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Collection Name RAYMOND, WALTER: FILES

Withdrawer

SMF 7/14/2011

File Folder [PROJECT TRUTH, PROJECT DEMOCRACY, PUBLIC DIPLOMACY, AND NED JULY 1986-AUGUST 1986]

FOIA

M430

Box Number 7

LAMB,
CHRISTOPHER

74

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of	Doc Date	Restrictions
115245	CABLE	161655Z JUL 86 D 8/27/1999 NLSF95-041/2 #95; R 11/2/2012 M430/2	1	7/16/1986	B1
115246	MEMO	ACTIVE MEASURES WORKING GROUP 7/31/86 MEETING P 11/21/2002 F95-041/2 #96; PAR M430/2 #115246	2	7/31/1987	B1 B3 B6
115247	SPECIAL ANALYSIS	PAGE 9 OF PUBLICATION RE USSR-AFRICA DISINFORMATION ACTIVITIES P 7/3/2000 F95-041/2 #97; PAR M430/2 #115247	1	7/5/1986	B1
115249	WORKING PAPER	SUGGESTIONS D 7/3/2000 NLSF95-041/2 #98; R 11/2/2012 M430/2	3	ND	B1
115252	CABLE	041753Z AUG 86 R 8/27/1999 NLSF95-041/2 #99	2	8/4/1986	B1
115255	CABLE	131058Z JUL 86 D 8/27/1999 NLSF95-041/2 #100; R 11/2/2012 M430/2	1	7/13/1986	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of	Doc Date	Restrictions
115257	SUMMARY	SITUATION ROOM EVENING SUMMARY	1	7/15/1986	B1
		P 7/19/2000 F95-041/2 #101; PAR M430/2 #115257			

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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File Folder: [Project Truth, Project Democracy, Public Diplomacy, and NED 7/86-8/86] OA 91162

Date: January 27, 1998

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. cable	161655Z JUL 86 (1) <i>D 8/27/99 NLSF95-041/2 #95</i>	7/16/86	P1
2. minutes	Active Measures Working Group 7/31/86 meeting (2) <i>Art. 11/21/02 F95-041/2 #96</i>	7/31/86	P1 <i>133, B6</i>
3. special analysis	page 9 of publication, re USSR-Africa disinformation Activities (1) <i>P 7/3/00 NLSF95-041/2 #97</i>	7/5/86	P1
4. working paper	(3) <i>D 7/3/00 NLSF95-041/2 #98</i>		P1
5. cable	041753Z AUG 86 (2) <i>R 8/27/99 NLSF95-041/2 #99</i>	8/4/86	P1
6. cable	131058Z JUL 86 (1) <i>D 8/27/99 NLSF95-041/2 #100</i>	7/13/86	P1
7. summary	Situation Room Evening Summary (1) <i>P 7/19/00 NLSF95-041/2 #101</i>	7/15/86	P1

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT

f- SNG

PAGE 01 RYADH 6360 DTG: 161655Z JUL 86 PSN: 008952
EOB829 AM003893 TOR: 197/1658Z CSN: HCE967

THAT STRONG AFGHAN RESOLUTION BE ADOPTED.

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AMCONSUL PESHAWAR IMMEDIATE 0065
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0501

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ RYADH 06360

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, NAM, SA, AF, PK
SUBJECT: AFGHAN RESISTANCE ALLIANCE PRESENCE AT NAM
SUMMIT

REFS: (A) STATE 217815, (B) STATE 217655,
(C) ISLAMABAD 14962

1. ~~X~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. AMBASSADOR RAISED OUR INTEREST IN POSSIBILITY OF
AFGHAN RESISTANCE ALLIANCE PRESENCE AT NAM SUMMIT
IN HARARE DURING MEETING WITH SAUDI FOR MIN
PRINCE SAUD IN TAIF JULY 15 (SEE SEPTTEL FOR EXCHANGE
ON RABBANI RETURN VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA). AMBASSADOR
NOTED THAT, WHILE WE RECOGNIZED NAM WAS VERY
DIFFERENT FROM OIC AND THAT THERE WERE COMPLICA-
TIONS, WE BELIEVED THAT ALLIANCE WOULD GAIN
CONSIDERABLY IN INTERNATIONAL STATURE IF SUCH
PRESENCE COULD BE SECURED.

3. SAUD RESPONDED IMMEDIATELY THAT DEPUTY FOREIGN
MINISTER THUNAYYAN, WHO HAD JUST CONCLUDED AN OFFICIAL
VISIT TO HARARE, HAD RAISED THIS ISSUE, ALONG WITH SAUDI
INTEREST IN STRONG NAM RESOLUTION ON AFGHANISTAN, WITH
ZIMBABWEAN OFFICIALS. WITHOUT ALLUDING TO THE REACTION
OF THOSE OFFICIALS, SAUD SAID THAT ONE COULD NOT BE
OPTIMISTIC RE OFFICIAL STATUS FOR ALLIANCE AT SUMMIT.
HE NOTED THAT ZIMBABWE LOCALE AND GOZ'S LIKELY RELUC-
TANCE TO TAKE INITIATIVES LIKELY DIRECTLY TO OFFEND
SOVIETS WOULD WORK AGAINST THIS EFFORT. SAUD ALSO
NOTED THAT PAKISTANI SUPPORT WOULD BE REQUIRED.
AMBASSADOR, DRAWING ON REF C, OBSERVED THAT GOP MFA, AT
LEAST, HAD SOME RESERVATIONS RE TRYING TO SECURE ALLIANCE
PRESENCE AT NAM SUMMIT, PREFERRING TO CONCENTRATE ON A
STRONG RESOLUTION. AMBASSADOR SUGGESTED THAT SAG MIGHT
NEVERTHELESS WISH TO DISCUSS THE ISSUE WITH GOP. SAUD
DID NOT RESPOND DIRECTLY BUT REITERATED SAG DESIRE THAT
ALLIANCE HAVE OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD AT NAM SUMMIT AND

4. COMMENT: AS DESCRIBED BY SAUD, SAG HAS BEEN
UNCHARACTERISTICALLY AGGRESSIVE IN TAKING INITIATIVE
TO RAISE ALLIANCE PRESENCE ISSUE WITH GOZ. SAG
CLEARLY SHARES OUR ASSESSMENT OF POTENTIAL BENEFITS.
AT SAME TIME, HOWEVER, SAUD'S REFERENCE TO NEED
FOR PAKISTANI SUPPORT AND LIKELY GOZ SENSITIVITIES
INDICATE THAT THERE ARE (A) LIMITS TO SAUDI
WILLINGNESS TO GO IT ALONE AS WELL AS (B) PRE-
DISPOSITION TO ACCEPT THAT FULL SUCCESS IS UNLIKELY.
IT WAS NEVERTHELESS ENCOURAGING THAT SAUD APPEARED
TO BELIEVE THAT OPPORTUNITY MAY EXIST FOR ALLIANCE
VOICE IN SOME FORM TO BE HEARD IN HARARE. END
COMMENT. CUTLER
BT

115245

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M430/2 * 115245

BY KML NARA DATE 11/2/12

CONFIDENTIAL



United States Department of State #35/

Washington, D.C. 20520

W. Kayman

0500

July 31, 1986

~~SECRET~~/NOFORN

MEMORANDUM

TO: Active Measures Working Group

FROM: INR/ID - Kathleen C. Bailey

SUBJECT: Minutes of Working Group Meeting
of July 31, 1986

13524
E.O. 12958
As Amended
Sec. 3.5c

The meeting was chaired by Dr. Bailey. Attending were: Mr. Romerstein (USIA), Mr. Copp (USIA), Mr. Houghton (FBI), Mr. Knecht (PA/OAP), Mr. Rapoport (INR/IC), [redacted], Mr. Fischer (ACDA), Major Bobell (OJCS), Mr. Curtin (DIA), [redacted], Mr. Schmidt (EUR/SOV), Colonel Paddock (DOD/OSD/PSYOP), Ms. Johnson (NEA/RA), Ms. Swann (AF/P), [redacted], Mr. Hunter (1st PSYOP Bn), Lieutenant Colonel Dunbar (1st PSYOP Bn), [redacted], [redacted], Dr. Lenczowski (NSC), Mr. Lester (ARA/LPD), Lieutenant Colonel Jacobowitz (DOD/PSYOP), Mr. Hertzberg (M), Mr. Heatley (S/IL), and Mr. Harbin (EAP/RA).

I. Gingrich Report

The group discussed further suggested additions and revisions to the report on Soviet disinformation and press manipulation mandated by the first Gingrich Amendment (Sec. 147), hereinafter called the Gingrich report.

A new section on Soviet active measures against SDI, written by DIA, was distributed. [redacted] passed out copies of her new report on the use of agents of influence. [redacted] submitted his new draft on Soviet fronts to INR/ID for copying and distribution. INR/ID will also distribute revised copies of the paper on forgeries as well as the Executive Summary.

~~SECRET~~
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLRR M4302 #115240

BY RW NARA DATE 3/31/15

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

It was decided to hold another session on the Gingrich proposals. This meeting has been scheduled for 2:30 P.M. on Wednesday, August 6th in the INR Conference Room, 6530 NS.

II. Briefing on Active Measures in Central America

COL Paddock distributed copies of the joint State/DOD unclassified publication The Challenge to Democracy in Central America, which was released last month. COL Paddock then introduced the First PSYOP Battalion commander LTC Dunbar, who introduced his unit's intelligence officer, LT Hunter, who briefed the group on Active Measures and Hostile Propaganda in Central America. Mr. Hunter's briefing featured a case study of recent disinformation campaigns alleging US use of chemical and biological weapons in the region along with charges of immoral conduct by US troops in Honduras. It was well received and Dr. Bailey expressed the hope that some portion of it could be declassified in the future.

III. New Business

Dr. Bailey announced that this was Mr. Rapoport's last active measures meeting and invited working group members to attend his farewell party.

The next regular meeting of the active measures working group will be held on Wednesday, August 27 at 10:00 A.M. in the INR Conference Room, 6530 NS. Please note that this is a change from our usual Thursday meeting date. Members with agenda items should contact Andrew Sheren (647-8357).

Drafted:
INR/IC: ~~SJR~~Rapoport
7/31/86 647-5899
Wang Doc No. 0278A

~~SECRET~~

~~Top Secret~~

13526
E. O. 12958
As Amended
Sec. 3.3 b(1)

3.5c

USSR-AFRICA: Disinformation Activities

SNG
Hold

[redacted] Zimbabwean Prime Minister Mugabe has approved plans to release on the eve of the Nonaligned summit next month in Harare "proof" of a US-South African plot to assassinate him. Zimbabwe's security service recently received an apparent Soviet forgery alleging US-South African complicity on a number of issues. Meanwhile, an Indian newspaper often used by Moscow for disinformation has reported that the US, acting through Pretoria, may try to sabotage the summit. [redacted]

Comment: There is no direct evidence the Soviets are behind the assassination plot story, but they have long tried to encourage Mugabe's suspicions of US intentions in southern Africa. They have also been making a concerted effort to discredit the US prior to the Nonaligned summit. [redacted]

UN: Succession Politics

[redacted] Kenya will propose Robert Ouko, National Planning and Development Minister, as Africa's candidate to succeed UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar if he decides not to seek a second term. Two West Africans, Ghanaian Secretary General of UNCTAD Kenneth Dadzie and Cameroonian Director of the UN Institute of Training and Research Michelle Dookengue, also are seeking the office. In Kenya's view, West Africans already have a disproportionately large share of high-level UN jobs. Kenya reportedly fears, however, that any secretary general will fare badly during the UN's current financial crisis and would accept a second term for Perez de Cuellar. [redacted]

Comment: Because of past practice, it is generally assumed that an African will have the next turn at the top UN post, but Kenya's entry would split the African voting bloc in the General Assembly. The split increases the probability that Perez de Cuellar will remain in office.

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLRR M430/2#115247

BY RW NARA DATE 3/31/15

~~Top Secret~~

5 July 1986

SUGGESTIONS FOR EXPLORING THE VULNERABILITIES OF THE COPENHAGEN PEACE CONGRESS

BACKGROUND:

1. The Congress is organized by the World Peace Council, a well exposed Soviet front. Attempts are being made to conceal the WPC control and to improve the image of the WPC.
2. In recent WPC propaganda, the emphasis has been on issues of US-USSR relations, specifically SDI and INF, to the exclusion of "National Liberation Struggles." (Another Soviet front AAPS0 fills this gap.)
3. The leadership of WPC has been shifted to Europeans with the establishment of a European General Secretary and the addition of Europeans to the Secretariat.
4. Promises have been made to West European peace activists that there would be free discussion of ideas at the Congress.

VULNERABILITIES:

1. The contradiction between the reality of Soviet control and the image of a broadly based congress.
2. The contradiction between the non-communist West Europeans, concerned about mutual disarmament and the violence prone activists from the underdeveloped world.
3. The need to pass resolutions in support of Soviet themes contradicts the pretense that free discussion will be allowed.

EXPLOITATION:

A - Forms

- a - white - radio, FANs, discussions with Western journalists, friendly governments, and potential delegates
- b - gray - pamphlets, leaflets,
- c - black - pamphlets, leaflets, media placement, assets

B - Themes

1. Before and during the congress expose continued Soviet control
 - a - white, gray and black - expose WPC leadership of congress and nature of WPC

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M450/2 #115249

BY KML NARA DATE 11/2/12

2. Expose continuing activity of Soviet front AAPSO in support of violent groups. (AAPSO is closely associated with WPC)

a - white and gray - link AAPSO, PLO, etc. to WPC

b - black - see white - in addition encourage radicals from the underdeveloped countries to accuse WPC of ignoring their needs.

3. Expose every denial of free expression at the congress and hand picking of delegates to exclude articulate critics of the Soviet Union.

a - white - radio interviews with those refused delegate status. Provide such people with access to the press.

b - gray - leaflets on themes in white

c - black - leaflets and use of assets to promote themes in white.

PRE CONGRESS ACTIONS

White - brief press and friendly governments

- encourage non-communist delegates but not representing groups that would add prestige to the congress
- publish FAN on the congress as soon as possible
- use VOA and wireless file to report on Congress plans

Gray - publish pamphlets aimed at possible attendees

Black - encourage assets and contacts to attend

- publish pamphlets to discredit congress

ACTIONS DURING CONGRESS

White and Black - encourage opposition voices at congress

White - provide continuing information to press

Black - leaflets to undermine Soviet control, assets to challenge Soviet control slogans

POST CONGRESS ACTIVITIES

A. White

1. State USIA briefing teams to countries targeted by the WPC
2. VOA broadcasts
 - a - editorials
 - b - panel discussions
 - c - interviews with participants
3. FAN on congress.
4. Conference including one in Israel on Active Measures in Middle East to exploit Soviet image problem re: terrorist support

B. Black and Gray
pamphlets on congress

F-101

WR

DIRECTOR'S TESTIMONY BEFORE THE
HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS SUBCOMMITTEE
ON INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS, 7/23/86

Mr. Chairman, it gives me great pleasure to appear before the subcommittee today to testify on the Administration's Public Diplomacy efforts. As you know, I have been interested in this specific government activity and presented my own ideas on the subject in a 1981 Foreign Affairs article, "Speaking of America: Public Diplomacy In Our Time." I believe copies of this article have been provided to the committee staff. [I would like to talk to you today about the coordination and leadership of the U.S. Public Diplomacy efforts, particularly with respect to arms control, and my judgement as to whether or not we are doing the job of Public Diplomacy well enough.] As many of you perhaps already know, in a January 1983 National Security Directive, the President expressed his resolve to strengthen the organization, planning and coordination of various aspects of U.S. Government Public Diplomacy and outlined the basic framework for "An aggressive pursuit of Public Diplomacy in the informational, political, and broadcast fields." Through this decision, the President, in effect, established Public Diplomacy as an integral part of national security policy. Before discussing how our Public Diplomacy programs are put into practice, let me first outline for you the leadership, structure, and coordination aspects of our Public Diplomacy effort.

Leadership of our overall Public Diplomacy policy is vested in the National Security Council staff. NSC staff members chair the key

interagency groups responsible for developing Public Diplomacy strategy, coordinating its implementation, and assessing the effectiveness of our efforts. With respect to arms control, the key organization is the NSC-chaired Interagency Group (IG) on Arms Control and SDI Public Diplomacy. This IG is composed of senior Public Affairs Officials from all agencies dealing with arms control Public Diplomacy efforts. It provides broad guidance as well as specific

direction for transforming policy into action.

policy guidance from the S.A. - C-2, chaired by the President's
The organization which implements the Administration's Public

Diplomacy policies by developing materials, establishing speakers' programs, building up media contacts, etc. is the Interagency Working Group On Arms Control and SDI Public Diplomacy. Chaired by State/PM, this IG is the key link between policy makers and those who actually implement it, e.g. the drafter of a speech for a senior level official, the speaker at a public forum, the Administration representative being interviewed by the print or electronic media.

*If received its own
National
Security
Adviser.*

I would like now to turn from the organization of the Administration's Public Diplomacy effort and to spend some time on our actual programs paying specific attention to the activities of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Clearly, a major component of any Public Diplomacy effort must be a systematic domestic public speaking and media program by a Department's or Agency's officers. Operationally, a bureau or office of Public Affairs is responsible for planning and implementing these activities.

Programs which are the responsibility of Public Affairs organizations include speakers' bureaus; outreach to media, both print and electronic; publications; correspondence; and taking initiatives to reach public

audiences whenever the opportunities present themselves. I would like to explain the operation of such programs in somewhat greater detail.

Speakers' Bureaus receive invitations from the public requesting Administration officials to make presentations on USG policies.

In ACDA for example, I have not only established an Agency Speaker's Bureau, but also have informed State's Speakers' Bureau that

ACDA officials have been encouraged to participate in their program. *Similarly, State & other agencies frequently turn to ACDA to fill speaking requests.* Moreover, whenever a speaking invitation is accepted, the Administration always attempts to ^{coordinate} ~~awaken~~ related media interest too, so that officials will be able to reach the largest audiences possible.

In addition to supplementing public speaking engagements with print and electronic media interviews, the Administration is able to reach such important influencers of public opinion separately through direct line phone interviews, conducting backgrounders' in Washington, D.C. regularly scheduled appearances at the Foreign Press Center, participating in USIA Worldnet, and similar programs.

Administration efforts to produce publications in support of its Public Diplomacy activities are extensive. Whether it is providing guidance for the use of press spokesmen, or speakers' books for officials appearing at public forums, or a GIST synthesizing an Administration policy for the general public, or an in-depth statement on a complex issue for the attention of a more specialized public, the Administration has a plethora of publications available to inform both domestic and foreign audiences of USG policies and the rationale for them. If anything, we are expanding both the quantity and quality of such publications.

Finally, we are increasingly taking the initiative in Public Diplomacy activities, especially through the placing of Op-ed pieces in major newspapers and magazines, the submission of learned essays to respected professional journals, and the aggressive use of our own electronic capabilities such as Worldnet.

Let me dwell at some length on ACDA's activities, with the understanding that our efforts show in microcosm the extensive Public Diplomacy programs which permeate the Agencies and Departments of the entire Executive Branch.

As you perhaps already know, ACDA has always had as one of its primary functions the dissemination and coordination of public information on arms control and disarmament.

ACDA officials, at all levels, have delivered hundreds of speeches, to both domestic and foreign audiences, composed of civic, business, academic and religious groups. In this, the 25th year of ACDA's founding we are increasing the scope and intensity of our speakers program.

In addition to their public speaking efforts, ACDA officials have been interviewed on numerous occasions by print and electronic journalists. ACDA has made a special effort to reach representatives of foreign media by participating in the Visiting Professionals Programs of Meridian House International, USIA's Foreign Press Center, and initiating contacts with groups of visiting NATO journalists.

Other ACDA "outreach" efforts in Public Diplomacy include conducting special programs and conferences for nongovernmental organizations and domestic media, e.g. Aspen Seminars, which bring together

present and former senior level USG officials, and many of the most knowledgeable and experienced reporters and correspondents in the field of national security matters for intensive, off-the-record dialogue on the issues.

ACDA also assists school and university instructors, at their request to *provide information for the* ~~prepare~~ *ation of* arms control and disarmament segments of courses in political science, history, and international relations.

I cannot overlook in a discussion of the Agency's Public Diplomacy efforts is long-standing, and now expanding, publication efforts. We have established a solid reputation as a source for reference documents on arms control and disarmament issues through the publication of Documents on Disarmament, Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements, World Military Expenditures, Arms Control Impact Statements, and, of course, our Annual Report. *In addition, our publications enjoy* ~~We are now gaining a reputation~~ for a reliable information source on specific issues of topical concern to the public. For example, our publication The Soviet Propaganda Campaign Against INF was well received by both foreign and domestic audiences as was our recent publication Soviet Noncompliance. The latter has almost gone through its second printing, has been translated in whole or part in several languages, and is used by USG officials around the world. We expect a similar success with our soon to be released pamphlet The Soviet Propaganda Campaign Against SDI.

In addition to the efforts I've just described, one should not overlook the daily activities of Public Affairs Officers and Specialists who are in constant, direct contact with members of the public. For example, ACDA provides guidance for State Department Spokesmen on arms control matters. Our officers respond in writing and verbally

to thousands of written requests and telephone enquiries for information and materials about the Administration's arms control policies. Theirs is the "hidden" work which does not receive much recognition or thanks but which is essential for establishing a bond of trust between the public and its Government and for providing a solid base upon which to carry out the Administration's Public Diplomacy programs. *ACDA Library*

In closing my testimony this morning, I would like to address the subject of whether or not we are doing the job of Public Diplomacy well enough. We believe we are doing a very good job, and we plan to do even better. I do not make this statement without having evidence to support it. Let me explain.

We constantly monitor public opinion to discover the attitude of the public on any particular issue. The State Department, for example, conducts its own surveys of domestic public opinion, as reflected by editorials, correspondence, telephone calls, etc, while USIA performs a similar role to ascertain foreign audiences' responses to USG policies. In addition, Administration speakers compile reports of audience reactions to their presentations.

Such reports form the basis of periodic memos to Assistant Secretaries of Public Affairs, and are employed to first identify and then respond to, *public concerns and questions about* ~~those aspects of~~ Administration policies,

~~which are either not understood by the public, or do not have~~ *respond now*
~~the public's support.~~ In this way, we are able to *"fine tune"*
effectively ~~our presentations~~ to the public,, to explain our policies more
lucidly, and to build-up public *understanding* ~~support~~ for them.

One of the glories of a democracy is the provision it makes for

the free exchange of ideas in the "market-place" between the governed and their Government. Personally, I am delighted to participate in this flow of information between Administration's officials and our domestic and foreign audiences, and I look upon the Administration's Public Diplomacy efforts as the ideal way to facilitate these exchanges. The Administration welcomes the opportunity to present its case directly to the public and not to have it filtered through other sources, where the possibility for distortion and inaccuracies, whether deliberate or otherwise, is high.

If this, or any Administration, should lack the courage or confidence to present its policies directly to the American people, to answer their questions, and to defend the policies when criticized, then that Administration does not deserve the public's support. I assure you, this Administration lacks neither the courage nor confidence to do this.

8622477

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520 5042 reopen



F-SNB

August 9, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR VADM JOHN M. POINDEXTER
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Report to Congress on Soviet and Communist
Disinformation and Press Manipulation

The Report has been revised to reflect comments in Mr.
McDaniel's memorandum of July 18, 1986. The revised version is
attached.


for Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

As stated.

ACTIVE MEASURES :

A Report on the Substance and Process of Anti-U.S. Disinformation and Propaganda Campaigns

PREFACE

PREFACE

This report has been prepared in response to a Congressional Requirement that the Secretary of State provide an examination of Soviet and communist disinformation and press manipulation with respect to the United States. The purview of the report has been expanded in two respects. First, "communist disinformation and press manipulation" activities has been expanded to include all types of active measures, such as forgeries, front groups, and propaganda campaigns. Second, the focus is not only on active measures with respect to the United States alone; it includes any active measures designed to affect US policy interests in other areas of the world.

This report begins with a recommendation by the President to establish an Office of Disinformation Analysis and Response within the Department of State. This is followed by an executive summary of the report, and by a description of the Active Measures Working Group. The Working Group is an interagency effort which has had the primary responsibility of responding to active measures to-date, and will continue under the direction of the new Office. This is followed by a substantive report on selected aspects of Soviet active measures.

Because this report is a product of an interagency effort, it is comprised of several separate papers rather than a single document. The report includes sections on the following areas: the Soviet propaganda apparatus, including an appendix describing the anti-SDI campaign; active measures in the United States; Soviet front groups; forgeries suspected of being produced by the USSR and/or its allies; and, agents of influence. An appendix contains transcripts of presentations by scholars and journalists on the subject of active measures given in a State Department-sponsored seminar series in conjunction with preparation of this report.

The conclusion to be drawn from this report is that there is a massive and highly organized effort by the Soviet Union and its proxies to influence world opinion. This effort includes public diplomacy to enhance the Soviet image abroad and to further Soviet policy objectives. It also includes a persistent, widespread program of disinformation and deception designed to discredit the US image abroad and disrupt US foreign policy objectives. This program has achieved successes in the past and without effective responses by the US, it constitutes a threat to our national interests.

Soviet active measures have shown no diminution since General Secretary Gorbachev came to power. In the past year, virtually the entire Soviet leadership directly responsible for active measures has changed; the new leaders have a more eclectic view of world politics and are younger. Also, the International Department, which is directly responsible for active measures, has been reorganized. These changes indicate a renewed emphasis on active measures, and perhaps an increase in both quantity and quality of active measures for the foreseeable future.

RECOMMENDATION

RECOMMENDATION

The President of the United States recommends that a permanent Office on Disinformation Analysis and Response be established within the Department of State. The specific goals of this Office will be to monitor active measures in the US and worldwide, and to respond appropriately.

This Office will be staffed at a level sufficient to meet the challenges of increasing active measures against the US and its interests. The Office shall: continue to provide an executive secretary for the interagency Active Measures Working Group; regularly produce reports on active measures for release to the public; provide regular interagency briefings to appropriate US and foreign governmental and non-governmental bodies; assure efficient and timely US Government responses to active measures, both unilaterally and in concert with friendly governments.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

I. Definition

The term active measures is a literal translation from Russian, aktivnyye meropriyatiya, which denotes covert or deceptive operations conducted in support of Soviet foreign policy. Active measures are distinct both from espionage and counterintelligence, and from traditional diplomatic and informational activities. The goal of active measures is to influence opinions and perceptions of governments and/or publics to achieve a specific response.

Deceptiveness is the essence of active measures -- disinformation and forgeries, front groups, influence operations, media manipulation, and clandestine radio broadcasts. Often these measures involve covert activity, but not necessarily so.

Covertly implemented Soviet active measures are the responsibility of Service A of the KGB First Chief Directorate, which works in close coordination with the International Department of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee. All Soviet agencies and representatives abroad are potentially available to support or participate in Soviet active measures campaigns. Techniques include the following:

- Disinformation and Forgeries

Disinformation, a deliberate attempt to deceive public or governmental opinion, can be oral and/or written. Forged documents are frequently used in attempts to discredit individuals, institutions, or policies in such a way as to damage US foreign policy interests.

- Front Groups and Friendship Societies

The ID coordinates activities of front organizations such as the World Peace Council and the World Federation of Trade Unions, as well as local fronts and friendship societies. Fronts normally present themselves as non-governmental, non-political organizations engaged in promoting desirable goals such as world peace.

- Non-ruling Communist and Leftist Parties

The ID is also responsible for liaison with non-ruling communist and leftist parties, including socialist and social democratic parties. Contacts with these parties are usually overt, and are used to persuade the parties to carry out specific political action or propaganda campaigns on behalf of the USSR.

- Political Influence Operations

Agents of influence disguise their KGB connection while taking an active role in their nation's governmental, political, press, business, labor, or academic affairs. Their object is to convert their influence in those realms into real policy gains for the Soviet Union. At times, the Soviets use unwitting contacts to achieve similar results.

- Media Manipulation

The Soviets or other opponents of the US frequently place falsely attributed or nonattributed materials in print and broadcast media. These materials, which contain propaganda and/or disinformation, may appear in a variety of media, such as regular publications, clandestine broadcasts, or specially printed brochures.

Although the term active measures is taken from Russian and we generally think of active measures as being Soviet in origin, active measures may occasionally be generated against the US by other foreign powers. Yet, no state uses active measures techniques as extensively or as effectively as the USSR.

In studying active measures it is important to understand that propaganda and other efforts employed by the Soviets to influence public perceptions -- such as cultural programs, radio broadcasting, and publications -- may not be active measures in themselves, but may be the vehicles used to promote and sustain active measures. For example, a forgery -- definitely an active measure -- might surface accusing the US of plotting to assassinate a foreign leader. Even after being exposed by the US as a forgery, the content of the forged document may be repeated, for instance, by Novosti news agency. Thus, Novosti, an official propaganda and information organ, is used to promote an active measure. For this reason, Soviet propaganda and public diplomacy efforts and means must be taken into consideration when examining active measures.

II. The Soviet Foreign Propaganda Apparatus

The policies for propaganda, as well as for active measures, are decided by the Politburo, with inputs from the International Department (ID) and other party and government bodies. This large, highly centralized structure was reorganized in the spring of 1986, with the apparent intent of streamlining decisionmaking. The new head of the ID, the former Soviet ambassador to the US, Anatoliy Dobrynin, brings to his job considerable knowledge and experience of how to deal with open societies. With these changes, it is quite possible that not only the quantity of active measures and propaganda will increase, but also the quality and sophistication.

The Soviets devote major resources to disseminate anti-Western propaganda to a worldwide audience. The primary vehicles are radio broadcasting (over 2200 hours per week in over 80 languages), and news services (TASS has offices in 126 countries and Novosti news service distributes information to at least 5000 press and information organs in 110 countries). Cultural activities, scholarships (over 55,000 Third world students in the USSR), film, television, and publication of books and magazines also play a part.

III. Soviet Active Measures in the United States

Soviet active measures in the United States are designed to discredit the US government, promote Soviet foreign policy objectives, and influence US public opinion against US military, economic, and political programs. The primary Soviet vehicles for this are the Communist Party of the USA (CPUSA) and its front groups, the two most prominent of which are the United States Peace Council (USPC) and the National Council of American Soviet Friendship (NCASF). The Soviets place extensive reliance on these groups to support active measures and propaganda campaigns within the US.

Soviet KGB officers responsible for covert active measures operations are in frequent contact with officials of these groups. The Soviet fronts in the US have been particularly instructed to devote considerable attention to the US peace movement. CPUSA and its fronts have (along with several non-communist organizations) been involved in the organization of several mass demonstrations against US government policies, including the April 20, 1985 "April Actions for Peace, Jobs and Justice."

The KGB also is keenly interested in religious groups in the US as a potential vehicle for the exercise of political influence and, more recently, as a means of manipulating opposition against US disarmament policies, particularly increased spending for SDI. Also, as part of its campaign against US security policies, the KGB seeks to cultivate and target influential US citizens, particularly government officials, journalists, and political activists.

IV. Soviet Front Organizations

Since the early 1920's the USSR has used front organizations as a means of gaining worldwide support for its policies. Fronts are designed to appeal to a broad range of opinion and attempt to conceal their links to the USSR and international communism. They invariably support Soviet propaganda themes, attack the West, and never criticize the USSR.

The best known and largest front is the World Peace Council (WPC). Founded in Paris in 1949 as the World Committee of Partisans for Peace, the WPC has been based in Helsinki since 1968. It now contains over 140 affiliates including US Peace Council and the British Peace Assembly. The WPC maintains extensive links to other communist fronts. Although it claims otherwise, most of its expenses are met by the Soviets and their East European allies. Like all of the other Soviet fronts, the WPC operates under the general direction of the ID.

There are several other major fronts; virtually every profession and interest group has an appropriate front: organized labor, scientists, lawyers, Third World peoples, women, youth, students, journalists. There are also "fronts of fronts," groups established by parent fronts to address particular issues. A good example of this activity is the Generals for Peace, a front of the WPC.

Fronts are extensively utilized the UN system via consultative membership in the UN as non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Eleven fronts, including the WPC, have differing types of NGO status in one or more of the UN councils and agencies.

Soviets have tried to use the fronts to influence the West European peace movement toward unification on an exclusively anti-US platform, but this effort has not been successful. The fronts find it difficult to cooperate with groups who have criticized Soviet as well as Western policies.

V. Forgeries: An Instrument of Active Measures

Soviet use of forgeries has, we believe, increased in recent years, and has become more sophisticated. Our best evidence that the Soviet government is a source of forgeries comes from numerous KGB defectors, but rarely can we be absolutely certain that a given forgery is Soviet and are forced to rely on circumstantial evidence, analysis of the document itself, and the determination of whom the forgery ultimately benefits.

Forgeries can be easily exposed as fakes but denial may never entirely offset the initial damage, which can be compounded by repeated references to the original forgery in Soviet or pro-communist media, often months or years after the primary surfacing.

Forgeries are prepared by KGB specialists under the supervision of the Active Measures Section, Service A, of the KGB's First Chief Directorate, except for certain cases where timeliness is so important that the fake may be prepared by the local KGB residency and take on an imperfect character associated with a "rush job." But given sufficient time, virtually any type of document can be forged. Still, even the best forgery can be unmasked by analysis of errors that one experienced in the mechanics and wording of US government documents can detect.

The effectiveness of a forgery often depends more on the predisposition of the recipient than on the quality of the forgery. A recipient who is suspicious of and hostile toward the US is far more likely to credit a forgery than one who is not. Because of increasingly sophisticated journalists, many forgeries never achieve uncritical publication and appear only in communist or communist-dominated media.

VI. Agents of Influence

Agents of influence are individuals who support and promote Soviet interests, either openly or covertly. Often, the KGB is involved, but agents of influence may come from virtually any profession. Often, these individuals are recruited early in their lives and are not called upon to represent Soviet interests until they have achieved an influential position in government, business, academia, or media.

Agents of influence are motivated by a variety of factors. Some may be blackmailed, but many support the USSR for other reasons such as ideological affinity, ego, political expediency, or financial reward.

Arne Treholt, a former Norwegian government official, provides one of the best examples of a recent agent of influence. Recruited in his early years, he was activated by the Soviets after he took on a responsible government position years later. He actively advocated Soviet policies and positions in the conduct of his responsibilities, and helped the Soviets to receive favorable results during negotiations on several issues. In 1985, Treholt was convicted and jailed as a Soviet spy.

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PARM, PREL, PROP, SCUL, UN, UR, US
SUBJECT: US POLICY ON THE UN INTERNATIONAL YEAR OF
PEACE (IYP)

REF: A) LAGOS 08026 (NOTAL)
B) STATE 046077 (NOTAL)

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ENTIRE TEXT

2. BEGIN SUMMARY: THIS MESSAGE, STIMULATED BY REF A, IS BEING SENT TO ALL AF POSTS FOR GENERAL BACKGROUND. IT REVIEWS SOVIET IYP ACTIVITIES, AND UPDATES EARLIER GUIDANCE ON THE USG APPROACH TO THE IYP (REF B). ACTION ADDRESSEES ARE REQUESTED TO REPORT LOCAL ACTIVITIES COMMEMORATING IYP. END SUMMARY.

3. BACKGROUND: TO HONOR THE UN'S 40TH ANNIVERSARY, THE 40TH UNGA PROCLAIMED 1986 AS THE INTERNATIONAL YEAR OF PEACE. THE USG WAS ALWAYS UNENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT THE IYP FOR THESE REASONS:

-- COMMEMORATIVE FUNCTIONS AND GRANDILOQUENT SPEECHES, BY THEMSELVES, CONTRIBUTE NOTHING TO THE CAUSE OF PEACE. TOO OFTEN, THEY BECOME A SUBSTITUTE FOR POSITIVE ACTION BY UN MEMBER GOVERNMENTS.

-- IYP ACTIVITIES COULD DIVERT HUMAN AND FINANCIAL RESOURCES FROM THE SEARCH FOR PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS OF THE WORLD.

-- THE CHOICE OF 1986 CONFLICTED WITH USG POLICY THAT UN "INTERNATIONAL YEARS" SHOULD BE HELD ONLY EVERY OTHER YEAR (1985 WAS THE INTERNATIONAL YEAR OF YOUTH);

-- THE IYP GIVES THE SOVIETS AND THEIR FOLLOWERS YET ANOTHER OPPORTUNITY TO ADVERTISE ALLEGED SOVIET CONTRIBUTIONS TO PEACE, MISREPRESENT USG FOREIGN POLICY AND ARMS-CONTROL PROPOSALS, AND PROMOTE INITIATIVES AND

4. NEVERTHELESS, THE USG HAS JOINED IN CONSENSUS UNGA ADOPTION OF IYP RESOLUTIONS SINCE 1983 BECAUSE (A) THE IYP WAS AN INITIATIVE OF COSTA RICA, A FRIENDLY STATE THAT HAS WORKED WITH THE USG TO REDUCE IYP COSTS, AND (B) USG OPPOSITION TO THE IYP, HOWEVER PRINCIPLED, WOULD HAVE BEEN A PROPOGANDA COUP FOR THE SOVIETS AT THE UN.

5. SOVIET IYP ACTIVITIES: THE SOVIETS HAVE TAKEN THE PROPAGANDA OFFENSIVE IN THIS "PEACE YEAR." GORBACHEV PUT HIS JANUARY 16 PROPOSAL TO ELIMINATE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN AN IYP CONTEXT. IN THE WAKE OF LAST FALL'S UN ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATIONS, THE SOVIETS PROPOSED TO MARK THE IYP WITH A SPECIAL SESSION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, BUT HAD TO SETTLE FOR AN IYP STATEMENT BY THE UNSC PRESIDENT AT THE COUNCIL'S FIRST MEETING IN 1986. THE SOVIETS WERE UNABLE TO INSERT A REFERENCE TO "THE NEED FOR PEACE IN THE NUCLEAR AGE" INTO THAT STATEMENT. THE SOVIET BLOC WILL CONTINUE TO EXPLOIT THE IYP THEME AT THE UN AND ELSEWHERE AGAINST THE USG AND THE WEST, USING PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND THEIR TRIED-AND-TRUE TACTIC OF INTRODUCING EXTRANEOUS OR DUPLICATIVE ISSUES AT INTERNATIONAL GATHERINGS. SOVIET UN OFFICIALS WILL BE SIMILARLY ACTIVE. UN UNDER SYG USTINOV, FOR EXAMPLE, ADDRESSED A CONFERENCE SPONSORED BY THE WORLD PEACE

COUNCIL ON "THE MEDITERRANEAN AND WORLD PEACE" IN ATHENS ON JANUARY 30.

6. USG POSITION:

-- THE USG APPROACH TO THE IYP IS SUBDUED. WE SUPPORT ITS GOALS, BUT DO NOT VIEW RHETORIC AND COMMEMORATIVE EVENTS AS SUBSTITUTES FOR DEEDS.

-- OUR PRACTICAL ONGOING ACTIVITIES DO MORE THAN IYP CEREMONIES TO PROMOTE WORLD PEACE. THESE INCLUDE PARTICIPATION IN BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL ARMS TALKS, INCLUDING OUR PROPOSALS TO RADICALLY REDUCE NUCLEAR ARMS THROUGH VERIFIABLE AGREEMENTS; US-SOVIET SUMMIT MEETINGS; SUPPORT FOR UN PEACEKEEPING ACTIVITIES; THE USG MEDIATING ROLE IN REGIONAL CONFLICTS IN THE MIDEAST, SOUTHERN AFRICA, AND ELSEWHERE; AND MOUNTING EFFORTS TO COMBAT TERRORISM.

-- THE USG OPPOSES THE INTRODUCTION OF EXTRANEOUS POLITICAL ISSUES AT INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES. WE BELIEVE THAT SEPARATE IYP AGENDA ITEMS AT INTERNATIONAL GATHERINGS ARE UNNECESSARY, IN VIEW OF ALL THE OTHER COMMEMORATIVE ACTIVITY, AND USUALLY NOT GERMANE TO THE SUBSTANTIVE NON-POLITICAL MATTERS WITH WHICH THOSE BODIES ARE CHARGED.

- AS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, WE ALSO OPPOSE IYP ACTIVITIES WITH ADDITIONAL FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UN AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL BODIES.

-- IN DISCUSSING THE IYP, US REPRESENTATIVES SHOULD SEEK TO (A) INITIATE DISCUSSION OF USG CONTRIBUTIONS TO PEACE IN THE WORLD, (B) PREVENT DISTORTION OF USG POLICIES OR THE HISTORICAL RECORD, AND (C) DRAW ATTENTION, AS NEEDED AND APPROPRIATE, TO SOVIET ACTIVITIES THAT RUN COUNTER TO THE GOALS OF PEACE, I.E. CONTINUING WAR IN AFGHANISTAN, INTERVENTION BY PROXY IN ANGOLA, CAMBODIA, ETHIOPIA, ETC.; TIES WITH GROUPS AND STATES THAT SUPPORT TERRORISM;

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AND THE CONTINUING SOVIET MILITARY BUILDUP, INCLUDING
VIOLATIONS OF ARMS-CONTROL AGREEMENTS.

7. USG PUBLIC STATEMENT: IN RESPONSE TO PUBLIC
INQUIRIES OF ANY KIND, ADDRESSEES SHOULD TAILOR THE
FOLLOWING TEXT TO LOCAL CIRCUMSTANCES:

BEGIN TEXT:

THE UNITED NATIONS HAS MARKED ITS FORTIETH ANNIVERSARY,
IN PART, BY PROCLAIMING 1986 AS THE INTERNATIONAL YEAR OF
PEACE. USG ACTIVITIES IN SUPPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL
YEAR OF PEACE HAVE BEEN INCORPORATED INTO OUR OBSERVANCE
OF THE FORTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE UNITED NATIONS. OUR
APPROACH TO THIS EVENT IS ONE OF SOBER REFLECTION ON THE
ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND PROBLEMS OF THE UNITED NATIONS DURING
THE PAST FORTY YEARS, WITH THE INTENTION OF RECOMMITTING
OURSELVES AND THE WORLD COMMUNITY TO THE ORIGINAL
PURPOSES OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AND A REALISTIC
SEARCH FOR PEACE.

END TEXT

FOR ACTION ADDRESSEES

8. PLEASE REPORT TO THE DEPARTMENT (SLUG CABLES FOR
IO/UNP) AND USUN ANY LOCAL IYP ACTIVITIES, PARTICULARLY
SOVIET BLOC EFFORTS TO EXPLOIT IYP THEMES. IF IYP
COMMEMORATIVE REMARKS BECOME UNAVOIDABLE AT AN
INTERNATIONAL FUNCTION, WE PREFER THAT YOU INCORPORATE
THEM INTO GENERAL STATEMENTS. SHULTZ
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Check w. Boyd

National Endowment for Democracy

July 2, 1986

Mr. Walter Raymond, Jr.
National Security Council
OEOB Room 351
17th and Penn. Ave. NW
Washington, DC 20506

Dear Walt,


Do you have any comments about the Ukrainian journal
Vidnova published semi-annually in Munich?

Its chief editor is Jaroslav Pelensky, an old friend of mine who is also Professor of History at the University of Iowa. Pelensky came to see me yesterday about possible NED funding for the journal, which he said would run out of funds by early 1987. \$50,000 will keep him going for a year.

The magazine looks very interesting because it has on its editorial board a mix of Ukrainians, Russians, Poles, Jews, Germans and Americans, all of whom have a commitment to democracy and pluralism. Some of the more interesting board members are Vladimir Bukovsky, Vladimir Maksimov, Jerzy Giedroys (of Paris' Kultura), Jakob Karpinski and John Reshetar (Univ. of Washington).

Please give me a ring if you have any ideas.

Sincerely,


Yale Richmond

1156 Fifteenth Street, N.W., Suite 304, Washington, D.C. 20005

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Excerpt from Witold Charlamp's "Outside Diary"

"Kultura" (Paris) 5/86

Translated by Edward Assarabowski

Disputes within the desk of Radio Free Europe. Their fragmented echoes reach Poland, but more distinctly than the program which with difficulty pierces through the noise of jammers. The level of the station appears to be currently lower than several years ago, and above all, lower than the capabilities of the emigration, reinforced lately from Poland with a stream of specialists from all areas.

I don't know the details; besides, I don't believe that they are of interest. From the tangle of hands and feet now and then Najder's head and Kalabinski's torn ear pop out. And above this battlefield appears the cold smile of Urban, by no means our own, but the American chief of Radio Free Europe's Polish Section, George Urban.

Sad, because even from such a distance it is evident that for the conflicting sides, the level of the radio is a marginal issue. And what about other radio stations? Voice of America is too official, BBC phlegmatic, maybe only Radio France Internationale, though ^{it} broadcasts briefly, does so with humor and grace.

Sometimes, when scanning the radio dial I accidentally encounter a Soviet station, I have the impression that a chasm is opening under my feet. An abyss of mendacity. (Their stations are recognizable after two, sometimes after a single sentence; the sweetness of the speaker's voice and the smell of dead language. Truly, much still separates

"Western Polish-Language Radio Stations" by Jan Marcin

Kultura (Paris) 5/86

Translated by Edward Assarabowski

After all these comments, it is clearly seen that the author taking up this subject can base himself only on his own judgment and the opinion of trusted people constantly listening to Western Polish-language stations, and necessarily including professional journalists. This I did. In order to formulate, on the basis of these opinions, a substantive evaluation, I assumed that the Polish listener is interested in the situation of his own country against the background of the world situation, and desires to find in programs broadcast from abroad that which censored government propaganda does not bring him. Such a criterion for a substantive evaluation is in itself already subjective, but there is no other solution since the undersigned below does not have at his disposal a study center with a staff of pollsters. Such a formulated criterion is also in essence "Polono-centric" and shunts aside surely numerous specific interests (one of these, interest in life in the FRG, was, for example, here mentioned). I am nevertheless convinced that the overwhelming majority of listeners is "Polono-centric" in the very sense which I have formulated above, since it judges world events from the viewpoint of Poland and its interests -- expecting exactly this information and commentary.

So, taking into account all the limitations and subjectivisms, I can embark on an attempt at more detailed assess-

scale and providing further commentary dealing with individual broadcasters.

<u>Radio Station</u>	<u>Evaluation of Audibility</u>	<u>Remarks on Jamming</u>	<u>Substantive Evaluation</u>
BBC	4-	Sporadic	5-
France International	3+	Sporadic	4
Voice of America	5	None	2+
German Radio	5-	None	3
Radio Free Europe	3-	Constant	3+

Radio Free Europe

The favorite target of all types of jammers. Given the weak power of short-wave radio stations, this completely prevents listening in bands 49, 41, 31, and partly 25 meters. In these first three bands, I was very rarely able to understand anything from the broadcast programs. In the 25 meter band, only on the average of one in three days was jamming below that of a persistent nuisance. That leaves the shortest bands where jamming is decidedly weakest, yet these bands do not appear on all receivers found in Poland today. Lately, in any case, (September 1985) Radio Free Europe for unknown reasons limited transmissions on the shortest waves, and even the 19 meter band breaks off at 23:00, right before the main political program. The 75 meter band has marginal importance since there are few receivers (some Soviet and the most expensive Western ones) with this band built-in; and besides, long gone are the days when this band was not jammed. One can forget the medium-wave radio stations, and not even due to jamming, but to fatally weak power. Practically speaking, only sometimes in Northern and Western Poland was I able to receive it with audibility permitting comprehension of the program. This was possible throughout the country 10-15 years ago, but since this time both the power of neighboring radio-stations and the general level of interference have significantly increased. Radio Free Europe, however, technically is standing still and maybe even regressing. If it were up to me, I would exchange transmitters among this station and Voice of America;

both are financed by the US government, yet the benefits (also for America) of Radio Free Europe's audibility would be significantly greater. Today, a good part of the work of its editors and technicians is simply wasted.

A substantive evaluation of this station is not easy, although definitely higher than that of Voice of America. The primary virtue of Radio Free Europe is a clear and openly declared "Polono-centrism," a focusing of attention on Polish affairs. It is not a direct "mouth-piece," does not have to promote anyone, and is closest to that which a Pole could with sympathy describe as "Solidarity's radio." It is worse, however, with production. The main shortcoming of Radio Free Europe is weak and somewhat monotonous journalism. This stations transmits actually throughout the entire day, has the most antenna-time at its disposal at all hours, yet it in an exceptionally extravagant way wastes this time, not only through horrible audibility but also through patterned, inaccurate journalism. The division of this time into hour-long blocs repeated 2-3 times daily does not raise objections: people work during different times and in different times change conditions of audibility. The postulate for Radio Free Europe should not be the expansion of the program but the raising of its level and attractiveness. And as an indispensable condition -- greater station power, especially medium-wave.

The weakest element of this program is political commentary concentrated mainly in programs such as FACTS AND VIEWS (main political program) or PANORAMA. I am afraid that in

Munich conveniency and presumptuousness dominate, that lead to the repetition in commentaries of always the same generalities, which leaves only "opinions," while "facts and events" seem to vanish. A model here may be the competent BBC commentary in which evident are good journalistic preparation, reliance on documentation, knowledge about other similar events, etc... Here, on the other hand, predominates perpetual twaddling of the same, long-known opinions. The same can be said about discussions in which, in contrast to discussions on BBC, all [participants] are usually in agreement with one another. Radio Free Europe reads a lot of texts from the underground, emigre, and even officially published Catholic press. It also reads some uncensored books. This is correct given the size of the program since it gives the listener a chance to get acquainted with texts of small editions and those difficult to attain. As inexpedient, I consider only the reading of texts from the domestic Catholic press, unless they have been removed by censors or are texts of unusual importance. It is enough that they be commented on and discussed; after all, anyone can find them in an official library. I have reservations, however, to the selection of books, especially texts from the underground press where chance dominates on the principle of "what falls into hand." I advise resignation from the reading of texts of little importance, repeating opinions and facts long-known or of local significance. Also called for is the announcement of more meaningful texts to be read not only right before the program, but several days in advance in order that the

again: the program announcement, especially the announcement of important things, is totally underestimated by the editors of these stations, not only Radio Free Europe. The listener is treated as an individual of an unlimited amount of free time, listening daily to full program blocs "as they run." And yet, other than pensioners who have nothing else to do and bed-ridden people -- there are no such listeners.

Against the background of the threadbare greyness of Radio Free Europe's commentaries, Jacek Kalabinski's commentaries concerning foreign, especially American, policy favorably distinguish themselves. Good are such programs as Swieykowski's THROUGH THE VILLAGE (it is very difficult to gain the trust of farmers) or Zaluski's YOUTH PROGRAM. Recently, a good new program has appeared, POLAND'S POSSIBILITIES, partly replacing the above criticized reading of underground texts "as goes." As well, a tendency can recently be seen in FACTS AND VIEWS to expose the younger team of Radio Free Europe. This does not always bring encouraging results; precisely this station lacks good commentators on domestic affairs. Appearing lately in this role, Danuta Pacynska and Jacek Kaczmariski, are disappointing. The latter, in particular, is truly remarkable, but only when he sings; thus better that he stay in this role. The assumption by Zdzislaw Najder of the leadership of this radio station's Polish Section was generally linked with the expectation of great changes within this somewhat crusty, yet thanks to its focus on Polish affairs, very important institution. Certain changes took place, after which their impetus was slowed

and a distinct regression followed. One should only hope that some systematic refurbishment will ensue which will allow for a sensible utilization, propitious to Poles, of this radio station, the only one broadcasting free speech in Polish throughout the entire day.

However, without an improvement in technique no substantive or personnel changes will reach the listener.

In closing, an important observation remains concerning all stations. The good Polish of their editors and speakers is pleasantly astounding. In fact, of all of them without exception, of those from both the older and the newest emigration.

KULTURA (Paris) No. 5/1985

L E T T E R S T O T H E E D I T O R

Munich, 17 March 1986

Sir:

I earnestly requested that you publish my letter concerning the course of my journalistic association with the Polish Station of Radio Free Europe. Kultura is a journal for all Poles, and I would like to inform my colleagues from the Gdansk Shipyard and from "Solidarnosc" about what actually happened and why I am no longer the editor of the Workers' Programs at RFE.

At one time the Director of the Polish Station, Zdzislaw Najder, expressed the following opinion:

"It is obviously best for workers to be addressed by people stemming from a working class environment, peasants by someone with a rural background. That is an injunctions which we try to meet, but do not always succeed in achieving, simply because we don't have enough people." (Puls No. 21/84.)

No doubt this was his intention when he invited me to work with the /Polish/Station.

As you know, Sir, I spent 11 years working at the Gdansk Shipyard; six of which as a blue-collar employee. I took an active part in the strikes during 1976 and 1980. During the

period of Solidarity's legal activity, I acted as the chairman of the Shipyard Committee for the Defense of Those Imprisoned for Their Convictions. I was arrested during the night of 12/13 December 1981, and spent seven months in internment camps. After emigrating to the FRG, I wrote reminiscences (winning third Prize in the Kultura/RFE Competition), as well as articles which RFE, and also the London-based Dziennik Polski /Polish Daily/ utilized. Ever larger numbers of my texts went on the air until finally I was invited to Munich for a two-week probation. On 1 September 1984 I was given a six-month contract. I was assigned the regular feature on "Labor Affairs"* and then the regular slot dealing with "The Problems and Concerns of Workers."*

Aside from these assignment I devoted myself to the regular programming on the Solidarity Bureau Abroad in Brussels, I edited the feature dealing with "Labor Problems in the West," I moderated -- like all the other editors -- the program FACTS AND VIEWS, wrote commentaries on topical themes, inter alia, for PANORAMA and also for other programs. There were no basic reservations concerning the programs I submitted; on the contrary -- on several occasions I received commendations from the Directorate. Surely, I must have been making progress since my contract was extended for an additional three months, and

*WORKERS PROGRAM -- tr.

Director Najder gave me to understand repeatedly, that he will employ me on a permanent basis as soon as he gets a vacant position. In anticipation of this opening, I started working as a permanent employee as of 1 June 1985. I continued to have my own regular program, I was in charge of domestic worker themes and the situation at work establishments/factories/. A confirmation of my continued expectation for permanent job status came in the form of the Director's conversation with a member of the "Solidarity" Clandestine Works Council, who temporarily stayed in the FRG, and informed the Polish/Station Director, that my programs are very well received by the workers of the Coast. This conversation took place at the turn of June/July 1985. Director Najder stated during that conversation "that "Zurek is scheduled as a regular employee of the Radio.

A few words about my cooperation/association with the "old" employees: It so happens that our relationship from the Editorial Staff, the Production Unit, the Research and Evaluation section, and the Administration office. I soon settled down among the team. There were no divisions whatsoever between us. I -- a worker from Poland, and they -- journalists who spent long years in emigration, immediately found a common language. In contrast, I noticed that relations between the Directorate, -- and a substantial segment, the majority of the team -- were becoming worse and worse.

In mid-1985, a so-called "Solidarity Club" began to be formed at the Radio; according to its regulations, no "older" employee was entitled to belong to it. It was supposed to be an "elite body" grouping former "Solidarity" members, as well as new. RFE employees hired by Director Najdder. Attempts were made to convince me that the creation of the "Club" would help the Director in running the Station, while at the same time breaking up -- as it was termed -- "the clique of veteran staffers," who

were allegedly throwing impediments in Director Najder's path. I did not share that viewpoint. I was of the opinion that setting up such a coterie could only worsen the atmosphere among the team. Concerning this subject I approached the Director, saying that, as a former "Solidarity" activist, I am against setting up such a "Club" at the Radio, and that, indeed, I am indignant that the name of "Solidarnosc" be used for disruptive purposes. From that very moment there came a turning-point in the way the directorate treated me. The Director summoned me once again to his office, asking whether I maintained my critical opinion about the initiative to create a "Solidarity Club." I confirmed this. He said "thank you" and ended the conversation. Shortly afterwards, a job became vacant at the Radio. However, the Director hired his acquaintance for this vacancy (one of the main initiators of the idea to set up the "Club"), who had appeared from Poland a short time ago. Next, at the beginning of October 1985, I was deprived of the regular Workers' Program. A delegation went to the Director, requesting that he change his decision; the delegation was composed of both veteran employees of the Radio as well as representatives of the most recent emigration (but there was no one from among the "Solidarity Club," even though they had been asked to participate). The Director claimed he had no vacant jobs, no funds and ... that I did not know English. Didn't he know, when he asked me to come to Munich, that workers at the Shipyard do not speak English? Moreover, that acquaintance of Director Najder's who was hired for the vacant slot did not know one word of English. In his case, this was no obstacle, and he became an additional Radio correspondent in -- the United States. For if it were announced in Munich that a vacancy was available, I would have had priority to it, in keeping with regulations under German law.

Director Najder also rejected a petition from the team in my defense; he also rejected a proposal to establish a "Zurek fund" out of overtime hours, for a temporary period, until a vacancy became available. The Works Council and the Trade Unions obtained the American Management's consent that I might participate in the English Language Courses operated by the Radio (I also studied privately, on my own). But the momentum of chicanery against me was already escalating. I was deprived of an office desk, then the nameplate was removed from the office door, my name was dropped from the telephone list, and after New Year, the Radio I.D. card was taken away from me. The American Management then agreed to issue a pass to enter the building in connection with the language course, but Director Najder categorically opposed this. Neither was I allowed to attend the editorial meetings, nor write texts for programming. At the beginning of the current year Director Najder asked me to come to his office in order to give me his advice. His advice: the best thing for me to do was to go to work in German industry, because as far as the Radio is concerned I can only contribute something once every two weeks, at the most, and there can be no question of either any permanent job, or any regular programs.

That kind of an offer of cooperation I did not accept. I had really had enough of evasion and hypocrisy. Once again a "hick worker" has been gyped ... not for the first time.

Yours truly

Bogdan Zurek

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

0012
NED

August 1, 1986

Dear Carl:

I received a note from Jack Matlock on the question of Sinyavsky and Sintaxis. After you have had a chance to review the proposal, I would be interested in your thoughts. Sinyavsky was an outstanding intellectual, but many emigres working in the field have had difficulty working with the Sinyavskys, particularly Mrs. Sinyavsky.

Sincerely,

Walt

Walter Raymond, Jr.
Special Assistant to the
President

Attachment

Mr. Carl Gershman
President
National Endowment for Democracy
1156 Fifteenth Street, N.W.
Suite 304
Washington, D.C. 20005

NOTE FROM: Jack Matlock
SUBJECT: Sinyavsky and Sintaxis

The Sinyavskys came by to see me this morning. (They are on their way back from a conference in California on contemporary Soviet literature.) The purpose of the call was to solicit some financial support for Sintaxis, which they claim gets a higher proportion of manuscripts from inside the Soviet Union than the other journals. They did not, as they did last time, knock the other emigre journals, but simply said that they thought they were in a position to publish articles of a higher quality (in the cultural sense) than those with a more overt political content -- which they consider necessary, but not "their" thing.

Part of their argumentation rests on the thesis that opposition to the Soviet regime is now taking more cultural than overtly political forms (i.e., literature with an implicit message rather than outright samizdat polemics). They also feel that Gorbachev is trying to open things up a bit to appeal to the intellectuals, and this provides an atmosphere in which ideas can be injected into the process. Whatever one may think of Sintaxis (Rozanova -- Mrs. S -- carries out her petty vendettas in the letters column, but the articles themselves tend to be of high quality, and Sinyavsky himself is probably without a peer in the emigration as a literary critic.)

I suggested to the Sinyavskys that they apply to NED. (I also pointed out that they have a lot of applications, and of course no guarantees can be made.)

They left off a description of their "project" in Russian. It involves costs of printing four issues a year and the employment of two persons for secretarial, typesetting and editorial work, and comes to some 504,000 francs a year (\$80,000?).

"СИНТАКСИС" был основан в 1978 году как журнал, посвященный изучению советского общества, его состоянию на сегодняшний день, его истории, идеологии, культуре. Журнал исследует природу советского тоталитаризма и возможности его преодоления. В виде подзаголовка журнала "Синтаксис" значится: Публицистика. Критика. Полемика. Из этого следует, что мы не рассматриваем себя как литературный журнал и, если стихи и проза иногда появляются на наших страницах, то это исключение, а не правило.

В публицистике "Синтаксиса" особое внимание уделяется развитию коммунизма в России и тому, какие альтернативы появляются на этой основе. В частности "Синтаксис" единственный русский журнал, который в полный голос заговорил об опасности русского национализма как новой идеологии тоталитарного типа, вокруг которой могут объединиться силы официального и неофициального лагеря. Идеология воинствующего русского национализма представляется как серьезной угрозой западному миру, ибо патристические чувства народа, подогретые национализмом, смыкаются с агрессивной и милитаристской природой советского государства.

"Синтаксис" ориентируется прежде всего на наиболее демократические круги советской интеллигенции. Мы исходим из того, что в настоящее время в Советском Союзе нет и не может быть рабочего движения. Не может возникнуть оппозиция и в советской армии, ибо это сила монолитная, реакционная, которая всегда поддержит партийный режим. Религиозное движение в стране сильно преувеличено воображением русской эмиграции.

Единственная в Советском Союзе среда, способная порождать демократические идеи созвучные Западу и вести критику советского режима, — это интеллигенция. Мы не должны забывать, что именно здесь, в сфере культуры, прежде всего возникает идейное брожение, оппозиционное режиму. Об этом же говорит, в частности, история советского "Самиздата", начинавшегося /еще при Сталине/ с недозволенных стихов Цветаевой, Мандельштама, Пастернака и Ахматовой. Об этом же говорит история современного освободительного движения в Венгрии, Чехословакии, Польше. Свобода началась со свободы слова, с культуры.

Между тем мы можем наблюдать, что в последнее время советское государство стремится "переманить" интеллигенцию на свою сторону кое-ка-

гласностью и расширением возможностей работать в сфере культуры.

И еще одно наблюдение последних двух-трех лет: в стране заметно снизился интерес к чисто политическим проблемам и в оппозиционной среде возрос интерес к истории русской культуры, к формальным поискам в искусстве и литературе, к авангардным течениям. Именно "авангардисты" становятся сейчас объектом преследования со стороны Советской власти.

В этих условиях мы считаем необходимым усилить приток с Запада ~~прежде~~ ^{прежде} собственно-культурных источников, способных глубоко заинтересовать и привлечь советскую интеллигенцию. Именно из этих кругов к нам постоянно поступают рукописи из России. "Синтаксис" получает оттуда большую интеллектуальную поддержку в виде очень интересных и разнообразных материалов. По числу и уровню авторов "Самиздата", публикующихся в эмигрантской печати, "Синтаксис", мы полагаем, стоит на первом месте.

Достаточно привести следующие цифры: в 15 вышедших номерах "Синтаксиса" 2596 страниц, из которых 772 получены из Москвы, т.е. 30%. Думаем, что ни один эмигрантский журнал не может похвастаться таким % самиздата.

Кроме того в "Синтаксис" периодически поступают из страны рукописи, которые по объему не всегда укладываются в рамки журнала. Тогда мы выпускаем их отдельными книгами. Так был выпущен большой /на 600 стр./ сборник стихов московского поэта Геннадия Айги и роман московского писателя Вл. Сорокина "Очередь".

Слово же КРИТИКА отвечает русской журнальной традиции, где литературная критика всегда играла ведущую роль /от "Современника" Пушкина до "Нового мира" Твардовского/. Под критикой мы имеем в виду анализ, осмысление того, что происходит в литературе, всегда занимавшей первое место в сознании современников.

Мы осмелимся напомнить, что основным объектом разбирательства на судебном процессе Синявского-Даниэля в 1966 году было литературно-критическое эссе Синявского "Что такое социалистический реализм", в котором государство увидело ответ на вопрос - "а что такое советская власть и советское общество". Это специфика русского мышления - видеть мир, историю, философию через литературу, через литературную критику. Поэтому без критики, на наш взгляд, вообще не может быть серьезного русского журнала.

Одним из важных направлений работы "Синтаксиса", которая может помочь связать интеллигенцию Советского Союза с Западом, как представляется систематический обзор и анализ советских журналов и книг /в первую очередь литературных произведений/. В русской зарубежной периодике т

ких обзоров почти не бывает. Но если это дело поставить на высокий научный и критический уровень, оно позволило бы нам оказывать непосредственное влияние на развитие современной культуры в Советском Союзе. Мы хотели бы для этого подобрать группу квалифицированных авторов, которые внимательно следили бы за литературным процессом в России.

Последний подзаголовок "ПОЛЕМИКА" /дискуссия/ передает один из аспектов журнала. Полемика предполагает выявление разных точек зрения на один и тот же предмет, способствующее развитию вольной русской мысли. Мы склонны рассматривать советскую эмиграцию как часть советского общества и мы считаем, что процессы и споры, происходящие в современной русской эмиграции, порою отражают состояние советского общества в целом и позволяют моделировать его психологическую структуру. Полезно их изучать, полезно стимулировать плюралистическую и демократическую модель развития России и ее культуры. Если этого не делать, снова возобладает "однопартийный принцип", принесший столько несчастий стране и всему миру. К тому же советская интеллигенция устала быть однопартийной и ищет более гибких и разнообразных вариантов, которые бы послужили прообразом плюралистического общества.

Но кроме ориентации на советскую интеллигенцию, "Синтаксис" ориентирован и на западного читателя, которому наш журнал поможет понять многообразие "русской идеи" в ее современных аспектах, многообразие русской общественно-политической мысли. Проблемы, поднятые нашим журналом действительно интересны Западу, о чем говорят публикации материалов "Синтаксиса" в таких изданиях как *Le Monde* /Франция/, *Neue Rundschau* /Зап. Германия/, *Corriere della Sera* /Италия/, *Partisan Review* /Америка/, *Kasper Hauser* /Швейцария/ и др.

Во Франции вышел дайджест "Синтаксиса" - выбор из первых 7 номеров и сейчас готовится второй выпуск.

Между тем при таких серьезных задачах "Синтаксис" не имеет /и никогда не имел/ никакой финансовой поддержки и издается исключительно на личные средства Синявского. Естественно, что при такой финансовой базе журнал не может выходить регулярно, как хотелось бы - то есть 4 раза в год, а выпускается только тогда, когда на него собираются деньги. Надо учесть также, что сейчас журнал не имеет ни одного постоянного платного сотрудника, что тоже очень тормозит работу.

Для нормализации работы нам необходим следующий бюджет:

Типографские расходы на один номер - 36000 фр.фр.

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на 4 номера - 96000 фр.фр.

Два сотрудника, которые выполняли бы обязанности:

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тора и метранпажа - 12000 в месяц на одного


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Редакторы и издатели журнала "Синтаксис"

А. СИНЯВСКИЙ

М. РОЗАНОВА



DRAFT

FROM: Soviet Active Measures and Disinformation
Forecast, No. 3, Summer 1986.

CALENDAR

Targets For Soviet Active Measures and Disinformation Campaigns

June

- Parliamentary Elections, Spain (June 22)

July

- Goodwill Games, Moscow, USSR, (July 5 - 20)--Soviets seeking to "manage" TV coverage, from manning the cameras, to providing film footage about Soviet life, and making officials available for interviews. Over 3,000 athletes from more than 40 countries are expected to participate, and 129 hours of worldwide television coverage are planned by the USSR State Committees for Television and Radio and the Turner Broadcasting System. Major active measures objectives (i) promote Soviet arms control policy and the Spirit of Geneva; (ii) turn the Ukranian nuclear accident to Soviet advantage.
- Mississippi Peace Cruise, (July 26 - August 2).

August

- **Hiroshima and Nagasaki Day, (August 6 and 9)**--Moscow and Soviet front to push major Soviet anti-nuclear weapons themes, and exploit the Ukrainian nuclear accident, e.g., Soviet nuclear test moratorium expires, signing of People's Peace Treaty (New York).
- **Twenty Fifth Anniversary of Berlin Wall, (August 13)**--Soviets and East Germans will concentrate on damage limitation and on "counter-propaganda" activities.
- **Summit of Non-Aligned Heads of State, Harare, Zimbabwe, (August 26-September 7)**--Over 100 leaders expected to concentrate on anti-imperialism as well as issues which divide the non-aligned. US likely to be condemned for policy on Nicaragua and Libya.

September

- **"World Peace Day", (September 1)**
- **"International Day of Trade Union Action for Peace", (September 1)**--Soviet fronts have called for demonstrations for peace; September 1 is also Labor Day in the US and will be used to break down barriers between pro-Soviet and anti-Soviet trade unions in the interest of "world peace."
- **11th World Trade Union Conference, East Berlin, GDR, (September 16-22)**--World Federation of Trade Unions, Soviet international labor front. Main themes: necessity for breaking down barriers between communist and non-communist unions to promote peace; international solidarity in the struggle against "racism, imperialism and neocolonialism."

- **Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxic Weapons and on their Destruction, New York, USA, (September 8-26 or September 15-October 3)--Soviets will seek to exacerbate relations between the US and its allies by highlighting and attacking the US binary chemical weapons program. They will also attempt to keep the focus of the meeting on tactical battlefield issues and away from non-military research areas where many of their research and development activities are being conducted, i.e. the Soviet Academy of Sciences.**
- **UN International Day of Peace, (September 16)--Opening day of UN General Assembly in New York will provide opportunity for Soviet fronts to lobby and demonstrate.**
- **41st UN General Assembly Session, (September 16 - December)**

October

- **World Peace Congress, Copenhagen, Denmark, (October 15-19)-- Major Soviet front activity, but Moscow experiencing difficulty in concealing Soviet control. Will increase efforts to attract broader support, including the UN.**
- **UN Disarmament Week, (October 24-31)--UN leaving major activities to the NGO's, which presents Moscow and the international fronts with an opportunity.**

November-December

- US Congressional Elections, (November 4)
- Helsinki Review Conference, Vienna, Austria, (November 5-?)--Five-year review conference stipulated in CSCE Treaty will focus on military, economic, cultural and human rights issues. Soviets will attempt to shift focus away from human rights issues; will stress US role in increasing threat of nuclear war.
- 12th General Assembly, World Federation of Democratic Youth, Budapest, Hungary--Soviet international youth front meeting.
- Reagan-Gorbachev Summit, Washington, D.C., Date uncertain

1987

Parliamentary Elections, West Germany, (January 27)

*POL501 08/08/86

(USIA has full republication rights to the following.)

THE SOVIETS' SURGING PROPAGANDA WAR (2050)
By Herb Romerstein and Jan Hemming

(Herb Romerstein is coordinator of the U.S. Information Agency's program to counter Soviet active measures. Jan Hemming is assistant to the director for national communications at USIA. This article appeared in the June 1986 issue of American Legion Magazine.)

Throughout history, since Hannibal scared the Romans into believing he would annihilate them with a secret weapon, psychological tactics usually have been restricted to times of war. But in 1917, Lenin embarked on a new course when he said that there is no distinction between war and peace, and that until the aims of the proletariat state are achieved worldwide, the Soviet Union would use whatever tactics were necessary -- including the tactics of communication warfare during peacetime.

The Soviets call these tactics "active measures."

Through covert or deceptive political and psychological actions -- from forgeries and lies to planted press articles and agents of influence -- the Soviets and their proxies operate a massive network whose goal is to advance Moscow's foreign policy objectives through whatever means are necessary to undermine or embarrass the United States.

Thus, the Soviet Union became the first modern state to institutionalize these practices and make them a fundamental instrument of state policy. Members of the KGB and an army of 15,000 persons who work in Moscow, at Soviet embassies, elsewhere at press agencies and numerous Soviet front organizations, carry out the daily tasks of this vast empire.

A State Department report revealed that Soviet active measures have increased significantly in the past two years, particularly in the Third World, and in a few instances have resulted in the loss of life. In these campaigns, the United States has been falsely blamed for:

- Killing 7,000 persons by chemical warfare in Brazil's Amazon Basin.

- Plotting the assassination of Pope John Paul II.

- Firing astronaut Neil Armstrong because he allegedly converted to Islam after hearing the Moslem prayer on the moon.

-- Attacking the Holy Mosque in Mecca, which touched off an attack on the U.S. embassy in Islamabad.

-- Placing cruise missiles in South Africa.

-- Planning the balkanization of India, and using food for political blackmail against that country.

While some of the active measures or disinformation tactics seem ludicrous -- especially the Neil Armstrong incident -- they play on historical fears based on religious hatred, radical unrest, political mistrust or antagonism between rich and poor countries to foment anti-American sentiment around the world.

The phony U.S. plans against India gained so much credibility in that country that it was written about in influential newspapers and denounced by six elected officials in the Indian parliament before former U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Jeane Kirkpatrick -- who supposedly masterminded the scheme -- had a chance to deny it. More damaging, the rumor was circulated just before the non-aligned nations of the world met in India for a conference, causing further embarrassment for the United States.

Intelligence reports traced the source of the false claim that Americans had attacked the Holy Mosque to KGB rumors planted with their agents. It was leaked to a radio announcer who reported other "news" during a soccer match igniting an angry mob, which attacked and burned our embassy.

The Soviets even practice disinformation about themselves. When Soviet leader Yuri Andropov came to power, stories were leaked to the Western press that portrayed him as a jazz-loving, Scotch-drinking pragmatist who might prove less hostile to the United States than Leonid Breznev. This got wide circulation in the American media.

Much of what the United States has learned first-hand about Soviet disinformation has come from two defectors -- Ladislav Bittman, deputy chief of the Czechoslovak Disinformation Department before his defection in 1968, and Stanislav Levchenko, of the KGB's Tokyo "residency."

The Soviet's active measures network is controlled at the top by the International Department of CPSU Central Committee and serviced by the KGB, which runs clandestine active measures operations. Its annual budget of more than 4,000 million dollars is approved directly by the Politburo and is considered to be a closely guarded secret.

Levchenko said in the mid-1970s the Soviets effectively penetrated the peace movement in Europe and "dramatically enhanced anti-American sentiments in Europe" against deployment of the neutron bomb weapon. With public opinion

riding against the United States, President Carter cancelled its production. The Soviets came out of the fray with two victories. Their clear-cut superiority in tanks over NATO remained unchallenged and the United States stopped building an effective anti-tank device.

Levchenko warned recently that a major effort of the Soviets in the remainder of the 1980s will be to "create the impression that there are doves and hawks in the Soviet Politburo," and if the West takes a hard line attitude toward the USSR, "then the hawks will come to power in the Kremlin. The Soviets will push the idea that the Soviet Union can be a trustworthy partner in any negotiation and that their words should be taken at face value."

He said he believed they would continue to invest a great deal of private politicking and public relations to defeat the United States' proposed Strategic Defense Initiative and attacked global U.S. interests by attempting to weaken the U.S.-NATO alliance.

For decades, the United States ignored Soviet disinformation campaigns. The conventional wisdom in Washington was that whistle-blowing on the Soviets' political chicanery and deceit might only serve to lend credibility to their efforts and give them additional shelf life.

But the deaths at our embassy in Islamabad and other terrorist threats jolted American officials into the realization that Soviet active measures had more than cloak-and-dagger elements and there was now an urgent need to protect the lives of our foreign service corps.

In 1981, an interagency task force, including the United States Information Agency, suggested that an information network be put in place to track Soviet active measures and that a rapid system be established so that our foreign service officials could be given accurate and appropriate guidance to deruse disinformation ploys that might have potentially damaging consequences to our national security.

During the height of the INF (defensive missile) deployment issue in Europe, quick action by U.S. Embassy and Austrian officials averted political fallout from a forged letter purportedly written by U.S. Ambassador Helen Von Damm. The letter suggested that Austria compromise its historical military neutrality and join NATO.

USIA exposed a Soviet-inspired campaign to blame the United States for implicating the Soviets and Bulgarians in the assassination of Pope John Paul II by pointing out major defects in a supposedly authentic cable. The mistakes were so glaring -- including a missing cable number -- that it

backfired on the Russians. The flood of adverse stories against the Soviets in the Italian press raised the Soviet cost of engaging in disinformation campaigns.

The anatomy of a typical Soviet disinformation campaign often starts in a so-called legitimate Western paper although sometimes it is planted in sympathetic communist publications. On Nov. 1, 1984, the Greek newspaper Ethnos carried a lead story on the front page that the CIA was behind Indira Gandhi's assassination. That same day similar reports cropped up in numerous English-speaking dailies in India quoting government and Communist Party officials who believed "foreign powers" or U.S. imperialists were behind the Gandhi assassination. The next day the same theme was repeated in selected papers throughout Argentina from the extreme left wing daily La Voz to the right wing paper La Prensa. Allegations of "imperialist" involvement also were featured in pro-Soviet papers in Nepal and Indonesian papers including the respected Sinar Harapan.

By November 5, the story line had spread to the Gulf Daily News in Bahrain and appeared in the General-Anzeiger in Bonn and ABC in Spain, The German and Spanish papers -- both pro-Western, quoted Pravda, which attempted to implicate the CIA in Gandhi's death.

Some reports carried inflammatory phrases like this one in the November 5th edition of the Greek paper Rizospastis: "Does it matter that the Indians shouted 'Down with the CIA' just as soon as they heard of the assassination?... What can we do about the charitable secret agency of the USA, which is not ashamed to say openly that whoever gets in its way is going to get it?... These are the mafiosi of the world political scene."

One journal revived the disinformation about former U.S. Ambassador Kirkpatrick's supposed balkanization plot against India and the Times of India reported Pravda's claim that the United States was involved in the assassination because it was at odds with India's foreign policy.

Most Soviet disinformation campaigns take place far from America's shores, but there is now indisputable evidence that disinformation was used in Grenada during the New Jewel Movement's seizure and expansion of power. Documents captured by American forces after they secured the island reveal that Grenada was securely in the communist sphere. Copies of a secret speech delivered by Maurice Bishop, leader of the New Jewel Movement, outlined ways in which Washington and the free world would be deceived into thinking that

Grenada had created a moderate government embracing conservative elements within the country.

The deception was so effective that, prior to Bishop's last trip to America before his assassination, he was coached by the American wife of Cuban Ambassador Julian Torres Rizo on how to manipulate the American media. Rizo is a high-ranking intelligence officer with experience in active measures. Most of Mrs. Rizo's recommendations actually worked. They included blaming the Reagan administration for bad relations; speaking directly to the American people as their friend through the American press; finding sympathetic forums to express grievances about American treatment of Grenada; and announcing the construction of a modern airport to attract U.S. tourists rather than accommodate Russian jets. Secret documents found later showed the intended military use of the airport.

In one document, Marshal N.V. Ogarkov, chief of staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, boasted in 1983 to Major Einstein Louison, chief of staff of the Grenadian Army, "Over two decades ago, there was only Cuba in Latin America. Today there are Nicaragua, Grenada and a serious battle is going on in El Salvador."

We now have documents captured from Nidia Diaz, a leftist guerrilla in El Salvador, which lend credence to Ogarkov's chilling observation. They show direct Nicaraguan involvement in arms shipments to El Salvador's left-wing rebel faction in their effort to topple the government of Napoleon Duarte. Also captured were lists of persons selected from the Revolutionary Communist Workers Party of El Salvador, who had been trained in Vietnam, the Soviet Union, Cuba, Bulgaria and East Germany. This is the same group that murdered four U.S. Marines in El Salvador in June 1985.

The United States and other democratic nations are now aware that we are engaged in a communications war with the Soviets and that the aims of this war are just as politically real as Goebbels' campaign against the French.

The Soviets have demonstrated they will use every means available to spread their political doctrine throughout the Western world and influence public opinion in their favor. Soviet commitment to manipulating the channels of communication is fundamental to the Soviet goal of world domination, whether it involves the KGB using the Swiss office of Novosti Press Agency to develop an anti-American demonstration condemning U.S. policy in the Caribbean, recruiting Danish journalist Arne Harlov Petersen to penetrate and manipulate the "peace" movement in Western

Europe, whipping up racist sentiment against African athletes before the 1984 Summer Olympics in Los Angeles by mailing phony leaflets purportedly signed by the Ku Klux Klan, or deposing of the director of the Association of American Film Importers in Indonesia through street riots and attacks on his home.

French writer and philosopher Jean-Francois Revel said recently, "If the democracies don't regain their self-confidence I am very pessimistic because the Soviet Union is extremely skilled in its propaganda techniques. I think that the reality of our future lies in what I would call the reconquest of the truth."

NNNN

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 14, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JUDYT MANDEL

SUBJECT: Reply to Senator Simon on Exchanges

Attached for your signature is a suggested reply to Senator Simon, who sent you a copy of his May 21 speech, outlining his thoughts on the need for increased exchanges. He suggests:

- doubling the funding for Soviet and East European exchanges in FY '87;
- that exchanges be viewed as a strategic benefit in much the same way as our defense programs, and suggests that funds come from the Defense Department budget, the "only large discretionary pool of funds";
- the establishment of a National Endowment for International Studies to channel government funding for exchanges;
- targeting our scholarship programs on students from regions of importance to us from a national security standpoint, i.e. Central America, South Africa, etc.; and
- that we need to train more Soviet and East European specialists because we need more "understanding" of the Soviet Union after the invasion of Afghanistan.

While some of his suggestions are insightful, and address our long term need for well-informed and globally oriented citizenry, he oversells the potential for "winning hearts and minds" or directly affecting other countries' policies through such instruments as exchanges and scholarships. Moreover, the funding levels he proposes are clearly not attainable in the current climate of budgetary constraints, and undesirable from our point of view, if they are to come from Defense funds. Finally, Simon tends to attribute the difference between the US and Soviet Union to "misunderstandings" which can be corrected through more knowledge or contacts, rather than to divergent political, economic and ideological systems and interests.

The suggested reply indicates our shared interest in people-to-people and scholarly exchanges and contacts, but adds a cautionary note about the prospects for substantial increases in the near term.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached letter to Senator Simon.

Approve_____ Disapprove_____

Walt Raymond, Ray Burghardt, Ron Sable, Mike Donley, Jack Matlock concur.

Attachment

Tab I Letter to Senator Simon
Tab II Background Information

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

Dear Senator Simon:

Thank you for your letter of June 12, enclosing your speech on the need for increased exchanges as part of our national security strategy.

Your speech presented many thoughtful and valuable suggestions that deserve consideration. In particular, I share your underlying assumption that it is in America's long-term interest to reach out to the possible future leaders and citizens of the developing countries via exchanges and scholarships, and that we ourselves benefit from having more citizens skilled in foreign affairs and languages.

It is especially important that we try to overcome the barriers of misinformation and misperception that affect US-Soviet relations. That was the guiding principle behind the President's Geneva exchanges initiative, in which he proposed an unprecedented expansion of people-to-people exchanges to Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev. Indeed, as the President said in his November 14, 1985 Address to the Nation, such exchanges can "build genuine constituencies for peace" in both countries.

We are actively pursuing such exchanges and cooperative programs across a broad range of activities. Recently, a Soviet exchange delegation visited the US and concluded agreements with American counterpart organizations for thirteen new programs in the areas of education, higher education, culture, sports, and health -- the areas singled out by the President and the General Secretary for priority attention. Nineteen more programs are under active discussion, some of which may come to fruition this fall.

While these new programs, which are in addition to the scholarly, academic and cultural exchange programs carried out under the General Exchanges Agreement, also signed in Geneva, are a promising first step, we are by no means content to let the matter rest there. What the President envisioned was broad opening of contacts and travel possibilities for the citizens of both countries, especially the young people, and we will be pursuing this goal with the Soviets.

We are, however, realistic about such exchanges, and look at them as only one element of a long-term relationship that is by its nature competitive, based on very different values, political, economic and global interests. Exchanges must be a two-way street. The Soviet Government continues to place tight controls on the flow of information to and from its country, while

hundreds of thousands of Americans travel to, read about and independently study the Soviet Union. Unless there is a reciprocal Soviet commitment to increased contacts and genuine exchange, we cannot have the kind of understanding and dialogue you suggest. We hope that the new Soviet leadership will appreciate the benefits of such dialogue.

One of the salient features of the President's Geneva exchanges initiative was to involve the private sector more actively in such exchanges. Such involvement is particularly important at this time of severe budgetary constraints on all our foreign affairs programs. Ensuring that we can carry out existing programs at current levels -- let alone the expansion you propose -- will be a real challenge.

Your continued support for exchange programs of all kinds will be critical in the coming months, and I would welcome any thoughts or suggestions you may have.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Paul Simon
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

June 12, 1986

JUN 23 1986

Admiral John Poindexter
National Security Council
Old Executive Office Building
Washington, DC 20506


Dear John:

I have felt for a long time that we all have accepted too narrow a definition of national security. We make decisions about our central foreign policy and defense concern, the Soviet Union, with very little first-hand experience or expert guiding knowledge. It is no longer acceptable for the governments of the United States and the USSR to consider policy in a vacuum of misunderstanding and misperception. Too much is at stake.

We may never get the kind of relationship we desire with the Soviet Union, but we cannot afford to hide behind walls of ignorance. Equally important, we ought not let an opportunity to influence the present and future generations of Soviet leaders slip away. This holds true for other regions in the world, particularly Central America, where the battle for political values rages. A greatly expanded language training, area studies effort, and exchanges initiative is imperative.

I have outlined an initial agenda for action in these areas in a speech on the Senate floor on May 21, 1986. I would of course welcome your thoughts on this subject.

Cordially,



Paul Simon
U.S. Senator

PS/js

PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE

An Agenda for U.S.-Soviet Exchanges

by

U.S. SENATOR PAUL SIMON

Senate Chamber

May 21, 1986

MR. SIMON. Mr. President, since I came to Congress in 1975, I have given considerable thought to Soviet-American relations, and worked on education and exchange program legislation. Today I would like to offer, in my first detailed address before the Senate on the subject of U.S.-Soviet relations, some thoughts on the connection between our foreign policy goals and exchange programs.

When I speak on this issue, I do not do so as a partisan, because I am pleased to note the emphasis President Reagan gave to exchange programs at his Geneva meeting with Secretary Gorbachev. I particularly appreciate the leadership of Charles Wick and Ambassador Stephen Rhinesmith at the United States Information Agency (USIA) who understand the importance of exchanges and have made a significant contribution to the nation through the promotion of exchanges.

THE POWER OF IDEAS

Throughout history ideas have moved people and armies. Jesus, Marx and Jefferson have changed more lives than military conquerors. The invention of the printing press revolutionized the medieval world and laid the basis for progress in every field of endeavor. Ideas spread quickly. And centuries ago what seemed like a quick spread of ideas through books over a period of months has been changed into a spread of ideas in minutes throughout the world. That is part of the information revolution in which we find ourselves.

Information is power, and the ability to communicate effectively can alter the balance of power as surely as a squadron of fighter planes or a naval flotilla. Public diplomacy sometimes can prove more decisive than the blunt instruments of war, and we must rely on it more—one of the failures of U.S. foreign policy in recent years.

Unfortunately we still need the instruments of war as well as the instruments of diplomacy. It would be ideal to work always with friends and adversaries with logic, fairness, and common sense. This is not the state of the world, nor will it be. We must prepare for threats to our nation's security, and give assistance to others who need a shield for their defense.

But we also owe it to ourselves to examine whether these threats are real, and if they are real whether we have been given a balanced picture. We should regularly question our assumptions. We must seek balance as we allocate resources to further American foreign policy.

Today we find ourselves aboard an imbalanced ship of state, perilously close to capsizing economically, because of our excessive reliance on the military to carry out policy aims. We are losing precious cargo from that ship of state in a short-sighted quest with too heavy a military emphasis on superiority. Security can only come when we see the world as it is, not as we would like it to be.

In my years of public life I have seen us spend more and more and more on military security and achieve greater and greater and greater insecurity, not only for ourselves but for all the world. Like a greyhound at a dogtrack, we chase the rabbit of permanent military superiority, but like that greyhound, we shall never catch it. Those in the stands observing us know that. But like the greyhound, we do not. We expend greater and greater efforts for an illusory prize. The military-industrial complex—about which President Eisenhower warned us—cheers us on, but if we want something more than those cheers we must always be thoughtful and deliberate in advancing our foreign policy objectives.

On a future occasion I will address the fundamental question which needs reexamining: What should be the basic objectives of U.S. foreign policy? Today I want to discuss one aspect of implementing our current policies.

PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE

What I propose today is a significant expansion of our exchange programs with other countries. Our foreign policy will improve as we learn more about other countries and as others learn more about us. Americans at their best have not been content simply to learn facts; we have also wanted to understand the nature of things. That is true of others also. There is a need for other nations to understand our values, our political system, our aspirations, and our weaknesses and strengths. It is pure gain for us to learn more about others and for them to learn more about us. An understanding of their cultures, their languages, their hopes and fears will lead to less international tension.

President Reagan confirmed this with his people-to-people exchange initiative at the November summit in Geneva. I applaud his leadership on this. We need to get serious about exchanges, and the President's ideas and our tradition serve as an important start. The costs are not significant when we consider the scope of the federal budget. But they must come from somewhere. There is only one large discretionary pool of funds, and that is the Department of Defense budget. Since an exchange program serves the security interests of our country, it is a logical place to look.

When the Fulbright program was under consideration in 1946, former President Herbert Hoover was asked to comment on the undertaking. Hoover recalled that a similar program, much smaller in size, was initiated in 1920 with Belgium. The exchanges continued until World War II began. Hoover noted that many prominent Belgian graduate students and faculty studied in the U.S.; one prime minister and six cabinet members were exchangees. As a result of this program, Hoover said that he doubted "whether there is a country in Europe where the ideals and purposes of the American people are so well understood and so respected as they are in Belgium." Just before the war, Hoover argued that the old World War I European war debts ought to be converted into

provide even more support for one of the best educational opportunities available today.

A good program is the "Youth Exchange Initiative," which began with a three-year, \$10 million fund for 5,000 exchangees. The focus is on the developing world, and I believe that Mr. Wick is on the right track with this program: By the end of Fiscal Year 1986 we will have spent a total of \$14 million on these youth exchanges since we began this effort. This is exactly the kind of program we need with the Soviet Union, and in October 1985 I introduced with Senator Pell the U.S.-Soviet "Student Exchange-for-Peace Program," which closely parallels the President's November summit proposal to Mr. Gorbachev.

U.S.-SOVIET EXCHANGES

The U.S.-Soviet relationship is our number-one foreign policy concern. Yet in the 27 years of exchanges, we have managed to average only 600 Americans and 250 Soviet scholars exchanged each year. Contrast these numbers with an average of 14,000 per year with Japan; 5,500 with Britain; 3,600 with West Germany; 3,000 with France; and 14,000 with the People's Republic of China.

We will probably not soon reach the level of good relations with Moscow that we have with Paris, London, or Bonn, but who would have thought as late as 1968 that we would achieve the far-reaching accord with Beijing which we did following the Nixon summit? Our problems with China in the postwar years were no less real than many of our current problems with the Soviet Union.

We have a staggering task ahead of us in Soviet studies that directly affects our future relationship with Moscow. We need to build a much larger corps of Soviet and Eastern European specialists so that we can draw on a broadly based and reliable cadre of professionals to help formulate policy. While we have a few outstanding scholars and Soviet watchers in the United States, there are not nearly enough full-time Soviet experts and even fewer who have actually spent a significant amount of time studying in the Soviet Union.

For example, this year only about 200 American and Soviet scholars are being exchanged, about half the Americans through IREX, the International Research and Exchanges Board. There are many more American scholars, however, who would like the opportunity to observe the country of their studies up-close, but lack of funds blocked this avenue. The National Council for Soviet and East European Research, which advises the Department of State's Title VIII grants office, reports that they received far more applications for study grants than they could possibly absorb; they could fund only one-sixth of the applicants. There is no dearth of interest, just of means.

According to the National Council: "The central fact

remains that close to 100 promising projects by competent scholars, with a total value of some \$10 million, will not be funded . . . [These applications] provide eloquent testimony that the gap between current resources and the needs of the profession and the nation is manifest, compelling, and altogether too great."

Title VIII was given a ten-year authorization for annual funding at \$4.8 million. It already has been cut to \$4.6 million this fiscal year when the Gramm-Rudman sequester order went through March 1. Now the Office of Management and Budget, in another example of misplaced priorities, has cut back the Fiscal Year 1987 request to \$4 million. I believe this vital program ought to be doubled, but for now it should at least be restored to its original funding level of \$4.8 million in this year's budget.

There are 67 universities in the Soviet Union that are universities in the Western sense. Yet only two or three American universities, and one consortium of Midwestern universities, have set up "sister university" programs with just two Soviet schools: Moscow State and Leningrad State. Part of the problem comes from the Soviet end. The prospect of allowing high school or even college-age students to come to the United States for study frightens some of the Soviet bureaucrats charged with overseeing ideological purity within their youth organizations. But we owe it to ourselves to break down these barriers through persistent effort. Now that effort seems to be paying off. It is important for an influential segment of Soviet society to see us as we are, not as the propaganda mills portray us. And we should avoid distortions of the Soviet Union through similar on-the-scene observation.

In terms of officially sponsored exchanges, we expressed our dissatisfaction with the Kremlin by allowing the cultural exchanges accord to lapse in 1980 after the invasion of Afghanistan, as we did with three of the science and technology agreements in 1982 following the imposition of martial law in Poland. The National Academy of Sciences is down to about half the number of exchanges compared to the 1979 level. The real point after Afghanistan should have been that we need greater understanding, not less understanding. I appreciate the motivation of our policymakers in canceling the cultural exchange agreements because of Afghanistan, but that action was a mistake.

Exchanges can be most valuable precisely when relations are strained. Relations grew worse between 1981 and 1985, and two-way exchanges suffered. Would it not have been better to increase direct contact with each other when hostility was on the rise? Would it not have made more sense to have our youth, scholars, and professionals engaged in routine discussion with the other super-power capable of global destruction?

Clearly, we are not going to see a far-reaching effect on U.S.-Soviet relations overnight, although I agree

tral American Program of Undergraduate Scholarships (CAMPUS) idea, an attempt to bring more students from the region to study in the United States, has 154 students in attendance this year in American universities. Clearly, we have a long way to go before we approach the Soviet and Soviet-sponsored numbers.

It is simply amazing to me that we are not putting far more money and effort into a regional exchange initiative at a time when the military battle for Central America rages unabated. Whatever the real level of Soviet military aid, the figures I cited demonstrate that Moscow is looking beyond the next move on the Central American chessboard.

In Sub-Saharan Africa, we are making the same mistake. Much has been made of the Marxist influence within the African National Congress (ANC). There are obvious reasons why the ANC and other resistance groups in southern Africa have turned to Soviet assistance; our relationship with the government of South Africa is a contributing factor. Another factor is the importance the Soviets attach to direct exchanges with African students, and not just in Angola, Ethiopia, or Mozambique.

In Mauritania and Senegal, two countries I visited recently, the comparative numbers are astonishing. There are three government-sponsored Mauritians studying in U.S. schools; there are more than 300 in Soviet schools. The figures are comparable for Senegal. While there are now almost 35,000 Sub-Saharan Africans studying in the United States, only 2.5 percent are here on U.S.-government scholarships. This means that the vast majority are here on their own resources, mostly children of the wealthy elite. As important as children of the elite are—and we welcome them—we need to reach others in the developing countries.

THE COST OF ONE FIGHTER

Where does all this leave us? My hope is that we begin to look seriously at the long-range benefits that stem from exchanges. They can contribute to our foreign policy in more ways than we can guess. When the USIA wants to spend \$159 million in Fiscal Year 1986 on exchange activities—an increase of \$29 million—and Congress balks at providing the full increase, then we need to take another look at our priorities. The increase in question, incidentally, is roughly equivalent to the cost of one F-15 fighter.

Some may ask, "Why all the fuss over a few exchange programs? Why not spend more and more on defense? Why not buy that extra F-15 instead of spending money on exchanges?" The answer is simple. Look at all we have to gain through the spread of American ideas and commerce, and consider the technical and cultural information we gain about other lands. We are building a base of understanding that can make sensible cuts in defense spending possible. The U.S. and the

U.S.S.R. stand to gain the most through exchanges, because we have the special responsibility to avoid nuclear war.

By underfunding exchanges, we cheat ourselves and others.

The entire exchange effort contributes to our foreign policy goals and to the common defense, not only defense against military threats and terrorist attacks fueled by hatred and misunderstanding, but defense against poverty and disease and the afflictions of humanity. Exchanges build a strength gained from knowledge and understanding.

AN AGENDA

As in other areas, our policy on exchanges needs a guiding strategy if it is to be effective. We must know in advance what we would like to achieve, but we also have to identify funding possibilities and realistic goals. I would like to propose several objectives that make sense as we begin the second half of the 1980s:

1. Double Title VIII funding in Fiscal Year 1987 and subsequent years. Title VIII is also known as the "Soviet and East European Research and Training Act," presently funded at \$4.8 million. An annual allocation of \$10 million per year will enable us to conduct far more Soviet research than we can today, and train a new generation of Russian and other Soviet language speakers. This will fill a critical national need. Doubling Title VIII will cost us very little, but the Administration has requested a decrease in funding. This is short-sighted. The Modern Language Association has set a goal of 100,000 Russian-speakers by 1988. That target now seems beyond our reach, but why not aim for 1990? Exchanges will only realize their fullest potential when we have mastered each other's languages.

2. Expand the Central American Program of Undergraduate Scholarships (CAMPUS) administered by USIA. We can no longer pretend that military force alone will solve our hemispheric problems. The Soviets and Cubans have a very extensive scholarship and exchange effort underway in the region, and the United States ought not to abandon the educational high ground to Moscow and Havana. A good goal to aim for would be to bring in as many exchange students from Central America as currently attend schools and universities in the East Bloc. This year, out of 154 students, only six come from Nicaragua. This number must rise if we want to spread American political values. I will propose that we increase this program by \$1.6 million, to bring the number of these scholarships up to 200. I hope that with these additional scholarships more students from the warring states of the region can be brought together in the United States.

3. Resurrect the Critical Foreign Languages Study Program enacted in the 1984 Emergency Math and Science

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, AF, US, PK
SUBJECT: AFGHAN RESISTANCE ALLIANCE PRESENCE AT
- NAM SUMMIT

REF. STATE 217655

1. 1 - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. PER REFTEL, CHARGE JULY 13 WENT OVER TALKING POINTS ON AFGHAN RESISTANCE ALLIANCE PRESENCE AT NAM SUMMIT WITH MFA ADDITIONAL SECRETARY NAJMUDDIN SHAIKH. SHAIKH RESPONDED THAT "ANY SUGGESTION OF THIS NATURE IS GIVEN THE MOST CAREFUL CONSIDERATION" BY THE GOP. HE NOTED THAT CONSIDERABLE THOUGHT WITHIN MFA HAD ALREADY BEEN GIVEN TO SUCH AN ATTEMPT, BUT IT HAD BEEN DECIDED THAT "WE'D PROBABLY LOSE MORE THAN WE'D GAIN" IN MAKING THE EFFORT.

3. SHAIKH POINTED OUT THAT THE GOP HAD ALREADY ENSURED THAT THE LANGUAGE ON AFGHANISTAN IN THE DRAFT NAM SUMMIT DECLARATION WOULD BE AT LEAST AS GOOD AS LAST TIME, IF NOT EVEN STRONGER (THE IMPLICATION CLEARLY BEING THAT THIS WAS WHERE THE GOP SHOULD FOCUS ITS FINITE POLITICAL LEVERAGE WITHIN THE NAM). HE ALSO NOTED THAT THE GOP WOULD BE SENDING A SPECIAL EMISSARY (TENTATIVELY FORMER FOREIGN SECRETARY AND AMBASSADOR-DESIGNATE TO FRANCE NIAZ NAIK) TO HARARE TO CLEAR UP ANY MISCONCEPTIONS REGARDING A SOVIET WITHDRAWAL FROM AFGHANISTAN THAT MUGABE HAS APPARENTLY BROUGHT BACK FROM HIS RECENT TRIP TO MOSCOW. MCCARTHY BT

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M430/2 115255

BY KML NARA DATE 11/2/12

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135246
E.O. 12958
As Amended
Sec. 3.3 b(1)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SNB

SITUATION ROOM EVENING SUMMARY

JULY 15, 1986

~~SECRET~~

USSR-US: Gorbachev today hinted that Moscow considering extending moratorium on nuclear testing beyond 6 August... statement made at meeting of international group of scientists...said US response will greatly affect Soviet position. CIA expects Moscow to intensify public pressures on US as deadline approaches. [redacted]

USSR-FRANCE-MIDDLE EAST: Embassy Moscow believes Gorbachev not heavily committed to proposal presented to Mitterrand for preliminary UNSC Middle East peace conference... notes off-handed way proposal presented and low-key press coverage. Soviets probably presented idea to French believing US would reject it outright.
(C) Moscow 11979

NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA

PAKISTAN-AFGHANISTAN-USSR: Pakistan will use same position papers for Geneva talks resuming 30 July as used for May talks... MFA source also told Embassy he expects talks to fail. (S)
Islamabad 15267

INDIA: Rajiv Gandhi's recent offer to talk with any Sikh group has thrown Punjab dissidents into flurry of activity... reportedly brought offer from militants for a month's truce presumably to foster negotiations. (C) New Delhi 17073

EGYPT-ISRAEL: Embassy Cairo reports mood of Taba talks continues to be upbeat... Foreign Minister Abdel Meguid told Charge Clark Egypt hopes to conclude work on Taba before Vice President Bush's visit...cautioned, however, other demands on government may prevent timely resolution of Taba. (S) Cairo 16204

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BY rw NARA DATE 3/31/15

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