can just have the questions we wish. I have been trying to think to myself what is this really all about. And obviously it is about reductions in nuclear arms, particularly a particular class of armaments in Europe that are highly destabilizing and therefore especially dangerous. And clearly we have been in the position, the President has, of wanting to see that whole class of weapons eliminated globally. We continue to think that is the best solution.

We recognize that this is a negotiation and the Soviet Union has rejected that. And so the President has made another proposal. The new proposal you will have so I won't repeat it other than to say that it is a further effort to negotiate something that still aspires, although it isn't a condition, to get to elimination of these weapons but is willing to take as an interim step some finite number somewhere between zero and 572 warheads on both sides, and according to specified criteria that has been set out.

So partly this is about that. But I think that in the full perspective of things we tend to mislead ourselves if we concentrate overly on the weapons aspect of this problem. And it is a fact that we have had an extensive, rich consultative process with our allies on the, on the original 1979 Dual Track Decision, in the first place, then on the elimination option, in the second place, and now on the President's most recent proposal.

And we have had really sort of an alliance view throughout. It is very unified and strong and determined. So I think that raises a question of how is it possible to get so many countries that are geographically spread around and who have varying interests on many things to be so unified on something of this kind. And I think you have to come back to the values that these countries share in a determination to be able to defend those values against a very clear threat to them.

And it is really that that underlies the unity that we have and the fact that we are undertaking both to confront the Soviet Union with the strength implied by the First Track and the Dual Track Decision, but at the same time hold out to everyone the prospect of a reduction, or in our basic proposal, elimination of these very destabilizing weapons.

So the perspective that I want to lend is the strength of the alliance and the reason for that, namely our jointly held values as really the underlying source of strength. And I don't say that in any way to neglect the importance of the particulars of the arms reduction negotiation and the weapons systems and all that.

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SECRETARY SHULTZ: So, do you have any questions before I leave?

Q: Sir? From Moscow recently we have heard from Andropov and we have had some journalists reporting on the temper of the talk over there. And the general feeling seems to be that the Russians have had it up to here, if you will, with dealing with the Reagan Administration. Is that, do you find that is their reading?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: There have been some very sharp statements made, and I think it is fair to characterize the U.S.-Soviet relationship as, as not a particularly good one right now. It is tense. At the same time, I think it is important to point out that we have discussions going on with the Soviet Union in two fora in Geneva that include both the INF and the START talks also kind of adjoining each one of those talks about confidence-building measures.

There is a continuing discussion in Vienna and NBFR talks. We are engaged with them across a range of Helsinki Final Act and disarmament issues in Madrid. And we have quite a number of other settings in which there are from time to time meetings, for example, meetings that I have with Dobrynin, Ambassador Dobrynin.

So there is dialogue. And it is our feeling that the important element here is to see and to probe and to find out whether there are areas of importance where substantive agreements can be made. That is, tone reflects substance, not the other way around. And there are a great many substantive matters where we are in deep disagreement with the Soviet Union, and that is the essence of it.

So we need to work at the substance. And if it turns out that the substance can be improved, then I think the tone of the relationship will improve.

Q: Mr. Secretary, there is some very sharp differences in statements with the President made over a period of some weeks, very, very harsh denunciation of the Soviet Union and what everyone seems to feel is a very constructive proposal at this time. Why is there such a great variance between the President's rhetoric on some of these very, these occasions when he speaks so sharply and so strongly of the Soviet Union, the focus of all evil, and then made movement toward this kind of substantive thing? Because the first statements almost indicate that it wouldn't matter what negotiation we had, we wouldn't trust them to carry it out. And it would be almost impossible to negotiate.

Is there a plan here? Is it by accident? Why are these, these enormous differences in tone?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think that if we didn't feel that there was a reasonable possibility of arriving at significant agreements in these discussions we wouldn't be having them. So the fact that they are going on, at least from our standpoint, shows that we think there is a chance that things can improve and that the improvement can be genuine in the sense that it can be built on substance.

Now, the range of issues that one can discuss is quite broad. And, of course, on many of them, particularly when you are talking about something like arms control, I think that it is not so much a matter of trust as it is verifiability, that you are going to aspire to an agreement that is inherently capable of being carried out because you can know on both sides, they as well as ourselves, that it actually is being carried out.

MORE

So the key here is the subject of verifiability.

Q: Do you get any indication from the Soviets at all of a shift in their position on verifiability? Are they moving toward a more acceptable position as far as we are concerned? Is there any shift in that whole area?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, our negotiations are ongoing in various areas, and I think that the notion that an agreement ought to be verifiable is an accepted notion. The question of what it takes to satisfy yourself on that is where all of the argument comes.

MORE

For example, the President feels that the Threshold Test Ban Treaty is capable of considerable improvements in the area of verifiability, and the Soviets feel -- have told us that they do not agree with that. The Soviets have a difference of opinion there. It is not over whether verifiability is a proper concept -- it is over the implementation of the concept.

Q Sir, given that you have said that the tone for that meeting reflects substantive disagreements between us and the Soviet Union, wherein lies the possibility for an improvement or a chance of an agreement on improvement of the relationship? Why do you think there might be such a thing and do you think there is any prospect of a summit meeting before the end of the first term in this administration?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think you have to review all of the issues and then apprise them one by one and see what the prospects might be piece by piece, so if you say "any agreement" that can cover a broad range. The focus of attention right now is on the major arms reduction negotiations and particularly today the INF negotiations. But there are a lot of other things.

The President has said, and as far as I can read it Mr. Andropov has also said that in principle they are prepared to have a summit meeting but only on the basis of the prospect that something really significant could be achieved in the meeting. So the idea of a simple get-acquainted meeting doesn't seem to be in the cards.

Q Mr. Secretary, you have expressed the wonder -- the pleasurable wonder that at the --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No, I didn't express any wonderment. I insist that it is remarkable and that it is important and then I tried to give -- I tried not to have wonderment but rather to give you an answer, namely our shared values.

Q Isn't it true though, sir, that President Reagan would have stayed on his original zero-zero option had it not been for pressure from our allies in Europe?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The President has said -- and this has been an Alliance proposition all along as I understand it. I am relatively new to it but the 1979 decision -- the original proposal -- has been an Alliance proposition all along and it has been discussed continuously about what position we should take and what our negotiating strategy should be, and so on. And there have been lots of discussions within the U.S. government as well as within the European governments and among us. And I think it was a shared view that the timing is right now to make this change in our position. So I don't think it is a question of pressure this way or that way. It is a question of a continuous process of consultation and I think there emerged a very broad consensus in our government and in the governments abroad that this was the time to make a change, as the President has done.

Q You didn't find, sir, a reluctance in the Pentagon to make this change?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No. We had lots of discussions of this over quite a -- practically ever since I got here -- I was reminded this morning nine months ago. Somebody implied that it ought to be time for me to produce something. (Laughter.)

Q Mr. Secretary, isn't there perhaps a considerable danger that offering the interim proposal at this point shortly after the hurdle of the West German elections will suggest or be interpreted

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as meaning that the administration was not terribly intent on zero-zero option to begin with, that once the political hurdle had been cleared we throw out a more specific bargaining position and that this might tend to undercut the substance of zero-zero?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I don't think there is really any legitimate question about what the President feels and for that matter what our allies feel is the best outcome. It is the elimination of these weapons. We think so, we continue to think so, and I think that that position has a kind of broad appeal to mankind in a sense. It is supported by the Japanese. The Chinese think that it is the right proposal, and so on. There is a world-wide acceptance of that. I think there is also a recognition of the reality that we are trying to bring about arms reduction and that in the process of conducting this negotiation we need to try out other options, and so we have.

I think it is worth pointing out that the way the President has constructed this proposal, he did not substitute some number for zero. He rather said in effect that there are a variety of numbers that are conceivable and we are saying to the Soviet Union that we are willing to seek an interim number. And if they would accept this concept maybe there are some numbers that they think are better than other numbers. Obviously you cannot just pick any number for a whole bunch of reasons. But I think it is an effort to put this forward in a manner that is -- maximizes the potential for negotiation and for some reality of the prospect of getting some place as much as -- We cannot do it, of course. It takes two sides to make an agreement.

Q Does this put the onus on the Soviet Union now to come up with a number -- an acceptable number -- and is it, in terms of the public relations battle of this, is the ball now to be perceived in the Soviet court?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think that the ball has always been in the Soviet court because we have tabled a complete and very good proposal in what has been called the zero option, and I guess you could say that they have made a response but the response is so far out of the ball park that I don't think anyone really took it that seriously. But at any rate, certainly this is another effort to put forward something as they have said very clearly that they do not accept the idea that they will have none of these weapons.

So this is another way of trying to get at it consistent with the principles that have been implicit in the President's position and the Alliance position all along and has been enunciated most recently in his American Legion speech and again by Paul Nitze in Geneva.

Q You are asking in effect -- you are saying to the Soviets in effect, what number will you take? Is that the way that you read it?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: It leaves it open to the negotiators to say, well, you think this number, we might think that number, but if we can get the thing into that ballpark then it seems to me that that is a big advance. I don't know whether the Soviets will respond that way, but at any rate I think that our position is a good one. It has a good ultimate objective and it is a negotiating position and it has strong Alliance support.

Q Mr. Secretary, we are truly trying to maximize the prospects of coming up with an agreement. Isn't there -- will there be some way to take account of the fact that the British and the French are modernizing their strategic nuclear forces in a significant way and either in this negotiation or in START might we accommodate that fact somehow? Because it doesn't seem to me from the Soviet perspective a priori crazy to insist that these forces be factored in this tabulation of forces.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: You used -- I will just focus on the current -- the negotiations we are talking about. You used a good word, "strategic," and these are intermediate-range missiles that we are talking about. We are talking about land-based missiles, and we are talking about the U.S. and the Soviet Union. I don't think that it is reasonable to consider -- we should not consider a proposition broadly that equality consists of adding up the armed forces of every country in the world and then saying that the Soviet Union has to have the same as everybody else combined. I think this problem that we have has to be put in terms of the U.S. and the Soviet Union and equality and capacity to deter on our part based on that notion. As you know, the overwhelming number of UK and French systems are submarine-based so that they are not land-based systems -- I believe only a very small number of the French systems are land-based. So strategic land-based -- those are national systems. They are not NATO systems. So I don't think that they should be counted, let alone taken into account in this negotiation.

I need to extract myself here and let you get --

Q I wondered if the United States would feel that the number of SS-4 and SS-5 missiles that the Soviet Union has, if they eliminated those would this be a realistic approach to the thing? Because the Soviets have never given an indication in their history of eliminating a new weapons system.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: You must be kidding.

Q Well, no I am not.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: You must be kidding.

Q The Soviet Union has never eliminated an operating weapons system. They have only gotten rid of the old obsolete systems, and they haven't given any indication in these negotiations, I am sure, that they wish to dismantle any of the SS-20's.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, we cannot appraise proposals according to what the Soviet Union would like. We have to appraise proposals according to what would be sensible and reasonable from the standpoint of our allies and which one would think would be reasonable for them. If they feel, as it has been said so often, that they are threatened, then why isn't it reasonable to say let's just eliminate all of these weapons and then they don't threaten anybody.

Q I wasn't talking about what was reasonable --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think that there are all sorts of responses to these things, but to think that we could accept -- the number of SS-20 warheads now deployed, I think, well exceeds 1,000 and not have anything to confront that and to be used as a component of our deterrence would be absolutely ridiculous.

I will leave you in the hands of my better peers.

END

10:30 A.M. EST

Office of the Press Secretary
(Los Angeles, California)

For Release at 12:50 pm PST
Thursday, March 31, 1983

Remarks by the President to the
Los Angeles World Affairs Council

FACT SHEET

Today, the President made a major public statement on arms control before the World Affairs Council meeting in Los Angeles. The main element was an outline of the new U.S. proposal in the negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear missiles. He also briefly reviewed the U.S. approach to the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks and other arms control negotiations, and reiterated his opposition to a freeze.

In a short address on Wednesday, the President announced that the United States has put forward in Geneva a new proposal for an interim agreement under which the United States would substantially reduce its planned deployment of Pershing II and Ground-launched Cruise Missiles provided the Soviet Union reduced the number of its weapons on longer-range INF missiles to an equal level on a global basis. The U.S. has previously proposed the total elimination of all such missiles, or zero, on both sides. In Wednesday's statement, made before a gathering of the Ambassadors of the various NATO nations in the East Room of the White House, the President stated that the United States proposal to eliminate this entire class of weapons remains the optimal outcome for the INF negotiations, and that the zero-zero proposal remains on the table in Geneva. Further, he indicated that the U.S. views this new proposal as a serious initial step toward the total elimination of this class of weapons, and hopes that the Soviet Union will join us in this view. In today's remarks, he provided the broad arms control context within which the INF proposal was made.

To provide this context, the President reviewed the record of U.S. arms control initiatives since the Baruch Plan, and including this Administration's broad agenda of major arms control efforts.

- In the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START) in Geneva, we have proposed a 50 percent cut in ballistic missiles and a one-third cut in their warheads.
- In the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force (INF) negotiations, we have made the far-reaching proposals described above.
- In the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) negotiations in Vienna, we and our Allies are seeking reduced and equal ceilings on NATO and Warsaw Pact military forces.
- At the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, Vice President Bush on behalf of the U.S. Government recently proposed negotiations on a total and verifiable ban on chemical weapons, weapons which, together with toxins are being used by Soviet forces and their allies in Afghanistan, Laos and Kampuchea.
- We and our Allies have proposed a Conference on Disarmament in Europe.
- We are working with our Allies to assure comprehensive international safeguards that would prevent nuclear proliferation.

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-- We have proposed to the Soviet Union that we improve the verification provisions of two agreements limiting nuclear testing.

-- We have proposed a series of confidence-building measures to reduce the risks of conflict from miscalculation or accident and are consulting with distinguished senators (including Senators Nunn, Jackson and Warner) on additional measures.

While we have pursued these and other initiatives in good faith, there have been many disappointments in the past. Soviet military arsenals have continued to grow far beyond defensive needs, and the Soviets continue to resist pursuing these and substantial reductions and effective verification measures. At the same time, the President cautioned that there are increasingly serious grounds for questioning the Soviet Union's compliance with the arms control agreements that they have already signed, and said that he might address this issue further in the near future. In our efforts to achieve genuine arms control, he said we seek reductions to equal and balanced levels, which promote stability and which are effectively verifiable.

The President made clear the Administration's opposition to a freeze, which would preserve today's high and unequal levels of nuclear forces; and eliminate Soviet incentives to negotiate for real reductions. It would pull the rug out from under our negotiators in Geneva. Contrary to the perception that a freeze would be easy to agree on, the President pointed out that reaching agreement on what would be frozen and how it would be verified would raise enormously complex problems. In addition, many U.S. nuclear systems have been in use for many years and are now obsolete and badly in need of modernization.

The President stressed that we would continue close consultations with our Allies, and pledged to pursue the goal of strengthening the peace and reducing armaments with all his energy and determination.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington DC 20520

Walt Raymond
Evan Kraemer

For tomorrow's (4/5)
2:00 meeting of

April 1, 1983

The Dailey group -
Rm 6226, State -
Jennings

CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

TO: NSC - Dennis Blair
FROM: P - David Lowenfeld
SUBJECT: Outline

Attached outline summarizes our discussion
of this morning.

Please let us know if you have any additions
or deletions. Gerry would like the Dailey Group
to meet to discuss this outline before Steve's
group takes a crack at it for your strategy paper.

cc: EUR/P - Steve Steiner

- Ask about
buildup chart
- Peace movement
waning?

CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

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CONFIDENTIAL

I. Where do we stand?

- A. Public and Official Responses to President's Latest Proposal**
- B. Is the Support Sustainable?**
- C. The Specific West European Hurdles and Barriers to be Overcome**
- D. Domestic Issues/Interest**

II. Possible Soviet Moves

- A. Substantive Policy Shift**
- B. Rhetoric (Draw upon Jatrass paper)**

III. How do we re-inforce our message

- A. Revising our Materials and Themes**
- B. Senior Spokesmen**
- C. USIA Programs**
- D. White Paper**
- E. Working with European Governments (country-by-country look)**
- F. Working with Private European Groups**

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

Dept. of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

BY LN NARA, DATE 8/16/12

April 1, 1983

Revised Press Guidance

SENATORS' LETTER ON TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Q: Do you have any comment on the letter to the President from the fifteen Senators concerning the reduction of American tactical nuclear weapons in Europe?

A:--The Department appreciates the concerns expressed in the letter. Without commenting on its points in detail, I would note that in the March 23 communique of NATO's Nuclear Planning Group, allied defense ministers stated that in present circumstances, both short- and intermediate-range nuclear forces continue to play their necessary role in maintaining an unbroken spectrum of deterrence. They also reaffirmed NATO's longstanding policy that the overall size of its nuclear forces should be at the lowest level consistent with the Alliance's agreed deterrence strategy.

-- The composition of the NATO nuclear stockpile is under constant review by the Alliance. NATO's High Level Group is in fact currently conducting a detailed study which addresses this question among others.

--While we do not comment on the specific makeup of the stockpile, I would like to emphasize, as does the letter, that, as the result of the 1979 NATO decision on INF modernization and arms control, we have already withdrawn 1,000 warheads from Europe.

--The 1979 NATO decision stipulated that the INF deployment would be effected on the basis of a one-for-one replacement of existing warheads. Therefore, there will be no increase in the size of the stockpile.

EUR/RPM:MLekson:0205B:4/1/83

Clearances:NSC:RLinhart

OSD:CThudium

JCS:TGiles

ACDA:HGrady

PM:PSweirs

EUR:JDobbins

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BACKGROUND BRIEFING ON GROMYKO PRESS CONFERENCE
SATURDAY, APRIL 2, 1983, 11:07 A.M.

MODERATOR: Good morning. The statement is ON THE RECORD. It is a Department of State statement that you have. I hope you've had time to read it; it was put out here a few minutes ago.

Briefing material is attributable to senior officials.

Obviously, you have seen what is here in terms of the statement. I think these officials may want to talk about it a little bit. And, in fact, why don't I, instead of going on, say that that statement is ON THE RECORD from the Department. The President, of course, has also spoken ON THE RECORD previously; and I think the speakers have an opening remark and then we'll take questions.

Q Before we begin, I don't usually make a point of this sort of thing, but I wonder (inaudible) should not be ON THE RECORD.

MODERATOR: As I say, the statement is an official statement. It is ON THE RECORD. The President's statement is ON THE RECORD. And this is going to be ON BACKGROUND. But I take your point.

Q The statement is anonymous, by the way.

MODERATOR: This statement is an official statement issued by the Department of State. You're going to waste your own time in terms of some people having deadlines in Europe they've got to make.

Q But it's a matter of some importance. If the Soviet Foreign Minister is ON THE RECORD, there's no reason why these officials who go on television, make speeches around the country, can't be ON THE RECORD answering these questions. There's no sensitivity involved in this.

MODERATOR: I take your point. The briefing will be ON BACKGROUND.

Q Can we attach your name to the statement?

MODERATOR: It's a Department of State statement, issued by the Department.

Q No -- did the Secretary participate in its composition?

MODERATOR: This is a Department of State statement. We do that frequently.

Q I know, but when you speak for the Department of State you still have a name. You are Alan Romberg Spokesman for the State Department.

MODERATOR: Do you want to say that I made available to you an official statement? Is that all right with you?

Q It would make a difference to us if Secretary Shultz prepared the statement --

MODERATOR: All right.

Q -- or if the 12th Assistant Deputy Assistant Secretary to the Deputy Assistant who prepared it.

MODERATOR: No. This is an official statement. If you want to say that I issued the statement on behalf of the Department, you can do that. I'm not going to go into the drafting process.

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL. The answer to your question is yes. The Secretary of State is aware of the statement and he, of course, did participate. All right?

Q Thank you. I appreciate it.

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: I just have a few brief remarks to make and then (the other officials) will be happy to answer your questions.

The statement does speak for itself, so I'm not going to try to summarize it. I will point out to you though that it addresses both the specific points that the Soviet Foreign Minister raised about the INF negotiations and our position in those negotiations as well as make some broader points about U.S.-Soviet relations.

I wanted to just make a few specific points about the Foreign Minister's statements concerning the INF negotiations.

The Soviet Foreign Minister had three principal arguments about the interim proposal.

The first was the familiar concern about the British and French forces.

The second was the absence of aircraft limitations in the interim proposal.

And the third concerned the Soviet position on forces deployed in the Asian portions of the Soviet Union.

In each one of these three objections, we believe we have a strong case for the approach we have chosen, and I thought I might make that case.

First of all, on the question of aircraft, the Soviet Union has wanted to include aircraft in overall reductions. We have never ruled out altogether INF agreements limiting aircraft. In fact, we have called our negotiating approach a phased approach. We have wanted to concentrate in the first stage of these negotiations on the most destabilizing weapon systems and where the greatest disparity in forces exist -- which is, clearly, the land-based long-range intermediate forces where the Soviet Union, as the statement makes clear, has some 1300 warheads and the United States has zero.

However, if you look at the overall balance in nuclear-capable aircraft, you arrive at some very interesting conclusions; and that is that the Soviet Union has a substantial advantage, together with its allies, in nuclear-capable aircraft able to deliver nuclear weapons against targets in Europe in contrast to the United States and all of its allies.

Last year NATO examined this problem and put together what it called a force-comparison study, which showed that the Soviet Union, together with its allies, had some 2500 nuclear-capable aircraft that could be used today against targets in Europe, while the equivalent figure for the NATO Alliance was some 450 aircraft.*

So it is difficult to take the Soviet charge seriously on aircraft because of the substantial advantage they enjoy. Nearly ~~five~~⁸⁰⁰ -- or more than ~~five~~³ -- to-one advantage is in this category of systems. ³

* NOTE: The correct figure for NATO Alliance nuclear-capable aircraft is 800. The 450 figure refers to U.S. only nuclear-capable aircraft.

Secondly, in the British and French forces area, we have said all along that these forces, which are almost entirely sea-based ballistic-missile forces, do not have the same role or function as the U.S. and Soviet forces. It should not be included in these negotiations. However, again, looking at the numbers, it's important to make a point -- which is if you take existing levels of Soviet submarine-launched ballistic missiles, which are some 950 submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and you look at existing levels of U.S. submarine-launched ballistic missiles -- which I think are, roughly, 550 -- and you add the British and French submarine missiles -- what, 144? -- most of those are 162 --

SECOND SENIOR OFFICIAL: 162.

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: -- to minus 18, you find that the Soviet Union still has a substantial advantage over the United States, Britain and France in the category of submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

Of course, submarine-launched ballistic missiles -- the ones that are deployed by the United States and the Soviet Union -- are limited in the strategic arms category and are under discussion right now in the START negotiation.

Finally, on the Asian systems, the Soviet Union, of course, would like us to ignore the substantial SS-20 forces they deploy in Asia. There are a couple of points worth making here.

First, a good fraction of those Asian forces can reach targets in Europe where they are now deployed because of the range of the SS-20s.

Secondly, those forces, because the SS-20 is a mobile and transportable missile, can easily be moved from East to West. In fact, a number of the Soviet SS-20 bases have been constructed in areas close to rail links and other transportation centers and our studies indicate these these missiles can be moved very quickly from one portion of the Soviet Union to another. So we obviously have to take into account these forces.

And, finally, we have to take into account the threat that these systems pose to our Asian friends and allies. We simply cannot ignore those threats. And this is why we have been willing to limit worldwide our deployment of intermediate-range nuclear forces. [While our existing plans call for only deploying these systems in Europe] we

would be willing to reduce and eliminate altogether these forces anywhere in the world; and all we are asking the Soviet Union to do is take the same step.

And I think all three of us would be happy to answer these questions, but I think we need to get to the guts of the Gromyko argument; and when we get to the guts of that argument, we find that it doesn't stand up -- that there is no reason why the Soviet Union should not either agree on our bold version of arms control eliminating these systems -- and if they're unwilling, as they have been, then agree to take a step in that direction to agree to equal levels of U.S. and Soviet warheads.

Q Despite the substantial disagreement, can you take an overall view of this agreement? Is there a basis for negotiations now? In other words, as important as the details may be to you, aren't you arguing details with the Soviets now and isn't the net result that you've made mutual progress toward arms control -- or is that not so?

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: I think that when you call these "details," they are --

Q Important.

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL -- they are important details. Nevertheless, I think there is, and the President has come forward, with a proposal that does provide a basis for progress and negotiation in Geneva.

Q And Gromyko didn't kill it today?

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: I think, as we point out in the statement, we found it somewhat restrained.

Q Isn't it true that the last time that Gromyko responded directly to an American proposal was in March of '77?

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: I'm not too sure if that is true. I know I have asked some of our Soviet historians. That was a famous presentation he made. But he gives press conferences and responds to disarmament and other issues every year in New York --

Q I know in New York.

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: -- at the General Assembly.

Q But in terms of a U.S. proposal and and an immediate direct response by Gromyko, isn't this comparable to 1977?

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: I think it is comparable. Whether this is the first time since '77 he's done that, I just can't say.

Q (Inaudible) your statement said that Gromyko has rejected this proposal as well. I mean, is it assumed here that it is rejected or not rejected?

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: The statement says it was rejected. What I said in my statement is that the President's proposal does provide the basis for a negotiation.

Q Well, "rejected" is a special word in diplomatic language. I mean he may have rebuffed it. "Rejected" is really to say no way. Do you take that as saying no way?

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: Again, I think the statement speaks for itself.

Q The statement uses the word "unacceptable" at several key points.

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: I think Mr. Gromyko used the word "unacceptable."

Q Yes, that's what I mean.

Q What we are trying to find out is are we still engaged in a process of negotiation with the Soviets based on the proposal that the President has made most recently or are we checking that out somehow?

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: The negotiation -- let me just -- Paul Nitze, at the end of the last round, laid out the ideas that the President publicly discussed. We are not now in formal negotiations with the Soviets. That formal negotiation will resume on May 17. What we are saying is that we think this proposal provides the basis for negotiation and we hope that the Soviet Union does as well. And we hope that when we return to the negotiating table on May 17 some progress will result on the basis of the President's proposal. And in the statement, I think, as you can see, we call on the Soviet Union to seriously examine this proposal and not to reject it out of hand.

Q Thank you.

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THIRD SENIOR OFFICIAL: I'll just add there's a history here of things being rejected at one moment and ultimately accepted. The Soviets rejected the concept of negotiation about these forces until the December 1979 decision, after which they agreed to negotiate. What they regard as unacceptable today they may not regard as unacceptable tomorrow and they have every reason to be concerned about conveying the impression, which Gromyko's remarks have begun to do, that they are unwilling to enter into any agreement that would be based on equality of the relevant forces, which are the warheads on long-range missiles.

Q Directly after the President's speech, you gentlemen held a briefing at the White House, at which it was said that there might be another American proposal of specific numbers if indeed the Soviets turn this one down.

I presume that we are not in a position now where the United States is preparing that and the initial position has been rejected, killed -- or whatever word you want. There's still some life in it, right?

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: We certainly do believe there's life in it, and this is why we have called on the Soviets to examine this carefully; and we're not going to negotiate in public. We want to hear what the Soviets have to say when we return to Geneva to the negotiating table.

Q Isn't this about what you expected?

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: I don't want to comment because I think there was more than simply this possibility. I think my own view is the Soviets could have come out with a much stronger and tougher line than they did, but that's my own personal view.

Q In one of the briefings this week it was said that the Soviets were asked not to reject the proposal out of hand and to think about it seriously and come back to the table. Had you specifically wanted them not to issue this kind of statement?

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: No, I wouldn't say that. I think that we expected some type of statement from them.

Q Could you address Gromyko's allegation that Japan and the waters surrounding Japan are stuffed full of nuclear weapons and the Island of Okinawa is an enormous nuclear weapons base. South Korea is a complex of nuclear-weapons bases, the Indian Ocean -- blah, blah, blah -- Diego Garcia stuffed full of nuclear weapons, the Persian Gulf stuffed full of nuclear weapons?

2
FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: I think those allegations are somewhat ridiculous. It is very clear -- and my colleagues may want to comment on this -- it is very clear that over the last ten years the Soviet Union has engaged in a massive military buildup in the Far East and they have deployed nuclear-capable aircraft to the area. They have deployed their SS-20 missiles -- which can reach targets in Japan, South Korea and elsewhere in Asia -- and we have not engaged in any kind of major military buildup in Asia. Our desire there has been to maintain and preserve the balance.

Q But could you take it step by step?

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: No. I'm not going to comment on the whole question. We never do on the question of nuclear-weapons deployment. You know that.

THIRD SENIOR OFFICIAL: What he seems to be referring to is the fact that we have nuclear-aircraft carriers that move throughout the oceans of the world. They sometimes have on board small numbers of nuclear weapons, and I suppose he counts them every time they move from one ocean to another.

The fact is in the Pacific the Soviets have an overwhelming advantage in nuclear weapons and have had for some time, and that is an advantage that has been increasing. We have deployed no new weapons in the Pacific.

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: If you're going to compare forces -- I mean what he's talking about are basically tactical aircraft that are deployed on aircraft carriers [or in Japan] or with U.S. air force units in Korea, which are of course in no way comparable to missiles, strategic weapons with thousands-of-miles range that can strike and destroy whole cities.

Q So what you're rejecting then is the word "base," when he says there are bases -- "base" meaning --

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: No. We're just saying they're not comparable. You're talking about some tactical aircraft that have the ability to deliver nuclear weapons and you're trying to compare them with awesome strategic-capability systems like the SS-20s.

Q Their major growth has been just in the SS-20s --

FIRST OFFICIAL: No.

THIRD SENIOR OFFICIAL: As my colleague said, it's been across the board. But I did want to underline that when you talk about what we are focusing on in INF -- which are these intermediate long-range missiles of the SS-20 type -- they have deployed 324 warheads or 108 systems to Asia already, and there may be more on the way. We don't have any comparable system in Asia at all. So for them to raise this issue is really almost incomprehensible.

I think they are referring, as my colleague said, to a few ships. they have lots of ships of their own that we believe carry nuclear weapons.

Q On that figure, you know, I've seen 90 to a hundred. You're saying 108 now.

SECOND SENIOR OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q What is the current rate of new SS-20s -- about one a week? about one a month of them going to Asia? 351 was the last one. Where are we today?

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: Roughly, we will stay and have stayed with this rough estimate that they deploy one new SS-20 a week; and they allocate, I think, one out of three or one out of four SS-20s to Asia.

Q So they're building up the Asian forces as well as the European forces?

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: Yes, they are.

Q O.K.

SECOND SENIOR OFFICIAL: Clearly, but it's a little misleading to say one a week or whatever. They came at different times. That kind of figure is more from looking at the overall number and saying it would be an average of one a week.

Q All right.

SECOND SENIOR OFFICIAL: We have seen recent deployments in Asia, and it continues to build up in Asia. There's a lot of emphasis on Asia.

Q You are also concerned about mobility. Is there any evidence that SS-20s are shifted at all from either side of the ~~ocean~~ urals?

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: They don't need to shift them now, because they have deployments in the eastern and western parts of the Soviet Union --

Q Yes, I know.

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: -- but what there is evidence of, in exercises and the way they produce the weapons and they transport them, is that it's an easily transportable system and they have the capability to transport it over a great distance.

Q A small point on the SS-20s in Asia. I'm curious that many of those can reach targets in Alaska, since he flatly says that none of them can reach American targets.

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: O.K. Let me give you my best estimate, and again our expert -- maybe my colleague -- may want to comment on this specifically.

And, again, his point about mobility or your point about mobility -- they are mobile. They can shift them very quickly. If they did ship them, without question, they could; where they are deployed right now, it depends on which range estimate you buy, and there's been a difference of a small number of about 500 kilometers in terms of estimating in various range estimates.

If you take one estimate of it, they can, clearly. If you take another estimate, they can, barely. But, you know, this is a very small part of Alaska right now in the current deployments.

-- MORE --

Q What are the parameters? What are the range parameters you are talking about?

SECOND SENIOR OFFICIAL: Let's see -- I don't think these are classified numbers: 4,400 to 5,000 kilometers in range -- much longer, by the way, than the Pershing II or the GLCM that we're talking about; and those ranges are 1800 kilometers and 2400 kilometers. Theirs is almost double the range.

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: One thing you should bear in mind with the SS-20 is that while we worry about the threat that it poses to our allies in Europe, where it is deployed it has the capacity to cover the entire Middle East, large portions of northern Africa, the Indian sub-continent, and all of China.

THIRD SENIOR OFFICIAL: And the United States.

Q What is the rate of dismantlement of the 4s and 5s -- are the Russians doing much along those lines? And secondly, what about the Chinese missiles? The Soviets have raised this as an argument, that the Chinese have IRBM-type missiles. How do you answer that, that they would need some in Asia to counter Chinese weapons?

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: I can answer that; my colleague might want to do the -4s and -5s dismantlement.

The Soviet Union has substantial nuclear capabilities to use against countries in Asia, including China, without the deployment of the SS-20s, and no one would try to suggest that there is anything approaching a regional nuclear balance between the Soviet Union and China. But we make the point in the statement that we cannot accept the principle that we have to enter into arms control agreements with the Soviet Union that provide an outcome that gives the Soviet Union equality with all of its potential adversaries combined, because what that means is that the United States enters an agreement in which it accepts inferiority with the Soviet Union.

I think the President has been very clear -- and the Alliance has been very clear -- that the only basis that we're prepared to negotiate with the Soviet Union is on the basis of equality.

SECOND SENIOR OFFICIAL: Do you want me to just add, on the -4s and -5s, those numbers do change. Right now they are in the 240-250 range, closer probably to 240. They have decreased a little bit as these SS-20s have built up in large measure.

With regard to China, they have a very small, strategic missile program; the Soviets have a huge one.

Q They have decreased from what, over how long a period? It's just never been made clear.

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: I think their figure was, roughly, 600 four, or maybe 5 years ago, so they are gradually reducing that force. They have said that they were retiring that force, come what may. We should not view this as any kind of concession. After all, we're talking about missiles that are well over 20 years old.

THIRD SENIOR OFFICIAL: It's worth putting a couple of these numbers into perspective. Since the late 1960s, the United States has been reducing the number of its deployed nuclear weapons to the point where we now have deployed today the lowest number of nuclear weapons we've had deployed at any time in the last twenty years, and some 8,000 fewer nuclear weapons than we had in the mid-to-late 1960s.

By contrast, the Soviet Union has been steadily adding nuclear weapons over the whole of this period. If you look just at Europe, the United States, in December 1979, unilaterally removed 1,000 nuclear warheads from Europe. And we are pledged under the terms of the December 1979 agreement to remove an additional 464 nuclear warheads from Europe as the ground-launch Cruise missiles are deployed. So we will have actually reduced the total number of weapons deployed in Europe, even if we were to carry out the full planned deployment by over 1,000 weapons.

The Soviets have been adding weapons at the rates that we've been discussing, both in Europe and the Far East. In addition to the longer-ranged weapons that we've been talking about, they have been making significant additions across the spectrum of shorter-ranged systems, and they continue to do that.

Q Even though you're not talking numbers at this point, in our proposal is the Cruise-Pershing mix negotiable?

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: What is negotiable are reductions in both the ground-launch Cruise missile numbers and the Pershing II numbers, that we have said this week that we would deploy, if we deployed a reduced number, a mix of both Pershing II and Cruise missiles. In other words, we're not talking about dropping the Pershing II.

Q Why? What is the reason?

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: Because we think there are sound military reasons for maintaining a ballistic missile and cruise missile mix.

Q What is the military reason for the mix?

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: Because there are different defenses against the two types of systems. They have different capabilities, and in the analysis that was done by the NATO military authorities during 1978-1979, it was agreed that a mix was more militarily appropriate.

SECOND SENIOR OFFICIAL: Could I just add on one point there, too? As you compare these systems, in which the Soviets, as you know, have over 1,050 warheads right now, SS-20 warheads, all of those warheads or missiles in their 351 systems move at the same speed as the Pershings. We've often heard people talking about the short flight time of the Pershing compared to the Cruise. All on the Soviet side are the same flight time as the Pershing.

Q I got a heated phone call one day from someone in Alabama claiming to be an expert who took vigorous exception to the notion that the Pershings can reach the Soviet territory in six minutes -- you've seen 5 to 8, 6. He says it's much slower than that.

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: It's roughly 15 minutes, which is, by the way, the same flight time as some Soviet submarine-launched ballistic missiles against targets in the United States.

Q I've never seen a published account of those. I keep seeing 5 to 8, or 6. That's flat wrong, right?

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: That is flat wrong.

SECOND SENIOR OFFICIAL: It matters where it is. Some people are talking about how much warning time they might have. There are a lot of variables involved.

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: One question we need to ask ourselves is why is it somehow unacceptable to threaten the Soviet Union from Europe with a ballistic missile, but it is perfectly all right for the Soviet Union to threaten our allies with an even more destructive ballistic missile?

Q While we've got you, I'd like to ask you about the demonstrations in Europe this weekend -- what effect you think they might have on the Soviet statement here and what effect you think they might have on our negotiating position in Geneva.

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: I would only on your first question say that I think it would be a mistake for the Soviet Union to view those activities as somehow representing a lack of commitment or will on the part of the Alliance to go forward with the December '79 decision. I think the response of the European governments to the President's proposal demonstrates that there is very strong support for continuing preparations for deployment in order to achieve an arms control outcome, that the Alliance has remained united behind this issue since the December '79 decision was taken, and it is as united as ever right now.

In terms of our negotiating position, we recognize the concerns of Europeans, and Americans for that matter, for reducing the risks of nuclear war. What is clear is that you will not reduce the risk of nuclear war if we do not either get an acceptable arms control outcome or are unable to deploy, and the Soviet Union is left with a total monopoly in these weapons. Unilateral disarmament is certainly not a solution to this problem.

Specifically on this question, from my special perspective -- someone who worries about Europe -- that is one of the major problems with the freeze, that what the freeze would do would be to lock in the United States and its allies into a massive inferiority in the area of INF systems. It would preserve the Soviet 1300-to-zero advantage.

Q I haven't been to all the briefings this week, but the question has come up in my office which goes something like this: If there is no agreement, the U.S. would be deploying over several years 572 new warheads; the Soviet Union has some 1300, plus or minus, some over this period. The interim proposal calls for both sides to end up with equality of warheads. So in other words, the U.S. is asking the Soviet Union to give up in the negotiations

something the U.S. is not willing to do on the ground -- that is, we're not willing to deploy the number that would bring us to equality with the Soviet Union warheads, but yet asking them to come down to equality on their own.

The question just is this: Is this a logical proposal?

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: I think it's completely logical. And you might look at our position in the Vienna negotiations on conventional force levels.

I think the important point is that the United States and its allies cannot formally agree to codify or institutionalize inferiority. In December '79, we took a specific decision, and that decision was to deploy 572 systems. We are not at this stage going to revise that decision because our concentration is, at this stage, to implement that decision. That is what we intend to do.

But we are not prepared to codify Soviet superiority, or to institutionalize it, within an agreement. The purpose of these systems, of 572 systems, is to establish, in the face of the Soviet SS-20 buildup, a clear link between the defense and security of Europe and the defense and security of the United States. We believe that the December '79 decision, which includes the 572 systems, will do that.

Q Have we settled on the number of 572 with the Allies, because their traditional deployment in Europe, the Soviets, was around 600 warheads? How have we arrived at that number?

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: No. There were a number of factors that led to the 572, everything from looking at overall military requirements, targets, the countries involved. For instance, the Pershing II numbers, part of that 572 -- 108 -- each one of the Pershings will replace a shorter-ranged Pershing, and that figure was already set, of 108. So I think there were a number of factors, and no one was predominant.

MODERATOR: Let's take one more.

Q You, obviously, can't answer this in detail, but to pick up on your point that we cannot afford to codify Soviet superiority, they are still deploying. At what point do you have to reevaluate your own strategic position in that regard, because obviously, if they deploy 500 SS-20s, 572 GLCMS and Pershing IIs don't really have very much to do with the strategic balance.

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: My colleague may want to add a point to this because he is the fellow who is responsible for working with the Allies in looking at NATO requirements in the future; and that's a future-oriented question.

Our problem right now is to implement the decision we have already taken, and that is the focus of our effort. It would be counter-productive, in my view, to begin raising questions about that decision. Our purpose now is, in the absence of an agreement, in the absence of eliminating these systems altogether, or in the absence of achieving an agreement on the basis of the President's interim proposal, is to deploy all 572 systems.

SECOND SENIOR OFFICIAL: Let me just add one point, which is that the numbers the Soviets have already deployed make no military sense to us. The number greatly exceeds any reasonable scenario for the employment of those weapons. There are so many more weapons than there are targets that one wonders why the Soviets go on deploying them, unless it is to create a political effect. But we can't justify even their current number.

While they could, of course, go on building to the sorts of numbers you suggest, it seems to us a terribly ill-conceived deployment plan and a wasteful one.

(The briefing concluded at 12:43 P.M.)

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