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David Boren (D-Oklahoma)
Rudy Boschwitz (R-Minnesota)
John Chafee (R-Rhode Island)
John Danforth (R-Missouri)
David Durenberger (R-Minnesota)
J. James Exon (D-Nebraska)
Wendell Ford (D-Kentucky)
John Glenn (D-Ohio)
Charles Grassley (R-Iowa)
John Heinz (R-Pennsylvania)
Walter Huddleston (D-Kentucky)
Roger Jepsen (R-Iowa)
Nancy Kassebaum (R-Kansas)
Russell Long (D-Louisiana)
Charles Mathias (R-Maryland)
John Melcher (D-Montana)
Bob Packwood (R-Oregon)
Larry Pressler (R-South Dakota)
Jennings Randolph (D-West Virginia)
Robert Stafford (R-Vermont)

Dyson
Hughes
Carper
Andrews
Britt
W. Jones
E. Jones
Neal
Valentine
Whitley
Sisisky
L. Thomas
Derrick
Spratt
Tallon
L. Hamilton
McCloskey
Sharp
Mazzoli
Perkins
T. Hall
Applegate
Mollohan
G. Long
Dowdy
Boner
Erdreich
Flippo
Shelby
Fuqua
MacKay
Mica
Volkmer
Bob Young
Annunzio
Bryant
R. Coleman
Frost
Kazen
Patman
Anthony
Synar
McNulty
Kogovsek
Coelho
Matsui

Mineta
Martinez
Mavroules
Gaydos
A. Murphey
Yatron
Byron
Hoyer
Boucher
Hatcher
Jenkins
Rowland
Zablocki
Jacobs
Natcher
Eckart
Weber
Rahall
Roemer
Tauzin
Cooper
Lloyd
Fascell
Ireland
Pepper
Huckaby
Durbin
Russo
Brooks
de la Garza
Gonazlez
Reid
Swift
Heftel
Akaka

Carney (NY-1)
Bereuter (NE-1)
Boehlert (NY-25)
C. Evans (IO-3)
Gunderson (WI-3)
McKinney (CT-4)
Molinari (NY-14)
Roukema (NJ-5)
V. Smith (NE-3)
Sundquist (TN-7)
V. Weber (MN-2)
Coughlin (PA-13)
Goodling (PA-19)
Leach (IO-1)
Tauke (IO-2)
Conte (MA-1)
Forsythe (NJ-13)
Green (NY-15)
Chandler (WA-8)
Gilman (NY-22)
Horton (NY-29)
N. Johnson (CT-6)
Lent (NY-4)
McKernan (ME-1)
Snowe (ME-2)
Schneider (RI-2)
Zschau (CA-12)
Clinger (PA-23)
Fish (NY-21)
Gekas (PA-7)
Gregg (NH-2)
Jeffords (VT-At Large)
McGrath (NY-5)

L. Martin (IL-16)
Paul (TX-22)
Petri (WI-6)
Ridge (PA-21)
C. Smith (NJ-4)
B. Smith (OR-2)
Rinaldo (NJ-7)
Gene Snyder (KY-4)
Larry Hopkins (KY-6)
Don Young (AK-At Large)
Broomfield (MI-18)
Frenzel (MN-3)
Roth (WI-8)
Gradison (OH-2)
Regula (OH-16)
Shuster (PA-9)
Broyhill (NC-10)
O'Brien (IL-4)

APPROPRIATIONS

Room: H218 Capitol

Phone: 225-2771

Democrats (36)

- Jamie Whitten (Miss.) —
Chairman
- Edward P. Boland (Mass.)
- William H. Natcher (Ky.) —
- Neal Smith (Iowa) —
- Joseph P. Addabbo (N.Y.)
- Clarence D. Long (Md.) —
- Sidney R. Yates (Ill.)
- David R. Obey (Wisc.)
- Edward R. Roybal (Calif.)
- Louis Stokes (Ohio)
- Tom Bevill (Ala.)
- Bill Chappell, Jr. (Fla.)
- Bill Alexander (Ark.)
- John P. Murtha (Pa.)
- Bob Traxler (Mich.) —
- Joseph D. Early (Mass.) —
- Charles Wilson (Texas)
- Lindy Boggs (La.)
- Norman D. Dicks (Wash.)
- Matthew F. McHugh (N.Y.) —
- William Lehman (Fla.) —
- Jack Hightower (Texas)
- Martin Olav Sabo (Minn.)
- Julian C. Dixon (Calif.) —
- Vic Fazio (Calif.)
- W. G. Hefner (N.C.) —
- Les AuCoin (Ore.)
- Daniel K. Akaka (Hawaii) —
- Wes Watkins (Okla.) —
- William H. Gray, III (Pa.)
- Bernard J. Dwyer (N.J.)
- William R. Ratchford (Conn.)
- Bill Boner (Tenn.) —
- Steny H. Hoyer (Md.) —
- Bob Carr (Mich.)
- Robert J. Mrazek (N.Y.)

Staff Director:

Keith Mainland

Republicans (21)

- Silvio O. Conte (Mass.)
- Joseph M. McDade (Pa.)
- Jack Edwards (Ala.)
- John T. Myers (Ind.)
- J. Kenneth Robinson (Va.)
- Clarence E. Miller (Ohio)
- Lawrence Coughlin (Pa.)
- C. W. (Bill) Young (Fla.)
- Jack F. Kemp (N.Y.)
- Ralph S. Regula (Ohio)
- George M. O'Brien (Ill.)
- Virginia Smith (Neb.)
- Eldon Rudd (Ariz.)
- Carl D. Pursell (Mich.)
- Mickey Edwards (Okla.)
- Robert L. Livingston (La.)
- S. William Green (N.Y.)
- Thomas G. Loeffler (Texas)
- Jerry Lewis (Calif.)
- John E. Porter (Ill.)
- Harold Rogers (Ky.)

Minority Staff Director:

Mike Hugo
225-3481

SUBCOMMITTEES

Agriculture and Rural Development

Democrats: Whitten (*Chairman*), Traxler, McHugh, Natcher, Akaka, Watkins, Hightower, Smith, Alexander

Republicans: Smith, Robinson, Myers, Lewis

(Continued on next page)

Mr. Edwards Allie Chalmer
agreed to help

Joe Baker Son of Walter Citing
Industries

Associated Bldg & Contractors

Dennis Dix Outflow Power
Equipment Inst.

5/4 pm Strategy on MX

Jack Edwards - Submits movement in H early next week (appropriation bill)

Senate - w/in 2-3 weeks; target action in full Senate first

Both Houses will complete action prior to Memorial Day recess (5/22)

Harb Status

4 Phase P.R. plan for MX Commission now into Phase 4: NSC, WH, DOD, USAF met once a wk w/ Tom Reed to prepare/execute P.R. strategy

Tue 2 p.m. Deliberation, Steyer co-chair. JHR will now attend.

Thurs 3 p.m. PA mtg

Press + editorial analyses available

Laird, Rumsfeld + Brown available for briefings

Thayer, Jack Lyons + Clements available, too; John Deutch (MIT)

OPL Plan: 2 more briefings - moved up to next week

1. Senior leaders in East Room w/ heavy letters w/ Pres
2. Work days in 450 w/ senior Admin officials w/VP

MX Associates - Fred Joyce + Clint Boelt, HTE

Harb mtg Tues 5/10 am in Anaheim

OPL Plan: Max mailing ltr from President w/ talking pts.

Small Bus. Procurement Conf 5/10 on Pres. day by daytime briefing

THE WHITE HOUSE


WASHINGTON

May 4, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR ANNE HIGGINS

FROM:

MARY JO JACOBI



SUBJECT:

Presidential Letter - MX Appeal

The Office of Public Liaison will conduct a mailing to about 2,000 people throughout the United States requesting their support for the President's MX Peacekeeper Missile plan.

Would you please draft a Presidential letter to be mailed along with a packet of information about the plan. Bob Moss will be the contact in my office and if you have further questions you may reach him on extension 7140. A one page appeal for their support would be excellent.

Thanks for your help.

cc: John Rousselot

D R A F T

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

TO: FRED RYAN, DIRECTOR OF PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS AND SCHEDULING

FROM: FAITH RYAN WHITTLESEY

REQUEST: To Drop by a briefing in the East Room for 200-250 Chief Executive Officers of the major trade and business associations ^{AND} _{CORPORATIONS} here to be briefed on the M X proposal now before Congress.

PURPOSE: To enlist attendees' support, along with the support of their respective organizations, for the President's M X Proposal.

BACKGROUND: The Office of Public Liaison has been asked by the senior staff to provide a communications campaign aimed at identifying and solidifying support within the business and general public for the President's M X Proposal. Several briefings for various groups are planned. However, this briefing will be one of the largest, and will be attended by key people who can extend the greatest amount of influence to boost the M X Proposal. Briefing will be provided by a top NSC or Defense official.

DATE: May 17 or 18, 1983

LOCATION: East Room, The White House

PARTICIPANTS: 200-250 people

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: Introduction and briefing by NSC or Defense official; then a drop by with brief remarks by the President.

REMARKS REQUESTED: Brief remarks to emphasize and underscore the importance of this issue for national security.

MEDIA COVERAGE:

RECOMMENDED BY: Faith Ryan Whittlesey
John H. Rousselot

OPPOSED BY:

PROJECT OFFICER: John H. Rousselot

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 5, 1983

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

TO: FRED RYAN, DIRECTOR OF PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS AND SCHEDULING

FROM: FAITH RYAN WHITTLESEY

REQUEST: To drop by briefing for Chief Executive Officers of major trade associations and corporations on President's M X Proposal now before the Congress.

PURPOSE: To enlist attendees' support, along with the support of their respective organizations, for the M X Proposal.

BACKGROUND: There will be 200 of the most influential corporate and association leaders at the White House to be briefed on the President's M X plan. The briefing is aimed at identifying and solidifying support within the business community, as they have been active supporters of the President's budget and tax initiatives. We would like to reactivate their grassroots effort on behalf of M X.

DATE: May 17 & 18, 1983

LOCATION: The White House

PARTICIPANTS: 200-250 people

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: Introduction and briefing by NSC or Defense official; then drop by and brief remarks by the President

REMARKS REQUESTED: Brief remarks to emphasize and underscore the importance of M X for U.S. national security.

~~==~~ MEDIA COVERAGE: Full Press

RECOMMENDED BY: Faith Ryan Whittlesey


OPPOSED BY:

PROJECT OFFICER: John H. Rousselot 

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON
May 5, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR HERB HETU

FROM: JOHN H. ROUSSELOT 

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH M X ASSOCIATES

Persuant to our discussion at the White House on May 4th, the following is a list of those things which I feel should be communicated to the M X people when you meet with them next week in California.

1. The President is still solidly behind production and deployment of the M X, and has made it a top legislative priority.
2. The White House staff is prevented by law from doing actual organization of any effort to directly generate congressional support through grassroots mobilization.
3. A public affairs effort has been launched through the National Security Council, as well as the White House Office of Public Liaison. These groups are working together to provide briefings and assistance to individuals and organizations interested in this effort.
4. It would be most helpful to the effort if the Associates were to organize a "boiler room operation" in one of their offices, where strategy could be implemented and progress tracked. This sort of command center could, ideally, keep track of things with us here, and we could then legally delegate specific tasks to be carried out at critical points in time on the legislative agenda. I believe this kind of ongoing and immediate contact can be a key in the success of the whole project.
5. This staff is willing and able to be used as a resource for the Associates' efforts whenever legally and logistically possible.

TALKING PAPER

"SUMMARY OF THE REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON STRATEGIC FORCES"

Improving strategic stability and reducing risk of war should be at the center of our national objectives. Our strategic modernization programs and arms control proposals should work together to permit us and encourage the Soviets to take steps toward such enhanced stability. We must make such efforts in full awareness of both the devastating nature of modern warfare and the expansionist nature of the Soviet system — and the leverage which the Soviets hope to obtain from any military advantages.

In this context, the multiple structure of our strategic forces — consisting of ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and bombers with cruise missiles — is important for three main reasons: (1) the existence of each is a hedge over the long term against any failures of, or Soviet breakthroughs endangering, the others; (2) any planned Soviet attack would be significantly more complex and less effective because of the different type of attack needed against each part of our forces; and (3) each part has unique capabilities.

The preponderance of our submarines, bombers, and ballistic missiles were deployed in the 1960s or early 1970s. As the Commission considered the most appropriate way of modernizing these forces, it kept four broad issues in mind: opportunities for stabilizing arms control; developments in Soviet strategic programs; economic cost; and trends in technology.

NOTE: This talking paper, prepared for use by recipients of this briefing book, should not be used as a release or handout or identified as officially reflecting the views of the Commission or the report. For specifics, see the report.

Technological trends along have changed the situation dramatically since the 1960s. Accuracy of weapons has steadily increased since then, and continues to do so. Thus, in spite of new concepts and developments in hardening fixed targets such as ICBM silos or shelters, it will not be likely that even the hardest such targets will be able to withstand destruction in the long term. Mobility is becoming more feasible for strategic systems. Open-ocean search for submarines and anti-ballistic missile defense of land targets will both continue to be extremely difficult, but Soviet efforts in these fields must be watched carefully. In light of these trends: modernization should continue for our strategic command, control and communications; construction of Trident submarines should proceed, as should the program for development and deployment of the Trident II (D-5) missile; and modernization of the bomber and cruise missile force should continue. Although the task of ABM defense remains very challenging, vigorous research in this area is worthy of support. Similarly, research on a smaller ballistic missile submarine would prudent.

Modernization of our ICBM force, and fitting that modernization into the context of stabilizing arms control, has presented a major challenge for the last decade. In the Commission's view, this problem has come to be mis-cast over recent years, in part because of the implicit judgment that all of the immediate and the future needs of our ICBM force could be satisfied promptly and by a single missile based in a single way. In the Commission's view a three-part approach is preferable: development of a small, single-warhead ICBM; an arms control approach to improve stability; and deployment now of 100 MX missiles in Minuteman silos.

For the long term, survivability of the ICBM force — and hence its role as a hedge against any possible Soviet breakthrough in anti-submarine warfare — would best be provided by moving toward a small, single-warhead ICBM. A force consisting of such ICBMs would inherently deny to an attacker the ability to destroy more than one warhead with one attacking warhead and would also offer more flexibility in basing. Engineering design of such a missile should begin now, with a view toward initial deployment in the early 1990s. Basing in more than one mode would be advisable. Hardened mobile launchers and hardened silos or shelters are worthy of vigorous investigation.

Over the long run, stability -- i.e. reduction in the risk of war — would best be fostered by an approach toward arms control that permits the U.S. and encourages the Soviet Union to move toward ICBM forces consisting primarily of such small, single-warhead missiles. This requires that arms control limitations and reductions be couched, not in terms of launchers or missiles, but in terms of equal levels of warheads of roughly equivalent yield.

The prompt deployment of the MX missile is necessary in order to encourage the Soviets to move toward more stabilizing ICBM deployments and to be willing to engage in arms control agreements that can enhance stability. It is also necessary in order to match, in part, Soviet capabilities to destroy hardened targets and to support the NATO alliance's overall deterrent. Primarily because of operational complexities that the Soviets would face in trying to attack our bombers and ICBMs simultaneously, a deployment of 100 MX missiles in Minuteman silos should have adequate survivability for these purposes for a number of years if the ICBM force is not viewed in isolation. Research on hardening of silos may also reveal ways to contribute to MX survivability.

Finally, the Commission unanimously believes that a new spirit of compromise by all of us is essential if the many contending groups that have staked out claims to particular approaches to strategic modernization or arms control are ever to come together in a broad national consensus on these questions. Only such a consensus can hope to reverse the highly divisive record of executive-legislative and partisan strife of the last decade on the issues of arms control and ICBM modernization. Our recent approaches and attitudes have produced, collectively, neither agreement among ourselves, nor restraint by the Soviets, nor lasting mutual ratified limitations on strategic offensive weapons.

The stakes are high. Effective deterrence and stabilizing arms control are possible with such a consensus. Without it, it seems likely that there will be a continuation of the last decade's divisiveness and lack of progress. If we can begin to see ourselves, in dealing with these issues, not as political partisans or as crusaders for one specific solution to a part of this complex set of problems, but rather as citizens of a great Nation with the humbling obligation to persevere in a long-run task of preserving both peace and liberty for the world, our perspectives may become clearer.

- - - E N D - - -

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 5, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR FAITH RYAN WHITTLESEY

FROM: JOHN ROUSSELOT
MARY JO JACOBI

SUBJECT: Update on MX Legislative Project

The Business Liaison section of the Office of Public Liaison has been planning the strategy for the passage of MX legislation. We have been in constant communication with the National Security Council, through Alan Meyer and Herb Hetu (consultant) and we are recently privy to an executive planning session headed by Dave Gergen. Following is the summary of our actions:

BRIEFINGS - OPL would like to conduct two major briefings. The first should be for CEOs of major corporations and associations throughout the United States. The briefing must be conducted by "senior" spokespersons, to assure a good turnout the President or Vice President must drop-by. The East Room in the mansion will also signal the importance of this briefing. Also being considered is a reception held preferably in the State Dining Room with the guests mingling with White House staffers and perhaps the President or Vice President. The optimal timing will be May 17.

A second briefing should be held with the Washington representatives of the same corporations and associations attending May 17. This should be conducted May 18 to be held in the OEOP 450. Senior spokespersons must brief with a drop-by from Judge Clark and perhaps the Vice President. This meeting will ensure that the Washington representatives get the same message as their bosses.

MAILINGS -- A Presidential letter is currently being prepared by Anne Higgins, Correspondence Office. The President will make an appeal to about 2,000 of his constituents throughout the United States. Lists for the mailings will be supplied by all portfolios from OPL. A sample mailing will be available to other offices within the White House so they may make a similar mailing to others. Along with the letter the package will contain fact sheets, talking points,

and editorials.

OTHER

POSSIBLE

ACTIVITIES- Other White House briefings will be conducted between now and ~~June 1~~^{May 31}; Those briefings are with: Business Records Manufacturers Associations - May 17; the Western Regional Council - May 18.

Armed Forces Day may be ~~utilized~~^{UTILIZED} in some fashion for the MX program. This should include VIP tickets for members of the business community. This will make it easier to ask for their support when they know they get this treatment from the White House. The event is scheduled for May 14 at Andrews Air Force Base.

Saturday Radio talk on the importance of the MX Peace-keeper Missile.

Other event suggestions should be funnelled to Dave Gergen.

cc: Jonathan Vipond

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

s/s MX

Full report on log strategy on Friday; possible
Commission on Arms Control; R² mtg of Hill people
next week

Armed Forces Day

Carter/Brown have cooled on their support, according
to rumors

Hergen will follow up re former presidents' possible
testimony - alternative is to use David Brinkley show
on another vehicle


OPK will coordinate project also AWACS

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 5, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR FAITH RYAN WHITTLESEY

FROM: JOHN ROUSSELOT
MARY JO JACOBI 

SUBJECT: Update on MX Peacekeeper Missile Resolution

The Business section of the Office of Public Liaison has been implementing the accepted plan for the passage of MX legislation. We have been in constant communication with the National Security Council, through Alan Meyer and Herb Hetu (consultant), and we have recently become privy to the executive planning sessions headed by David Gergen. Following is the summary of our actions:

BRIEFINGS - OPL would like to conduct two major briefings. The first being for CEOs of major corporations and associations throughout the United States. The briefing must be conducted by senior spokespersons and to assure an excellent turnout the President or Vice President should drop-by. The East Room, used for the briefing, will signal to the community the importance of the President's initiative. We should also consider a reception immediately following the briefing to be held in the State Dining Room. This will offer the opportunity, to the guests, to mingle with White House staffers and perhaps the President or Vice President. We must have them know exactly how to assist the President pass this legislation. The optimal time is May 16.

The second briefing should be held with the Washington representatives of the same corporations and associations present on May 16. The time best suited for this briefing is the following day, May 17, to be held in the OEOB 450. This meeting will serve to reinforce what their bosses heard the day before and give added impetus to activate on behalf of the President. Judge Clark should drop-by to make an appeal or perhaps the Vice President.

The participant's list will be compiled from all the OPL's portfolios under our guidance.

MAILINGS

- A Presidential letter is currently being prepared by Anne Higgins, Presidential Correspondence Office. The President will make an appeal to about 2,500 - 3,000 of his constituents throughout the United States. Lists for the mailings will be supplied by all portfolios. A sample mailing will be provided through you to all White House offices so they may conduct similar mailings. Along with the Presidential letter will be a packet containing talking points, fact sheets and editorials. This packet will be forthcoming for your approval.

OTHER
ACTIVITIES

- Other OPL/White House briefings will be conducted between now and May 26. The two currently scheduled are: the Business Records Manufacturers Association - May 17; the Western Regional Council - May 18. An MX pitch will be included in the remarks.
- All speech activities by OPL and other White House staff members should include pitch on the MX.
- Saturday radio speech by the President on MX.
- Armed Forces Day planned for May 14 should include VIP treatment for representatives of the major corporations and associations. These favors mean a great deal to people and their significance should not be overlooked. The event will be at Andrews Air Force base.
- A major event featuring the past three Presidents. This is a natural event for the media and will permit a joint statement supporting the MX plan. A good site would be in the Capitol and coverage is guaranteed.

As developments occur and further progress is made we will continue our update.

cc: Jonathan Vipond

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 5, 1983

TO : Morton Blackwell
Judi Buckalew
Michael Gale
Dee Jepsen
Virginia Knauer
John Tiller

FROM : Mary Jo Jacob

SUBJECT: MX Briefings

Mary J

We are planning two major briefings on the MX for May 17 and 18. The May 17 briefing will be for Chief Executive Officers of constituent groups and will feature a drop-by by the President. The May 18 briefing will be a follow-up meeting for the Washington Representatives of the organizations participating in the May 17 briefing.

We need your help. Please submit lists of suggested participants for each meeting to Bob Moss by COB Monday, May 9. Please include the name, title, name of organization, mailing address and telephone number.

Thanks!

MJJ:vad

These are terrible!

TALKING PAPER

MX Talking Points

Can't we do better than the Commission? Jonathan

"SUMMARY OF THE REPORT OF THE S/6
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON STRATEGIC FORCES"

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In this context, the multiple structure of our strategic forces — consisting of ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and bombers with cruise missiles — is important for three main reasons: (1) the existence of each is a hedge over the long term against any failures of, or Soviet breakthroughs endangering, the others; (2) any planned Soviet attack would be significantly more complex and less effective because of the different type of attack needed against each part of our forces; and (3) each part has unique capabilities.

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Modernization of our ICBM force, and fitting that modernization into the context of stabilizing arms control, has presented a major challenge for the last decade. In the Commission's view, this problem has come to be mis-cast over recent years, in part because of the implicit judgment that all of the immediate and the future needs of our ICBM force could be satisfied promptly and by a single missile based in a single way. In the Commission's view a three-part approach is preferable: development of a small, single-warhead ICBM; an arms control approach to improve stability; and deployment now of 100 MX missiles in Minuteman silos.

For the long term, survivability of the ICBM force — and hence its role as a hedge against any possible Soviet breakthrough in anti-submarine warfare — would best be provided by moving toward a small, single-warhead ICBM. A force consisting of such ICBMs would inherently deny to an attacker the ability to destroy more than one warhead with one attacking warhead and would also offer more flexibility in basing. Engineering design of such a missile should begin now, with a view toward initial deployment in the early 1990s. Basing in more than one mode would be advisable. Hardened mobile launchers and hardened silos or shelters are worthy of vigorous investigation.

Over the long run, stability -- i.e. reduction in the risk of war — would best be fostered by an approach toward arms control that permits the U.S. and encourages the Soviet Union to move toward ICBM forces consisting primarily of such small, single-warhead missiles. This requires that arms control limitations and reductions be couched, not in terms of launchers or missiles, but in terms of equal levels of warheads of roughly equivalent yield.

The prompt deployment of the MX missile is necessary in order to encourage the Soviets to move toward more stabilizing ICBM deployments and to be willing to engage in arms control agreements that can enhance stability. It is also necessary in order to match, in part, Soviet capabilities to destroy hardened targets and to support the NATO alliance's overall deterrent. Primarily because of operational complexities that the Soviets would face in trying to attack our bombers and ICBMs simultaneously, a deployment of 100 MX missiles in Minuteman silos should have adequate survivability for these purposes for a number of years if the ICBM force is not viewed in isolation. Research on hardening of silos may also reveal ways to contribute to MX survivability.

Finally, the Commission unanimously believes that a new spirit of compromise by all of us is essential if the many contending groups that have staked out claims to particular approaches to strategic modernization or arms control are ever to come together in a broad national consensus on these questions. Only such a consensus can hope to reverse the highly divisive record of executive-legislative and partisan strife of the last decade on the issues of arms control and ICBM modernization. Our recent approaches and attitudes have produced, collectively, neither agreement among ourselves, nor restraint by the Soviets, nor lasting mutual ratified limitations on strategic offensive weapons.

The stakes are high. Effective deterrence and stabilizing arms control are possible with such a consensus. Without it, it seems likely that there will be a continuation of the last decade's divisiveness and lack of progress. If we can begin to see ourselves, in dealing with these issues, not as political partisans or as crusaders for one specific solution to a part of this complex set of problems, but rather as citizens of a great Nation with the humbling obligation to persevere in a long-run task of preserving both peace and liberty for the world, our perspectives may become clearer.

- - - E N D - - -

Mary Jo

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 9, 1983

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

TO: FRED RYAN, Director
Presidential Appointments and Scheduling

FROM: JONATHAN VIPOND, III *JV*
Deputy Assistant to the President
Office of Public Liaison

JOHN H. ROUSSELOT
Special Assistant to the President and
Deputy Director, Office of Public Liaison

REQUEST: To drop by briefing for Chief Executive Officers of major trade associations and corporations on President's MX Proposal now before the Congress, followed by Reception.

PURPOSE: To enlist attendees' support, along with the support of their respective organizations, for the MX Proposal.

BACKGROUND: There will be 200 of the most influential corporate and association leaders at the White House to be briefed on the President's MX plan. The briefing is aimed at identifying and solidifying support within the business community, as they have been active supporters of the President's budget and tax initiatives. We would like to reactivate their grassroots effort on behalf of MX.

DATE & TIME: Monday, May 16, 1983 - Between 3 p.m. & 7 p.m.

LOCATION: The White House, East Room for Briefing
The White House, State Dining for Reception

PARTICIPANTS: 200 - 250 people

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: Introduction and briefing by NSC or Defense official; then drop by and brief remarks by the President, followed by drop by at reception by the President.

REMARKS REQUESTED: Brief remarks to emphasize and underscore the importance of MX for U.S. national security.

Page Two

MEDIA COVERAGE: Full Press
RECOMMENDED BY: Faith Ryan Whittlesey
OPPOSED BY:
PROJECT OFFICER: John H. Rousselot

cc: Richard Darman
David Gergen
Kenneth Duberstein
Robert McFarland
Allan Meyer

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 5, 1983

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

TO: FRED RYAN, DIRECTOR OF PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS AND SCHEDULING

FROM: FAITH RYAN WHITTLESEY

REQUEST: To drop by briefing for Chief Executive Officers of major trade associations and corporations on President's M X Proposal now before the Congress.

PURPOSE: To enlist attendees' support, along with the support of their respective organizations, for the M X Proposal.

BACKGROUND: There will be 200 of the most influential corporate and association leaders at the White House to be briefed on the President's M X plan. The briefing is aimed at identifying and solidifying support within the business community, as they have been active supporters of the President's budget and tax initiatives. We would like to reactivate their grassroots effort on behalf of M X.

DATE: May 17 & 18, 1983

LOCATION: The White House, East Room

PARTICIPANTS: 200-250 people


OUTLINE OF EVENTS: Introduction and briefing by NSC or Defense official; then drop by and brief remarks by the President

REMARKS REQUESTED: Brief remarks to emphasize and underscore the importance of M X for U.S. national security.

MEDIA COVERAGE: Full Press

RECOMMENDED BY: Faith Ryan Whittlesey

OPPOSED BY:

PROJECT OFFICER: John H. Rousselot 

5/9

MX Strategy

5/16 Briefing for CEOs

President Ent Am

Judge Clark

5/17 Wash Rep follow-up

Per 450

5/14 Andrews AFB Armed Forces Day Celebration

VIP tickets for business

5/11 Reception for Small Bus. Procurement

Paul Hays at Pentagon

5/11 Rose Garden Ceremony w/President 11:00

Mass Mailing to go out no later than 5/18

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 10, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR JUDGE WILLIAM CLARK

FROM: JONATHAN VIPOND, III
JOHN H. ROUSSELOT

THROUGH: FAITH RYAN WHITTLESEY

SUBJECT: M X BRIEFING FOR CEO'S

We have scheduled a briefing for 200-250 Chief Executive Officers of Fortune 500 companies and major trade associations on Monday, May 16 at _____ in the East Room. The subject will be the M X Peacekeeper missile program, why it is vital to U.S. national security, and possibly an update as to where the package stands at that time in the Congress.

The purpose of this briefing is to inform and motivate these CEO's to contact their legislators to ask for support for the M X plan. We would like you to come to this function to briefly address this group (15-20 minutes).

We realize this is very short notice we have given you, and we have only recently received this assignment. Please let us know immediately if you will be able to speak to this group by contacting John Rousselot's office, ext. 6246.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 10, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR VICE PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH

FROM: JONATHAN VIPOND, III
JOHN H. ROUSSELOT

THROUGH: FAITH RYAN WHITTLESEY

SUBJECT: M X BRIEFING FOR CEO'S

We have scheduled a briefing for 200-250 Chief Executive Officers of Fortune 500 companies and major trade associations on Monday, May 16 at _____ in the East Room. The subject will be the M X Peacekeeper Missile program, why it is vital to U.S. national security, and possibly an update as to where the package stands at that time in the Congress.

The purpose of this briefing is to inform and motivate these CEO's to contact their legislators to ask for support for the M X plan. We have asked National Security Advisor William Clark to address the group and give the update. In addition, we would like you to come to make a few remarks to the group. This should require no more than five to ten minutes of your time, and your remarks would be a reiteration of the M X's importance to U.S. national defense and the key to bringing the Soviets to the table for arms control, etc.

We realize this is very short notice we have given you, and we have only recently received this assignment. Please let us know immediately if you will be able to speak to this group by contacting John Rousselot's office at -xt. 6246.

ICBM MODERNIZATION FACT SHEET

- President Reagan's Recommendations
 - Deploy 100 Peacekeeper missiles in existing silos at F. E. Warren Air Force Base.
 - Initiate engineering design of a small, single-warhead missile.
 - Conduct technology programs (superhardening, land-mobile vehicles, and ballistic missile defense).
- U.S. Nuclear Strategy
 - Deter war by negotiating from a position of strength.
 - Support U.S. arms reduction proposals.
 - Support deterrence and number modernization in NATO.
- Budgetary Impact of ICBM Modernization
 - Appropriations of \$19.9 billion* over the FY 1984-88 period.
- National Economic Benefits of ICBM Modernization
 - A total increase of industrial output valued at \$33.0 billion over the 1984-88 period.
 - This equates to an annual average increase of \$6.6 billion in sales for various industries nationally.
 - Increased industrial output will yield an annual average employment creation of 158,700 jobs over the 1984-88 period, with peak year (1987) employment of 182,500 workers.
- Specific Economic Benefits of ICBM Modernization
 - Largest increase in output will be posted by aerospace and support industries (aircraft, electronic components, scientific instruments, communications equipment, etc.)

* All figures are in FY 1982 dollars.

- Gains in employment and output shared by service industries, including wholesale and retail trade, real estate, transportation, and business and professional services.
- Total employment creation consists of three components:
 - Direct employment would amount to some 38,800 jobs a year for the 1984-88 period, consisting of 36,500 jobs a year for the 1984-88 period, consisting of 36,500 jobs in missile development and production industries and 2,300 construction jobs.
 - Indirect employment would average 30,300 jobs in industries related to missile development and production, and 1,100 construction-related jobs nationwide.
 - Income generated from the total of 70,200 direct and indirect jobs for missile development, production and deployment would lead to induced employment of an additional 88,500 jobs annually.
- While almost every state will benefit from employment in support industries, 28 states will benefit from direct development employment. The eight states with the greatest proportion of prime contracts are: California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Utah and Washington.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SUBJECT: Outline of Strategic Forces Modernization Briefings,
May 16-17

Briefing to CEOs of Business and Trade Associations

- o Date/Time: May 16, 4:00-5:30 p.m.
- o Place: 4:00-5:00 p.m., briefing in East Room
5:00-5:30 p.m., reception in State Dining Room
- o Details:
 - 4:00-4:10 The President. Remarks will key on pressing need for passage of program, impact on deterrence and arms reduction, need for bipartisan consensus.
 - 4:10-4:13 Press clears out.
 - 4:13-4:15 Faith Ryan Whittlesey. Introduction of Speakers.
 - 4:15-4:25 John Lyons, Commission member and VP, AFL-CIO. Briefing on Commission Report, the fact of unanimity, and why entire package makes sense and deserve bipartisan support.
 - 4:25-4:35 Nick Brady, U.S. Senator (R-N.J.), Commission member.
 - 4:35-4:48 Robert C. (Bud) McFarlane, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
 - 4:48-4:49 Faith Ryan Whittlesey introduces the Vice President
 - 4:50-5:00 The Vice President

Briefing to Senior Washington area Business and Trade Representatives

- o Date/Time: May 17, 2:00-2:50 p.m.
- o Place: Room 450 OEOB
- o Details:
 - 2:00-2:02 Faith Ryan Whittlesey. Welcome and introduction of Speakers.
 - 2:02-2:10 William F. Clark (Judge)
 - 2:10-2:30 Dr. John Deutch, Dean of Science, MIT and Member of President's Commission on Arms Control and Modernization.
 - 2:30-2:40
 - 2:40-2:41 Faith Ryan Whittlesey introduces Vice President
 - 2:40-2:50 The Vice President

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
MX Briefing for CEO's
Monday, May 16, 1983

LOCATION: East Room

FROM: Gahl Hodges *L. F. Gahl D. N.*

3:15 p.m. Guests arrive the Southwest Gate, Diplomatic Reception Room. They are held in the Lower Cross Hall.

3:45 p.m. Guests are led up the Grand Staircase to the East Room where they may be seated.

Mrs. Faith Whittlesey, Mr. John Lyons, and Lieutenant General Skantze are escorted to the Green Room where they hold briefly.

3:55 p.m. Mrs. Faith Whittlesey, Mr. John Lyons, and Lieutenant General Skantze proceed to the platform and take their places.

4:00 p.m. THE PRESIDENT arrives the State Floor via the elevator and is announced into the East Room where he proceeds to the podium.

Remarks by THE PRESIDENT.

4:10 p.m. THE PRESIDENT departs the East Room and proceeds to the elevator via the Cross Hall.

Mrs. Faith Whittlesey introduces Mr. John Lyons.

4:12 p.m. Remarks by Mr. John Lyons, Commission Member, MX Commission; and Vice President, AFL-CIO.

4:30 p.m. Remarks by Lieutenant General Skantze, United States Air Force.

4:45 p.m. The Vice President arrives the State Floor via the elevator and is announced into the East Room where he takes his place at the podium.

Remarks by the Vice President.

PAGE 2

5:00 p.m. Upon conclusion of the Vice President's remarks, the guests proceed to the Grand Foyer for a reception.

5:30 p.m. The guests begin to depart the Grand Staircase, Diplomatic Reception Room.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 12, 1983

Dear //2//:

The Preamble to the Constitution makes clear that among the fundamental purposes of our national government is to "provide for the common defence". This is a responsibility which is borne by both the President and the Congress.

Since becoming President in January, 1981, I have made clear my desire to negotiate significant new agreements with the Soviet Union to reduce our nuclear arsenals. I am happy to report to you that steady progress is being made in that effort; we have made serious proposals and several rounds of talks have been held, with another round set to begin in Geneva on May 17. We are confident that one reason for the progress to date is that we have embarked on a long overdue program of modernization of our strategic forces. This program is needed just to keep pace with the major strides the Soviets have made in modernizing and enlarging their military forces during the past decade.

For over twenty years, our nuclear security has rested on a strategic triad of manned bombers, submarines, and land-based missiles (ICBMs). Today, however, the third leg of that triad is dangerously out-of-date, and that fact will leave us increasingly vulnerable to enemy attack. That's why I've asked the Congress to approve production and deployment of the MX Peacekeeper missile.

But this isn't just my recommendation. In response to the intense controversy surrounding this issue, I appointed a blue-ribbon Commission on Strategic Forces to give both the Congress and myself the benefit of their expertise. Their report calls for production and deployment of the Peacekeeper missile, and one line in their report especially impresses me. They write, "It is illusory to believe that we could obtain a satisfactory agreement with the Soviets limiting ICBM deployments if we unilaterally terminated the only new U.S. ICBM program that could lead to deployment in this decade."

That is where the debate stands now. Because you are a respected leader of opinion, you can have a major impact on the final decision if you make your views known to Members of Congress. I have asked my staff to prepare a packet of materials which will give you some important background information, and I hope you will take a little time from your busy schedule to look it over. The decisions we make this year will affect our national security, as well as our hopes for peace, for the rest of this decade and beyond. Your active support is needed now.

With my appreciation for your past support and with my best wishes,

Sincerely,

//3//

FAITH RYAN WHITTLESEY TALKING POINTS FOR PEACEKEEPER (MX) MISSILE

- I. NEED FOR MODERNIZATION OF ICBM (INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILE) SYSTEMS: (MX is part of "nuclear triad": subs, bombers, MX)
 - A. GIVES U.S. ARMS CONTROL LEVERAGE -- SOVIETS HAVE HISTORICALLY SHOWN REAL WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE ONLY WHEN U.S. HAS ON-GOING PROGRAMS...e.g.: 1972 ABM TREATY CAME ABOUT ONLY BECAUSE U.S. HAD AN ON-GOING ABM (ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE) PROGRAM
 - B. DEMONSTRATES STRONG NATIONAL WILL -- EFFECTIVE DETERRENCE IS LARGELY DEPENDENT UPON THE SOVIETS' PERCEPTION OF OUR NATIONAL WILL AND COHESION.
 - C. PRESENT SYSTEM AGED AND OUTDATED -- THE LAST U.S. ICBM WAS SENT TO THE FIELD IN 1969. SINCE THAT TIME, THE USSR HAS CONTINUED TO INTRODUCE MODERN TECHNOLOGY INTO THEIR ICBM's. THE U.S. HAS REMAINED AT A STAND-STILL. 1980's TECHNOLOGY IS NEEDED FOR THE 1980s. THE M.X. HAS IT.
 - D. PRESENT SYSTEM HAS LIMITED CAPABILITIES -- SOVIETS HAVE HARDENED THEIR ICBM SILOS AND CONTROL CENTERS TO THE POINT THAT MINUTEMAN SYSTEM HAS ONLY LIMITED CAPABILITES AGAINST THEM. MEANWHILE, SOVIETS HAVE INCREASED THEIR CAPABILITIES AGAINST OUR HARDENED FACILITIES. IMBALANCE MUST BE CORRECTED.
 - E. FIRST STRIKE CAPABILITIES FOR USSR -- PRESENT DEPLOYMENT OF SOVIET ICBM's CAPABLE OF DESTROYING MOST OF U.S. ICBM

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m/mg

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 12, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR JENNIFER FITZGERALD

FROM: JOHN ROUSSELOT *JR*

SUBJECT: MX Briefing - May 16

The briefing time has been changed for the CEO meeting on May 16 in the East Room. The Vice President was originally scheduled for 3:45 - 4:00 PM, however we would now like to change his time to 4:45 - 5:00 PM. I hope that this meets with his approval and does not cause too much of a burden.

Thank you for your kind assistance.

F 12/83

PRIORITY

- Opal Coughlin - PATTENSON
- Pursell -
- Whitten -
- Natcher -
- Boggs -
- McHugh - PATTENSON
- Hefner - G.P., REAGAN, LOCKHART
- Boner -
- Akaka -
- Watkins - REAGAN
- Hoyer -
- Traxler - AFOL
- Dwyer -
- Neal Smith -

BASELINE MODEL - CONGRESS ORDERED VOTE IN DEC.

SCHEDULE TO FLOOR

- A. TITLE III - DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION
- B. APPROPRIATION (CONTINUATION)
"ENTIRE PACKAGE"

CON STEVENSON - COMIN

CONCERNS

- ① ARMS CONTROL
- ② SMALL VERSION

WHOLE PACKAGE - OUT OF COMMITTEE

5. E-107/10-7

Snyder - *17 - [unclear]*

Hopkins -
Parris -
Paul -
Chandler -
Bob Smith -
Zschau -
Bereuter
L. Martin -
V. Weber - *N.S.C.*
Frenzel -
Gunderson -
Gradison -
Clinger -
Goodling -
Shuster -
Fish - *10/10/58 - 6E*
Horton -
Green -
C. Smith
McKernan -
Snowe -
Dyson -
Hughes
Carper
Andrews
Britt
Clarke
W. Jones
E. Jones
J. Jones
Neal
Valentine
Whitley
Olin
Sisisky
L. Thomas
Derrick

Spratt
Tallon - *A.S.C.*

L. Hamilton
McCloskey
Sharp
Mazzoli
Hubbard
Perkins
T. Hall
Applegate
Mollohan
G. Long
Dowdy
Boner
Erdreich
Flippo
Shelby
Fuqua
MacKay
Mica
Volkmer
Bob Young
Annunzio
Bryant
R. Coleman
Frost
Kazen
Patman
Pickle
Anthony
Synar
McNulty
Kogovsek
Coelho -
Matsui
Mineta
Martinez

TONY
MACROSS