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2

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
89882	MEMO	RONALD SABLE TO LINDA BENNETT RE GRENADA EVENT (PARTIAL)	1	10/23/1984	B6
89883	LIST	RE CONGRESSIONAL STAFFERS (PARTIAL)	1	ND	B6

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

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B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

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RECEIVED 16 OCT 84 08

TO MCFARLANE FROM GINGRICH, NEWT
STEINER

DOC DATE 10 OCT 84

26 OCT 84

KEYWORDS: GRENADA

MCO

SUBJECT: LTR TO MCFARLANE FM REP GINGRICH RE GRENADA

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE: 20 OCT 84 STATUS X FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

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COMMENTS

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OCT 29 1984 Mcfarlane gd RS, PT, RB
ON, KS

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE (C)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 29, 1984

Newt
Dear Congressman Gingrich:


Thank you for your letter of October 10 describing some of the actions which have been undertaken under private auspices to explain the reasoning behind our rescue mission in Grenada last year and the lessons learned from the documents found there. We are extremely pleased that various private organizations have taken a continuing interest in this issue.

We cannot agree with you more on the significance of events in Grenada and on the importance of our rescue mission. The President's own admiration for the servicemen who took part in the rescue and for the students who were rescued was made abundantly clear in his remarks to these two groups at the White House ceremony on October 24. I would hope that the very moving ceremony which we had here will itself help to broaden public awareness of the methods used by Marxist forces in Grenada and by their outside supporters.

My compliments to you for the fine public affairs efforts which you have helped to generate. I am confident that our own work within the Administration and these private sector efforts usefully complement each other.

Best wishes.

Sincerely,



Robert C. McFarlane

The Honorable Newt Gingrich
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

October 26, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: STEVEN E. STEINER

SIGNEDSUBJECT: Response to Congressman Newt Gingrich
on Grenada

Newt Gingrich wrote to you on October 10 (Tab II) laying out in some detail the various public affairs activities of the private groups with which he is involved related to the Grenada rescue mission and to exploitation of the Grenada documents. He asked specifically for your help in: (a) encouraging academic institutions and media outlets to use a Biznet broadcast which he put together on Grenada and (b) to help find a foundation that would pay to provide microfiche copies of the captured documents to colleges around the country. Since either action by USG officials could raise serious questions about their appropriateness, I have drafted a general reply which compliments these activities by the private sector, expresses our interest in keeping up this effort and points out that these various governmental and private sector activities can usefully complement each other.

Gingrich has sent similar letters to other government officials, including at least the Vice President and Secretary Shultz. Answers to the others are being drafted by Otto Reich's people, and I have coordinated this response with them.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the response to Gingrich at Tab I.

Approve ✓ Disapprove

Ron Sable, Paul Thompson, Ray Burghardt, Ollie North and Karna Small concur.

Attachments

Tab I Ltr to Gingrich
Tab II Ltr fr Gingrich, Oct 10, 84



WASHINGTON OFFICE:
305 LONGWORTH HOUSE OFFICE BLDG.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515
(202) 225-4501

Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

October 10, 1984

Honorable Bud McFarlane
National Security Council
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Bud:

On October 24th and 25th there is a project on Grenada and communism that you can help make a significant turning point in American foreign policy. With your help, we can draw the public's attention to the lessons to be learned from the liberation of Grenada. We need your help now to focus attention on this great opportunity. Let me explain.

When the United States liberated Grenada, we captured for the first time a communist bureaucracy. We now have, in English, the internal documents of not only the communist Grenadian government, but also the advice they received from their Soviet and Cuban allies. The parallels with Nicaragua and the lessons to be learned are extremely important.

Reading the book of Grenada documents (which you will receive under separate cover) will convince you that communists, including Nicaraguans, do lie systematically to us. There are, for example, specific instructions on how to keep two sets of books for the International Monetary Fund. There are also specific statements by Soviet and Cuban advisors on secret plans for military use of the airfield and how to infiltrate the churches. In general, this is the most revealing set of documents in recent times on the nature of the communist system and the influence of the Soviet Union and its Cuban allies.

In order to highlight the potential research value of this book, we are staging on October 24th and 25th of this year a series of events. We hope the effect of these events will be to draw attention to the tremendous inner knowledge we have discovered about the communist system. In addition, we'd like to focus attention on the research potential now available in this book for every student interested in how communism works.

On October 24th, we are bringing 90 students who were in Grenada back from the Caribbean to a reception in Washington. We are hoping to honor Prime Minister Eugenia Charles of Dominica. You will remember her as the courageous woman and chairman of the Organization of Caribbean States who asked the United States to help restore freedom in the Caribbean. The medical students will also hold a press conference on the Capitol steps.

On the evening of the 24th, there will be a two hour national film and a one hour national television call-in show on the Biznet Satellite Network. This will be available to any cable television operator.

On October 25th, we hope to fly the medical students to 90 college campuses nationwide for various events. These will include local press conferences, "student liberation rallies", teach-ins by the medical students, and another airing of the documentary on Grenada.

Any help you can be in encouraging colleges, high schools, cable T.V. operators, and other groups to participate in using the Biznet broadcast on Wednesday evening October 24th or Thursday morning October 25th will be an important step in the right direction. Also, we would appreciate your help in finding a foundation that is willing to pay to give the microfiche copies of the 35,000 pounds of communist bureaucratic paperwork which lie behind this book to colleges. We hope that one day every college in America will have the raw research material for its students to use as a foundation for study on how communism really thinks and works. If you need further information, please contact Don Morrissey at (202) 225-0537.

This is a non-partisan educational effort to draw the attention of the American people to the fact that communism is a real system which does exist. When you read these documents you get a very different picture than you get if you only look at the headlines. Thank you for your help.

Sincerely,



Newt Gingrich

NG/am

National Security Record

A Report from Washington on National Security Affairs

THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION • 214 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE, N.E. • WASHINGTON, D.C. • 20002 • (202) 546-4400

NO. 72

SEPTEMBER 1984

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Decisiveness, secrecy, good intelligence, readiness and coordination = *success*.

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by Paul A. Smith, Jr.

Information control is essential to political control.

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Resolution to Repudiate Yalta.

W

The Lessons of Grenada

One year ago next month, on October 25, 1983, the United States launched a rescue mission on the island of Grenada at the request of, and in concert with, the member states of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS). It was a well-executed use of military force, undertaken for urgent humanitarian reasons, but with important geopolitical benefits. Despite stiffer opposition than expected from over 700 armed and well-trained Cubans, the U.S. forces performed efficiently, rescuing 600 American medical students and freeing over 100 political prisoners, with a minimum of casualties. More than 100 communist officials, including East Germans, Libyans, North Koreans, Bulgarians and 45 Russians, were found holed up in the Russian Embassy. This first successful use of significant military force since the rescue of the vessel Mayaguez from Cambodian forces during the Ford Administration had the additional benefit of ending tyranny on Grenada. U.S. combat forces left on December 12, just six weeks after they landed on the island.

A REIGN OF TERROR

The crisis began on October 19, when Prime Minister Maurice Bishop, who had been placed under house arrest by hard-core Stalinists six days earlier, was released by a crowd of supporters led by Foreign Minister Unison Whiteman. Elements of the People's Revolutionary Army then moved in and fired on the crowd, killing up to 100 people. They took the prime minister, foreign minister and other cabinet members prisoner, and then brutally murdered them.

The execution of the nation's leadership was followed by the imposition of a curfew, with a warning that no one was to go outside for four days and violators would be shot on sight. The airport was closed, preventing departure of the American medical students or anyone else. The commander of the People's Revolutionary Army, General Hudson Austin, was

ostensibly in charge, but General Austin visited the vice chancellor of the medical university "in a terrible state" and said he didn't see how he could be in charge of the country when he wasn't even in charge of himself. The other states in the Eastern Caribbean were getting the clear impression that the Grenadan army was little more than a gang of murderous thugs, who had imposed a reign of terror on the island.

With a regular army of 1,200 and a militia estimated at 2,500, supplemented by 784 armed Cubans and a huge arsenal of weapons, the Grenadan-Cuban forces dwarfed those of the other OECS islands, which have from no military to armies totaling less than 200 men. Considering the Cuban presence, large stocks of arms and the existence on Grenada of 100 motorized boats that could reach any of the islands, the OECS members were understandably concerned for the safety of their peaceful and undefended islands (the OECS consists of Antigua-Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, the Grenadines, St. Kitts-Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Montserrat).

THE OECS ASKS FOR HELP

Eugenia Charles, Prime Minister of Dominica and Chairman of the OECS, later testified before Congress that when the OECS met on October 21 to consider the crisis on Grenada "it didn't take us more than half an hour to decide that intervention was necessary." Grenada was without a government, legal or otherwise, and the only legitimate authority, Governor General Sir Paul Scoon, had sent a message through diplomatic channels asking both the OECS and the U.S. for help. While the mini-states were willing to intervene, an attack by some 300 soldiers and police from the other islands, the largest force they could muster, would be no match for the much larger and heavily armed Grenadan-Cuban forces.

But United States forces were available. With the price of

delay in the Iranian hostage crisis fresh in mind, U.S. officials were taking no chances. On October 20, the day after the murders, the aircraft carrier *Independence*, its naval battle group and the Marine amphibious squadron it was escorting to Lebanon, were ordered to divert to the Eastern Caribbean. The next day, Washington received a request from the OECS for intervention, noting the lack of authority in Grenada and the threat to the peace and security of the region.

Prime Minister Charles has stated emphatically that the OECS asked the U.S. to intervene and not the other way around, pointing out that the OECS member states were very fearful of communist domination of the whole Eastern Caribbean and knew they were helpless to prevent it.

Once the mission began, all major objectives were taken in four days, and military operations were complete within one week. The U.S. troops departed themselves exceptionally well, provided medical and humanitarian assistance to the population, tried to minimize damage to Grenadan property, and left six weeks after they arrived, turning the security of the island over to an OECS police force. As a consequence, the vast majority of Caribbean people are pleased with the results of the intervention. Good will for the U.S. in general and president Reagan in particular remains exceptionally high, both on Grenada and throughout the non-communist Caribbean.

THE IMPACT IN THE AREA

A large volume of documents was captured on Grenada, revealing that the Grenadan revolutionary party, the New Jewel Movement, consisted mainly of a dedicated group of communists committed to strengthening ties with Cuba and the USSR. The documents show that Moscow considered Cuba, Nicaragua and Grenada to be in their camp, providing them with a trio of bases that formed a triangle around the Caribbean. The 10,000 foot runway that was under construction on Grenada would have greatly increased Soviet air supply capabilities to Central and South America. The documents indicated that the Soviets believed that Suriname, Belize and El Salvador were ripe for communist subversion.

An immediate impact was felt in Suriname, which had been collaborating closely with Cuba and was moving toward the communist camp. Within hours of the U.S. landing on Grenada, Suriname ruler Col. Dési Bouterse took action to reduce the Communist presence by ordering the departure of the Cuban ambassador and 105 other Cubans, and suspending Suriname's economic aid agreement with Havana. The intervention had a demoralizing effect on the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and caused a reassessment by the guerrillas in El Salvador. Both now know they can expect no help from Moscow or Havana in a showdown, and they have noted with concern that the Cubans on Grenada failed to follow Castro's orders to fight to the death. This apprehension has led the Nicaraguan government, at least rhetorically, to moderate its posture to avoid antagonizing the U.S.

The Soviets lost one point of a Caribbean triangle and a major staging base for subversion in Central America. Their hopes for subverting the Caribbean island states suffered a serious setback. The loss of the Grenadan airbase has ended for now the possibility of an easier supply route to Nicaragua, the El Salvador guerrillas and other potential Soviet clients in Central and South America. Soviet and Cuban support for revolutionary groups in Latin America must be much less popular to such groups now than it was before their ignominious departure from Grenada.

LESSONS LEARNED

Following are some of the lessons learned at Grenada: ***Decisiveness can be crucial.*** The comparison between President Carter's indecisive handling of the Iranian hostage crisis and President Reagan's action in Grenada is striking. There always are those who will argue against military action, no matter what the circumstances, and those who will argue for delay. But delay often proves fatal. Margaret Thatcher rejected the recommendations for delay from her foreign office and won a military victory in the Falklands that restored the world stature of Britain. President Reagan's bold decisiveness in Grenada had a similar effect on U.S. morale and sent a message to friend and foe alike that America finally was over the policy paralysis caused by Vietnam. Early in the crisis, the President decided that U.S. action to rescue the U.S. medical students was essential—he would permit no more Iranians for America. This presidential decisiveness pre-empted any objections or arguments for delay that might normally have been raised within the Administration.

Secrecy is essential. The furor raised by much of the media because it was not informed during the early stages of the military operation quickly subsided when it became clear that the public was not sympathetic. The confidentiality of the operation code-named "Urgent Fury" during the five day planning phase that began on October 20 with an early morning meeting of the National Security Council's Crisis Planning Group was reminiscent of World War II secrecy. The initial meeting, to assess the situation following the October 19 murder of Grenadan government leaders, was followed by precautionary moves of the fleet and then, after receipt of the OECS request for intervention, full-scale assault planning. Tight security was maintained throughout, contributing to the success of the mission.

Good intelligence is important. The planning for "Urgent Fury" was handicapped by a lack of operational intelligence about what was actually happening on Grenada. There also was a lack of recent intelligence photographs of the island (which was quickly remedied by overflights of SR-71s) and insufficient knowledge of its hydrography to plan amphibious operations. Two small-boat sailors in the task force who were familiar with the waters of the island, and a reconnaissance by SEALs, provided the information. But the need for good intelligence, even in a small operation close to home, was apparent. The importance to possible military operations of human intelligence via both CIA and military attaché activities around the world cannot be underestimated.

Light and mobile military forces are needed. The operation highlighted the importance of the Marine amphibious forces and light infantry for use in limited operations in the third world. The readiness and rapid deployability of such forces are especially important. In the wake of the Grenada experience, both the Pentagon and Congress should assure that rapid deployment forces and their required support are not shortchanged in the defense budget.

Effective military coordination is important. The Administration wisely issued orders to the Pentagon and then turned the planning and execution over to the uniformed experts. Problems, when they arose, were skillfully overcome without "rudder orders" from the White House. Any deficiencies in the ability to operate jointly were solved by the nature of the operation, which effectively separated the services from each other on the island. But that may not be possible in future operations, in which case effective inter-service coordination will be important.

The warnings were right. For a number of months, information from Caribbean sources indicated that the Soviet-Cuban takeover of Grenada was much more extensive than generally believed. These reports were dismissed by much of the media as anti-communist alarmism. As it turned out, the warnings were right (so was the CIA, which had made a highly accurate assessment of the extent of Soviet-Cuban involvement). Nonetheless, revelations of extensive Soviet-Cuban control of the island, secret agreements with communist countries, a major arms buildup, and even a disinformation campaign to mislead U.S. public opinion, came as a surprise to many Americans. In the future, warnings of communist subversive activities should be given greater credence.

The Monroe Doctrine is alive and well. The mission to Grenada made clear to the world, and particularly to the

Soviets and their proxies, that the U.S. would intervene in countries of the Western Hemisphere if necessary to protect American citizens or prevent a takeover by totalitarian forces aligned with the Soviets or Cuba. The Grenada action was based first on the danger to American citizens and second on the OECS appeal for help in the absence of governmental authority. But the sandbox that was upset was full of Russians and their proxies. Although Castro called on his "construction workers" to fight to the death, the Soviets carefully stayed out of the whole affair. One important signal conveyed by the mission was that the U.S. will protect its citizens and its interests in the Western Hemisphere. Another, surely noted by communist revolutionaries, was that neither the Russians nor the Cubans can be relied upon to support their proxies in this part of the world when the going gets rough.

Soviet Information Control

by Paul A. Smith, Jr.

It is wrong, a British statesman observed of Nazi Germany, to regard a nation with unalterable suspicion. But what, he asked, if that nation gives unalterable cause? A similar dilemma faces those today who ask what in the Soviet pattern of behavior is alterable, and what is unalterable. It is increasingly clear that the systematic distortion of truth is one of the unalterable features of the Soviet system.

But recently there have been alterations in the controls Soviet leaders exercise over access to information from the West, and they have been for the worse. Telephone calls, mail, and parcel deliveries now are blocked or seriously impeded. Jamming of radio broadcasts is intensified. Attempts by western diplomats to speak over Soviet media are rudely refused. Vituperation of the West, its spokesmen, and its literature has increased. Traditional Russian xenophobia is again in full cry.

Those who continue to hope that this unpleasant feature of Soviet power may change should look fully into the serious scholarship on Soviet media and communications practices. For example, a recent Rand report documents convincingly the conclusion that when there are periods of relative tolerance in Soviet intellectual life, and a modest increase in access to information from the West, it is because the central leadership chooses to allow it, and when it chooses to stop it, it has no trouble in doing so. In Russia, both tolerance and repression come from above, not from below. And Lenin and his successor dictators have regarded the monopoly of mass media as absolutely essential to their political control.

The Soviet form of information control is not partial or selective. Unlike most western forms of autocracy, it is total. Frederick the Great once said that he did not mind what his subjects thought or said as long as they obeyed him. Communist regimes mind very much what people think, and they are paranoid about what they say. Immense resources are devoted to assuring not only that people do not say what is forbidden, but that they say frequently what is desired by the regime.

Blocking alien ideas is the function of two organs, *Glavlit* and the KGB. *Glavlit* is concerned with censoring state secrets which may creep into Soviet media. It is a formidable job, since most government activities are secret. *Glavlit's* rulings are backed by the intimidation of the KGB. Since the death of Stalin, both organs have tended to function according to rulings which, however oppressive and incomprehensi-

ble to western minds, are understood and accepted in helpless resignation by most Russians.

The entry of informational material into Russia is tightly controlled at Soviet borders by the State Customs Administration, also backed by the KGB. This process, in the words of the most recent State Department report on implementation of the Helsinki Final Act, is "extremely restricted." Another barrier to the free exchange of information is the jamming of foreign radio broadcasts. The intensity of Soviet jamming has fluctuated over the years, depending on the internal security needs of the Soviet leadership and the status of East-West relations. Currently, jamming is on the increase in both scope and intensity.

Transformation of Western ideas and concepts is another information control device. It is only effective as part of a total system on the Soviet model, which enjoys a monopoly of communications channels and promulgates and enforces an official, all-pervasive ideology, such as Marxism-Leninism. In this environment, words like bourgeoisie, peace, democracy, and aggression, acquire special and unique meanings. They have become so deeply imbedded in ordinary discourse that it comes as a surprise to most Soviet intellectuals to discover that they could have any other meanings.

Like other closed societies around the world, the USSR also has such means of communication as journals, newspapers, radio and TV programs, universities and libraries. What is different in the Soviet system is their hierarchical subordination to the Party, and within the Party, to the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee Secretariat. It is in the Party Secretariat that decisions are made on what themes, ideas and topics can be presented to the Soviet reader. It is also here that decisions are made through the *nomenklatura* system about who will get jobs in the Soviet media.

By controlling personnel appointments to top media positions, the Propaganda Department dominates the intellectual processes of a multi-national empire of 267 million people. It also exercises a veto power over the allocation of funds and—most important for publishers—paper supplies. Alert responsiveness to the Party line, as set by the General Secretary of the Party, is the duty of every media official in the USSR. The editors and writers themselves are the key instruments of the Party's political control of the media.

Continued on page 4



Insiders Report

Tracking the Policy Process in Washington



New Poll on National Security Issues: During the two week period from June 26 to July 9 the Sindlinger national polling organization conducted a nationwide poll commissioned by the Heritage Foundation of 2,258 persons on U.S.-Soviet relations and other security issues. The results show that the public believes by a huge margin that the Soviets cannot be trusted. Also, a significant majority supports a policy of countering the Soviet threat, including deployment of the anti-ballistic missile defense known as "Star Wars."

The gist of some of the questions and the results:

• Do you believe that the USSR is violating its arms control agreements?

Yes	96.8%
No	.5%
Don't know	2.7%

• Should the U.S. enter into an arms control treaty with the USSR that does not absolutely assure that the U.S. can verify that the USSR is observing that treaty?

Yes	4.8%
No	95.0%
Don't know	.2%

• Should the U.S. offer concessions to lure the Soviets back to negotiations or remain firm and only offer concessions if Moscow does?

U.S. Should offer concessions	35.1%
Offer concessions only if the Soviets do	62.8%
Don't know	2.1%

• Would you favor developing a system which would protect much, if not all, of the population from nuclear destruction, by a ballistic missile defense?

Yes	82.6%
No	15.2%
Don't know	2.2%

• Should the U.S. encourage or support dissidents and

ethnic minorities in Eastern Europe and the USSR with the objective of political liberalization in these countries?

Yes	72.0%
No	19.9%
Don't know	8.1%

• Would you say that the situation in Central America is a threat to the security of the U.S.?

Yes	66.5%
No	32.6%
Don't know	.9%

State Department Bonuses: A list of 85 recipients of executive bonuses for senior career foreign service officers has been released by the State Department. It includes five bonuses of \$20,000 each, 39 at \$10,000 and 26 at lesser amounts. The recipients are selected by boards of fellow foreign service officers, who may be friends or even subordinates of the candidates. In the rest of the government, decisions on executive bonuses are made by management, i.e., by the President's appointees. But the foreign service has agreed with its labor unions to preclude management from participating in the decision making process, to prevent the "politicization" of the foreign service. Some contend that the real effect is to prevent the Administration from exercising its management responsibilities.

The 1984 awards include \$20,000 for **Charles Bray**, who was **President Carter's** deputy director of the U.S. Information Agency for four years, and \$10,000 each for **Thomas Enders**, relieved earlier this year as Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America, and **Michael Armacost**, recently named Under Secretary for Political Affairs over conservative objections. Most surprising was a \$20,000 top bonus for **Ronald Spiers**, who as Under Secretary for Management is in overall charge of the bonus program. Pity the poor board members—it is tough to vote against a bonus for the boss.

Soviet Information Control (Cont. from p. 3)

What are the results of these massive investments in thought control? How much of the propaganda is sloughed off as tendentious nonsense, and how much sticks? The short answer is that much of the Party line, especially on foreign affairs, gains at least partial acceptance. Michigan State University sociologist Boris Shlapentokh draws a distinction between propaganda about everyday life in the USSR, on which the Party line gains little acceptance because people can see where it is false, and conditions in the outside world, where they cannot.

Russians see things differently in matters relating to the outside world than non-Russians, who comprise nearly half the Soviet population. Roughly grouped in 15 national republics, all Soviet citizens are subject to the same propaganda from Moscow, but not all are equally susceptible. The Baltic republics and others on the western border, such as Ukraine, retain a different awareness of the West and its values than Russians. Although overrun by Nazi Germany, many were more impressed by Germany's—and Europe's—post-war recovery than by German wartime excesses.

The forty million Central Asian Turks have their own religious and historical framework from which they view the world, only partially modified by the imposition of Russian imperial power. Urbanization, industrialization, and literacy may not have created a sense of gratitude toward the Russians who brought these forces to Central Asia, but the changes did have the effect of making the Turks susceptible to the impact of modern mass media.

Russian propaganda and agitation, coupled with Party organization, have been regarded by Moscow as the most important of domestic activities. Internally, no other aspect of rule enjoys as much intense and continuous attention by the Politburo. Konstantin Chernenko, who spent his entire professional life involved in these activities, is not likely to diminish their importance. His firm commitment to and effective use of the instruments of propaganda to assure Party control are essential to his political survival. Any meaningful moderation of total state control of information in Soviet society should not be expected.

Paul A. Smith, Jr. is the Editor of Problems of Communism. The views contained herein are those of the author and not necessarily those of USIA or the U.S. Government.

✓ Checklist of Upcoming Issues

An October Surprise? The Soviets are so bitterly opposed to President Reagan and his policies that the possibility of an October surprise to try to influence the election is being given real credence in Washington. The greatest concern is focused on Central America, where the Soviets support a proxy government in Nicaragua and guerrilla forces in El Salvador. The flow of communist supplies and equipment to the guerrillas has increased considerably over the past several months. A guerrilla attack aimed at humiliating the Duarte government and embarrassing the United States, in the style of a "Tet offensive," is considered a real possibility. A less ambitious effort might be an attempt to assassinate Americans in El Salvador, in an effort to promote dissatisfaction with the Administration's Central American policy.

Sen. **Daniel P. Moynihan** (D-NY) recently called attention to another way in which the Soviets might try to create a crisis. In a statement before the Senate on August 9, the senator noted that the new Punta Huete airfield under construction about 30 kilometers from Managua will have a longer runway than Andrews Air Force Base and will be able to handle any aircraft in the Soviet inventory. Nicaragua has admitted that its new airfield is for military purposes. A defector has reported that Nicaraguans are receiving flight training in MIGs in Bulgaria and that MIGs now in Cuba will be transferred to Nicaragua when the pilots are trained.

Sen. Moynihan expressed concern that the Soviets could cause a major international crisis in a matter of hours by moving Backfire bombers or MIG fighters into Nicaragua. That would create a situation, he said, that the United States could not allow. "If Nicaragua invites the Soviets to establish themselves on the mainland . . . the result would be a situation the United States as a responsible world power could not and would not accept. We would move instantly to reverse it."

Status of the MX: The House voted to freeze production, while in the Senate the MX survived on a 48-48 tie vote (broken by **Vice President Bush**). The House-Senate conferees have been unable to reconcile their differences, and the prospects for MX funding are uncertain in the Appropriations Committee. As a result, the Defense Department may have to operate on a continuing resolution until after the election. Since **President Reagan** supports the MX and **Walter Mondale** opposes it, the election should settle the issue. But if there is another MX vote before the election, the views of the top authorities on U.S.-Soviet arms control negotiations should be considered.

- Amb. **Edward L. Rowley**, Chairman of the START Delegation:

"A failure of the Congress to authorize continued procurement and deployment of the MX would reward the Soviets for their intransigence and seriously undermine our negotiations. The MX is not a bargaining chip. Rather, it is necessary for our security, for deterrence, and for crisis stability. It encourages the Soviets to bargain in good faith. Failure to authorize MX production and deployment would, in my view, encourage the Soviets to stay away from the negotiating table."

- Amb. **Paul H. Nitze**, U.S. Representative to the INF Negotiations:

"Personally, I am concerned that a . . . vote against MX will send a message to Moscow harmful to U.S. interests. I believe the Soviets' decision to walk out of the INF negotiations and to refuse to set a date for the resumption of the START negotiations was prompted by a calculation that the absence of negotiations would stir anxieties . . . and create pressures for unilateral concessions on arms control questions . . . Rejection of MX would send precisely the wrong signal, i.e., that the Soviet campaign was bearing fruit."

- **Eugene V. Rostow**, former Director of ACDA:


"A vote against MX . . . would doom any hope there may be of obtaining fair and balanced nuclear arms agreements with the Soviet Union based on the principle of Soviet-American equality. The Soviet Union has walked out of the Geneva talks and is trying other tactics to exploit the pressures of the American election in order to force us to accept agreements based on Soviet nuclear superiority . . . The defeat of MX now would thus be an act of pre-emptive capitulation."

Afghans Need Better Weapons: A major deficiency of the aid reaching the Afghan resistance fighters is the poor quality of some of the weapons being delivered. Thus far, aid has been limited to Russian equipment. The most serious problems have been with the SA-7 heat-seeking anti-aircraft missile and the 82mm mortar. The SA-7 is the Soviet counterpart to the U.S. Redeye shoulder-fired rocket, but it has long been considered an inferior weapon. Used extensively by the Egyptians and Syrians in the 1973 Yom Kippur War and subsequently in the Lebanese fighting, its record in both conflicts was zero kills against combat aircraft. Even against helicopters, the effectiveness of the SA-7 has been very poor. Likewise, the Soviet 82mm mortar is deficient in range and accuracy for use in the mountainous terrain of Afghanistan.

Afghan resistance leaders have been pleading for better weapons, but the Administration is anxious to prevent the U.S. from being identified as a source of supply. What appears needed is a better coordinated international effort to provide the best available western weapons for the type of conflict the Afghans are fighting. The U.S. Stinger ground-to-air missile, which the Administration wants to send to Jordan and Saudi Arabia, would be a major improvement over the SA-7. The very effective Finnish or British 81mm mortars would meet the need for that type of equipment. As the Soviets did not hesitate to supply North Vietnam with large quantities of their equipment for its war of aggression, the West should do no less for the Afghans in their heroic struggle against communism. This urgent need deserves early, high level attention.

Resolution to Repudiate Yalta: Last February Sen. **Robert Kasten** (R-Wis) introduced in the Senate a resolution to renounce the 1945 Yalta agreement that had the result of putting Eastern Europe in the Soviet sphere of influence. The resolution went nowhere. Then on a recent visit to a captive nations meeting in Illinois, Sen. **Charles Percy** (R-Ill) was surprised to find himself being attacked by the ethnic community for not moving the resolution in the Foreign Relations Committee. The senator returned to Washington determined to do something about it. Meanwhile, **President Reagan** was received enthusiastically when he spoke in Chicago on the 40th anniversary of the Warsaw uprising, sharply criticizing the Soviets for not holding free elections in Eastern Europe, and stating that the U.S. does not accept the present situation there as permanent.

The resolution now is being reworded from a renunciation of the Yalta agreement to a repudiation of the consequences of that agreement, to make it clear that the objection is not to the agreement itself, but to Soviet non-compliance with its call for free elections in the countries of Eastern Europe. The prospects for Senate action are believed to have improved considerably.



Suggested Reading

On Grenada:

- Ashby, Timothy. "Grenada: Soviet Stepping Stone." *Proceedings—U.S. Naval Institute*, December 1983, pp. 30-35.
- Bennett, Ralph K. "Grenada: Anatomy of a 'Go' Decision." *Reader's Digest*, February 1984, pp. 72-77.
- Byron, Michael J. "Fury from the Sea: Marines in Grenada." *Proceedings/Naval Review* 1984, pp. 119-131.
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- Connell-Smith, Gordon. "The Grenada Invasion in Historical Perspective: from Monroe to Reagan." *Third World Quarterly*, April 1984, pp. 432-445.
- Dieguez, Richard P. "The Grenada Intervention: 'Illegal' in Form, Sound as Policy." *NYU Journal of International Law and Politics*, Summer 1984, pp. 1167-1204.
- "Grenada: Collective Action by the Caribbean Peace Force." *Department of State Bulletin*, December 1983, pp. 67-82.
- "JCS Replies to Criticism." *Army*, August 1984, pp. 28-37.
- Kirkpatrick, Jeane J. "The U.N. and Grenada: A Speech Never Delivered." *Strategic Review*, Winter 1984, pp. 11-18.
- Kolb, Richard K. "Restoring Order South of the Border." *Proceedings—U.S. Naval Institute*, July 1984.
- Lynch, Edward A. "Bold Action in Grenada: Countering a Soviet Threat." *Background*, The Heritage Foundation, October 26, 1983.
- Mas, Jorge L. "Grenada Aftermath: Implications for U.S. Policy." *Cuban Update*, August 1984, pp. 5-8.
- Moore, John Norton. *Law and the Grenada Mission*, Charlottesville, Va., Univ. of Virginia School of Law, 1984.
- Motley, James B. "Grenada: Low-Intensity Conflict and the Use of U.S. Military Power." *World Affairs*, Winter 1983-84, pp. 221-238.
- Naipul, V.S. "An Island Betrayed." *Harper's*, March 1984, pp. 61-72.
- Owens, MacKubin T. "The Utility of Force." *Background*, The Heritage Foundation, August 1, 1984.
- "Report of the Delegation to Eastern Caribbean and South American Countries." House Armed Services Committee, February 1984.
- Valenta, Jiri and Virginia. "Leninism in Grenada." *Problems of Communism*, July-August 1984, pp. 1-23.
- Wiarda, Howard J. "Aftermath of Grenada: The Impact of the U.S. Action on Revolutionary Prospects in Central America." Address to the Conference on Soviet/Cuban Strategy in the Third World after Grenada at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Calif., Aug. 15-18, 1984.
- Zeybel, Henry. "Gunships at Grenada." *National Defense*, February 1984, pp. 53-56.

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

November 23, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM:

CHRISTOPHER M. LEEHAN

SUBJECT:

Grenada Event Correspondence

Attached at Tab II is a letter which was sent to President Reagan in care of my office. The letter is from Miss Kathleen Major who was on the dias with the President at the Grenada Students' Ceremony in the East Room last month.

The letter is very heartwarming and you may wish to have the President review it personally. If not, I have prepared a memo (Tab I) and draft response (Tab A) which you may wish to send to Anne Higgins.

Walt Raymond and Oliver North concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward Miss Major's letter to the President for his review.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Or, alternatively, that you sign the memo to Anne Higgins and forward it with the draft response.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memo for Signature

Tab A Draft Response

Tab II Incoming letter from Kathleen Major

TAB I

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

MEMORANDUM FOR ANNE HIGGINS

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT

SUBJECT: Letter from Kathleen Major to the President

At Tab A is a draft response to Ms. Kathleen Major, a former American medical student at St. George's University, in Grenada. The letter responds to Ms. Major's touching letter to the President which describes her feelings of the liberation of Grenada and the pride she felt when she was on the dias with the President at the Ceremony with the University of St. George's Medical Students on October 24, 1984.

Attachment

Tab A Draft Response

TAB A

Dear Ms. Major,

Thank you very much for your letter of October 31, 1984. I appreciate your kind words and your support.

As I look forward to another term of office it is my fervent hope that there will be no need for rescue missions for American citizens overseas. I am pleased that you are again able to pursue your studies and I know you will one day make a competent and dedicated physician.

Sincerely,

TAB II

St. George's University School of Medicine
Sunset Crest
St. James, Barbados
October 31, 1984

Dear President Reagan,

Words will never be able to express the emotional impact my brief encounter with you had upon me.

When I first learned that I was to present the student's appreciation plaque to you, I was shocked, excited, honored, and frightened. The realness of it all soon became apparent, and I asked if I might please see the plaque, read the message it bore, and most of all, hold it in my arms to gain a feeling for it. I was permitted to take it and familiarize myself with the inscription. Somehow, that did not seem to be enough. While the message was beautiful and sincere, it was written by someone else, and I wanted so desperately to share with you the feelings I had deep inside of me. I

asked permission to say a few words, and went away by myself to collect my thoughts. I wrote a few lines which would not only tell the world of the sorrow, pride and joy I felt on the Grenada anniversary, but also share a small part of me with you.

When you mentioned me in your speech and expressed your gratitude, I was truly touched by your sincerity. After I gave you the plaque, and you kissed my cheek and embraced me, I recognized a very strong and brave man who was not afraid to show warmth and gentleness. And finally, when I looked into your eyes and saw how touched you were, I knew somehow, you understood all I wanted you to know. Thank you for sharing a part of you with me.

For a grown woman to say she has felt like Cinderella may sound silly, but that's how it was when for one brief moment I felt very special in the eyes of our President.

The events of October 1983 have given me a new sense of pride, joy, respect, and most of all, a feeling once again of Americanism. A brief sharing of these feelings with you on a memorable day in October 1984, has helped to make them a part of me forever. Once again, I thank you from the bottom of my heart.

Respectfully,

Kathleen Major

Major
S.G. U.S.O.M.
Sunset Crest
St. James, Barbados



President Ronald Reagan
C/o Mr. Christopher Lehman, Special Asst. to the
President for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. USA

8576

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Respectfully,

Kathleen Major

Major
S.G. U.S.O.M.
Sunset Crest
St. James, Barbados



President Ronald Reagan
C/o Mr. Christopher Lehman, Special Asst. to the
President for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. USA

file Grenada

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

FOR RELEASE AT 3:15 pm EDT
WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 24, 1984

TEXT OF REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT
AT CEREMONY WITH UNIVERSITY OF ST. GEORGE'S
MEDICAL STUDENTS

Together, we celebrate today with joy an anniversary of honor for America: your rescue and the liberation of our neighbor, Grenada, from the grip of oppression and tyranny. Just one year ago, Grenada's Governor General Paul Scoon and members of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States called for our help.

Using military force is the most serious decision any president must make, an awesome responsibility. But the evidence to me was clear: At stake was the freedom of 110,000 Grenadians, the security of the democracies of the Eastern Caribbean, and yes, most important, the safety and well-being of you American medical students trapped by events totally beyond your control. So we approved a military operation to rescue you, to help the people of Grenada, and to prevent the spread of chaos and totalitarianism throughout the Caribbean.

Side by side with forces from neighboring Caribbean democracies, the brave young soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen accomplished their mission. They went to Grenada not to conquer, but to liberate. And they did. They saved the people, they captured tons of Soviet military equipment, and they averted a hostage crisis before it happened. And then those combat troops left the island, so the Grenadian people could start a new life and give peace, freedom, democracy, and self-determination a chance.

But today, over 100,000 Soviet troops are still ravaging Afghanistan. There is a fundamental moral distinction between the Grenada rescue mission and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan -- a brutal and bloody conquest that aims to destroy freedom, democracy, and self-determination. It's the difference between totalitarianism and democracy, between tyranny and freedom. And it gives all of us hope for the future to know that you see this difference that others should have seen from the very beginning.

During the latter part of the 1970's, America passed through a period of self-doubt and national confusion. We talked and acted like a nation in decline and the world believed us. Many questioned our will to continue as a leader of the Western Alliance and to remain a force for good in the world.

I believe this period of self-doubt is over. History will record that one of the turning points came on a small island in the Caribbean where America went to take care of her own, and to rescue a neighboring nation from a growing tyranny.

Our brave military personnel displayed that same love of liberty and personal courage which has made our nation great and kept her free.

This courage and love of country is also what we saw in Beirut, and we will always honor those brave Americans. Let no one doubt that those brave men were heroes every bit as much in their peacekeeping mission, as were our soldiers in their rescue mission in Grenada.

MORE

(OVER)

And we continue to see this devotion and commitment every day, on the D.M.Z. in Korea, on the NATO lines in Europe, at bases from Diego Garcia to Guam, and on our ships at sea. Young Americans are proudly wearing the uniform of our country and serving with the same distinction as those who came before.

Cicero once said, "Courage is that virtue which champions the cause of right." With us today is a small contingent of military personnel, a few of the heroes who took part in the rescue mission, two each from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines. Thank you for joining us today. We're all very grateful to you.

Also here is Miss Kathleen Major, who was a medical student and a registered nurse one year ago. When the fighting erupted, she immediately went to work treating the wounded.

Nineteen brave men died during the Grenada rescue, serving their country and the cause of freedom. One of them was Sean Luketina, a paratrooper grievously wounded by a rocket. He was evacuated to Puerto Rico and there in the hospital slipped in and out of a coma. His father, Col. Robin Luketina, a retired military officer who is here with us today, rushed to his bedside. And, Col. Luketina, I'm told that, in one of those moments when your son regained consciousness, you asked Sean, "Son, was it worth it?" "Yes, Dad," Sean answered. "Would you do it again?" And he looked up at you and said, "Hell, yes, Dad." A few months ago, Sean died of his wounds.

Sean Luketina gave his life in the cause of freedom. He did not die in vain. The young Americans he helped to rescue know that. The liberated people of Grenada know that. Grenada's neighbors know that. And Sean himself knows. Let us honor him as he would have wished -- by keeping faith with a policy of peace and deterrence that assures the survival of our freedom, and keeps alive the hope of freedom for all the peoples of the world. This is the meaning of peace through strength. And let us always remember that America is the land of the free. Because we are the home of the brave.

To Sean and all the men and women who serve the cause of freedom, and to all of you students who are dedicating yourselves to saving human life -- you are the hope of America; you are America's future.

Thank you for what you do and God bless you all.

#

hold till
Oct 30

GRENADA ARCHIVES PROJECT

-- NATIONAL DEBATE ON AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY ON OCTOBER 25, 1984.

-- ISSUES OF DEBATE:

"WHAT IS THE CORRECT AMERICAN RESPONSE TO THREATS TO
OUR NATIONAL SECURITY?"

"WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT AND ITS
RELATIONSHIP TO SOVIET UNION AND CUBAN
INVOLVEMENT IN THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES?"

-- FOCUS OF DEBATE:

THE GRENADA OPERATION - OCTOBER, 1983

THE GRENADA ARCHIVES; Ledeen and Romerstein, (1984, U.S.GPO)

-- DEBATE SETTING:

- 1) THE MEDIA
- 2) COLLEGE CAMPUSES
- 3) CIVIC FORUMS

GRENADA ARCHIVES PROJECT: CORE AGENDA

PHASE A: GRENADA ARCHIVES

- PUBLIC RELEASE OF GRENADA ARCHIVES; Ledeen and
Romerstein, (1984)
- PUBLIC CEREMONY ON OPENING OF GRENADA ARCHIVES
- NATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF GRENADA ARCHIVES TO:
 - 1) STUDENT ACTIVISTS ON 117 CAMPUSES
 - 2) COLLEGE FACULTY AND OTHER ACADEMICIANS
 - 3) CIVIC GROUPS
 - 4) MEDIA EDITORIAL OUTLETS
- EDITORIAL AND GENERAL MEDIA TOUR FOR AUTHORS LEDEEN, ROMERSTEIN
AND CONGRESSIONAL PARTICIPANTS

GRENADA ARCHIVES PROJECT: CORE AGENDA

PHASE B: GRENADA OPERATION ANNIVERSARY

STUDENT GROUP ACTIVITIES

WEDNESDAY, OCT. 24, 1984 (Washington, D.C.)

- RELEASED MEDICAL STUDENTS MEET WITH PRESIDENT
- BIPARTISAN RECEPTION FOR MEDICAL STUDENTS
- NATIONAL AIRING OF DOCUMENTARY ON GRENADA VIA SATELLITE

THURSDAY, OCT. 25, 1984 (117 CAMPUSES NATIONWIDE)

- LOCAL PRESS CONFERENCE WITH MEDICAL STUDENTS
- NATIONAL AIRING OF 1 HOUR FILM ON GRENADA
- "STUDENT LIBERATION DAY" RALLY ON CAMPUS
- TEACH IN: -- SPEECHES BY MEDICAL STUDENTS
 -- CAMPUS SPONSORED DEBATES ON GRENADA
- EVENING RECEPTION FOR MEDICAL STUDENTS

CIVIC GROUP ACTIVITIES

- MEETINGS CENTERED ON DOCUMENTARY AIRING
- SPONSOR DEBATES OR DISCUSSIONS ON GRENADA
- HOST SPEAKERS ON ISSUES OF DEBATE

CONGRESSIONAL ACTIVITIES (BIPARTISAN)

- MEMBERS AND CHALLENGERS HOLD TOWN HALL MEETINGS AND PRESS
 CONFERENCES ON GRENADA
- MEMBERS AND CHALLENGES PARTICIPATE IN CAMPUS AND CIVIC GROUP
 FORUMS

GRENADA ARCHIVES PROJECT

WHAT WE NEED FROM YOU:

1. AGREEMENT TO SPEED UP INITIAL DELIVERY DATE OF GRENADA ARCHIVES TO NO LATER THAN OCT. 1, 1984.

2. COMMITMENT TO PURCHASE AND DISTRIBUTE NATIONALLY TO MEDIA AND COLLEGE CAMPUSES COPIES OF GRENADA ARCHIVES

MINIMUM ESTIMATE: 300 copies for media
500 copies for student groups
500 copies for civic groups
2500 copies for faculty

TOTAL 3800 copies

3. COMMITMENT TO SIGN A COVER LETTER (SEE ATTACHMENT A) FOR DISTRIBUTION TO MEDIA
4. COMMITMENT TO SIGN A COVER LETTER (SEE ATTACHMENT B) FOR DISTRIBUTION TO CAMPUSES
5. COMMITMENT TO SIGN A COVER LETTER (SEE ATTACHMENT C) FOR DISTRIBUTION TO CIVIC GROUPS
6. COMMITMENT TO PUT GRENADA ARCHIVES OPENING CEREMONY ON HIGH PROFILE FOR MEDIA COVERAGE

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89882	MEMO RONALD SABLE TO LINDA BENNETT RE GRENADA EVENT (PARTIAL)	1	10/23/1984	B6

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

October 23, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR LINDA BENNETT

FROM: RONALD K. SABLE

SUBJECT: Grenada Event/October 24, 1984

Linda, in checking on activities associated with the Grenada event tomorrow, I find the following individuals have been invited to attend. NSC supports their attendance.

Morrissey, Donald
Sacharanski, John
McConnell, Alan
Flaherty, Peter
Luketina, Robin



66

A review of the letter to B. from Rep. Gingrich does not reveal any additional individuals NSC would recommend inviting to the Grenada event.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 18, 1984

TO: M. B. OGLESBY, JR.
FROM: PAM TURNER
SUBJECT: Suggested Invitees for October 24 Grenada Event

Senator Charles Percy
Senator Jesse Helms
Senator Bob Kasten
Senator Barry Goldwater
Senator John Tower
Senator Howard Baker

Senator Claiborne Pell
Senator Ed Zorinsky
Senator Dan Inouye
Senator Pat Moynihan
Senator Sam Nunn

As we receive regrets on these, we would like to invite:

Senator Dick Lugar
Senator Charles Mathias
Senator Nancy Kassebaum
Senator Rudy Boschwitz
Senator Larry Pressler
Senator Frank Murkowski
Senator Paula Hawkins

~~Senator Joseph Biden~~
Senator Chris Dodd
Senator Dennis DeConcini
Senator Bennett Johnston

OK f30

Social Office.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 19, 1985

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done
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MEMORANDUM FOR ~~M. B. OGLESBY, JR.~~

FROM: DENNIS THOMAS

SUBJECT: Recommended House Members for Grenada Event

The following are our recommendations for the Grenada event:

Duncan Hunter (R-California)
Newt Gingrich (R-Georgia)
Mark Siljander (R-Michigan)
Vin Weber (R-Minnesota)
Ken Robinson (R-Virginia)
William Broomfield (R-Michigan)
Henry Hyde (R-Illinois)
Connie Mack (R-Florida)
Dan Coats (R-Indiana)
Robert Walker (R-Pennsylvania)

Sonny Montgomery (D-Mississippi)
Ike Skelton (D-Missouri)
Sam Stratton (D-New York)

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89883	LIST RE CONGRESSIONAL STAFFERS (PARTIAL)	1	ND	B6

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To Chris Lehman

Congressional Staffers

MORRISSEY, Don [REDACTED]

Rep. Study Comm. [REDACTED]

SACHARANSKI, John [REDACTED]

Cong. Hunter [REDACTED]

MC CONNELL, Alan [REDACTED]

FLAHERTY, Peter [REDACTED]

yes) LUKETINA, Robin M. [REDACTED]

Cong. Siljander

b6

These are the
Staffers we are
inviting - all
have been working
on the
Project. OK?

Steve

We are meeting in Bill Martin's
ofc. at 10⁰⁰ Tuesday for a
final review of preparations.
Care to join us?

1)

RECEIVED 16 OCT 84 08

TO MCFARLANE

FROM GINGRICH, NEWT

DOCDATE 10 OCT 84

KEYWORDS: GRENADA

MCO

SUBJECT: LTR TO MCFARLANE FM REP GINGRICH RE GRENADA

*File Grenada
(no reply per Steiner)*

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE

DUE: 20 OCT 84 STATUS S

FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

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Steve Steiner now acting officer OCT 22

COMMENTS

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Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
October 10, 1984

Honorable Bud McFarlane
National Security Council
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Bud:

On October 24th and 25th there is a project on Grenada and communism that you can help make a significant turning point in American foreign policy. With your help, we can draw the public's attention to the lessons to be learned from the liberation of Grenada. We need your help now to focus attention on this great opportunity. Let me explain.

When the United States liberated Grenada, we captured for the first time a communist bureaucracy. We now have, in English, the internal documents of not only the communist Grenadian government, but also the advice they received from their Soviet and Cuban allies. The parallels with Nicaragua and the lessons to be learned are extremely important.

Reading the book of Grenada documents (which you will receive under separate cover) will convince you that communists, including Nicaraguans, do lie systematically to us. There are, for example, specific instructions on how to keep two sets of books for the International Monetary Fund. There are also specific statements by Soviet and Cuban advisors on secret plans for military use of the airfield and how to infiltrate the churches. In general, this is the most revealing set of documents in recent times on the nature of the communist system and the influence of the Soviet Union and its Cuban allies.

In order to highlight the potential research value of this book, we are staging on October 24th and 25th of this year a series of events. We hope the effect of these events will be to draw attention to the tremendous inner knowledge we have discovered about the communist system. In addition, we'd like to focus attention on the research potential now available in this book for every student interested in how communism works.

On October 24th, we are bringing 90 students who were in Grenada back from the Caribbean to a reception in Washington. We are hoping to honor Prime Minister Eugenia Charles of Dominica. You will remember her as the courageous woman and chairman of the Organization of Caribbean States who asked the United States to help restore freedom in the Caribbean. The medical students will also hold a press conference on the Capitol steps.

On the evening of the 24th, there will be a two hour national film and a one hour national television call-in show on the Biznet Satellite Network. This will be available to any cable television operator.

On October 25th, we hope to fly the medical students to 90 college campuses nationwide for various events. These will include local press conferences, "student liberation rallies", teach-ins by the medical students, and another airing of the documentary on Grenada.

Any help you can be in encouraging colleges, high schools, cable T.V. operators, and other groups to participate in using the Biznet broadcast on Wednesday evening October 24th or Thursday morning October 25th will be an important step in the right direction. Also, we would appreciate your help in finding a foundation that is willing to pay to give the microfiche copies of the 35,000 pounds of communist bureaucratic paperwork which lie behind this book to colleges. We hope that one day every college in America will have the raw research material for its students to use as a foundation for study on how communism really thinks and works. If you need further information, please contact Don Morrissey at (202) 225-0597.

This is a non-partisan educational effort to draw the attention of the American people to the fact that communism is a real system which does exist. When you read these documents you get a very different picture than you get if you only look at the headlines. Thank you for your help.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Newt", with a stylized flourish extending from the end.

Newt Gingrich

NG/am