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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
132405	CABLE	120022Z MAR 86	2	3/12/1986	B1
132406	MEMO	JUDYT MANDEL TO JOHN POINDEXTER RE REPLY TO WICK R 6/8/2018 M326/2	1	6/9/1986	B1
132407	MEMO	TO CHARLES WICK RE USIA SUPPORT	1	ND	B1
132408	LETTER	CHARLES WICK TO JOHN POINDEXTER RE PROPOSED PLAN	2	3/18/1986	B1
132409	PAPER	RE OUTLINE OF USIA ACTIONS	2	ND	B1

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Research Memorandum

United States Information Agency
Washington, D.C. 20547

Office of Research



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2/28/12

May 10, 1986

F-Soviet Political Act 1)
[Signature]

SOVIET CULTURAL AND INFORMATION ACTIVITIES IN SOUTH ASIA: 1985

Summary

This report examines Soviet cultural and information (C&I) activities conducted in 1985 in five South Asian countries: India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka.

Soviet C&I activities continue to be most extensive and to have the greatest impact in India, a country which enjoys close ties with the USSR. Soviet periodicals and books penetrate almost all sections of literate Indian society; and Soviet placements are fairly common both in the print media and on TV. In 1985, India and the USSR signed a protocol for the exchange of television materials that will probably pave the way for additional Soviet programs on Indian TV.

Pakistan, the country which has most restricted Soviet C&I activities, is showing signs of opening up somewhat. Soviet periodicals are being distributed through regular channels again, and the Soviets have been improving their cultural facilities. The Soviet cultural center in Karachi has moved to a new suburban location which may be more convenient and less subject to surveillance; and a second cultural center will be opened in Islamabad in mid-1986. Although Soviet C&I activities did not have much impact in Pakistan, the lifting of martial law at the end of 1985 may permit an expansion of Soviet activities in the year ahead.

In Sri Lanka, more Soviet publications are being sold and distributed, and the Soviet cultural center moved to a larger, better-equipped building. In Bangladesh, after a period in which Soviet C&I activities had been curtailed by the government, the Soviet Cultural House in Dhaka was reopened, and a number of Soviet activities resumed. No major changes were observed in Nepal, where Soviet media placements constitute the only significant activity.

End Summary

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The Focus of Soviet Activity

The USSR conducts various cultural and information (C&I) activities in Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. Most of the activities are covered by bilateral agreements.

The principal target country for Soviet C&I activities in South Asia is India, where the Soviets sponsor extensive and diverse programs that reach millions of people. Close relations between India and the USSR and the relatively uncontrolled local press provide a favorable environment for Soviet activities. In contrast, Pakistan has had strained relations with the USSR and closely monitors Soviet activities.*

In India, there are estimated to be about 50 Soviet diplomats who are primarily responsible for C&I activities stationed there; and each diplomat is backed up by about ten local employees. Several dozen additional Soviet citizens are employed in five cultural centers, as correspondents, and as representatives of Soviet organizations such as "Sovfilmeksport" and "Mezhdunarodnaia Kniga." Furthermore, there are probably at least 100 Soviet professors and instructors teaching at local educational establishments.

Trends in Soviet C&I Activities

In the South Asian countries, most Soviet C&I activities have continued with little change over the past several years. The more noteworthy shifts are discussed below.

In India, Soviet TV placements increased to between five and eight per month and now reach an estimated viewing audience of five million. They are likely to rise further, since in March 1985 a new bilateral agreement was signed to expand the exchange of TV and radio programs. The exchange will include TV newsreels, documentaries, films, musical performances, and children's shows. Nonpolitical programming (e.g., music, dance, sports, and children's shows) tends to be most popular.

The number of Soviet propaganda and disinformation stories carried by Indian news agencies has also increased in recent years. Not only the leftist press, but even the independent English and regional newspapers frequently publish the stories.

*For further details, see the Appendix, which discusses Soviet C&I activities in South Asia in the context of Moscow's worldwide effort.

In Sri Lanka, the Soviets have expanded their information-dissemination activities since 1983. Soviet newspapers and periodicals have become more available: at least 16 are now distributed through newsstands, Soviet-supported bookstores and the Soviet Embassy. More Soviet books are also being sold and distributed, especially to left-leaning intellectuals in the cities and to Tamil- and Sinhala-language libraries in the countryside.

The Soviet Cultural House in the Sri Lankan capital, Colombo, was moved to a better location in 1985. The new center is much larger than the previous one and includes a reading room and auditorium. Like other Soviet cultural centers, it shows Soviet films, stages exhibitions, holds lectures, and sponsors chess and sports competitions.

While most Soviet C&I activities in Nepal showed little change over the past two years, there was a decline in the number of pro-Soviet newspapers. Pro-Soviet and independent newspapers had proliferated a few years ago as a result of a liberal newspaper registration policy. After a stricter registration policy was adopted in 1985, however, many pro-Soviet papers were closed for not complying with the new regulations.

In Bangladesh, the trend in Soviet C&I activities has been mixed. At the end of 1983, the Soviet Cultural House in Dhaka was closed by the Bangladesh government (due to alleged Soviet interference in the country's internal politics), and the staff of the Soviet Embassy was cut by 50 percent. In 1985, the Center was reopened, and some Soviet C&I activities returned to pre-1983 levels. Other activities have declined since 1983 (e.g., the number of pro-Soviet newspapers has dropped, in part because of a reduction in the Soviets' quota of imported paper; and fewer Soviet films have been shown at film festivals).

Although Pakistan has continued to pose problems for Soviet C&I programs, the situation has been changing somewhat. Until fairly recently, Soviet newspapers and magazines were seldom seen in bookstores or newsstands. The Urdu-language magazine Tulu had ceased publication in 1980, and the government of Pakistan reportedly had refused to permit the resumption of Soviet printing and distribution activities when the cultural agreement was negotiated in 1982. Since 1983, however, Soviet placements in local newspapers read by the Pakistani intelligentsia have increased, and the Soviet viewpoint on arms control, the Middle East, Central America, and other areas has received a wider hearing. Soviet publications have also become more available. In 1985, two English-language magazines, New Times and Sputnik, began to be distributed again through regular channels.

The Soviets have also been improving their cultural facilities in Pakistan. The Soviet Cultural House in Karachi was moved to a suburban location where it may be more convenient and less subject to surveillance. A second Soviet cultural center is scheduled to open in mid-1986 in Islamabad in a building separate from the Soviet Embassy.

The Impact of Soviet C&I Activities

In attempting to assess the impact of Soviet C&I activities in South Asia, this report relies on the judgments of observers in the region. They took into account a number of factors, including the size and nature of the audience reached, the appeal of the C&I activity, and its effect on attitudes toward or perceptions of the USSR and/or of the U.S. and their policies. The following discussion concentrates on those activities that were judged to have significant impact.

In India, the Soviet information and propaganda efforts have had considerable success. Soviet periodicals and books penetrate almost all sections of literate Indian society; and Soviet placements are fairly common both in the print media and on TV (but not on radio). The Soviet point of view thus reaches a large audience. Moreover, because of the importance India attaches to its relations with the USSR, Moscow-dated stories command a fair degree of credibility and reinforce the pro-Soviet attitudes held by many readers.

There are indications that the Soviets have also been quite successful in planting anti-U.S. disinformation stories in the Indian press. There are many articles that malign the U.S. Government and try to link the CIA with almost everything that adversely affects Indian interests. These efforts are facilitated by the relatively uncontrolled press and the large number of leftist publications in India. By offering various inducements, the Soviets have been able to lure economically weak papers into supporting these efforts.* Although sophisticated and well-educated readers may see through the disinformation, the repeated presentation of propaganda and misinformation themes helps to shape public opinion, especially among less discerning readers.

*In all five countries, Soviet representatives reportedly use questionable methods to increase their access to the media. Journalists and editors were said to have been lured with various inducements, which ranged from a bottle of scotch to regular under-the-table payments or guaranteed scholarships for their children. In some cases, Soviet representatives alleg-

Other Soviet activities have also had a widespread impact in India. Performances by Soviet troupes and athletic contests with Soviet teams have been well-received by enthusiastic audiences; and the hundreds of Soviet exhibits put on by the cultural centers and through friendship societies reach Indians even in remote villages. There is scarcely a single important fair where Soviet material is not in evidence.

Such C&I efforts have helped project an image of the USSR as a friend and ally of India and its people among broad sections of the Indian public. No less important, Moscow has succeeded in exerting considerable influence on a number of politically significant groups in Indian society. These groups include professionals, intellectuals, civil servants, and students; religious minorities (Sikhs, Muslims, and Christians); and members of the communist party and to a lesser degree of the ruling Congress Party. It should be noted, however, that Soviet C&I efforts have not been completely successful: educated and influential Indians still tend to look to the West for cultural, academic, economic, and ideological models.

In the other countries, Soviet C&I activities have had more limited impact. In Bangladesh, the most significant C&I activities are Soviet publications and short-term exchanges. Soviet books are translated into Bengali, and two magazines (the pro-Soviet monthly Udoyan and the imported New Times) have gained a following. Furthermore, the Soviets try to cultivate young journalists and performing artists through their front organizations; and they have also been somewhat effective in reaching students and labor groups.

In Sri Lanka, the book program, scholarship program, personal exchanges, and cultural presentations all have been fairly successful in influencing university students, intellectuals, persons working in the media, Buddhist priests, and political and labor leaders.

In Nepal, the only Soviet C&I activity which is significant in terms of its impact is press placement. However, Soviet publications and exchanges have also had some success in influencing labor activists. The impact of Soviet C&I efforts is mitigated by the fact that foreign policy issues and communist ideology generally arouse little interest among the Nepalese.

edly gave clandestine subventions to pro-Soviet newspapers; in others, the Soviet Embassy reportedly bought ads or paid for full-page coverage of Soviet leaders' speeches on the condition that the publisher would pick up a certain number of TASS or Novosti pieces in return.

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- 6 -

In Pakistan, Soviet C&I activities have been severely limited by the government and have achieved little success. Here, as in Nepal, press placements constitute the most significant activity; yet, their impact is still quite limited. It is possible, however, that the lifting of martial law at the end of 1985 may enable the Soviets to operate more freely and on a larger scale.

Prepared by USIA Office of Research:
Richard B. Dobson, Analyst (P/RSE)

M-5/10/86

Approved by:
Nils H. Wessell, Director of Research
485-2965

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APPENDIX

Soviet C&I Activities in South Asia
in the Context of Moscow's Worldwide Effort

The USSR maintains some form of cultural and informational (C&I) relations with most of the world's countries, including the five noncommunist South Asian countries discussed in this report. Soviet activities in the C&I sphere include: radio broadcasts; TASS and Novosti placements in the local media; the distribution of books, newspapers, and periodicals; trade fairs; film festivals; cultural exhibits and performances; cultural centers and friendship societies; sporting events; and educational exchanges.

Soviet media and cultural organizations are instrumental in carrying out these activities. For example, Radio Moscow and other Soviet external radio stations broadcast more than 2200 hours of programs per week, of which 365 hours are beamed to South Asia in 18 languages. The TASS news agency claims that its wire service goes to more than 1,000 local news agencies, newspapers and magazines, radio and TV networks, and government information offices in 115 countries around the world, including the five South Asian nations covered in this report. Novosti provides features, news sheets, and other publications in almost as many countries.

The Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries claims to have ties with local organizations in more than 50 countries of the world, including friendship societies in India, Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. USSR Goskontsert (which organizes exchanges in the performing arts) cooperates with about 90 countries; as a result, more than 160 Soviet groups and about 300 Soviet soloists give performances abroad every year. A number of Soviet performers tour India each year, and some visit the neighboring South Asian countries as well.

Soviet personnel are generally on hand locally to conduct and assist these C&I programs. Soviet embassies, even many of the smaller embassies, typically have several officers with responsibilities for information and culture. With few exceptions they are competent and well-versed in the local languages. Soviet cultural centers, with their directors and staffs of librarians and Russian-language instructors, are active in all five South Asian countries. Soviet correspondents representing TASS, Novosti, and Soviet newspapers such as Pravda, Izvestiia, and Trud are stationed in each country.

In India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepal, standard export periodicals such as New Dawn, Soviet Land, Sputnik, and New Times are sold cheaply or given away; and Soviet books are available in well-situated bookstores and newsstands. Prices have generally been kept low through subsidies.

In India, seven different Soviet periodicals are published in 40 editions in 12 Indian languages and in English. Soviet Land, the most popular of the locally produced periodicals, has a circulation of half a million. The total circulation of Soviet newspapers and periodicals produced and distributed in India in 1985 is estimated at 630,000. Furthermore, 26 Soviet periodicals are imported from the USSR. Mezhdunarodnaia Kniga, the Soviet book and periodical distributor, reported in 1983 that more than a million Indians subscribe to these periodicals.

In all five countries, the Soviets have large cultural centers that sponsor film shows (sometimes daily), cultural programs, exhibits, language instruction, and other programs. In India, the USSR maintains large cultural centers in five cities -- New Delhi, Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, and Trivandrum. The biggest one is the recently constructed, multistory House of Soviet Science, Art and Culture in New Delhi. Each center has a library, a reading room, and facilities for meetings, exhibits, language instruction, and music. An estimated 200 Indians visit each center every day. The centers' level of activity has increased in recent years, and there have been efforts to involve more people in the centers' programs by forming clubs for various activities, such as music, ballet, and sports.

In all countries except Pakistan, Soviet friendship societies contribute to the C&I effort. In India, there are two societies. The largest one is the Indian-Soviet Cultural Society (ISCUS), whose membership probably exceeds 200,000. ISCUS sponsors film showings, language classes, cultural programs, exhibits, and trips, and even operates medical clinics that receive Soviet medicine and equipment. ISCUS and its smaller sister organization, the Friends of the Soviet Union (FSU), have exchange agreements with the Soviet-Indian friendship society in the USSR, which make it possible for the societies' activists to visit each other's country. Both ISCUS and FSU have been very effective in creating goodwill toward the Soviet Union and publicizing Soviet contributions to India's development.

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In addition to organizing cultural presentations, film showings, and exhibits, the Soviets sponsor a variety of scientific, educational, and cultural exchanges. In South Asia, for example, the Soviets offer hundreds of scholarships for study in the USSR. In 1985, the number of scholarships for new students ranged from about 40 in Nepal to 80 in Sri Lanka, 100 in Bangladesh, and 400 in India. The grants generally cover expenses for four to six years' study, plus transportation (there are no tuition fees for higher education in the USSR). Pakistan, the only country which discourages students from accepting Soviet scholarships, nonetheless allows a few students to pursue undergraduate and postgraduate study in the USSR. At the end of 1985, there were approximately 3,600 students from the five South Asian countries studying in the USSR.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

P/US-SW PD

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ACTION

June 9, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JUDYT MANDEL *JM*
SUBJECT: Reply to Wick on Public Diplomacy

Charlie Wick wrote to you in March to outline some of his ideas for the public diplomacy effort to build international support for the next Reagan-Gorbachev meeting (Tab II).

Since the timing for that meeting and key policy questions have not been decided, it would be premature to put into place the specific support mechanism Charlie describes. However, we are working on a long-term public diplomacy strategy for U.S.-Soviet relations designed to build broad public understanding and support for our overall approaches to the USSR and our four-part agenda, and thus lay the foundation for the Summit.

We have refined and revised the "concept paper" based on comments by the Public Affairs officers in Europe, and we will be establishing an informal working group including representatives of USIA to develop an action plan and begin drafting the key resource materials.

In the meantime, we should encourage USIA to continue its valuable public opinion polling and analysis, media surveys, and weekly highlights of Soviet propaganda.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the interim reply to Wick at Tab I.

Approve *JM* Disapprove _____
Jack Marlock and Walt Raymond concur. *WR*

Attachment

Tab I Reply to Wick
Tab II Ltr fr Wick, March 18, 86, w/atch

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DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

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BY LW NARA DATE 6/8/18

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132407	MEMO TO CHARLES WICK RE USIA SUPPORT	1	ND	B1

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132408	LETTER CHARLES WICK TO JOHN POINDEXTER RE PROPOSED PLAN	2	3/18/1986	B1

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132409 PAPER	RE OUTLINE OF USIA ACTIONS	2	ND	B1

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT

TIME STAMP

86 AUG 15 5:17

SYSTEM LOG NUMBER: 6022

ACTION OFFICER: MATLOCK

DUE: 19 AUGUST

☐ Prepare Memo For President

☐ Prepare Memo McDaniel to Chew

☒ Prepare Memo For Poindexter / Fortier / Keel

☐ Prepare Memo McDaniel to Dolan

☐ Prepare Memo _____ to _____

CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS*

PHONE* to action officer at ext. 5112

FYI

☐ Brooks
☐ Burghardt
☐ Burns
☐ Cannistraro
☐ Childress
☐ Cobb
☐ Danzansky
☐ deGraffenreid
☐ Dobriansky
☐ Donley
☐ Douglass
☐ Farrar
☐ Grimes
☐ Hanley
☐ Kelly
☐ Kissell
☐ Kraemer

FYI

☐ Laux
☒ Lavin
☒ Lenczowski
☐ Levine
☒ Linhard
☐ Mahley
☐ Major
☐ Mandel
☐ Matlock
☐ May
☐ Mingle
☐ North
☐ Perry
☐ Platt
☐ Pugliese
☒ Raymond
☐ Reger

FYI

☐ Ringdahl
☐ Ross
☐ Sable
☐ Sachs
☐ Saunders
☒ Sestanovich
☐ Small
☐ Sommer
☐ Soos
☐ Stark
☐ Steiner
☐ St Martin
☐ Tahir-Kheli
☐ Teicher
☐ Thompson
☐ Tillman
☐ _____

INFORMATION ☐ McDaniel

☒ Rodman

☐ Poindexter (advance)

☒ Pearson

☐ Cockell

☐ Fortier (advance)

☒ Secretariat

☐ _____

☐ Keel (advance)

COMMENTS

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

- Washington, D.C. 20451

OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

August 14, 1986


MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

Careful thought should begin on the nature of Gorbachev's visit to the U.S., if, as I believe, the summit takes place this Fall. There is no better way to start this thought than by learning from history--Nikita Khrushchev's 1959 tour of the U.S. preceding his summit with President Eisenhower.

The lessons learned from that occasion were:

1. Gorbachev will probably be more interested in output than input--in getting the Soviets' message across to the world rather than in seriously learning about the U.S.
2. There will be many hassles with media and security, mostly unavoidable, which will limit his mobility and what Gorbachev can see and learn about America.
3. We can probably get more say over Gorbachev's itinerary than we did over Khrushchev's in 1959, if we are more precise, even insistent with the Soviets about where to go.
4. The European audience is just as critical as ours.
5. Both U.S. and European publics will probably be more receptive to the Soviet leader today than they were in 1959.

The attached makes for fascinating reading. It teaches quite a bit.


Kenneth L. Adelman

Attachment: a/s

PS- I gave copy of the paper to Don R. as well

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If there is a summit this year, Gorbachev may wish to travel beyond Washington, Camp David, or Santa Barbara.

If the Soviet leader comes to the United States, and if he decides to see the sights, it's worth learning what we can from the only other visit by a Soviet leader that included real sightseeing--Khrushchev's 1959 summit with President Eisenhower. Khrushchev visited the United States for 12 days in September 1959, for the first U.S.-Soviet summit held on American soil.

What went wrong with this visit? What went right? What might we expect to happen this time?

Propaganda Barrage

One thing that is plain from the 1959 experience is that an extended Khrushchev-style visit would provide Gorbachev with an extremely valuable public-relations opportunity. In the course of his 12-day visit, Khrushchev had no fewer than 21 occasions on which to convey his message to the public. The last day of his trip included a one-hour press conference and a one-hour TV address on NBC to the nation. "Not since the televised Army-McCarthy hearings of 1954," a Washington Post article observed, "has television so concentrated on a single man." Coverage of Gorbachev is likely to be as or even more intense.

In Breaking with Moscow, Arkady Shevchenko, the senior Soviet diplomat who defected to the United States in 1978, recalls how this looked from the point of view of Soviet officialdom:

21

A veneer of propaganda obscured almost everything related to Khrushchev's visit to the United States. He was obviously delighted that President Eisenhower had invited him to pay an official visit. The mere fact of the invitation was important to him: he saw it as the United States' admission that the U.S.S.R. was an equal with whom solutions to international problems must be sought. The Soviet Union had striven persistently for such status. Khrushchev felt that his visit would bring him and the Soviet Union prestige regardless of whether the talks with Eisenhower succeeded or failed.

The Soviet leader set out his major theme straightforwardly upon arriving in Washington. "There are only two nations which are powerful--the Soviet Union and the U.S.," he declared. "You people must accept the facts of life. You must recognize that we are here to stay."

The visit was carefully orchestrated to get this message across, and at the same time to build pressure on President Eisenhower for concessions during the Camp David talks scheduled for the end of the trip.

(It is interesting to note that the 1959 summit happened essentially by accident. The President had meant to convey to the Soviets the message that he was interested in a summit on the condition that concrete progress was made at an earlier foreign ministers' conference. To the President's dismay, the message was bungled. The invitation was presented to the Soviets without the condition--and quickly seized upon by Khrushchev.)

The first sally of the Soviet P.R. campaign was launched three days before the Soviet leader's departure for the United States, when the Soviets fired a rocket to the moon, the Lunik II.

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On arriving in the Oval Office, Khrushchev presented the President with a replica of the object sent to the moon. President Eisenhower recalled in his memoirs that the Lunik II launch was "a noteworthy feat, but the propaganda purpose of the timing was blatant." (These, remember, were the days of Sputnik and the "missile gap," when the Kremlin leader was endlessly boasting about the Soviet Union's capabilities in nuclear missiles, and U.S. spacecraft were having trouble getting off the ground. Coincidentally, during the period of the Khrushchev visit, the U.S. space program suffered some noteworthy failures.)

Khrushchev's other major theme was disarmament and an end to the Cold War. After meeting with President Eisenhower, he kicked off his U.S. tour with a major speech to the United Nations General Assembly proposing a bold three-stage plan for general and complete disarmament (a forerunner of Gorbachev's January 15, 1986 proposal).

In all his U.S. pronouncements, Khrushchev applied what Henry Kissinger had called the Kremlin's "strategy of ambiguity"--mixing threats with blandishments, outbursts of anger with the soothing themes of a "peace offensive." Khrushchev's tactic was to stir up popular anxiety about nuclear holocaust, while at the same time presenting himself to the world as a man of peace --all of this designed to pressure President Eisenhower into concessions on Berlin and other issues. As the Soviet leader wrote in his memoirs, "Eisenhower was being forced to listen to voices in democratic circles and in the business community which advocated concrete measures to reduce tensions."

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The New York Times headline of September 17 captured the dual -
nature of the Soviet leader's message:

Khrushchev Has An Arms Plan;
Asks Peace Effort Lest Earth
Turn Into "Ashes and Graves"

Finally, Khrushchev's messages were aimed as much
at the European and Soviet audiences as at the American one.

The United States in World Affairs 1959 noted: "Every detail of
the visitor's itinerary, so far as it lay within Soviet control,
appeared to have been calculated for the fullest effect on American
opinion and, beyond it, on the world at large. The Soviet people
read glowing press accounts of the welcome supposedly accorded
their leader."

"The Man Who Came to Teach and Not to Listen"

At an April 12 press conference, President Eisenhower
expressed his hopes concerning what Khrushchev might see on his
visit--which are remarkably similar to President Reagan's hopes
for Gorbachev to see California by helicopter:

I would like for him, among other things, to see this:
the evidence that the fine, small or modest homes that
Americans live in are not unusual or exceptional as he seemed
to think the sample we sent to [the American exhibit in]
Moscow was. . . .

I would like to see him go into our great farmland and see
our farmers, each one operating on his own, not regimented.

. . .
Now, I want him to see our great industrial plants and
what we are doing.

Hardly any of this happened. What went wrong?

First, the Soviet leader made a point of showing little

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interest in the various evidences presented to him of capitalist prosperity and American success. "Even when his hosts drove him through towns with tall white steeples, through prosperous farms, friendly campuses and towering skyscrapers," Time complained, "he barely bothered to look out the window." James Reston titled his September 20 column on Khrushchev's visit "The Man Who Came to Teach and Not to Listen." President Eisenhower was disappointed when the Soviet leader, aloft in the Presidential helicopter, made "no expression revealing his reaction" to the suburban American landscape below, with its plentiful houses, cars, and manicured streets. Instead, Khrushchev "openly expressed his admiration for the helicopter itself" (and indeed ordered three of them for his personal use after returning to Moscow).

But of course, all this was in line with Khrushchev's purpose, which was to dramatize the power and legitimacy of the Soviet system, not the virtues of the United States. He subordinated his visible responses to this political goal. Gorbachev may act similarly.

Logistics

There were also serious logistical problems.

First, media people formed an almost impenetrable cordon around the Soviet leader. "Mr. Khrushchev cannot see America for all the cops and photographers," Reston wrote in The New York Times on September 24, the day after the visit to an Iowa farm. "[N]ewsmen are not reporting the visit; they are smothering it . . . All this, mind you, gives Mr. Khrushchev no pain. He

is less interested in seeing America than in having the world see him in America."

Second, security was tight. The Soviet leader complained at one point of being kept under "house arrest" and claimed he was being barred from meeting "ordinary Americans." Security considerations resulted in the famous cancellation of Khrushchev's Disneyland visit, and the Premier's angry response: "Just now I was told I could not go to Disneyland. I asked: Why not? What is it? Do you have rocket-launching pads there? I do not know." (In point of fact, Khrushchev's security people had agreed with the cancellation.) But after the Disneyland episode, security was loosened slightly to permit the General Secretary more access to ordinary citizens.

Such episodes contributed to an impression that trip was poorly organized. The Washington Post called it a "three-ring circus," blaming the State Department's planning.

The third major problem, which in part explained the disarray, was the scheduling, which had been tightly controlled by the Soviet ambassador, Mihail Menshikov. Menshikov accepted a number of invitations from labor groups and others without prior consultation of the State Department, causing some scheduling conflicts. (Gorbachev is likely to get a number of invitations from private groups and institutions, as he did from Stanford University, and the Soviets may be disinclined to coordinate all of them with U.S. officials.)

It is worth remembering the Soviet schedule was designed to

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show the Soviet leader, not the United States, in a good light. Menshikov ignored the President's expressed wish that the tour include Abilene, Kansas--his home town--and Levittown. Moreover, the schedule was extremely tight, with emphasis on meetings with dignitaries. Henry Cabot Lodge, charged with escorting the Soviet leader, later told Gromyko, "There have been too many banquets and they have lasted too long."

Finally, to add to the impression of confusion, there were frequent angry encounters between local officials, eager for the limelight, and the Soviet Premier. Whether from a genuine incomprehension of the independence of American local government or to score points in the propaganda war, Khrushchev accused Washington of orchestrating provocations. The White House was finally prompted to issue a statement on September 22 to the effect that "The purpose of constructive meetings at Camp David is not served by any personal discourtesies extended to the Chairman during his visit."

Khrushchev's Impression on the Public

The American media were far more openly suspicious of the Soviet leader in 1959 than they would be today. It's a sad sign of the times, but nonetheless true. When U.S. News & World Report printed excerpts from Khrushchev's American speeches in their September 28 issue, the editors followed each excerpt with a paragraph in boldface type refuting the Soviet premier--something sadly unlikely to happen in 1986.

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Time's 1959 evaluation of the Khrushchev visit was bluntly negative:

The U.S., long since disabused of the image of Nikita the Vodka-Slopping Peasant, already knew Khrushchev to be the skillful and dynamic leader of 200 million people. The U.S. found out, as Khrushchev boiled into excessive rages in Washington, New York, and Los Angeles (twice) before TV crowds of millions, that Khrushchev could also carry out a combination of uncontrolled willfulness, ignorance and ill temper. Above all, the U.S. found out last week that Khrushchev's New Course of Communism was the same Old Course; that his protestations of peace and friendship cloaked a naked drive for world power no less sustained than that of the late Joseph Stalin.

Time, however, was especially harsh. Some argued that Khrushchev's presence put a more human face on the Soviet system. The Khrushchev outbursts mentioned by Time did not always work to the Soviet Premier's disadvantage. In fact, many speculated that they were calculated.

Following a Khrushchev outburst at the National Press Club on September 16, Arthur Krock wrote admiringly in The New York Times that Khrushchev had "matched the best performances of politicians put to the question in democratic parliaments" -- a remark one can easily imagine being made about Gorbachev.

Nor was Khrushchev without charm, suggested by the following question put to President Eisenhower during a September 17 press conference:

Mr. President, with millions of Americans seeing Mr. Khrushchev on TV, and noting his apparent conviction and sincerity when he speaks, and also at times his friendliness and warmth of personality--do you think some Americans' opposition to Communism might weaken and they might become psychologically disarmed?

(President Eisenhower answered, among other things, that he did

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"not believe the master debater or great appearances of sincerity or anything else are going to fool the American people long.")

In fact, from a public relations standpoint, Khrushchev's overall impact in the United States was mixed. Shortly before and shortly after the visit, the Gallup Poll asked, "Just your own impression--what type of person do you think Premier Khrushchev is?" The results were as follows:

	<u>Before Visit</u>	<u>After Visit</u>
Intelligent	11%	18%
Cooperative	2%	9%
Unyielding	12%	9%
Untrustworthy	12%	22%
Domineering	10%	6%
Ruthless	9%	5%

A majority (59%) surveyed in the U.S. after the Soviet premier's visit thought he was not "sincere in wanting to work out an effective disarmament plan." Only 20% believed he was sincere in this effort. Gorbachev today would probably score much higher.

Some Western European media responded more receptively to the summit. The London Daily Telegraph for example, proclaimed lavishly:

What we are witnessing today is a diplomatic revolution, nonetheless profound for being--let us hope--bloodless. September 15, 1959, marks the day when the United States and the Soviet Union symbolically affirm their joint responsibility for determining the future of the world.

The Paris-Journal noted:

Two men, Eisenhower and Khrushchev, know that they alone hold the fantastic power to destroy the world or to halt the race to the abyss. . . Nobody can make us believe that Eisenhower, despite his verbal precautions, will not open a major negotiation with Khrushchev in a concrete way.

What Did Khrushchev Learn?

For all his show of indifference to his setting, there was a feeling among sophisticated observers that Khrushchev had clearly grasped some of the realities of American life.

During a brief tour of an IBM Plant in San Jose, the Soviet leader asked two workers about their wages, and how they spent their income. One worker said he was spending \$100 a month for a house he was buying. "You mean for an apartment?" Khrushchev said. "No," said the worker, "a house. I am buying a house." On the way back to San Francisco, Khrushchev requested another, unscheduled stop at a housing development under construction, where he asked workers similar questions, as if to verify his impressions.

An assessment of the Khrushchev trip done by the State Department for the NSC in 1973 made the point that U.S. advantages in agriculture were and are likely to come through especially clearly to any Soviet leader:

The beneficial impact of a visit to an agricultural area in the United States cannot be exaggerated. American superiority, efficiency and per capita production are more readily recognized by Soviet leaders in the agricultural than in the industrial sector. This productive efficiency together with the high standard of living prevailing in US agricultural areas combine to make a strong impact on Soviet visitors.

Of course whether what Khrushchev saw influenced him toward peace is another question, and far less clear. The same State Department document pointed out that the Soviet leader's perception of the American people's strong desire for peace could actually encourage Soviet hope that the USSR could achieve its goals

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"through more assertive tactics without incurring increased risks of war." But Khrushchev, who had given indications of wishing to drive a wedge between the U.S. President and the people, also evidently perceived the popular support for President Eisenhower's foreign policy.

The Political Consequences of the Summit

Thus far we have left the large diplomatic issues out of the summit story. A concluding word, therefore, about the foreign policy upshot of the meeting.

The Camp David summit occurred against the backdrop of two major Soviet challenges--the space/missile race, begun with the 1957 Sputnik launch, and, more pressingly, the Berlin Crisis, ignited in November 1958 when Khrushchev demanded a peace treaty requiring withdrawal of the three Western powers from that city.

The specific issues at stake in 1959 were naturally somewhat different from those of concern now. Arms control was not so clearly at center stage. But the pressures on the President to engage in summit meetings--coming most heavily from the Soviets and the Western allies--were strikingly similar.

President Eisenhower was very clear on the pitfalls of summitry. In his press conference of February 25, 1959, the President said:

When the people of the world understand there is going to be a head of state or a head of government summit conference, they expect something to come out of it; and a feeling of pessimism and, in a way, hopelessness, I think, would be

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increased if you entered such a meeting and then nothing real came out of it as, indeed, was the case at Geneva [in 1955]. There was a great deal of talk about the spirit of Geneva, but frankly, before we went there, while we were there, and afterward, our government said one thing: the proof of the sanity and value of this Geneva meeting was going to be shown within the next few months when we went down to the concrete problems. And there we went over in October--the foreign ministers did--and we got exactly zero progress.

President Eisenhower insisted on limited aims for the Camp David conference. The purpose, he said, was "to melt a little bit of the ice that seems to freeze our relationships with the Soviets." On August 27 the President stated:

I myself am not conducting negotiations for anybody else with Mr. Khrushchev. I am conducting conversations, trying to explore his mind, to see whether there's any kind of proposal, suggestion, that he can make, that would indeed make him a real leader in the search for peace in the world.

One of the President's best-advised moves was to travel to Europe shortly before Khrushchev's scheduled arrival in the U.S., conferring with Chancellor Adenauer in Bonn, Prime Minister Macmillan in London, and President DeGaulle in Paris. The Presidential trip was credited with solidifying the alliance on the eve of the meeting with Khrushchev.

In the end, the immediate effect of the Camp David summit was to diffuse some of the tensions over Berlin. (The crisis would reemerge, however, in almost identical form two years later under President Kennedy.) President Eisenhower noted later that the visit resulted in "a better atmosphere," though he felt Khrushchev's references to "the Spirit of Camp David" to be unwarranted.

According to Shevchenko, Khrushchev talked of the meeting a year later on an ocean voyage to New York. "As for

the United States," writes Shevchenko, "for the time being he saw little hope of changing its attitude, but there were many opportunities for 'kindling distrust' of the Americans in Europe. 'We threw a little scare into the NATO countries last year with the spirit of Camp David,' he said in recalling his 1959 talks with President Eisenhower. 'We must work further at turning the United States against Europe, and Europe against the United States. That was the technique Vladimir Ilyich [Lenin] taught us.'"