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Collection: Raymond, Walter: Files
Folder Title: [Unfolded – Project Truth, Project
Democracy, Public Diplomacy & NED June
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name RAYMOND, WALTER: FILES

Withdrawer

SMF 7/14/2011

File Folder [PROJECT TRUTH, PROJECT DEMOCRACY, PUBLIC DIPLOMACY, AND NED JUNE 1986]

FOIA

M430

Box Number 7

LAMB,
CHRISTOPHER

73

| ID | Doc Type | Document Description | No of | Doc Date | Restrictions |
|--------|----------|---|-------|-----------|--------------|
| 115223 | MINUTES | ACTIVE MEASURES WORKING GROUP 6/5/86 MEETING P 11/21/2002 F95-041/2 #83; PAR M430/2 #115223 | 3 | 6/9/1986 | B1 B3 B6 |
| 115224 | MEMO | ACTIVE MEASURES MEMO #8 OF 1986 P 11/21/2002 F95-041/2 #83; PAR M430/2 #115224 | 5 | 6/4/1986 | B1 B3 |
| 115226 | NOTES | HANDWRITTEN IN PENCIL AND PEN ON YELLOW LEGAL PAPER RE ACTIVE MEASURES WORKING GROUP ET AL R 7/19/2000 NLSF95-041/2 #85 | 1 | ND | B1 |
| 115228 | NOTES | HANDWRITTEN PEN ON YELLOW LEGAL PAPER RE CHERNOBYL R 7/19/2000 NLSF95-041/2 #86 | 1 | ND | B1 |
| 115231 | CABLE | 170137Z JUN 86 [STATE 190562] P 8/27/1999 NLSF95-041/2 #87 | 1 | 6/17/1986 | B1 |
| 115232 | CABLE | 050024Z JUN 86 D 7/3/2000 F95-041/2 #88; UPHELD M430/2 #115232 | 2 | 6/5/1986 | B1 B3 |
| 115234 | NOTES | HANDWRITTEN IN GREEN PEN R 7/19/2000 NLSF95-041/2 #89 | 1 | 11/7/1986 | B1 |

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name RAYMOND, WALTER: FILES

Withdrawer

SMF 7/14/2011

File Folder [PROJECT TRUTH, PROJECT DEMOCRACY, PUBLIC DIPLOMACY, AND NED JUNE 1986]

FOIA

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CHRISTOPHER

73

| ID | Doc Type | Document Description | No of | Doc Date | Restrictions |
|--------|----------|---|-------|-----------|--------------|
| 115236 | CABLE | 022116Z JUN 86 D 7/3/2000 F95-041/2 #90; PAR M430/2 #115236 | 3 | 6/2/1986 | B1 B3 |
| 115241 | MINUTES | ACTIVE MEASURES WORKING GROUP 6/19/86 MEETING P 11/21/2002 F95-041/2 #91; PAR M430/2 #115241 | 3 | 6/20/1986 | B1 B3 B6 |
| 115242 | MINUTES | ACTIVE MEASURES WORKING GROUP 7/8/86 MEETING P 11/21/2002 NLSF95-041/2 #92 | 3 | 7/8/1986 | B1 B3 B6 |
| 115243 | MEMO | ACTIVE MEASURES MEMO #9 OF 1986 P 11/21/2002 NF95-041/2 #93; PAR M430/2 #115243 | 5 | 6/18/1986 | B1 B3 |
| 115244 | MEMO | ACTIVE MEASURES MEMO #10 OF 1986 P 11/21/2002 F95-041/2 #94; PAR M430/2 #115244 | 4 | 7/2/1986 | B1 B3 |

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: RAYMOND, WALTER: Files

Archivist: lov

File Folder: [Project Truth, Project Democracy, Public Diplomacy, and NED 6/86] OA 91162

Date: January 27, 1998

| DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|-----------------------|---|-----------------|---------------|
| 1. minutes | Active Measures Working Group 6/5/86 meeting (3) <i>Part. 11/21/02 F95-041/2 #83</i> | 6/9/86 | P1, B3, B6 |
| 2. memo | Active Measures Memo #8 of 1986 (5) <i>Part. #84</i> | 6/4/86 | P1, B3 |
| 3. notes | handwritten in pencil and pen on yellow legal paper, re Active Measures Working Group et al (1) A 7/19/00 NLSF95-041/2 #85 | nd | P1 |
| 4. notes | handwritten pen on yellow legal paper, re Chernobyl et al (1) A 7/19/00 NLSF95-041/2 #86 | nd | P1 |
| 5. cable | 170137Z JUN 86 (1) <i>P 8/27/99 NLSF95-041/2 #87</i> | 6/17/86 | P1 |
| 6. cable | 050024Z JUN 86 (2) <i>D 7/3/00 NLSF95-041/2 #88</i> | 6/5/86 | P1/F3 |
| 7. notes | handwritten in green pen (1) R 7/19/00 NLSF95-041/2 #89 | 11/7 | P1 |
| 8. cable | 022116Z JUN 86 (3) <i>D 7/3/00 NLSF95-041/2 #90</i> | 6/2/86 | P1/F3 |
| 9. minutes | Active Measures Working Group 6/19/86 meeting (3) <i>Part. 11/21/02 F95-041/2 #91</i> | 6/20/86 | P1, B3, B6 |
| 10. minutes | Active Measures Working Group 7/8/86 meeting (3) <i>Part. #92</i> | 7/8/86 | P1, B3, B6 |
| 11. memo | Active Measures Memo #9 of 1986 (5) <i>Part. #93</i> | 6/18/86 | P1, B3 |
| 12. memo | Active Measures Memo #10 of 1986 (4) <i>Part. #94</i> | 7/2/86 | P1, B3 |

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].



United States Department of State 351

Washington, D.C. 20520


DEOB

June 9, 1986

~~SECRET~~/NOFORN

MEMORANDUM

TO: Active Measures Working Group

FROM: INR/ID - Kathleen C. Bayley 

SUBJECT: Minutes of Working Group Meeting
of June 5, 1986

F-SNG

135216
E. O. ~~12958~~
As Amended
Sec. 3.3 b(1)
3.5c

The meeting was chaired by Dr. Bailey. Attending were: Dr. Lenczowski (NSC), Mr. Romerstein (USIA), [redacted], [redacted], Mr. Copp (USIA), Mr. Houghton (FBI), Mr. Sheren (INR/IC), Mr. Knecht (PA/OAP), Ms. Friedt (INR/SEE), Mr. Rapoport (INR/IC), [redacted], [redacted], Mr. Thompson (ARA/RPP), Mr. Valentine (FBI), and Mr. Harbin (EAP/RA).

I. Publications

Ms. Friedt completed the first draft of the Foreign Affairs Note (FAN) on the decision by non-communist Danish groups to boycott the proposed October World Peace Congress in Copenhagen. It is now in review and should be released later this summer. CIA has just disseminated its quarterly Active Measures Alert. Mr. Houghton stated that his unclassified study of active measures in the US for the Gingrich report is still in final review, but should be available shortly.

II. Gingrich Amendment

Dr. Bailey noted that the Gingrich report must be submitted to State's Bureau of Congressional Relations (H) by June 30 for transfer to the NSC. She stressed the need for members to finish their assigned portions as soon as possible.

III. Embassy Active Measures Committees

During Dr. Bailey's consultations with the regional bureaus, the idea emerged that Embassies in countries where major active measures activity takes place should establish committees to meet on a regular basis and exchange information

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DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLRR M430/2 #115223
BY RW NARA DATE 3/31/15

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- 2 -

and coordinate responses to active measures. [redacted]

[redacted] This should help eliminate some of the problems in coordination at posts that has been noted in the past. We have accordingly drafted a cable for all State posts requesting selected Embassies to establish such a committee and suggesting that other posts may wish to follow suit. The cable is now in the clearance process.

IV. Current Active Measures

Mr. Rapoport reviewed the current active measures in Memo No. 8, highlighting the new forgery that surfaced in Nigeria, an alleged State Department document entitled "U.S. Strategy in Foreign Policy, 1985-88." The document appears to be a fairly sophisticated piece, suggestive of the Kirkpatrick speech in scope. Only the Africa-related portions of the study appeared in Nigerian newsmagazine African Guardian, and it is possible that other purported excerpts may emerge elsewhere.

There was also much new reporting about media manipulation activities of the Soviet Information Department (SID) in India. [redacted]

Dr. Bailey noted that Embassy Rangoon responded to the Soviet propagandizing of Burmese Muslims by alerting the appropriate Burmese authorities and providing them with copies of the often anti-US tracts. We have sent a cable to Rangoon commending them for their initiative.

V. New Business

Mr. Rapoport reported that he had spoken to Mr. Paul Cook regarding Dr. Lenczowski's suggestion that fellowships be created for Ph.D students working on active measures-related topics using the Lugar funds for Soviet studies. Mr. Cook responded that these funds had to be channelled through established national organizations active in the field of Slavic studies, and that interested students should apply to these organizations. Dr. Bailey noted that INR's long range planning office might have some extra money that could be used in this fashion. Dr. Lenczowski urged that we try to arrange funding for this project apart from the Lugar funds.

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- 3 -

Mr. Romerstein noted that that recent NSC memo expressing a strong interest in the active measures working group had been extremely useful in terms of sensitizing USIA to the importance of this program. ||

Mr. Knecht stressed the need to send future briefing teams to the Pacific area. Dr. Bailey agreed and suggested that such a team also visit South Asia. ||

Mr. Sheren screened a Canadian film on active measures, "The Deception Network," for the group. Reaction was highly positive.

The next meeting of the active measures working group will be held on Thursday, June 19 at 10:00 A.M. in the INR Conference Room, 6530 NS. Members with agenda items should contact Sheldon Rapoport (647-5899).

Drafted:
INR/IC: SJRapoport
6/9/86 647-5899
Wang Doc #0164A

~~SECRET~~



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

June 4, 1986

SECRET/ WNINTEL/ NOFORN/ NOCON/ ORCON

MEMORANDUM

TO: Active Measures Working Group
FROM: INR/ID - Kathleen C. Bailey *SK*
SUBJECT: Active Measures Memo #8 of 1986

13526
E. O. 12958
As Amended
Sec. 3.3 b(1)

1. Nigeria: Magazine Publishes "Secret" State Document

Independent Nigerian newsmagazine African Guardian of June 5 published alleged excerpts of a lengthy secret State Department document entitled "U.S. Strategy in Foreign Policy, 1985-88" in an article headlined "Washington Connection: Secret State Department Document Reveals It All." The document, among other things, states:

- constructive engagement with Pretoria has justified expectations;
- UNSC Resolution 435 on Namibia is outdated and no longer reflects the actual situation or the wider interests of the free world;
- our assistance to the opposition movements (in Angola and Mozambique) should be increased and coordinated with that of Pretoria;
- an actual U.S. military presence in the Horn of Africa is necessary ... we should contribute to ... (an) alliance of Somalia, Kenya, Uganda, Sudan, and Egypt to defend our common interests and ... isolate the Marxist regime of Ethiopia; and
- we must seek ... to influence (Nigerian) political processes, exploiting in this connection the capabilities of Nigerian emigrants.

The document is an apparent fraud. The PAO has been instructed to challenge the editor to produce the original for technical analysis. (INR/ID Comment: This appears to be a sophisticated fraud and is reminiscent in its scope of the Kirkpatrick speech. (UNCLAS: Lagos 6180, 30 May 86)

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DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLRR M430/R#15224
BY RW NARA DATE 3/31/15

2. India:B. Pakistan Uses Missiles Against Indian Aircraft!

Several Delhi papers carried a May 25 Press Trust of India (PTI) report that Pakistan had used Stinger missiles against an Indian aircraft on the Siachin Glacier, a disputed border area that has seen some military activity. The missiles allegedly were given to Pakistan by the US for use by Afghan rebels. Radio Moscow has also replayed the story, which is pure disinformation. Embassy Islamabad reports that complicated accounting storage and procedures govern Stinger deployments and, to its belief, the missiles are where they are supposed to be. Pakistan's Foreign Ministry issued a statement terming the charge "baseless." (CONF: New Delhi 13017, 27 May 86; Islamabad 11764, 29 May 86)

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- 3 -

3. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

4. Soviet Active Measures in Mexican Media

Soviet active measures in Mexico are conducted with discretion and are designed to influence the climate for change there.

[REDACTED]

The Soviets use a wide variety of means, including their wire services and leftist-oriented Mexican and exile journalists, to influence local media. Other communist countries, following the Soviet example, generate excellent media coverage of the many public events and functions they host locally.

The Soviets tend to emphasize anti-American rather pro-Soviet themes, a deliberate means for hiding their disinformation efforts. The Mexican press will typically identify five or more sources for a single article, including references to Bloc wire services. (In addition to their wire services, five Soviet media organizations have offices in Mexico City.) The items are carefully tailored for the Mexican leftist-nationalist audience.

5. US Behind Berlin Disco Bombing: A Reprise

A. May 31 Pravda printed a letter by Charge Combs protesting the May 7 publication of a story from South Yemen that the US was behind the Berlin disco bombing. Pravda commented that the US Embassy shouldn't seek to censor the Soviet press and that the CIA had been behind many similar atrocities. (UNCLAS: FBIS III, 2 June 86, A1-2)

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- 4 -

B. The Czechs responded verbally to a non-paper protesting a similar May 17 story in Rude Pravo, "Provocative Blast Prepared by CIA," claiming that they merely reported the story as printed in a Beirut paper and that they did not consider themselves at fault if the article was in error. PAO informed the Czech official that this reply was "insufficient." (LOU: Prague 2977, 2 June 86)

6. Briefly Noted: Suspected Active Measures

A.

B. Korea: US Military Atrocities Charged

Leaflets circulating among Korean student groups charge that there were cases of gang rape by US military personnel committed against two Korean females during the recent joint US/ROK "Team Spirit" exercise. According to Embassy enquiries, no such incident took place. A public statement was issued. (INR/ID Comment: The charges are similar to those regarding the joint US/Honduran military exercises earlier this year.) (UNCLAS: Seoul 4562, 21 May 86)

C. Soviets Propagandize Burmese Muslims

Soviet Embassy officers and influence agents in Rangoon continue to actively distribute propaganda among the Burmese Muslim community (about 10% of the population) portraying the USSR as a friend of Islam and the US as its enemy. Embassy Rangoon has informed appropriate Burmese authorities. (S NF LIMDIS: USDAO Rangoon 2834, 221003z May 86 and Rangoon 2995, 3 June 86)

D. Ghana Claims US Behind South African Raids

Ghana's People's Daily Graphic charged that the South African raids against three Frontline states were part of a conspiracy "hatched against Africa by US imperialist circles using South Africa and Israel and the complicity of the NATO alliance." (UNCLAS: FBIS V, 21 May 86, T1)

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- 5 -

E. Zhukov To Chair Peace Year Committee

The Soviets established a committee to coordinate preparatory work for the World Peace Congress under the chairmanship of Soviet Peace Committee head Yuriy Zhukov. (UNCLAS: FBIS III, 2 June 86, CC6-7)

F. Religious Conference Praises Soviet Arms Control Policy

A conference on the problems of fighting hunger, poverty, and the arms race organized in Moscow by the World Conference of Religious Leaders concluded on May 26. About 70 religious leaders from 30 countries took part under the chairmanship of Paul Mar Gregorios of India, a noted front group activist. The final communique expressed concern about US aggression against Libya and South African aggression against Zimbabwe, Botswana, and Angola. (UNCLAS: FBIS III, 2 June 86, CC5-6)

G. Turkey: Clandestine Radio Alleges Libyans Tortured

Turkish Communist clandestine station Our Radio charged on May 23 that the Libyans being held for the attempted bombing of the US Officers' Club in Ankara were interrogated "by English-speaking people in a room with an American flag" and were tortured. (FBIS: VII, 23 May 86, T1)

Drafted: *SLM*
INR/IC/CD: *ADSheren/SJRapoport*
6/4/86 647-8357/647-5899
Wang Doc 0157A

~~SECRET~~

1. A/MWG
 - Upgrade levels.

2. IIC
 -

Go down to
prepare
minutes

- US policy initiative to be taken in
admission action -

- Think of personnel - stimulate policy
actors.

NAM - 26 Aug - 7 Sept - Harare
Chemobyl - (6-9 Aug.) - Harare.
WPL 11-19 Oct - Copenhagen
CSCE Vienna - Nov 5

SDI

CBW - Sverdlovsk (attribution in Empress)

Nuclear-bio-chem (bip. for + redaction)
2:30

Themes - CBW

o Talk to Jim re this - !?

o Talk re Sverdlovsk - CIA

4 June

① all ✓

Chemobyl

o Hungarian guidelines exp. - Notes - delay ✓
o Need to press intl controls Exhaustive

② all ✓

Goals do be achieved

-- Soviets be forced to conf w intl standards.
Issues where we have belated it.

③ W2 ✓

Pre-plan paper - Hutchinson
Copyability - Burton

Nuc
Bio
Chem

DECLASSIFIED/Released

NLS F95-0412#85

BY amf, NARA, DATE 2/19/08



CHERNOBYL — Palmer/Bishop — Sverdlovsk, Hungary.

NAM (Aug) — Zimbalist — Hatcher

WPC (Oct) — Copestake — Renshaw

Report on their depts

Views — what could be accomplished. (identity issues + assets to be utilized)

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NLS F95-041/2 #86

BY Amf, NARA, DATE 7/19/08

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT

F- JNG

PAGE #1 SECSTATE WASHDC #562 DTG: 170137Z JUN 86 PSN: #28474
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~~SECRET~~ STATE 190562

NOFORN

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PROP, PINR, SCOM
SUBJECT: COUNTERING SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES

FOR CHIEFS OF MISSION FROM UNDER SECRETARY ARMACOST

REF: 85 STATE 70751

1. ~~THE ENTIRE~~ TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: TO BETTER COUNTER AN ANTICIPATED INCREASE
IN ACTIVE MEASURES ACTIVITY, WE ARE ASKING SELECTED
EMBASSIES TO ESTABLISH ACTIVE MEASURES COMMITTEES
CONSISTING OF REPRESENTATIVES OF STATE, USIS, AND CIA.
END SUMMARY.

3. SOVIET AND SOVIET SURROGATE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES
HAVE LONG USED ACTIVE MEASURES AND ALLIED COVERT ACTION
TECHNIQUES SUCH AS FORGERIES, MEDIA MANIPULATION,
POLITICAL INFLUENCE OPERATIONS AND FRONT GROUPS TO TURN
OFFICIAL AND PUBLIC OPINION IN FAVOR OF LONG-TERM SOVIET
FOREIGN POLICY GOALS. WE EXPECT THAT THIS ACTIVITY WILL
INCREASE OVER COMING MONTHS AND INDEED IN COMING YEARS,

PARTICULARLY IN AREAS SUCH AS SDI, DISARMAMENT, AND
TERRORISM, AS A REVITALIZED AND MORE SOPHISTICATED
LEADERSHIP IS INSTALLED IN THE SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES
POLICYMAKING APPARATUS.

4. AN INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP, CHAIRED BY STATE AND
INCLUDING REPRESENTATION FROM USIA, CIA, DOD, FBI, THE
NSC, AND OTHERS HAS PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY WITHIN THE USG
FOR COUNTERING ACTIVE MEASURES. WHILE THESE EFFORTS,
UNOBTAINED IN COOPERATION WITH OUR POSTS, HAVE MET WITH
CONSIDERABLE SUCCESS, MUCH MORE CAN BE DONE. WORKING
GROUP MEMBERS, INCLUDING THE NSC, ARE PLACING INCREASED
EMPHASIS ON ACTIVE MEASURES AND PLANNING TO INCREASE THE
RESOURCES DEVOTED TO THIS PROGRAM.

5. ACTIVE MEASURES REPORTING FROM POSTS VARIES WIDELY IN
ITS QUALITY AND QUANTITY. FROM ACTIVE MEASURES BRIEFING
TRIPS, WE HAVE LEARNED THAT EMBASSY ATTEMPTS TO COUNTER
ACTIVE MEASURES ACTIVITY HAVE AT TIMES BEEN STYMIED BY

PROBLEMS IN COORDINATION. AGENCIES THAT SHOULD BE
INVOLVED OFTEN FAIL TO DISCUSS ACTIVE MEASURES MATTERS AT
THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL AND TO ACT IN CONCERT. BOTH
CLASSIFIED AND UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION SENT TO ONE
AGENCY AT POST OFTEN IS NOT SHARED WITH OTHERS WHERE IT
COULD BE PUT TO EFFECTIVE USE.

6. TO IMPROVE ACTIVE MEASURES REPORTING AND TO
INSTITUTIONALIZE STRATEGY SESSIONS TO COUNTER SUCH
ACTIVITIES, I AM ASKING SELECTED EMBASSIES (SEE FOLLOWING
PARAGRAPH) TO ESTABLISH COMMITTEES TO FOCUS SPECIFICALLY
ON ACTIVE MEASURES. THESE BODIES WOULD CONSIST OF
REPRESENTATIVES FROM STATE (PRESUMABLY A POLITICAL
OFFICER), USIS, [REDACTED] AND WOULD BE ESTABLISHED ONLY IN
COUNTRIES THAT APPEAR TO BE THE TARGETS OF SIGNIFICANT
ACTIVE MEASURES ACTIVITY.

7. I REQUEST THE FOLLOWING POSTS TO ESTABLISH ACTIVE
MEASURES COMMITTEES: ACCRA, ATHENS, ANKARA, BERN, BONN,
BRASILIA, BRUSSELS, BUENOS AIRES, CAMBERRA, CARACAS,
COPENHAGEN, DAMASCUS, DHAKA, HARARE, ISLAMABAD, JAKARTA,
KUWAIT, LAGOS, LIMA, LISBON, LONDON, LUSAKA, MADRID,
MANILA, MEXICO, NAIROBI, NEW DELHI, OTTAWA, PARIS, ROME,
SAN JOSE, STOCKHOLM, THE HAGUE, TOKYO, VIENNA. OTHER
POSTS ARE ALSO ENCOURAGED TO ESTABLISH SUCH COMMITTEES
DEPENDING ON LOCAL CIRCUMSTANCES.

8. WE DO NOT WISH TO IMPOSE ONE MORE BURDENSOME
REQUIREMENT ON ALREADY BUSY MISSIONS. I PROPOSE LIMITING
THE ACTIVE MEASURES COMMITTEES TO ONLY THOSE POSTS THAT

HAVE BEEN SERIOUSLY AFFECTED BY ACTIVE MEASURES
ACTIVITY. WE ALSO DO NOT ENVISION THIS COMMITTEE GETTING
TOGETHER ON ANY MORE THAN A MONTHLY BASIS BARRING TIMES
OF EXCESSIVE ACTIVE MEASURES ACTIVITY, BUT LEAVE THAT TO
THE JUDGEMENT OF EACH COM.

9. THE EMBASSY ACTIVE MEASURES COMMITTEE WOULD HELP
ASSURE THAT INDIVIDUALS RESPONSIBLE FOR REPORTING AND FOR
COUNTERING ACTIVE MEASURES DO INDEED TALK TO EACH OTHER
ON A REGULAR BASIS. THE PROGRAM INSPECTOR GENERAL WILL
REQUEST INSPECTION TEAMS TO REVIEW THE OPERATIONS OF THE
ACTIVE MEASURES COMMITTEES DURING POST INSPECTIONS.

10. THIS CABLE HAS BEEN COORDINATED WITH USIA [REDACTED]
WHO WILL BE INFORMING THEIR RESPECTIVE COMPONENTS VIA
THEIR OWN CHANNELS.

11. I REQUEST YOUR PERSONAL ASSISTANCE IN THIS EFFORT TO
IMPROVE OUR RESPONSE CAPABILITY TO THE THREAT POSED TO
OUR INTERESTS BY SOVIET AND SURROGATE ACTIVE MEASURES. SHULTZ
BT

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS F95-0412 # 89

By [REDACTED], NARA, Date 8/27/99

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

DBS

T NN

~~Done~~
~~Report in Dec~~
Rays → Cope in it and Rpt - Neg.

1) RFEAL/VOA

- { ~~High~~ Officers Ent wife
- ③ Contracting
- ④ Work - for home
- Field " (Tech / subs)
- RFEAL —

2) #1 - How to deal w. adversarial country with mystery.

3) #3 - Will distribute

4) #7 - DOD - 1 Dec

CIA → Economic analysis of trade - M. —
→ Keep responsibility.
→

7) → Institute of the Study of USSR (Utilizing New Wave)

• US Funding for Soviet Studies

• Soviet Studies { Paul Simon, Lee Hamilton }
Doubt legal.

→ Institute for studying Suf of Soviet & Western countries —
WR - TO review Pols acts PLUS something in Cayman.

13) TV to USSR

— Circulate papers re MODO to purges + in next WG

— TV Rpt - Will be very good in part

Q.V. DBS - ?!

14. Director Dial -

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DRAFT

WALT

RAYMOND

Look forward to
talking w/ you
Walt. T. Harvey

ACTION

PLEASE RETURN W/
COMMENTS/LINE INS-
LINE-OUTS BY COB
26 SEPT. TO:

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

PRM/10 - Nati
Start Comm

TOM HARVEY

FROM:

WILLIAM A. COCKELL/PETER W. RODMAN

RM 374

Ph: 5633

SUBJECT:

National Strategy

① FA. buffer

② Democ. Prog

THANKS!

BACKGROUND:

As you are aware, an element of the soon to be signed DOD Reorganization Bill requires the President to transmit to Congress a comprehensive report on the National Strategy of the United States. (Tab I)

With this requirement the Administration is presented with several opportunities:

-- capture the momentum of a significant number of ongoing strategy initiatives (Tab II);

-- provide a vehicle to limit almost certain degradation of 050/150 budgets;

-- put the President out front as a visionary leader charting a course for future world peace and prosperity;

-- develop a blueprint for the future that would be the foundation of the Reagan National Security legacy;

-- offer the President's successor a comprehensive National Strategy focus that captures the imagination of the public and the Congress and takes the offensive in the foreign affairs and defense field;

-- raise the public's awareness of the essential elements of our National Strategy as well as raise the level of Congressional debate from micromanagement of program specifics to broader strategic issues and;

-- head off Democratic criticism concerning incoherent defense and foreign policy handling by the Reagan Administration.

DISCUSSION:

All too often the Reagan Administration has been criticized for not having a coordinated plan, policy or strategy to deal with defense and foreign policy issues. The government is perceived as being engaged in crisis management, reacting to current issues, and responding to domestic political expediencies to the neglect of developing, obtaining Congressional and public support for, and implementing comprehensive and long-term plans to advance U.S. interests on the international scene.

This criticism was most recently articulated in a mainstream document written by Charles Robb, Sam Nunn, Al Gore and Les Aspin for the Democratic Leadership Conference.

The document presented what it termed "thoughtful, cost effective alternatives" to current policy. A policy which it described as being "marred by several pervasive flaws: the lack of a coherent defense strategy related to this country's foreign policy aims and allied capabilities; its failure to pursue arms control with alacrity and imagination; the general incoherence of its strategic program, especially its failure to close the "window of vulnerability" and to define clearly the scope and purpose of its Strategic Defense Initiative; and its ill-conceived hostility to military reorganization and reform."

Much of this criticism is not deserved. There are very defined and well thought out elements of U.S. strategy: nuclear deterrence, NATO strategy, Pacific strategy, Maritime strategy, SW Asia scenario to name a few. The fundamental problem lies in the fact that much of the thought supporting these strategies lies buried in NSDDs, is rarely interrelated and most often remains unexplained to a questioning public. This causes a linkage deficiency which ripples through U.S. defense and foreign policy causing fits and starts in the eyes of our allies, Congress and the nation.

A result of this confusion is increased Congressional interference in foreign and defense issues, continued budget assaults on needed programs, and confusion on the part of our allies. The pressures of Gramm-Rudman, the evolving debate on SDI and its relationship to the nuclear threshold, our arms control objectives, and an increasingly belligerent Congress with "electionitis" will only make the situation worse, particularly in the next two years.

In the next ten to twenty year period, American Presidents will have to face a fundamental imperative.

This imperative will be a REDEFINITION OF HIGH STRATEGY IN WORLD AFFAIRS AND OF NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS.

A redefinition of the post-World War II conception of national security and "vital interests" will be the indispensable condition for freeing sufficient economic and political energies to cope with the necessary reconstruction of domestic U.S. economic policies and institutions.

A redefinition of high strategy and national security will have to accommodate a new configuration of international power that will make the cold war assumptions and outlook of the last 35 years basically obsolete, especially the almost universally accepted notion that containment will continue to operate effectively. This thinking has to change to deal effectively in the emerging world power configuration.

This Administration should BEGIN NOW to lay the building blocks for this transition past the end of the Reagan term of office. The Reagan National Security Strategy has to be built upon with the objective of lasting past the tenure of the President. TIMING is the key to this approach. Why? Because of two factors which did not exist even several years ago in the United States. First, there is emerging a significant number of top level initiatives in the country that focus on movement toward a more coherent and integrated National Security Strategy. (Tab II)

Second, and most importantly, President Reagan has the highest rating of any President in public opinion standing at this point in office, in modern history. This is a President who stands in a trusted position with the American people. This is the key to this approach.

President Reagan has the opportunity now to set in place the implementation of a U.S. National Security Strategy, on an integrated basis, which can set the course of events for the next 10-20 years.

If this approach is adopted and the process begun, this Administration can leave the nation with a Reagan legacy in the National Security Strategy area which cannot be quickly unraveled.

What this approach seeks is to establish a longer-term, less erratic course for both foreign policy and defense policy which will allow the United States to move forward in the international competition on both the super power level and sub super power levels.

As this approach is rolled out for both U.S. domestic and foreign consumption, the appeal should be that it is a striking departure from prior Administrations. If the President can appropriately deliver key building blocks in carefully selected forums, foreign policy momentum and defense momentum can be maintained. To maintain momentum of the past 5½ year period is the objective. This Administration has been able to successfully turn the tide in both defense and foreign policy arenas. The gains of the past years should not be lost because of inaction in this particular area.

It is imperative that a major thrust of the last two years of the Reagan Administration be toward setting in place the National Strategy framework for the next 10-20 years.

This approach can only be successful if formulated and implemented at the Presidential level through the National Security Council.

What is critical in this approach is the understanding that we are not starting from scratch. As mentioned previously, many elements of our defense and foreign policy are extremely well thought out. The Reagan Doctrine, as misunderstood as it is, has a very solid strategic rational as its foundation. What has been lacking is the "packaging," and "marketing" of such plans that demonstrate the linkage with foreign and defense policy considerations.

There are, however, areas in the U.S. strategy arena which do need "shoring up." The proposed NSSD to look at conventional force modernization and low intensity conflict deals with two essential elements which have long been overlooked and require a clear and comprehensive strategy. While aggressive and positive action has been taken to come to grips with U.S. counter-drug, counterterrorism responsibilities, these plans are still immature and need to be "honed" to have the level of response necessary to be successful.

The Packard Commission recommendations included a very strong statement concerning the need to relate strategy to military requirements. NSDD 219 and the implementation of the Packard Commission is an aggressive beginning. The NSDD 32 follow-on is another positive step toward translating national strategy objectives into concrete strategies for meeting security requirements. It builds on NSDD 238 which highlighted the need for modernization of our conventional forces.

These building blocks of National Strategy policy and the previously mentioned "pockets of strategy initiative," (Tab II) underscore the need for a clear and comprehensive National Strategy. A strategy that integrates foreign and defense policy. A strategy that can be articulated and understood by Congress, the nation and our allies. A strategy that allows the President to "get his arms around" the many pieces of the National Strategy puzzle and present a clear vision for the future. A strategy that incorporates those elements of our defense and foreign policy which are rather well defined, but not adequately linked and those areas which are immature in terms of development.

CONCLUSION:

The requirement to develop a National Security Strategy document emanated from a strong desire on the part of Congress to have all the elements of strategy mentioned above pulled together and balanced with foreign policy considerations. (Tab III) There is no better time than now, and there is no better place than the NSC to accomplish such a task.

The President has the unique opportunity to pull all the positive energy surrounding these strategy issues together, saddle that pony and ride it well past his term in office. His Packard Commission can easily be credited with providing the genesis for the "strategy movement." He should claim it, embrace it and put it to work in a lasting framework of strategic vision. The development and delivery of the first Presidential National Security Strategy report provides the opportunity to lay the cornerstone of the Reagan National Security legacy.

RECOMMENDATION

That the President put his name and support behind the strategy movement and approve the action plan outlined at Tab IV.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Danzansky, Raymond, Teicher and Sable concur.

TAB I

"ANNUAL NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY REPORT

"Sec. 104. (a)(1) The President shall transmit to Congress each year a comprehensive report on the national security strategy of the United States (hereinafter in this section referred to as a 'national security strategy report').

"(2) The national security strategy report for any year shall be transmitted on the date on which the President submits to Congress the budget for the next fiscal year under section 1105 of title 31, United States Code.

"(b) Each national security strategy report shall set forth the national security strategy of the United States and shall include a comprehensive description and discussion of the following:

"(1) The worldwide interests, goals, and objectives of the United States that are vital to the national security of the United States.

(2) The foreign policy, worldwide commitments, and national defense capabilities of the United States necessary to deter aggression and to implement the national security strategy of the United States.

(3) The proposed short-term and long-term uses of the political, economic, military, and other elements of the national power of the United States to protect or promote the interests and achieve the goals and objectives referred to in paragraph (1).

(4) The adequacy of the capabilities of the United States to carry out the national security strategy of the United States, including an evaluation of the balance among the capabilities of all elements of the national power of the United States to support the implementation of the national security strategy.

"(5) Such other information as may be necessary to help inform Congress on matters relating to the national security strategy of the United States.

"(c) Each national security strategy report shall be transmitted in both a classified and an unclassified form."

(2) The table of contents in the first section of such Act is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 103 the following new item:

"Sec. 104. Annual national security strategy report."

TAB II

NATIONAL STRATEGY INITIATIVES

- PACKARD COMMISSION - "Today there is no rational system whereby the Executive Branch and the Congress reach coherent and enduring agreement on the National Military Strategy, the forces to carry it out and the funding that should be provided."
- CONGRESSIONAL NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY ACT - "Requires the President to provide a foundation report on the National Strategy at the beginning of each year. Joint sessions of the SASC, HASC and Foreign Relations Committees will be convened to hear joint presentation of the document by the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense."
- REVISED NSDD 32 - "This grand strategy requires the development and integration of a set of strategies to achieve our national objectives, including political, diplomatic, military, informational, economic, intelligence, and arms control components. This NSDD shall serve as the starting point for further development of policy and strategy"
- DOD COMPETITIVE STRATEGIES - "Competitive Strategies capitalize on our long-term strengths in ways that exploit Soviet long-term weaknesses. The hallmark of this Administration's defense program in the second term will be the search to identify and implement competitive strategies for deterrence."
- INTEGRATED LONG TERM STRATEGY PROJECT - "A changing and demanding environment dictates the need for a coherent long-term strategy in developing policy for the research and introduction of US and Allied weapons systems."
- CONVENTIONAL FORCE MODERNIZATION - "U.S. Conventional Strategy is not clear. A need exists to integrate regional strategies into a cohesive global concept of operations to highlight potential problems and provide a coordinated framework for addressing procurement decisions."
- LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT - "US is doomed to blunder through an increasingly violent future of terrorism, guerilla warfare and peacetime contingencies unless it sets a clear strategy." NSSD study proposal has been submitted to address improving U.S. conventional/low intensity conflict strategy.
- GLOBAL STRATEGY SYMPOSIUM - Two day seminar held at NDU, attended by many senior individuals from this Administration as well as past Administrations highlights the interest and attention given to the National Strategy issue.
- GLOBAL STRATEGY COUNCIL - (President Mike Daniels) - Active participation of private organizations, spearheaded by this council lends an ever expanding network of support to the issue, at a senior government and civilian level as well as grass roots.

A few of the groups actively pursuing this issue under the orchestration of the Global Strategy Council are CSIS, Heritage, Council for National Policy, Citizens for America, National Forum Foundation, High Frontier, International Strategic Studies Association, Defense and Foreign Affairs publications group.

-- STRATEGIC POLICY THROUGH THE TURN OF THE CENTURY - CSIS Bud McFarlane pulled together a bipartisan group addressing basic questions on strategic nuclear policy, arms control and strategic defense in order to develop a set of National Security policies for the future.

-- DEMOCRATIC LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE NATIONAL DEFENSE REPORT - A group of centrist Democrats lead by Robb, Nunn, Gore and Aspin outlined in this mainstream document what it termed as thoughtful, cost effective alternatives to Reagan defense and foreign policy.

-- FOUNDATION FOR THE COHESION OF THE WEST - High level effort led by Helderman and Eagleburger to develop a global approach to strengthen the Western alliance insuring lasting security and peace.

** This list highlights only a few of the ongoing initiatives to improve the way the U.S. goes about pursuing its National Security objectives.

TAB III

Bumping Heads in State, Defense

By DAVID S. BRODER

WASHINGTON

Symptoms of a serious problem have been popping up all over Washington in recent weeks. President Reagan did — or maybe, didn't — signal an end to American adherence to the SALT II treaty limits on deployment of nuclear missiles. The House, by a shaky 12-vote margin, reversed its earlier refusal to provide military aid to the anti-Sandinista contras in Nicaragua.

The State Department said the United States is ending its defense obligations to New Zealand because of New Zealand's refusal to allow Navy ships with nuclear weapons the use of its harbors. On another front, the United States increased its contacts with forces opposing the government of South Africa, but refused again to impose economic sanctions against apartheid.

More symptoms: The budget approved by Congress reduced inflation-adjusted Pentagon appropriations for the second straight year, without any easing of our defense obligations. And the Senate Armed Services Committee, trying to stay within those limits, had a series of 10-9 votes on military projects involving several hundred million dollars each.

Is this any way for a superpower to manage its national security? The answer given by several key Republican legislators is no, and they have taken the lead in a modest-looking but potentially significant reform.

Believing that all these are symptoms of a lack of an agreed-upon overall defense and foreign policy, Sen. John Warner, R-Va., and Reps. Bob McEwen, R-O., and Dick Cheney, R-Wy., have sponsored what they call "the national strategy act." Its provisions were attached to the Department of Defense reorganization act recently passed by the Senate and to the companion bill being written in the House Armed Services Committee.

It would require the administration to submit, at the time of the president's annual budget message, "a comprehensive written report on the national security strategy of the United States," including a rundown on our "vital interests, goals and objectives" and "the foreign policy, worldwide commitments and national defense capabilities ... necessary to deter aggression."

At the beginning of each congressional session, the secretaries of state and defense would be invited to testify together on the report to joint meetings of the Foreign Affairs and Armed Services committees of the House and Senate.

Smart "hawks," like Rep. John McCain, R-Ariz., the much-decorated Navy veteran and Vietnam POW, have complained for more than two years that military spending has not been gauged by "the commitments the United States has in the world" and the resources available to meet them. As Warner, McEwen and Cheney pointed out in interviews, the process mandated by their national strategy act could force a degree of rationality and planning into the foreign policy-defense field.

It would give Congress a basic yardstick against which to measure the myriad individual decisions it makes on foreign aid, military assistance and defense appropriations. Although foreign-policy goals logically should determine defense strategy, the Armed Services and Foreign Affairs committees almost never meet or do business with each other.

"Instead of focusing on the national interest," McEwen said, "we go from crisis to crisis and parochial interest to parochial interest. ... We debate aid to 'contras' as if the issue were which agency's accounting system we trust, and we decide battleship vs. carrier, not on our obligations to protect the sea lanes, but whether Pascagoula or San Diego should have more jobs."

Equally important are the potential benefits for the administration. The secretary of state and secretary of defense traditionally avoid giving joint testimony to Congress. By requiring them to frame a joint "national strategy" document and answer questions on it together, Cheney said, "you not only force a more coherent debate, you force the early surfacing of the differences within the administration."

Warner, a former secretary of the Navy, agreed that a major effect of the new process "would be to require both the secretaries to meet beforehand to reconcile the major differences those two powerful individuals often have had." That is supposed to be done now through the National Security Council. But the frequent disagreements between George Shultz and Caspar Weinberger on arms con-



WASH. POST
6 JULY 1986

trol, troop commitments and other basic security issues clearly indicate that the process is not working well. Nor is this the first administration to face that problem.

The sponsors tell me that Weinberger has been supportive of their effort while the State Department,

perhaps jealous of its prerogatives, has been dragging its feet, giving public assent while undersecretary John Whitehead lobbied privately against it. That does not bode well for the execution of the new procedure if, as seems likely, it becomes law this year.

The effort to involve both the

administration and Congress in defining a comprehensive and reasonable national security policy deserves the best effort both branches of government can muster.


Broder is a Washington Post columnist.

NEWSDAY/DAIRY VISKUPIC

Is This Any Way to Make Foreign Policy?

To Ronald Reagan, the House vote on military aid to the contras was "a step forward in bipartisan consensus in American foreign policy." But Reagan was being diplomatic. His 12-vote margin of victory had cost him six years, 10 separate votes and all the presidential lobbying clout he could muster. In the end, only 51 Democrats supported his Nicaragua policy.

Despite his immense popularity and the widespread appeal of his "resurgent America" message, the president has had no more success in constructing a bipartisan foreign policy than most of his predecessors. His defense and foreign-aid budgets are being slashed in the ongoing controversy over the federal deficit. Congress is skeptical of his commitment to arms control, particularly his decision to abandon SALT II, and full funding for his Strategic Defense Initiative is in trouble. His trade policy is imperiled by protectionist pressures from both houses and both parties. He has had to modify his Stinger-missile arms sale to Saudi Arabia because of anti-Arab sentiment on Capitol Hill, and his proposed arms sale to Jordan has been scuttled for the same reason. Last but not least, Reagan's policy of "constructive engagement" toward South Africa has been all but dismantled by Congress.



Modifications in the Saudi arms deal: Stinger missiles

Taken together, the long list of reversals, defeats and forced concessions leads many in the administration—and even some in Congress—to wonder whether foreign policymaking was really meant to be this way. The answer, constitutionally speaking, is yes: as political scientist Kenneth W. Thompson argues, the Founding Fathers were "ambivalent" about who should control foreign policy, and the result has been "an invitation" to perpetual struggle. But the natural tug between the executive and legislative branches became open conflict during the war in Vietnam, and it has hardly let up since. Congress has grown more confident of its ability to meet a president head-on, matching an administration's expertise and information on

foreign-policy issues with its own, and the members' interest in foreign policy has grown as well. Meanwhile, congressional reforms that diminished the power of committee chairmen have made attaining consensus far more difficult. "Everybody is his own secretary of state now," says Elliott Abrams, assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs. "In the good old days you had to become a committee chairman first." But, says Democrat Les Aspin, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, this is inevitable when an administration is adrift. "If there is confusion," he said, "Congress moves in."

At the very least, administration officials say, congressional input leads to foreign policy that is driven more by

domestic political concerns than by any cohesive global view. It can lead to erratic decision making, as it did on the contra issue, which makes the United States look like an unpredictable ally. And the vogue for congressional fact-finding missions, in which relatively junior members of the House and Senate sometimes offer their own pronouncements on policy, has sometimes only confused delicate diplomatic situations. State Department officials still have nightmares about former Rep. George Hansen, who staged an unsuccessful one-man mission to Iran to free the American hostages.

Broader questions: The contra debate has begun to convince some members of Congress that this has all gone too far. Rep. Dick Cheney and Sen. John Warner, both Republicans, are proposing legislation to require each administration to submit "a general statement on strategy" at the beginning of each session to "force Congress to look at broader questions." The idea is that Congress should leave the day-to-day "micromanagement" of U.S. foreign policy to the executive branch. Would it work? No one knows—and given the ambiguities of the Constitution, there is no guarantee that any such reform would last. But it may be a sign that the heyday of congressional foreign policymaking is finally drawing to a close.

Gloria Borger in Washington

WASH TIMES
25 JUNE 1986

Congressmen request annual strategy plan

By Warren Strobel
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

Three Republican lawmakers yesterday renewed their call for an annual statement of U.S. world strategy, saying the nation's piecemeal approach to foreign policy handicaps planners and leads to incidents such as Monday's clash between President Reagan and House Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill.

Sen. John Warner of Virginia and Reps. Dick Cheney of Wyoming and Bob McEwen of Ohio want to replace that approach with a law requiring the president to give Congress an annual "State of the World" report and a cohesive U.S. strategy for key world areas.

The report would be made just before congressional budget battles begin.

"All of the [foreign policy and budget] questions get decided outside

any broad context of what our strategic vision might be," Mr. Cheney told policymakers and analysts at Strategy '86, a conference sponsored by Defense & Foreign Affairs magazine and the International Strategic Studies Association.

"In the mid-'70s, we found it impossible to carry out any kind of long-term, coherent policies" because of the War Powers Act and other congressional inroads into presidential foreign policy-making, according to Mr. Cheney, White House chief of staff under then President Ford.

"I sense now that we're right back where we were," Mr. Cheney said. "With respect to questions like Nicaragua and Angola, we see the wheel coming back full circle again," he said.

He called the speaker's refusal Monday to let Mr. Reagan address the House of Representatives in sup-

port of aid to the Nicaraguan resistance "an outrageous act. It's an act of arrogance."

Said Mr. McEwen: "To have a person, who is willing to make the overture, to physically come to the chamber... and then to have the speaker, who gleefully and willfully injects himself into every [policy] area, say the president can't come... is startling."

The three conservative legislators said the strategy statement would help shield strategic decisions from politics, streamline defense budget debates and aid planners in blunting advances by the Soviet Union, which has a consistent world strategy designed to further the spread of communism.

The bill is sponsored in the Senate by Mr. Warner and in the House by Mr. Cheney and Mr. McEwen. Dubbed the National Strategy Act, it is pending before committees in the two chambers. Language calling for

an annual presidential strategy statement also was added to a Department of Defense reorganization bill and that bill has passed the Senate.

The National Strategy Act would require the secretaries of Defense and State to present the president's statement to committees in each chamber of Congress.

Mr. Warner, however, denied the trio was trying to allow the president to dictate foreign policy to the Congress. "At least there would be a foundation document toward which all could look to orient themselves," the senator said.

"Sometimes it seems the United States has been forced into a position of having to respond or react to aggressive moves by other nations," Mr. McEwen said. "Under many circumstances, the real strengths of the United States are not taken into consideration."

Weinberger warns of 'hollow strategy'

By Walter Andrews
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

The United States faces the prospect of a "hollow strategy," in which U.S. global commitments outstrip its military capability, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger said yesterday.

"What makes this potential weakness in our ability to execute strategy all the more threatening is the fact that warfare itself is changing so rapidly," Mr. Weinberger told a forum on national strategy at the National Defense University.

The Pentagon under Mr. Weinberger has been criticized, in Congress and elsewhere, for failing to articulate a national strategy framework to justify military budget increases.

The defense secretary said opponents of the Reagan administration's Strategic Defense Initiative fail to see the implications of future technological change.

"Prudent strategy must compre-

hend a vision of the future at the same time it sustains us in the present," he said. "Foremost in our mind must be the way in which new technologies influence the face of battle."

Mr. Weinberger said the "most obvious and threatening weaponry" the nation faces today are nuclear missiles.

"I suspect that years from now historians will be baffled by our willingness to have remained so long completely undefended against the most potent weapons of our enemies," he said.

The first task of American strategy, the defense secretary said, is to assure that the U.S. deterrent to nuclear war remains credible. This credibility is now maintained by the ability of U.S. missiles to survive a nuclear attack and retaliate.

He warned that "almost overnight technology can change credible deterrence into incredible posturing."

This is why the president has called on the U.S. scientific commu-

nity "to see if it is possible to defend ourselves against the Soviet missile threat," Mr. Weinberger said.

The defense secretary said "strategic defense is no mere add-on to American strategy. Democratic nations will always be uneasy with a policy that deters only by threatening destructive retaliation."

"Moreover, the Strategic Defense Initiative embraces the area of one of our greatest strengths — technological creativity and innovation," he said.

Mr. Weinberger said that "to a certain extent" there has always been a gap between the worldwide commitments of the United States and American military capability.

"While the Truman Doctrine held that we would assist free peoples everywhere, it wisely did not specify the exact way in which we would lend that support. We therefore fulfill our commitments in ways best suited to particular circumstances," he said.

He said non-nuclear conventional

forces best serve this purpose by being kept flexible and mobile. The flexibility of the administration's maritime strategy of building up the Navy to a 600-ship fleet is best suited to meet U.S. global commitments by moving conventional forces quickly, the defense secretary said.

Mr. Weinberger said some of those who charge the administration with a lack of strategy, really mean they do not agree with the strategy and are piqued because their policies have not been adopted.

Because public opinion shifts and administrations come and go, the strategy for achieving the national goals of containing Soviet aggression and deterring war have not always been executed consistently, the defense secretary said.

"The complex nature of policymaking in a democracy upsets many people, who may secretly admire the stolid consistency of the Soviets. But, why should we admire a consistency that so often has led to oppression and violence," he asked.

Building a National Strategy to Put the Future in Focus

by Sen. John Warner (R-VA)

On February 6th, I filed Senate Bill S.2064, The National Strategy Act, which would require the President to make a report on the National Strategy of the United States each year at the beginning of the budget process.

On February 28th, the President's Commission on Defense Management (Packard Commission) recommended that "Defense planning would start with a comprehensive statement of national security objectives and priorities. . . ." The Commission further stated: "Today there is no rational system whereby the Executive Branch and the Congress reach coherent and enduring agreement on national military strategy, the forces to carry it out, and the funding that should be provided."

Implicit in the Packard Commission finding is an urgent need to accomplish the following:

- Strengthen the US strategic orientation to better cope with global conflict and pro-

such strategy a reality.

Momentum is at last gathering, both in Congress and the Executive Branch, against a long background of bipartisan concern on this issue:

✓ Robert McNamara remarked when he was Secretary of Defense, "There is no longer any such thing as a US strategy, only crisis management."

✓ Walter Laqueur, in the *New York Times* in 1982, highlighted that "a US strategy . . . is not yet in sight . . . in fact, it does not seem to be fully realized that such a strategy is needed; that defense, foreign policy, and international economics have to be coordinated and integrated."

✓ Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Sen. Barry Goldwater (R-AZ) said in a speech to the American Business Press in 1983 that "We need a grand strategy—and we need it now. It must be coherent. It must be realistic. It must be sufficient to deter our enemies and protect

How do we do it today?

Traditionally, Congress has collected this body of policy justification in a very diverse manner: Presidential addresses, posture statements, hearings, fact sheets, responses to questions, and the like. Further, the information is presented at different times, to different committees, in different versions—a very fragmented, inconclusive procedure.

With enormous defense budgets, ranging around \$300-billion, impacting upon State Department budgets of around \$13-billion, it is essential that Congress receive at the very beginning of the budget process a documentation of the foundation of our National Strategy. A coordinated, comprehensive description of our foreign policy, our worldwide commitments, and the requirements of our national defense to deter aggression and implement our foreign policy is needed as the foundation block on which to build.



The National Strategy Act provides the opportunity to do just that, for it enables the Foreign Relations, Foreign Affairs, and Armed Services Committees and the entire Congress to start with a common point of departure as they annually begin to perform their budget, authorization, and appropriation responsibilities.

To support the development of this initiative, the National Strategy Act requires that:

- The President provide a foundation report on the National Strategy to the Congress at the beginning of each year. The Chairmen of the Armed Services Committee and the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate will convene a joint hearing to receive this report and request that the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense appear together to present the report. A similar procedure will be followed by the House of Representatives.

- These open and closed hearings will

(Continued on page 76.)



mote common strategic objectives among our allies.

- Promote common strategic objectives between the Executive Branch and Congress as a basis for solidifying a bipartisan approach to US global affairs.
- Promote a broad, integrated approach to US global affairs that consists of a sound balance between political, economic, military, psychological, and moral elements.
- Develop a matching budget mechanism that coordinates these elements while at the same time remaining flexible enough to meet the challenges of a dynamic, complex, and ever-changing world.
- Work towards an understanding of our National Strategy that is so clear and well articulated that Congress, the military, and the Nation recognize the value and the need for those supporting programs that make

our friends. And it must be understood by the American people and have their support."

In short, the US must seek to develop a sustainable strategy geared to American goals and interests and realistically coupled to the existing and future assets of the military. A gap between these two essentials cannot exist if our strategy is to be credible in the eyes of the world.

Responsibility of the Administration

The first essential element in developing a clear and comprehensive National Strategy is the responsibility of the Administration. The President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and vested by the Constitution of the United States as the principal authority in forming policy, must place before Congress convincing justifications for the funds to carry forward America's National Strategy.

Sen. Warner, in his second term, is a senior Member of the Senate Armed Services Committee. A former Secretary and Under Secretary of the Navy (1969-1974), he



served on active duty in the Navy (World War II) and the Marine Corps (Korea). He was the Defense Department delegate to the Law of the Sea Conference from 1969 to 1972 and headed the US delegation to the Incidents at Sea Conference with the Soviet Navy in 1970-1972. That resulted in an executive agreement between the two superpowers which is in full force, effect, and compliance today. At the beginning of the 99th Congress, he was selected by Senate leaders to serve on the Senate group overseeing the Geneva arms control negotiations.

National Strategy

(Continued from page 73.)

take place annually following the President's State of the Union message but prior to hearings on the annual posture statements.

This would enable these four key Committees, working with the rest of Congress, and the Nation to have a common understanding of the Administration's present National Strategy objectives.

Congressional Responsibility

With this common understanding, Members of Congress will be better prepared to measure the value and relevancy of the individual programs—Pentagon spending as well as State Department foreign assistance—by assessing how they contribute to the Administration's overall national and military strategies and foreign policy.

Traditionally, there have been differences in approach to our National Strategy between the State Department's perspective of foreign policy goals and the Defense Department's perspective as to the reality of achieving these goals with military assets in hand. These differences are an inherent strength of our system of government, but they should be clearly understood.

The difficult task of coordinating a National Strategy through these two departments will, it is hoped, lessen some of those differences and bring into sharper focus the remaining ones.

It is not anticipated that the two Secretaries will speak with one voice, but to the extent that consensus can be achieved, Congress' responsibility to make certain funding decisions becomes clearer.

This very important first step in developing a more deliberate mechanism for our national security planning is just a start. Meaningful change, if it is ever to be effected, must coincide with procedural and structural modifications that over time will lead to more fundamental intellectual adjustment.

Strategic consensus requires almost unprecedented cooperation, agreement, and coordination among policymakers; strong and dedicated leadership by the Administration; and commitment by Congress and the American public to support force deployments and resource requirements demanded by such fundamental decisions.

With this initiative we can begin our legislative process each year with a better understanding of the Administration's view of our National Strategy. The responsibility of Congress is, primarily, to determine the funding levels. If, at the end of the process, Congress funds at levels above or below the Administration's request, then there is an obligation to explain what and how the National Strategy, presented by the Administration in the beginning, is changed by Congress as it performs its Constitutional responsibilities. ■ ☆ ■

TAB IV

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY ACTION PLAN

| <u>ITEM</u> | <u>ACTION</u> | <u>DATE</u> |
|---|----------------|---|
| o Establish SIG to develop National Strategy document. Cockell/Rodman cochair to demonstrate defense/foreign policy interface | ADM Poindexter | 10-1-86 |
| o Presidential signing of DOD REORG Bill. President emphasizes National Security Strategy Report and endorses as his initiative (Packard Commission link) | President | Week of 10-6-86 |
| o Admiral Poindexter calls Sec State/Sec Def and reaffirms President's strategy initiative. Ask for support with Strategy SIG. | ADM Poindexter | After Pres.'s statement on strategy |
| o Strategy SIG initially meets to lay out markers for document preparation | Cockell/Rodman | Week of 10-6-86 |
| o Initial outline for Strategy Report | Cockell/Rodman | 10-15-86 |
| o 1st draft of Strategy document | Cockell/Rodman | 11-4-86 |
| o Refinement of Strategy document | Cockell/Rodman | 11-4-28-86 |
| o Coordination of Strategy document | Cockell/Rodman | 12-1-1286 |
| o Publication of Strategy document | Cockell/Rodman | 12-12-86 |
| o President's State of Union - mention close relationship of foreign & defense policy as outlined in soon to be released Strategy document | President | 1-15-87 |
| o Release of Strategy document | President | Same date as budget is submitted to Cong. |

| <u>ITEM</u> | <u>ACTION</u> | <u>DATE</u> |
|---|-----------------------|-------------------------------|
| o Sec State/Sec Def jointly brief strategy document to joint sessions of SASC, HASC, and foreign relations committees * | Sec State/ Sec Def | before posture hearings |
| * President should take the initiative and endorse this historic presentation which symbolically demonstrates the the cohesion his Administration is working to achieve in the foreign/defense policy arena. | | |
| ** The Administration should use this cornerstone of National Strategy to educate/inform Congress, the Nation and our Allies through a series of well placed speeches, fireside chats, articles, pamphlets, videotapes, etc. over the next two years. | | |

Problems of Communism

Walt Raymond
NSC 0E0B Rm 351
Washington DC 20506

US Information Agency

6/11/86

1776 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC, 20547

(202) 632-4887

4615 N. 38th St.
Arlington, VA 22207

Walt

Someone said that writing a book is like sculpting an elephant - you take a block of marble and chip away everything that doesn't look like an elephant. My question; do I have the right amount of marble; and how much should I chip off?

As ever,

Paul Smith

enc: Outline - Draft I.

F- *Intentional Communication
& Information*

Paul A. Smith, Jr.
June 1986--DRAFT 1
Tel. 536-4034
4615 N 38th St.
Arlington, VA 22207

ON POLITICAL WAR

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| V | People |
| VI | Research |
| VII | Tactics |
| VIII | Strategic Outcomes |
| XI | Past, Present, and Future |
| | Bibliography |
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Preface

A. Need

Political warfare is a part of the human condition, and ~~our~~ *an* understanding of it is needed by any country which hopes to prevail in the international arena. It is an aspect of conflict which is widely practiced, much maligned, and seldom studied dispassionately. This book is intended to stimulate such study.

B. Acknowledgements

1. Support: USIA, and NDU
2. Access: Limited to documents and interviews which can be placed on the historical record and be available to scholars.
3. Clearances: The Author bears sole responsibility for the judgments in the book; the MS is cleared for security only.
4. Sources: Full sourcing for all quoted and specific citations, and for points which are disputed, or on which the author's views differ from those generally held.
5. Readers: Will be identified, with appropriate recognition.

Introduction

A. Approach

The objects of a war may be just or unjust, but the act of fighting always involves bodily harm to someone. Similarly, political warfare may be conducted for just or unjust reasons, but its practice almost always involves bending the truth, at least by someone's definition. Nothing in this study should be read as advocacy of such practices, nor as an attempt to set standards for the conduct of international affairs by any group or nation. Nor should it be regarded as a condemnation of them.

B. Method

This study is historical in perspective. Its sources are mainly documentary. It uses examples, mostly from 19th and 20th Century European history, to illustrate conclusions and authors' arguments. Statistical matter may be introduced, where relevant, but it will be secondary to the accounts, judgments, and opinions expressed by participants and those who have studied their affairs. The author's reliance on classical writers in the art of war, and of international relations, is acknowledged.

Illustrations

Visual images, mostly photography, in black and white, fully sourced, are used to enhance the textual presentation of people, places, events, and symbols. Clarity, composition, and graphic impact will be considered, but only to the extent consistent with utility and accuracy. Half-tones will require 10 to 15 percent of the book. They should be printed on glossy stock, usually full or half-page cuts.

I. Nature

Definition: The use of political means to compel an opponent to do one's will, political being understood as purposive set intercourse between peoples and governments affecting national survival and relative advantage. Political warfare may be combined with violence, economic pressure, subversion, and diplomacy; but its chief aspect is the use of words, images, and ideas, commonly known, according to context, as propaganda, psychological warfare, or public diplomacy.

A. Aims:

1. Political Will
2. Expansion
3. Retrenchment
4. Status quo.

B. Ethics:

1. Just
2. Unjust
3. Amoral

C. Actors:

1. Empires
2. Alliances
3. Nation States
4. Movements
5. Insurgents

D. Scope:

1. Global
2. Regional
3. National (foreign; domestic)
4. Single Issue

3. Resources:

1. Ideas
2. Material
3. Geography
4. Money
5. Manpower

F. Outcomes:

1. Victory
2. Defeat
3. Stalemate
4. Peace

II. Theory

Definition: A distillation of experience covering propaganda, armed conflicts, and world outlook by periods of history--mostly European--still pertinent to contemporary affairs.

A. Ancient:

1. Hebrew
 - a. Mosaic
 - b. Pauline
2. Greek
 - a. Hellene
 - b. Byzantine
 - c. Slav
3. Roman
 - a. Republican
 - b. Imperial
4. Muslim
 - a. Suni
 - b. Shii

B. Modern:

1. Vatican
2. Protestant
3. Napoleonic
4. Anglo-Saxon
5. German
6. Russian

C. Totalitarian:

1. Communist
2. Fascist
3. Nazi

D. Contemporary:

1. Atlantic
2. Soviet

III. Strategy

Definition: Use of Propaganda Campaigns in Political Warfare.

X
^
A. World Contest:

1. General Peace
2. General War
3. Limited ~~Ferried?~~ Wars

X
^
B. National Contest:

1. Open Societies
2. Closed Societies
3. Authoritarian Societies

C. 'Zeitgeist':

1. Rationalism
2. Romanticism
3. Radicalism
4. Conservatism

D. Other Arms:

1. Military
2. Economic
3. Subversive
4. Diplomatic

E. Maneuver:

1. Concentration
2. Dispersion
3. Timing
4. Deception

5. Silence

F. Targets:

1. Nations
2. Classes
3. States
4. Governments
5. Alliances
6. Policies and Ideas

G. Engagement:

1. Attack
2. Defense
3. Containment
4. Minimum-Maximum
5. Risk

H. Missions:

1. Mobilize
2. Direct
3. Divert
4. Weaken
5. Destroy

I. Disengagement:

1. Tacit
2. Negotiated
3. Sanctioned
4. Temporary

IV. Forces

Definition: Propaganda instruments usable by a commander in the conduct of political warfare.

A. Order of Battle:

1. Balance
2. Mode
 - a. Black
 - b. White
 - c. Grey

B. Media:

1. Interpersonal
2. Fast
3. Slow
4. Public Sector
5. Private Sector

C. Cultural Organs:

1. Literature
2. Visual Arts
3. Music
4. Sports

D. Political Organs:

1. Parties
2. Fronts
3. Volunteers
4. Privateers

E. Allied Governments:

1. Bases
2. Access
3. Personnel
4. Media

F. Diplomatic Posts:

1. Multilateral
2. Bilateral
3. Special Missions

G. Crowds:

1. Controlled
2. Spontaneous
3. Local
4. National
5. International

V. PEOPLE

Definition: Characteristics to be considered in recruitment and preferment.

A. Motives:

1. Idealism
2. Ambition
3. Mercenary
4. Professional
5. Compulsion

B. Allegiance:

1. Citizenship
2. International
3. Ethnics
4. Exiles

C. Skills:

1. Journalists
2. Scholars
3. Advertising
4. Politicians
5. Arts
6. Clergy

D. Languages:

1. Natives
2. Non-native
3. Regional & Political Idioms

E. Terms of Employment:

1. Career
2. Contract
3. Freelance

F. Originality:

1. High
2. Low
3. Medium

G. Authenticity

VI. Research

Definition: Information on oneself, the enemy, and the world, useful for political warfare.

A. Organization:

1. Subordination
2. Collection
3. Production
4. Dissemination

B. Methods:

1. Historical
2. Documentary
3. Social Statistics
4. Attitudinal

C. Uses:

1. Policy
2. Plans
3. Programs
4. Program Support
5. Evaluation

D. Abuses:

1. Power
2. Personality
3. Ideology
4. False-feedback

VII. Tactics

Definition: Use of propaganda forces in political warfare campaigns.

A. Situation:

1. Operation
2. Seasons
3. Time Zones
4. Media Environment

B. Coordination:

1. Military
2. Economic
3. Subversive
4. Diplomatic

C. Channels:

1. Solos
2. Quartets
3. Chorus
4. Orchestra

D. Rhetoric:

1. Declamatory
2. Descriptive
3. Emotive
4. Lies and Innuendos
5. Semantics

E. Manuever:

1. Confronting

2. Flanking
3. Pulsing
4. Carrooms
5. Silence

F. Targets:

1. Media
2. Social Groups
3. Minorities
4. Governments
5. Leaders
6. Policies

G. Engagement:

1. Guidelines
2. Embargoes
3. Cautions

H. Missions:

1. Mobilize
2. Placate
3. Divert
4. Weaken
5. Destroy

I. Disengagement:

1. Capstone
2. Sellout
3. Switch
4. Capitulate
5. Silence.

VIII. Strategic Outcomes

Definition: A decisive shift in the correlation of forces, usually having extended significance for the national survival or political existence of one or more actors.

A. General War:

1. Defeat
2. Victory
3. Stalemate

B. Limited War:

1. Gains
2. Losses
3. Side Effects
4. Imponderables

C. Peace:

1. Continuity
2. Compromise
3. Capitulation
4. Conversion

D. Cold War:

1. Symetrical
2. Asymetrical

IX. Past, Present, and Future

Definition: A summation applying concepts in this book to Soviet-US relations since 1945, and a look at possible developments two decades ahead.

A. Alternations:

1. Stalin-Truman
2. Khrushchev-Eisenhower
3. Brezhnev-Nixon
4. Brezhnev-Carter
5. Andropov, et. al.-Reagan

B. Symetry Restored(?)--1981-1986

C. Trends to 2000:

1. Strategic
2. Conventional
3. Low Intensity

D. Question: Symetry or Asymetry After 2000?

APPENDIX: Lead Times for Political Warfare Instruments: NATO;
Warsaw Pact.

- Equipment
- Personnel
- Money
- Bases
- Access Arrangements
- Legislation
- Public Support

Bibliography

A. Selected Reading: Annotated

B. Sources Consulted:

1. Monographs
2. Memoirs
3. Journals
4. Official Documents
5. Research Reports
6. Interviews

INDEX

Name, and Subject, dictionary format.



Hans Graf Huyn

Mitglied des Deutschen Bundestages
Vorsitzender des Arbeitskreises
Außen-, Deutschland-, Verteidigungs-
und Entwicklungspolitik der CSU-Landesgruppe
im Deutschen Bundestag

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5300 Bonn 1
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Prof. Eugen Loeb1
170 West End Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10023
USA

19 June 1986

Dear Eugen,

As you told me, the intention is to ask Mr. Ronald Reagan, the President of the United States, for a message of greeting for the conference "A Strategy for Peace in Freedom", which is being organized by the "European Conference for Human Rights and Self-Determination". As a member of the executive council and Vice-President of the European Conference for Human Rights and Self-Determination, I can assure you that we would feel extremely honoured.

I am enclosing some information material on the European Conference for Human Rights and Self-Determination. I am a co-founder of this organization and have since its inception been International Vice-President and President of the German Section. The International President is Dr. Kurt Müller, a Member of the Swiss National Council and an editor of the renowned newspaper "Neue Zürcher Zeitung".

Those expected to speak at this conference, which is to take place in Bern (Switzerland) on 1 and 2 September 1986, include


/...

Prof. Karl Carstens (former Federal President of the Federal Republic of Germany), Dr. Peter Sager (Member of the National Council and head of the Swiss Eastern European Institute, Bern) and Jean-François Revel (author, Paris).

At the same time a book will appear in English and German on the subject of the conference, in which the most important speakers will present their theses. This book will be displayed at the conference and it would therefore be particularly welcome if the message of greeting from the American President could be published in this book.

With best wishes,

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Henry Kissinger". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

Provisional Programme
of the European Conference for Human Rights and Self-Determination in
Muri/Bern on 1 and 2 September 1986

Speakers and topics:

- | | |
|---|--|
| 1. Dr. Kurt Müller, President of the European Conference for Human Rights and Self-Determination, Member of the National Council and editor of the newspaper "Neue Zürcher Zeitung" | Opening remarks |
| 2. Prof. Karl Carstens, former Federal President of the Federal Republic of Germany, Bonn | Strategy for peace and freedom |
| 3. Prof. Eugen Loeb, Jr., Vassar College, New York, former deputy Minister for Foreign Trade of Czechoslovakia | Self-determination in East and West |
| 4. Jean-François Revel, author and journalist, Paris | Human rights - a universal concern |
| 5. Prof. Kurt Eichenberger, specialist in public law, University of Basel | The state under the rule of law and the guarantor of human rights |
| 6. Dr. Anton Czettler, President of the Federation of Hungarian Associations in Switzerland, Brugg | The Hungarian struggle for freedom - 30 years later |
| 7. Hans Graf Huyn, Member of the German Bundestag, Vice-President of the European Con- ference for Human Rights and Self- Determination | Will for self-determinatio- - integration as an imperative requirement |
| 8. Charles Horner, Director of Program of the U.S. Information Agency (USIA), Washington, D.C. | The importance of basic values for the free world |
| 9. Dr. Peter Sager, Member of the National Council, head of the Swiss Eastern European Institute, Bern | Concluding remarks - summary and future perspectives |

(The topics are working titles; most of the speakers have
accepted the invitation to address the conference.)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT

PAGE 01 OF 02
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TOR: 153/2336Z CSM: E1A681

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OF 2

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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REPORT CLASS S E C R E T

EXCLUSIVE DISSEMINATION TO ADDRESSEES LISTED AT END OF REPORT

DIST: B2 JUNE 1986
COUNTRY: USSR/INTERNATIONAL

SUBJ: WORLD PEACE COUNCIL CALENDAR OF EVENTS FOR 1986

001: APRIL-MAY 1986

TEXT: 1. THE SOVIET-DOMINATED WORLD PEACE COUNCIL (WPC) IS CURRENTLY PLANNING EITHER TO ORGANIZE, CO-SPONSOR, SUPPORT, OR OTHERWISE PARTICIPATE IN THE FOLLOWING INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES, SEMINARS AND EVENTS DURING THE REMAINING MONTHS OF 1986. THE EVENTS, TOGETHER WITH PLANNED VENUE AND DATES, HAVE BEEN LISTED BELOW IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER.

1. SPECIAL COMMITTEE MEETING OF GENEVA, 3 JUNE
INTERNATIONAL NON GOVERNMENTAL SWITZERLAND
ORGANIZATIONS (INGO'S) ON HUMAN
RIGHTS ISSUES

2. MEETING OF THE ORGANIZING GENEVA 4-5 JUNE
GROUP FOR THE COPENHAGEN WORLD
CONGRESS DEVOTED TO THE INTER-
NATIONAL YEAR OF PEACE.

3. AAPRAD CONFERENCE ON INTER- BRUSSELS 5-6 JUNE
REGIONAL CO-OPERATION IN
SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT.

4. REGIONAL MEETING OF THE WPC ON DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT. ADDIS ABABA 6-9 JUNE

5. SUB-COMMITTEE ON RACISM, GENEVA CIRCA
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION, 10 JUNE
APARTHEID AND DECOLONI-
SATION OF THE SPECIAL U.N.
COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS.

6. SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF NGO'S GENEVA 5 JUNE
ON DEVELOPMENT.

7. INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE IN BRAZZAVILLE 19-21 JUNE

8. SYMPOSIUM ON TRANS-NATIONAL GENEVA 25-26 JUNE
CORPORATIONS AND PEACE.

9. NGO SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON GENEVA 24 JUNE
TRANS-NATIONAL CORPORATIONS.

18. U.N. DISARMAMENT FELLOWSHIP GENEVA
26 JUNE -
PROGRAM. 29 AUGUST

11. HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE GENEVA 30 JUNE-
WORKING GROUP ON COMMUNI-
JULY

CATIONS

12. EUROPEAN REGIONAL SYMPOSIUM VIENNA 30 JUNE - 1 JULY
FOR NGO'S.

| | EVENT | PLACE | DATE |
|------|-------|-------|------|
| MAY: | | | |

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NLRR M430/2#115236

BY RW NARA DATE 3/31/15

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT

PAGE 02 OF 02

DTG: 022116Z JUN 86 PSN: 075229

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JULY:

1. INTERNATIONAL MEETING OF NON- VIENNA 2 - 4 JULY

GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AT
THE UNITED NATIONS OFFICE IN
VIENNA.

2. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE BANGALORE, 4 - 7 JULY
ALL-INDIA PEACE AND SOLIDA- INDIA
RITY ORGANIZATION.

3. CONFERENCE OR SEMINAR BANGALORE, 6 - 7 JULY
ON PEACE AND SECURITY IN INDIA
ASIA.

4. INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PARIS 15 JULY -
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 2 AUGUST
DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT.

BT

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

June 20, 1986

F-SNG

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

MEMORANDUM

TO: Active Measures Working Group

FROM: INR/ID - Kathleen C. Bailey

SUBJECT: Minutes of Working Group Meeting
of June 19, 1986

13524
E.O. 12958
As Amended
Sec. 3.3 b(1)
3.5c

The meeting was chaired by Dr. Bailey. Attending were: Mr. Romerstein (USIA), Mr. Copp (USIA), Mr. Houghton (FBI), Mr. Sheren (INR/ID), Mr. Knecht (PA/OAP), Ms. Friedt (INR/SEE), Mr. Rapoport (INR/IC), Mr. Harbin (EAP/RA), [redacted], [redacted], COL Paddock (OSD/PSYOP), Mr. Wessell (USIA/P/R), [redacted], Mr. Major (NSC), Mr. Fischer (ACDA), and Ms. Johnson (NEA/RA).

I. Publications

Mr. Rapoport reported that Ms. Friedt has completed a draft of the first of the Foreign Affairs Note (FAN) on the October Copenhagen World Peace Congress. [redacted] noted that CIA is preparing a new serial publication on active measures and arms control that should appear every two months. He added that the Fronts Chart will be published only in an unclassified form and that parts of the new data base on the Soviet presence in the US will also be made available in unclassified form. Mr. Kopp has finished USIA's latest unclassified active measures report to the field (no. 6), which includes much information on the World Peace Council organizational shakeup. Colonel Paddock reported that OSD/PSYOP has been working on some unclassified publications, mainly on Central American issues, in cooperation with State's Office of Latin American Public Diplomacy (S/LPD). The recently-issued report is entitled Challenge to Democracy in Central America.

II. Gingrich Amendment

Dr. Bailey stated that we will meet the June 30 deadline for submitting the Gingrich report to to State's Bureau of Congressional Relations (H) for transfer to the NSC. She

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DECL: OADR

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BY RW NARA DATE 3/31/15

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- 2 -

called on members to finish their portions as soon as possible and regretted the necessity of sending component papers around for clearance piecemeal rather than as a unified package. Mr. Knecht suggested that we include somewhere a section about what the USG is doing to combat Soviet propaganda. The report contains a lengthy section on the Soviet propaganda apparatus and we should respond to it both in the sense of logic and as a means of educating a Congressional audience.

III. Embassy Active Measures Committees

The cable from Under Secretary Armacost to chiefs of mission calling for the establishment of active measures committees at selected posts went out last week. Initial reactions have been favorable.

IV. Uses for the Active Measures Memo

The group discussed sending some form of the active measures memo to the field. [redacted]

[redacted] has no problem with the concept [redacted]

[redacted] Mr. Houghton also expressed some concerns about how FBI material would be used and was assured that all [redacted] materials would be cleared with issuing agencies before use in the proposed memo. The group considered how the memo should be disseminated and whether it should be sent to the field in one worldwide version or in region-specific form. The general consensus was in favor of one cable prepared for a worldwide audience.

V. Academic Research on Active Measures

Mr. Sheren reported that INR has made available \$3,000 that could be divided into three grants of \$1000 each to be awarded as prizes for the three best undergraduate research papers on an active measures-related topic at several selected schools. There was some discussion as to whether the grants would be limited to undergraduates and whether it could be arranged to have students prepare precis from which the group could choose the three projects most appropriate for funding.

Colonel Paddock commented that it might be possible to place active measures on the list of possible topics for papers by officers studying at the national war colleges. This might provide some excellent work in the area. He will investigate this possibility, as well as the possibility of once again obtaining DOD funding for an academic conference on active measures to take place either in the US or Europe. He will report on both topics at the next meeting.

~~SECRET~~

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- 3 -

Mr. Harbin suggested that we might wish to consider including a Canadian institution in a proposed prize program and as a possible conference site. The Canadian Defense College might be a likely possibility.

VI.

The next meeting of the active measures working group will be held on Thursday, July 3 at 10:00 A.M. in the INR Conference Room, 6530 NS. Members with agenda items should contact Sheldon Rapoport (647-5899).

Drafted:
INR/IC: SJRapoport
6/20/86 647-5899
Wang Doc No. 0193A

~~SECRET~~



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

July 8, 1986

13526
E.O. 12958
As Amended
Sec. 3.3 b(1)
3.5c

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

MEMORANDUM

TO: Active Measures Working Group

FROM: INR/ID - Kathleen C. Bailey *K Bailey*

SUBJECT: Minutes of Working Group Meeting
of July 8, 1986

The meeting was chaired by Dr. Bailey. Attending were: Mr. Romerstein (USIA), Mr. Copp (USIA), Mr. Houghton (FBI), Mr. Sheren (INR/ID), Mr. Knecht (PA/OAP), Mr. Rapoport (INR/IC), [redacted], Mr. Fischer (ACDA), Major Bobell (OJCS), Mr. Curtin (DIA), [redacted], [redacted], [redacted], [redacted], Mr. Thompson (ARA/RPP), [redacted], Ms. Russell (AF/P), Mr. Schmidt (EUR/SOV), and Mr. Kamin (INR/SEE).

I. Gingrich Report

Dr. Bailey announced that the report on Soviet disinformation and press manipulation mandated by the first Gingrich Amendment (Sec. 147) has been forwarded to State's Bureau of Congressional Affairs (H) for review and subsequent transmittal to the NSC.

Mr. Schmidt distributed copies of his draft response to the second Gingrich Amendment (Sec. 155), which calls for a report on the advisability of establishing a permanent office in the State Department to study Soviet and international Communist behavior that violates the concept of national sovereignty and peace between nations. The draft recommends against the establishment of such an entity, believing that it would be redundant and would divert funding away from other parts of State, CIA, and DIA already performing that function.

II. Active Measures Cable

Responses to Under Secretary Armacost's cable on active measures continue to come into the Department. They are largely favorable. USIA has sent out a similar call for active

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measures committees at selected Embassies through its own channels. CIA has not yet done so.

Ambassador Salgo, in Budapest, sent in a cable urging that active measures committees also be formed in the East European countries, noting that Soviet disinformation campaigns extensively use East European media, sometimes as a first point for surfacing disinformation. Mr. Romerstein stated that USIA agrees with this proposal and has responded favorably. It is important to take note of anti-US disinformation appearing in Bloc media and protest it to the host country. This gives us ammunition to use against the same story when it appears in non-communist media.

III. Using the Active Measures Memo Overseas

The group continued previous discussions of the possibility of sending out the active measures memo to overseas posts. Mr. Romerstein expressed basic support, noting that the classified material would be useful to the new active measures committees.

Mr. Schmidt discussed the possibility of devising a special TAG (a State department information management reference symbol) for active measures, as well as designating a subject line and office symbols for an active measures message. Mr. Rapoport noted that we had already established a subject line format that included the appropriate action office symbols (INR/IC/CD and USIA/P/G) in a previous cable to the field, but we could reinvestigate the possibility of a special TAG and update the subject and office listing. Dr. Bailey agreed that this should be investigated.

IV. Films

Mr. Romerstein stated that USIA was moving ahead on acquiring the 40 minute version of the Canadian film on active measures for distribution abroad. The film should however be updated to show the elimination of the International Information Department and the substitution of Dobrynin for Ponomarev as the head of the International Department. USIA also planned to add a panel discussion, including author John Barron, as a means of updating the film. There was general approval for this approach.

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V. New Business

Dr. Bailey reported on the recent Hoover Institute-sponsored conference, "The Red Orchestra in Africa." This conference was the third in a series of sessions about Soviet activities in various key areas. The first two featured Western Europe and Central America and the Caribbean. Dr. Bailey observed that most of the academics participating seemed to see no Soviet or Soviet proxy activity in Africa, except for Southern Africa and the Horn. Academics also tended to ignore political active measures in favor of military activities. Mr. Romerstein added that these sessions were to be published and that the volume on the session on Central America and the Caribbean should be out shortly.

The group briefly discussed current active measures.

The next meeting of the active measures working group will be held on Thursday, July 31 at 10:00 A.M. in the INR Conference Room, 6530 NS. Members with agenda items should contact Sheldon Rapoport (647-5899).

Drafted:

INR/IC: SJRapoport

7/8/86 647-5899

Wang Doc No. 0232A

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

June 18, 1986

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13526
E.O. 12958
As Amended
Sec. 3.3 b(1)

MEMORANDUM

TO: Active Measures Working Group
FROM: INR/ID - Kathleen C. Bailey *[Signature]*
SUBJECT: Active Measures Memo #9 of 1986

1. WPC To Screen Peace Congress Attendees

The WPC has established a means of accreditation for the October Copenhagen World Peace Congress designed to bar the attendance by independent and dissident groups inclined to speak against the Soviet line. A person may not attend without a recommendation from the Congress preparatory committee in his home country. These preparatory committees, while being presented to the public as "independent," are in fact controlled by local WPC affiliates. In countries without a preparatory committee, a person needs the recommendation of the national affiliate to attend.

2. WPC: Calendar of Events for Remainder of 1986

As of early May 1986, the Soviet-dominated World Peace Council (WPC) was planning either to organize, co-sponsor, support, or otherwise participate in over twenty international conferences, seminars and events during the remaining months of 1986. Major meetings/events include (date listed is date session begins):

- 25 May - IPPNW Congress in Cologne, West Germany
- 3 Jun - Special Committee of NGOs on Human Rights, Geneva
- 4 Jun - Organizational meeting for Copenhagen World Congress, Geneva
- 6 Jun - Regional meeting of WPC on Disarmament and Development, Addis Ababa
- 10 Jun - Subcommittee on Racism, Racial Discrimination, Apartheid and Decolonization of the Special UN Committee on Human Rights, Geneva

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15 Jun - Special Committee of NGOs on Development
Geneva
24 Jun - NGO Special Committee on Trans-National
Corporations, Geneva
26 Jun - UN Disarmament Fellowship, Geneva
2 Jul - International meeting of non-governmental
organizations at the UN office in Vienna
13 Aug - Council for the World's Religions, Frankfurt
15 Oct - World Peace Congress, Copenhagen

3. More on WPC Structural Changes

At the April 24-27 WPC Congress in Sofia, the Soviet Peace Committee (SPC) called for structural change to improve the effectiveness of WPC operations and voiced dissatisfaction with the high costs and ineffective results of previous WPC efforts.

The Soviets insisted on the reinstitution of the position of Secretary General within the WPC Secretariat in Helsinki and upon the ascendancy to that position of Johannes Pakaslahti, chairman of the Finnish WPC affiliate. Pakaslahti is said to be an effective administrator who can take charge of the management responsibilities neglected and mishandled by WPC President Romesh Chandra over the years. The Soviets also wanted a European in the position to provide a spokesman who, unlike Chandra, would be focused upon and effective in Europe.

Pakaslahti, 41 years old, is the son of a well-known Finnish historian and diplomat. He has a background in journalism, having been a correspondent for Tiedonantaja, main press organ of the hardline "Stalinist" minority faction of the Finnish Communist Party, and editor-in-chief of the Finnish WPC affiliate's principal media organ Rauhan Puolesta (For Peace). He has built the Finnish WPC affiliate, Finnish Peace Defenders (Suomen Rauhanpuolustajat), into a broadly based organization with representatives of most major political parties on its governing board while control is kept in the hands of the minority faction communists. Through his organization, he has been a major force in pressing the Finnish government to speak out against the "threat" to world peace posed by NATO.

The Soviets also called for the elimination of representatives of national affiliates from the WPC Bureau, which previously had included the WPC president and vice presidents and several affiliate representatives and met several times a year. The Soviets believed the body to be too unwieldy and independent to control effectively. The new, smaller body is committed only to meet "on a regular basis" and will be easier for the Soviets to manage.

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Despite Soviet threats of widescale changes in the WPC Secretariat and Presidential Committee, relatively few Vice Presidents and Secretariat members were replaced. The Soviets were apparently unwilling to alienate old friends in vice presidential slots and go against the affiliates who sought new terms for their incumbent secretaries.

[REDACTED]

4. Soviets Link Disarmament and Chernobyl

Soviet delegates at two international conferences, the 6th World Congress of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) in Cologne and the 2nd All-union Conference of Scientists on the Problems of Peace and the Prevention of Nuclear War in Moscow, cited the experience of Chernobyl as "a formidable warning of the nuclear danger" that reinforces Soviet arms control policies and the need for a comprehensive atomic test ban.

In another example of linkage, TASS charged that US nuclear tests are contaminating the atmosphere and that "total radioactive releases from underground nuclear tests in Nevada are much higher than releases from the Chernobyl accident."
(UNCLAS: FBIS III, 30 May 86, AA8-10 and 4 June 86, AA11-15; Helsinki 2797, 9 June 86)

5. WIDF Plans Moscow Congress for 1987

The Women's International Democratic Federation has set its next World Congress of Women for June, 1987 in Moscow. The Congress motto will be "Towards the Year 2000 Without Nuclear Weapons; for Peace, Equality, Development." WIDF hopes to encourage broad participation through a series of preliminary meetings and may ask the WPC to establish preparatory committees for the congress through its national affiliates.

[REDACTED]

6. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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7. [REDACTED]

8. IOJ Targets Community Radio

The Soviet front International Organization of Journalists (IOJ) has selected community or alternative radio stations as a priority target for IOJ control and domination. These privately-funded, volunteer-staffed, local stations, which are often linked to labor or church groups and educational institutions, exist in both industrialized and third world countries. The IOJ sees community radio as vulnerable to manipulation via programming and financial assistance.

[REDACTED]

9. Czechs Publish US Protest on Disco Bombing Charge

Rude Pravo of June 7 printed the full text of Charge Schmidt's letter objecting to an earlier article alleging CIA involvement in the bombing of the West Berlin La Belle Disco. The letter was followed by the original article and a six paragraph comment taking swipes at US foreign policy and concluding that the Embassy's purpose in sending the letter was to impede dialogue and "act as an advocate for ... state terrorism." Embassy Prague comments that previous protest letters to Rude Pravo have never brought forth any reaction. The Embassy is bemused by their decision to publish the letter in full along with the original article and a commentary. Curiously, the Soviets took exactly the same tack. (See Active Measures Memo No. 8.)
(CONF: Prague 3134, 9 June 86)

10. [REDACTED]

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11. Briefly Noted: Suspected Active Measures

A. Cuba: Possible Prensa Latina Office in Barbados

With the victory of the Democratic Labor Party over the Barbados Labor Party in recent elections, Cuba will again request permission from the Barbados Government to open a Prensa Latina office in Barbados. Barbados rejected a similar request last year.

B.

C. Nepal: Soviets Plan Anti-US Demonstration

The Soviets and North Koreans are reportedly urging local contacts to mount a demonstration to protest the US raid on Libya.

Drafted:

INR/IC: SJRapoport/ADShafen

6/18/86 647-5899/647-3857

Wang Doc No. 0189A

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

July 2, 1986

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13526
E.O. 12958
Amended
Sec. 3.3 b(1)

MEMORANDUM

TO: Active Measures Working Group
FROM: INR/ID - Kathleen C. Bailey
SUBJECT: Active Measures Memo #10 of 1986

1.



2. Central American Disinformation

A. Nicaragua Blames US for Meningitis Outbreak

Nicaraguan Health Minister Dora Maria Tellez has reportedly charged that a recent epidemic of viral meningiti, which has led to the closing of all primary schools, "could be the product of bacteriological aggression organized by the North American government against Nicaragua." Her remarks, sourced

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to Prensa Latina, appeared in pro-Sandinista daily El Nuevo Diario of June 28. Embassy Managua notes the similarities to past allegations by Sandinista officials of US bacteriological warfare against Nicaragua.

(LOU: Managua 4287, 27 June 86 and Managua 4300, 30 June 86)

B. US Presses Against Central American Parliament

Small, left-of-center, Guatemalan daily La Hora (circ. 8000) has been running a series of articles, citing unidentified sources, claiming the US is pressuring Guatemala and other Central American states to drop plans for a Central American parliament. This is all allegedly part of a US campaign to isolate Nicaragua.

(UNCLAS: Guatemala 6692, 25 June 86)

3. Argentina: Soviet Charge Nuclear Leakage from UK Ships

In a June 25 press conference held to drum up opposition to the US position on SALT II, Soviet officials commented on links between recent penguin deaths and possible leakage from nuclear weapons on four British ships sunk in the 1982 war. The Soviet Literary Gazette reporter evoked the possibility of an Argentine Chernobyl. Embassy Buenos Aires comments that this type of press conference by the Soviets is unusual and believes the press questions on the Falklands may have been planted. In any case, the Soviets were well primed to reply.

(CONF: Buenos Aires 5047, 27 June 86)

4. US Kidnaps Afghan Diplomat in Karachi?

In a June 29 press conference, Afghan diplomats in Karachi charged a US Vice Consul (and CIA agent) with the June 25 kidnapping of Afghan Consul General Baz Mohammed and his wife and infant daughter. Pakistan was also accused of complicity in the incident. Local papers speculate that Baz disappeared because of differences with the new Afghan regime and that he has defected. Congen Karachi does not believe that the Afghan claim of a kidnapping is being taken seriously. Still, the story has thus far appeared as a straight news item in Kuwait and UAE media.

(CONF: Karachi 5555, 29 June 86. LOU: Karachi 5577, 30 June 86. UNCLAS: Abu Dhabi 2986, 1 July 86 and Kuwait 3689, 30 June 86)

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5. Seychelles: President Thinks Further on Coup Plot

President Rene informed the US ambassador that he has not ruled out disinformation in the affair of the alleged US/UK plot against his government. Rene believes the disinformation could have come from elements in the US opposed to his government, from the Soviets, or from others. He seemed to be in a real quandary as to who or what to believe.
(CONF: Victoria 1028, 23 June 86)

6. US Charged with Palme Death

Bulgarian Communist Party daily Rabotnichesko Delo of June 14 carried an article, sourced to the London Observer and Stockholm's Daily Express, charging CIA involvement in the death of Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme and alleged cooperation between the CIA and Chile's DINA in creating "an international organization for terrorism and political assassination." The Palme assassination was purportedly arranged by US citizen and "CIA and DINA agent" Michael Townley. A similar article appeared in the same paper two days later. Embassy Sofia believes the articles represent Bulgaria's way of getting back at US charges of Bulgarian involvement in terrorist operations. Embassy Sofia has protested both articles to the Foreign Ministry. Both TASS and Polish media have picked up the story, sourcing it to Swedish newspaper Norrskens Flamman.

(CONF: Sofia 2774, 27 June 86 and Sofia 2599, 17 June 86.
LOU: Sofia 2671, 20 June 86. UNCLAS: Sofia 2595, 17 June 86 and Warsaw 6936, 1 July 86)

7. Greece: Anastasi Cleared of All Charges

New York Times and London Daily Telegraph correspondent Paul Anastasiades aka Anastasi has been cleared of threatening to destroy the offices of KGB-linked Athens daily Ethnos and kill members of its staff. A three-member council of district attorneys ruled that Anastasi should not be brought to trial because the charges were not filed within three months of the purported incidents. Previously, the Athens District Attorney called for dismissal of the case and claimed there was no substance to the charges.

While Anastasi now faces no further charges, Ethnos still faces two trials. Anastasi has an outstanding suit against Ethnos publisher George Bobolas, editor Alexander Filipopoulos, and three other staff members for defamation, perjury, and filing false charges. Bobolas and Filipopoulos also face retrial on accusations that they tapped Anastasi's office phone.
(UNCLAS: Athens (AP), 30 June 86)

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9. Soviets Active Among Burmese Muslims

The Soviet Embassy in Rangoon has attempted to increase its influence within the Muslim community by secretly underwriting the costs of large gatherings at which the works of prominent Muslim poets are read. Various meetings have been presided over and attended by foreign ambassadors who are believed to be unaware of the Soviet sponsorship. Soviet officials have also been in contact with Muslim student groups and provided them with funds to rent meeting places as well as propagandizing the membership. The campaign, which includes the Soviet Ambassador and several members of his staff, appears to be a well-coordinated effort. (S/NF: IIR 6 812 0086 86, USDAO Rangoon BM 3338, 180907Z Jun 86)

10. Briefly Noted: Suspected Active Measures Activity

A. TASS to Expand Nigerian Operation

TASS plans to add a second correspondent to its Lagos office, whose relatively low activity level would not appear to justify a second foreign correspondent.

B. Somalia: Clandestine Radio Charges Ongoing Power Battle

Radio Halgan, a dissident Somali-language station broadcasting from Ethiopia, charged that a power struggle has been going on in Somalia, after President Siad Barre was shot, between members of his family and Vice President Samantar. (CONF: Mogadishu 7103, 30 June 86)

Drafted:
INR/IC: SJR: report
7/2/86 647-5899
Wang Doc No. 0224A

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