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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EUROPEAN AND SOVIET AFFAIRS DIRECTORATE, NSC
: RECORDS

Withdrawer

CAS 8/16/2012

File Folder PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 1983 (18 OF 19)

FOIA

M11-443

Box Number 12

HAENNI

102

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
141281	MEMO	STEVEN STEINER TO EUROPEAN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY SUBGROUP RE REPORT ON 5/19 MEETING	2	5/23/1983	B1
141282	MEMO	STEVEN STEINER TO EUROPEAN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY SUBGROUP RE REPORT ON 5/26 MEETING (INCLUDES HANDWRITTEN NOTES ON REVERSE OF LAST PAGE) <i>R 9/5/17 M443/5</i>	3	5/31/1983	B1
141283	CABLE	STATE 159033 <i>R 9/5/17 M443/5</i>	1	6/8/1983	B1
141284	MEMO	STEINER TO EUROPEAN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY SUBGROUP <i>R 9/5/17 M443/5</i>	1	6/8/1983	B1
141349	MEMO	JUDY MANDEL TO EUROPEAN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY GROUP RE REPORT ON 6/30 MEETING <i>R 9/5/17 M443/5</i>	2	7/6/1983	B1
141352	MEMO	JUDY MANDEL TO EUROPEAN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY GROUP RE REPORT ON 7/07 MEETING	3	7/14/1983	B1
141354	DRAFT LETTER	REAGAN TO HELMUT KOHL <i>R 9/5/17 M443/5</i>	2	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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Collection Name

EUROPEAN AND SOVIET AFFAIRS DIRECTORATE, NSC :
RECORDS

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PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 1983 (18 OF 19)

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141281 MEMO

2 5/23/1983 B1

STEVEN STEINER TO EUROPEAN PUBLIC
DIPLOMACY SUBGROUP RE REPORT ON 5/19
MEETING

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May 12, 1983

INF OPPOSITION PREVAILS ONLY IN ITALY AND BELGIUM

This paper summarizes major findings from late-April public opinion surveys in the five INF basing countries. Local firms, mostly Gallup affiliates, were used; and samples of about 1000 were obtained (500 in Belgium).

INF Opposition Rises in Belgium; Little Change Elsewhere

In the wake of Easter demonstrations, USIA surveys in the basing countries show no dramatic changes in opposition to INF deployment, except in Belgium where opposition has risen sharply (by 16 points, since last measured in July 1982).

The late-April surveys show that when INF deployment is linked to negotiations:

- o Majorities are unconditionally opposed in Italy (54%) and in Belgium (62%). And about one-third are opposed in the FRG (36%) and in the U.K. (29%).
- o Combining all of those who "would accept" INF deployment (1) without conditions or (2) contingent on the arms talks, acceptance prevails in the U.K. (65%) and -- but only narrowly -- in the FRG (45%). The Dutch are divided at the 40 percent level:

	<u>BRITAIN</u>	<u>WEST GERMANY</u>	<u>ITALY</u>	<u>NETHERLANDS</u>	<u>BELGIUM</u>
Oppose INF	29%	36%	54%	41%	62%
Accept INF	65	45	42	39	39

With minor variations, the current findings are consistent with poll results from last July and October. Other than Belgium, the trends suggest generally increasing INF opposition in Italy and generally increasing acceptance in Britain. The pattern in the FRG and the Netherlands has changed very little.

The current survey shows that, when given deployment as a fait accompli, hard-core opposition declines in Italy and Belgium, indicating some softness in the high levels of opposition there.

That is, when asked their future reactions should their governments deploy in the absence of an arms agreement, people's "strong" opposition is markedly less in Italy (40%) and Belgium (24%) and slightly less in Britain (23%) and the Netherlands (35%). Opposition to this future deployment in Germany is at the same level (36%) as unconditional opposition today.

Much Confusion, But Most Favor U.S. Interim Proposal

In all countries, one-half or more claim to have heard about President Reagan's interim proposal that "NATO stations fewer...missiles than currently planned and the USSR reduces (its) missiles, so that both sides have roughly the same number of medium-range nuclear missiles."

Majorities (up to 79% in the U.K.) say they support the U.S. initiative.

However, there is much uncertainty and confusion over INF proposals. When three proposals -- the zero option, the U.S. interim proposal, and the first Andropov proposal -- are explained, but sponsors not identified:

- o Pluralities in West Germany (51%), Italy (53%), and Belgium (44%) prefer the zero-option that "NATO station no new medium-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe, and the USSR dismantles all of its...missiles" over the other two alternatives. The Dutch and the British are as likely to favor the zero-option as the interim U.S. proposal (at roughly the 30%-level).
- o At the same time, many more identify the more recent interim proposal (40%-level) than the zero option (20%-level) as U.S.-sponsored.
- o In all countries, uncertainty is widespread about the government's position: no less than 40 percent anywhere either "don't know" or say their government favors the Andropov proposal.
- o Confusion is greatest about where the Soviets stand. In all countries, 40 percent or more "don't know" which is the Soviet proposal. And about as many (20%-30% range) identify the Soviets with the U.S. interim proposal as with the first Andropov proposal that "NATO stations no new... missiles" and the Soviets reduce theirs to "equal the number of nuclear missiles that the French and British have."

...And Perceived U.S. Sincerity in Negotiations Improves

Only about one person in five (but 37% in Italy) sees the U.S. interim proposal as evidence of increased U.S. "willingness to negotiate" an arms agreement. However, in this poll -- taken shortly after President Reagan announced his interim proposal -- there have been notable improvements in perceptions of U.S. sincerity in negotiations:

- o In all countries, the number seeing the U.S. as making a "genuine effort" in arms negotiations has risen. The increase is greatest in the U.K. and the FRG, where majorities (54% and 61%, respectively) now see the U.S. as sincere in seeking an arms reduction agreement. Last October, this was a minority view in Britain and a division of opinion in the FRG.
- o A favorable perception also predominates in the Netherlands (46% to 29%). In Belgium and Italy (though barely) skepticism prevails.

In all countries, the U.S. does markedly better than the USSR in public perceptions of sincerity in negotiations. But the Soviets, too, have improved their standing in the Netherlands and, especially, in West Germany, where as many (35%-level) credit the USSR with making a genuine effort in seeking an arms agreement as do not.

By about a three-to-one margin (roughly 60%-to-20%) people in the U.K., Italy, and Belgium do not think the Soviets are making a genuine effort in negotiations.

Prepared by:
P/R - GHursh-Cesar
485-2965

N-05/12/83

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SECDEF WASHDC

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USIA

FOR AMBASSADOR BENNETT FROM DIRECTOR WICK

STATE FOR EUR/P: J. JAMISON

STATE FOR P/A: J. KELLY

SECDEF FOR OASD/PA: LT. CDR. F. LEEDER

EO 12356 N/A

SUBJECT: PUBLIC SERVICE ADVERTISING ON NATO

REFERENCE: USNATO 03118

1. PROJECT DESCRIBED REFTEL SOUNDS EXCELLENT AND NATIS AND ATLANTIC COUNCIL SEEM TO BE PROCEEDING EXACTLY RIGHT.
 2. I WOULD BE HAPPY TO SUPPORT THIS REQUEST THROUGH A PHONE CALL TO BOB KEIM, THE PRESIDENT OF THE ADVERTISING COUNCIL AND A CLOSE PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATE. FYI, THE PRODUCTION COST FOR THE YOUTH EXCHANGE FULL SERVICE CAMPAIGN INCLUDING TV IS 411,000 DOLS. THIS DOES NOT INCLUDE CREATIVE FEES WHICH IS WAIVED BY THE VOLUNTEER ADVERTISING AGENCY.
 3. I WILL ALSO BRING THIS PROPOSAL TO THE ATTENTION OF THE AGENCY'S PUBLIC POLICY FOUNDATIONS COMMITTEE, CHAMBER OF COMMERCE COMMITTEE, PUBLIC RELATIONS COMMITTEE AND MARKETING COMMITTEE. THESE COMMITTEES ARE MADE UP OF VERY HIGHLY PLACED INDIVIDUALS IN THE CORPORATE AND FOUNDATION WORLDS. THEY MAY WELL HAVE USEFUL SUGGESTIONS ABOUT ADDITIONAL SOURCES OF FUNDS. IF THEY DO, I WILL SUGGEST THEY GET IN TOUCH DIRECTLY WITH FRANCIS WILCOX OF THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL.
 4. AS YOU SUGGEST, WE WILL ALSO BRING THE PROPOSAL TO THE ATTENTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION COMMITTEE WHICH ALSO MAY HAVE SOME VALUABLE IDEAS. (EU)
- WICK

EOT

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INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 5593

SECDEF WASHDC

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USIA FOR DIRECTOR WICK FROM AMBASSADOR BENNETT

STATE FOR EUR/P AND PA;

DCD FOR OASD/PA

L.C. 12356: N/A

TAGS: CPRC, NATC

SUBJ: PUBLIC SERVICE ADVERTISING ON NATO

1. THE NATO INFORMATION SERVICE (NATIS) AND THE US ATLANTIC COUNCIL HAVE BEEN TRYING TO GENERATE A PUBLIC SERVICE ADVERTISING CAMPAIGN IN THE UNITED STATES GEARED TO THE 35TH ANNIVERSARY OF NATO NEXT YEAR.

2. A POLL TAKEN IN 1981 INDICATED THAT 51 PERCENT OF AMERICANS DO NOT KNOW WHAT NATO IS. THE AIM OF THE CAMPAIGN ON A SIMPLE LEVEL, THEREFORE, WOULD BE TO HAVE MORE AMERICANS RECOGNIZE WHAT NATO IS AND HOW IT AFFECTS THEIR LIVES. INTERESTED INDIVIDUALS WOULD BE ASKED TO WRITE FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION TO BE PROVIDED BY NATIS AND THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL.

3. THE FOLLOWING STEPS HAVE BEEN TAKEN TOWARDS REALIZING

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PAGE 02 USNATC 03118 101854Z

THE PROJECT:

- THE J. WALTER THOMPSON COMPANY HAS AGREED TO DONATE ITS BRAIN-POWER AND SERVICES TO CREATE A MULTI-MEDIA CAMPAIGN. PROVIDED ACTUAL PRODUCTION COSTS ARE FOUND FROM OTHER SOURCES. PRODUCTION COSTS ARE ESTIMATED AT A MINIMUM \$100,000.

- THE MCDONNELL DOUGLAS CORPORATION HAS IN PRINCIPLE AGREED TO DIVERT PART OF ITS ADVERTISING BUDGET FOR NEXT YEAR TO PRODUCTION OF A CAMPAIGN. NATIS IS COMMITTED TO PROVIDING \$25,000.

- THE ADVERTISING COUNCIL HAS AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO SUPPORT THE CAMPAIGN. THOUGH THERE IS APPARENTLY SOME QUESTION AS TO WHAT FORM OR LEVEL ITS SUPPORT MIGHT

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PAGE 1

6
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TRAM.

4. THOUGH CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE, THERE ARE STILL MAJOR HURDLES. NATIS AND THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL NEED AT LEAST ONE OTHER NON-DEFENSE-RELATED CORPORATION OR FOUNDATION TO PROVIDE FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE. IT WOULD ALSO BE HELPFUL IF THE ADVERTISING COUNCIL COULD BE NUDGED INTO A FULL COMMITMENT TO THE CAMPAIGN.

5. I AM AWARE OF YOUR OWN VERY SUCCESSFUL EFFORTS IN REALIZING A PUBLIC SERVICE CAMPAIGN FOR THE PRESIDENT'S YOUTH EXCHANGE INITIATIVE. AND WOULD WELCOME ANY ADVICE YOU MIGHT HAVE ON HOW NATIS AND THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL SHOULD PROCEED. THIS ALSO MIGHT APPROPRIATELY BE A SUBJECT FOR INVOLVEMENT OF THE INTER-DEPARTMENTAL WORKING GROUP ON INFORMATION.

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PAGE 03 USNATO 03118 101854Z

6. THE WASHINGTON CONTACT ON THE PROJECT IS FRANCIS WILCOX, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL. I UNDERSTAND THAT HE WILL BE DISCUSSING THE PROJECT WITH MY ANNOUNCED SUCCESSOR, DR. DAVID AESHIRE OF GEORGETOWN CSIS, WHO IS ALSO ON THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL.

7. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THERE IS NO MORE IMPORTANT INFORMATION TASK BEFORE US THAN THE PROMOTION OF CONTINUED AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR THE ALLIANCE. ANY ASSISTANCE YOU CAN PROVIDE WILL BE GREATLY APPRECIATED. BEST REGARDS.

BENNETT

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DECLASSIFIED O.C. 20520

NLRR M443/5 #141282

May 31, 1983

BY RW NARA DATE 9/5/17

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*File: European
Public Diplomacy*

TO: EUROPEAN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY SUBGROUP
FROM: EUR/P - Steven E. Steiner
SUBJECT: Report on 5/26 Meeting and Agenda for 6/2

REMINDER: At the next meeting, at 10:00 June 2 in the EUR Conference Room, John Freeman of the British MOD will brief the group on the INF public diplomacy efforts of his government. This will be followed by discussion with him.

The following issues were covered at the 5/26 meeting:

1. Public Strategy on Soviet Cruise: EUR reported that, as requested by the INF IG, a first cut has been prepared addressing public affairs handling of Soviet cruise missile development. Based on comments from those given a copy of this draft, which has been distributed informally to only a few individuals on a close hold basis, a second draft will be prepared this week. The paper will then be considered in the INF IG context.
2. Predeparture Events for Secretary Shultz: EUR briefed on the possible public affairs events to be held in connection with the Secretary's departure for the NAC Ministerial. It was suggested by others that if a backgrounder is held, an effort be made to seat European correspondents in the front of the room and to take some of their questions. It was also suggested that a briefing be held at the Foreign Press Center. EUR agreed to examine these suggestions.
3. Special Report on Arms Control ("White Paper"): USIA reported that it has completed an informal text of the report and has sent this by air freight to 10 key European posts. This includes Paris, Bonn, Rome and Madrid, which are being asked to translate the document ASAP. USIA said that it is also sending a cable to posts informing them of this action. It was stressed that the text remains embargoed until the document is formally released, in connection with the NAC Ministerial. State pointed out that the release will be low key, with no special public affairs event held for this purpose.
4. UK/French Systems: It was asked whether we intend to respond to French suggestions concerning public discussion of French and British systems. It was noted that the French have asked us to try to avoid separating their systems into "strategic" and "intermediate", and that we emphasize instead that the French forces constitute one national deterrent system. It was also noted that the French have asked us to be

p

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

cautious concerning any implication that French systems might be included in START or some future negotiation. (Note: While we do not now plan an official response to the French, we are trying to work these points into our public handling of the issue.)

5. Reference to Treaty Texts: The JCS rep informed the group that during the visit of General Altenburg, Inspector General of the German Armed Forces, he suggested that we point out in public that we now have two treaty texts on the table in the INF negotiations. Other subgroup members expressed concern over whether this would be consistent with the principle of confidentiality. It was noted that we did state publicly earlier that we had tabled a text calling for a zero-zero outcome, but we had done this in response to a public charge by the Soviets that we were not negotiating seriously.

EUR noted that in the recent US-Netherlands Bilateral on information policy, Dutch officials had asked that we try to provide more information publicly on the course of the negotiations.

It was agreed to defer any further discussion of this question for now. The JCS rep indicated that JCS may possibly raise it in the INF IG context.

6. Bishops' Letter: State/PM noted that a meeting would be held the same afternoon to discuss public handling of the Bishops' letter. A briefing packet is being assembled in regard to the letter.

7. INF Qs and As: USIA distributed the final version of its Qs and As pamphlet on INF, which has been sent to posts for use at their discretion.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[Stene Band]

[Judge Clark's letter]

Lessons: Size ^{also} not overestimated
Complexity of argument / Tricent
Consultations (STAR WARS)

Interim
offer

- Target
- No first use

British Thinking

- Intermediate - land-based like SS-20
- Brit & Fr not included 1979 decision
- Do not concede to Soviet demands equality
- Soviets drive a wedge (Soviets want same count as everyone together)
- Polaris - sea-based
- minimum deterrent nuclear
- no reason to give compensation
power, argument ~ balance
- not inflexible

INFIG

RECEIVED 08 JUN 83 14

TO

CLARK

FROM HILL, C

DOCDATE 07 JUN 83

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

CJ 8/12/12

*Please
Public Diplomacy
(Do we have such a
file)*

KEYWORDS: ARMS CONTROL

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

SUBJECT: STATE RESPONSE / PUBLIC DIPLOMACY STRATEGY FOR ARMS CONTROL BACKGROUND
PAPER

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK

DUE: 10 JUN 83 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

KRAEMER

LEHMAN

RAYMOND

LENCZOWSKI

LINHARD

SIMS

SOMMER

DOBRIANSKY

COMMENTS

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

June 7, 1983


~~SECRET~~MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSESubject: Public Diplomacy Strategy for Arms Control
Background Paper

Attached as requested are suggestions for public affairs activities in the U.S. and Europe to promote the forthcoming State publication "Security and Arms Control: The Search for a More Stable Peace". We suggest an early, ad hoc meeting be convened to consider the outstanding options.

Charles Hill
Executive Secretary~~SECRET~~
DECL:OADRDECLASSIFIED
Dept. of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
BY CW NARA DATE 2/16/12

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~~SECRET~~

Release Scenario for Arms Control Special Report

Europe

- Burt to release at post-SCG press conference, 6/9, Paris.
- Secretary Shultz to stress importance of this document at his post-NAC press conference, 6/10, Paris.
- Translations being done at Bonn, Rome, Madrid and Paris.
- Copies (English version) being sent by air freight ASAP to other posts, Europe and Asia.

Washington

- The President:
 - Could give copies at private meeting with Congressional leaders, 6/8, if final version available (uncertain).
 - In any event, can mention impending release in his 10 min. remarks on arms control tentatively scheduled for 6/8.
- Backgrounding:
 - Palmer, Dean, representative from ACDA, Romberg and possibly others at State, 6/9.
 - Possible backgrounder at Foreign Press Center, 6/10.
- Congress:
 - Copies to all Members under Powell Moore's signature, 6/9 or when available.
 - Copies provided to key staffers, 6/9 or when available.
- Major speech:
 - Possible reference in Secretary Shultz's Stanford address, 6/12.

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Dept. of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
BY 11 NARA, DATE 8/16/12

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PAGE 01
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 159033

GENEVA FOR USSTART; PARIS ALSO FOR HOWE, BURT AND MCMANAWAY
E O 12356 DECL: OADR
TAG : PARM, START
SUBJ : INFORMING ALLIES OF PRESIDENT'S START ANNOUNCEMENT

REF: STATE 158301

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. REFTEL CONTAINED TALKING POINTS FOR USE IN BRIEFING
HOST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS ON PRESIDENT'S JUNE 8 STATEMENT
ON START. IF THERE IS OCCASION TO USE THESE POINTS IN THE
FUTURE FOLLOWING SHOULD ALSO BE MADE AS PENULTIMATE TALK-
ING POINT:

-- WHILE FOCUSING ON REDUCTIONS IN BALLISTIC MISSILES, THE
U.S. START PROPOSAL ALSO CALLS FOR EQUAL LIMITS ON HEAVY
BOMBERS, AND FOR LIMITATIONS ON THE NUMBER OF AIR-LAUNCHED
CRUISE MISSILES CARRIED ON THOSE BOMBERS. THUS, THE U.S.
START PROPOSAL REPRESENTS A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH ADDRESS-
ING ALL SIGNIFICANT ELEMENTS OF THE STRATEGIC EQUATION.

DAM
BT

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BY LN NARA DATE 9/5/17

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FOR DOBBINS OR HAWES WITH SECRETARY'S PARTY
E.O. 12356 DECL: OADR
TAGS: PARM
SUBJECT: ARMS CONTROL WHITE PAPER

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. TRANSMITTED BELOW IS FULLY INTERAGENCY-CLEARED
PRESS STATEMENT ON THE ARMS CONTROL WHITE PAPER.

BEGIN TEXT OF PRESS STATEMENT ON ARMS CONTROL WHITE
PAPER:

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE HAS ISSUED A SPECIAL REPORT,
ENTITLED "SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL: THE SEARCH FOR A
MORE STABLE PEACE". THE REPORT EXAMINES THE
CONTRIBUTION OF ARMS CONTROL TO SECURITY AND DISCUSSES
THE STATE OF NEGOTIATIONS IN THE PRINCIPAL AREAS OF
ARMS CONTROL. IT SETS FORTH THE U.S. APPROACH ON
SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL, SEEKING AGREEMENTS WHICH
WILL CONTRIBUTE TO STABILITY, WILL ACHIEVE SUBSTANTIAL
REDUCTION OF FORCES TO EQUAL LEVELS ON BOTH SIDES, AND
WILL BE EFFECTIVELY VERIFIABLE.

SECRETARY SHULTZ POINTS OUT IN HIS MESSAGE OPENING THE
STUDY THAT THE PEACE AND STABILITY WHICH THE UNITED
STATES AND ITS ALLIES HAVE ENJOYED FOR ALMOST FOUR
DECADES

- "HAS BEEN BASED ON THE TWIN PILLARS OF DEFENSE AND
DIALOGUE: UPON THE MAINTENANCE OF A MILITARY
EQUILIBRIUM COUPLED WITH EFFORTS TO RESOLVE
DIFFERENCES PEACEFULLY AND REMOVE SOURCES OF
CONFLICT. ARMS CONTROL HAS BEEN EMPLOYED BY WESTERN
GOVERNMENTS TO STRENGTHEN BOTH THESE PILLARS, TO
STABILIZE A MILITARY BALANCE AT THE LOWEST POSSIBLE
LEVELS, AND IN SO DOING TO ENHANCE MUTUAL CONFIDENCE
AND EXPAND THE AREA OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN
ADVERSARIES."

THE REPORT CONCLUDES THAT "THE PURSUIT OF A MORE STABLE
PEACE THROUGH A VIGOROUS ARMS CONTROL PROGRAM IS AN
ESSENTIAL PART OF COLLECTIVE EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN
WESTERN SECURITY AND WILL REMAIN AMONG THE HIGHEST
PRIORITIES OF THIS AND FUTURE ADMINISTRATIONS."

PUBLICATION OF THIS PAPER IS INTENDED AS A CONTRIBUTION

TO THE CURRENT PUBLIC DIALOGUE IN THE US AND OTHER
COUNTRIES ON THE REQUIREMENTS OF WESTERN SECURITY AND
ARMS CONTROL. AS THE REPORT NOTES, "THE RESPONSIBILITY
TO PURSUE PEACE AND FREEDOM OFTEN HAS FORCED THE
PEOPLES OF THE WEST TO MAKE DIFFICULT DECISIONS ON
SECURITY ISSUES." A WELL-INFORMED PUBLIC DEBATE IS AN
ESSENTIAL ELEMENT IN REACHING THE BROAD UNDERSTANDING
AND CONSENSUS NEEDED TO SUSTAIN THE TIES OF COLLECTIVE
SECURITY BETWEEN THE US AND ITS FRIENDS AND ALLIES, AND
THUS TO ENSURE THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE AND A MORE
STABLE BASIS FOR EAST-WEST RELATIONS.

"SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL" TAKES AS A STARTING POINT
THE FOUNDATIONS OF WESTERN SECURITY SINCE WORLD WAR
II. "THE KEYSTONE OF U.S. SECURITY POLICY IS CLOSE,
COOPERATIVE TIES WITH THE WORLD'S INDUSTRIALIZED
DEMOCRACIES...WITH THESE NATIONS, WE SHARE MORE THAN A
COMMON THREAT; WE SHARE A CIVILIZATION, A SET OF VALUES
AND POLITICAL PRINCIPLES TO BE PROTECTED, FOSTERED, AND
PROPAGATED."

THE REPORT EXPLAINS THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE
WEST'S STRATEGY OF DETERRENCE, WHICH FOR MORE THAN 30
YEARS HAS MET THE CHALLENGE OF PRESERVING PEACE DESPITE
THE ENORMOUS GROWTH IN SOVIET MILITARY POWER. THIS
STRATEGY "REQUIRES THAT A POTENTIAL AGGRESSOR BE
CONVINCED THAT THE COSTS OF AGGRESSION OUTWEIGH ANY
POSSIBLE GAINS IT MIGHT HOPE TO ACHIEVE," THE REPORT

STATES. "MAINTAINING DETERRENCE FOR MORE THAN THREE
DECADES HAS BEEN A DIFFICULT AND DYNAMIC PROCESS," IT
CONTINUES, NOTING THAT THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES
"HAVE HAD TO ADAPT TO TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS, TO THE
GROWTH AND MODERNIZATION OF SOVIET MILITARY POWER, AND
TO POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGE AT HOME AND ABROAD."

THE REPORT EXAMINES RECENT WESTERN ARMS CONTROL
INITIATIVES, THE OBJECTIVES AND CRITERIA EMBODIED IN
THESE INITIATIVES, AND THE APPROACH ADOPTED BY THE
SOVIET UNION TO MAJOR ARMS CONTROL ISSUES.

THE REPORT FURTHER DETAILS THE HISTORY, OBJECTIVES AND
POSITIONS TAKEN BY EAST AND WEST IN SEVEN MAJOR ARMS
CONTROL AREAS:

• THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS NEGOTIATIONS, WHERE
THE UNITED STATES IS SEEKING DEEP REDUCTIONS THAT WOULD
"HALT AND DRAMATICALLY REVERSE THE COMPETITION IN
STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARMS".

• THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCE NEGOTIATIONS,
WHERE THE UNITED STATES HAS PROPOSED TOTAL ELIMINATION
OF AN ENTIRE CLASS OF AMERICAN AND SOVIET NUCLEAR
WEAPONS, BUT HAS ALSO OFFERED AGREED EQUAL LIMITS ON
THESE WEAPONS FOR BOTH SIDES.

• THE MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTION
NEGOTIATIONS, WHERE THE U.S. AND NATO ALLIES SEEK
SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS TO EQUAL LEVELS OF MILITARY
MANPOWER IN CENTRAL EUROPE, THE AREA OF GREATEST
MILITARY CONFRONTATION ON THE GLOBE.

• CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES, WHERE THE UNITED
STATES, ITS ALLIES AND LIKE-MINDED STATES ARE SEEKING
IN VARIOUS NEGOTIATIONS TO IMPROVE COMMUNICATIONS,
INCREASE OPENNESS, AND REDUCE THE RISKS OF
MISCALCULATION, MISUNDERSTANDING OR SURPRISE ATTACK.

• CHEMICAL WEAPONS, WHERE THE U.S. SEEKS PROGRESS
TOWARDS A COMPLETE AND VERIFIABLE PROHIBITION OF

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Dept of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

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PAGE 02 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 7967

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CHEMICAL WEAPONS STOCKPILING AND TOTAL ELIMINATION OF
EXISTING STOCKS.

. NUCLEAR TESTING, WHERE THE U.S. IS WORKING TO
STRENGTHEN VERIFICATION MEASURES AND WHERE A TREATY
"BANNING ALL NUCLEAR TESTING REMAINS A LONG-TERM U.S.
OBJECTIVE".

. NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION, WHERE PREVENTION OF THE
SPREAD OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES IS "A FUNDAMENTAL NATIONAL
SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVE".

COMMENTING ON THE RECORD OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS, THE
REPORT NOTES THAT ALTHOUGH MAJOR STRIDES HAVE BEEN

ACHIEVED OVER THE LAST 30 YEARS, "THE POTENTIAL FOR THE
EMERGENCE OF DANGEROUS QUANTITATIVE OR QUALITATIVE
IMBALANCES IS SERIOUS."

"WHERE THERE HAS BEEN GENUINE SUCCESS, THE RECORD
SUGGESTS THAT THIS HAS RESULTED FROM WESTERN PATIENCE,
PERSISTENCE AND UNITY," THE REPORT STATES. "FAILURE OR
DISAPPOINTMENT HAS BEEN OCCASIONED WHEN WESTERN
GOVERNMENTS SUCCUMBED TO CONFUSED OBJECTIVES, DIVIDED
COUNSEL, AND PRESSURE FOR QUICK RESULTS.

"EXPERIENCE HAS SHOWN," THE REPORT CONCLUDES, "THAT
CAREFUL, PATIENT NEGOTIATIONS TOWARD SPECIFIC,
WELL-DEFINED ENDS CAN LEAD TO CONSTRUCTIVE AGREEMENTS
THAT ENHANCE THE SECURITY OF THE PARTIES TO THESE
ACCORDS AND MANKIND AS A WHOLE... THE PURSUIT OF A MORE
STABLE PEACE THROUGH A VIGOROUS ARMS CONTROL PROGRAM IS
AN ESSENTIAL PART OF COLLECTIVE EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN
WESTERN SECURITY AND WILL REMAIN AMONG THE HIGHEST
PRIORITIES OF THIS AND FUTURE ADMINISTRATIONS."

THE DEPARTMENT HOPES THIS PUBLICATION WILL SERVE AS A
USEFUL SOURCE BOTH FOR THE EXPERT AND THE GENERAL
READER. "SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL: THE SEARCH FOR A
MORE STABLE PEACE" WILL BE DISTRIBUTED BY THE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BOTH IN THE US AND OVERSEAS.

END TEXT.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

June 8, 1983

CONFIDENTIAL

TO: EUROPEAN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY SUBGROUP
FROM: EUR/P - Steven E. Steiner *SES*
SUBJECT: Agenda for June 9 Meeting

The next meeting will take place on the regular schedule at 10:00 a.m. Thursday, June 9 in the EUR Conference Room, Room 6226. *16*

The key agenda item will be a readout on the consultations held here in each agency by John Freeman of the UK MOD. Above all, we wish to review UK suggestions on public handling of UK and French systems -- including Freeman's suggested eight points. Also, I will pass on the conclusions which he drew on the basis of the week of consultations and invite further comments.

Other items on the agenda will include the question of European media access to INF-related sites in this country and the status of the revision of the INF Speakers Packet.

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NLRR M443/5 #141284
BY *RW* NARA DATE *9/5/17*

10
*European
Public Diplomacy*

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

EMBARGOED FOR WIRE TRANSMISSION & RELEASE
UNTIL 11:00 A.M. EDT
WEDNESDAY, JUNE 8, 1983

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

The Strategic Arms Reductions Talks, or START, officially resumed today in Geneva. I would like to speak for a moment about my hopes for these important negotiations and about changes which I have decided to make in our START proposal. Such changes reflect concerns and recommendations of the Scowcroft Commission, the Congress, and others. They offer the prospect of new progress toward a START agreement.

New Consensus and New Progress

Before discussing these specifics, I would like to comment on what I see as very positive developments taking place both here and abroad. I am happy to say that today there is a growing sense that we are making progress. I just met in Williamsburg with the leaders of the major industrialized nations, and I was struck there not only by the facts and figures pointing toward economic recovery, but also by a spirit of optimism and cooperation which was remarkable. This same spirit is visible in our discussions of security issues. In NATO, as in our other alliances, there is a new feeling of partnership. The Atlantic Alliance is alive and well, and its close consultations are a source of strength and participation for each of its members.

The Scowcroft Commission

At least as important, and very gratifying to me, is the new spirit of bipartisanship on national security issues which is increasingly evident in both Houses of Congress. When I established the Scowcroft Commission I could not then foresee the impact that this outstanding panel would have. Clearly, the Commission's work, which went beyond MX to address critical issues of deterrence and arms control, has become a major stimulus to the rethinking of national policy. The Commission's report challenged some favorite assumptions, and called for changes in our strategic planning. At the same time, it expressed support for my Administration's most heartfelt objectives in arms control: deep reductions, modernization for stability's sake, and the elimination of the first-strike threat.

I have pledged to Congress my full support for the Scowcroft Commission recommendations and my intention to incorporate them in our START proposal. So that we can continue to benefit from the wisdom of its counsel, I intend to ask the Commission to continue to serve. Its bipartisan membership will thus be able to provide timely advice to me both with respect to the adoption of its proposals into our defense program and our arms control policies.

Congressional Consultations

In recent weeks, I and officials of my Administration have had an extensive series of private meetings with many Members of Congress. We have reviewed implications for the START negotiations of the Scowcroft Commission recommendations and also

- more -
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of the "Mutual Guaranteed Build-Down" advocated by a number of distinguished Members of the Congress.

The review of our START position was capped by four recent meetings: three yesterday, and one today. Yesterday morning, at a meeting of the National Security Council, my senior advisors and I reviewed major implications and options. We also considered a range of congressional viewpoints. Yesterday afternoon, I met with groups of Senators and Congressmen whose interest and expertise in arms control I value highly. I discussed with them the major issues before us. This morning I met with the leadership of both Houses of Congress. And throughout the START negotiations, the Administration has consulted with our allies.

START

Three full rounds of negotiations on START are now behind us. It is my judgement that these rounds have been useful and have permitted us to cover necessary ground. However, due largely to Soviet intransigence, we have not yet made meaningful progress on the central issues. I remain firmly committed to take whatever steps are necessary to increase the likelihood of real, substantive progress towards an agreement involving significant reductions in U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear arsenals -- and in the national security interests of both sides. Above all, our goal is to maintain a stable nuclear balance in order to reduce the risk of war. Our efforts in the START negotiations must be guided by that objective.

The report of the Scowcroft Commission offers us a new opportunity for progress. It has provided a consistent and coherent framework to guide our thinking about the fundamental elements of our national security policy -- deterrence, defense and arms control. But, more than that, it has provided the basis for renewed, bipartisan support for that policy.

To capitalize on this critical opportunity and on the basis of the widest possible range of advice, I have directed new steps toward progress in achieving real arms reductions at the START negotiations. The purpose of this guidance, provided to Ambassador Ed Rowny, our Chief START Negotiator, is to adjust the U.S. START position to bring it into line with the Scowcroft Commission's recommendations and to provide additional flexibility to our negotiators in pursuing our basic goals.

Although we have put forth a comprehensive proposal on limiting strategic ballistic missiles and bombers, our primary aim in the START negotiations has been, and continues to be, to reduce the threat posed by the most destabilizing systems, namely ballistic missiles. To achieve that aim, measures that constrain the number and destructive capability and potential of ballistic missile warheads are essential. Our proposed limit of 5,000 total ballistic missile warheads -- a reduction by one-third of the current level -- remains the central element of the U.S. START position.

The U.S. START position tabled in previous negotiating rounds includes another constraint. It would have limited each side to no more than 850 deployed ballistic missiles. This measure was never viewed as being as useful or important a constraint as the limit on total ballistic missile warheads. The Scowcroft Commission report specifically suggested that it should be reassessed since it could constrain the evolution we seek toward small, single-warhead ICBM's.

Acting upon the Scowcroft Commission's recommendation, I have now directed our negotiators to adjust our position on deployed

ballistic missiles by relaxing our current proposal for an 850 deployed ballistic missile limit. At the same time, the U.S. remains firm on the point that the destructive capability and potential of ballistic missiles must be addressed in START. Our current position includes a network of constraints designed to lead to a more stable strategic balance at reduced force levels -- while addressing the destructive potential of missiles. The Soviets and others have complained that these constraints are designed to dictate Soviet force structure according to U.S. standards. This is not the case. We believe, as does the Scowcroft Commission, that stability can be increased by limitations on the destructive capability and potential of ballistic missiles. As a consequence, we will continue to propose such constraints which indirectly get to the throw weight problem while making clear to the Soviets our readiness to deal directly with the corresponding destructive capability if they prefer.

There may be more than one way to achieve our objective of greater stability at reduced levels of arms. So I have instructed Ambassador Rowny to make clear to the Soviet delegation our commitment to our fundamental objectives, but I have also given him the flexibility to explore all appropriate avenues for meeting our goals. I sincerely hope that the Soviet Union will respond with corresponding flexibility.

Finally, high-priority work is continuing on how the mutual and guaranteed build-down concept proposed by several United States Senators can be applied in our quest for significant and stabilizing strategic arms reductions.

Conclusion

These actions reflect a bipartisan consensus on arms control, and new flexibility in the negotiations -- steps to be viewed seriously by the Soviets and all others who have a stake in world peace. To the leaders of the Soviet Union, I urge that this new opportunity not be lost. To America's friends and allies around the world, I say that your steadfast support for the goals of both deterrence and arms control is essential in the future. To Congress and to the American people, I say let us continue to work together in a bipartisan spirit so that these days will be spoken of in the future as the time when America turned a corner. Let us put our differences behind us. Let us demonstrate measured flexibility in our approach, while remaining strong in our determination to reach our objectives of arms reductions, stability, and security. Let us be leaders in the cause of peace.

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Washington, D.C. 20520

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July 6, 1983

TO: European Public Diplomacy Group
FROM: PM - Judy Mandel
SUBJECT: Report on 6/30 Meeting; Agenda for 7/7

The meeting was largely devoted to a discussion of an INF action plan for the remainder of the year and suggestions for new public diplomacy initiatives. A cable to posts on contacts with nuclear demonstrations and handling demonstrations in Europe was circulated for clearance. A new calendar of events and opportunities is being prepared for circulation, and the revised INF speakers book draft was circulated for comments.

1. INF Action Plan: Per SPG instructions, we intend to have an INF action plan by mid-July. An initial draft will be prepared and circulated following the 7/7 meeting. Elements of the plan include:

Target audiences: Full analysis of the latest tranche of USIA's polling data from Europe has not been completed but should be available in a few weeks. Steve Shaffer (USIA) will discuss preliminary findings and implications of the polling results for the INF public diplomacy effort at the 7/7 meeting. This information should help us refine and tailor our approach to key target audiences.

Calendar of Events and Opportunities: Susan Koch (OSD) listed key events for the fall which can serve as the nexus of an updated calendar. Additional items--upcoming conferences, political events, demonstrations and anniversaries through the end of the year were to be submitted to EUR/P by COB Friday 7/1, for inclusion in a revised calendar to be reviewed at the 7/7 meeting.

Guidance on Contacts with Anti-Nuclear Groups: Susan Koch distributed a draft cable to European diplomatic and military posts on handling anti-nuclear demonstrations in Europe. The cable requests posts' initial assessment of the scope and timing of planned demonstrations, their impact on host governments and publics, and recommendations for US and host government action. DOD expressed particular concern that personnel at US bases be alerted and prepared for "provocations" against them. This issue is addressed in the cable to posts. Comments on the cable should be given to Susan Koch by Wednesday, 7/6. EUR will also check with the basing country desk officers for their comments and assessments.

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2. New Initiatives: ACDA asked whether we should respond to major Soviet propaganda initiatives such as Andropov's May INF proposal, by more extensive backgrounding, notably at the Foreign Press Center. USIA's initial response was that generating interest in such backgrounders would be difficult unless they were conducted at an appropriately high level. USIA agreed to check with the FPC to see if there were any additional actions not covered by their memoranda of April which might be undertaken.

Special Conference for Journalists - One new proposal suggested for the public diplomacy effort on arms control was a special conference for journalists and editorial writers to serve as an educational and discussion forum. Such a conference might include American and European journalists. It was suggested that we explore the possibility of arranging such a conference in connection with an already scheduled journalist or editorial writers meeting, or with a USIA-sponsored journalists tour. David Lowenfeld, John Williams and Steve Kane agreed to look into these possibilities and report back to the next meeting.

Other proposals - Members were asked to submit suggestions for new actions, communication goals, etc. the group should consider. John Williams was asked to provide an informal assessment of our public diplomacy initiatives in Europe to date: which have been most effective, which least, and what areas were not adequately covered.

3. INF Speakers' Book: A draft of the revised speakers' book was distributed. There were no proposals to revise the format or subject arrangement. Comments and clearances at the appropriate level are due at the 7/7 meeting.

4. Agenda for 7/7 meeting:

- USIA report on polling in Europe (Steve Shaffer)
- Journalists' conference feasibility report (USIA, DOS/PA and DOS/P)
- New INF initiatives
- Cable to posts on public handling
- INF Speakers' Book

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Peter Sommer

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141354

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear Helmut:

Thank you for sending Hans-Dietrich Genscher to give us a personal debrief of your visit to Moscow. He did his usual sterling job and confirmed the impression we had received of your steadfastness in defending legitimate Western interests. Your firmness in Moscow reinforced the prospects for progress in East-West relations. The Madrid Conference has demonstrated again that patience, firmness, and Western unity are the keys to successful management of our relations with the Soviet Union.

I remain hopeful that the Soviet Union will also respond positively in other areas to our efforts to build a more constructive relationship. As you know, I have encouraged our negotiators, in the INF talks, in START, and in MBFR to explore creatively the possibilities for progress. While the Soviet response to date is less than we hoped, it has not been entirely negative. We will not slacken our efforts. Should progress in these and other areas provide prospects for real achievement through a personal meeting with the Soviet leaders, I will be prepared to take such a step.

It is necessary that we in the West take every opportunity to reaffirm our solidarity, since the Soviets will certainly seek opportunities in the coming months to stimulate alarm among our publics as a device for blocking INF deployment. In your Moscow talks, I believe you struck precisely the right note, both in private and public. We especially appreciate your efforts to disabuse the Soviet leaders of any illusions they may have had about our determination to implement the decisions we have already taken.

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BY FW NLRN M443/5 #141354
NARA DATE 9/5/17

Foreign Minister Genscher's visit to Washington also provided a useful opportunity for extensive consultations on a broad range of issues, including the INF deployment schedule. In this regard, I was particularly pleased to learn that the Federal Security Council has recently approved the further technical measures needed to move forward on schedule with deployment of the Pershing II. It is especially important that in the months ahead we leave the Soviet Union no room for doubt that the Alliance will deploy Pershing II's and Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles on schedule unless a concrete agreement is reached in Geneva eliminating the entire class of land-based LRINF missiles.

Again, we are grateful for the extraordinarily close consultations before and following your visit to Moscow. I am confident, as we face new challenges in the coming months, that our two governments will continue the closest possible cooperation at every level. Together, and in concert with our Allies, we can ensure this period will be one of great achievement for the West.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Dr. Helmut Kohl
Chancellor of the Federal Republic
of Germany
Bonn

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Press Initiatives

Most authoritative and influential news articles on U.S. security policies in Europe are written by relatively few journalists. Increasing the number of journalists with sufficient background to write on U.S. security policy might allow for a broader range of views, ideas and accounts of U.S. policy to be aired.

The four initiatives described below are aimed at this objective. They include: a NATO Information Service sponsored conference for U.S. and European regional newspaper editors and writers, an in-service seminar series for Washington based foreign journalists, a local U.S. media press package, and an UNGA foreign media briefing and press package.

NATO Security Conference for Regional Journalists

- The conference would be held in Brussels, organized by the NATO Information Service and funded in part by USIA. We would hope to attract 30 U.S. and European journalists from regional papers such as The St. Louis Post-Dispatch or the Atlanta Constitution, and from national newspaper chains, particularly those with centralized editorial policy.
- Subjects to be covered would include the security and arms control aspects of conventional forces, theater nuclear forces, strategic nuclear balance, the Soviet challenge, U.S. and European public opinion, and out of the theater activities. The seminar would include background lectures, discussion groups, visits to military sites and on-the-record interviews with senior officials.

Foreign Press Center Series

- The Foreign Press Center would organize a series of weekly briefings as an in-service seminar on arms control and defense issues for Washington based foreign journalists.

- The subjects that would be covered include more specific arms control issues, the Soviet challenge, European public opinion, European security and NATO.
- The format would be a series of background presentations by U.S. officials and selected academics followed by Q's and A's, one hour session per week for three to four weeks.
- The first seminar should be organized at the Foreign Center in Washington. If this session proves *fruitful, we might organize others.*

Local Media Press Package

- U.S. government speakers addressing local audiences should have packages of information on arms control and U.S. security policy to give to local press.
- This package should include:
 - Gists
 - Quotes from the President's most recent speeches (to be provided by State/PM)
 - State Department primer, "Security and Arms Control: The Search for a More Stable Peace."
 - Press release (drafted by EUR and PM and provided by State/PA) about the speaker's appearance and message

UNGA Foreign Journalist Briefing and Press Package

- We should make a special effort to reach the many foreign journalists who will cover the UNGA in New York on a broad range of subjects including arms control and defense issues.
- If there is sufficient interest, we should organize a briefing on arms control by a senior U.S. official (perhaps Mr. Adelman). Such a briefing might be most effectively timed to coincide with the Secretary's appearance at UNGA or debate on arms control issues.

-- The arms reduction and defense press package should include:

--Brief overview of arms reductions proposals

--Gists

--Quotes from the President's most recent speeches (To be provided by State/PM).

--Quotes from world leaders in support of President Reagan's arms reduction policies (to be developed by ACDA).

--State Department primer, "Security and Arms Control: The Search for a More Stable Peace."

--Soviet Military Power

--an assessment of Soviet military policies (to be developed by State/EUR).

July 15, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: State/P - David Lowenfeld
FROM: USIA/P/PACO - John S. Williams
SUBJECT: European Security Issues: Press Initiatives

Attached are comments by Frank Gomez, USIA's Director of Foreign Press Centers, on the second of your proposals for enhanced attention to the media on security issues. My office agrees with Gomez that a series of weekly seminars for Washington-based foreign bureau heads who do not specialize in security affairs, but who must cover them, would be useful. If done well, such an exercise would not only enhance the participants' general knowledge and thus presumably enable them to treat the issues more effectively, but might also generate some copy.

USIA, for legal reasons, has more difficulty with the idea of bringing American correspondents to Europe for a conference on regional security. As you know, we are enjoined from funding or participating in projects whose purpose is to create a favorable atmosphere for understanding of U.S. foreign policy within this country. On the other hand, the Agency would have no difficulty considering funding for those European journalists participating in this event. In point of fact, we consider this idea to be potentially very useful to our public affairs efforts in Europe.

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meeting
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INF: Press
Initiatives

July 14, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR:

P - John Scott Williams

FROM:

P/F - Frank D. Gomez *FDG*

SUBJECT:

Arms Control and Defense Issues Seminars

SUMMARY

In response to EUR and security issues staff suggestions, the Foreign Press Centers proposes a series of six weekly briefings by officials from State, DOD, NSC and ACDA for Washington-based foreign correspondents that would better equip them to write more balanced stories on U.S. security policy.

BACKGROUND

The most authoritative and influential news articles on U.S. security policies in Europe are written by a relatively few of the foreign journalist corps in Washington. It is in the national interest to increase the number of correspondents with sufficient background on the subject to write balanced and informative stories that may counter common misperceptions in Europe and elsewhere.

We propose, therefore, a series of specialized briefings on arms control issues, the Soviet challenge, European public opinion, European security and NATO for a select group of about 30 correspondents who would benefit most by them.

Among the experts we plan to invite as briefers are Kenneth L. Adelman, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Fred C. Ikle; Assistant Secretary of State Richard R. Burt; Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Richard N. Perle; Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces Policy Ronald F. Lehman; Edward M. Malloy, Director of the office of Nuclear Policy and Operations, Department of State, and a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

The format would be a series of 60 to 90-minute background presentations by these experts, preferably in the offices of the briefing officials, followed by Q and A sessions.

The Foreign Press Centers would coordinate the invitations with the press offices of the departments involved.

The briefings would have distinct foreign policy advantages:

- they would provide the overview and perspective needed by those who report daily on American security policy issues;
- they would acquaint correspondents with senior officials responsible for specific regions and issues;
- they would build a foundation of trust and mutual cooperation required for effective communication of U.S. policy;
- they would acquaint officials with attitudes and perceptions of those who interpret U.S. policy for audiences abroad;
- they would demonstrate the importance the administration attaches to foreign public opinion and foreign media in the conduct of its foreign relations.

We believe this series of briefings would be instrumental in correcting misperceptions abroad about U.S. policy and its objectives, and we seek full security issues staff support in carrying them out.