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126282	PAPER	RE NUCLEAR POLICY	5	4/6/1982	B1
126283	MEMO	WILLIAM CLARK TO JAMES BAKER III RE NUCLEAR FREEZE AND RELATED ARMS CONTROL AND DEFENSE ISSUES	1	4/26/1982	B1

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April 3, 1982

Dear Mr. President:

For our fellow authors and for ourselves, we are offering you, through the courtesy of Judge Clark, this preprint of an article that will be published next Thursday, April 8, in Foreign Affairs. Washington being Washington, we have been very careful to avoid compromising the embargo of 6 P. M., Wednesday, April 7. But we did want to afford you a few days of advance private notice.

We offer this paper to you ahead of time in part because it deals with a subject -- nuclear weapons policy -- whose tremendous importance you have repeatedly emphasized, but still more because the framing of basic policy in this field is so inescapably and centrally the responsibility of the President.

The paper urges careful study, both by public authorities and private citizens, of the ways and means of moving to a policy of no-first-use of nuclear weapons in the Atlantic Alliance. We believe that the dangers in our present doctrine, which this Administration inherited, are growing, and that careful study of a new policy can help to keep the peace and hold the Alliance together in the next decades. But we are urging study, not offering final judgment. We think you will see that the article is not critical of any one administration as compared to another, and indeed not one of its authors claims to have been always right in the past or to know all the answers now.

Too much of our national discussion of these great issues has been distorted in past years by early and mutually suspicious polarization. We are most eager to avoid any such result here. We believe that you will agree with this objective, and it is obvious that no one can do as much as the President to ensure that discussion proceeds in this spirit -- a spirit which is made almost mandatory by the truth you expressed so clearly this last Wednesday: "Everybody would be a loser if there's a nuclear war."

We need hardly add that if any of us can help in such further consideration as you may decide to give this matter, we shall be at your disposal.

Respectfully,

McGeorge Bundy Robert S. McNamara

The Honorable Ronald Reagan
President of the United States
Washington, D. C.

Summary of "Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance"

The long-standing policy of the Atlantic Alliance is to be ready and willing to be the first to use nuclear weapons if necessary to block conventional aggression. This policy should be reconsidered. "The time has come for careful study of the ways and means of moving to a new policy and doctrine: that the Alliance will not use nuclear weapons unless an aggressor should use them first."

The current disarray in the Alliance on nuclear matters has its root cause in the existence "of essentially equivalent and enormously excessive nuclear weapons systems both in the Soviet Union and in the Atlantic Alliance." Even the most limited use of nuclear weapons would have appalling consequences and would create inescapable and enormous risks of unlimited escalation.

Any new policy must provide for maintaining the effectiveness of NATO's deterrent problem on the central front. It must especially respect the interests and concerns of West Germany, which is directly exposed to Soviet threats and dependent on American nuclear protection. Even under no-first-use that protection must be maintained to deter Soviet nuclear threats. But the West Germans are probably like the rest of us in wishing to be able to defend the peace by forces that do not require the dreadful choice of nuclear escalation.

A no-first-use policy will require a strengthened confidence in the adequacy of the conventional forces of the Alliance. To do what is needed is primarily a matter of political will. It seems clear that the nations of the Alliance together can provide whatever forces are needed, and within

realistic budgetary constraints. But it would be wrong to make a hasty judgment that any necessary changes would be excessively difficult or costly. Soviet conventional strength is often exaggerated. "Today there is literally no one who really knows what would be needed."

The present Administration has not yet shown interest in this question, but Administrations have changed their minds on nuclear matters before, and in any case the matter need not wait on governments for study. Many strong private voices have been raised in recent months on behalf of stronger conventional forces.

A no-first-use policy could help us in many ways: by making our needs for nuclear modernization much more modest; by helping to meet understandable anxieties in Europe; by reducing the risk of conventional aggression through improved conventional forces; and by strengthening the political cohesion of the Alliance through the adoption of a credible military policy. "A posture of effective conventional balance and survivable second-strike nuclear strength is vastly better for our own peoples and governments, in a deep sense more civilized, than one that forces the serious contemplation of 'limited' nuclear scenarios that are at once terrifying and implausible."

No-first-use can help in our relations with the Soviet Union, which has repeatedly offered to join in declaring such a policy, and it might also help open the path toward reduction of nuclear armaments.

"There has been no first use of nuclear weapons since 1945, and no one in any country regrets that fact. The right way to maintain this record is to recognize that in the age of massive thermonuclear overkill it no longer makes sense -- if it ever did -- to hold these weapons for any other purpose than the prevention of their use."

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McGeorge Bundy
George F. Kennan
Robert S. McNamara
Gerard Smith

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

Reprinted From

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW

SPRING 1982

McGeorge Bundy
George F. Kennan
Robert S. McNamara
Gerard Smith

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

We are four Americans who have been concerned over many years with the relation between nuclear weapons and the peace and freedom of the members of the Atlantic Alliance. Having learned that each of us separately has been coming to hold new views on this hard but vital question, we decided to see how far our thoughts, and the lessons of our varied experiences, could be put together; the essay that follows is the result. It argues that a new policy can bring great benefits, but it aims to start a discussion, not to end it.

For 33 years now, the Atlantic Alliance has relied on the asserted readiness of the United States to use nuclear weapons if necessary to repel aggression from the East. Initially, indeed, it was widely thought (notably by such great and different men as Winston Churchill and Niels Bohr) that the basic military balance in Europe was between American atomic bombs and the massive conventional forces of the Soviet Union. But the first Soviet explosion, in August 1949, ended the American monopoly only

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McGeorge Bundy was Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from 1961 to 1966 and President of the Ford Foundation from 1966 to mid-1979. He is currently Professor of History at New York University.

George F. Kennan is Professor Emeritus at the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton. He was U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, 1952, and to Yugoslavia, 1961–63, and is the author of *Soviet-American Relations, 1917–20* (2 Vols.); *Memoirs* (2 Vols.) and other works.

Robert S. McNamara was Secretary of Defense from 1961 to 1968 and President of the World Bank from 1968 to mid-1981.

Gerard Smith was Chief of the U.S. Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) from 1969 to 1972, and is the author of *Doubletalk: The Story of SALT I.* He also served as Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for atomic energy affairs (1954–57), Director of the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State (1957–61), a full-time consultant on the Multilateral Force (1961–64), and Ambassador at Large and Special Presidential Representative for nonproliferation matters (1977–80).

one month after the Senate approved the North Atlantic Treaty, and in 1950 communist aggression in Korea produced new Allied attention to the defense of Europe.

The "crude" atomic bombs of the 1940s have been followed in both countries by a fantastic proliferation of weapons and delivery systems, so that today the two parts of a still-divided Europe are targeted by many thousands of warheads both in the area and outside it. Within the Alliance, France and Britain have developed thermonuclear forces which are enormous compared to what the United States had at the beginning, although small by comparison with the present deployments of the superpowers. Doctrine has succeeded doctrine, from "balanced collective forces" to "massive retaliation" to "mutual assured destruction" to "flexible response" and the "seamless web." Throughout these transformations, most of them occasioned at least in part by changes in the Western view of Soviet capabilities, both deployments and doctrines have been intended to deter Soviet aggression and keep the peace by maintaining a credible connection between any large-scale assault, whether conventional or nuclear, and the engagement of the strategic nuclear forces of the United States.

A major element in every doctrine has been that the United States has asserted its willingness to be the first—has indeed made plans to be the first if necessary—to use nuclear weapons to defend against aggression in Europe. It is this element that needs re-examination now. Both its cost to the coherence of the Alliance and its threat to the safety of the world are rising while its deterrent credibility declines.

This policy was first established when the American nuclear advantage was overwhelming, but that advantage has long since gone and cannot be recaptured. As early as the 1950s it was recognized by both Prime Minister Churchill and President Eisenhower that the nuclear strength of both sides was becoming so great that a nuclear war would be a ghastly catastrophe for all concerned. The following decades have only confirmed and intensified that reality. The time has come for careful study of the ways and means of moving to a new Alliance policy and doctrine: that nuclear weapons will not be used unless an aggressor should use them first.

II

The disarray that currently besets the nuclear policy and practices of the Alliance is obvious. Governments and their representatives have maintained an appearance of unity as they persist in

their support of the two-track decision of December 1979, under which 572 new American missiles of intermediate range are to be placed in Europe unless a satisfactory agreement on the limitation of such weapons can be reached in the negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union that began last November. But behind this united front there are divisive debates, especially in countries where the new weapons are to be deployed.

The arguments put forward by advocates of these deployments contain troubling variations. The simplest and intuitively the most persuasive claim is that these new weapons are needed as a counter to the new Soviet SS-20 missiles; it may be a recognition of the surface attractiveness of this position that underlies President Reagan's striking—but probably not negotiable—proposal that if all the SS-20s are dismantled the planned deployments will be cancelled. Other officials have a quite different argument, that without new and survivable American weapons which can reach Russia from Western Europe there can be no confidence that the strategic forces of the United States will remain committed to the defense of Western Europe; on this argument the new missiles are needed to make it more likely that any war in Europe would bring nuclear warheads on the Soviet Union and thus deter the aggressor in the first place. This argument is logically distinct from any concern about the Soviet SS-20s, and it probably explains the ill-concealed hope of some planners that the Reagan proposal will be rejected. Such varied justifications cast considerable doubt on the real purpose of the proposed deployment.

An equally disturbing phenomenon is the gradual shift in the balance of argument that has occurred since the need to address the problem was first asserted in 1977. Then the expression of need was European, and in the first instance German; the emerging parity of long-range strategic systems was asserted to create a need for a balance at less than intercontinental levels. The American interest developed relatively slowly, but because these were to be American missiles, American planners took the lead as the proposal was worked out. It has also served Soviet purposes to concentrate on the American role. A similar focus has been chosen by many leaders of the new movement for nuclear disarmament in Europe. And now there are American voices, some in the executive branch, talking as if European acceptance of these new missiles were some sort of test of European loyalty to the Alliance. Meanwhile some of those in Europe who remain publicly committed to both tracks of the 1979 agreement are clearly hoping that the day of deployment will never arrive. When the very origins of a new proposal become the source of irritated argument

among allies—"You started it!"—something is badly wrong in our common understanding.

A still more severe instance of disarray, one which has occurred under both President Carter and President Reagan, relates to the so-called neutron bomb, a weapon designed to meet the threat of Soviet tanks. American military planners, authorized by doctrine to think in terms of early battlefield use of nuclear weapons, naturally want more "up-to-date" weapons than those they have now; it is known that thousands of the aging short-range nuclear weapons now in Europe are hard to use effectively. Yet to a great many Europeans the neutron bomb suggests, however unfairly, that the Americans are preparing to fight a "limited" nuclear war on their soil. Moreover neither weapons designers nor the Pentagon officials they have persuaded seem to have understood the intense and special revulsion that is associated with killing by "enhanced radiation."

All these recent distempers have a deeper cause. They are rooted in the fact that the evolution of essentially equivalent and enormously excessive nuclear weapons systems both in the Soviet Union and in the Atlantic Alliance has aroused new concern about the dangers of all forms of nuclear war. The profusion of these systems, on both sides, has made it more difficult than ever to construct rational plans for any first use of these weapons by anyone.

This problem is more acute than before, but it is not new. Even in the 1950s, a time that is often mistakenly perceived as one of effortless American superiority, the prospect of any actual use of tactical weapons was properly terrifying to Europeans and to more than a few Americans. Military plans for such use remained both deeply secret and highly hypothetical; the coherence of the Alliance was maintained by general neglect of such scenarios, not by sedulous public discussion. In the 1960s there was a prolonged and stressful effort to address the problem of theater-range weapons, but agreement on new forces and plans for their use proved elusive. Eventually the proposal for a multilateral force (MLF) was replaced by the assignment of American Polaris submarines to NATO, and by the creation in Brussels of an inter-allied Nuclear Planning Group. Little else was accomplished. In both decades the Alliance kept itself together more by mutual political confidence than by plausible nuclear war-fighting plans.

Although the first years of the 1970s produced a welcome if oversold détente, complacency soon began to fade. The Nixon Administration, rather quietly, raised the question about the long-run credibility of the American nuclear deterrent that was to be

elaborated by Henry Kissinger in 1979 at a meeting in Brussels. Further impetus to both new doctrine and new deployments came during the Ford and Carter Administrations, but each public statement, however careful and qualified, only increased European apprehensions. The purpose of both Administrations was to reinforce deterrence, but the result has been to increase fear of nuclear war, and even of Americans as its possible initiators. Intended as contributions to both rationality and credibility, these excursions into the theory of limited nuclear war have been counterproductive in Europe.

Yet it was not wrong to raise these matters. Questions that were answered largely by silence in the 1950s and 1960s cannot be so handled in the 1980s. The problem was not in the fact that the questions were raised, but in the way they seemed to be answered.

It is time to recognize that no one has ever succeeded in advancing any persuasive reason to believe that any use of nuclear weapons, even on the smallest scale, could reliably be expected to remain limited. Every serious analysis and every military exercise, for over 25 years, has demonstrated that even the most restrained battlefield use would be enormously destructive to civilian life and property. There is no way for anyone to have any confidence that such a nuclear action will not lead to further and more devastating exchanges. Any use of nuclear weapons in Europe, by the Alliance or against it, carries with it a high and inescapable risk of escalation into the general nuclear war which would bring ruin to all and victory to none.

The one clearly definable firebreak against the worldwide disaster of general nuclear war is the one that stands between all other kinds of conflict and any use whatsoever of nuclear weapons. To keep that firebreak wide and strong is in the deepest interest of all mankind. In retrospect, indeed, it is remarkable that this country has not responded to this reality more quickly. Given the appalling consequences of even the most limited use of nuclear weapons and the total impossibility for both sides of any guarantee against unlimited escalation, there must be the gravest doubt about the wisdom of a policy which asserts the effectiveness of any first use of nuclear weapons by either side. So it seems timely to consider the possibilities, the requirements, the difficulties, and the advantages of a policy of no-first-use.

III

The largest question presented by any proposal for an Allied policy of no-first-use is that of its impact on the effectiveness of NATO's deterrent posture on the central front. In spite of the doubts

that are created by any honest look at the probable consequences of resort to a first nuclear strike of any kind, it should be remembered that there were strong reasons for the creation of the American nuclear umbrella over NATO. The original American pledge, expressed in Article 5 of the Treaty, was understood to be a nuclear guarantee. It was extended at a time when only a conventional Soviet threat existed, so a readiness for first use was plainly implied from the beginning. To modify that guarantee now, even in the light of all that has happened since, would be a major change in the assumptions of the Alliance, and no such change should be made without the most careful exploration of its implications.

In such an exploration the role of the Federal Republic of Germany must be central. Americans too easily forget what the people of the Federal Republic never can: that their position is triply exposed in a fashion unique among the large industrial democracies. They do not have nuclear weapons; they share a long common boundary with the Soviet empire; in any conflict on the central front their land would be the first battleground. None of these conditions can be changed, and together they present a formidable challenge.

Having decisively rejected a policy of neutrality, the Federal Republic has necessarily relied on the nuclear protection of the United States, and we Americans should recognize that this relationship is not a favor we are doing our German friends, but the best available solution of a common problem. Both nations believe that the Federal Republic must be defended; both believe that the Federal Republic must not have nuclear weapons of its own; both believe that nuclear guarantees *of some sort* are essential; and both believe that only the United States can provide those guarantees in persuasively deterrent peacekeeping form.

The uniqueness of the West German position can be readily demonstrated by comparing it with those of France and the United Kingdom. These two nations have distance, and in one case water, between them and the armies of the Soviet Union; they also have nuclear weapons. While those weapons may contribute something to the common strength of the Alliance, their main role is to underpin a residual national self-reliance, expressed in different ways at different times by different governments, which sets both Britain and France apart from the Federal Republic. They are set apart from the United States too, in that no other nation depends on them to use their nuclear weapons otherwise than in their own ultimate self-defense.

The quite special character of the nuclear relationship between the Federal Republic and the United States is a most powerful reason for defining that relationship with great care. It is rare for one major nation to depend entirely on another for a form of strength that is vital to its survival. It is unprecedented for any nation, however powerful, to pledge itself to a course of action, in defense of another, that might entail its own nuclear devastation. A policy of no-first-use would not and should not imply an abandonment of this extraordinary guarantee—only its redefinition. It would still be necessary to be ready to reply with American nuclear weapons to any nuclear attack on the Federal Republic, and this commitment would in itself be sufficiently demanding to constitute a powerful demonstration that a policy of no-first-use would represent no abandonment of our German ally.

The German right to a voice in this question is not merely a matter of location, or even of dependence on an American nuclear guarantee. The people of the Federal Republic have demonstrated a steadfast dedication to peace, to collective defense, and to domestic political decency. The study here proposed should be responsive to their basic desires. It seems probable that they are like the rest of us in wishing most of all to have no war of any kind, but also to be able to defend the peace by forces that do not require the dreadful choice of nuclear escalation.

IV

While we believe that careful study will lead to a firm conclusion that it is time to move decisively toward a policy of no-first-use, it is obvious that any such policy would require a strengthened confidence in the adequacy of the conventional forces of the Alliance, above all the forces in place on the central front and those available for prompt reinforcement. It seems clear that the nations of the Alliance together can provide whatever forces are needed, and within realistic budgetary constraints, but it is a quite different question whether they can summon the necessary political will. Evidence from the history of the Alliance is mixed. There has been great progress in the conventional defenses of NATO in the 30 years since the 1952 Lisbon communiqué, but there have also been failures to meet force goals all along the way.

In each of the four nations which account for more than 90 percent of NATO's collective defense and a still higher proportion of its strength on the central front, there remain major unresolved political issues that critically affect contributions to conventional deterrence: for example, it can be asked what priority the United

Kingdom gives to the British Army of the Rhine, what level of NATO-connected deployment can be accepted by France, what degree of German relative strength is acceptable to the Allies and fair to the Federal Republic itself, and whether we Americans have a durable and effective answer to our military manpower needs in the present all-volunteer active and reserve forces. These are the kinds of questions—and there are many more—that would require review and resolution in the course of reaching any final decision to move to a responsible policy of no-first-use.

There should also be an examination of the ways in which the concept of early use of nuclear weapons may have been built into existing forces, tactics, and general military expectations. To the degree that this has happened, there could be a dangerous gap right now between real capabilities and those which political leaders might wish to have in a time of crisis. Conversely there should be careful study of what a policy of no-first-use would require in those same terms. It seems more than likely that once the military leaders of the Alliance have learned to think and act steadily on this "conventional" assumption, their forces will be better instruments for stability in crises and for general deterrence, as well as for the maintenance of the nuclear firebreak so vital to us all.

No one should underestimate either the difficulty or the importance of the shift in military attitudes implied by a no-first-use policy. Although military commanders are well aware of the terrible dangers in any exchange of nuclear weapons, it is a strong military tradition to maintain that aggressive war, not the use of any one weapon, is the central evil. Many officers will be initially unenthusiastic about any formal policy that puts limits on their recourse to a weapon of apparently decisive power. Yet the basic argument for a no-first-use policy can be stated in strictly military terms: that any other course involves unacceptable risks to the national life that military forces exist to defend. The military officers of the Alliance can be expected to understand the force of this proposition, even if many of them do not initially agree with it. Moreover, there is every reason for confidence that they will loyally accept any policy that has the support of their governments and the peoples behind them, just as they have fully accepted the present arrangements under which the use of nuclear weapons, even in retaliation for a nuclear attack, requires advance and specific approval by the head of government.

An Allied posture of no-first-use would have one special effect that can be set forth in advance: it would draw new attention to

the importance of maintaining and improving the specifically American conventional forces in Europe. The principal political difficulty in a policy of no-first-use is that it may be taken in Europe, and especially in the Federal Republic, as evidence of a reduced American interest in the Alliance and in effective overall deterrence. The argument here is exactly the opposite: that such a policy is the best one available for keeping the Alliance united and effective. Nonetheless the psychological realities of the relation between the Federal Republic and the United States are such that the only way to prevent corrosive German suspicion of American intentions, under a no-first-use regime, will be for Americans to accept for themselves an appropriate share in any new level of conventional effort that the policy may require.

Yet it would be wrong to make any hasty judgment that those new levels of effort must be excessively high. The subject is complex, and the more so because both technology and politics are changing. Precision-guided munitions, in technology, and the visible weakening of the military solidity of the Warsaw Pact, in politics, are only two examples of changes working to the advantage of the Alliance. Moreover there has been some tendency, over many years, to exaggerate the relative conventional strength of the U.S.S.R. and to underestimate Soviet awareness of the enormous costs and risks of any form of aggression against NATO.

Today there is literally no one who really knows what would be needed. Most of the measures routinely used in both official and private analyses are static and fragmentary. An especially arbitrary, if obviously convenient, measure of progress is that of spending levels. But it is political will, not budgetary pressure, that will be decisive. The value of greater safety from both nuclear and conventional danger is so great that even if careful analysis showed that the necessary conventional posture would require funding larger than the three-percent real increase that has been the common target of recent years, it would be the best bargain ever offered to the members of the Alliance.

Yet there is no need for crash programs, which always bring extra costs. The direction of the Allied effort will be more important than its velocity. The final establishment of a firm policy of no-first-use, in any case, will obviously require time. What is important today is to begin to move in this direction.

V

The concept of renouncing any first use of nuclear weapons should also be tested by careful review of the value of existing

NATO plans for selective and limited use of nuclear weapons. While many scenarios for nuclear war-fighting are nonsensical, it must be recognized that cautious and sober senior officers have found it prudent to ask themselves what alternatives to defeat they could propose to their civilian superiors if a massive conventional Soviet attack seemed about to make a decisive breakthrough. This question has generated contingency plans for battlefield uses of small numbers of nuclear weapons which might prevent that particular disaster. It is hard to see how any such action could be taken without the most enormous risk of rapid and catastrophic escalation, but it is a fair challenge to a policy of no-first-use that it should be accompanied by a level of conventional strength that would make such plans unnecessary.

In the light of this difficulty it would be prudent to consider whether there is any acceptable policy short of no-first-use. One possible example is what might be called "no-*early*-first-use;" such a policy might leave open the option of some limited nuclear action to fend off a final large-scale conventional defeat, and by renunciation of any immediate first use and increased emphasis on conventional capabilities it might be thought to help somewhat in reducing current fears.

But the value of a clear and simple position would be great, especially in its effect on ourselves and our Allies. One trouble with exceptions is that they easily become rules. It seems much better that even the most responsible choice of even the most limited nuclear actions to prevent even the most imminent conventional disaster should be left out of authorized policy. What the Alliance needs most today is not the refinement of its nuclear options, but a clear-cut decision to avoid them as long as others do.

VI

Who should make the examination here proposed? The present American Administration has so far shown little interest in questions of this sort, and indeed a seeming callousness in some quarters in Washington toward nuclear dangers may be partly responsible for some of the recent unrest in Europe. But each of the four of us has served in Administrations which revised their early thoughts on nuclear weapons policy. James Byrnes learned the need to seek international control; John Foster Dulles stepped back somewhat from his early belief in massive retaliation; Dwight Eisenhower came to believe in the effort to ban nuclear tests which he at first thought dangerous; the Administration of John

F. Kennedy (in which we all served) modified its early views on targeting doctrine; Lyndon Johnson shelved the proposed MLF when he decided it was causing more trouble than it was worth; and Richard Nixon agreed to narrow limits on anti-ballistic missiles whose large-scale deployment he had once thought indispensable. There were changes also in the Ford and Carter Administrations, and President Reagan has already adjusted his views on the usefulness of early arms control negotiations, even though we remain in a time of general stress between Washington and Moscow. No Administration should be held, and none should hold itself, to inflexible first positions on these extraordinarily difficult matters.

Nor does this question need to wait upon governments for study. The day is long past when public awe and governmental secrecy made nuclear policy a matter for only the most private executive determination. The questions presented by a policy of no-first-use must indeed be decided by governments, but they can and should be considered by citizens. In recent months strong private voices have been raised on both sides of the Atlantic on behalf of strengthened conventional forces. When this cause is argued by such men as Christoph Bertram, Field Marshal Lord Carver, Admiral Noel Gayler, Professor Michael Howard, Henry Kissinger, François de Rose, Theo Sommer, and General Maxwell Taylor, to name only a few, it is fair to conclude that at least in its general direction the present argument is not outside the mainstream of thinking within the Alliance. Indeed there is evidence of renewed concern for conventional forces in governments too.

What should be added, in both public and private sectors, is a fresh, sustained, and careful consideration of the requirements and the benefits of deciding that the policy of the Atlantic Alliance should be to keep its nuclear weapons unused as long as others do the same. Our own belief, though we do not here assert it as proven, is that when this possibility is fully explored it will be evident that the advantages of the policy far outweigh its costs, and that this demonstration will help the peoples and governments of the Alliance to find the political will to move in this direction. In this spirit we go on to sketch the benefits that could come from such a change.

VII

The first possible advantage of a policy of no-first-use is in the management of the nuclear deterrent forces that would still be

necessary. Once we escape from the need to plan for a first use that is credible, we can escape also from many of the complex arguments that have led to assertions that all sorts of new nuclear capabilities are necessary to create or restore a capability for something called "escalation dominance"—a capability to fight and "win" a nuclear war at any level. What would be needed, under no-first-use, is a set of capabilities we already have in overflowing measure—capabilities for appropriate retaliation to any kind of Soviet nuclear attack which would leave the Soviet Union in no doubt that it too should adhere to a policy of no-first-use. The Soviet government is already aware of the awful risk inherent in any use of these weapons, and there is no current or prospective Soviet "superiority" that would tempt anyone in Moscow toward nuclear adventurism. (All four of us are wholly unpersuaded by the argument advanced in recent years that the Soviet Union could ever rationally expect to gain from such a wild effort as a massive first strike on land-based American strategic missiles.)

Once it is clear that the only nuclear need of the Alliance is for adequately survivable and varied *second strike* forces, requirements for the modernization of major nuclear systems will become more modest than has been assumed. In particular we can escape from the notion that we must somehow match everything the rocket commanders in the Soviet Union extract from their government. It seems doubtful, also, that under such a policy it would be necessary or desirable to deploy neutron bombs. The savings permitted by more modest programs could go toward meeting the financial costs of our contribution to conventional forces.

It is important to avoid misunderstanding here. In the conditions of the 1980s, and in the absence of agreement on both sides to proceed to very large-scale reductions in nuclear forces, it is clear that large, varied, and survivable nuclear forces will still be necessary for nuclear deterrence. The point is not that we Americans should move unilaterally to some "minimum" force of a few tens or even hundreds of missiles, but rather that once we escape from the pressure to seem willing and able to use these weapons first, we shall find that our requirements are much less massive than is now widely supposed.

A posture of no-first-use should also go far to meet the understandable anxieties that underlie much of the new interest in nuclear disarmament, both in Europe and in our own country. Some of the proposals generated by this new interest may lack practicability for the present. For example, proposals to make

"all" of Europe—from Portugal to Poland—a nuclear-free zone do not seem to take full account of the reality that thousands of long-range weapons deep in the Soviet Union will still be able to target Western Europe. But a policy of no-first-use, with its accompaniment of a reduced requirement for new Allied nuclear systems, should allow a considerable reduction in fears of all sorts. Certainly such a new policy would neutralize the highly disruptive argument currently put about in Europe: that plans for theater nuclear modernization reflect an American hope to fight a nuclear war limited to Europe. Such modernization might or might not be needed under a policy of no-first-use; that question, given the size and versatility of other existing and prospective American forces, would be a matter primarily for European decision (as it is today).

An effective policy of no-first-use will also reduce the risk of conventional aggression in Europe. That risk has never been as great as prophets of doom have claimed and has always lain primarily in the possibility that Soviet leaders might think they could achieve some quick and limited gain that would be accepted because no defense or reply could be concerted. That temptation has been much reduced by the Allied conventional deployments achieved in the last 20 years, and it would be reduced still further by the additional shift in the balance of Allied effort that a no-first-use policy would both permit and require. The risk that an adventurist Soviet leader might take the terrible gamble of conventional aggression was greater in the past than it is today, and is greater today than it would be under no-first-use, backed up by an effective conventional defense.

VIII

We have been discussing a problem of military policy, but our interest is also political. The principal immediate danger in the current military posture of the Alliance is not that it will lead to large-scale war, conventional or nuclear. The balance of terror, and the caution of both sides, appear strong enough today to prevent such a catastrophe, at least in the absence of some deeply destabilizing political change which might lead to panic or adventurism on either side. But the present unbalanced reliance on nuclear weapons, if long continued, might produce exactly such political change. The events of the last year have shown that differing perceptions of the role of nuclear weapons can lead to destructive recriminations, and when these differences are compounded by understandable disagreements on other matters such

as Poland and the Middle East, the possibilities for trouble among Allies are evident.

The political coherence of the Alliance, especially in times of stress, is at least as important as the military strength required to maintain credible deterrence. Indeed the political requirement has, if anything, an even higher priority. Soviet leaders would be most pleased to help the Alliance fall into total disarray, and would much prefer such a development to the inescapable uncertainties of open conflict. Conversely, if consensus is re-established on a military policy that the peoples and governments of the Alliance can believe in, both political will and deterrent credibility will be reinforced. Plenty of hard questions will remain, but both fear and mistrust will be reduced, and they are the most immediate enemies.

There remains one underlying reality which could not be removed by even the most explicit declaratory policy of no-first-use. Even if the nuclear powers of the Alliance should join, with the support of other Allies, in a policy of no-first-use, and even if that decision should lead to a common declaration of such policy by these powers and the Soviet Union, no one on either side could guarantee beyond all possible doubt that if conventional warfare broke out on a large scale there would in fact be no use of nuclear weapons. We could not make that assumption about the Soviet Union, and we must recognize that Soviet leaders could not make it about us. As long as the weapons themselves exist, the possibility of their use will remain.

But this inescapable reality does not undercut the value of a no-first-use policy. That value is first of all for the internal health of the Western Alliance itself. A posture of effective conventional balance and survivable second-strike nuclear strength is vastly better for our own peoples and governments, in a deep sense more civilized, than one that forces the serious contemplation of "limited" nuclear scenarios that are at once terrifying and implausible.

There is strong reason to believe that no-first-use can also help in our relations with the Soviet Union. The Soviet government has repeatedly offered to join the West in declaring such a policy, and while such declarations may have only limited reliability, it would be wrong to disregard the real value to both sides of a jointly declared adherence to this policy. To renounce the first use of nuclear weapons is to accept an enormous burden of responsibility for any later violation. The existence of such a clearly declared common pledge would increase the cost and risk of any

sudden use of nuclear weapons by either side and correspondingly reduce the political force of spoken or unspoken threats of such use.

A posture and policy of no-first-use also could help to open the path toward serious reduction of nuclear armaments on both sides. The nuclear decades have shown how hard it is to get agreements that really do constrain these weapons, and no one can say with assurance that any one step can make a decisive difference. But just as a policy of no-first-use should reduce the pressures on our side for massive new nuclear forces, it should help to increase the international incentives for the Soviet Union to show some restraint of its own. It is important not to exaggerate here, and certainly Soviet policies on procurement are not merely delayed mirror-images of ours. Nonetheless there are connections between what is said and what is done even in the Soviet Union, and there are incentives for moderation, even there, that could be strengthened by a jointly declared policy of renouncing first use. At a minimum such a declaration would give both sides additional reason to seek for agreements that would prevent a vastly expensive and potentially destabilizing contest for some kind of strategic advantage in outer space.

Finally, and in sum, we think a policy of no-first-use, especially if shared with the Soviet Union, would bring new hope to everyone in every country whose life is shadowed by the hideous possibility of a third great twentieth-century conflict in Europe—conventional or nuclear. It seems timely and even urgent to begin the careful study of a policy that could help to sweep this threat clean off the board of international affairs.

IX

We recognize that we have only opened this large question, that we have exhausted no aspect of it, and that we may have omitted important elements. We know that NATO is much more than its four strongest military members; we know that a policy of no-first-use in the Alliance would at once raise questions about America's stance in Korea and indeed other parts of Asia. We have chosen deliberately to focus on the central front of our central alliance, believing that a right choice there can only help toward right choices elsewhere.

What we dare to hope for is the kind of new and widespread consideration of the policy we have outlined that helped us 15 years ago toward SALT I, 25 years ago toward the Limited Test Ban, and 35 years ago toward the Alliance itself. Such consider-

ation can be made all the more earnest and hopeful by keeping in mind one simple and frequently neglected reality: there has been no first use of nuclear weapons since 1945, and no one in any country regrets that fact. The right way to maintain this record is to recognize that in the age of massive thermonuclear overkill it no longer makes sense—if it ever did—to hold these weapons for any other purpose than the prevention of their use.

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Subject: The Anti - Nuclear Weapons Movement

I. Introduction. The anti - nuclear weapons movement seems likely to grow. It could reach extremely large proportions effecting large numbers of people virtually over the entire nation. The concern behind the movement is an understandable one. The vision of a nuclear war and its potential consequences ought to absorb and concern our citizenry. What is unfortunate is that it is a concern which lends itself to emotional, demagogic exploitation. It is possible to present the concern so as to suggest that some favor nuclear war while others do not. That is,of course, hardly the case. The basic question is how best to avoid nuclear war. Many of those instrumental in the growing anti-nuclear campaign appear to believe this is possible by somehow isolating and sanitizing nuclear weapons and the strategy for their use, from all other forms of conducting warfare and,indeed, even more fundamentally from international politics. The opposing view, in contradistinction, accepts nuclear weapons as a fact of contemporary existence. It believes that the most effective barrier to their use is to adopt those policies and take those steps which protect our interests and those of our allies while avoiding war. Among the more important corrallaries is that we must be militarily strong at all levels, conventional as well as nuclear ~~xxxxxxx~~, and must demonstrate an unambiguous national will to defend those interests, including a willingness to fight to protect them using all means available. This latter view believes such a posture has a decent chance - - there is no sure thing - - of deterring a war. It holds that the most likely path to nuclear war is through failure to respond to political demands which lead to a conventional war. The former view, while generally asserting a common agreement of the need to respond to political threats and aggression, generally tends to believe the concern over such aggression (in particular from the USSR) is exaggerated. Moreover, should such aggression take place those holding the

anti-nuclear view would respond conventionally; it has already rejected the notion of a Western first use of nuclear weapons in response to Soviet aggression. Beyond this point its views become ambiguous. Some would support a so-called "second-use", that is in response to a Soviet first use. Others would apparently reject any use, under any circumstances. Perhaps most are ambiguous and unclear as to their preferences. While all of those associated with the anti-nuclear movement are impressed and repelled by the potential consequences of nuclear weapons use, few have examined the consequences of a possible non-use. Some would undoubtedly prefer to be "red than - dead". Most have simply not considered the alternatives to and consequences of, abandoning reliance in some measure, on nuclear weapons. Whatever the motivation, whatever the degree of understanding, the movement seems to be gaining momentum.

II. <u>What Might Be The Consequences of This Movement?</u>

This is, of course, a speculative question. In theory, it could exhaust itself and largely disappear. For the calcuable future this does not seem likely. To the contrary: it seems likely to grow. It could well become a powerful national movement. If it does, it is almost certainly likely to have a profound effect upon national policy. Defense budgets and programs are likely to be driven before the emotional force of this movement. Legislative restraints upon Presidential power to control nuclear weapons are more, rather than less, likely. Arms control proposals may be mandated which are imprudent, to say the least. Political careers may be built upon opposition to nuclear weapons. Commitments to friendly powers may be denounced. The U.S. Alliance system constructed after World War II which, despite its obvious limitations, has served to keep the peace, could collapse. In short, the very security and freedom of the nation could be placed in jeapordy. In a crises with the USSR, U.S. leadership could find its hands tied.

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III. What Ought To Be Done?

Unless the Executive Branch addresses the issue squarely and provides leadership to confront it there is little likelihood that any effective counter-movement can be organized. This does not mean that the Executive Branch must do all that needs to be done to confront the movement. Quite to the contrary; private groups in the society will have to carry the burden of countering the anti-nuclear movement. But they will require guidance, direction and effective support. This means that the Executive Branch will have to accept this leadership role. Moreover, time is short; in fact, an organized approach to the problem is long overdue.

IV. Who Should Take The Lead?

Leadership has to come fron the White House, directly. The nature of the problem, its complexities, the fact that it cuts across the responsibilities of many Departments of the Executive Branch and finally, because of its extreme political sensitivity, all make it inevitable that responsibility for addressing this issue must rest with the White House.

V. What Organizational Entity Is Needed?

One individual, reporting directly to the President, as a senior advisor, should be appointed. This function should be his sole and full-time concern. He should establish a senior level Steering Committee which includes such officials as the principal members of the White House staff and the Deputy Special Assistant to the Presidentfor National Security Affairs, as well as Deputies of the Departments of State and Defense, the Deputy Director of the FBI and of the CIA, The Deputy Attorney General, the Director of ACDA, the Chairman of the JCS (and perhaps others). Officials below the level of those named to the Committe should not be permitted to attend meetings on their principal's behalf. The problem

must receive the direct attention of those designated and, while the bureaucracy will have a role to play, this is not a matter which can or should be delegated to it. (It may be assumed that some, perhaps many,in the bureaucracy may find their sympathies lie with the anti-nuclear movement.) There is, incidentally, something of a precedent for this approach. During the Carter Administration a senior level official was brought into the White House to work full time in advancing the case for ratification of SALT II. Despite the very weak case he had to work with, he almost was successful.

a. Organizing the Executive Branch. Inevitably key officials in the Executive Branch will have to carry a large part of the burden of explaining the implications of the anti-nuclear movement upon U.S. national interests. Speeches by the President, key Cabinet heads and other senior people will be required. Willingness to write, to travel and participate in panels, in town hall discussions, etc. will be necessary. Making as certain as they can that their agencies understand Executive Branch policy, and to the extent appropriate, mobilizing the resources of their agencies to support that policy, will be required. (For example, during the SALT II debate, a Speakers Bureau was established which sent knowledgeable lesser level officials, either when they were requested to do so or, alternatively, when they saw a good opportunity to do so, to

speak throughout the nation).

b. Appeal to and Organization of Groups and Individuals. As suggested earlier, while the Executive Branch has a key leadership role to play, it can not hope to do the job by itself. Indeed, its most important contribution should be to gain support from within the wide body of our society. Specially early attention should be given to:

(1) Key members of Congress who share a concern over the anti-nuclear movement or who, at the very least, are willing to approach the difficult dilemma presented by nuclear weapons, with an open mind. Meetings should be held, in small groups, in some cases one-on-one, with these officials. The President's personal participation is required at least in the case of senior level Congressional leaders. A careful case should be developed which explains the limitation and fallacies of the case made by the anti-nuclear movement. Assistance in confronting the movement, especially in their home states, should be sought.

(2) In a like vein other key groups should be approached, including: Labor leaders, leaders of industry, key educators, members of the media-press, TV and radio - - taking care to give high priority to non - Washington representatives, the clergy, leaders in the fields of science, medicine and leaders of the legal profession, leaders in the entertainment world, civic groups of all sorts (Elks, Chambers of Commerce, Voter Leagues, etc.), American Legion and other Veterans Groups, Committee on the Present Danger outstanding leaders in the society in other walks (with special attention to retired government officials of special prominence). Special attention will have to be given to explaining our position to friendly foreign groups (especially governments) whose expressions of concern and support could be

especially valuable. While providing our point of view to these various groups and individuals and soliciting their assistance ought to be our principle goal, listening to their advice and insights should be a major aspect of our approach.

c. Analyse the Nature of the Anti-Nuclear Movement.

In order to deal sensibly with the movement, it must be well understood. While it has already attracted the anti-war, social disruption and youth groups, reminiscent of the Vietnam era, we should not assume that the movement is solely made up of nihlists. It is already apparent that highly respected groups in the society, many of whom one might have expected would reject the emotional clamour of the anti-nuclear groups, have already expressed sympathy with its aims: 40 Catholic Bishops have spoken out against nuclear weapons and the president of its hierarchy has stated that the Church must "say clearly no" to the use of nuclear weapons, several Vermont towns have passed anti-nuclear resolutions, some former high ranking Generals and Admirals have joined the movement, some members of the media associated with a conservative view have expressed sympathy for the anti-nuclear movement goals, etc. Accordingly, we need an objective analysis of who tends to support the movement and why. (No memtion has been made of possible Communist support. It is obviously important that this aspect be investigated. However, great care should taken to avoid accusations until and unless good evidence is available. A witch hunt psychology will almost certainly fail. On the otherhand, if firm evidence can be uncovered of such support it should be made public).

d. Develop the Substantive Considerations.

The entire effectiveness of the Executive Branch effort will be dependent upon how persuasive its substantive arguments are. Though by no means a complete list, among

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the views on which careful papers should be developed are:

(1) What role have nuclear weapons played in keeping the peace for the past 35 years?

(2) What risks are present in abandoning that policy?

(3) How might nuclear weapons be actually used?

(4) What is our present nuclear strategy?

(5) What is the range of possible effects of such usage?

(6) What might be the consequences of a conventional war?

(7) What does our strategy have to say about deterrence, war winning, etc.?

(8) What would be the effect upon our alliances of abandoning (or modifying) our nuclear committments?

(9) What effect might be had upon world-wide nuclear proliferation?

(10) What are Soviet views on nuclear weapons and nuclear strategy?

(11) What are Soviet political objectives and how do nuclear weapons relate thereto?

(12) What are the defense budgetary costs of maintaining nuclear forces?

(13) What would be the costs of developing a conventional capability assuming no reliance on nuclear weapons?

(14) What would be other social consequences of relying on a larger conventional military force, e.g. conscription?

(15) What would be the impact on arms control of a reduced reliance on nuclear deterrence/weapons?

(16) Is there such a thing as nuclear superiority and if so how does it (or lack of it) effect U.S. security?

(17) Under what circumstances does it make sense to target cities (and what are the moral implications?

(18) What is meant by "the nuclear arms race"?

(19) Which country has made massive additions to its nuclear arsenal over the past ten years, the U.S. or the U.S.S.R.?

(20) What is meant by overkill; does it exist?

(21) Should we care if the USSR has a much greater nuclear capability than the US; if so, why?

(22) If peaceful negotiations are not successful and the USSR were to threaten or actually commit aggression, should the US and its allies resist that aggression? (If we do not, what are the alternatives and their consequences?)

(23) Are there any circumstances in which it might be in our national interest to use nuclear weapons to defend ourselves?

(24) If the use of nuclear weapons is forced upon us, how should we use them? (For example, should we hit Soviet cities and kill civilian men, women and children, or should we first try to use them against military targets such as invading troops?)

VII. <u>What Should Be the Over-riding Themes of the Executive Branch</u>?

While intellectual analysis of such questions as those outlined in VI (d) above are very important, in the last analysis they are not likely to be determining in terms of how the public at large perceives the merits of the anti-nuclear movement arguments. Those latter arguments, as noted earlier, are certain to appeal to emotion and in any event are likely to be far more simplistic than Executive Branch rejoinders. It is the inevitable difference between those who carry responsibility and those who do not. In any event, it seems desirable for the Executive Branch, whatever else it does, to develop a very few key themes which are true, easy to understand and likely to generate support from the body politic. Those which seem to meet these criteria are:

a. Our past and present nuclear policy is designed to deter war; the anti-nuclear movemetn is supporting a policy which, however well intentioned, could lead to war. And once a war starts

the danger of its becoming nuclear is very great.

b. Our past policy has been successful; the change supported by the anti-nuclear movement is dangerous because no one can be certain where it will lead.

c. No matter what we in the West do, the anti-nuclear movement will have no impact upon Soviet policy. Indeed there is good reason to believe that the Soviets would be delighted if the West down-graded its reliance on nuclear deterrence for then the Soviets would have a freer hand to extend their influence.

Four former U.S. Government officials have proposed, in an article in Foreign Affairs, a major departure in a central tenant of U.S. military doctrine ("Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance, Foreign Affairs, April 1982). In so doing they have proffered a service of unestimable value; though not necessarily thereby advancing the substantive positions they favor.

The authors assert that their aim is "to start a discussion, not to end it." Nevertheless, they make clear their preferred course of action: it is for the U.S. to abandon the commitment made to our NATO allies (by President Truman and since reconfirmed by every President since then) for a first use of nuclear weapons in the event conventional defense of Europe is inadequate. That most, if not all of the authors, themselves were instrumental in either personally conveying such a commitment during their government service or in strongly supporting its desirability need not necessarily detract from the force of their present arguments. After all, times and circumstances change; so do men's views. If they are saying that they would not support now what they once supported, they still have a right to respectful attention. [Perhaps, however, it is not entirely unfair to point out that at least two of these officials played a central role in advancing another military policy (a third more indirectly so) during their terms of office, a policy which proved, in retrospect, disasterous for U.S. interests: the Vietnam war. One cannot help but wonder whether the scars of that most unfortunate experience have not had some effect upon

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their judgment concerning other U.S. military doctrines, in this case that are applicable to the defense of Europe. Is there a degree of mea culpa to be found in their arguments? Perhaps, but this need not concern us since it is the substance of the views which are advanced which must stand up to careful scrutiny and here is where the great failing is apparent. And] Though the failings in their substantive positions are many, perhaps none is more significant than that their new proposal could have, what is surely the unintended effect, of making war more likely. This consequence flows from their desire to reduce the deterrent effect of the threat of nuclear weapons, substituting in its stead preparations for fighting a large conventional war. Reasonable men may of course differ as to the best strategy for the U.S. and its allies. But there is one thing that we know with some certainty: whatever the shortcomings of existing NATO military doctrine it has helped to deter a war in Central Europe for almost four decades. Before we abandon such a doctrine, substituting another which could inadvertently have the effect of increasing the possibility that we may be more prone to being drawn into a war, we had better review all relevant considerations most carefully.

Thus, it is in the professed spirit advanced by the authors, that is, the desire to engage in a dialogue among thinking men who may hold honest differences of opinion on the matter, that this counter analysis is offered.

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First, for those who may not have had an opportunity to read for themselves what the authors have to say, herewith a synopsis.

As already noted, the central thesis is that the U.S. should abandon its commitment to NATO of a first use of nuclear weapons for defense of Europe. This, it is argued, is desirable because, in effect, it presents a "threat to the safety of the world" while at the same time "it's deterrent credibility declines." They assert that the first-use commitment contributes to alliance political dissonance, in addition to its lack of military credibility. Moreover, it is alleged, the concept tends to support the need for ever increasing nuclear capabilities to fight a nuclear war which is inherently unwinnable. Conversely, abandonment of the first-use commitment would advance the cause of arms control and improve the possibility of reaching agreement with the Soviets for large reductions in the nuclear arsenals on both sides.

In place of the first-use commitment the authors espouse a buildup in U.S. and West European conventional capabilities, sufficient to fully frustrate any possible Soviet attack (the authors concentrate on the Central Front of Europe and have nothing to say about the NATO flanks) in addition to which a "second use" commitment would be offered by the U.S., i.e., U.S. nuclear weapons would only be used in response to a Soviet first use.

This is the heart of the authors' proposal. It raises more questions than it answers. Several premises advanced by the authors are of questionable validity, if not flatly wrong. On numerous critical issues they are silent or at best one is left to infer their point of view.

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What then are the critical issues which deserve careful examination?

A nuclear first use threat has lost its deterrent effect. If ever there was a classic case of "throwing out the baby with the bath water" it is the authors' treatment of this central issue. Having reached the hardly remarkable conclusion that the threat of using nuclear weapons has diminished as Soviet nuclear capabilities have grown, they jump to the illogical conclusion that whatever remaining deterrent effect such a threat has should be utterly abandoned! There is a curious internal inconsistency in their logic. Much of their article deals with the dangers of a nuclear war, with its uncertainties and its consequences, and especially with the esclatory dangers. This goes precisely to the heart of the deterrence issue: if such dangers exist from the use of nuclear weapons, then the deterrent effect is self-evident. It is precisely this view that has dominated NATO strategic planning. It is a view which has been central to the European perspective, a perspective about which the authors profess greatest concern. Our allies do not wish to abandon the very threat of which the authors would relieve them.

There is another feature of deterrence not reflected upon at all by the authors. For a Soviet conventional attack to be most effective, the Soviets must mass their forces. But massed forces make the most lucrative targets on a nuclear battlefield. If a first-use threat remains part of NATO's doctine, the Soviets will be under enormous pressure to disperse their forces, thereby

making a conventional attack less likely thereby enhancing deterrence. Conversely, the conventional defense espoused by the authors is actually made more difficult by abandoning the first-use threat; an aggressor can mass for attack with relative impunity. Surely the authors know better. Any suggestion of an abandonment of the first-use commitment would send shock waves throughout allied capitals. (It would, incidentally, be a reversal of a commitment most forcefully advanced during the time one author was Secretary of Defense and another was Special Assistant to the President for National Security.) It would confirm what the minority in Europe has questioned: U.S. constancy as an ally. If the authors were correct in their contention that abandonment of first use would remove a heavy burden from the backs of our allies, is it not strange that our allies have not long since asked us to drop our commitment? It is true, of course, that there is an anti-nuclear movement in Europe, as there is in our own country. Typically in Europe these are the youth marching in the street to whom appeal to reason makes no dent. Could the authors unintentionally be appealing to such emotionalism in Europe, and perhaps even in the U.S., in order to embarrass governments whose policies are a product of the most careful weighing, over decades, of all relevant considerations? One would hope not. Yet, it may be significant that the authors state that they do not appeal, in the first instance, to governments to initiate a change in the policy. Rather they look to "citizens." To which citizens? Why not to governments? Are not those govern-

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ments the duly elected representatives of their citizens? There is an undertone of appeal to anarchy in the authors' suggestion that not "governments" but rather "citizens" is where the issue should be resolved.

A large increase in conventional capability is in the interest of the alliance. It has been consistent U.S. policy, at least for approximately thirty years, to press for increased conventional military capabilities. (Just as we have pressed for increased nuclear capabilities, given the growing Soviet threat in both military capabilities.) Modest but not unimportant improvements have been made to NATO's conventional forces. What is by no means clear is that the Alliance, taken as a whole, sees it as either politically feasible or in its interest to attempt to develop a conventional capability of such a level as to fully match Soviet-Warsaw Pact capabilities. The reasons vary somewhat from country to country but in essence are these:

-- Contrary to the authors' contentions, most experts believe the costs of doing so would be high. In the U.S. defense budget, by way of illustration, only 9 to 15% has historically been devoted to strategic nuclear forces, plus a few extra percent to theater nuclear capabilities. The remainder, the overwhelming majority of the defense budget, goes into support of conventional forces. Are we prepared to increase our budget even above its presently high levels? Will our allies be prepared to do so?

-- Matching the Soviets conventionally would almost certainly require an increase in force levels and a U.S. draft (most allies

already have one) . While there are many in the U.S. who would favor both -- with or without abandonment of the first-use commitment -- one wonders how many of the anti-nuclear group would.

-- Our European allies, for readily understandable reasons, have no enthusiasm for a strategy which places primary emphasis on a massive conventional war. Why? Because Europe experienced two successful conventional wars within one generation and was destroyed by them. Not a family and hardly a town or village remained untouched. This historical fact plus the geographic proximity of Europe to a conventional war (while America is separated from that threat by a 3,000-mile moat) goes a long way toward explaining European aversion to a strategy of fighting a conventional war and its attachment to the deterrent effect of the use of nuclear weapons.

Soviet conventional capabilities are overestimated. So assert the authors. War outcomes are inherently uncertain. Nevertheless, no senior official in NATO, no Supreme Allied Commander past or present, no U.S. intelligence analysis, no NATO intelligence analysis, agrees with the authors' conclusion. One does not have to believe that the Soviets are "ten feet tall" to comprehend that an authoritarian government which has massively out spent our own on defenses -- conventional and nuclear -- for more than a decade, is likely to be the beneficiary of a superior military force. One should never overlook Soviet weaknesses. To the contrary, one should be prepared to exploit them. But by the

same token one should not delude oneself, advancing unsupported and unsupportable military judgments. The weight authorative judgment is that without the use of nuclear weapons, a Soviet attack in Europe could not long be contained short of the English channel.

Emphasis on conventional forces would require NATO to maintain a lesser level of nuclear forces. This assertion is simply unsupported. It is especially curious in light of (if not flatly inconsistent with) the authors' insistence that we not abandon our nuclear commitment to NATO, simply transforming it into a "second-use" commitment. Why this would require lesser nuclear capabilities is not clear. Indeed, it could require more. Surely in the large-scale conventional war the authors prefer, nuclear capabilities would be destroyed. Accordingly, to be prepared to stop a massive Soviet conventional attack with a "second use" we might have to provide in advance for even a larger inventory of nuclear weapons.

The Soviets would welcome a no-first use pronouncement. Here the authors could hardly be more correct. Indeed, the Soviets have been trying for years to gain such a concession from NATO. Why? Because the Soviets seek an objective in NATO's interest? Hardly. "No first use" has been Soviet strategy over the years:

-- because the Soviets have good reason to fear the possible consequences of a nuclear response to their aggression.

-- because acceptance of such a policy would be highly divisive within the NATO Alliance.

The authors' proposal would crown thirty years of Soviet policy with success.

A no first use would make arms control more likely. How the authors reach this conclusion is difficult to derive from their article. Of course, their long-standing support for arms control proposals with little apparent concern for equity is on the record. Apparently, negotiability is what counts, not equity. A no first-use agreement would surely be easy to negotiate; as suggested above it is just what the Soviets want. The authors also summon up the argument of increased "international incentives for the Soviet Union to show some restraint of its own." They see "incentives for moderation" developing inside the Soviet Union. Not a shred of evidence is offered in support of this pollyannish view of Soviet behavior. When have the Soviets shown self restraints, especially in military matters? Have they ever responded to our own unilateral self restraint? Former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown answered this best when he noted that when our defense budgets go up, the Soviet budgets go up; and when ours go down, the Soviet's go up! Every shred of available historical evidence rejects the authors' wishful thinking. What the authors seem not to understand is that in the Soviet Union we are dealing with an adversary whose political purposes are anethetic to our own. They want superior military force in order to advance their political purposes. They will have no incentive to negotiate an equitable and verifiable arms control agreement until persuaded that the U.S. and its NATO allies have the will

to compete effectively with them. A no-first use declaration, accompanied by the unilateral reduction in nuclear capabilities which the authors support is precisely the wrong way to induce Soviet support for an arms control agreement consistent with Western interests.

It is not possible in a limited response to address all of the misstatements of fact, strategic misconceptions and errors of omission in the Foreign Affairs article. What seems to stand out is this. The authors seem untroubled by the consequences of a large conventional war. Conversely, they chastise "Pentagon officials" who do not understand "the intense and special revulsion that is associated with killing by 'enhanced radiation'." Surely, the authors do not intend to convey that killing by conventioinal weapons should not be viewed with intense revulsion? [Nowhere do the authors reflect Sherman's view of war.] I know of no "Pentagon official" who has anything but revulsion for war in any form. Why do the authors have more revulsion for an enhanced radiation weapon, which may be effective in deterring war, than for a conventional replay of World War II which killed and injured ____ millions? And that is a central difficulty with their entire thesis. They want NATO to be prepared to fight a conventional war. They are entirely correct in supporting a build up in NATO's conventional capabilities. But they seem relatively uninterested in deterring a war, to which a nuclear first-use commitment contributes. Nor is much introspection evident with regard to

anciallary, but nonetheless important, potential consequences of abandoning such a long-standing commitment to our allies. Will nations who have previously relied upon our nuclear commitments be driven to consider more seriously reliance upon their own national nuclear programs? It is safe to predict that all four authors are opposed to nuclear proliferation and understand that the world is likely to be a more dangerious place in which to live if such proliferation takes place. It would be paradoxical if their concentration on the no first-use issue had such a pre-verse effect.

Finally, nowhere do the authors reveal their vision of how nuclear weapons might be used in the event that conventional forces could not hold. They have scorn for past doctrines for nuclear use such as that of "flexible response." They believe that "even the most restrained battlefield use" would be enormously destructive "to civilian life and property." They are for keeping the fire break between conventional and nuclear use "wide and strong." Despite all this, they insist upon their fidelity to a U.S. commitment to a "second use" of nuclear weapons. No elaboration is offered. How would nuclear weapons be used? If, as the authors state, nuclear war-fighting for the most part is "nonsensical," what do they have in mind for the second use they support? While they do not tell us in this article, each had made his views known in other writings. (NOTE: Review writings if time permits.) Their preference is for attacking Soviet cities. The immorality of intentionally killing tens of millions

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of men, women and children apparently holds no revulsion, certainly not as compared to the expressed revulsion in killing attacking Soviet soldiers on the battlefield. Moreover, can such a threat of attack be credible as a deterrent? It is not totally lacking in credibility. However, since every analyst concedes that a Soviet response against U.S. cities would kill even more American men, women and children, it will be enormously difficult for an American President to order such an attack. An attack which it seems incredible to launch can not be a persuasive deterrent. Where does this leave NATO strategy? The prescription is one for political and military chaos.

National Security Council
The White House

Package # _____

RED TAG

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	1	✓	
Bud McFarlane	2	HAS CHOPPED	
Jacque Hill	3		
Judge Clark	4	✓	A
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary	✓		D
Sit Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch

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COMMENTS

This is a Bob Sims product that Bud and I asked him to produce.

Brian - pls make cy for WC's chron

MEMORANDUM

2850

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 22, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR EDWIN MEESE III
JAMES A. BAKER III
MICHAEL DEAVER

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Policy Offensive on Arms Control and the Anti-Nuclear Movement

The movement to educate Americans on the effects of nuclear weapons is gaining momentum, and this week enters a crucial phase. Ground Zero activities are pictured as educational by its national organizers, who claim to want to arouse the citizenry rather than propose specific solutions, such as a nuclear freeze. But under the Ground Zero umbrella are a variety of policy proposals that would be detrimental to the United States. The next phase for the movement could be toward promotion of policy solutions, as its leaders try to keep up momentum. In any event, Ground Zero educational activities leave the movement open for exploitation by others of all stripes.

Our effort should be directed toward convincing Americans whose anxieties are heightened by this movement that our policy solutions best meet their desire that the United States do something to lessen the prospect of a nuclear holocaust. The time for us to do something is now, and I agree with Dave Gergen that the communications effort must be pulled together by the NSC and White House.

We have begun. I will personally chair an interagency meeting, probably this week, with a specific agenda to deal with the issues. I have no illusions about solving our problem by asking the bureaucracy to produce fact sheets on a lot of esoteric issues. That's just the kind of activity that could give everyone a feeling of accomplishment, while actually not moving the ball an inch. My purpose is to sensitize all departments to our concern about the direction of public and international opinion on arms control, and to emphasize our desire to take the lead in the policy solution phase of the movement's activities. I want to involve all departments in a coordinated strategy, bringing their talents to bear on specific aspects of the problem.

In no way do I wish to foster a "we/they" syndrome, wherein we become antagonists with Roger Molander of Ground Zero, or Billy Graham, or 40 Catholic Bishops, or the Mayor of Pella, Iowa. The broad public is being awakened to the problem specialists in and out of government have dealt with for years: they are scared to death at the prospect of nuclear war. We should welcome the public's concern about this issue, as it parallels our own. But we must convince the public that our policies are best for dealing with their newfound concerns: that unilateral disarmament by the United States would only endanger us more; that progress can be made only when the Soviets (where is their anti-nuclear movement, we should ask) respond to our fears about the growth of their conventional and nuclear armaments. We should go beyond a static restatement of our policy to generate real enthusiasm for new initiatives as we unfold them, especially our proposals for START. Clearly, as Dave Gergen says, we should emphasize the President's role as a peacemaker, but we must not let the Russians off the hook. We must also focus on concrete policy and new initiatives; otherwise, our "peace offensive" will be met with cynicism, both at home and abroad.

A strategy for the next six months could include these activities:

a) Immediate efforts to enhance communication of the President's philosophy on arms control. The radio talk Saturday was a beautiful step in the right direction -- perfectly timed to present the President's views at the beginning of Ground Zero week, rather than in reaction to it. We should hammer his theme in the immediate future, as in Gene Rostow's speech at the National Press Club (Monday, April 19), in network television opportunities involving Administration spokesmen and friends, and in Senate testimony on the Jackson/Warner Amendment later this month. This will mean passing the word to our own people and briefing outside organizations and individuals on a priority basis, one of the things I will stress at our initial interagency meeting. The themes must be kept basic. Any cabinet member or political official may expect to receive questions in public on this issue; while we do not want every appointee to become our spokesman, each senior official should know how to handle the issue when it comes up. More important, we urgently need a small, but readily available, stable of articulate people who can address the issue and guide the public to support our policy solutions. We should identify these people, and promptly formalize a system for providing our spokesmen on request -- or better yet, on our own initiative -- for public speeches, television appearances, editorial board conferences, media interviews, and group meetings.

b) Communications with the activists. The fact that the activists have our attention should be be kept secret. We want to demonstrate that we, too, are activists -- seeking resolution to the same concerns. As we organize to deal with the problem more coherently, we should make it known without fanfare that we are doing so, rather than have the media leap on the inevitable leak to portray us as secretive and defensive. Also, I see no reason to rule out high-level meetings soon with people like the Physicians for Social Responsibility group, Molander, Billy Graham, or Senator Jackson -- meetings designed to show the public that we are paying attention to the national message of concern, and that we have the best program to deal with those concerns. These meetings could hint at new initiatives and solicit views and recommendations. Even if the meetings do not reassure or convert the participants, they should at least help reassure the concerned public as to our good faith and reasonableness. (I am not suggesting meetings with those who are intent on political exploitation of the issue and would gain more from the exposure than would we. Questions of who to meet with, where, when, who should represent us, etc., need careful examination, but with dispatch.)

c) Address the arms control issue in the President's foreign policy speech in May and again on television prior to the European trip. The President should restate his policy as a major, but not central, part of his overall foreign policy speech, foreshadowing a new initiative in connection with START. Then, in line with Dave Gergen's suggestion, he should go on prime time to present his arms control proposals and propose a date for START. This appearance should come as soon as feasible after the foreign policy speech, and should be designed to capture the initiative by its boldness, to give the President genuine national (and perhaps bipartisan) foreign policy support as he goes to Europe. The television talk and our associated efforts could be the key to gaining public support from June to November. The talk should be accompanied by an all-out communications and policy coordination effort. The logic in doing this before Europe and before his UN speech seems overwhelming to me; but so is the task of agreeing on policy proposals, coordinating with allies overseas and here, and undertaking the communications effort in the relatively short time left. Needless to say, the reaction of the Soviets, other countries, and our public to the President's presentation will be factors in deciding how to proceed during the European trip and at the UN. the point is that we must go on the offensive and stay on the offensive, rather than waiting and reacting -- a situation likely to give the Soviets and anti-government forces in this country the upper hand.

Getting the job done:

This strategy calls for a special organizational approach. Ideally, one individual -- a Special Advisor reporting directly to the President and working closely with the National Security Advisor -- should manage this issue as a sole responsibility. He or she should establish a senior-level steering committee of principal members of the White House staff and Deputies in other key departments. This Special Advisor should keep policy issues moving, orchestrate our actions, take over and push the communications effort I have initiated, act as principal articulator of policy in public appearances, and develop and lead a team of spokesmen. There are drawbacks to this approach: we'd need an individual with the abilities and stature of a Henry Kissinger to make it work best; staffing and obtaining cooperation from all departments could be problems. However, the management advantages are obvious: there would be full time top-level attention to the problem; Presidential involvement and control would be insured. Public affairs benefits would also accrue -- we would have a competent and authoritative spokesman and team leader; we'd be giving evidence of the serious attention the Administration is placing on the issue. Another obvious advantage: the Special Advisor assignment would not last forever. It would stop, at latest, with START.

The alternative to a Special Advisor is for the President to designate someone with functional responsibility -- the Vice President Secretary of State, National Security Advisor, or Director of ACDA -- to take the lead and devote the major part of his time and effort to the project. That route presents many opportunities for failure.

In conclusion, what I have outlined is a proposed grand strategy to deal with what may be the most important national security opportunity and challenge of this Administration. With some hard work, it can be done. Success in the next six months is well within our grasp. There is no need for panic, only for planning and action. We should be fully in agreement on this strategy before proceeding. Could we talk about it briefly at everyone's earliest convenience.

cc: Dave Gergen

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126283	MEMO WILLIAM CLARK TO JAMES BAKER III RE NUCLEAR FREEZE AND RELATED ARMS CONTROL AND DEFENSE ISSUES	1	4/26/1982	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing
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2358

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 26, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
THE DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AGENCY

SUBJECT: Nuclear Freeze and Related Arms Control and Defense Issues

The nuclear freeze movement and the accelerating growth of anti-nuclear sentiment in this country and abroad make it imperative that the Administration develop a comprehensive arms control and defense information effort on the important issues involved.

A meeting to consider our strategy for dealing with these issues will be held in the White House Situation Room on Wednesday, April 28 at 5:00 p.m.

A list of supporting requirements is attached. It is requested that designated agencies prepare the material assigned and forward them to me no later than C. O. B. Tuesday, April 27. Agencies should be represented at the meeting by senior policy officials.

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

William P. Clark

Attachment

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Review April 23, 1988

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AGENDA

REQUIREMENT	PROPOSED ACTION AGENCIES (To Prepare Drafts for NSC Review)
A. Public Affairs Fact Sheets and Q's and A's.	(See Attachment)
B. Existing Government Publications which complement Q&A material	State; DOD; ACDA
C. Inventory of White House Agency Resources for Public Appearances	All agencies to submit list.
D. Inventory of Private Sector Resources	White House (Dole)
E. Legislative calendar of relevant hearings.	White House (Duberstein); State (H); DOD (LA)
F. Outline of Press Strategy on the above.	White House (Allin); State (PA); DOD (PA)
G. Development of International Information Strategy on the above	ICA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Review April 23, 1982

CONFIDENTIAL

FACT SHEETS AND Q's AND A's

(1) What role have nuclear weapons played in keeping the peace for the past 25 years? STATE

(2) What risks are present in abandoning that policy? STATE

(3) What is our present nuclear strategy? DEFENSE

(4) What does our strategy have to say about deterrence, war winning, etc.? DEFENSE

(5) What would be the effect upon our alliances of abandoning (or modifying) our current strategy (MC14/3). STATE

(6) What would be the implications for proliferation? STATE

(7) What are Soviet views on nuclear strategy and the use of nuclear weapons? DEFENSE

(8) What are Soviet political objectives and how nuclear weapons relate thereto? STATE

(9) What are the defense budgetary costs of maintaining nuclear forces? DEFENSE

(10) What would be the costs of developing a conventional capability assuming no reliance on nuclear weapons? DEFENSE

(11) What would be other social consequences of relying on a larger conventional military force, e.g., conscription? DEFENSE

(12) What would be the impact on arms control of a reduced reliance on nuclear deterrence/weapons? ACDA

(13) How would Soviet nuclear superiority affect U.S. security? STATE

(14) What is meant by "the nuclear arms race"? ACDA

(15) Which country has made massive additions to its nuclear arsenal over the past ten years, the U. S. or the U. S. S. R.? DEFENSE

(16) Should we care if the USSR has a much greater nuclear capability than the US; if so, why? STATE and DEFENSE

(17) If peaceful negotiations are not successful and the USSR were to threaten or actually commit aggression, should the US and its allies resist that aggression? (If we do not, what are the alternatives and their consequences?) STATE

(18) Are there any circumstances in which it might be in our national interest to use nuclear weapons to defend ourselves? STATE and DEFENSE

(19) What is our arms control strategy? ACDA

(20) What is Soviet arms control strategy? ACDA