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NSC/S PROFILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ID 8307441

RECEIVED 17 OCT 83 18

TO CLARK

FROM WICK, C

DOCDATE 07 OCT 83

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1987

By CIS NARA, Date 1/29/03

KEYWORDS PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

VOA

ARMS CONTROL

UN

INF

NATO

SUBJECT: STATUS RPT 34 RE ARMS REDUCTION & SECURITY ISSUES 26 - 30 SEP

ACTION: ANY ACTION NECESSARY

DUE: 21 OCT 83 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

RAYMOND

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COMMENTS

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LOG 8306888

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W/ATTCH FILE

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**United States
Information
Agency**

Washington, D.C. 20547

Office of the Director



7441

October 7, 1983

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable
Lawrence S. Eagleburger
Chairman, International Political Committee

The Honorable
Gerald B. Helman
Chairman, Public Diplomacy Committee

FROM: Charles Z. Wick
Director

SUBJECT: Status Report No. 34 — Arms Reduction and
Security Issues (Week of September 26 - 30)

HIGHLIGHTS

Voice of America Broadcasts and Wireless File items highlight U.S. Arms Control Initiatives:

- The President used his regular Saturday VOA radio address on September 24 to say that the U.S. would not be deterred in its arms reduction efforts by Soviet recalcitrance and inflexibility. He also appealed, in remarks heard around the world and in the Soviet Union, to Moscow for good-faith negotiations following upon the latest U.S. initiatives in the INF talks. Those initiatives were explained, and broadcast live worldwide by VOA, in the President's September 26 address at the United Nations General Assembly.
- The text of the President's UNGA speech was carried on the Wireless File on September 26. The File also featured a September 27 summary of reaction from U.N. delegations, entitled "U.N. Diplomats Encouraged by Reagan Speech", as well as the President's New York Post interview and other related items.
- Both VOA and the Wireless File also covered the criticism of the President's initiative by Soviet leader Andropov, contrasting Soviet views with widespread favorable reaction in the West.

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Classified by: Charles Z. Wick
Declassify or Downgrade on: OADR

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Authority

BY

GN NARA DATE

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12/19/16

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Izvestiya Attacks VOA:

-- USIS Moscow reported that, soon after the President's VOA radio address, an article in Izvestiya accused VOA Deputy Director Levitsky of working for the CIA, and also alleged that the CIA now controls VOA broadcasts. The Post views this as an attempt to discredit VOA, which "is obviously reaching and influencing a large audience of Soviet listeners, who must be given an Izvestiya antidote."

The Washington Foreign Press Center arranged with State/EUR to have Deputy Assistant Secretary John Kelly brief Washington's resident correspondents from Finland on September 23, in an on-the-record scene setter for the upcoming visit of President Koivisto. The correspondents represent Finland's major print and electronic media.

USIS Bogota reports that Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Johnstone's recent Telepress Conference made a positive contribution to overcoming the distortions and misunderstandings of U.S. initiatives common in the local media.

Our Embassy in The Hague reports that a September 5-9 NATO tour for Dutch regional editors was highly successful. The tour familiarized editors from influential regional papers and news services with a number of NATO issues, including air defense capabilities, conventional force modernization, the Warsaw Pact threat and INF. Common themes emerging in their questions include: (1) concern about U.S. preparations for anti-nuclear demonstrations in the FRG; (2) curiosity about NATO cohesion, especially with regard to using armed forces for non-NATO missions; (3) concern about the cost of conventional alternatives to INF.

Our Embassy in Copenhagen reports that two interviews with CSCE Ambassador Max Kampelman have been published in major independent newspapers. In the interviews Ambassador Kampelman contrasts Soviet behavior in Afghanistan, in the KAL incident, and in SS-20 missile deployments with multilateral efforts, such as the CSCE, to civilize international behavior and make nations accountable for their actions. He also argues that NATO must stand firm against Soviet threats in executing its 1979 dual track decision.

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USIS Port Moresby reported that Wireless File and other materials on the KAL incident were well received by local media and government and political leaders, who appreciated the factual, in-depth information they provided. VOA editorials were published in full in several major newspapers. Another carried a column by an Australian journalist praising the restraint of the U.S. reaction to the tragedy.

cc: Judge William P. Clark, Jr., SPG ✓
Secretary George P. Shultz, SPG
Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger, SPG
Administrator M. Peter McPherson, SPG

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NSC/S PROFILE

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ID 8307687

RECEIVED 26 OCT 83 09

TO MCFARLANE FROM TOMLINSON, K

DOCDATE 21 OCT 83

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By 025 NARA, Date 1/29/13

KEYWORDS PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ARMS CONTROL

SUBJECT STATUS RPT NO-35 ARMS REDUCTION & SECURITY ISSUES 3 / 7 OCT

ACTION ANY ACTION NECESSARY DUE 31 OCT 83 STATUS S FILES

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**National Security Council
The White House**

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Package # 7687

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John Poindexter	<u>2</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Wilma Hall	<u>3</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Bud McFarlane	<u>4</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>I</u>
John Poindexter			
Executive Secretary			
NSC Secretariat			
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I = Information

A = Action

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

7687

CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

INFORMATION

November 4, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MC FARLANE

FROM: WALTER RAYMOND, JR. *WR*
SUBJECT: USIA Actions in Support of
INF Deployment

As you are aware, USIA provides us a weekly summary of activity on this subject (Tab I). I do not burden you with these regularly, but I think from time to time it is worth noting to you that this activity continues, and at an effective level.

Attachment

Tab I Status Report No. 35

CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By WRS NARA, Date 1/29/13

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**United States
Information
Agency**

Washington, D.C. 20547

7687
Office of the Director



CONFIDENTIAL

October 21, 1983

83 OCT 25 P7:22
RECEIVED
MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Honorable
Lawrence S. Eagleburger
Chairman, International Political Committee

The Honorable
Gerald B. Helman
Chairman, Public Diplomacy Committee

FROM:

Kenneth Y. Tomlinson *report*
Acting Director

SUBJECT:

Status Report No. 35 — Arms Reduction and
Security Issues (Week of October 3-7)

HIGHLIGHTS

Ambassador Nitze Briefs European Journalists Following Address:

- Chief INF negotiator Paul Nitze met with a group of European journalists at The Hague on October 7 following his address on the status of the negotiations before a plenary session of the North Atlantic Assembly. Participating in the deep background session were eight Dutch journalists, representatives of the London Times and the Guardian, as well as the International Herald Tribune and several American publications.

USIA Security Issues Workshop Rated Solid Success:

- Thirty-four USIA and State Department officers attending the October 3-5 workshop on European security issues at USNATO Brussels have greeted the event as a signal contribution to their ability to deal with public affairs aspects of this complicated subject matter in the challenging months ahead. Three days of intensive lectures by leading analysts, followed in each case by active and often lively questioning, compacted a mass of information and concepts into packages which will enable USIS posts in Western Europe to sharpen their treatment of the issues and better evaluate and react to the environment in which they operate. Speakers included US permrep to NATO David Abshire; Ambassador Jack Matlock (NSC); Edward Warner, of Rand; Dov Zakheim (DOD); Ed Ifft (U.S. START delegation); and Jack Kangas, of the Washington Defense Research Group. This group of speakers outlined U.S.-Soviet relations, Soviet military doctrine, and the evolution of U.S. strategic thinking. Issues facing NATO were addressed by Robert Osgood (State); Leon Sloss, of Leon Sloss Associates; Ken Myers (SAIS); and John Hawes (EUR/RPM). Ambassador Jonathan Dean, of the Carnegie Endowment, discussed MBFR; Gary Crocker, of the Department, outlined USG efforts on Soviet use of CBW and toxin weapons; and Stephen Shaffer of USIA presented the latest polling data on European attitudes toward security and INF deployment.

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Classified by: Kenneth Y. Tomlinson
Declassify or Downgrade on: OADR

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Authority: *POS UNIV 11/6/15*
BY: *W* NARA DATE: *12/19/11*

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The implications of American policy in Central America for our security programming in Europe were addressed by the Department's Ambassador Luers and DOD Deputy Assistant Secretary Nestor Sanchez.

The workshop was concluded by a wide-ranging discussion of programming efforts so far on arms control and security issues, from which emerged several new concepts and approaches.

The Administration's new proposals at the START talks were the focus of an October 5 briefing by ACDA Director Adelman at the Washington Foreign Press Center. Adelman granted several short television interviews following the briefing, as did PM Deputy Director Robert Dean, who briefed on INF at the WFPC. One of those interviewing Adelman after his briefing was Gerhard Lowenthal, who is assembling material on security issues for West German television's "ZDF Magazine".

The senior diplomatic correspondent for France's influential daily Le Matin, Jean-Louis Arnaud, met during the week with DAS Dobbins; EUR/SOV Director Thomas Simons; S/P Soviet specialist Jeremy Azreal; and Sven Kraemer of the NSC. Arnaud also saw Dmitri Simes at Carnegie; Walter Laquer (CSIS, Georgetown); and Simon Serfaty (SAIS).

Antonio Gambino, of Italy's Espresso and La Repubblica, met with David Emery, ACDA Deputy Director, and with DAS James Dobbins (EUR), as well as with PM Deputy Director Robert Dean and S/P Deputy Director Phillip Kaplan during the week.

Another visiting journalist, Viktor Meier, the Vienna-based East European correspondent for the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, interviewed Jack Matlock at the NSC; EUR/SOV's Tom Simons; and EUR/EEY's Roland Kuchel.

Filming for the Dutch television production dealing with the history of the INF process continued this week, with the VPRO-TV crew taping an interview with Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle during a stop in Holland. The program is scheduled for airing later this month, and USIS The Hague anticipates that its factual, impartial treatment of the history of NATO's response to Soviet LRINF deployments may influence large protest demonstrations scheduled for the end of the month.

Agency American Participant Michael Mandelbaum participated in an October 1 symposium in Bonn on "Perspectives for Strengthening Conventional Forces and Lowering the Nuclear Threshold in Europe". Sponsored by the German Atlantic Treaty Association, the meeting also featured panel members from the German Defense Ministry. Bonn reports that, as in previous appearances, Mandelbaum proved to be an "effective and knowledgeable analyst".

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-3-

During the week, a State Department/USIA briefing team met with representatives of NATO nations to discuss Soviet disinformation aimed at influencing the INF debate in Western Europe. The group stressed that the U.S. strategy is to counter and expose disinformation as soon as it is detected, rather than waiting for it to surface in the foreign media.

USIS Rome reports that public affairs aspects of Secretary Weinberger's October 2-3 visit to Italy went smoothly, despite the brevity of the visit and intense media interest. More than 100 journalists attended a joint Weinberger/Spadolini press conference.

USIS Bogota reports that four of Colombia's principal radio networks took the live VOA feed of the President's September 26 UNGA speech, assuring an audience of about 15 million listeners. Also in Colombia, the first of a series of television specials on defense issues, hosted by noted commentator Hector Mora, aired on September 29. The program bureau of USIA assisted the Washington Foreign Press Center with last-minute appointments for Mora in Washington earlier in September. Interviews with EUR/SOV's Alexander Vershbow and Ray Caldwell, Deputy Director, EUR/PRM, were featured on the first program, which dealt with START and INF. Bogota estimates the audience at 1.5 million. On October 6, the second program in the "Passport to the World" series will feature Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Theater and Strategic Forces, Frank Gaffney.

Our Embassy in Moscow, reviewing recent Soviet attacks on USIA and the Voice of America, concludes that the "number and tone" of the vitriol since the KAL shoot down suggest that the Soviet leadership and propagandists are "deeply worried about their population's susceptibility to American sources of information." The current campaign is an attempt to discredit USIA and the Voice by associating them with certain fundamental fears of the Soviet people, such as the "militaristic" course of the Reagan Administration, and, in several instances, even German revanchism and Nazism. Literaturnaya Gazeta, for example, on October 5 termed President Reagan the "second pretender" to world domination; the first, of course, being Hitler.

cc: Judge William P. Clark, Jr., SPG
Secretary George P. Shultz, SPG
Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger, SPG
Administrator M. Peter McPherson, SPG

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NSC/S PROFILE

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ID 8308312

RECEIVED 17 NOV 83 15

TO MCFARLANE

FROM KRAEMER

DOCDATE 16 NOV 83

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KRAEMER

17 NOV 83

By AS NARA, Date 1/29/63
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1987

KEYWORDS: ARMS CONTROL

MEDIA

SUBJECT: WH ARMS CONTROL PUBLICATION / FINAL DRAFT

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 18 NOV 83 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION

November 17, 1983
1:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: SVEN KRAEMER *SK*

SUBJECT: White House Arms Control Publication -- Final Draft

The attached "final" draft of the proposed White House publication to be issued on a priority basis on the President's Arms Control policy incorporates comments received during this morning from within the NSC Staff and from OSD, State, and ACDA. We believe it is now in good shape and ready for your final review. (Since it differs substantially from the draft we provided you at COB last night, you should put yesterday's draft aside as being OBE.)

As soon as you have review/revised the attached, we will incorporate your fixes into the text and provide a final copy to Mike Baroody's office.

Rm Ron Lehman and *RBS* Bob Sims concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you review and approve, or revise, the attached draft for publication by the White House later today.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment

CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 29, 1997
By *CS* NARA, Date *11/29/03*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRESIDENT REAGAN
ON
PEACE, ARMS REDUCTIONS, AND DETERRENCE

POLICY
AND
PROGRAMS

November 1983

November 17, 1983

PRESIDENT REAGAN ON PEACE, ARMS REDUCTIONS, AND DETERRENCE

The Administration's Policies and Programs

INTRODUCTION

Every American President has sought to prevent conflict, reduce the risk of war, and safeguard the peace. In addition to these three fundamental objectives, President Reagan is pursuing a fourth: substantial reductions in current levels of nuclear weapons through genuine arms control.

Peace must be more than a slogan. Keeping the peace requires hard work, realistic programs, a commitment to strong deterrent forces, and the patience to pursue meaningful arms reduction negotiations.

Throughout the post-World War II era, the pursuit of peace with freedom has been based upon the twin pillars of

defense and dialogue; upon the maintenance of a military equilibrium coupled with efforts to resolve differences peacefully and to remove sources of conflict. The US has been at the forefront of efforts to limit and reduce nuclear arsenals and to prevent war.

American arms control efforts have sought to strengthen both these pillars, to stabilize a military balance at the lowest possible levels, and at the same time to enhance mutual confidence and expand the area of understanding between nations.

The Reagan Administration has fashioned its security policies upon this proven basis of defense and dialogue, while giving added emphasis to stability, significant reductions, and effective verification as objectives for arms control. The continued growth of Soviet military power has required us to improve our own defenses to assure a credible deterrent, but it has also led us to intensify and expand our efforts through negotiations to reverse the growth in armaments.

The nuclear age has given us a special and most critical challenge -- that of removing the threat of nuclear war. This Administration has been especially aware of that challenge and of the fact that there are no easy and simple solutions. President Reagan succinctly expressed both the challenge as we see it and the way to meet it: "...in today's world, the existence of nuclear weapons could mean, if not the extinction of mankind, then surely the end of civilization as we know it. ...We must not allow ourselves to be paralyzed by the problem, to abdicate our moral duty....I intend to search for peace along two parallel paths -- deterrence and arms reductions. I believe these are the only paths that offer any real hope for an enduring peace."

The following pages outline how we are conducting the search for peace today -- and the importance of both deterrence and arms control to building the more lasting peace we all seek.

Section One describes America's current arms control efforts. The United States is embarked on the most ambitious arms reductions agenda ever developed, while also seeking measures to reduce the possibility of misunderstanding or miscalculation. The record speaks for itself.

Section Two explains our deterrence policy and describes the changed military balance, the US modernization programs required for deterrence, and the reductions in the US nuclear weapons stockpile.

Section Three provides a representative collection of President Reagan's personal views on questions of peace, deterrence, and arms reduction.

SECTION I

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PRESIDENT REAGAN'S ARMS REDUCTION AGENDA

"We want to reduce the weapons of war, pure and simple."
(President Reagan, 1983)

Today, we are embarked on the most ambitious arms reduction agenda ever developed by any Administration. We are negotiating directly with the Soviet Union about deep reductions in strategic and intermediate-range nuclear weapons. We and our NATO Allies are negotiating with the Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies about cutting conventional forces in Europe. And we are negotiating with the Soviet Union and other interested nations about an effective and verifiable ban on chemical weapons. We have also asked the Soviet Union to join us in efforts to ensure that nuclear testing limits can be effectively verified. And we have asked the Soviet Union and others to join with us in the search for confidence-building agreements that can help reduce the risk of accidental war.

The United States along with its Allies have periodically and unilaterally reduced nuclear weapons inventories to ensure that our posture is that needed for deterrence, and no more and to serve as a positive example to other nations.

Today's efforts build upon the experience of more than three decades, upon the agreements already achieved, and upon the lessons learned from past successes and failures. Our efforts have only one purpose -- to reverse the arms build-up, to establish a more stable military balance at lower force levels, and to enhance the prospects for lasting peace.

CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS -- THE TRACK RECORD

Strategic Arms Negotiations

The Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) deal with the principal elements of the U.S. and Soviet intercontinental nuclear weapon. In these negotiations, which began in Geneva in June 1982, the President has boldly sought to reverse the trend of past agreements which simply ratified greater and more destabilizing nuclear arsenals.

° The U.S. approach is to secure an equitable, verifiable agreement which will reduce the number of ballistic missile warheads by one-third, gain substantial reductions in the most destabilizing systems, by as much as one-half, reduce the destructive capacity of nuclear missiles, and establish limits on bombers and cruise missiles.

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° In order to facilitate an agreement, the President has made substantial adjustments to our initial position. The adjustments made over the last few months have been taken in close consultations with the Scowcroft Commission and the Congress and take expressed Soviet concerns into account. And they include a guaranteed mutual build-down as recommended by many in the Congress. Strong, bipartisan support of the Congress and the American people is essential to success in the negotiations.

° The President has expressed a willingness to agree to trade-offs between areas of U.S. interest or advantage and areas of Soviet interest and advantage. Everything is on the table, and our negotiators have great flexibility.

° While the Soviet Union has not yet demonstrated a similar flexibility toward reaching agreement, either by responding positively to our recent initiatives or by tabling new, more forthcoming proposals of its own, there is reason for hope. Already, the Soviet Union has agreed to the importance of reductions and has shown some limited flexibility on secondary issues. Increased Congressional support for our defense program and a new bipartisan spirit in arms control will enhance the likelihood that the Soviets will increasingly realize that it is time to begin to negotiate seriously on the central issues.

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Negotiations

The INF negotiations which began in November 1981 deal with the growing imbalance in intermediate-range nuclear forces. The focus of the negotiations between the US and the Soviet Union is on the systems of greatest concern to the two sides -- the land-based longer-range INF missiles. During the past two years, the U.S. position has reflected three initiatives in an effort to address Soviet concerns and to improve prospects for reaching a stabilizing agreement. This would reduce the threat to the peace posed by the Soviet monopoly in this class of weapons and would enhance the security of both sides.

° In November 1981, President Reagan announced the zero-zero option of U.S. and Soviet longer-range, land-based INF missiles. The President thereby offered to cancel the planned deployment of 572 Pershing II and Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles in return for Soviet elimination of its 600 SS-20, SS-4 and SS-5 missiles with far more warheads, which it had been unilaterally deploying for a number of years. This proposal would eliminate an entire class of nuclear weapons. The President made clear that the U.S. would also carefully consider any serious Soviet proposal.

° By March 1983, it was clear that the Soviets were not ready to accept the U.S. proposal. In an effort to move negotiations forward, the President announced a proposal for an interim agreement: the U.S. would reduce the planned

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deployment of Pershing IIs and GLCMs, provided the Soviets reduced the number of their warheads to an equal level on a global basis. At the same time, the U.S. made clear that the zero-zero proposal remained on the table. But no meaningful Soviet counterproposal was offered.

° Notwithstanding Soviet inflexibility, the President on September 26, 1983, announced a further initiative designed to move the negotiations forward. The initiative responded to expressed Soviet concerns with the U.S. proposal. This time, we agreed explicitly to include aircraft in the negotiations and to consider foregoing deploying in Europe the full complement of missiles we would be allowed within a global limit.

Unfortunately, the Soviet Union has not yet demonstrated comparable flexibility. Each Soviet proposal tabled since the negotiations began in 1981 would have the same basic outcome: the prohibition any of NATO deployments while the Soviets retained their substantial monopoly in LRINF missiles, which now have some 1,400 warheads to our zero.

Conventional Force Reductions in Europe

The negotiations in Vienna on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) are multilateral negotiations involving NATO and Warsaw Pact nations. The negotiations, which began in 1973, result from a NATO initiative to reduce the unequal levels of military manpower of East and West in Central Europe to equal and significantly lower levels. They are part of broader efforts by the United States and its allies to reduce the likelihood of conflict in Central Europe and to strengthen East-West stability generally. Although the Warsaw Pact nations nominally accept this goal, their unwillingness thus far to address their present manpower superiority, or to accept effective verification measures to ensure compliance with an MBFR agreement, remains the main obstacle to progress.

° The goal of the negotiations is the reduction of each side's military manpower in Central Europe to parity at a level of 700,000 ground force personnel and a maximum of 900,000 air and ground force personnel combined.

° In MBFR's 10-year existence, both East and West have made a variety of proposals. On both sides, however, there has been a strong continuity in negotiating objectives. The West has consistently sought parity of forces at a reduced level. The East, with equal consistency, has resisted effective acceptance of parity. Initially, it rejected equality explicitly; later, it did so implicitly, accepting parity as a goal but refusing to admit to the size of its current forces and, consequently, to the size of reductions that would be needed to arrive at parity. It has refused to provide sufficient detail on how it would go about ensuring compliance.

° In July 1982, the West tabled a new draft treaty, marking a further effort to address expressed Warsaw Pact/Soviet concerns while preserving the Western requirement for parity and effective verification. The major innovation of the Western draft is that it would bind all direct participants in one agreement to undertake the reductions required to reach the reduced ceiling. This provision seeks to address the frequently expressed Soviet concern that initial Soviet reductions might not be followed by reductions in the forces of the United States' NATO allies. The East has yet to respond constructively.

Confidence-Building Measures

Confidence-building measures are designed to enhance mutual knowledge and understanding about military forces and activities. Their overall purpose is to reduce the possibility of an accidental East-West confrontation, miscalculation, or failure of communication; to inhibit opportunities for surprise attack; and to increase stability in times of calm or crisis.

° U.S.-Soviet confidence-building measures include the "Hotline" Agreement and the "Accidents Measures" to reduce the risk of accidental outbreak of nuclear war. Multilateral measures in force are also contained in the Final Act of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), signed in Helsinki in 1975. The principal feature of the CSCE measures is the agreement of both East and West to prior notification of large military maneuvers. This concept has also been incorporated into the Western proposals at the MBFR negotiations.

° In 1982, President Reagan proposed a new set of bilateral confidence-building measures, including prior notification of ballistic missile launches, prior notification of major military exercises, and expanded exchange of forces data. These proposals have been tabled at the START and INF negotiations. In addition, the US has proposed and begun bilateral discussions with the Soviet Union to improve the hotline, establish a U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Military Communications Link and improve embassy-capital communications. We have also proposed a multilateral agreement on consultations concerning unexplained nuclear incidents. When the Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) begins in Stockholm in January 1984, we will seek agreement on additional measures which would inhibit opportunities for surprise attack in Europe.

Chemical Weapons

The Soviet Union and its allies have employed chemical and toxin weapons in Afghanistan, Kampuchea, and Laos in violation of existing arms control agreements outlawing use

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of such weapons. An immediate challenge is to bring all parties, including the Soviet Union, into compliance with existing international agreements outlawing the use of chemical weapons while also achieving agreement on new accords that would impose a comprehensive and verifiable ban on chemical weapons.

° Towards these ends, the United States is seeking to improve compliance with existing international agreements. In the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, the United States and its allies are seeking a complete and verifiable ban on chemical weapons production, stockpiling possession, transfer, and use. Whether we can achieve this objective will depend largely on whether the Soviet Union is willing to accept effective provisions for verification and compliance.

° The US maintains a limited stock of chemical weapons as a deterrent against the use of such weapons against the US and our Allies, and as an incentive to the Soviet Union to negotiate a verifiable, worldwide chemical weapons ban. Our program to begin modernization of this deterrent stockpile after 14 years of unilateral restraint is intended to increase the prospects for achieving such a comprehensive ban.

Nuclear Testing

While achievement of a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing remains the ultimate US objective, progress toward that goal is a step-by-step process. In the 1970s, the US and the USSR took steps in that direction when they signed the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, which limit the size of underground nuclear tests. However, serious questions have been raised about Soviet compliance with the limits of these unratified Treaties and about the adequacy of the Treaties' verification measures. To help resolve these questions, the United States in 1982 proposed to the Soviet Union that we discuss means to enhance the verification provisions of the Treaties. Unfortunately, the Soviets have been unwilling to date to enter into such discussions with us.

Nonproliferation

The United States is committed to spread of nuclear weapons. This includes strengthening the 1968 treaty against the spread of nuclear weapons and our efforts to strengthen international safeguards on nuclear material and more tightly to control access to technology relating to the production of nuclear weapons. Under the Reagan Administration, regular bilateral talks have been initiated with the Soviet Union to focus on problems of nuclear proliferation.

Outer Space Arms Control

The Administration is in the process of assessing the merits of a number of outer space arms control proposals, but there are a number of serious problems related to this area. These include the difficulty of assuring effective verification, and the question of the threat posed by the existing Soviet anti-satellite interceptors and by present and prospective Soviet satellites which, while not weapons themselves, are designed to provide direct support to the Soviet Union's terrestrial forces in the event of a conflict. The US has been actively involved in establishing a Working Group to discuss outer space issues at the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, with a view to determining what if any new arrangements might be needed or desirable to further the peaceful uses of space.

SECTION II -- DETERRENCE

"The defense policy of the United States is based on a simple premise: The United States does not start fights....We maintain our strength in order to deter and defend against aggression -- to preserve freedom and peace....This strategy of deterrence...works. But what it takes to maintain deterrence has changed." (President Reagan, 1983)

Our Policy

US military forces are organized and armed to deter attack and coercion and to prevent war. It is our policy and that of our Allies not to use any force, whether nuclear or non-nuclear, except to deter and defend against aggression. Immediately following World War II, the United States proposed through the Baruch Plan to place nuclear weapons under the control of the infant United Nations -- and out of the hands of any nation-state. Those efforts foundered and steps had to be taken to ensure that, especially as nuclear weapons proliferated, they would never be used. To that end, United States nuclear weapons policy has focused solely on preventing -- on detering -- attack that might lead to nuclear war. That policy has been successful for some 40 years, including years of severe international tension. There has been no nuclear conflict. Nor has there been direct military conflict of any sort between the United States and the Soviet Union, or between East and West in Europe.

We are under no illusions about the consequences of a nuclear war. There would be no winners. Thus, deterrence is and must remain the cornerstone of our nuclear policy and, indeed, of our entire national security posture.

To this end, we seek to maintain the lowest possible force levels consistent with the basic requirements of effective deterrence. We must recognize that two decades of unabated Soviet military growth and US restraint have created severe imbalances which we must redress if we are to maintain an effective deterrent. This is why we must modernize our aging forces even as we pursue genuine arms control.

The Shifting Military Balance

The facts on the deployment of new military systems during the past decade and more, reflect an unparalleled Soviet buildup, even in the face of considerable US and Allied restraint. The facts include the following:

- Some 3/4 of nuclear warheads on US strategic weapons are on systems which are more than 15 years old. But 3/4 of the warheads on Soviet strategic weapons are on systems which are less than 5 years old.
- The US deployed no new strategic bomber since the last B-52 was deployed in 1962, while the Soviet Union has deployed more than 230 intercontinental-range Backfire bombers and is expected to deploy the Blackjack bomber as well.
- The US, until last year, had deployed no new strategic submarine (SSBN) for some 13 years, while the Soviet Union deployed 6 new classes involving 62 new strategic submarines during the same period.
- The US deployed only one new strategic submarine missile (SLBM) during the past 12 years, while the Soviets deployed 5 new types, involving hundreds of new missiles during the same period.
- The US deployed no new land-based strategic missile (ICBM) since 1969, undertaking only a warhead improvement for a proportion of its Minuteman force, while the Soviets deployed at least 3 new types of systems involving over 800 new missiles and are already testing 2 more new types.
- While the US destroyed its biological warfare stocks in 1969 and produced no new chemical weapons for 14 years, the Soviet Union greatly expanded its CBW efforts, and with its proxies is employing chemicals and toxins against tribesmen in three countries of Asia.
- The Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies have substantially outpaced the United States and its NATO Allies in the production and deployment of conventional offensive weapons, including tanks, artillery, etc.
- In addition to major asymmetries in the production and deployment of weapons, the Soviet Union and its proxies have aggressively expanded their military pressure throughout the world.

The US Nuclear Stockpile

The United States nuclear stockpile and the modernization program have one purpose and one purpose only: to maintain a military posture sufficient to convince Soviet leaders that nuclear aggression cannot, under any circumstances, be in their interest. Our nuclear weapons are for deterrence and nothing else. This clear purpose enables the United States to maintain the lowest possible inventory of nuclear weapons consistent with sustaining a credible deterrent. The facts provide unequivocal evidence.

° The total numbers of nuclear weapons in the US stockpile has declined significantly since its peak in the mid-sixties.. Today, the US has one-third fewer weapons than it had at that time. Since then many thousands of US weapons have been disassembled and destroyed, and today the US stockpile is at its lowest level in 20 years.

° The destructive power as measured in total yield, or megatonnage, of the US nuclear weapons stockpile has declined even more sharply since its peak in the early 1960s. Today, the total yield of our stockpile is only one-fourth as large as it was then. Today, the total yield of the US stockpile is at its lowest level in 25 years. The total yield of the stockpile will not change in the years ahead.

° The same reductions trend has taken place in Europe. In December, 1979, NATO reached a decision to reduce immediately the number of shorter-range nuclear weapons stationed in Europe. In 1980, we carried out that decision by removing 1,000 of these weapons. The same decision also committed the Alliance to a further review of the remaining systems of this category.

That review has now been completed, and a decision was made in October, 1983, that the overall size of the NATO nuclear stockpile will now be reduced by an additional 1,400 weapons, not counting those to be withdrawn on a one-for-one basis as new INF systems are deployed. When these 2,400 weapons have been withdrawn, the US will have reduced its nuclear weapons in Europe by over one-third from 1979 levels and NATO will have the lowest number of nuclear weapons in 20 years.

What this means is that the Alliance will have removed five times as many nuclear missile warheads as we will deploy if the negotiations in Geneva do not lead to the agreement we are so earnestly seeking.

Conclusion

These numbers and comparisons make clear that due to more than a decade of enormous Soviet expansion and relative US restraint, we must modernize the three legs of the strategic triad, and our INF forces, now if we are to retain the deterrent required to prevent war, while also providing an incentive to the Soviet Union to negotiate seriously. Modernization will help persuade the Soviets that we are serious about deterring war by protecting peace and freedom, and that it is in the best interest of the Soviet Union, as well as ours, to achieve the substantial reductions we are seeking in US and Soviet nuclear arsenals.

SECTION III

PRESIDENT REAGAN ON PEACE, DETERRENCE, AND ARMS CONTROL

NUCLEAR MUST
NEVER BE FOUGHT

"A nuclear war can never be won
and must never be fought."

Speech to Japanese
Parliament, Tokyo
November 11, 1983

NEGOTIATE
FOR
REDUCTIONS

"We want to reduce the weapons
of war, pure and simple. All
of our efforts in both the START
and the INF negotiations continue
to be guided by that objective."

Rose Garden
The White House
October 4, 1983

NUCLEAR WAR
MUST NEVER
BE FOUGHT

"A nuclear war cannot be won and
must never be fought."

United Nations,
New York
September 26, 1983

U.S. WILL
ACCEPT ANY
EQUITABLE
ARMS REDUCTION
AGREEMENT

"I want to make an unequivocal
pledge to those gathered today in
this world arena. The United States
seeks and will accept any equitable,
verifiable agreement that stabilizes
forces at lower levels than currently
exist. We are ready to be flexible in
our approach, indeed, willing to
compromise."

United Nations,
New York
September 26, 1983

HIGHEST
PRIORITY:
REMOVE THREAT
OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS

"...I have no higher priority than removing the threat of nuclear war and seeking the stability necessary for true peace. To achieve that objective, we must reduce the nuclear arsenals of both the United States and the Soviet Union."

Radio Address to
the Nation
July 16, 1983

LONG RANGE
GOAL: BAN ALL
NUCLEAR
WEAPONS

"Our current goal must be the reduction of nuclear arsenals -- and I for one believe we must never depart from the ultimate goal of banning them from the face of the Earth."

Radio Address to
the Nation
July 16, 1983

PROMISES MADE:
PEACE THROUGH
STRENGTH; SEEK
ARMS REDUCTIONS

"Coming into office, I made two promises to the American people about peace and security: I promised to restore our neglected defenses in order to strengthen and preserve the peace, and I promised to pursue reliable agreements to reduce nuclear weapons. Both these promises are being kept."

Speech to
Los Angeles World
Affairs Council
March 31, 1983

PROGRESS TOWARD
ARMS REDUCTIONS
IS A SACRED TRUST

"I pledge to you, my goal-and I consider it a sacred trust-will be to make progress toward arms reductions in every one of the several negotiations now underway."

Speech to
Los Angeles World
Affairs Council
March 31, 1983

ON INF, ZERO IS
BEST. IF
SOVIETS WILL
NOT AGREE, FEW
IS BETTER THAN
MANY

"When it comes to intermediate nuclear missiles in Europe, it would be better to have none than to have some. But if there must be some, it is better to have few than to have many.

If the Soviets will not now agree to the total elimination of these weapons, I hope that they will at least join us in an interim agreement that would substantially reduce these forces to equal levels on both sides.

To this end, Ambassador Paul Nitze has informed his Soviet counterpart that we are prepared to negotiate an interim agreement in which the United States would substantially reduce its planned deployment of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles, provided the Soviet Union reduce the number of its warheads on longer-range I.N.F. missiles to an equal level on a global basis."

White House Press
Release
March 30, 1983

U.S. MAINTAINS
STRENGTH TO
DETER

"The defense policy of the United States is based on a simple premise: The United States does not start fights. We will never be an aggressor. We maintain our strength in order to deter and defend against aggression-to preserve freedom and peace.

Since the dawn of the atomic age, we've sought to reduce the risk of war by maintaining a strong deterrent and by seeking genuine arms control. "Deterrence" means simply this: making sure any adversary who thinks about attacking the United States, or our allies, or our vital interests, concludes that the risks to him outweigh any potential gains. Once he understands that, he won't attack. We maintain the peace through our strength; weakness only invites aggression."

TV Address to
the Nation
March 23, 1983

THE STRATEGY OF
DETERRENCE WORKS

"This strategy of deterrence has not changed. It still works. But what it takes to maintain deterrence has changed."

TV Address to
the Nation
March 23, 1983

TAKE WHATEVER
STEPS NEEDED
TO ACHIEVE
EQUITABLE
NEGOTIATIONS

"I remain firmly committed to take whatever steps are necessary to increase the likelihood of real, substantive progress towards an agreement involving significant reductions in U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear arsenals -- and in the national security interests of both sides. Above all, our goal is to maintain a stable nuclear balance in order to reduce the risk of war. Our efforts in the START negotiations must be guided by that objective."

Statement on START
Negotiations
The White House
June 8, 1983

WHY
MODERNIZATION
OF ARMS?
DETERRENCE AND
AS AN INCENTIVE
FOR NEGOTIATIONS

"Modernization goes hand-in-hand with a credible deterrent; both are necessary incentives to persuade the Soviets that it is in their best interest as well as ours to achieve meaningful arms reductions."

Presidential Op Ed
Washington Post
May 24, 1983

NEGOTIATIONS
TO ENHANCE
SECURITY AND
STABILITY

"The fundamental U.S. goal in negotiations concerning arms reduction, and especially in our approach to the START negotiations, is to seek agreements that would enhance security and stability by reducing overall force levels while permitting modernization of U.S. forces necessary for a credible deterrent."

Letter to Senators
Percy, Nunn
and Cohen
May 12, 1983

PRUDENT
MODERNIZATION

"At the same time, let me emphasize that we do not seek a first strike capability. To this end, we will constrain the number of Peacekeeper missiles to the minimum number needed to assure the effectiveness of our deterrent and no more."

Letter to Senators
Percy, Nunn
and Cohen
May 12, 1983

PEACE WITH
FREEDOM

"We must both defend freedom and preserve the peace. We must stand true to our principles and our friends while preventing a holocaust...We cannot conduct ourselves as if the special danger of nuclear weapons did not exist. But we must not allow ourselves to be paralyzed by the problem, to abdicate our moral duty. This is the challenge that history has left us."

Letter to Senators
Percy, Nunn
and Cohen
May 12, 1983

PEACE THROUGH
DETERRENCE AND
ARMS CONTROL

"We desire peace, but peace is a goal not a policy. Lasting peace is what we hope for at the end of our journey; it doesn't describe the steps we must take, nor the paths we should follow to reach that goal. I intend to search for peace along two parallel paths-deterrence and arms reductions. I believe these are the only paths that offer any real hope for an enduring peace."

TV Address to
the Nation
November 22, 1982

NATIONAL WILL
IS KEY TO
SUCCESS IN
NEGOTIATIONS

"...unless we demonstrate the will to rebuild our strength and restore the military balance, the Soviets-since they're so far ahead-have little incentive to negotiate with us. Let me repeat that point, since it goes to the heart of our policy. Unless we demonstrate the will to rebuild our

strength, the Soviets have little incentive to negotiate. If we hadn't begun to modernize, the Soviet negotiators would know we had nothing to bargain with except talk."

TV Address to
the Nation
November 22, 1982

ABOVE ALL,
PEACE IS
THE GOAL

"Our children should not grow up frightened. They should not fear the future. We are working to make it peaceful and free. I believe their future can be the brightest, most exciting of any generation. We must reassure them and let them know that their parents and the leaders of this world are seeking above all else to keep them safe and at peace. I consider this to be a sacred trust."

TV Address to
the Nation
November 22, 1982

REDUCE THE
RISK OF WAR
BY REDUCING
THE MEANS OF
WAGING IT

"There are threats now to our freedom, indeed to our very existence, that other generations could never even have imagined.

There is first the threat of global war. No President, no Congress, no Prime Minister, no Parliament can spend a day entirely free of this threat. And I don't have to tell you that in today's world the existence of nuclear weapons could mean, if not the extinction of mankind, then surely the end of civilization as we know it. That's why negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces now underway in Europe and the START talks-Strategic Arms Reduction Talks-which will begin later this month, are not just critical to American or Western policy; they are critical to mankind. Our commitment to early success in these negotiations is firm and

unshakable, and our purpose is clear: reducing the risk of war by reducing the means of waging war on both sides."

Address to the
British Parliament
June 8, 1982

NEED TO
FACE FACTS

"If history teaches anything it teaches self-delusion in the face of unpleasant facts is folly."

Address to the
British Parliament
June 8, 1982

DESIRE FOR
PEACE MUST BE
MATCHED BY
HARD WORK

"My duty as President is to insure that the ultimate nightmare never occurs, that the prairies and the cities and the people who inhabit them remain free and untouched by nuclear conflict.

I wish more than anything there were a simple policy that would eliminate that nuclear danger. But there are only difficult policy choices through which we can achieve a stable nuclear balance at the lowest possible level."

Commencement Address
Eureka College
May 9, 1982

IT TAKES TWO
SIDES TO
NEGOTIATE

"We will negotiate seriously, in good faith, and carefully consider all proposals made by the Soviet Union. If they approach these negotiations in the same spirit, I'm confident that together we can achieve an agreement of enduring value that reduces the number of nuclear

weapons, halts the growth in strategic forces, and opens the way to even more far-reaching steps in the future."

Commencement Address
Eureka College
May 9, 1982

PRESIDENT REAGAN
ON
PEACE, ARMS REDUCTIONS, AND DETERRENCE

POLICY
AND
PROGRAMS

November 1983

November 17, 1983

PRESIDENT REAGAN ON PEACE, ARMS REDUCTIONS, AND DETERRENCE

The Administration's Policies and Programs

INTRODUCTION

Every American President has sought to prevent conflict, reduce the risk of war, and safeguard the peace. In addition to these three fundamental objectives, President Reagan is pursuing a fourth: substantial reductions in current levels of nuclear weapons through genuine arms control.

Peace must be more than a slogan. Keeping the peace requires hard work, realistic programs, a commitment to strong deterrent forces, and the patience to pursue meaningful arms reduction negotiations.

Throughout the post-World War II era, the pursuit of peace with freedom has been based upon the twin pillars of

defense and dialogue; upon the maintenance of a military equilibrium coupled with efforts to resolve differences peacefully and to remove sources of conflict. The US has been at the forefront of efforts to limit and reduce nuclear arsenals and to prevent war.

American arms control efforts have sought to strengthen both these pillars, to stabilize a military balance at the lowest possible levels, and at the same time to enhance mutual confidence and expand the area of understanding between nations.

The Reagan Administration has fashioned its security policies upon this proven basis of defense and dialogue, while giving added emphasis to stability, significant reductions, and effective verification as objectives for arms control. The continued growth of Soviet military power has required us to improve our own defenses to assure a credible deterrent, but it has also led us to intensify and expand our efforts through negotiations to reverse the growth in armaments.

The nuclear age has given us a special and most critical challenge -- that of removing the threat of nuclear war. This Administration has been especially aware of that challenge and of the fact that there are no easy and simple solutions. President Reagan succinctly expressed both the challenge as we see it and the way to meet it: "...in today's world, the existence of nuclear weapons could mean, if not the extinction of mankind, then surely the end of civilization as we know it. ...We must not allow ourselves to be paralyzed by the problem, to abdicate our moral duty....I intend to search for peace along two parallel paths -- deterrence and arms reductions. I believe these are the only paths that offer any real hope for an enduring peace."

The following pages outline how we are conducting the search for peace today -- and the importance of both REDUCTION deterrence and arms ~~control~~ to building the more lasting peace we all seek.

Section One describes America's current arms control efforts. The United States is embarked on the most ambitious arms reductions agenda ever developed, while also seeking measures to reduce the possibility of misunderstanding or miscalculation. The record speaks for itself.

Section Two explains our deterrence policy and describes the changed military balance, the US modernization programs required for deterrence, and the reductions in the US nuclear weapons stockpile.

Section Three provides a representative collection of President Reagan's personal views on questions of peace, deterrence, and arms reduction.

SECTION I

PRESIDENT REAGAN'S ARMS REDUCTION AGENDA

"We want to reduce the weapons of war, pure and simple."
(President Reagan, 1983)

Today, we are embarked on the most ambitious arms reduction agenda ever developed by any Administration. We are negotiating directly with the Soviet Union about deep reductions in strategic and intermediate-range nuclear weapons. We and our NATO Allies are negotiating with the Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies about cutting conventional forces in Europe. And we are negotiating with the Soviet Union and other interested nations about an effective and verifiable ban on chemical weapons. We have also asked the Soviet Union to join us in efforts to ensure that nuclear testing limits can be effectively verified. And we have asked the Soviet Union and others to join with us in the search for confidence-building agreements that can help reduce the risk of accidental war.

The United States along with its Allies have periodically and unilaterally reduced nuclear weapons inventories to ensure that our posture is that needed for deterrence, and no more and to serve as a positive example to other nations.

Today's efforts build upon the experience of more than three decades, upon the agreements already achieved, and upon the lessons learned from past successes and failures. Our efforts have only one purpose -- to reverse the arms build-up, to establish a more stable military balance at lower force levels, and to enhance the prospects for lasting peace.

CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS -- THE TRACK RECORD

Strategic Arms Negotiations

The Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) deal with the principal elements of the U.S. and Soviet intercontinental nuclear weapon. In these negotiations, which began in Geneva in June 1982, the President has boldly sought to reverse the trend of past agreements which simply ratified greater and more destabilizing nuclear arsenals.

° The U.S. approach is to secure an equitable, verifiable agreement which will reduce the number of ballistic missile warheads by one-third, gain substantial reductions in the most destabilizing systems, by as much as one-half, reduce the destructive capacity of nuclear missiles, and establish limits on bombers and cruise missiles.

° In order to facilitate an agreement, the President has made substantial adjustments to our initial position. The adjustments made over the last few months have been taken in close consultations with the Scowcroft Commission and the Congress and take expressed Soviet concerns into account. And they include a guaranteed mutual build-down as recommended by many in the Congress. Strong, bipartisan support of the Congress and the American people is essential to success in the negotiations.

° The President has expressed a willingness to agree to trade-offs between areas of U.S. interest or advantage and areas of Soviet interest and advantage. Everything is on the table, and our negotiators have great flexibility.

° While the Soviet Union has not yet demonstrated a similar flexibility toward reaching agreement, either by responding positively to our recent initiatives or by tabling new, more forthcoming proposals of its own, there is reason for hope. Already, the Soviet Union has agreed to the importance of reductions and has shown some limited flexibility on secondary issues. Increased Congressional support for our defense program and a new bipartisan spirit in arms control will enhance the likelihood that the Soviets will increasingly realize that it is time to begin to negotiate seriously on the central issues.

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Negotiations

The INF negotiations which began in November 1981 deal with the growing imbalance in intermediate-range nuclear forces. The focus of the negotiations between the US and the Soviet Union is on the systems of greatest concern to the two sides -- the land-based longer-range INF missiles. During the past two years, the U.S. position has reflected three initiatives in an effort to address Soviet concerns and to improve prospects for reaching a stabilizing agreement. This would reduce the threat to the peace posed by the Soviet monopoly in this class of weapons and would enhance the security of both sides.

° In November 1981, President Reagan announced the zero-zero option of U.S. and Soviet longer-range, land-based INF missiles. The President thereby offered to cancel the planned deployment of 572 Pershing II and Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles in return for Soviet elimination of its 600 SS-20, SS-4 and SS-5 missiles with far more warheads, which it had been unilaterally deploying for a number of years. This proposal would eliminate an entire class of nuclear weapons. The President made clear that the U.S. would also carefully consider any serious Soviet proposal.

° By March 1983, it was clear that the Soviets were not ready to accept the U.S. proposal. In an effort to move negotiations forward, the President announced a proposal for an interim agreement: the U.S. would reduce the planned

deployment of Pershing IIs and GLCMs, provided the Soviets reduced the number of their warheads to an equal level on a global basis. At the same time, the U.S. made clear that the zero-zero proposal remained on the table. But no meaningful Soviet counterproposal was offered.

° Notwithstanding Soviet inflexibility, the President on September 26, 1983, announced a further initiative designed to move the negotiations forward. The initiative responded to expressed Soviet concerns with the U.S. proposal. This time, we agreed explicitly to include aircraft in the negotiations and to consider foregoing deploying in Europe the full complement of missiles we would be allowed within a global limit.

Unfortunately, the Soviet Union has not yet demonstrated comparable flexibility. Each Soviet proposal tabled since the negotiations began in 1981 would have the same basic outcome: the prohibition any of NATO deployments while the Soviets retained their substantial monopoly in LRINF missiles, which now have some 1,400 warheads to our zero.

Conventional Force Reductions in Europe

The negotiations in Vienna on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) are multilateral negotiations involving NATO and Warsaw Pact nations. The negotiations, which began in 1973, result from a NATO initiative to reduce the unequal levels of military manpower of East and West in Central Europe to equal and significantly lower levels. They are part of broader efforts by the United States and its allies to reduce the likelihood of conflict in Central Europe and to strengthen East-West stability generally. Although the Warsaw Pact nations nominally accept this goal, their unwillingness thus far to address their present manpower superiority, or to accept effective verification measures to ensure compliance with an MBFR agreement, remains the main obstacle to progress.

° The goal of the negotiations is the reduction of each side's military manpower in Central Europe to parity at a level of 700,000 ground force personnel and a maximum of 900,000 air and ground force personnel combined.

° In MBFR's 10-year existence, both East and West have made a variety of proposals. On both sides, however, there has been a strong continuity in negotiating objectives. The West has consistently sought parity of forces at a reduced level. The East, with equal consistency, has resisted effective acceptance of parity. Initially, it rejected equality explicitly; later, it did so implicitly, accepting parity as a goal but refusing to admit to the size of its current forces and, consequently, to the size of reductions that would be needed to arrive at parity. It has refused to provide sufficient detail on how it would go about ensuring compliance.

° In July 1982, the West tabled a new draft treaty, marking a further effort to address expressed Warsaw Pact/Soviet concerns while preserving the Western requirement for parity and effective verification. The major innovation of the Western draft is that it would bind all direct participants in one agreement to undertake the reductions required to reach the reduced ceiling. This provision seeks to address the frequently expressed Soviet concern that initial Soviet reductions might not be followed by reductions in the forces of the United States' NATO allies. The East has yet to respond constructively.

Confidence-Building Measures

Confidence-building measures are designed to enhance mutual knowledge and understanding about military forces and activities. Their overall purpose is to reduce the possibility of an accidental East-West confrontation, miscalculation, or failure of communication; to inhibit opportunities for surprise attack; and to increase stability in times of calm or crisis.

° U.S.-Soviet confidence-building measures include the "Hotline" Agreement and the "Accidents Measures" to reduce the risk of accidental outbreak of nuclear war. Multilateral measures in force are also contained in the Final Act of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), signed in Helsinki in 1975. The principal feature of the CSCE measures is the agreement of both East and West to prior notification of large military maneuvers. This concept has also been incorporated into the Western proposals at the MBFR negotiations.

° In 1982, President Reagan proposed a new set of bilateral confidence-building measures, including prior notification of ballistic missile launches, prior notification of major military exercises, and expanded exchange of forces data. These proposals have been tabled at the START and INF negotiations. In addition, the US has proposed and begun bilateral discussions with the Soviet Union to improve the hotline, establish a U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Military Communications Link and improve embassy-capital communications. We have also proposed a multilateral agreement on consultations concerning unexplained nuclear incidents. When the Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) begins in Stockholm in January 1984, we will seek agreement on additional measures which would inhibit opportunities for surprise attack in Europe.

Chemical Weapons

The Soviet Union and its allies have employed chemical and toxin weapons in Afghanistan, Kampuchea, and Laos in violation of existing arms control agreements outlawing use

of such weapons. An immediate challenge is to bring all parties, including the Soviet Union, into compliance with existing international agreements outlawing the use of chemical weapons while also achieving agreement on new accords that would impose a comprehensive and verifiable ban on chemical weapons.

° Towards these ends, the United States is seeking to improve compliance with existing international agreements. In the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, the United States and its allies are seeking a complete and verifiable ban on chemical weapons production, stockpiling, possession, transfer, and use. Whether we can achieve this objective will depend largely on whether the Soviet Union is willing to accept effective provisions for verification and compliance.

° The US maintains a limited stock of chemical weapons as a deterrent against the use of such weapons against the US and our Allies, and as an incentive to the Soviet Union to negotiate a verifiable, worldwide chemical weapons ban. Our program to begin modernization of this deterrent stockpile after 14 years of unilateral restraint is intended to increase the prospects for achieving such a comprehensive ban.

Nuclear Testing

While achievement of a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing remains the ultimate US objective, progress toward that goal is a step-by-step process. In the 1970s, the US and the USSR took steps in that direction when they signed the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, which limit the size of underground nuclear tests. However, serious questions have been raised about Soviet compliance with the limits of these unratified Treaties and about the adequacy of the Treaties' verification measures. To help resolve these questions, the United States in 1982 proposed to the Soviet Union that we discuss means to enhance the verification provisions of the Treaties. Unfortunately, the Soviets have been unwilling to date to enter into such discussions with us.

Nonproliferation

the prevention of the

The United States is committed to the spread of nuclear weapons. This includes strengthening the 1968 treaty against the spread of nuclear weapons and our efforts to strengthen international safeguards on nuclear material and more tightly to control access to technology relating to the production of nuclear weapons. Under the Reagan Administration, regular bilateral talks have been initiated with the Soviet Union to focus on problems of nuclear proliferation.

Outer Space Arms Control

The Administration is in the process of assessing the merits of a number of outer space arms control proposals, but there are a number of serious problems related to this area. These include the difficulty of assuring effective verification, and the question of the threat posed by the existing Soviet anti-satellite interceptors and by present and prospective Soviet satellites which, while not weapons themselves, are designed to provide direct support to the Soviet Union's terrestrial forces in the event of a conflict. The US has been actively involved in establishing a Working Group to discuss outer space issues at the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, with a view to determining what if any new arrangements might be needed or desirable to further the peaceful uses of space.

SECTION II -- DETERRENCE

"The defense policy of the United States is based on a simple premise: The United States does not start fights....We maintain our strength in order to deter and defend against aggression -- to preserve freedom and peace....This strategy of deterrence...works. But what it takes to maintain deterrence has changed." (President Reagan, 1983)

Our Policy

US military forces are organized and armed to deter attack and coercion and to prevent war. It is our policy and that of our Allies not to use any force, whether nuclear or non-nuclear, except to deter and defend against aggression. Immediately following World War II, the United States proposed through the Baruch Plan to place nuclear weapons under the control of the infant United Nations -- and out of the hands of any nation-state. Those efforts foundered and steps had to be taken to ensure that, especially as nuclear weapons proliferated, they would never be used. To that end, United States nuclear weapons policy has focused solely on preventing -- on detering -- attack that might lead to nuclear war. That policy has been successful for some 40 years, including years of severe international tension. There has been no nuclear conflict. Nor has there been direct military conflict of any sort between the United States and the Soviet Union, or between East and West in Europe.

We are under no illusions about the consequences of a nuclear war. There would be no winners. Thus, deterrence is and must remain the cornerstone of our nuclear policy and, indeed, of our entire national security posture.

To this end, we seek to maintain the lowest possible force levels consistent with the basic requirements of effective deterrence. We must recognize that two decades of unabated Soviet military growth and US restraint have created severe imbalances which we must redress if we are to maintain an effective deterrent. This is why we must modernize our aging forces even as we pursue genuine arms control.

The Shifting Military Balance

The facts on the deployment of new military systems during the past decade and more, reflect an unparalleled Soviet buildup, even in the face of considerable US and Allied restraint. The facts include the following:

- Some 3/4 of nuclear warheads on US strategic weapons are on systems which are more than 15 years old. But 3/4 of the warheads on Soviet strategic weapons are on systems which are less than 5 years old.
- The US deployed no new strategic bomber since the last B-52 was deployed in 1962, while the Soviet Union has deployed more than 230 intercontinental-range Backfire bombers and is expected to deploy the Blackjack bomber as well.
- The US, until last year, had deployed no new strategic submarine (SSBN) for some 13 years, while the Soviet Union deployed 6 new classes involving 62 new strategic submarines during the same period.
- The US deployed only one new strategic submarine missile (SLBM) during the past 12 years, while the Soviets deployed 5 new types, involving hundreds of new missiles during the same period.
- The US deployed no new land-based strategic missile (ICBM) since 1969, undertaking only a warhead improvement for a proportion of its Minuteman force, while the Soviets deployed at least 3 new types of systems involving over 800 new missiles and are already testing 2 more new types.
- While the US destroyed its biological warfare stocks in 1969 and produced no new chemical weapons for 14 years, the Soviet Union greatly expanded its CBW efforts, and with its proxies is employing chemicals and toxins against tribesmen in three countries of Asia.
- The Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies have substantially outpaced the United States and its NATO Allies in the production and deployment of conventional offensive weapons, including tanks, artillery, etc.
- In addition to major asymmetries in the production and deployment of weapons, the Soviet Union and its proxies have aggressively expanded their military pressure throughout the world.

The US Nuclear Stockpile

The United States nuclear stockpile and the modernization program have one purpose and one purpose only: to maintain a military posture sufficient to convince Soviet leaders that nuclear aggression cannot, under any circumstances, be in their interest. Our nuclear weapons are for deterrence and nothing else. This clear purpose enables the United States to maintain the lowest possible inventory of nuclear weapons consistent with sustaining a credible deterrent. The facts provide unequivocal evidence.

° The total numbers of nuclear weapons in the US stockpile has declined significantly since its peak in the mid-sixties.. Today, the US has one-third fewer weapons than it had at that time. Since then many thousands of US weapons have been disassembled and destroyed, and today the US stockpile is at its lowest level in 20 years.

° The destructive power as measured in total yield, or megatonnage, of the US nuclear weapons stockpile has declined even more sharply since its peak in the early 1960s. Today, the total yield of our stockpile is only one-fourth as large as it was then. Today, the total yield of the US stockpile is at its lowest level in 25 years. The total yield of the stockpile will not change in the years ahead.

° The same reductions trend has taken place in Europe. In December, 1979, NATO reached a decision to reduce immediately the number of shorter-range nuclear weapons stationed in Europe. In 1980, we carried out that decision by removing 1,000 of these weapons. The same decision also committed the Alliance to a further review of the remaining systems of this category.

That review has now been completed, and a decision was made in October, 1983, that the overall size of the NATO nuclear stockpile will now be reduced by an additional 1,400 weapons, not counting those to be withdrawn on a one-for-one basis as new INF systems are deployed. When these 2,400 weapons have been withdrawn, the US will have reduced its nuclear weapons in Europe by over one-third from 1979 levels and NATO will have the lowest number of nuclear weapons in 20 years.

What this means is that the Alliance will have removed five times as many nuclear missile warheads as we will deploy if the negotiations in Geneva do not lead to the agreement we are so earnestly seeking.

Conclusion

These numbers and comparisons make clear that due to more than a decade of enormous Soviet expansion and relative US restraint, we must modernize the three legs of the strategic triad, and our INF forces, now if we are to retain the deterrent required to prevent war, while also providing an incentive to the Soviet Union to negotiate seriously. Modernization will help persuade the Soviets that we are serious about deterring war by protecting peace and freedom, and that it is in the best interest of the Soviet Union, as well as ours, to achieve the substantial reductions we are seeking in US and Soviet nuclear arsenals.

SECTION III

47

PRESIDENT REAGAN ON PEACE, DETERRENCE, AND ARMS CONTROL

NUCLEAR MUST
NEVER BE FOUGHT

"A nuclear war can never be won
and must never be fought."

Speech to Japanese
Parliament, Tokyo
November 11, 1983

NEGOTIATE
FOR
REDUCTIONS

"We want to reduce the weapons
of war, pure and simple. All
of our efforts in both the START
and the INF negotiations continue
to be guided by that objective."

Rose Garden
The White House
October 4, 1983

NUCLEAR WAR
MUST NEVER
BE FOUGHT

"A nuclear war cannot be won and
must never be fought."

United Nations,
New York
September 26, 1983

U.S. WILL
ACCEPT ANY
EQUITABLE
ARMS REDUCTION
AGREEMENT

"I want to make an unequivocal
pledge to those gathered today in
this world arena. The United States
seeks and will accept any equitable,
verifiable agreement that stabilizes
forces at lower levels than currently
exist. We are ready to be flexible in
our approach, indeed, willing to
compromise."

United Nations,
New York
September 26, 1983

HIGHEST
PRIORITY:
REMOVE THREAT
OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS

"...I have no higher priority than removing the threat of nuclear war and seeking the stability necessary for true peace. To achieve that objective, we must reduce the nuclear arsenals of both the United States and the Soviet Union."

Radio Address to
the Nation
July 16, 1983

LONG RANGE
GOAL: BAN ALL
NUCLEAR
WEAPONS

"Our current goal must be the reduction of nuclear arsenals -- and I for one believe we must never depart from the ultimate goal of banning them from the face of the Earth."

Radio Address to
the Nation
July 16, 1983

PROMISES MADE:
PEACE THROUGH
STRENGTH; SEEK
ARMS REDUCTIONS

"Coming into office, I made two promises to the American people about peace and security: I promised to restore our neglected defenses in order to strengthen and preserve the peace, and I promised to pursue reliable agreements to reduce nuclear weapons. Both these promises are being kept."

Speech to
Los Angeles World
Affairs Council
March 31, 1983

PROGRESS TOWARD
ARMS REDUCTIONS
IS A SACRED TRUST

"I pledge to you, my goal-and I consider it a sacred trust-will be to make progress toward arms reductions in every one of the several negotiations now underway."

Speech to
Los Angeles World
Affairs Council
March 31, 1983

ON INF, ZERO IS
BEST. IF
SOVIETS WILL
NOT AGREE, FEW
IS BETTER THAN
MANY

"When it comes to intermediate nuclear missiles in Europe, it would be better to have none than to have some. But if there must be some, it is better to have few than to have many.

If the Soviets will not now agree to the total elimination of these weapons, I hope that they will at least join us in an interim agreement that would substantially reduce these forces to equal levels on both sides.

To this end, Ambassador Paul Nitze has informed his Soviet counterpart that we are prepared to negotiate an interim agreement in which the United States would substantially reduce its planned deployment of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles, provided the Soviet Union reduce the number of its warheads on longer-range I.N.F. missiles to an equal level on a global basis."

White House Press
Release
March 30, 1983

U.S. MAINTAINS
STRENGTH TO
DETER

"The defense policy of the United States is based on a simple premise: The United States does not start fights. We will never be an aggressor. We maintain our strength in order to deter and defend against aggression-to preserve freedom and peace.

Since the dawn of the atomic age, we've sought to reduce the risk of war by maintaining a strong deterrent and by seeking genuine arms control. "Deterrence" means simply this: making sure any adversary who thinks about attacking the United States, or our allies, or our vital interests, concludes that the risks to him outweigh any potential gains. Once he understands that, he won't attack. We maintain the peace through our strength; weakness only invites aggression."

TV Address to
the Nation
March 23, 1983

THE STRATEGY OF
DETERRENCE WORKS

"This strategy of deterrence has not changed. It still works. But what it takes to maintain deterrence has changed."

TV Address to
the Nation
March 23, 1983

TAKE WHATEVER
STEPS NEEDED
TO ACHIEVE
EQUITABLE
NEGOTIATIONS

"I remain firmly committed to take whatever steps are necessary to increase the likelihood of real, substantive progress towards an agreement involving significant reductions in U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear arsenals -- and in the national security interests of both sides. Above all, our goal is to maintain a stable nuclear balance in order to reduce the risk of war. Our efforts in the START negotiations must be guided by that objective."

Statement on START
Negotiations
The White House
June 8, 1983

WHY
MODERNIZATION
OF ARMS?
DETERRENCE AND
AS AN INCENTIVE
FOR NEGOTIATIONS

"Modernization goes hand-in-hand with a credible deterrent; both are necessary incentives to persuade the Soviets that it is in their best interest as well as ours to achieve meaningful arms reductions."

Presidential Op Ed
Washington Post
May 24, 1983

NEGOTIATIONS
TO ENHANCE
SECURITY AND
STABILITY

"The fundamental U.S. goal in negotiations concerning arms reduction, and especially in our approach to the START negotiations, is to seek agreements that would enhance security and stability by reducing overall force levels while permitting modernization of U.S. forces necessary for a credible deterrent."

Letter to Senators
Percy, Nunn
and Cohen
May 12, 1983

PRUDENT
MODERNIZATION

"At the same time, let me emphasize that we do not seek a first strike capability. To this end, we will constrain the number of Peacekeeper missiles to the minimum number needed to assure the effectiveness of our deterrent and no more."

Letter to Senators
Percy, Nunn
and Cohen
May 12, 1983

PEACE WITH
FREEDOM

"We must both defend freedom and preserve the peace. We must stand true to our principles and our friends while preventing a holocaust...We cannot conduct ourselves as if the special danger of nuclear weapons did not exist. But we must not allow ourselves to be paralyzed by the problem, to abdicate our moral duty. This is the challenge that history has left us."

Letter to Senators
Percy, Nunn
and Cohen
May 12, 1983

PEACE THROUGH
DETERRENCE AND
ARMS CONTROL

"We desire peace, but peace is a goal not a policy. Lasting peace is what we hope for at the end of our journey; it doesn't describe the steps we must take, nor the paths we should follow to reach that goal. I intend to search for peace along two parallel paths-deterrence and arms reductions. I believe these are the only paths that offer any real hope for an enduring peace."

TV Address to
the Nation
November 22, 1982

NATIONAL WILL
IS KEY TO
SUCCESS IN
NEGOTIATIONS

"...unless we demonstrate the will to rebuild our strength and restore the military balance, the Soviets-since they're so far ahead-have little incentive to negotiate with us. Let me repeat that point, since it goes to the heart of our policy. Unless we demonstrate the will to rebuild our

strength, the Soviets have little incentive to negotiate. If we hadn't begun to modernize, the Soviet negotiators would know we had nothing to bargain with except talk."

TV Address to
the Nation
November 22, 1982

ABOVE ALL,
PEACE IS
THE GOAL

"Our children should not grow up frightened. They should not fear the future. We are working to make it peaceful and free. I believe their future can be the brightest, most exciting of any generation. We must reassure them and let them know that their parents and the leaders of this world are seeking above all else to keep them safe and at peace. I consider this to be a sacred trust."

TV Address to
the Nation
November 22, 1982

REDUCE THE
RISK OF WAR
BY REDUCING
THE MEANS OF
WAGING IT

"There are threats now to our freedom, indeed to our very existence, that other generations could never even have imagined.

There is first the threat of global war. No President, no Congress, no Prime Minister, no Parliament can spend a day entirely free of this threat. And I don't have to tell you that in today's world the existence of nuclear weapons could mean, if not the extinction of mankind, then surely the end of civilization as we know it. That's why negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces now underway in Europe and the START talks-Strategic Arms Reduction Talks-which will begin later this month, are not just critical to American or Western policy; they are critical to mankind. Our commitment to early success in these negotiations is firm and

unshakable, and our purpose is clear: reducing the risk of war by reducing the means of waging war on both sides."

Address to the
British Parliament
June 8, 1982

NEED TO
FACE FACTS

"If history teaches anything it teaches self-delusion in the face of unpleasant facts is folly."

Address to the
British Parliament
June 8, 1982

DESIRE FOR
PEACE MUST BE
MATCHED BY
HARD WORK

"My duty as President is to insure that the ultimate nightmare never occurs, that the prairies and the cities and the people who inhabit them remain free and untouched by nuclear conflict.

I wish more than anything there were a simple policy that would eliminate that nuclear danger. But there are only difficult policy choices through which we can achieve a stable nuclear balance at the lowest possible level."

Commencement Address
Eureka College
May 9, 1982

IT TAKES TWO
SIDES TO
NEGOTIATE

"We will negotiate seriously, in good faith, and carefully consider all proposals made by the Soviet Union. If they approach these negotiations in the same spirit, I'm confident that together we can achieve an agreement of enduring value that reduces the number of nuclear

weapons, halts the growth in
strategic forces, and opens the
way to even more far-reaching
steps in the future."

Commencement Address
Eureka College
May 9, 1982

**National Security Council
The White House**

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Wilma Hall	3	<i>[initials]</i>	
Bud McFarlane	4	<i>[initials]</i>	A
John Poindexter			
Executive Secretary			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			
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I = Information	A = Action	R = Retain	D = Dispatch	N = No further Action
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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

November 17, 1983
1:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: SVEN KRAEMER *SK*

SUBJECT: White House Arms Control Publication -- Final Draft

The attached "final" draft of the proposed White House publication to be issued on a priority basis on the President's Arms Control policy incorporates comments received during this morning from within the NSC Staff and from OSD, State, and ACDA. We believe it is now in good shape and ready for your final review. (Since it differs substantially from the draft we provided you at COB last night, you should put yesterday's draft aside as being OBE.)

As soon as you have review/revised the attached, we will incorporate your fixes into the text and provide a final copy to Mike Baroody's office.

Ron Ron Lehman and *RBS* Bob Sims concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you review and approve, or revise, the attached draft for publication by the White House later today.

Approve *✓* Disapprove

as modified.

Attachment

See changes on page iii and 5.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By *CS* NARA, Date *1/29/03*

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National Security Council
The White House

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Wilma Hall	<i>[initials]</i>		<i>[initials]</i>
Bud McFarlane	<i>[initials]</i>		<i>[initials]</i>
John Poindexter		<i>[initials]</i>	
Executive Secretary		<i>[initials]</i>	
NSC Secretariat		<i>[initials]</i>	
Situation Room			
Executive Secretary			

I = Information

A = Action

R = Retain

D = Dispatch

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION

November 16, 1983

6:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: SVEN KRAEMER **SK**

SUBJECT: White House Arms Control Publication Draft

Attached redraft just completed reflects substantial input from DOD, State, ACDA, and NSC staff to the draft paper prepared earlier by Al Myer for possible White House use.

Because this revision has been undertaken under great pressure (and has not even been properly proofread), we are LDXing informally within this hour to appropriate State (e.g., Judy Mandel), DOD, and ACDA levels for last-minute accuracy check, with final comments to be provided to us later tonight or at opening of business tomorrow morning.

When you have provided your own comments, and we (including Ron Lehman, Bob Linhard, and Bob Sims) have had a chance to review tonight's text, we will provide approved text on an urgent basis to Mike Baroody tomorrow morning for White House reprinting and circulation to other agencies, as appropriate.

^{RBS} Bob Sims and ^{for} Ron Lehman concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you review and revise the attached as soon as possible.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment

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White House Guidelines, August 20, 1997
By CS NARA, Date 11/29/13

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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PRESIDENT REAGAN
ON
PEACE, DETERRENCE, AND ARMS REDUCTIONS

POLICY
AND
PROGRAMS

November 1983

Every American President has accepted the goals of preventing conflict, reducing the risk of war, and safeguarding the peace as his most basic responsibilities. In addition to these three fundamental objectives, President Reagan is pursuing a fourth: substantial reductions in current levels of nuclear weapons through genuine arms control.

Peace must be more than a policy. It must also be a constant goal and that requires hard work, realistic programs, a commitment to strong deterrent forces, and the patience to pursue meaningful arms reduction negotiations.

Throughout the post-World War II era, the pursuit of peace with freedom has been based upon the twin pillars of defense and dialogue; upon the maintenance of a military equilibrium coupled with efforts to resolve differences peacefully and to remove sources of conflict.

American arms control efforts seek to strengthen both these pillars, to stabilize a military balance at the lowest possible levels, and in so doing to enhance mutual confidence and expand the area of understanding between nations.

The Reagan Administration has fashioned its security policies upon this proven basis of defense and dialogue, while giving added emphasis to stability, significant reductions, and effective verification as objectives for arms control. The continued growth of Soviet military power has required us to improve our own defenses to assure a credible deterrent, but it has also led us to intensify and expand our efforts through negotiations to reverse the growth in armaments.

The nuclear age has given us a special challenge -- that of removing the threat of nuclear war. This Administration has been especially aware of that challenge and of the fact that there are no easy and simple responses, ~~to the challenge~~. President Reagan succinctly stated both the challenge as we see it and the way to meet it: "...in today's world, the existence of nuclear weapons could mean, if not the extinction of mankind, then surely the end of civilization as we know it. ...We must not allow ourselves to be paralyzed by the problem, to abdicate our moral duty....I intend to search for peace along two parallel paths--deterrence and arms reductions. I believe these are the only paths that offer any real hope for an enduring peace."

The following pages outline how we are conducting the search for peace today -- and the importance of both deterrence and arms control to building the more lasting peace we all seek.

Section One describes America's current arms control efforts. The United States is embarked on the most ambitious arms reductions agenda ever developed, while also seeking measures to reduce the possibility of misunderstanding or miscalculation. The record speaks for itself.

Section Two explains our deterrence policy and describes the changed military balance, ^{the} US modernization programs, required for deterrence and the reductions in the US nuclear weapons stockpile.

Section Three provides a representative collection of President Reagan's personal views on questions of peace, deterrence, and arms reduction.

u3

SECTION I

PRESIDENT REAGAN'S ARMS REDUCTION AGENDA

"We want to reduce the weapons of war, pure and simple."
(President Reagan, 1983)

Today, we are embarked ^{by any Administration.} on the most ambitious arms reduction agenda ever developed. We are negotiating directly with the Soviets about deep reductions in strategic and intermediate-range nuclear weapons. We and our NATO Allies are negotiating with the Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies about cutting conventional forces in Europe. And we are negotiating with the Soviets and other interested nations about an effective and verifiable ban on chemical weapons. We have also asked the Soviets to join us in efforts to ensure that nuclear testing limits can be effectively verified. And we have asked the Soviets and others to join with us in the search for confidence-building agreements that can help reduce the risk of accidental war.

Today's negotiation efforts build upon more than three decades' experience, upon the agreements already achieved, and upon the lessons learned from past successes and failures. Our efforts have only one purpose -- to reverse the arms build-up, establish a more stable military balance at lower force levels, and to enhance the prospects for lasting peace.

Apart from negotiating forums, the United States along with its Allies have periodically and unilaterally reduced nuclear weapons inventories to ensure that our posture is that needed for deterrence, and no more.

CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS -- THE TRACK RECORD

Strategic Arms Negotiations

The Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) deal with the principal elements of the U.S.-Soviet intercontinental nuclear weapon. In these negotiations, which began in Geneva in June 1982, the President has boldly sought to reverse past trends which simply ratified greater and more destabilizing nuclear arsenals.

- ° The U.S. approach is to secure an equitable, verifiable agreement which will reduce the number of ballistic missile warheads by one-third, gain substantial reductions in the most destabilizing systems, by as much as one-half, reduce the capacity of missiles to carry warheads, and establish limits on bombers and cruise missiles.

- ° In order to facilitate an agreement, the President has made substantial adjustments to our initial position. The adjustments made over the last few months have been in response to recommendations of the Scowcroft Commission and the Congress and take expressed Soviet concerns into account. And they include a guaranteed mutual build-down as recommended by many in the Congress.

° The President has expressed a willingness to agree to trade-offs between areas of U.S. interest or advantage and areas of Soviet interest and advantage. Everything is on the table, and our negotiators have great flexibility.

° While the Soviet Union has not yet demonstrated a similar flexibility toward reaching agreement, either by responding positively to our recent initiatives or by tabling new, more forthcoming proposals of its own, there is reason for hope. Already, the Soviet Union has agreed to the importance of reductions and has shown some limited flexibility on secondary issues. Increased Congressional support for our defense program and a new bipartisan spirit in arms control will enhance the likelihood that the Soviets will increasingly realize that it is time to begin to negotiate seriously on the central issues.

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Negotiations

The INF negotiations which began in November 1981 deal with the growing imbalance in intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe. The focus of the negotiations between the US and the Soviet Union is on the systems of greatest concern to the two sides -- the land-based longer-range INF missiles. During the past two years, the U.S. position has gone through three stages in an effort to reduce the threat to the peace posed by the Soviet monopoly in this class of weapons.

° In November 1981, President Reagan announced the zero-zero option of U.S. and Soviet longer-range, land-based INF missiles. The President thereby offered to cancel the planned deployment of 572 Pershing II and Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles in return for Soviet elimination of its 600 SS-20, SS-4 and SS-5 missiles with far more warheads, which it had been unilaterally deploying for a number of years. This proposal would eliminate an entire class of nuclear weapons. The President made clear that the U.S. would also carefully consider any serious Soviet proposal.

° By March 1983, it was clear that the Soviets were not ready to accept the U.S. proposal. In an effort to move negotiations forward, the President announced a proposal for an interim agreement: the U.S. would reduce the planned deployment of Pershing IIs and GLCMs, provided the Soviets reduced the number of their warheads to an equal level on a global basis. At the same time, the U.S. made clear that the zero-zero proposal remained on the table. But no meaningful Soviet counterproposal was offered.

° Notwithstanding Soviet behavior, the President on September 26, 1983, announced a further initiative designed to move the negotiations forward. The initiative responded to expressed Soviet concerns with the U.S. proposal. This time, we agreed explicitly to include aircraft in the negotiations and, within a global limit, to consider foregoing deploying in Europe the full complement of missiles we would be allowed, even if the Soviets deployed the full number.

Unfortunately, the Soviet Union has not yet demonstrated comparable flexibility. Each Soviet proposal tabled since the negotiations began in 1981 would have the same basic outcome: the prohibition any of NATO deployments while the Soviets retained their substantial monopoly in LRINF missiles, which now have some 1,400 warheads to our zero.

Conventional Force Reductions in Europe

The negotiations in Vienna ^{nations} on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) are multilateral negotiations involving NATO and Warsaw Pact. The negotiations, which began in 1973, result from a NATO initiative to reduce the unequal levels of military manpower of East and West in Central Europe to equal and significantly lower levels. They are part of broader efforts by the United States and its allies to reduce the likelihood of conflict in Central Europe and to strengthen East-West stability generally. Although the Warsaw Pact nations nominally accept this goal, their unwillingness thus far to address their present manpower superiority, or to accept effective verification measures to ensure compliance with an MBFR agreement, remains the main obstacle to progress.

° The goal of the negotiations is the reduction of each side's military manpower in Central Europe to parity at a level of 700,000 ground force personnel and a maximum of 900,000 air and ground force personnel combined.

° In MBFR's 10-year existence, both East and West have made a variety of proposals. On both sides, however, there has been a strong continuity in negotiating objectives. The West has consistently sought parity of forces at a reduced level. The East, with equal consistency, has resisted effective acceptance of parity. Initially, it rejected equality explicitly; later, it did so implicitly, accepting parity as a goal but refusing to admit to the size of its current forces and, consequently, to the size of reductions that would be needed to arrive at parity. It has refused to provide sufficient detail on how it would go about ensuring compliance.

° In July 1982, the West tabled a new draft treaty, marking a further effort to address expressed Warsaw Pact/Soviet concerns while preserving the Western requirement for parity and effective verification. The major innovation of the Western draft is that it would bind all direct participants in one agreement to undertake the reductions required to reach the reduced ceiling. This provision seeks to address the frequently expressed Soviet concern that initial Soviet reductions might not be followed by reductions in the forces of the United States' NATO allies. The East has yet to respond constructively.

Confidence-Building Measures

Confidence-building measures are designed to enhance mutual knowledge and understanding about military forces and activities. They differ from arms reductions provisions,

which seek to constrain the size, weaponry, or structure of military forces. They can have various objectives, but their overall purpose is to reduce the possibility of an accidental East-West confrontation, miscalculation, or failure of communication; to inhibit opportunities for surprise attack; and to increase stability in times of calm or crisis.

° U.S.-Soviet confidence-building measures include the "Hotline" Agreement and the "Accidents Measures" and Incidents at Sea Agreements. Multilateral measures in force are contained in the Final Act of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), signed in Helsinki in 1975. The principal feature of the CSCE measures is the agreement of both East and West to prior notification of large military maneuvers. This concept has also been incorporated into the Western proposals at the MBFR negotiations.

° In 1982, President Reagan proposed a new set of bilateral confidence-building measures, including prior notification of ballistic missile launches, prior notification of major military exercises, and expanded exchange of forces data. These proposals have been tabled at the START and INF negotiations. In addition, the US has proposed and begun bilateral discussions with the Soviet Union to improve the hotline, establish a U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Military Communications Link, improve embassy-capital communications, and develop a multilateral agreement on consultations concerning nuclear terrorism. When the Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) begins in Stockholm in January 1984, we will seek agreement on additional measures which would inhibit opportunities for surprise attack in Europe.

Chemical Weapons

The Soviet Union and its allies have employed chemical and toxin weapons in Afghanistan, Kampuchea, and Laos in violation of existing arms control agreements outlawing ^{use of} such weapons. An immediate challenge is to bring the Soviet Union into compliance with existing international agreements outlawing the use of chemical weapons while also achieving agreement on new accords that would impose a verifiable ban on the production and stockpiling of chemical weapons.

° Towards these ends, the United States is seeking to improve compliance with existing international agreements and to negotiate a more effective instrument. In the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, the United States and its allies are seeking a complete and verifiable ban on chemical weapons production and stockpiling. Whether we can achieve this objective will depend largely on whether the Soviet Union is willing to accept effective provisions for verification and compliance.

Nuclear Testing

While achievement of a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing remains the ultimate US objective, progress toward that goal is a step-by-step process. In the 1970s, the US and the USSR took steps in that direction when they signed the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, which limit the size of underground nuclear tests. However, serious questions have been raised about Soviet compliance with the limits of these unratified Treaties and about the adequacy of the Treaties' verification measures. To help resolve these questions, the United States in 1982 proposed to the Soviet Union that we discuss means to enhance the verification provisions of the Treaties. Unfortunately, the Soviets have been unwilling to date to enter into such discussions with us.

Nonproliferation

The United States is committed to effective implementation of the 1968 treaty on the spread of nuclear weapons. We are working to strengthen international safeguards on nuclear material and more tightly to control access to technology relating to the production of nuclear weapons.

SECTION II

"The defense policy of the United States is based on a simple premise: The United States does not start fights....We maintain our strength in order to deter and defend against aggression -- to preserve freedom and peace....This strategy of deterrence...works. But what it takes to maintain deterrence has changed." (President Reagan, 1983)

Our Policy

US military forces are organized and armed to deter attack and coercion to prevent war. It is our policy and that of our Allies not to use any force, whether nuclear or non-nuclear, except to deter and defend against aggression. Immediately following World War II, the United States proposed through the Baruch Plan to place nuclear weapons under the control of the infant United Nations -- and out of the hands of any nation-state. Those efforts foundered and steps had to be taken to ensure that, especially as nuclear weapons proliferated, they would never be used. To that end, United States nuclear weapons policy has focused solely on preventing -- on detering -- attack that might lead to nuclear war. That policy has been successful for some 40 years, including years of severe international tension. There has been no nuclear conflict. Nor has there been direct military conflict of any sort between the United States and the Soviet Union, or between East and West in Europe.

We are under no illusions about the consequences of a nuclear war. There would be no winners. Thus deterrence is and must remain the cornerstone of our nuclear policy and, indeed, of our entire national security posture.

To this end, we seek to maintain the lowest possible force levels consistent with the basic requirements of effective deterrence. We must recognize that two decades of unabated Soviet military growth and US restraint have created severe imbalances which we must redress if we are to maintain an effective deterrent. This is why we must modernize our aging forces even as we pursue genuine arms control.

The Shifting Military Balance

The facts on the deployment of new military systems during the past decade and more, reflect an unparalleled Soviet buildup, even in the face of considerable US and Allied restraint. The facts include the following:

- Some 3/4 of nuclear warheads on US strategic weapons are on launchers which are more than 10 years old. But 3/4 of warheads on Soviet strategic weapons are on launchers, which are less than 5 years old.
- The US deployed no new strategic bomber since the B-52 in 1962, while the Soviet Union has deployed more than 200 intercontinental-range Backfire bombers and is expected to deploy the Blackjack bomber as well.
- The US, until last year, had deployed no new strategic submarine for some 13 years, while the Soviet Union deployed over 5 new classes involving 60 new strategic submarines during the same period.
- The US deployed only one new strategic submarine missile during the past 17 years, while the Soviets deployed 5 new types, involving hundreds of new missiles during the same period.
- The US deployed no new land-based strategic missile since 1969, undertaking only a warhead improvement for a proportion of its Minuteman force, while the Soviets deployed at least 4 new types of systems involving many hundreds of new missiles and are already testing 2 more new types.
- While the US destroyed its biological warfare stocks in 1969 and produced no new chemical weapons for 14 years, the Soviet Union greatly expanded its CBW efforts, and is employing chemicals and toxins against tribesmen in three countries of Asia.
- The Soviet^{Union} and its Warsaw Pact allies have substantially outpaced the United States and its NATO Allies in the production and deployment of conventional offensive weapons, including tanks, artillery, etc.
- In addition to major asymmetries in the production and deployment of weapons, the Soviet Union and its proxies have aggressively expanded their military pressure throughout the world.

The US Nuclear Stockpile

The United States nuclear stockpile and modernization program have one purpose and one purpose only: to maintain a military posture sufficient to convince Soviet leaders that nuclear aggression cannot, under any circumstances, be in their interest. Our nuclear weapons are for deterrence and nothing else. This clear purpose enables the United States to maintain the lowest possible inventory of nuclear weapons consistent with sustaining a credible deterrent. The facts provide unequivocal evidence.

° The total numbers of nuclear weapons in the U.S. stockpile has declined significantly since its peak in 1965. Today, the U.S. has one-third fewer weapons than it had in 1965. Many thousands of U.S. weapons have been disassembled and destroyed. Today, the U.S. stockpile is at its lowest level in 20 years.

° The destructive power as measured in total yield, or megatonnage, of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile has declined even more sharply since its peak in 1960. Today, the total yield of our stockpile is only one-fourth as large as it was in the early 1960s. it is today. Today, the total yield of the U.S. stockpile is at its lowest level in 25 years. The total yield of the stockpile will not change in the years ahead.

° The same reductions trend has taken place in Europe. In December of 1979, NATO reached a decision to reduce immediately the number of shorter-range nuclear weapons stationed in Europe. In 1980, we carried out that decision by removing 1,000 of these weapons. The same decision also committed the Alliance to a further review of the remaining systems of this category.

That review has now been completed and a decision was made in October, 1983, that the overall size of the NATO nuclear stockpile will now be reduced by an additional 1,400 weapons. When these 2,400 weapons have been withdrawn, the U.S. will have reduced its nuclear weapons in Europe by over one-third from 1979 levels and NATO will have the lowest number of nuclear weapons in 20 years.

What this means is that the Alliance will have removed at least five nuclear weapons for every new missile warhead we will deploy if the negotiations in Geneva don't lead to the agreement we are so earnestly seeking.

Conclusion

What these numbers and comparisons make clear is that due to more than a decade of enormous Soviet expansion and relative US restraint, we must modernize three legs of the strategic triad and our INF forces now if we are to retain the deterrent required to prevent war, while also providing an incentive to the Soviet Union to negotiate seriously. Modernization will help persuade the Soviets that we are serious about deterring war by protecting peace and freedom, and that it is in the best interest of the Soviet Union, as well as ours, to achieve substantial reductions we are seeking in US and Soviet nuclear arsenals.

SECTION III

PRESIDENT REAGAN
ON
PEACE, DETERRENCE, AND ARMS CONTROL

NUCLEAR MUST
NEVER BE FOUGHT

"A nuclear war can never be won
and must never be fought."

Speech to Japanese
Parliament, Tokyo
November 11, 1983

NEGOTIATE
FOR
REDUCTIONS

"We want to reduce the weapons
of war, pure and simple. All
of our efforts in both the START
and the INF negotiations continue
to be guided by that objective."

Rose Garden
The White House
October 4, 1983

NUCLEAR WAR
MUST NEVER
BE FOUGHT

"A nuclear war cannot be won and
must never be fought."

United Nations,
New York
September 26, 1983

U.S. WILL
ACCEPT ANY
EQUITABLE
ARMS REDUCTION
AGREEMENT

"I want to make an unequivocal
pledge to those gathered today in
this world arena. The United States
seeks and will accept any equitable,
verifiable agreement that stabilizes
forces at lower levels than currently
exist. We are ready to be flexible in
our approach, indeed, willing to
compromise."

United Nations,
New York
September 26, 1983

HIGHEST
PRIORITY:
REMOVE THREAT
OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS

11 73
"...I have no higher priority than removing the threat of nuclear war and seeking the stability necessary for true peace. To achieve that objective, we must reduce the nuclear arsenals of both the United States and the Soviet Union."

Radio Address to
the Nation
July 16, 1983

LONG RANGE
GOAL: BAN ALL
NUCLEAR
WEAPONS

"Our current goal must be the reduction of nuclear arsenals -- and I for one believe we must never depart from the ultimate goal of banning them from the face of the Earth."

Radio Address to
the Nation
July 16, 1983

PROMISES MADE:
PEACE THROUGH
STRENGTH; SEEK
ARMS REDUCTIONS

"Coming into office, I made two promises to the American people about peace and security: I promised to restore our neglected defenses in order to strengthen and preserve the peace, and I promised to pursue reliable agreements to reduce nuclear weapons. Both these promises are being kept."

Speech to
Los Angeles World
Affairs Council
March 31, 1983

PROGRESS TOWARD
ARMS REDUCTIONS
IS A SACRED TRUST

"I pledge to you, my goal-and I consider it a sacred trust-will be to make progress toward arms reductions in every one of the several negotiations now underway."

Speech to
Los Angeles World
Affairs Council
March 31, 1983

12 74
ON INF, ZERO IS
BEST. IF
SOVIETS WILL
NOT AGREE, FEW
IS BETTER THAN
MANY

"When it comes to intermediate nuclear missiles in Europe, it would be better to have none than to have some. But if there must be some, it is better to have few than to have many.

If the Soviets will not now agree to the total elimination of these weapons, I hope that they will at least join us in an interim agreement that would substantially reduce these forces to equal levels on both sides.

To this end, Ambassador Paul Nitze has informed his Soviet counterpart that we are prepared to negotiate an interim agreement in which the United States would substantially reduce its planned deployment of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles, provided the Soviet Union reduce the number of its warheads on longer-range I.N.F. missiles to an equal level on a global basis."

White House Press
Release
March 30, 1983

U.S. MAINTAINS
STRENGTH TO
DETER

"The defense policy of the United States is based on a simple premise: The United States does not start fights. We will never be an aggressor. We maintain our strength in order to deter and defend against aggression-to preserve freedom and peace.

Since the dawn of the atomic age, we've sought to reduce the risk of war by maintaining a strong deterrent and by seeking genuine arms control.

"Deterrence" means simply this: making sure any adversary who thinks about attacking the United States, or our allies, or our vital interests, concludes that the risks to him outweigh any potential gains. Once he understands that, he won't attack. We maintain the peace through our strength; weakness only invites aggression."

TV Address to
the Nation
March 23, 1983

THE STRATEGY OF
DETERRENCE WORKS

"This strategy of deterrence has not changed. It still works. But what it takes to maintain deterrence has changed."

TV Address to
the Nation
March 23, 1983

TAKE WHATEVER
STEPS NEEDED
TO ACHIEVE
EQUITABLE
NEGOTIATIONS

"I remain firmly committed to take whatever steps are necessary to increase the likelihood of real, substantive progress towards an agreement involving significant reductions in U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear arsenals -- and in the national security interests of both sides. Above all, our goal is to maintain a stable nuclear balance in order to reduce the risk of war. Our efforts in the START negotiations must be guided by that objective."

Statement on START
Negotiations
The White House
June 8, 1983

WHY
MODERNIZATION
OF ARMS?
DETERRENCE AND
AS AN INCENTIVE
FOR NEGOTIATIONS

"Modernization goes hand-in-hand with a credible deterrent; both are necessary incentives to persuade the Soviets that it is in their best interest as well as ours to achieve meaningful arms reductions."

Presidential Op Ed
Washington Post
May 24, 1983

NEGOTIATIONS
TO ENHANCE
SECURITY AND
STABILITY

"The fundamental U.S. goal in negotiations concerning arms reduction, and especially in our approach to the START negotiations, is to seek agreements that would enhance security and stability by reducing overall force levels while permitting modernization of U.S. forces necessary for a credible deterrent."

Letter to Senators
Percy, Nunn
and Cohen
May 12, 1983

PRUDENT
MODERNIZATION

"At the same time, let me emphasize that we do not seek a first strike capability. To this end, we will constrain the number of Peacekeeper missiles to the minimum number needed to assure the effectiveness of our deterrent and no more."

Letter to Senators
Percy, Nunn
and Cohen
May 12, 1983

PEACE WITH
FREEDOM

"We must both defend freedom and preserve the peace. We must stand true to our principles and our friends while preventing a holocaust...We cannot conduct ourselves as if the special danger of nuclear weapons did not exist. But we must not allow ourselves to be paralyzed by the problem, to abdicate our moral duty. This is the challenge that history has left us."

Letter to Senators
Percy, Nunn
and Cohen
May 12, 1983

PEACE THROUGH
DETERRENCE AND
ARMS CONTROL

"We desire peace, but peace is a goal not a policy. Lasting peace is what we hope for at the end of our journey; it doesn't describe the steps we must take, nor the paths we should follow to reach that goal. I intend to search for peace along two parallel paths-deterrence and arms reductions. I believe these are the only paths that offer any real hope for an enduring peace."

TV Address to
the Nation
November 22, 1982

NATIONAL WILL
IS KEY TO
SUCCESS IN
NEGOTIATIONS

"...unless we demonstrate the will to rebuild our strength and restore the military balance, the Soviets-since they're so far ahead-have little incentive to negotiate with us. Let me repeat that point, since it goes to the heart of our policy. Unless we demonstrate the will to rebuild our

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strength, the Soviets have little incentive to negotiate. If we hadn't begun to modernize, the Soviet negotiators would know we had nothing to bargain with except talk."

TV Address to
the Nation
November 22, 1982

ABOVE ALL,
PEACE IS
THE GOAL

"Our children should not grow up frightened. They should not fear the future. We are working to make it peaceful and free. I believe their future can be the brightest, most exciting of any generation. We must reassure them and let them know that their parents and the leaders of this world are seeking above all else to keep them safe and at peace. I consider this to be a sacred trust."

TV Address to
the Nation
November 22, 1982

REDUCE THE
RISK OF WAR
BY REDUCING
THE MEANS OF
WAGING IT

"There are threats now to our freedom, indeed to our very existence, that other generations could never even have imagined.

There is first the threat of global war. No President, no Congress, no Prime Minister, no Parliament can spend a day entirely free of this threat. And I don't have to tell you that in today's world the existence of nuclear weapons could mean, if not the extinction of mankind, then surely the end of civilization as we know it. That's why negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces now underway in Europe and the START talks-Strategic Arms Reduction Talks-which will begin later this month, are not just critical to American or Western policy; they are critical to mankind. Our commitment to early success in these negotiations is firm and

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unshakable, and our purpose is clear: reducing the risk of war by reducing the means of waging war on both sides."

Address to the
British Parliament
June 8, 1982

NEED TO
FACE FACTS

"If history teaches anything it teaches self-delusion in the face of unpleasant facts is folly."

Address to the
British Parliament
June 8, 1982

DESIRE FOR
PEACE MUST BE
MATCHED BY
HARD WORK

"My duty as President is to insure that the ultimate nightmare never occurs, that the prairies and the cities and the people who inhabit them remain free and untouched by nuclear conflict.

I wish more than anything there were a simple policy that would eliminate that nuclear danger. But there are only difficult policy choices through which we can achieve a stable nuclear balance at the lowest possible level."

Commencement Address
Eureka College
May 9, 1982

IT TAKES TWO
SIDES TO
NEGOTIATE

"We will negotiate seriously, in good faith, and carefully consider all proposals made by the Soviet Union. If they approach these negotiations in the same spirit, I'm confident that together we can achieve an agreement of enduring value that reduces the number of nuclear

weapons, halts the growth in strategic forces, and opens the way to even more far-reaching steps in the future."

Commencement Address
Eureka College
May 9, 1982