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Bishop hoped to hide Marxism, trick U.S. into aiding Grenada

By Stephanie L. Nall
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

S463

The late Grenadan Prime Minister Maurice Bishop had an elaborate plan to gain economic help from the United States and the "bourgeoisie" of Grenada while still steering the country more firmly to Marxism, according to a secret speech by Mr. Bishop released by the U.S. State Department.

Mr. Bishop told a closed meeting of his New Jewel Movement on Sept. 13, 1982, that he intended to deceive U.S. authorities into thinking his revolution was non-Marxist. The prime minister told the group he feared the United States would intervene militarily if his true Marxist-Leninist position were known.

"The first task is sinking the ideas of Marxism/Leninism among the working class and the working people," Mr. Bishop said, but, "we need the alliance [with the bourgeoisie] because we don't have enough capital, because we don't have enough international contacts, because we don't have enough markets."

The 50-page "Line of March" speech by Mr. Bishop was seized by the U.S. military during its invasion of Grenada last October. The speech, marked "confidential" by Grenadan authorities, was released to a group of government, military and "think-tank" researchers in August but had not been publicized.

Mr. Bishop said the revolution had established a temporary tactical alliance with "bourgeoisie" elements "so that imperialism [the United States] won't get too excited and say 'well, they have some nice fellas... everything all right.' And as a result, they wouldn't think about sending in troops."

Mr. Bishop said the Grenadan rev-

olution had "more sense" than leftists in Gambia, who staged a coup in 1982 and immediately announced their intention to set up a Marxist-Leninist state.

"The same day, they [the bourgeoisie] overthrew them. ... They didn't even give them three days," Mr. Bishop said.

U.S. officials have released several batches of documents seized during the invasion. Thousands of documents still are being reviewed and catalogued by Defense Department employees. Another installment of Grenadan party, state and police papers is expected to be released in October, a State Department official said yesterday.

Mr. Bishop led the Grenadan revolution from 1979 until he was executed by leftist opponents on Oct. 19, 1983. Six days later, the United States, worried about the safety of the approximately 700 Americans on the island, joined with other friendly Caribbean nations in an invasion that led to the ouster of the post-Bishop government.

The administration described the invasion as a "rescue mission," but officials have acknowledged that the defeat of the Cuban-backed regime was a clear strategic bonus for the United States as well.

Mr. Bishop's strategy of deception failed on two fronts. Despite Mr. Bishop's plan to conceal the revolution's Marxist direction from the United States, the Reagan administration always treated him as a pro-Cuban Marxist.

He was not invited to the White House during his trip to the United States the summer before his death and his talks with mid-level government officials did not result in any economic help from the United States.

However, in his own party and within

the Marxist-Leninist community, he was perceived as being too soft with capitalists. His trip to the United Nations and appeals to U.S. businessmen to drum up travel business for the island were looked upon with suspicion by his fellow communists.

Such tourism now is beginning, with U.S. financial help.

In his speech, Mr. Bishop emphasized that the alliance with bourgeoisie elements was merely tactical. "They are not part of our dictatorship," he said. "They are not part of our rule and control. We bring them in for what we want to bring them in for."

He said that in its dealings with the bourgeoisie, the revolution was walking a tightrope, giving them "incentives and encouragement" on the one hand but, on the other, "when they step out of line, we will have to crush them."

Mr. Bishop made no pretense of basing his regime on popular will. "Just consider, comrades, how laws are made in this country," he said. "Laws are made in this country when Cabinet agrees and I sign a document on behalf of the Cabinet."

"Consider how people are detained in this country. We don't go and call for no votes. You get detained when I sign an order after discussing it with the National Security Committee of the party or with a higher party body. Once I sign it — like it or don't like it — it's up to 'em. I'll be there" (a reference to fire in a hilltop prison).

He compared Grenada's strategy with that of the Soviet Union, which also encouraged capitalist development shortly after its revolution and capitalist domination.

"We have the same problem as the young Soviet state faced but a million times more difficult, because our state sector is a million times smaller and does not have the potential in this immediate period for providing the profits to build the economy and the country," he said.

His speech neither confirms nor repudiates the Reagan administration's claim that the new international airport being constructed with Cuban help was intended, in part, as a base from which Cuba could project its military power into the eastern Caribbean and northern South America.

Throughout the speech, however, Mr. Bishop made clear his goal was a Marxist-Leninist state. At one point, he said, "Our primary task must be to sink the ideas of Marxism-Leninism amongst the working people. The main vehicle for this, comrades, is socialism classes. The central committee feels very strongly that this is the No. 1 task."

Bishop Eyed Marxist State In Grenada

Associated Press

A year before the U.S.-led invasion of Grenada, then-Prime Minister Maurice Bishop outlined in a secret speech his strategy for establishing a Marxist-Leninist state but warned that the plan must remain confidential lest it provoke American military action.

Bishop said he had invited a number of "bourgeois" elements to join his government so that the United States, mindful that "some nice fellas" had joined the revolution, "wouldn't think about sending in troops."

The speech, delivered before a closed meeting of his New Jewel Movement on Sept. 13, 1982, was stamped "Confidential" by Grenadian authorities. U.S. officials said it is the lead item in a compendium of party,

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

October 24, 1984

REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT
AT CEREMONY WITH UNIVERSITY OF ST. GEORGE'S
MEDICAL STUDENTS

The East Room

3:30 P.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. Thank you very much. Well, good afternoon. I just flew in from Columbus. But, I want to welcome to the White House this impressive delegation of American students who were on Grenada at the time of the rescue mission last year. I know many of you came to see us last year also, and I am especially happy to have you here with us again and I also want to welcome Ambassador Xavier of Grenada and our other distinguished guests.

Together, we celebrate today with joy an anniversary of honor for America -- your rescue and the liberation of our neighbor, Grenada, from the grip of oppression and tyranny. Just one year ago, Grenada's Governor General Paul Scoon and members of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States called for our help.

Using military force is, I'm sure you realize, the most serious decision any President must make. It's an awesome responsibility. But the evidence to me was clear. At stake was the freedom of 110,000 Grenadians, the security, the democracies of the Eastern Caribbean and most important, the safety and well-being of you American medical students trapped by events that were totally beyond your control. So we approved a military operation to rescue you, to help the people of Grenada, and to prevent the spread of chaos and totalitarianism throughout the Caribbean. (Applause.)

Side by side, with forces from neighboring Caribbean democracies, the brave young soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen accomplished their mission. They went to Grenada not to conquer, but to liberate, and they did. They saved the people, they captured tons of Soviet military equipment and they averted a hostage crisis before it happened. And then, those combat troops left the island so the Grenadian people could start a new life and give peace, freedom and democracy, and self-determination a chance.

But today, over 100,000 Soviet troops are still ravaging Afghanistan. There is a fundamental moral distinction between the Grenada rescue mission and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan -- a brutal and bloody conquest that aims to destroy freedom, democracy, and self-determination. It's the difference between totalitarianism and democracy, between tyranny and freedom. And it gives all of us hope for the future to know that you see the difference that others should have seen from the very beginning.

During the latter part of the 1970's, America passed through a period of self-doubt and national confusion. We talked and acted like a nation in decline and the world believed us. Many questioned our will to continue as a leader of the Western Alliance and to remain a force for good in the world.

MORE

But I believe this period of self-doubt is over. History will record that one of the turning points came on a small island in the Caribbean where America went to take care of her own -- (applause) -- and to rescue a neighboring nation from a growing tyranny.

Our brave military personnel displayed the same love of liberty and personal courage which has made our nation great and kept her free.

And this courage and love of country is also what we saw in Beirut at virtually the same time. And we will always honor those brave Americans. Let no one doubt that those brave men were heroes every bit as much in their peacekeeping mission, as were our men in the rescue mission in Grenada. (Applause.)

And we continue to see this devotion and commitment every day, on the demilitarized zone in Korea and the NATO lines in Europe, at bases from Diego Garcia to Guam, and on our ships at sea. Young Americans are proudly wearing the uniform of our country and serving with the same distinction as those who came before.

Cicero once said, "Courage is that virtue which champions the cause of the right." Well, with us today is a small contingent of military personnel, a few of the heroes who took part in the rescue mission. To each, from the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines, and four of these brave young Americans are here with me in the podium and the other four are sitting among the students that they rescued. So I thank them for joining us today and thank all of you. We're very grateful to all of you.

Also here in the podium is Miss Kathleen Major, who was a medical student and registered nurse one year ago. And when the fighting erupted, she immediately went to work treating the wounded. And, Miss Major, we thank you. It was good of you to come today. (Applause.)

Nineteen brave men died during the Grenada rescue, serving their country and the cause of freedom. One of them was Sean Luketina. He was a paratrooper seriously wounded by a rocket. He was evacuated to Puerto Rico and there in the hospital slipped in and out of a coma. His father, Col. Robin Luketina, a retired military officer who is here with us today, rushed to his bedside. And Col. Luketina, I'm told that on one of those moments when your son regained consciousness, you asked him "Sean, was it worth it?" And "Yes, Dad," he answered. And you asked again, "Would you do it again?" and he looked up at you and said, "Hell, yes, Dad." (Applause.) A few months ago, Sean died of his wounds. But he, Sean Luketina, gave his life in the cause of freedom. He did not die in vain. The young Americans he helped to rescue know that. The liberated people of Grenada know that, Grenada's neighbors know that, and Sean himself knows. So, let us honor him as he would have wished by keeping faith with the

MORE

policy of peace and deterrence that assures the survival of our freedom, keeps alive the hope of freedom for all the peoples of the world. This is the meaning of peace through strength. And let us always remember that America is the land of the free because we're the home of the brave.

To Sean and all the men and women who served the cause of freedom, and to all of you, all of you students who are dedicating yourselves to saving human life, you are the hope of America. You are all America's future. Thank you for what you do and God bless you. (Applause.)

MR. GELLER: President Reagan, distinguished members of the military, honored guests, it was a year ago that I stood at this podium and spoke about the Grenada evacuation. I spoke about how proud we were when the U. S. Army Rangers and other members of the military rescued us on the island of Grenada. I spoke about how happy we were to realize that America had not forgotten us and how proud we were to be Americans.

The decision to invade Grenada was a tough one. It was a decision that called for quick and decisive action by a true leader. I want to thank you, Mr. President, once again for making that decision. Yes, it has been a year now since we left Grenada and hardly a day goes by when I don't think about what went on there.

I think about our soldiers, the Navy Seals, the Air Force, the Marines, the Army Rangers, and the 82nd Airborne. You know, all the men who fought down there in Grenada are different. Some are tall, some are short, some are white, and some are black. They all have one thing in common and that's conviction.

They all had the courage and conviction to stand up and fight for what they believed and for what America believes as well. I want to tell America and all the students in America that the lessons we have learned in Grenada shall not be forgotten, that the Americans that died in Grenada did not die in vain. We, the students of St. George's University, have returned to become teachers for two days, to remind the citizens of America that we cannot forget that lesson, that freedom is just too precious, too valuable, to be taken for granted, and we must stand up and protect that right whenever and wherever necessary.

President Reagan, you came to our aid when our freedom was in jeopardy. You made us proud to be Americans. On behalf of the students assembled here today, I'd like to thank you and all four branches of the armed forces for being there when we needed you. Thank you. (Applause.)

MS. MAJOR: President Reagan, members of the military, and honored guests, the events of Grenada are now a part of history but our feelings will always remain alive inside of us. I can never forget the feeling of intense fear and the sense of relief when I first saw Americans. I hope I never forget the feelings of pride and admiration for the finest military on the face of the earth, the American military -- (applause) -- and also my gratitude to their Commander-in-Chief, who made a most courageous decision.

And, finally, I hope I never forget to say how proud I am to be an American. (Applause.)

MORE

President Reagan, it is with great honor I present this plaque, which reads, "October 25, 1984, In grateful appreciation to President Ronald Reagan for your decisive leadership which resulted in the liberation of Grenada and restored to us our freedom and our future. Presented on the first anniversary of the liberation of Grenada by the American students who were rescued that day." (Applause.)

DR. MODICA: Mr. President, as you know, I was probably the first person to voice reservations about your decision to go ahead with the rescue mission in Grenada last year. I know I certainly was the most publicized. During my State Department briefing the following day, I realized there were factors unknown to me which require that you make a tough and immediate decision. I then felt it my duty to publicly acknowledge the necessity of the mission, and I did so upon leaving the State Department that very day. I have realized over the past year that you have taken the greatest risk of your political career when you made the decision to act, rather than to ignore the plight of our students, and the call for help from six Caribbean nations.

You had little to gain in taking military action as the people of our nation have become increasingly unsupportive of such actions over the past decade. Had the mission failed in any way, you would have shouldered the entire blame. Recently, we've been hearing alot about leadership and strong leadership in recent weeks. The very definition of strong leadership is exemplified by your decisive action in Grenada. No wonder our renewed national pride has emerged from your ability to take action when necessary.

I know you will want to remember those brave men who gave their lives in the Grenada mission. This replica of the memorial that will be unveiled on our Grenada campus October 29 bears the names of each of those fine young men who gave their lives. On behalf of its co-sponsors, St. George's University, and the parents network of St. George's University, I am proud and honored to present it to you as our Commander-in-Chief. (Applause.)

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you very much. But, I came all the way back here from Columbus to honor all of you. (Laughter.) And I'm deeply grateful. And you brought this on yourselves now. I know I've told this many times but, you know, when you get past forty, you have a tendency to tell the same story over again. (Laughter.)

I just have to tell you a little story about Grenada here and then I will get back to the office and goto work. This young lieutenant Marine flying a Cobra helicopter was at Grenada and then went on to Beirut. And from Beirut he wrote back to the Pentagon to the Armed Forces Journal, and he said that there was one thing in all the news stories about Grenada that was so consistent and so repeated that he decided it was a code, and he was going to break the code. That line was that Grenada produces more nutmeg than any other spot on earth. (Laughter.)

So he said, in breaking the code, number one, that is true -- they produce more nutmeg than any other spot on earth. He said, number two, the Soviets and the Cubans are trying to take Grenada. And, number three, you can't have good eggnog without nutmeg. (Laughter.) And, number four, you can't have Christmas without eggnog. And, number five, the Soviets and the Cubans were trying to steal Christmas. (Laughter.) (Applause.)

And, number six, we stopped them. (Laughter.) (Applause.)

END

3:53 P.M. EDT

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

October 24, 1984

TO:

WALT RAYMOND
CONSTANTINE MENGES
JACKIE TILLMAN
RAY BURGHARDT
CHRIS LEHMAN
RON SABLE
GEOFF KEMP
HOWARD TEICHER
TOM SHULL
OLLIE NORTH
RON HINCKLEY

FROM:

STEVE STEINER

THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

FOR RELEASE AT 3:15 pm EDT
WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 24, 1984

TEXT OF REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT
AT CEREMONY WITH UNIVERSITY OF ST. GEORGE'S
MEDICAL STUDENTS

Together, we celebrate today with joy an anniversary of honor for America: your rescue and the liberation of our neighbor, Grenada, from the grip of oppression and tyranny. Just one year ago, Grenada's Governor General Paul Scoon and members of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States called for our help.

Using military force is the most serious decision any president must make, an awesome responsibility. But the evidence to me was clear: At stake was the freedom of 110,000 Grenadians, the security of the democracies of the Eastern Caribbean, and yes, most important, the safety and well-being of you American medical students trapped by events totally beyond your control. So we approved a military operation to rescue you, to help the people of Grenada, and to prevent the spread of chaos and totalitarianism throughout the Caribbean.

Side by side with forces from neighboring Caribbean democracies, the brave young soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen accomplished their mission. They went to Grenada not to conquer, but to liberate. And they did. They saved the people, they captured tons of Soviet military equipment, and they averted a hostage crisis before it happened. And then those combat troops left the island, so the Grenadian people could start a new life and give peace, freedom, democracy, and self-determination a chance.

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MORE

(OVER)

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Merges
Jackie
Ray
Chelma
Sable
Kemp
HT
Shull
North
Hinkley
F. Grenada

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To Sean and all the men and women who serve the cause of freedom, and to all of you students who are dedicating yourselves to saving human life -- you are the hope of America; you are America's future.

Thank you for what you do and God bless you all.

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ST. GEORGE'S UNIVERSITY



SCHOOL OF MEDICINE

UNIVERSITY CENTRE
ST. GEORGE'S, GRENADA
WEST INDIES
TELEPHONE NO. 4440

OFFICE OF THE CHANCELLOR

Charles R. Modica, J.D.
CHANCELLOR

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STATEMENT BY CHANCELLOR CHARLES MODICA MADE
AT THE WHITE HOUSE, OCTOBER 24, 1984

Mr. President, as you know, I was probably the first person to voice reservations about your decision to go ahead with the rescue mission in Grenada last year. I certainly was the most publicized. During my State Department briefing the following day, I realized there were factors unknown to me which required that you make a tough and immediate decision. I then felt it my duty to publicly acknowledge the necessity of the mission and did so upon leaving the State Department that day.

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I know you will want to remember those brave men who gave their lives in the Grenada Rescue Mission. This replica of the memorial that will be unveiled on our Grenada campus on October 29th. bears the names of each of those fine men. On behalf of its cosponsors, St. George's University and the Parent's Network of St. George's University, I am proud to present this memorial to you.

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Office of the Press Secretary

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AT CEREMONY WITH UNIVERSITY OF ST. GEORGE'S
MEDICAL STUDENTS

The East Room

3:30 P.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. Thank you very much. Well, good afternoon. I just flew in from Columbus. But, I want to welcome to the White House this impressive delegation of American students who were on Grenada at the time of the rescue mission last year. I know many of you came to see us last year also, and I am especially happy to have you here with us again and I also want to welcome Ambassador Xavier of Grenada and our other distinguished guests.

Together, we celebrate today with joy an anniversary of honor for America -- your rescue and the liberation of our neighbor, Grenada, from the grip of oppression and tyranny. Just one year ago, Grenada's Governor General Paul Scoon and members of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States called for our help.

Using military force is, I'm sure you realize, the most serious decision any President must make. It's an awesome responsibility. But the evidence to me was clear. At stake was the freedom of 110,000 Granadians, the security, the democracies of the Eastern Caribbean and most important, the safety and well-being of you American medical students trapped by events that were totally beyond your control. So we approved a military operation to rescue you, to help the people of Grenada, and to prevent the spread of chaos and totalitarianism throughout the Caribbean. (Applause.)

Side by side, with forces from neighboring Caribbean democracies, the brave young soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen accomplished their mission. They went to Grenada not to conquer, but to liberate, and they did. They saved the people, they captured tons of Soviet military equipment and they averted a hostage crises before it happened. And then, those combat troops left the island so the Grenadian people could start a new life and give peace, freedom and democracy, and self-determination a chance.

But today, over 100,000 Soviet troops are still ravaging Afghanistan. There is a fundamental moral distinction between the Grenada rescue mission and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan -- a brutal and bloody conquest that aims to destroy freedom, democracy, and self-determination. It's the difference between totalitarianism and democracy, between tyranny and freedom. And it gives all of us hope for the future to know that you see the difference that others should have seen from the very beginning.

During the latter part of the 1970's, America passed through a period of self-doubt and national confusion. We talked and acted like a nation in decline and the world believed us. Many questioned our will to continue as a leader of the Western Alliance and to remain a force for good in the world.

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But I believe this period of self-doubt is over. History will record that one of the turning points came on a small island in the Caribbean where America went to take care of her own -- (applause) -- and to rescue a neighboring nation from a growing tyranny.

Our brave military personnel displayed the same love of liberty and personal courage which has made our nation great and kept her free.

And this courage and love of country is also what we saw in Beirut at virtually the same time. And we will always honor those brave Americans. Let no one doubt that those brave men were heroes every bit as much in their peacekeeping mission, as were our men in the rescue mission in Grenada. (Applause.)

And we continue to see this devotion and commitment every day, on the demilitarized zone in Korea and the NATO lines in Europe, at bases from Diego Garcia to Guam, and on our ships at sea. Young Americans are proudly wearing the uniform of our country and serving with the same distinction as those who came before.

Cicero once said, "Courage is that virtue which champions the cause of the right." Well, with us today is a small contingent of military personnel, a few of the heroes who took part in the rescue mission. To each, from the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines, and four of these brave young Americans are here with me in the podium and the other four are sitting among the students that they rescued. So I thank them for joining us today and thank all of you. We're very grateful to all of you.

Also here in the podium is Miss Kathleen Major, who was a medical student and registered nurse one year ago. And when the fighting erupted, she immediately went to work treating the wounded. And, Miss Major, we thank you. It was good of you to come today. (Applause.)

Nineteen brave men died during the Grenada rescue, serving their country and the cause of freedom. One of them was Sean Luketina. He was a paratrooper seriously wounded by a rocket. He was evacuated to Puerto Rico and there in the hospital slipped in and out of a coma. His father, Col. Robin Luketina, a retired military officer who is here with us today, rushed to his bedside. And Col. Luketina, I'm told that on one of those moments when your son regained consciousness, you asked him "Sean, was it worth it?" And "Yes, Dad," he answered. And you asked again, "Would you do it again?" and he looked up at you and said, "Hell, yes, Dad." (Applause.) A few months ago, Sean died of his wounds. But he, Sean Luketina, gave his life in the cause of freedom. He did not die in vain. The young Americans he helped to rescue know that. The liberated people of Grenada know that, Grenada's neighbors know that, and Sean himself knows. So, let us honor him as he would have wished by keeping faith with the

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policy of peace and deterrence that assures the survival of our freedom, keeps alive the hope of freedom for all the peoples of the world. This is the meaning of peace through strength. And let us always remember that America is the land of the free because we're the home of the brave.

To Sean and all the men and women who served the cause of freedom, and to all of you, all of you students who are dedicating yourselves to saving human life, you are the hope of America. You are all America's future. Thank you for what you do and God bless you. (Applause.)

MR. GELLER: President Reagan, distinguished members of the military, honored guests, it was a year ago that I stood at this podium and spoke about the Grenada evacuation. I spoke about how proud we were when the U. S. Army Rangers and other members of the military rescued us on the island of Grenada. I spoke about how happy we were to realize that America had not forgotten us and how proud we were to be Americans.

The decision to invade Grenada was a tough one. It was a decision that called for quick and decisive action by a true leader. I want to thank you, Mr. President, once again for making that decision. Yes, it has been a year now since we left Grenada and hardly a day goes by when I don't think about what went on there.

I think about our soldiers, the Navy Seals, the Air Force, the Marines, the Army Rangers, and the 82nd Airborne. You know, all the men who fought down there in Grenada are different. Some are tall, some are short, some are white, and some are black. They all have one thing in common and that's conviction.

They all had the courage and conviction to stand up and fight for what they believed and for what America believes as well. I want to tell America and all the students in America that the lessons we have learned in Grenada shall not be forgotten, that the Americans that died in Grenada did not die in vain. We, the students of St. George's University, have returned to become teachers for two days, to remind the citizens of America that we cannot forget that lesson, that freedom is just too precious, too valuable, to be taken for granted, and we must stand up and protect that right whenever and wherever necessary.

President Reagan, you came to our aid when our freedom was in jeopardy. You made us proud to be Americans. On behalf of the students assembled here today, I'd like to thank you and all four branches of the armed forces for being there when we needed you. Thank you. (Applause.)

MS. MAJOR: President Reagan, members of the military, and honored guests, the events of Grenada are now a part of history but our feelings will always remain alive inside of us. I can never forget the feeling of intense fear and the sense of relief when I first saw Americans. I hope I never forget the feelings of pride and admiration for the finest military on the face of the earth, the American military --(applause) -- and also my gratitude to their Commander-in-Chief, who made a most courageous decision.

And, finally, I hope I never forget to say how proud I am to be an American. (Applause.)

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President Reagan, it is with great honor I present this plaque, which reads, "October 25, 1984, In grateful appreciation to President Ronald Reagan for your decisive leadership which resulted in the liberation of Grenada and restored to us our freedom and our future. Presented on the first anniversary of the liberation of Grenada by the American students who were rescued that day." (Applause.)

DR. MODICA: Mr. President, as you know, I was probably the first person to voice reservations about your decision to go ahead with the rescue mission in Grenada last year. I know I certainly was the most publicized. During my State Department briefing the following day, I realized there were factors unknown to me which require that you make a tough and immediate decision. I then felt it my duty to publicly acknowledge the necessity of the mission, and I did so upon leaving the State Department that very day. I have realized over the past year that you have taken the greatest risk of your political career when you made the decision to act, rather than to ignore the plight of our students, and the call for help from six Caribbean nations.

You had little to gain in taking military action as the people of our nation have become increasingly unsupportive of such actions over the past decade. Had the mission failed in any way, you would have shouldered the entire blame. Recently, we've been hearing alot about leadership and strong leadership in recent weeks. The very definition of strong leadership is exemplified by your decisive action in Grenada. No wonder our renewed national pride has emerged from your ability to take action when necessary.

I know you will want to remember those brave men who gave their lives in the Grenada mission. This replica of the memorial that will be unveiled on our Grenada campus October 29 bears the names of each of those fine young men who gave their lives. On behalf of its co-sponsors, St. George's University, and the parents network of St. George's University, I am proud and honored to present it to you as our Commander-in-Chief. (Applause.)

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you very much. But, I came all the way back here from Columbus to honor all of you. (Laughter.) And I'm deeply grateful. And you brought this on yourselves now. I know I've told this many times but, you know, when you get past forty, you have a tendency to tell the same story over again. (Laughter.)

I just have to tell you a little story about Grenada here and then I will get back to the office and goto work. This young lieutenant Marine flying a Cobra helicopter was at Grenada and then went on to Beirut. And from Beirut he wrote back to the Pentagon to the Armed Forces Journal, and he said that there was one thing in all the news stories about Grenada that was so consistent and so repeated that he decided it was a code, and he was going to break the code. That line was that Grenada produces more nutmeg than any other spot on earth. (Laughter.)

So he said, in breaking the code, number one, that is true -- they produce more nutmeg than any other spot on earth. He said, number two, the Soviets and the Cubans are trying to take Grenada. And, number three, you can't have good eggnog without nutmeg. (Laughter.) And, number four, you can't have Christmas without eggnog. And, number five, the Soviets and the Cubans were trying to steal Christmas. (Laughter.) (Applause.)

And, number six, we stopped them. (Laughter.) (Applause.)

END

3:53 P.M. EDT

National Security Record

A Report from Washington on National Security Affairs

THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION • 214 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE, N.E. • WASHINGTON, D.C. • 20002 • (202) 546-4400

NO. 72

SEPTEMBER 1984

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The Lessons of Grenada

One year ago next month, on October 25, 1983, the United States launched a rescue mission on the island of Grenada at the request of, and in concert with, the member states of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS). It was a well-executed use of military force, undertaken for urgent humanitarian reasons, but with important geopolitical benefits. Despite stiffer opposition than expected from over 700 armed and well-trained Cubans, the U.S. forces performed efficiently, rescuing 600 American medical students and freeing over 100 political prisoners, with a minimum of casualties. More than 100 communist officials, including East Germans, Libyans, North Koreans, Bulgarians and 45 Russians, were found holed up in the Russian Embassy. This first successful use of significant military force since the rescue of the vessel *Mayaguez* from Cambodian forces during the Ford Administration had the additional benefit of ending tyranny on Grenada. U.S. combat forces left on December 12, just six weeks after they landed on the island.

A REIGN OF TERROR

The crisis began on October 19, when Prime Minister Maurice Bishop, who had been placed under house arrest by hard-core Stalinists six days earlier, was released by a crowd of supporters led by Foreign Minister Unison Whiteman. Elements of the People's Revolutionary Army then moved in and fired on the crowd, killing up to 100 people. They took the prime minister, foreign minister and other cabinet members prisoner, and then brutally murdered them.

The execution of the nation's leadership was followed by the imposition of a curfew, with a warning that no one was to go outside for four days and violators would be shot on sight. The airport was closed, preventing departure of the American medical students or anyone else. The commander of the People's Revolutionary Army, General Hudson Austin, was

ostensibly in charge, but General Austin visited the vice chancellor of the medical university "in a terrible state" and said he didn't see how he could be in charge of the country when he wasn't even in charge of himself. The other states in the Eastern Caribbean were getting the clear impression that the Grenadan army was little more than a gang of murderous thugs, who had imposed a reign of terror on the island.

With a regular army of 1,200 and a militia estimated at 2,500, supplemented by 784 armed Cubans and a huge arsenal of weapons, the Grenadan-Cuban forces dwarfed those of the other OECS islands, which have from no military to armies totaling less than 200 men. Considering the Cuban presence, large stocks of arms and the existence on Grenada of 100 motorized boats that could reach any of the islands, the OECS members were understandably concerned for the safety of their peaceful and undefended islands (the OECS consists of Antigua-Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, the Grenadines, St. Kitts-Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Montserrat).

THE OECS ASKS FOR HELP

Eugenia Charles, Prime Minister of Dominica and Chairman of the OECS, later testified before Congress that when the OECS met on October 21 to consider the crisis on Grenada "it didn't take us more than half an hour to decide that intervention was necessary." Grenada was without a government, legal or otherwise, and the only legitimate authority, Governor General Sir Paul Scoon, had sent a message through diplomatic channels asking both the OECS and the U.S. for help. While the mini-states were willing to intervene, an attack by some 300 soldiers and police from the other islands, the largest force they could muster, would be no match for the much larger and heavily armed Grenadan-Cuban forces.

But United States forces were available. With the price of

delay in the Iranian hostage crisis fresh in mind, U.S. officials were taking no chances. On October 20, the day after the murders, the aircraft carrier *Independence*, its naval battle group and the Marine amphibious squadron it was escorting to Lebanon, were ordered to divert to the Eastern Caribbean. The next day, Washington received a request from the OECS for intervention, noting the lack of authority in Grenada and the threat to the peace and security of the region.

Prime Minister Charles has stated emphatically that the OECS asked the U.S. to intervene and not the other way around, pointing out that the OECS member states were very fearful of communist domination of the whole Eastern Caribbean and knew they were helpless to prevent it.

Once the mission began, all major objectives were taken in four days, and military operations were complete within one week. The U.S. troops departed themselves exceptionally well, provided medical and humanitarian assistance to the population, tried to minimize damage to Grenadan property, and left six weeks after they arrived, turning the security of the island over to an OECS police force. As a consequence, the vast majority of Caribbean people are pleased with the results of the intervention. Good will for the U.S. in general and president Reagan in particular remains exceptionally high, both on Grenada and throughout the non-communist Caribbean.

THE IMPACT IN THE AREA

A large volume of documents was captured on Grenada, revealing that the Grenadan revolutionary party, the New Jewel Movement, consisted mainly of a dedicated group of communists committed to strengthening ties with Cuba and the USSR. The documents show that Moscow considered Cuba, Nicaragua and Grenada to be in their camp, providing them with a trio of bases that formed a triangle around the Caribbean. The 10,000 foot runway that was under construction on Grenada would have greatly increased Soviet air supply capabilities to Central and South America. The documents indicated that the Soviets believed that Suriname, Belize and El Salvador were ripe for communist subversion.

An immediate impact was felt in Suriname, which had been collaborating closely with Cuba and was moving toward the communist camp. Within hours of the U.S. landing on Grenada, Suriname ruler Col. Dési Bouterse took action to reduce the Communist presence by ordering the departure of the Cuban ambassador and 105 other Cubans, and suspending Suriname's economic aid agreement with Havana. The intervention had a demoralizing effect on the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and caused a reassessment by the guerrillas in El Salvador. Both now know they can expect no help from Moscow or Havana in a showdown, and they have noted with concern that the Cubans on Grenada failed to follow Castro's orders to fight to the death. This apprehension has led the Nicaraguan government, at least rhetorically, to moderate its posture to avoid antagonizing the U.S.

The Soviets lost one point of a Caribbean triangle and a major staging base for subversion in Central America. Their hopes for subverting the Caribbean island states suffered a serious setback. The loss of the Grenadan airbase has ended for now the possibility of an easier supply route to Nicaragua, the El Salvador guerrillas and other potential Soviet clients in Central and South America. Soviet and Cuban support for revolutionary groups in Latin America must be much less popular to such groups now than it was before their ignominious departure from Grenada.

LESSONS LEARNED

Following are some of the lessons learned at Grenada: **Decisiveness can be crucial.** The comparison between President Carter's indecisive handling of the Iranian hostage crisis and President Reagan's action in Grenada is striking. There always are those who will argue against military action, no matter what the circumstances, and those who will argue for delay. But delay often proves fatal. Margaret Thatcher rejected the recommendations for delay from her foreign office and won a military victory in the Falklands that restored the world stature of Britain. President Reagan's bold decisiveness in Grenada had a similar effect on U.S. morale and sent a message to friend and foe alike that America finally was over the policy paralysis caused by Vietnam. Early in the crisis, the President decided that U.S. action to rescue the U.S. medical students was essential—he would permit no more Irans for America. This presidential decisiveness pre-empted any objections or arguments for delay that might normally have been raised within the Administration.

Secrecy is essential. The furor raised by much of the media because it was not informed during the early stages of the military operation quickly subsided when it became clear that the public was not sympathetic. The confidentiality of the operation code-named "Urgent Fury" during the five day planning phase that began on October 20 with an early morning meeting of the National Security Council's Crisis Planning Group was reminiscent of World War II secrecy. The initial meeting, to assess the situation following the October 19 murder of Grenadan government leaders, was followed by precautionary moves of the fleet and then, after receipt of the OECS request for intervention, full-scale assault planning. Tight security was maintained throughout, contributing to the success of the mission.

Good intelligence is important. The planning for "Urgent Fury" was handicapped by a lack of operational intelligence about what was actually happening on Grenada. There also was a lack of recent intelligence photographs of the island (which was quickly remedied by overflights of SR-71s) and insufficient knowledge of its hydrography to plan amphibious operations. Two small-boat sailors in the task force who were familiar with the waters of the island, and a reconnaissance by SEALs, provided the information. But the need for good intelligence, even in a small operation close to home, was apparent. The importance to possible military operations of human intelligence via both CIA and military attaché activities around the world cannot be underestimated.

Light and mobile military forces are needed. The operation highlighted the importance of the Marine amphibious forces and light infantry for use in limited operations in the third world. The readiness and rapid deployability of such forces are especially important. In the wake of the Grenada experience, both the Pentagon and Congress should assure that rapid deployment forces and their required support are not shortchanged in the defense budget.

Effective military coordination is important. The Administration wisely issued orders to the Pentagon and then turned the planning and execution over to the uniformed experts. Problems, when they arose, were skillfully overcome without "rudder orders" from the White House. Any deficiencies in the ability to operate jointly were solved by the nature of the operation, which effectively separated the services from each other on the island. But that may not be possible in future operations, in which case effective inter-service coordination will be important.

The warnings were right. For a number of months, information from Caribbean sources indicated that the Soviet-Cuban takeover of Grenada was much more extensive than generally believed. These reports were dismissed by much of the media as anti-communist alarmism. As it turned out, the warnings were right (so was the CIA, which had made a highly accurate assessment of the extent of Soviet-Cuban involvement). Nonetheless, revelations of extensive Soviet-Cuban control of the island, secret agreements with communist countries, a major arms buildup, and even a disinformation campaign to mislead U.S. public opinion, came as a surprise to many Americans. In the future, warnings of communist subversive activities should be given greater credence.

The Monroe Doctrine is alive and well. The mission to Grenada made clear to the world, and particularly to the

Soviets and their proxies, that the U.S. would intervene in countries of the Western Hemisphere if necessary to protect American citizens or prevent a takeover by totalitarian forces aligned with the Soviets or Cuba. The Grenada action was based first on the danger to American citizens and second on the OECS appeal for help in the absence of governmental authority. But the sandbox that was upset was full of Russians and their proxies. Although Castro called on his "construction workers" to fight to the death, the Soviets carefully stayed out of the whole affair. One important signal conveyed by the mission was that the U.S. will protect its citizens and its interests in the Western Hemisphere. Another, surely noted by communist revolutionaries, was that neither the Russians nor the Cubans can be relied upon to support their proxies in this part of the world when the going gets rough.

Soviet Information Control

by Paul A. Smith, Jr.

It is wrong, a British statesman observed of Nazi Germany, to regard a nation with unalterable suspicion. But what, he asked, if that nation gives unalterable cause? A similar dilemma faces those today who ask what in the Soviet pattern of behavior is alterable, and what is unalterable. It is increasingly clear that the systematic distortion of truth is one of the unalterable features of the Soviet system.

But recently there have been alterations in the controls Soviet leaders exercise over access to information from the West, and they have been for the worse. Telephone calls, mail, and parcel deliveries now are blocked or seriously impeded. Jamming of radio broadcasts is intensified. Attempts by western diplomats to speak over Soviet media are rudely refused. Vituperation of the West, its spokesmen, and its literature has increased. Traditional Russian xenophobia is again in full cry.

Those who continue to hope that this unpleasant feature of Soviet power may change should look fully into the serious scholarship on Soviet media and communications practices. For example, a recent Rand report documents convincingly the conclusion that when there are periods of relative tolerance in Soviet intellectual life, and a modest increase in access to information from the West, it is because the central leadership chooses to allow it, and when it chooses to stop it, it has no trouble in doing so. In Russia, both tolerance and repression come from above, not from below. And Lenin and his successor dictators have regarded the monopoly of mass media as absolutely essential to their political control.

The Soviet form of information control is not partial or selective. Unlike most western forms of autocracy, it is total. Frederick the Great once said that he did not mind what his subjects thought or said as long as they obeyed him. Communist regimes mind very much what people think, and they are paranoid about what they say. Immense resources are devoted to assuring not only that people do not say what is forbidden, but that they say frequently what is desired by the regime.

Blocking alien ideas is the function of two organs, *Glavlit* and the KGB. *Glavlit* is concerned with censoring state secrets which may creep into Soviet media. It is a formidable job, since most government activities are secret. *Glavlit*'s rulings are backed by the intimidation of the KGB. Since the death of Stalin, both organs have tended to function according to rulings which, however oppressive and incomprehensi-

ble to western minds, are understood and accepted in helpless resignation by most Russians.

The entry of informational material into Russia is tightly controlled at Soviet borders by the State Customs Administration, also backed by the KGB. This process, in the words of the most recent State Department report on implementation of the Helsinki Final Act, is "extremely restricted." Another barrier to the free exchange of information is the jamming of foreign radio broadcasts. The intensity of Soviet jamming has fluctuated over the years, depending on the internal security needs of the Soviet leadership and the status of East-West relations. Currently, jamming is on the increase in both scope and intensity.

Transformation of Western ideas and concepts is another information control device. It is only effective as part of a total system on the Soviet model, which enjoys a monopoly of communications channels and promulgates and enforces an official, all-pervasive ideology, such as Marxism-Leninism. In this environment, words like bourgeoisie, peace, democracy, and aggression, acquire special and unique meanings. They have become so deeply imbedded in ordinary discourse that it comes as a surprise to most Soviet intellectuals to discover that they could have any other meanings.

Like other closed societies around the world, the USSR also has such means of communication as journals, newspapers, radio and TV programs, universities and libraries. What is different in the Soviet system is their heirarchical subordination to the Party, and within the Party, to the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee Secretariat. It is in the Party Secretariat that decisions are made on what themes, ideas and topics can be presented to the Soviet reader. It is also here that decisions are made through the *nomenklatura* system about who will get jobs in the Soviet media.


By controlling personnel appointments to top media positions, the Propaganda Department dominates the intellectual processes of a multi-national empire of 267 million people. It also exercises a veto power over the allocation of funds and—most important for publishers—paper supplies. Alert responsiveness to the Party line, as set by the General Secretary of the Party, is the duty of every media official in the USSR. The editors and writers themselves are the key instruments of the Party's political control of the media.

Continued on page 4



Insiders Report

Tracking the Policy Process in Washington



New Poll on National Security Issues: During the two week period from June 26 to July 9 the Sindlinger national polling organization conducted a nationwide poll commissioned by the Heritage Foundation of 2,258 persons on U.S.-Soviet relations and other security issues. The results show that the public believes by a huge margin that the Soviets cannot be trusted. Also, a significant majority supports a policy of countering the Soviet threat, including deployment of the anti-ballistic missile defense known as "Star Wars."

The gist of some of the questions and the results:

• Do you believe that the USSR is violating its arms control agreements?

Yes	96.8%
No	.5%
Don't know	2.7%

• Should the U.S. enter into an arms control treaty with the USSR that does not absolutely assure that the U.S. can verify that the USSR is observing that treaty?

Yes	4.8%
No	95.0%
Don't know	.2%

• Should the U.S. offer concessions to lure the Soviets back to negotiations or remain firm and only offer concessions if Moscow does?

U.S. Should offer concessions	35.1%
Offer concessions only if the Soviets do	62.8%
Don't know	2.1%

• Would you favor developing a system which would protect much, if not all, of the population from nuclear destruction, by a ballistic missile defense?

Yes	82.6%
No	15.2%
Don't know	2.2%

• Should the U.S. encourage or support dissidents and

ethnic minorities in Eastern Europe and the USSR with the objective of political liberalization in these countries?

Yes	72.0%
No	19.9%
Don't know	8.1%

• Would you say that the situation in Central America is a threat to the security of the U.S.?

Yes	66.5%
No	32.6%
Don't know	.9%

State Department Bonuses: A list of 85 recipients of executive bonuses for senior career foreign service officers has been released by the State Department. It includes five bonuses of \$20,000 each, 39 at \$10,000 and 26 at lesser amounts. The recipients are selected by boards of fellow foreign service officers, who may be friends or even subordinates of the candidates. In the rest of the government, decisions on executive bonuses are made by management, i.e., by the President's appointees. But the foreign service has agreed with its labor unions to preclude management from participating in the decision making process, to prevent the "politicization" of the foreign service. Some contend that the real effect is to prevent the Administration from exercising its management responsibilities.

The 1984 awards include \$20,000 for **Charles Bray**, who was **President Carter's** deputy director of the U.S. Information Agency for four years, and \$10,000 each for **Thomas Enders**, relieved earlier this year as Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America, and **Michael Armacost**, recently named Under Secretary for Political Affairs over conservative objections. Most surprising was a \$20,000 top bonus for **Ronald Spiers**, who as Under Secretary for Management is in overall charge of the bonus program. Pity the poor board members—it is tough to vote against a bonus for the boss.

Soviet Information Control (Cont. from p. 3)

What are the results of these massive investments in thought control? How much of the propaganda is sloughed off as tendentious nonsense, and how much sticks? The short answer is that much of the Party line, especially on foreign affairs, gains at least partial acceptance. Michigan State University sociologist Boris Shlapentokh draws a distinction between propaganda about everyday life in the USSR, on which the Party line gains little acceptance because people can see where it is false, and conditions in the outside world, where they cannot.

Russians see things differently in matters relating to the outside world than non-Russians, who comprise nearly half the Soviet population. Roughly grouped in 15 national republics, all Soviet citizens are subject to the same propaganda from Moscow, but not all are equally susceptible. The Baltic republics and others on the western border, such as Ukraine, retain a different awareness of the West and its values than Russians. Although overrun by Nazi Germany, many were more impressed by Germany's—and Europe's—post-war recovery than by German wartime excesses.

The forty million Central Asian Turks have their own religious and historical framework from which they view the world, only partially modified by the imposition of Russian imperial power. Urbanization, industrialization, and literacy may not have created a sense of gratitude toward the Russians who brought these forces to Central Asia, but the changes did have the effect of making the Turks susceptible to the impact of modern mass media.

Russian propaganda and agitation, coupled with Party organization, have been regarded by Moscow as the most important of domestic activities. Internally, no other aspect of rule enjoys as much intense and continuous attention by the Politburo. Konstantin Chernenko, who spent his entire professional life involved in these activities, is not likely to diminish their importance. His firm commitment to and effective use of the instruments of propaganda to assure Party control are essential to his political survival. Any meaningful moderation of total state control of information in Soviet society should not be expected.

Paul A. Smith, Jr. is the Editor of Problems of Communism. The views contained herein are those of the author and not necessarily those of USIA or the U.S. Government.

✓ Checklist of Upcoming Issues

An October Surprise? The Soviets are so bitterly opposed to President Reagan and his policies that the possibility of an October surprise to try to influence the election is being given real credence in Washington. The greatest concern is focused on Central America, where the Soviets support a proxy government in Nicaragua and guerrilla forces in El Salvador. The flow of communist supplies and equipment to the guerrillas has increased considerably over the past several months. A guerrilla attack aimed at humiliating the Duarte government and embarrassing the United States, in the style of a "Tet offensive," is considered a real possibility. A less ambitious effort might be an attempt to assassinate Americans in El Salvador, in an effort to promote dissatisfaction with the Administration's Central American policy.

Sen. **Daniel P. Moynihan** (D-NY) recently called attention to another way in which the Soviets might try to create a crisis. In a statement before the Senate on August 9, the senator noted that the new Punta Huete airfield under construction about 30 kilometers from Managua will have a longer runway than Andrews Air Force Base and will be able to handle any aircraft in the Soviet inventory. Nicaragua has admitted that its new airfield is for military purposes. A defector has reported that Nicaraguans are receiving flight training in MIGs in Bulgaria and that MIGs now in Cuba will be transferred to Nicaragua when the pilots are trained.

Sen. Moynihan expressed concern that the Soviets could cause a major international crisis in a matter of hours by moving Backfire bombers or MIG fighters into Nicaragua. That would create a situation, he said, that the United States could not allow. "If Nicaragua invites the Soviets to establish themselves on the mainland . . . the result would be a situation the United States as a responsible world power could not and would not accept. We would move instantly to reverse it."

Status of the MX: The House voted to freeze production, while in the Senate the MX survived on a 48-48 tie vote (broken by Vice President Bush). The House-Senate conferees have been unable to reconcile their differences, and the prospects for MX funding are uncertain in the Appropriations Committee. As a result, the Defense Department may have to operate on a continuing resolution until after the election. Since President Reagan supports the MX and **Walter Mondale** opposes it, the election should settle the issue. But if there is another MX vote before the election, the views of the top authorities on U.S.-Soviet arms control negotiations should be considered.

• **Amb. Edward L. Rowny**, Chairman of the START Delegation:

"A failure of the Congress to authorize continued procurement and deployment of the MX would reward the Soviets for their intransigence and seriously undermine our negotiations. The MX is not a bargaining chip. Rather, it is necessary for our security, for deterrence, and for crisis stability. It encourages the Soviets to bargain in good faith. Failure to authorize MX production and deployment would, in my view, encourage the Soviets to stay away from the negotiating table."

• **Amb. Paul H. Nitze**, U.S. Representative to the INF Negotiations:

"Personally, I am concerned that a . . . vote against MX will send a message to Moscow harmful to U.S. interests. I believe the Soviets' decision to walk out of the INF negotiations and to refuse to set a date for the resumption of the START negotiations was prompted by a calculation that the absence of negotiations would stir anxieties . . . and create pressures for unilateral concessions on arms control questions . . . Rejection of MX would send precisely the wrong signal, i.e., that the Soviet campaign was bearing fruit."

• **Eugene V. Rostow**, former Director of ACDA:

"A vote against MX . . . would doom any hope there may be of obtaining fair and balanced nuclear arms agreements with the Soviet Union based on the principle of Soviet-American equality. The Soviet Union has walked out of the Geneva talks and is trying other tactics to exploit the pressures of the American election in order to force us to accept agreements based on Soviet nuclear superiority . . . The defeat of MX now would thus be an act of pre-emptive capitulation."

Afghans Need Better Weapons: A major deficiency of the aid reaching the Afghan resistance fighters is the poor quality of some of the weapons being delivered. Thus far, aid has been limited to Russian equipment. The most serious problems have been with the SA-7 heat-seeking anti-aircraft missile and the 82mm mortar. The SA-7 is the Soviet counterpart to the U.S. Redeye shoulder-fired rocket, but it has long been considered an inferior weapon. Used extensively by the Egyptians and Syrians in the 1973 Yom Kippur War and subsequently in the Lebanese fighting, its record in both conflicts was zero kills against combat aircraft. Even against helicopters, the effectiveness of the SA-7 has been very poor. Likewise, the Soviet 82mm mortar is deficient in range and accuracy for use in the mountainous terrain of Afghanistan.

Afghan resistance leaders have been pleading for better weapons, but the Administration is anxious to prevent the U.S. from being identified as a source of supply. What appears needed is a better coordinated international effort to provide the best available western weapons for the type of conflict the Afghans are fighting. The U.S. Stinger ground-to-air missile, which the Administration wants to send to Jordan and Saudi Arabia, would be a major improvement over the SA-7. The very effective Finnish or British 81mm mortars would meet the need for that type of equipment. As the Soviets did not hesitate to supply North Vietnam with large quantities of their equipment for its war of aggression, the West should do no less for the Afghans in their heroic struggle against communism. This urgent need deserves early, high level attention.

Resolution to Repudiate Yalta: Last February Sen. **Robert Kasten** (R-Wis) introduced in the Senate a resolution to renounce the 1945 Yalta agreement that had the result of putting Eastern Europe in the Soviet sphere of influence. The resolution went nowhere. Then on a recent visit to a captive nations meeting in Illinois, Sen. **Charles Percy** (R-Ill) was surprised to find himself being attacked by the ethnic community for not moving the resolution in the Foreign Relations Committee. The senator returned to Washington determined to do something about it. Meanwhile, President Reagan was received enthusiastically when he spoke in Chicago on the 40th anniversary of the Warsaw uprising, sharply criticizing the Soviets for not holding free elections in Eastern Europe, and stating that the U.S. does not accept the present situation there as permanent.

The resolution now is being reworded from a renunciation of the Yalta agreement to a repudiation of the consequences of that agreement, to make it clear that the objection is not to the agreement itself, but to Soviet non-compliance with its call for free elections in the countries of Eastern Europe. The prospects for Senate action are believed to have improved considerably.



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September 19, 1984

*For FYI
Bill Grenada*

THE GRENADA RESCUE MISSION IS NOT OVER

INTRODUCTION

The Reagan Administration's bold action to restore democracy and a free market economy to Grenada is now threatened by a combination of political inertia and renascent leftist subversion. The strategically located island, scene of last October's historic intervention by forces from six Caribbean islands and the United States, may be in danger of returning to the unstable political and economic environment preceding the 1979 Marxist coup d'etat that carried Grenada solidly into the Soviet/Cuban camp.

The Grenada rescue mission was politically risky for the Reagan Administration. Although a military defeat was hardly possible given the overwhelming tactical superiority of the rescue forces, a prolonged campaign or the chance that the U.S. medical students would be taken as hostages by the Grenadian Marxists could have had severe domestic and international political repercussions.

The rescue did not end with the defeat and removal of Soviet-bloc forces from Grenada.¹ Recognizing the need to restore the shattered Grenadian economy, the White House moved quickly to promote public and private aid to the island. Yet Grenada remains beset with burgeoning problems that could frustrate the development of democratic institutions and provide opportunities for ex-members of the Marxist People's Revolutionary Government (PRG) to regain power. American initiatives equally as bold as the rescue mission are now needed to restore the positive momentum generated in the aftermath of last year's action.

¹ For a description of the events leading up to the U.S. action, see "Leninism in Grenada," Problems of Communism, July-August 1984, pp. 33-41.

BACKGROUND

The dramatic events of October 1983 left Grenada in a political vacuum and economic shambles. The People's Revolutionary Government had largely dissolved through fratricidal assassination and imprisonment even before the allied intervention. Sir Paul Scoon, the Grenadian-born Governor-General who had retained his vestigial colonial office throughout the revolutionary period, assumed de jure control of the island's affairs following the suspension of allied martial law. The Governor-General appointed a nine-member "advisory council" under the chairmanship of Nicholas Braithwaite to serve as an interim governing body.

Grenada was an economic disaster following 4½ years of socialist experimentation and mismanagement. Anti-U.S. rhetoric had frightened away most of the tourist trade, while confiscatory taxation and suppression of private enterprise nearly strangled the native business community.

From 1981 to 1983, economic growth was concentrated in the public sector; all other sectors declined, with the exception of construction (due to work on the Point Salines airport). In 1982, Grenada's Gross Domestic Product was \$107 million, with imports reaching 66 percent of GDP. Foreign exchange earnings from cocoa, the most important cash crop, fell from \$10 million in 1979 to \$4 million in 1983. Banana production declined from 26,000 tons in 1978 to 9,000 tons in 1983, and land under banana cultivation dropped from 5,000 acres in 1978 to 3,200 acres in 1983.

Commercial banks and other credit sources on the island, such as insurance companies, had no cash to lend in the aftermath of the allied rescue mission because the People's Revolutionary Government's insatiable appetite for funds had drained them of their reserves. By March 1983, the net credit extended to the public sector amounted to roughly 35 percent of total deposits--up from approximately 14 percent at the end of 1981. Additional credit was extended to ex-Prime Minister Maurice Bishop's Marxist regime in the form of purchases of government paper, overdrafts, and commercial loans. Grenada's current account deficit grew from the equivalent of 1 percent of GNP in 1978 to 33 percent in 1982.

PROBLEMS AFTER THE RESCUE MISSION

The Political Climate

Members of the advisory council were chosen to be as non-partisan as possible in the confusing Grenadian political milieu. One major criterion was that they should have "no vested interest" in the island. As a result, most interim government members are international civil servants with no training in playing an active role in the government processes. The advisory council has removed several of the most extreme Marxists from diplomatic and

civil service posts, and made token efforts at decreasing some of the most odious tariffs imposed by the PRG on such items as basic foodstuffs. It has not developed, however, new investment incentives or made changes in the tax codes to encourage private investment. Although members of the advisory council are aware of the various problems confronting Grenada and probably are sympathetic toward the need for a more dynamic approach to their solution, apathetic inertia has become the council's trademark.

This is the central flaw with the interim advisory council. Because the government is provisional--appointed rather than elected--its members feel that they have no authority to enact the series of measures needed to put Grenada back on its feet. The island's governing authority therefore exists in a political limbo, having no mandate to do more than make cosmetic changes and prepare for the election of a parliament. Advisory council inertia is reflected in the widespread mood of apathy and cynicism among the electorate. Public opinion polls have revealed that Grenadians are unsure about their political future and even less certain about those politicians who aspire to lead them.²

Dissatisfaction with the interim government seems to be mounting. The editor of the Grenadian Voice wrote in March 1984:

...we have examined the interim administration closely and it is now abundantly clear that they are hamstrung by the limitations they have placed on themselves and will never make certain important decisions that need to be made. Let us prepare to thank them for their

² The most scholarly of these polls was conducted by Professor William Adams of George Washington University in January 1984. Approximately 84 percent of those islanders interviewed were unable to name anyone they wanted to see emerge as Grenada's next prime minister, an answer repeatedly qualified by the statement that "there were no good leaders they could trust." Many Grenadians voiced objections to holding elections in 1984 and said that an interim government should rule with U.S. support for at least a few years. Not surprisingly, the survey revealed that 75 percent of the people questioned would like for Grenada to officially become part of the United States, demonstrating that Grenadians seem to have temporarily lost confidence in their ability to rule themselves.

The validity of the George Washington University poll is borne out by subsequent surveys conducted by a variety of regional and international organizations. For example, a survey taken by the Grenadian Voice newspaper in March concurred in most respects, with an overwhelming majority of respondents (82 percent) stating that elections should be postponed until 1985 or 1986. Both voters and would-be politicians are still returning from exile, and the enumeration of voters has been extended to accommodate them.

efforts and send them back to their chosen fields of endeavor and let us do so before they have a chance to make too many mistakes.³

Grenadians apparently fear, however, what is commonly called the "election threat": the possibility that divisiveness and inexperience among centrist political groups could result in a victory, by default, of either the corrupt, eccentric Sir Eric Gairy or the surviving members of the Marxist People's Revolutionary Government. Responsible islanders believe that Grenada has not had sufficient time to recover from years of political strife, and that the mistakes of the past may be repeated unless new leaders with fresh ideas are allowed the time necessary for organizing and campaigning.

The Political Situation

Six known political parties are preparing candidates for the next general elections. These are: Grenada United Labor Party (GULP); Grenada National Party (GNP); Grenada Democratic Movement (GDM); National Democratic Party (NDP); Christian Democratic Labor Party (CDLP); and Maurice Bishop Patriotic Movement (MBPM). The GNP, GDM, NDP, and CDLP formed a coalition on August 26, 1984, called the New National Party.

GULP, the party of former prime minister Sir Eric Gairy, began actively rebuilding its party organization within days of the rescue mission. The Grenada United Labor Party grew out of the trade union movement organized by Gairy in 1950 to defend agricultural workers; it continues to draw strong support from predominately older members of the black peasantry. Although Gairy states that he will not participate personally in the next elections, he remains GULP's dominant force and will almost certainly maneuver his way into Parliament if his party forms a government. Critics of Gairy charge that he and his party are on the far right of the political spectrum. In truth, however, they are populist, with a strong emphasis on traditionalism and religion (including Obeah and Shango, the Grenadian variants of Voodoo).

GULP is currently the strongest political party and probably would win 25 to 30 percent of the vote if the elections were held now. This could enable GULP to capture enough seats in the 15-member Parliament to form a government, especially if the remainder of the vote were split among other contending parties. In the island's last elections, held in December 1976, GULP received 52.2 percent of the votes and captured nine of the fifteen seats; the remainder was split, with Maurice Bishop's New Jewel Movement (NJM) receiving 3, the Grenada National Party (GNP) 2, and the United Peoples Party (UPP) 1.

³ The Grenadian Voice, March 31, 1984, pp. 1, 8, and 9.

The GNP, second oldest of Grenada's political parties, was founded in 1955 by Dr. John Watts, a dentist educated at Michigan State University. Although an early GNP manifesto declared that it was "democratic socialist,"⁴ Watts disavowed trade union connections and shaped the party to have a multi-class appeal--a philosophy inherited by Herbert Blaize, a barrister and civil servant from the dependency island of Carriacou. He has led the GNP since 1957.

The GNP's main support is drawn from the old merchant and planter classes as well as from a portion of the new, conservative black middle class. Based on its record when it held office from 1957-1961 and from 1962-1967, the GNP is business-oriented. Its 1961 budget proposed to turn over the government-owned telephone and electricity services to private enterprises and to grant tax "holidays" to a wide range of enterprises.

The Grenada Democratic Movement (GDM), chaired by Dr. Francis Alexis, emerged in May 1983 as an alliance of various exile groups opposed to the Bishop regime. Centrist in ideology, its members comprise a greater number of university-educated Grenadians than the GNP, including several former supporters of the PRG who became disenchanted with its Marxist-Leninist orientation. The GDM had been allied with the GNP for several months prior to the formation of the New National Party.

The GDM lost a number of its younger followers when the National Democratic Party (NDP) was formally launched this June by George Brizan, an economist and educator. The NDP appears social democratic in ideological orientation, emphasizing employment creation through an interrelated program of tourism, agriculture, fishing, and light industry.

GNP's Blaize and GDM's Alexis had been negotiating with Brizan for several months in an attempt to draw his NDP into a coalition. Although all three leaders say they want to form an alliance that could lead to a "government of national reconciliation," disagreements have hindered progress. Blaize, now leader of the New National Party, reportedly clashed with Brizan over economic policy and his unwillingness to relinquish coalition leadership. Winston Whyte, chairman of the Christian Democratic Labor Party, also resisted efforts to be drawn into a coalition until the Prime Ministers of Barbados, St. Vincent and St. Lucia personally intervened.

With the exception of GULP, individual electoral strengths of the other parties are difficult to estimate.

Whyte, youthful leader of the Christian Democratic Labor Party (CDLP), was elected to parliament in 1976 on the United

⁴ G.N.P.'s Plan for Grenada (1955), p. 11.

Peoples Party (UPP) ticket. Imprisoned and tortured by the Bishop regime, Whyte has emerged as something of a hero in Grenada, and is considered to have a good chance of regaining his seat. He recently won the support of younger GDM defectors who view him as a conservative counterweight to the liberal Brizan.

The coalition New National Party could win enough seats in the upcoming Grenadian elections to form a government, although its members are still squabbling over division of constituencies and the party platform. One important factor that may polarize the vote even further, however, is the resurgent Left, represented by the Maurice Bishop Patriotic Movement (MBPM).

New Threat From the Left

The political vacuum and quarrelling among moderate political elements is being exploited by those Marxist revolutionaries who launched the Cuban-supported 1979 coup d'etat that brought Maurice Bishop's PRG to power. Last January, ex-PRG ministers Kenrick Radix and George Louison established the Maurice Bishop and Martyrs of October 19, 1983 Memorial Foundation, which led in June to a new political party called the Maurice Bishop Patriotic Movement (MBPM).

Although publicly disavowed by former PRG moderates such as Tourism Minister Lyden Ramdhanny, the MBPM plans to field candidates for all 15 parliamentary seats and appears to enjoy at least a moderate degree of support from young leftist sympathizers in the civil service and teaching professions as well as unemployed members of the disbanded Peoples Revolutionary Army. Covertly funded by Cuba and Libya, the MBPM began distributing its Indies Times newspaper in April.⁵ The tabloid now has a circulation of around 2,500, representing about 5.3 percent of the 46,900 registered voters. The MBPM is also openly subsidized by support groups such as the New York-based Grenada Foundation, Inc., which is linked to similar organizations in Canada, Sweden and Britain. The Grenada Foundation counts among its supporters such personalities as Representatives John Conyers and Ronald Dellums, Judge Margaret Burnham, singer/composer Pete Seeger, and the American Association of Jurists.⁶

Former PRG officials such as Organization of American States Ambassador Dessima Williams and Press Secretary Don Rojas travel widely in the West and socialist bloc nations, promoting Bishop-- "a true Marxist-Leninist"--as a popular and heroic leader murdered by a "killer clique" with possible CIA connections.⁷

⁵ Information from Leslie Pierre, Editor, The Grenadian Voice, Washington, D.C., August 1, 1984.

⁶ The Grenada Foundation, Inc., News Release, June 19, 1984, p. 1.

⁷ Prague, Rude Pravo in Czech, May 5, 1984, pp. 1, 7 (FBIS, May 10, 1984, p. S1).

Grenadians are advised to continue "resistance against the invaders" while, over media such as Radio Havana, MBPM spokesmen proclaim that "very soon (Grenada) will be liberated by a second revolution which, according to the laws of history, is inevitable."⁸

Such resistance is not empty rhetoric. Crime, particularly theft, is increasing on the island, reportedly encouraged by MBPM activists who advise unemployed and disaffected youths to "liberate" items from "imperialist" tourists. This alone could set back Grenada's economic development by keeping away visitors. The erosion of effective "law and order" is exacerbated by the fact that the U.S. is forbidden by Congress from training the Grenada Police Force.

Leftists also remain in the Grenadian government, most notably within the New York consulate and on the dependency island of Carriacou, where an ex-PRA officer and youth organizer has been reappointed to the District Office. In late May, ten employees were dismissed from the Ministry of Information, which interim government chairman Nicholas Braithwaite said was "packed with people who are not genuine workers but are committed to an alien ideological cause."⁹ Grenadian sources indicate that Braithwaite's words could also be used to describe the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Education, Labor, Social Affairs and Women's Affairs.

While the MBPM's electoral base may be small, its domestic network, financial resources and contacts with international leftist organizations give it potential influence. Maurice Bishop remains a hero to many young Grenadians who have no real Marxist sympathies, a factor being exploited. Although the MBPM probably does not, as yet, enjoy enough popular support to win any seats in the next parliamentary elections, it may well split the "anti-Gairy" vote in key districts and ensure a victory for GULP candidates. Indeed, this may be part of a long-range MBPM strategy: a GULP government would provide the Left with a much greater base for public dissent than would a centrist coalition.

A public opinion poll conducted by a Trinidad research organization showed that 38 percent of the respondents felt that, on the whole, the Bishop regime had been good for Grenada; of this, 55 percent of those aged 16-21 said the PRG was good for Grenada, and 41 percent of those identified as "lower class" took this view.

The several hundred Grenadians earlier sent on "educational" programs to the socialist bloc are also a source of potential

⁸ Havana Domestic Service in Spanish, May 30, 1984 (FBIS, June 1, 1984, pp. Q11, Q12).

⁹ Bonaire Trans World Radio in English, May 25, 1984 (FBIS May 30, 1984, p. S1).

subversion or terrorism. These included three Grenadian military officers (two of whom are now in prison) who attended advanced courses in the USSR and four Grenadians who received Soviet intelligence and security training. Since March, approximately 40 students have returned to the island from socialist countries, although 172 remain in Cuba, 14 in the Soviet Union and 7 in East Germany. At least six of these youths were attending Moscow's International Leninist Party School, where mandatory courses included "Tactics of Revolutionary Movements" and "Social Psychology and Propaganda."

DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE IN PERSPECTIVE

The Reagan Administration has committed itself to restoring the political and economic viability of Grenada. To achieve this, a variety of public and private assistance projects have been initiated in cooperation with other nations and several international agencies.

Public Sector Aid

Even as sporadic fighting continued during the last days of October 1983, the U.S. Agency for International Development began air-ferrying emergency supplies to Grenada. In mid-November, the U.S. Congress provided \$15 million for medium- to long-term economic development on the island, including a \$5 million balance of payments grant to help provide liquidity for resumption of commercial lending to the private sector, assist the government of Grenada in meeting local costs of development programs, and help finance essential supplies of food, raw materials and spare parts.

Overall, U.S. aid to Grenada is estimated at \$57.2 million in FY 1984 and FY 1985, the bulk of which will go to projects in the early phase of implementation (\$10 million); airport completion (\$19 million); and various other development projects. The controversial Point Salines airport is scheduled to open officially for commercial flights on October 25, 1984--the first anniversary of the allied rescue mission--and will employ an estimated 300 Grenadians.

Restoration of the island's badly deteriorated infrastructure has been given priority by the U.S. The Agency for International Development is also cooperating with the Ministry of Education to find places in Western universities for Grenadian students who choose to return home from socialist bloc countries. American Peace Corps volunteers arrived on the island in January to fill teaching and technical positions left vacant by Cuban instructors. The U.S. government also is encouraging and assisting Grenada to accelerate economic reforms in 1) divestiture of state-owned enterprises, 2) return of agricultural lands to the private sector, 3) marketing of agricultural imports and products, and 4) usury laws. Such Western nations as Great Britain, Australia, and Canada have followed the United States in assisting Grenada.

Private Sector Aid

Enduring stability for Grenada can only come through private sector jobs creation. Unemployment--conservatively estimated at 30 percent overall, with a much higher percentage among the under 25 age group--is one of the island's most serious problems.

The White House Office of Private Sector Initiatives began putting together an investment promotion program for Grenada early last November. The Reagan Administration also appointed Ambassador Loren Lawrence--a career foreign service officer with an impressive background in Caribbean business--as U.S. chargé d'affairs in Grenada.

Despite an initial euphoria on the island generated by the combination of expert promotional work and Grenada's undeniably great potential, a number of once enthusiastic businessmen from the U.S. and other countries are now hedging on committing capital to the island. Would-be investors have been frustrated by the lackadaisical attitude and inertia of the interim advisory council. Senior corporate executives on whirlwind visits to the island have been kept waiting for hours by unconcerned government officials who often fail to show up for meetings. Sir Eric Gairy reportedly has attempted to solicit "campaign funds" from businessmen, threatening to revoke the concessions of those who rebuff him if GULP wins the elections.

Many participants on the White House-sponsored investment missions have stated that their prime concern is the vacuum in political leadership in Grenada coupled with the uncertainty of the investment tax codes. The only new development legislation enacted--the Investment Incentives Ordinance 1984--is inadequate, being simply an ambiguous rehash of codes dating back to the 1950s, which are noncompetitive in the mid-1980s Caribbean. Other "incentives" such as the Income Tax Act of the People's Law No. 20 of 1980 are actually disincentives due to their socialist nature. These offer no real tax relief for entrepreneurs and restrict foreign investors to a narrow range of options.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Political

A truly democratic future for Grenada must be a reflection of the will of the people. Public opinion polls and private conversations reveal that a majority of Grenadians do not wish to rush into one of the most crucial elections in their island's history. A compromise is needed: a national referendum should be held in late October or early November to give Grenadians the chance to vote on a slate of issues including the date of parliamentary elections and a new constitution. A choice of firm election dates should be included on the ballot, with late November 1984, March 1985, and November 1985 as possibilities.

A referendum would allow Grenadians to test their democratic process and demonstrate to the world that they are truly masters of their own destiny. Such a plebiscite would also permit them to approve or disapprove of the interim advisory council.

Given the fragility of democratic institutions in Grenada at present, it should be helped by the recently established U.S. National Endowment for Democracy. The purpose of the Endowment is precisely to encourage development of democratic institutions and procedures, and a democratic political culture. Grenadian projects would be a most cost-effective utilization of Endowment resources.

Economic

Grenada must follow the example of such Caribbean islands as the Caymans, the Bahamas and the Turks and Caicos in establishing an innovative and highly attractive climate for investment. Only a restructuring of the existing investment incentives and tax code will give Grenada the chance to compete economically with more developed and experienced West Indian states. New investment legislation is too important to the island's political, social and economic stability to be left in the hands of a single ministry or consulting firm: it should be the product of a working group comprising members of the Grenada Chamber of Commerce, Overseas Private Investment Corporation, the White House Office of Private Sector Initiatives, and others.

The Grenada Chamber of Commerce is a strong and unified force in the community, with excellent leadership. The Chamber has formulated a strategy for development which centers on tourism and agriculture. Its recommendations have won support from U.S. Agency for International Development and OPIC. The Chamber advises that the banana, cocoa and nutmeg associations be immediately returned to cooperative management and control; that the hotels owned by Grenada Resorts Corporation be sold to the private sector; that light industrial facilities such as the Agro-Industrial Plant and the Sugar Factory be sold to private firms; that television and radio be operated privately and that Marketing and Import Board operations be limited to the distribution of local fruits and vegetables, not imported commodities.

Tourism has the greatest potential for providing jobs and an infusion of much-needed hard currency into the Grenadian economy. Due to the terms of Reagan's Caribbean Basin Initiative, light manufacturing also promises to be an important component of the Grenadian economy. Intelligent land use and sound zoning regulations could help foster tourism and light industrial growth. Southern Grenada is ideal for tourist-related development because of proximity to the new international airport and port of St. George's as much as for its unspoiled beaches. Land in this area is limited, however, and thus should not be marred by industrial parks. Industry should be encouraged in the undeveloped areas north of St. George's, particularly in the Tempé valley (where a

bottling plant and flour mill exist) and in the environs of the town of Grenville, which has a port suitable for expansion.

The often overlooked dependency of Carriacou--16 miles north of Grenada--should be designated an "enterprise zone" or tax haven using ideas borrowed from Britain's Thatcher government and the 1981 Companies Ordinance and Insurance Ordinance adopted by the Turks and Caicos Islands. Carriacou, an 11-square-mile island with 7,000 inhabitants, is well suited for light manufacturing, food processing and related enterprises; it is relatively flat and dry and has an airstrip and a sheltered harbor with great development potential. An innovative scheme for virtually laissez-faire development would serve to provide employment for inhabitants of both Carriacou and Grenada, as well as serving as an ongoing publicity vehicle for the island group as a whole.

Security

The joint U.S./Caribbean Peacekeeping Force (including 300 American military personnel, 100 of whom are military police) must be maintained for the foreseeable future to guarantee stability. Whether to keep the peacekeeping forces on the island should be included in a national referendum to allow the Grenadian people to express their wishes on the subject.

Special powers on a pro tempore basis should be granted to the interim government to deal with subversion and terrorism. Acts of sabotage recently have occurred and authorities believe that arms caches still exist on the island. Persons considered security risks--such as ex-PRG members who continue to travel to the Soviet bloc--should have their passports revoked.

The Grenada incident highlights the necessity for the strengthening of the federation of Caribbean states to mutually defend against external aggressions. A more extensive regional security program requires: 1) an increase in U.S. security assistance funding and 2) relief from the clause of section 660 of the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act which bars U.S. training of security forces. The resulting increased funds should then be used to expand the existing multinational Regional Defense Force into a more permanent Caribbean Defense Force consisting of primarily combat infantry troops. Most of the Caribbean nations rely on regular police forces to both maintain internal law and order and defend against external aggressors. Increased Military Assistance Program and International Military Education and Training funding is needed to train the 3,370 police in the Eastern Caribbean, of which only ten percent possess any kind of paramilitary training, to help offset shortages of regular regional army forces in the event of any escalation of hostilities.¹⁰

¹⁰ Report of the Delegation of Eastern Caribbean and South American Countries, February 1984, U.S. Government Printing Office.

CONCLUSION

In the long term, the best means of assuring the political stability of Grenada is by the election of a moderate, reform-minded government to administer an economy as free from legislative encumbrances as possible. Only the creation of a fertile climate for the growth of free enterprise can produce the jobs needed to alleviate Grenada's chronic, and potentially explosive, unemployment problem. The Reagan Administration's policy of providing Grenada with a largesse of recuperative aid is wise, and should ultimately be the basis for a new era of U.S.-Caribbean relations. However, to guarantee that the Grenada rescue mission remains victorious, the White House must be wary of allowing itself to slip into a position of benign neglect toward the island: wise and decisive actions are once again needed to regain the positive momentum generated last October.

First among these should be a speedy national referendum, encouraged by the National Endowment for Democracy, that will allow Grenadians to decide the timetable for parliamentary elections and a new constitution. Next, the country's economy must be rebuilt. The Grenadian Chamber of Commerce has a promising market-oriented development strategy. The White House Office of Private Sector Initiatives should work with it to restructure investment incentives and the tax code, and U.S. aid should support Grenadian tourism and agriculture projects that will bring jobs and needed hard currency to the island. Finally, to guard against external aggression, the U.S. should grant security assistance to expand the current Regional Defense Force into a more permanent Caribbean Defense Force. With proper guidance, Grenada can become yet another example of the benefits of democracy and free market development.

Prepared for The Heritage Foundation by
Timothy Ashby
President, Caribbean Financial Consultants
Arlington, Virginia

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

October 2, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR RON LEHMAN
JOHN DOUGLASS
MIKE DONLEY
FROM: RON SABLE
SUBJECT: MX Planning Information

As we proceed to bring together the various parts of the President's mandated March 1, 1985 report to Congress, it may be useful to address a few areas outlined by Senator Nunn:

- Consideration of new developments in MX basing.
- Cost and deployment assessment of Midgetman.
 - Viability outside arms control agreements.
- A plan that goes beyond simply putting the MX into "vulnerable" Minuteman silos.

RECEIVED 02 OCT 84 09

TO MCFARLANE FROM DARMAN, R

DOCDATE 02 OCT 84

URGENT

KEYWORDS: BUDGET CENTRAL AMERICA
NICARAGUA ENROLLED BILLS
DARMAN REFERRAL

SUBJECT: H J RES 653 RE CONTINUING APPROPRIATIONS FOR FY1985

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO KIMMITT TO DARMAN DUE: 02 OCT 84 STATUS S FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

ROBINSON

DONLEY

MENGENS

FORTIER

NORTH

KIMMITT

LEHMAN, C

SABLE

THOMPSON

COMMENTS DUE ASAP

URGENT

REF# LOG NSCIFID (CL)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

DISPATCH

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WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

URGENTDATE: 10/2/84 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: ASAPSUBJECT: ENROLLED BILL H.J. RES. 653 - CONTINUING APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE
FISCAL YEAR 1985

	ACTION FYI			ACTION FYI	
VICE PRESIDENT	☐	☐	MURPHY	☒	☐
MEESE	☐	☒	OGLESBY	☒	☐
BAKER	☐	☒	ROGERS	☐	☐
DEAVER	☐	☒	SPEAKES	☐	☒
STOCKMAN	☐	☐	SVAHN	☒	☐
DARMAN	☐	☒	VERSTANDIG	☒	☐
FIELDING	☒	☐	WHITTLESEY	☒	☐
FULLER	☒	☐	_____	☐	☐
HERRINGTON	☐	☐	_____	☐	☐
HICKEY	☐	☐	_____	☐	☐
McFARLANE	☒	☐	_____	☐	☐
McMANUS	☐	☒	_____	☐	☐

REMARKS:

May we have your comments on the attached Bill Report as soon as possible.

Note: We have not yet received the Bill, but it is expected sometime this morning.

RESPONSE:

Richard G. Darman
Assistant to the President
Ext. 2702



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET 201 007 - 1 11 71 30

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

OCT 01 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Enrolled Bill H.J. Res. 653 -- Continuing
Appropriations for the Fiscal Year 1985
Sponsor: Rep. Whitten (D), Mississippi

Last Day for Action

October 12, 1984

Signature as soon as possible is recommended in order to avoid the disruption of affected agency activities while debate on a longer-term continuing resolution is completed.

Purpose

This resolution provides for continuing activities of the Federal government through October 3, 1984.

Agency Recommendations

Office of Management and Budget

Approval

Other affected agencies

Approval assumed

Background

The new fiscal year begins today, October 1, with Congressional action still not completed on nine of the thirteen regular appropriation bills. The Congress is currently debating a continuing resolution that would provide funding for the full fiscal year for the agencies covered by these unenacted bills. The Administration has indicated that both the House and Senate versions of the continuing resolution under debate are not acceptable because of excessive funding for many domestic programs, inclusion of funds for new water projects, and other undesirable language provisions. This continuing resolution would provide for a brief continuation of government activities at a restrictive rate while differences over the longer-term continuing resolution are resolved.

Major Features of the Resolution

1. Funding Levels

This continuing resolution provides funding at the current rate (including supplemental funding) for activities covered by the following nine appropriations bills:

- Agriculture
- Defense
- District of Columbia
- Foreign Assistance
- Interior
- Labor/HHS/Education
- Military Construction
- Transportation
- Treasury/Postal

This bill also continues to provide funding for the one-year emergency immigrant education program created over the Administration's objection in last year's continuing resolution.


2. Provisions Affecting Programs

The enrolled resolution contains a provision that would deny funding for the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense or any other U.S. intelligence agency from supporting, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua. While this provision is certainly not supported by the Administration, the brief span of this resolution will not hamper the current policies of the Administration.

Recommendation

The funding provided in this resolution represents levels enacted in 1984. While these spending levels are not completely adequate for implementing your policies for the entire 1985 fiscal year, I believe these funding recommendations will permit continued government operations for the short span of this resolution.

I recommend that you sign the enrolled bill.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "David A. Stockman", with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

David A. Stockman
Director