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
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Dorothea Lange, WRA
Manzanar Relocation Center
July 3, 1942

Manzanar. Minidoka. Heart Mountain.

Unfamiliar names of remote and desolate places, etched permanently in the minds of some, forgotten by many.

Yet history records in 1942, the forcible eviction of 120,000 men, women and children of Japanese ancestry from their homes on the West Coast.

Without trial, without charges of wrongdoing, without the basic protections guaranteed by law, an entire group of loyal Americans became the tragic victims of a government action solely because of their ancestry.

And in the course of their detention Japanese Americans suffered severe losses—freedom, dignity, income, careers—and for some, a mental anguish that would last a lifetime.

Manzanar, Minidoka, Heart Mountain, Poston, Tule Lake, Gila River, Granada, Topaz, Jerome, Rohwer—these were America's concentration camps.

In 1980, a Federal Commission was established to review the facts surrounding the exclusion and detention of Japanese Americans and to recommend appropriate

remedies. Following exhaustive research and hearings, the Commission concluded that the Government's wartime policies were without justification. Their recommendations form the basis for congressional legislation—U.S. Senate Bill, S.2116, and U.S. House of Representatives Resolution, HR 4110—which seek to redress civil rights violations against an American ethnic group.

The evacuation experience of Japanese Americans during World War II is a harsh reminder of the frailties of constitutional guarantees: That wherever and whenever civil liberties can be taken from one group or individual, they can be taken from any group or individual.

Passage of these bills will be a significant step toward rectifying a mistake of the past in the hope a similar tragedy will never again be repeated.

**The Japanese American
Incarceration:
A Case for Redress**
Japanese American Citizens League

Frank Sato
Tim Gojio

May 13, 1985

- Violence against Asian-Am's.
- ~~Jack Smith~~. Internment Compensation
 - House & Senate
 - wants Admin to give yes.
- W. Germany govt. Holocaust victims/survivors.
receive payments. U.S.

HAUNTING ECHOES OF THE LAST ROUND -UP:

"9066"

REVISITED

by James G. Trager

A few days after that "day of infamy" at Pearl Harbor, Lt. General John L. DeWitt, CO of the Fourth Army Western Area Command, spoke for millions of outraged Americans. "A Jap is a Jap. It makes no difference whether the Jap is a citizen or not...."

And so it was, earlier this year, when the newspapers and TV in recent months showed Americans savaging Iranian students and businessmen—many of them U.S. citizens—some of us couldn't help but think back to the time, nearly 40 years ago, when a similar ugliness befell the more than 120,000 Japanese-Americans on the West Coast. Perhaps having a Japanese wife makes me especially sensitive to an analogy between these isolated incidents and what the American Civil Liberties Union in 1942 called "the worst single wholesale violation of civil rights in our history."

This time there is no racial motivation, no hysteria about "fifth columnists," no thought that the Ayatollah plans to bomb the U.S. mainland. Despite the gradual escalation of U.S. responses to Iran's seizure of American hostages, including the move by the Immigration & Naturalization Service to get Iranian students to prove their status, there is no suggestion that the outbreaks against some of the 200,000 Iranians were in any way sanctioned by the White House. Still, the common thread of revenge, of lynch mob psychology or scapegoating is there to be seen.

Finding historical precedents for current outrages can be treacherous. It would be easy to exaggerate the common denominators between the signing of Executive Order 9066 by President Franklin D. Roosevelt on February 19, 1942 and the burning of a Dallas clothing store, the assaults on college campuses and all the "Iranians Keep Out" signs that grace storefronts and restaurants across the country.

The essential difference is that "9066" was not just a

mindless act of patriotism but a calculated presidential policy decision—a decision arrived at after much deliberation by the executive and legislative branches of government, and then given the blessings of the judicial. The decision had nothing to do with any "clear and present danger" and almost everything to do with the basest of racial prejudice and economic greed. Before Pearl Harbor, as an innocent American read about the wretched excesses of the Nazis—including their promulgation of the Nuremberg Racial Laws turning Jews into non-persons, followed by the Nazi expropriation of Jewish property and the expulsion of its owners—people insisted "it can't happen here."

After Pearl Harbor, it almost did.

Executive Order 9066, lest we forget, rustled up 120,000 Japanese-Americans and herded them into "relocation centers" in some of the most barren, Godforsaken parts of California, Idaho, Utah, Oregon, Washington, Colorado, Arizona, Wyoming and Arkansas. Fairgrounds, livestock exhibition halls and race tracks were converted into virtual concentration camps, surrounded by barbed wire fences protected by rifle-wielding guards in watch-towers. Many of the living quarters were horse stalls, some complete with manure. While most camps held 5,000 detainees, the converted Santa Ana race track near Los Angeles held over 18,000 Japanese-Americans. Out of the 120,000 detainees in all camps, about one-half were under the age of 21, approximately one-quarter were young children and many were the elderly. Not one was tried for any crime, but nearly all lost their homes, jobs, businesses and farms.

The facts behind that mass evacuation of Japanese-Americans from their West Coast homes—the inconsistencies, the ironies, the naked racial bias—boggle the mind. Taken together, they are a reminder of the excesses that even this democratic society is capable of sanctioning in wartime.

Nearly two-thirds of the internees were *Nisei*, native-born American citizens many of whom were young children and infants. The others were, for the most part, elderly *Issei*, immigrants who, in countless cases, lost everything they had worked for and saved over many years.

James G. Trager is author of the recent bestseller, The People's Chronology. He has also written Amber Waves of Grain, a 1973 expose of the U.S.-Soviet secret wheat deal which contributed to the current American food price spiral. Trager is married to the photographer Chie Nishio, a Japanese national.

Japanese living in the Hawaiian Islands, often in close proximity to naval bases and air stations, were not interned. They were nearly 2,100 miles west of San Francisco and less than 3,400 miles east of Yokohama, but they were too important to the local economy and to the U.S. military effort for any action to be taken against them. And, unlike California, Hawaii was not in the throes of a gubernatorial election.

No German or Italian aliens, certainly no Americans of German or Italian descent, were interned except in the cases of diplomats and clearly identified enemy agents. Not having the telltale epicanthic fold—"slant eyes"—they enjoyed virtual immunity. "When we are dealing with the Caucasian race," intoned California's Attorney General and gubernatorial aspirant Earl Warren, "we have methods that will test [their] loyalty." But for Americans of even 1/32nd percentile Japanese ancestry—that would be ancestry traceable to one's great, great, great grandparent—government oversight was required. The old "Yellow Peril" talk again proved to be as good for votes and newspaper sales as it had been in the earlier part of the century, when the Chinese "coolies" faced such laws as a San Francisco ordinance that taxed pigtailed.

But after 1941, the wartime climate triggered an epidemic of suspicion that sharpened any pre-existing animosities.

"Rumors about Japanese fields of flowers and vegetables planted 'arrowlike' pointing to nearby military installations reverberated through California and beyond."

The recent Steven Spielberg film, *1941*, may not have achieved the comic heights intended, but it documents accurately enough the climate of fear prevalent in wartime America. After a stray Japanese submarine lobbed a few shells into an oil-field near Santa Barbara on February 23, 1942, Californians grew increasingly fearful that a Japanese combined sea-air attack of their coastal cities was imminent. San Franciscans learned to respond quickly to frequent air-raid siren alerts and black-outs. The only Japanese aircraft to appear over United States territory, however, didn't show until November, and then only up north in Oregon. It turned out to be a submarine-launched, pontoon-equipped Zero piloted by Flying Officer Nobuo Fujita of the Imperial Japanese Navy. Fujita flew two sorties over a tinder-dry forest but his incendiary bombs failed to trigger the intended fire storm.

The absence of an invasion by the People of the Rising Sun was apparently troubling to politicians. Worse, despite all the circulating rumors, there was no sabotage. Americans everywhere held their breath—and nothing happened. This silence aggravated chauvinistic worries captured in Earl Warren's frettings on the campaign trail: "...this is the most ominous sign of the whole situation. It convinces me more than perhaps any other factor that the sabotage we




are to get, the fifth column activities, are timed just [as] Pearl Harbor was timed and just like the invasion of France, and of Denmark, and of Norway, and all of those other countries [sic]."

The *Nation* in its March 7, 1942 issue found the West Coast "more jittery" than the rest of the country. "Rich folk are leaving San Francisco, Seattle and other places for the safety of inland Arizona and Nevada," reported Louis Fischer. "Most people I have encountered this month in California, Oregon and Washington believe they will be severely bombed...this intensifies the manhunt on Japanese-born and American-born Japanese who, it is alleged, might try to capture cities, shipyards and plants during the raids. I talked to women who were honestly afraid that Japanese truck growers would poison their vegetables."

It's fair to point out that during this period a few political leaders came to the defense of the victims. One of them, Governor Ralph Carr of Colorado, offered to accept citizens of Japanese descent and guard their constitutional rights. But such voices of reason could not stem the growing tide of hysteria sweeping the nation. Rumors about Japanese fields of flowers and vegetables planted "arrowlike" pointing to nearby military installations reverberated through California and beyond.

As a teenager making his first visit to California in the



summer of 1941, I heard people lower their voices when their Japanese gardeners came within earshot. Some "Japs," they told me, had been seen photographing military installations. Or was it naval installations? Or the approaches to the then four-year old Golden Gate Bridge? The year before, on a trip to Virginia, I'd felt a physical revulsion at the sight of restrooms, drinking fountains and public benches labeled "White Only" or "Colored." But after Pearl Harbor, my view of the Japanese was peculiarly altered by the stereotypes that films, comic strips and magazine illustrations had created. I'd read about Warsaw, Rotterdam and London, but the Nazis looked not unlike most Americans. "Japs" were something else—sneaky, unpredictable, fanatical, bestial and racially alien. (Who hadn't heard about the December, 1937 "Rape of Nanking"?) What was it that Mississippi Congressman John E. Rankin had said? "Once a Jap, always a Jap. You cannot regenerate a Jap, convert him and make him the same as a white man any more than you can reverse the laws of nature."

The fever was contagious. Even the wise Walter Lippmann, ardent champion of civil rights, fell victim. In his nationally syndicated column he declared the Pacific Coast "an official combat zone." And no one, certainly not the Japanese working there, had "a constitutional right to do business on a battlefield." There was plenty of room for

them on less threatened terrain elsewhere in the U.S.

Some of Mr. Lippmann's brethren were more vicious. The Los Angeles Times editorialized: "A viper is nonetheless a viper wherever the egg is hatched, so a Japanese-American, born of Japanese parents, grows up to be Japanese, not American." Westbrook Pegler chimed in by writing, "to hell with *habeas corpus* until the danger is over."

Maintaining his equilibrium, *The Nation's* Louis Fischer found press and politicians to be "out for blood and wholesale internment. Jingoism are endeavoring, under the cover of wartime, flag-waving patriotism, to do what they always wanted to do in peacetime: get rid of the Japanese, harness labor and frighten the liberals. Cheap demagogues," he concluded, "are having a field day."

Nearly 30 years later, however, FDR's biographer James McGregor Burns would write that "only a strong civil libertarian president could have faced [the chauvinists] down, and Roosevelt was not a strong civil libertarian. Like Jefferson, he was all for civil liberties in general but easily found exceptions in particular."

But racial suspicion and political opportunism were not the sole motives for internment. There were economic advantages in removing the American Japanese from their property. These Japanese were the children and grandchildren of a people who had revolutionized California's fishing

industry; who taught California's farmers how to develop good potato seed—making California, not Idaho or Maine, the nation's largest potato producer; who pioneered in land reclamation; who organized produce-growing to provide for a steady year-round flow to Eastern markets. Thus, by the end of 1941, Japanese-American farmers controlled 42% of the commercial truck crops grown in California—22% of the nation's total. They tilled only 3.9% of the state's farmland, but as much as 90% of California's artichokes, cauliflower, celery, cucumber, peppers, spinach, strawberries and tomatoes were Japanese-American grown.

Little wonder that members of the Western Growers Protective Association coveted those truck farms, especially if they could be picked up for virtually nothing at eviction sales. Others, notably the patriots of the Native Sons of the Golden West hungrily eyed all those other products of the legendary Japanese work ethic: the urban neighborhood fruit stands, grocery stores, florist shops, restaurants, and drycleaning establishments. As Carey McWilliams explained in the March 2, 1942 *New Republic*, "People are prone to forget, in a moment of excitement, that special-interest groups have axes to grind against the Japanese." Not only had White American nursery men already organized a boycott of Japanese firms, reported McWilliams, but now there was a proposal that "all Japanese be moved out of the coastal areas...and put to work on a semi-conscription basis as farm laborers in the San Joaquin Valley 'at reasonable wages.'"

As it turned out, that was one of the more benign proposals; more prevalent were calls to "deport" the Japanese and to "expropriate" their lands outright. In late 1941, spokesmen for the Grower-Shipper Vegetable Association traveled to Washington to assure Congress that "no vegetable shortage" would result from such a seizure. Many of those calling for mass deportation back to Japan eventually realized the impracticality of their scheme and settled instead for "incarceration." But even then they worried that "because Japs multiply like rabbits" the camps would become "breeding farms." Why not, suggested one California congressman, offer them a choice of "sterilization or deportation"?

Many internees did wind up working as voluntary field hands and were credited with saving the 1942 sugar beet crops in Utah, Idaho, Montana and Wyoming as well as Arizona's cotton crop. But no sooner were they locked up than agitation began to build against their eventual return to California from inland concentration camps.

Twenty-four years later, former U.S. Supreme Court Justice Tom Clark rued the day that he, as Assistant Attorney-General under Francis Biddle, had successfully argued the case before the Court. On his retirement in 1966 he said, "I have made a lot of mistakes in my life. One was my part in the evacuation of 1942. I don't think that served any purpose at all. We picked them up and put them in concentration camps. That's the truth of the matter. And as I look back on it...I am amazed that the Supreme Court ever approved it."

It was Earl Warren, the same Earl Warren who would one day occupy a lofty place in the pantheon of American

civil rights heroes because of *Brown v. Board of Education*, who convinced Clark that nobody could determine which of California's 94,000 or so Japanese—60,000 of them U.S. citizens—could be trusted. Clark had been dispatched to Sacramento by Biddle to persuade California officials that a full-scale evacuation could not be legally justified. But when he got there, Earl Warren managed to convince him otherwise. In his memoirs, Biddle would later regret: "It was un-American, unconstitutional and un-Christian."

The irony was that all the evidence gathered by a secret FDR-appointed intelligence mission argued against evacuation. "There is no Japanese problem," reported Curtis B. Munson of the State Department. West Coast and Hawaiian residents of Japanese descent were "extraordinary" in their loyalty to the U.S. *The Nisei*, especially, were "pathetically eager to show [their] loyalty."

Yet, by May 1942, most Japanese-Americans and their extended families had been herded into 15 assembly centers prior to being sent to the squalor of tar-paper barracks in some of the bleakest spots of the far West. They were yanked out of the lushest part of California to live in 20' x 100' "family-sized apartments" and "bachelor wards," while temperatures outside plunged to minus-30 F. and sandstorms and blizzards ripped through the pine boards.

"We picked them up and put them in concentration camps....As I look back on it...I am amazed that the Supreme Court ever approved it."

Today I find it hard to believe that as a nation we could have been so callous, so obtuse. At the time, of course, like so many other fervently patriotic Americans, I found this mass evacuation to be the most natural thing in the world.

Ida Shimonuchi, who in the 1970s taught literature to two of my children in Riverdale, N.Y., was a high-school girl at that time in San Francisco. She remembers being herded with thousands of others into the Tanforan Race-track on April 28, 1942.

"People made the best of it. Some put signs over their quarters reading, 'Home of Sea Biscuit' or 'War Admiral'—the famous race horses of the late 1930s—but the food was awful and the situation full of uncertainties till they sent us to the camp at Topaz, Utah. That looked good after the assembly center. The living conditions were spartan, and one old man was killed by a guard. That caused quite a stir. He was a bachelor, hard of hearing. He'd wandered out towards the sagebrush with his dog and didn't hear the order to halt. But I never heard any rancor, nor bitterness, of any kind. I guess young people who were engaged to Caucasians, or whose personal lives were disrupted in other traumatic ways, must have been less philosophical, but for most there was a kind of *c'est la vie* attitude."

Another Japanese-American, John Tanaka, now a New York advertising agency art director, was only seven when his family was shipped off to Poston, Arizona, where the





first camp was opened. He remembers that the food was bad but has happy recollections of swimming in the irrigation canal. His four older brothers served in the U.S. Army, two of them leaving Poston to join the all-*Nisei* 442nd Infantry Battalion which emerged from the Italian and French fighting with more decorations—and more casualties—than any other unit of comparable size and length of service in Army history. It should be stressed that the Japanese Americans suffered not only voluntary internment but enlisted in the army in order to prove their loyalty as citizens. (More than 30,000 Japanese-Americans served in the armed forces during World War II, some with Merrill's Marauders in Burma. The mortality rate was fearful, the 442d alone sustaining 9,486 casualties.) And yet, the fear and bigotry directed against Japanese-Americans back home continued unabated. In 1945, the American Legion Post of Hood River, Oregon, managed to have the names of all the local *Niseis*, including those followed by a gold star, removed from the town's Honor Roll.

The Tanakas were fortunate; they had managed to rent their house in Santa Ana rather than sell it, and so were able to return there before V-J Day. Those with no houses to reclaim had to remain in the barracks as late as March, 1946.

For most, the internment camps must have been a night-

mare: public toilets without partitions or doors; cold showers instead of the hot tubs that are so much a part of Japanese culture; unpalatable food; the humiliation of being treated like cattle. And this is to say nothing of blighted careers, ruined businesses, the loss of possessions left behind in supposed safekeeping but later looted by rapacious neighbors. Staggering financial losses, in fact, forced some 8,000 to return to Japan penniless in the ten months after V-J Day.

If the displaced persons of Europe caught up in the wake of World War II had counterparts in America, they were the survivors of Manzanar and Tule Lake, California; of Gila River and Poston, Arizona; of Heart Mountain, Wyoming and Minidoka, Idaho; of Topaz, Utah, Granada, Colorado and Jerome, Arkansas. But there were also lesser known detention centers—Fort Lincoln, North Dakota; Crystal City, Texas; Lordsburg, New Mexico—to which this nation condemned many people whose only transgression was their racial origin.

In retrospect, the position of the U.S. Government on the Japanese-Americans appears little better than the racial policies of the enemy overseas. The policy was sadly consistent, however, with the government's earlier treatment of its minorities. Indeed, there are historical precedents to be found for Executive Order 9066. Consider the tale of the



Acadians celebrated by Longfellow in his *Evangeline*, or the Trail of Tears, the Long Walk and other milestones in the tragic chronicles of our forefathers' dealings with Native Americans. The Soviets have their Gulag, we have ours.

And like our Native Americans, the Japanese-Americans sustained a tragic loss of property—an estimated \$400 million in material possessions. Only \$40 million, ten cents on the dollar, was ever returned. And much of that was in depreciated dollars.

The evacuees deserve more than they have received, but nobody seriously believes they will ever get more. Congress approved the mass evacuation of 1942, the Supreme Court upheld it, and although tens of thousands of American *citizens* suffered incalculable losses, their government is fearful of setting precedents. The \$25,000 a head or \$3 billion in reparations asked by the Japanese-American Citizens League would almost certainly invite new claims by one million Native Americans or the 25 million descendants of Kunta Kinte and his fellows.

What sticks in the craw is the absence of an official apology from the government for its wrongs. Nor should it be forgotten that Earl Warren, who won the California governorship in 1942 and was twice re-elected before rising to Chief Justice, never did repudiate his sad role in all of this.

There are those who convincingly argue that what hap-

pened was symptomatic of the times. But it can happen again, for the same elements may see nothing exceptional in the physical violence visited upon U.S. passport-carrying Iranians and Iranian-Americans after the 50 Americans were seized as hostages in the Teheran embassy last fall.

Interestingly, these most recent transgressions came at a time when some clearer-thinking heads renewed efforts to take up the cause of moral redress of Executive Order 9066.

And it may be that Congressional leaders are about to persuade the nation to accept responsibility for that past. Not satisfied with President Gerald Ford's half-hearted 1976 *mea culpa* that the 1942 evacuation was "wrong," eight U.S. senators introduced S. 1647 in August, 1979—a bill to establish a 15-member Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians. (The bill's sponsors were Hawaii's Daniel K. Inouye and Spark Matsunaga, California's Alan Cranston and S.I. Hayakawa, Idaho's Frank Church and James McClure, and Washington's Warren Magnuson and Henry (Scoop) Jackson.) The following month, Majority Leader Jim Wright of Texas led 113 co-sponsors to introduce a similar bill (H.R. 5499) in the House and in November, Congressman Mike Lowry of Washington state, with sixteen members of the House, sponsored H.R. 5977 which would have authorized direct redress to the World War II detainees. The outcome was an amended version of the Sen-

"The Federal Government itself has yet to acknowledge the wrong which was committed in complete disregard of the process of law."

ate bill which won the support of both houses and was signed into Public Law 96-317 by President Carter on July 31, 1980.

As Senator Matsunaga put it, "Although historians and many Americans have long recognized the internment of the Japanese-Americans as a black page in American history, the Federal Government itself has yet to acknowledge the wrong which was committed in complete disregard of due process of law."

Public Law 96-317 does not address the issue of reparations. It merely provides for an objective, unbiased study of the 1942 episode. For the victims of Executive Order 9066 this may seem an empty gesture, but it will at least serve to remind many of us of our capacity to match the wretched excesses we are quick to pin on other nations. As Clarence Mitchell, Chairman of the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, put it recently, should such a bill become law, "our country will then be able to speak with greater confidence and credibility when it rightly calls for respect for human rights in other parts of the world." While it's too early to tell exactly what findings and recommendations the newly created commission will eventually convey to Congress and the President, the fact that such a commission is finally in place is an important, if overdue, step in setting right a grievous wrong. ♦

Hardlining Title IX: WHO'S OFF-SIDE NOW?

by Karen deCrow

"It is indecent that the spectators should be exposed to the risk of seeing the body of a woman being smashed before their very eyes. Besides, no matter how toughened a sportswoman may be, her organism is not cut out to sustain certain shocks..."

—Baron Pierre de Coubertin, Founder of the modern Olympics, 1896

"...no person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from the participation in, denied the benefits of, or be subject to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."

—Title IX, Education Amendments of 1972, Higher Education Act of 1965

It's a good thing that former Judge Shirley Hufstедler of California likes such rugged outdoor sports as backpacking and mountain climbing. As the incoming head of the newly formed U.S. Department of Education, she will have to do the legal equivalent of both in order to enforce that part of Title IX which is supposed to guarantee women equality in athletics. Between de Coubertin's *dictum* and that which has been the law of the land since 1972, lies the high ground Hufstедler will have to conquer. I speak of the playing fields of intercollegiate sports, the last stronghold of the Male Mystique which the men aim to keep as long as they can.

For, at some point this year, the National Collegiate Athletics Association will argue in the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit in Denver

that since college teams don't receive "federal financial assistance," the Government is unjustified in using Title IX to enforce equality of opportunity on campus. Its other arguments are weak.

The NCAA claims, for example, that "Women really don't want to participate." Yet at every level, from kindergarten through professional sports, females are rushing into athletics in unprecedented numbers. Even the NCAA reports that it sponsors 21 sports for women, the most popular being basketball, followed by volleyball, tennis, field hockey, softball and swimming. Its own statistics for 1976-77 show that 64,375 women participated in intercollegiate sports, more than double the number five years previous. (Male participation during this time came to 170,384).

According to the National Federa-

tion of State High School Associations, there are now, in the year 1980, more than 450,000 high school girls playing basketball, for the number of programs has risen from 4,856 in 1970 to 15,290 this season. An equally dramatic increase is reported for other high school sports, including cross-country skiing, up from 1,719 in 1970 to 59,005 in 1980.

Not interested in sports? Women's enthusiasm for sports is clear. Nevertheless, the male position has changed very little over the past half a century. I was amused, recently, to read an editorial in the Oct. 31, 1930 *Syracuse Alumni News* that urged women students to "look interested" at football games.

Judging from the attitude of the students at the previous games this season, Syracuse women have little interest in football. They arrive after the opening play, they forget that their cheering is essential in developing real college spirit, and they

Karen deCrow is a member and former (1974-77) National President of the National Organization for Women (NOW). She is a graduate of both the Medill School of Journalism and the Syracuse University School of Law. In 1969 she was the first woman to run for Mayor of Syracuse as the candidate of the Liberal Party.

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SUBJECT: REQUESTS MEETING TO DISCUSS THE CIVIL AND
HUMAN RIGHTS OF AMERICAN CITIZENS OF
JAPANESE ANCESTRY

ACTION DISPOSITION

ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY (STAFF NAME) ACT CODE DATE YY/MM/DD TYPE RESP C COMPLETED D YY/MM/DD

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for Direct
Response*

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August 7, 1984

Dear Mr. Shimomura:

This is in response to your recent letter to the President requesting a meeting with him.

Unfortunately, due to the many commitments on the President's calendar at this time, we do not foresee when such a meeting may be arranged. I have, however, forwarded your correspondence to the appropriate office for their review.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR.
Director, Presidential
Appointments and Scheduling

Mr. Floyd D. Shimomura
National President
Japanese American Citizens League
1730 Rhode Island Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

FJR/NLM/nlm/NLM2

cc: Lilas Kojelis, OPL w/incoming for direct response

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1730 Rhode Island Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

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JAPANESE AMERICAN CITIZENS LEAGUE

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REGIONAL OFFICES: Washington, D.C. • Chicago • San Francisco • Los Angeles • Seattle • Fresno

16 July 1984

Scheduled

President Ronald Reagan
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

The Board of Directors of the Japanese American Citizens League (JACL) respectfully requests a meeting with you to discuss the civil and human rights of American citizens of Japanese ancestry.

Of particular concern is the issue of redress for those of us who were unjustly forced from our homes and corralled into desolate relocation camps during World War II.

The Japanese American redress movement enjoys increasing support, not only of our community, but from organizations across the nation. It has the support of city councils in such cities as Chicago, Los Angeles, New York, Philadelphia, and Seattle and state legislatures such as California, Hawaii, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, Oregon, Washington and Wisconsin. Our quest for justice has won the backing of religious groups such as the Church of the Brethren, the Methodist Church and the Presbyterian Church and of national support organizations such as the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, the American Civil Liberties Union, the United States Conference of Mayors, the AFL/CIO and most recently, the Democratic Party at its National Convention.

We know that you are a President who cares deeply about the rights of individual citizens and that you are a champion of freedom in this great nation. We hope you will find time to meet with us so that we may bring a message of hope and encouragement to our biennial National Convention to be held in Honolulu, Hawaii, August 12-17, 1984.

Respectfully yours,

Floyd D. Shimomura
WASHINGTON REPRESENTATIVE FOR
Floyd D. Shimomura
National JACL President



THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

National Affairs

B A C K G R O U N D E R

IRVING M. LEVINE
Director, National Affairs Department

REPARATIONS FOR INTERNED JAPANESE AMERICANS?

by Samuel Rabinove, Legal Director

Introduction

Last June 16, the National Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians recommended that the government pay \$20,000 to each of the 60,000 surviving Japanese Americans who were forced out of their homes on the West Coast and held in detention camps during most of World War II. The Commission also proposed that Congress pass a joint resolution, to be signed by the President, recognizing that a grave injustice was done to the Japanese Americans and offering the nation's apologies for removing and incarcerating them. Further, the Commission urged the President to pardon those who were convicted of violating the evacuation and curfew laws, and that Congress establish a special fund to encourage research and education concerning the wartime treatment of the Japanese Americans.

All of the recommendations were adopted unanimously by the nine-member Commission except the one for individual reparations of \$20,000 per person. The only member to oppose reparations was Congressman Daniel E. Lungren, Republican of California, who, while agreeing that the Japanese Americans had suffered a serious injustice, felt that they were no more entitled to individual financial redress than American blacks or American Indians. Other prominent members of the Commission were former United States Supreme Court Justice Arthur J. Goldberg, Father Robert F. Drinan and former United States Senator Edward W. Brooke of Massachusetts.

In announcing the Commission's recommendations, Joan Z. Bernstein, its chairperson, stated:

No amount of money can fully compensate the excluded people for their losses and sufferings. Two and a half years behind the barbed wire of a relocation camp, branded potentially disloyal because of one's ethnicity alone -- these injustices cannot neatly be turned into dollars and cents. Some find such an attempt in itself a means of minimizing the enormity of these events in a constitutional republic. Recalling the events of exclusion and detention, insuring that later generations of Americans know this history, is critical immunization against infection by the virus of



THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE, Institute of Human Relations, 165 East 56 Street, New York, N.Y. 10022

prejudice and the emotion of wartime struggle. "It did happen here" is a message that must be transmitted, not as an exercise in self-laceration but as an admonition for the future.

AJC Policy

AJC's Board of Governors considered this issue in 1979, based on the recommendations of the Japanese American Redress Committee of the Domestic Affairs Commission. During the Board's discussion, there was general agreement that although the Japanese American internment was a gross violation of the rights and dignity of American citizens, AJC could not support the concept of individual reparations. The Board did, however, endorse the following recommendations:

(a) AJC should strongly support the Japanese American Citizens League's grant request to the National Endowment for the Humanities for a project to create literature and a film series (similar to "Roots" and "Holocaust") on the Japanese American World War II experience.

(b) AJC should support creation of a Presidential Commission to investigate means of avoiding repetition of the Japanese American experience.

(c) AJC should maintain close contact with the Japanese American Citizens League and join with it in coalition as future situations may warrant.

This past year AJC supported the Japanese American Citizens League in a brief amicus filed in U.S. District Court in San Francisco on behalf of the petition of Fred Korematsu to vacate his indictment and conviction for refusing to comply with the Government evacuation order in 1942. With the approval of the Department of Justice, Korematsu's petition was recently granted by Judge Marilyn Patel.

Historical Overview

In retrospect, the virtual imprisonment of the West Coast Japanese Americans was indeed a tragic and shameful episode. The American Civil Liberties Union, which at first equivocated when faced with this dramatic moment of truth in 1942, subsequently marked it "the worst single wholesale violation of civil rights of American citizens in our history." As a matter of fact, very few Americans did question it at that time. Almost everyone either endorsed or acquiesced in the internment of the 120,000 Japanese Americans, two-thirds of whom were American citizens and supposedly entitled to all of the civil liberties protections guaranteed by the United States Constitution. How could this have happened?

It is comprehensible only in the light of the fierce and ugly temper of the time: the rage over the "sneak" attack on Pearl Harbor which crippled our Pacific Fleet, coupled with the deep-rooted racial hostility on the part of so many Americans toward the Japanese, particularly in California. Nobody even dreamed of according comparable treatment to the millions of American citizens of German and Italian descent, with whose home countries we were also at war. As groups, they were subjected to no restrictions whatsoever.

The fact is that the singular treatment of the Japanese Americans could never have occurred without the long history of pervasive racial prejudice and actual discrimination by law against them. The Asian Exclusion Act of 1924, for example, had barred all future Japanese immigration for permanent residence in

this country. And even before Pearl Harbor, the myth of the "yellow peril" was very much alive on the West Coast, reinforced by profound envy and resentment due to the highly visible success of the Japanese, both in agriculture and in business. Even former U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice Earl Warren, as Attorney General of California in 1942, wholeheartedly supported the relocation and internment of the Japanese Americans because he saw them as dangerous.

In all fairness, however, it must be stressed that during the first several months after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States seemed to be losing the war in the Pacific. Hence a Japanese attack, or even invasion, of the West Coast was by no means unthinkable. Yet hindsight tells us that the fear and hysteria were unwarranted, in part because of the decisive victory won by the U.S. Navy over Japan at the battle of Midway in June 1942, but mainly because our government had overestimated Japanese military power and capabilities (just as they had underestimated ours). But the fear and the hysteria then were real nevertheless. Feelings ran high, and there was concern about violence against Japanese Americans by local vigilantes.

An interesting sidelight to the incarceration of the West Coast Japanese Americans is that there was no such massive confinement in Hawaii, where there were 160,000 people of Japanese descent, one-third of the population of the islands. Hawaii, of course, was far more vulnerable than the West Coast to invasion by Japanese forces, yet only about 1% of the Hawaiian Japanese were arrested as possible security risks and sent to the mainland for internment. The Hawaiian Japanese were left alone, not because they were not suspect, but essentially because they played such a major role in the economy of the islands and thus were vital to the maintenance of the huge American military build-up which was centered there. The truth of the matter was, that despite widespread suspicion of Japanese American disloyalty, not a single person of Japanese ancestry, either in Hawaii or on the United States mainland, was ever even accused of either espionage or sabotage on behalf of Japan.

On February 19, 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066 (supplemented by Congressional action the following month), which in effect authorized the military commander of the Western Defense Command to relocate and confine civilians of Japanese ancestry living in California, Oregon and Washington, for an indefinite period, without either charges or trials. This vast removal and detention took place over a period of five months. Families had to leave their homes on a few days notice, taking with them only what they could carry. Homes, farms and businesses had to be sold hurriedly for whatever they could get (other Americans profited heavily.) Crops were left unharvested, and those who were unable to dispose of their property by sale lost it because they could no longer pay taxes or mortgage payments.

The government quickly built ten mass detention camps in isolated areas of the western states, each of which held some 12,000 Japanese Americans. The camps were surrounded by barbed wire fences, with guard towers at strategic intervals. Living conditions were crowded and there was little privacy. The Japanese language was banned at public meetings and all incoming and outgoing communications were censored by the camp administrators.

By and large, the detainees tried to make the best of their wretched situation. They used scrap materials to make furniture and room partitions, planted crops and started schools for their children. Some of them who volunteered to relieve labor shortages on farms and in factories were released, and college students were granted educational leaves. But all persons who were allowed out had to report periodically to government officials. Approximately

two-thirds of the people remained in the camps for most of the duration of the war. It should be stressed that several thousand of them volunteered to serve in the U.S. armed forces, either in combat units in the European theater (where their heroism was outstanding) or as Japanese language specialists in the Pacific area. During the period in which the internment camps were in operation, eight detainees were killed by guards and dozens of others were wounded while seeking to escape from the camps.

Not surprisingly, there were a number of legal challenges to the government's treatment of Japanese Americans during World War II. On December 18, 1944, in the case of Korematsu v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of their exclusion from certain areas of the West Coast as a valid exercise of the war power. In a 6-3 opinion, delivered by Justice Hugo L. Black (normally a staunch libertarian and joined in by Justice William O. Douglas, who previously had been equally staunch in defense of civil liberties), the Court justified the government action in 1942, even as applied to a citizen of Japanese extraction whose loyalty to the United States was unquestioned, because of the risks of invasion, espionage and sabotage, and the lack of available time to separate the loyal from the disloyal Japanese. Justice Black noted also that several thousand Japanese Americans had refused to swear allegiance to the U.S. and that many had requested repatriation to Japan. In a sharply worded dissenting opinion, Justice Frank Murphy declared that the exclusion of the Japanese "falls into the ugly abyss of racism" and accused the Court of opening the door "to discriminatory actions against other minority groups in the passions of tomorrow." On the same day that the Supreme Court decided Korematsu, it also struck down unanimously the incarceration of admittedly loyal American citizens in the case of Ex parte Endo. But by then it was almost over.

Although the actual property losses of the Japanese Americans who were relocated were estimated by the Federal Reserve Bank at about \$400,000,000, under the Evacuation Claims Act passed by Congress in 1948 only about \$38,000,000 eventually was paid to those persons who were able to prove their claims for loss. These settlements were deemed to be final. No inmate of any of the detention camps was ever paid a penny for hardship, humiliation or for income that might have been earned during the years of confinement.

Arguments For Individual Reparation

- (1) The treatment of Japanese Americans during World War II was a national disgrace. Recompense of sufficient magnitude to create public awareness of the blatant violations of their constitutional rights is necessary to prevent similar outrages in the future.
- (2) The damage done to those who were confined - physical, psychological, financial - was so enormous that the survivors still bear the scars of their experience.
- (3) There is historical precedent for individual reparations to the Japanese Americans, i.e., West Germany has paid and continues to pay billions of dollars in reparations to Jewish victims of Nazi oppression.
- (4) Even in this country, American Indian tribes have been making legal claims for land that was taken from them, and are winning monetary settlements.
- (5) Japanese Americans, in overwhelming numbers, feel deeply that the detention camp survivors are entitled to financial compensation.

- (6) From the standpoint of good intergroup politics, as well as justice, Jews in particular should be supportive of Japanese American claims for restitution.

Arguments Against Reparation

- (1) If Japanese Americans were to be compensated for what was done to them during World War II, what about compensation for American blacks whose ancestors were slaves and who have suffered the most grievous injustices since emancipation, or American Indians for the virtual genocide perpetrated on their peoples during the past 300 years? Is it fair to pay reparations for a relatively small group injustice - and let huge ones remain unrecompensed because the sums required would be astronomical and politically impossible to pay?
- (2) Future generations of taxpayers should not be burdened with the cost of mistakes made due to the exigencies of war in 1942, at a time of understandable panic and hysteria.
- (3) The treatment of the Japanese Americans was in no way comparable to the treatment of Jews by Nazi Germany. Despite their privations, Japanese Americans were never slaughtered, tortured, enslaved, starved or subjected to hideous medical experiments.
- (4) What America did to the Japanese in Japan, e.g., Hiroshima and Nagasaki, was infinitely worse than what was done to Japanese Americans. Should we pay them reparations too?
- (5) Why \$20,000 for each survivor - why not \$2,000 or \$200,000? Why should the same amount be paid to a survivor who was an infant at the time and to a businessman who was ruined? Why no payment to the heirs of those survivors who have since died? And since some Japanese Americans already received payment under the Evacuation Claims Act of 1948, why should they be paid twice?
- (6) Cash payments to Japanese Americans would merely serve to trivialize their suffering. An official apology, pardons for those who were convicted of violating the evacuation and curfew laws, and a special educational fund to create public awareness of what happened to them would be preferable.

Legislation has been introduced in both houses of Congress to pay individual reparations to the Japanese Americans. It remains to be seen whether it will pass and, if so, whether the President will approve it.

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**1983 SPACE ACTIVITIES
and a LOOK FORWARD**

98th Congress

**CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH
SERVICE
REVIEW**



March 1984

Mix of Active & Reserve Forces

OPEC Aid

*Compensation for Japanese-
Americans Relocated, WWII?*

Drought of 1983

Supercomputers

V. 5 No. 3



SHOULD COMPENSATION BE GIVEN TO JAPANESE AMERICANS RELOCATED DURING WORLD WAR II?

In February 1983 the U.S. Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians released a report saying that the evacuation and relocation of more than 110,000 Japanese Americans was a "grave injustice" caused by "race prejudice, war hysteria and a failure of political leadership." The Commission rejected the claim of "military necessity" as a basis for the relocation and said that the evacuees suffered violations of basic civil liberties and incurred substantial losses in property as a result of the relocation. Pursuant to its findings, the Commission recommended monetary and other compensation for those who were relocated. By the end of the first session of the 98th Congress five bills had been introduced in response to the findings and recommendations of the Commission, and subcommittee hearings had been held in the Senate. During the second session additional congressional hearings are possible.

Immediately after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941, the Federal Bureau of Investigation began a roundup of aliens deemed potentially dangerous as a result of prior investigation by the Bureau. Within weeks, several thousand aliens had been taken into custody, brought before an Alien Enemy Hearing Board and then released, paroled, or interned for the duration of the war. Those interned, if not considered a threat, were allowed later to apply for parole.

Early Japanese military and naval successes, and a belief that the American mainland would be attacked from the air or sea, and might even be invaded convinced many Americans, especially those living on the West Coast, that this somewhat selective screening process was not satisfactory. Before long, calls were heard for an evacuation of all aliens, especially the Japanese, from designated military areas.

Agitation against aliens on the West Coast continued, and in February 1942, pursuant to Executive Order 9066 and various directives of the United States military forces, more than 110,000 civilians (men, women, and children) of Japanese ancestry, including permanent resident aliens (Issei) and United States citizens (Nisei), were removed from the West Coast and placed in 10 relocation camps in remote and isolated areas of California, Arizona, Idaho, Wyoming, Colorado, Utah, and Arkansas.¹

Only those of Japanese ancestry living along the West Coast were objects of exclusion or detention.² No such actions were taken against German or Italian aliens or against American citizens of German or Italian descent, even though a state of war also existed with Germany and Italy. Moreover, there was no mass detention or evacuation of the almost 158,000 individuals of Japanese ancestry living in Hawaii, where they constituted more than 35 percent of the total population.

Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians

In 1900, in response to requests for an investigation into the relocation and demands for reparations for those removed, Congress established a Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians³ to review the facts and circumstances surrounding Executive Order 9066, to determine whether any wrong was committed against those American citizens and permanent resident aliens affected by Executive Order 9066, and to recommend appropriate remedies.

In February 1983, after two years of investigations and hearings, the Commission released a 467-page report, *Personal Justice Denied*, in which the Commission concluded that the evacuation and relocation of more than 110,000 Japanese Americans was a "grave injustice" caused by "race prejudice, war hysteria and a failure of political leadership."

WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY
WARTIME CIVIL CONTROL ADMINISTRATION
Presidio of San Francisco, California

INSTRUCTIONS TO ALL PERSONS OF JAPANESE ANCESTRY

LIVING IN THE FOLLOWING AREA:

All of that portion of the County of Alameda, State of California, within that boundary beginning at the point at which the southerly limits of the City of Berkeley meet San Francisco Bay; thence easterly and following the southerly limits of said city to College Avenue; thence southerly to College Avenue to Broadway; thence southerly on Broadway to the easterly limits of the City of Oakland; thence following the easterly limits of the City of Oakland to the southerly limits of the City of Oakland; thence southerly and northerly, and following the southerly limits of the City of Oakland to the point of beginning.

Pursuant to the provisions of the War Relocation Authority Act, goods will be shipped to the Assembly Center, dated April 30, 1942. Non-aliens, will be permitted to ship their goods on Thursday May 1, 1942.

The Government through its agencies will provide for the risk of the owner of the more substantial household effects, such as refrigerators, washing machines, pianos and other heavy furniture. Utensils and other small items will be accepted for storage if crated, packed and plainly marked with the name and address of the owner. Only one name and address will be used by a given family.

6. Each family, and individual living alone will be furnished transportation to the Assembly Center or will be authorized to travel by private automobile in a supervised group. All instructions pertaining to the movement will be obtained at the Civil Control Station.

Go to the Civil Control Station between the hours of 8:00 A. M. and 8:00 P. M., Friday, May 1, 1942, or between the hours of 8:00 A. M. and 8:00 P. M., Saturday, May 2, 1942, to receive further instructions.

J. L. DEWITT
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Commanding

April 30, 1942

The Commission also concluded that the claim of "military necessity" as a basis for the relocation lacked substantiation because "not a single documented act of espionage, sabotage or fifth column activity was committed by an American citizen of Japanese ancestry or by a resident Japanese alien on the West Coast." The Commission further found that the evacuees suffered violations of basic civil liberties and incurred substantial losses in property as a result of the relocation.

In June 1983, the Commission recommended the following actions:

1. The passage by Congress of a joint resolution, to be signed by the President, recognizing that a grave injustice was done through the exclusion, removal, and detention of Japanese resident aliens and Japanese American citizens, and apologizing for such actions of the United States Government.
2. The pardoning by the President of those Japanese Americans convicted of violations of statutes concerned with curfew (all enemy aliens had to be in their homes between 8 p.m. and 6 a.m.), evacuation, and the relocation. The Commission also recommended the review and possible pardon of other convictions found to be based on race or ethnicity.
3. The restitution of positions, status, or entitlements lost because of exclusion and relocation.
4. The establishment by the Congress of a special foundation to fund research and education activities concerning the relocation, as well as other historical instances where particular groups may have suffered racial prejudice and abuses of civil liberties.
5. The appropriation by the Congress of \$1.5 billion to establish a fund from which a one-time per capita compensatory payment of \$20,000 would be made to each of the approximately 60,000 survivors of the relocation camps. Monies remaining after payment would be used for public educational activities and for the general welfare of the Japanese American community.

The Commission also recommended monetary and other compensation for those Aleuts removed and relocated during World War II. In 1942, as a result of the Japanese capture of Attu and Kiska (the two westernmost Aleutian Islands), approximately 1,000 Aleuts were evacuated from these islands by the United States military and relocated in southeastern Alaska. The Commission concluded that while the "evacuation of the Aleuts was a rational wartime measure taken to safeguard them," the Aleuts nevertheless suffered harmful consequences as a result of this action. The Commission found that 10 percent of the Aleuts died because of improper housing and inadequate medical care. Moreover, the Aleuts discovered on their return that many of their homes and churches had been damaged, looted, and destroyed, and that much hazardous wartime debris remained in the islands.

Finally, the island of Attu was never returned to the Aleuts after World War II. (At present, Attu is used by the Coast Guard.)

Opponents of compensation for the Japanese Americans argue that the relocation of the Japanese Americans was necessary and justified on the grounds of military necessity and national security. They assert that in late 1941 and early 1942, the threat of a Japanese attack and invasion along the West Coast was considered a real possibility. American military authorities were convinced that a potential danger existed in the presence of the large Japanese population in the coastal States.

Opponents also argue that the Japanese Americans have already been compensated adequately under provisions of several statutes. In 1948, for example, P.L. 80-886 au-



Photos from the collections of the Library of Congress

thorized the Attorney General to adjudicate specified claims resulting from the evacuation of specifically identified persons of Japanese ancestry under military orders. Pursuant to the provisions of this law, these Japanese Americans received a total compensation of \$38 million after filing claims for losses incurred during the relocation. More recently, legislation was enacted amending the Social Security Act to provide benefits for those interned during World War II, and to provide civil service retirement credit for time spent in World War II camps.⁴

A further argument adduced by opponents is that the Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of the removal and relocation of the Japanese Americans, and thus internment was a constitutional procedure. On December 18, 1944, for example, the Supreme Court upheld the removal of the Japanese Americans as a military necessity and as a proper exercise of the war powers of the President and the Congress (*Korematsu v. United States*, 323 U.S. 214).

Finally, opponents claim that compensating one minority for alleged losses would set an undesirable precedent for similar claims by other groups.

Supporters of compensation claim that the Japanese American population on the West Coast constituted no espionage or sabotage threat, and point to statements by the FBI and the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) which dismissed the allegation of wholesale espionage and sabotage among the Japanese American population.⁵ The Japanese American Citizens League also argues that espionage or sabotage activities would have been difficult for Japanese Americans to carry out, because much of the Japanese American population was either "too young, too old, or too visible."⁶

Furthermore, supporters of compensation question why, if military necessity is accepted as grounds for relocation, the Japanese Americans in Hawaii, much closer to Japan and the scene of hostilities, were not relocated. Advocates of compensation also point out that while the American victory of June 1942 in the battle of Midway ended any possibility of a Japanese attack on the United States mainland, relocation continued. When the exclusion orders were rescinded in December 1944, approximately 80,000 Japanese Americans remained in custody.



While it is true that the Japanese Americans received some compensation as a result of legislation enacted in 1948, supporters of additional compensation argue that legislation disallowed claims for lost income and that the amount awarded was not a full and fair compensation for actual losses because, as concluded by the Commission, "elaborate proof of loss was required, and incentives for settling claims below the full value were built into the Act." On the other hand, opponents note the 1944 Supreme Court ruling which declared the exclusion and detention to be constitutional.

Supporters of compensation argue, however, that this and similar decisions were morally and legally wrong and were based on little factual evidence. For example, in November 1983, a Federal judge in California vacated the conviction of the defendant in the 1944 *Korematsu* case for failure to obey evacuation orders, claiming that the decision of the Supreme Court was based on unsubstantiated material, distortions, and misrepresentations.

Finally, those advocating compensation contend that the removal and relocation of the Japanese Americans was a unique case in American history and cannot be compared to the experiences of other groups. The Japanese American Citizens League, for example, claims that "only in the case of the Japanese Americans was there a total abrogation of constitutional guarantees inflicted against a single group solely on the basis of race."

Congressional Action

Following the issuance of the Commission's recommendations in June, five bills were introduced concerning the issue of compensation to those Japanese Americans and Aleuts placed in camps. Two of the bills (S. 1520 and H.R. 3387) carry the same title: "World War Civil Liberties Violations Redress Act." S. 1520 provides no specified amount of compensation, leaving the figure to be determined by congressional action. H.R. 3387 provides for a payment of \$20,000 to each living individual held in the camps. A hearing on S. 1520 was held on July 27, 1983, by the Subcommittee on Administrative Practices and Procedure of the Senate Judiciary Committee.

In October and November, 1983, two bills (H.R. 4110 and S. 2116) were introduced for the purpose of "accepting

the findings and recommendations of the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians." Both bills provide for a payment of \$20,000 to each living individual held in the camps and detail other forms of compensation to the Japanese Americans and the Aleuts. A fifth bill (H.R. 4322), "Aleutian and Pribilof Islands Restitution Act," introduced on November 4, 1983, is concerned solely with compensation to the Aleuts.

No further action was taken on any of these measures during the first session of the 98th Congress. It is anticipated, however, that additional hearings will be held during the second session.

Peter B. Sheridan is an analyst in American national government, Government Division.

¹ Issei were Japanese immigrants, ineligible under naturalization laws then in force for American citizenship. This disability was removed in 1952. Nisei were American-born children of Issei, hence American citizens. The Nisei comprised two-thirds of those relocated. Many Nisei, recruited from the camps and from Hawaii, served in the United States armed forces in World War II, most notably in military intelligence in the Pacific, and in the 100th Battalion and the 442nd Regimental Combat Team in Europe. The 442nd was one of the most decorated combat teams in World War II.

² As early as December 1941, enemy aliens were prohibited from residing or traveling in certain areas, i.e., excluded from such areas. Later proclamations of the military greatly extended these prohibited areas. In theory, all enemy aliens were to be so excluded. In practice, exclusion was limited to the Japanese Americans.

³ P.L. 96-317, 84 Stat. 964.

⁴ P.L. 92-603, 86 Stat. 1329; P.L. 95-382, 92 Stat. 727.

⁵ J. Edgar Hoover, for example, stated that the evacuation was "based primarily upon public and political pressure rather than on factual data." The FBI did not favor mass evacuation, preferring instead the roundup of only those individual Japanese Americans deemed dangerous.

⁶ Japanese American Citizens League. National Committee for Redress. Frequently Asked Questions About Redress. [Washington, 1983].


See Also: U.S. Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians. Personal Justice Denied. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1982.

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
Clem Albers WRA
Los Angeles, California
April, 1942



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Japanese American Citizens League National Headquarters: 1765 Sutter Street, San Francisco, California 94115 415.921.5225
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The Japanese American Incarceration: A Case for Redress

Japanese American Citizens League



SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
OF THE
COMMISSION ON WARTIME RELOCATION
AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS

Frequently Asked Questions about Redress

Answers by the National Committee for Redress of the Japanese American Citizens League

Q. WHY SEEK REDRESS? WHAT ARE THE ISSUES?

- A. The Japanese American Citizens League is seeking redress on behalf of Japanese Americans and legal permanent residents of Japanese ancestry (Issei) for their eviction and incarceration by official actions of the United States government during World War II. The action was based solely on racial grounds and imposed without criminal charges, indictments or trials of any kind. The Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians following an exhaustive historical and legal research of the exclusion and detention concluded in its report, PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, that: "The promulgation of Executive Order 9066 was not justified by military necessity, and the decisions that followed from it - detention, ending detention and ending exclusion - were not driven by analysis of military conditions. The broad historical causes that shaped these decisions were race prejudice, war hysteria and a failure of political leadership. A grave personal injustice was done to the American citizens and resident aliens of Japanese ancestry who, without individual review or any probative evidence against them, were excluded, removed and detained by the United States during World War II." Given the Commission's findings, the basic question is: Are the guarantees enumerated in the Bill of Rights and the Constitution absolute for all people at all times, or are they conditional and subject to the desires of those in power or the mood of the times? The JACL's redress efforts have been undertaken with the hope that our success will lead to some measure of assurance that the violation of constitutional rights experienced by Japanese Americans during World War II will not be inflicted on any other group of citizens in the future.

Q. WHICH RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED?

- A. Seven of the ten articles of the Bill of Rights were abrogated. They are as follows: Article I: (a) freedom of religion, (b) freedom of speech, (c) freedom of the press, (d) the right to assemble; Article II: (e) right to keep and bear arms; Article IV: (f) freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures; Article V: right to an indictment or to be informed of the charges, (h) right to life, liberty, and property; Article VI: (i) right to a speedy and public trial, (j) right to be confronted with accusatory witnesses, (k) right to call favorable witnesses,

(l) right to legal counsel; Article VII: right to trial by jury; Article VIII: right to reasonable bail, (o) freedom from cruel and unusual punishment; Further constitutional guarantees abridged were: (p) right against involuntary servitude, (q) right to equal protection under the law, (r) right to vote, (s) right to habeas corpus.

Q. WHAT ARE THE BASES FOR YOUR CLAIM?

- A. Defamation of character, false eviction, false imprisonment, loss of property, loss of income, loss of life and health due to government actions, emotional and psychological damages, damage to ethnic identity, disruption of family life. In essence, we base our claim on the loss of our basic constitutional rights as citizens of this country.

Q. WHAT DO YOU HOPE TO GAIN? WHAT ARE YOUR GOALS?

- A. Compensation of sufficient magnitude to serve as symbolic restitution for the violations of constitutional rights during 1942-46, and a greater awareness of the need for vigilance to prevent similar unconstitutional conduct in the future.

In July 1983, the JACL unanimously issued their support and endorsement of the Commission's recommendations, which include the establishment of an educational and humanitarian trust fund and monetary compensation to those affected by the Executive Order 9066. On October 6, 1983, House Majority Leader James Wright, (D-TX), introduced legislation based upon the Commission's recommendations, HR4110, the Civil Liberties Act of 1983. Senator Spark Matsunaga introduced a similar bill in the U.S. Senate on November 17, 1983, S.2116, which would accept and implement the recommendations of the CWRIC. The JACL has endorsed both bills and will actively be seeking their enactment.

Q. DIDN'T THE SUPREME COURT RULE THAT THE GOVERNMENT'S ACTIONS WERE CONSTITUTIONAL?

- A. Yes, the Supreme Court did in the Hirabayashi, Yasui, Korematsu and key portions of the Endo decisions. But we hold that these decisions were wrong - morally and legally. The Court reflected the prejudices of the times and based its decisions upon the rumors and suspicions of the military. There was no factual evidence to support its decision. In addition, the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians stated in their conclusion that "the record does not support the claim that military necessity justified the exclusion of the ethnic Japanese from the West Coast..." In recognizing the lack of evidence supporting

the "military necessity" argument, the Commission recommended presidential pardons be granted to those who were convicted of violating military restrictions imposed only on persons of Japanese ancestry, including American citizens of Japanese descent. In January of 1983, Korematsu, Hirabayashi and Yasui filed a Federal Court petition to reverse their Supreme Court convictions. The petition charged that the government officials and attorneys suppressed, altered and destroyed key evidence in order to influence the U.S. Supreme Court. On November 10, 1983, U.S. District Court Judge Marilyn Patel set aside Korematsu's conviction and condemned the U.S. government's acts of misconduct forty years ago.

Q. WEREN'T YOUR LOSSES ALREADY COMPENSATED?

- A. The Japanese American Claims Act of 1948 compensated only a small and inadequate fraction of the property losses alone. There were no inflation corrections and no interest paid, nor did the Act take into consideration such things as loss of freedom, loss of income, death, injuries, loss of increased land values, mental suffering, etc. According to the Commission's analysis of economic losses, "It is estimated that, as a result of the exclusion and detention, in 1945 dollars the ethnic Japanese lost between \$108 and \$164 million income and between \$41 and \$206 million in property for which no compensation was made after the war under the terms of the Japanese American Evacuation Claims Act. Adjusting these figures to account for inflation alone, the total losses of income and property fall between \$810 million and \$2 billion in 1983 dollars." Because the government placed an unreasonable burden of proof on the claimants in the Evacuation Claims Act, only \$37 million was received, or an average of \$200 per family that filed a claim. The current effort, however, is not an attempt to recover property losses but to rectify the constitutional injustice committed against Japanese Americans.

Q. WHY REDRESS NOW, AFTER 40 YEARS? WHY SO LONG A WAIT?

- A. The time lag is an indication of the severity of emotional damage incurred. The wounds have to be at least partially healed before the victims can confront the offender. Japanese Americans have been unable and unwilling to talk publicly about their WWII experiences, partly because of the stigma wrongfully placed upon them by their incarceration. In many cases, Nisei parents could not even discuss their wartime experiences with their own children, many of whom had to learn about the incarceration when they entered college history classes. The incarceration and the accompanying stigma of dishonor, disloyalty and shame brought upon Japanese Americans made it almost impossible for them

to speak out publicly about the experience for forty years. Until the Japanese American community could address the issue publicly, there could be no established redress effort since no other independent efforts were made to rectify the wrong. Also, it is not quite true that we simply waited. Examples of past actions are: the 1942-44 court challenges; the 1945-52 campaign to redeem property losses; the 1968-71 campaign to repeal the Emergency Detention Act; the 1969-72 effort to gain Social Security retirement credit; the 1975-76 drive to rescind Executive Order 9066; the 1975-78 effort to secure retirement credit for federal employees; and the 1982-83 state and local statutes to provide compensation to former employees who were unfairly fired or forced to resign because of their Japanese ethnicity. In spite of these past actions, there had never been an official review of the facts and circumstances surrounding the internment of persons of Japanese ancestry. The report, PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, issued by the CWRIC was the first major inquiry into the government's and military's decision to remove and detain U.S. citizens during 1942-45.

Q. CONSIDERING THE TREACHEROUS SNEAK ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR BY THE JAPANESE, WASN'T THE GOVERNMENT JUSTIFIED IN LOCKING UP THE JAPANESE?

A. As Americans, we were not responsible in any way for the acts of the government of Japan. We had absolutely nothing at all to do with the bombing of Pearl Harbor or any other acts by the military forces of Japan. By the logic of the question, one could then ask, are Americans of German ancestry to be held accountable for the acts of Nazi Germany? Or, Americans of Italian ancestry for the acts of the Italian government during WWII? The fact that only Japanese Americans were taken en masse without individual review substantiates the Commission's findings that it was, in part, an act of racism. Japanese Americans were readily and wrongfully identified as the enemy without regard to their rights as American citizens. Remember too, that Pearl Harbor is located in Hawaii, yet Americans of Japanese ancestry in Hawaii were not interned. To do so would have brought a halt to the economy of Hawaii because Americans of Japanese ancestry in Hawaii constituted, then as now, a major portion of the working force.

Q. EVERYONE SUFFERED AND LOST DURING THE WAR, SO WHY SHOULD YOUR CASE BE CONSIDERED DIFFERENT?

A. We made the same sacrifices that all other Americans made during the war, including giving our lives for this country on the battlefield. But no other group of Americans suffered eviction and false imprisonment because of ancestry. Our losses were not the result of enemy action, but the actions of the American government against American citizens.

Q. WEREN'T THE AMERICANS IN JAPAN INCARCERATED?

A. The question poses an incorrect analogy. We are talking about people who were incarcerated en masse by their own government, such as the German citizens of Jewish faith who were interned by their own government, Germany.

Q. ARE YOU SAYING THAT THE INCARCERATION OF JAPANESE AMERICANS IS SIMILAR TO THE JEWISH EXPERIENCE IN THE NAZI CONCENTRATION CAMPS?

A. Obviously, there are differences: the camps in Germany were death camps, while in America they were detention camps. However, there are similarities: barbed wire compounds with armed guards; innocent prisoners of our own country; isolated because of ancestry; imprisoned without charges and held without due process of law.

Q. WASN'T IT A MILITARY NECESSITY BECAUSE OF THE DANGERS OF ESPIONAGE AND SABOTAGE?

A. No person of Japanese ancestry was ever charged with or convicted of espionage or sabotage. But numerous Caucasians were charged and convicted as agents for Japan. The fact that the Japanese American population was no threat was fully documented by the FBI, Naval Intelligence and a special investigatory report ordered by the President. Furthermore, it was physically impossible for much of the Japanese American population to have engaged in espionage or sabotage---they were too young, too old, or too visible. Recently declassified diplomatic cables (MAGIC Cables) reviewed by the Commission reveal that Japan's intelligence efforts were directed towards recruiting non-Japanese Americans as possible informants. (See following question on "Magic" cables for further details.) The Commission, following 2½ years of study and research, concluded that "Executive Order 9066 was not justified by military necessity, and the decision that followed from it--exclusion, detention, and the ending of detention and the ending of exclusion--were not founded upon military considerations. The broad historical causes that shaped these decisions were race prejudice, war hysteria, and a failure of political leadership."

Q. BUT DIDN'T THE COMMISSION OVERLOOK THE "MAGIC" CABLES, WHICH WOULD JUSTIFY THE INTERNMENT OF JAPANESE ON THE GROUNDS THAT THEY WERE POTENTIAL SPIES FOR JAPAN?

A. Since the issuance of the Commission's Report and Recommendations, the Commission has reviewed the cables and has issued an addendum to their report. Briefly, the Commission found that "the 'Magic' cables confirm their basic analysis presented" concerning Japan's intelligence efforts on the West Coast. The Commission found that the Magic cables

reveal that Japan's intelligence efforts were directed toward recruiting informants from a variety of sources. The Magic Cables emphasize that, "Utilization of U.S. citizens of foreign extraction (other than Japanese), aliens (other than Japanese), communists, Negroes, labor union members and anti-Semites in carrying out the investigations...would undoubtable bear the best results." In fact, the U.S. government officials knew from the secret "Magic" cables that the Japanese government has instructed it's staff to "avoid" the use of Japanese Americans in gathering information. The cables actually show that according to the Commission, "there was no good argument for excluding and detaining the Japanese Americans."

Q. WASN'T IT JUST AN UNFORTUNATE NECESSITY BECAUSE THERE WAS A THREAT OF INVASION AND THERE WAS NO TIME TO DETERMINE WHO WAS LOYAL AND DISLOYAL?

A. If there was an actual threat of invasion, martial law could have been declared and the restrictions applied to everyone equally, as was the case in Hawaii. But martial law was not declared on the West Coast because our Government and the military knew that Japan was incapable of landing an invasion force on the continental United States, especially after June 1942 (the Battle of Midway), when the Japanese fleet was virtually destroyed. The question of who was dangerous was already determined through FBI and Navy Intelligence files. Anyone suspected of the crimes of espionage or sabotage could have been charged and brought to trial in the civil courts which were in full operation.

Q. WASN'T IT A PERFECTLY UNDERSTANDABLE WARTIME LAPSE CAUSED BY PANIC AND HYSTERIA?

A. The movement to exclude Japanese Americans from the West Coast had been going on for nearly 50 years. The war was only a convenient pretext seized upon to accomplish that goal. The public did not suddenly and spontaneously go berserk; instead, a carefully calculated and organized hate campaign started to achieve results. Furthermore, panic and hysteria should never justify the abrogation of constitutional guarantee. Federal District Court Judge Marilyn Patel of San Francisco, in reviewing the Korematsu decision based upon a petition of writ of error corum nobis, set aside Korematsu's conviction on November 10, 1983. Judge Patel stated that "in times of international hostility and antagonisms, our institutions - the executive, the legislative, or the judicial - must take the lead to protect all citizens from petty fears and prejudices that are so easily stirred up during those times."

Q. WEREN'T MOST OF THE ADULTS ENEMY ALIENS AND THEREFORE SUBJECT TO SUMMARY DETENTION DURING THE WAR?

- A. Of the total 120,313 persons of Japanese ancestry affected by the government's policies of exclusion and detention, over three-fifths were American citizens by birth. The majority of the adults were so-called "enemy aliens" only because they were prohibited by federal laws from becoming naturalized citizens, despite the fact that most of them had resided in the United States for over 40 years. Furthermore, they were permanent residents who were legally in the United States and were therefore fully entitled to the protections of the Bill of Rights and Constitution.

NOTE: Commissioner Goldberg reminded those attending hearings of the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians in Los Angeles that the Supreme Court has construed that the protection of the Constitution extends to resident aliens as well as citizens. Presidential Proclamation 2525, which was based on a 1798 statute, did permit the apprehension of certain "enemy aliens," but only those individuals against whom there was specific evidence to show they were dangerous to the security of the United States, and all such individuals had the right to a hearing in a court of law to determine if there was sufficient cause for removal or detention. Only those persons arrested under individual warrants by the FBI and placed in Department of Justice internment camps fell into this category -- and they comprised just 5% of the total number of Japanese aliens who were incarcerated. Japanese nationals could have been detained as "prisoners of war" under the provisions of the Geneva Convention of 1929, and many of the detainees demanded POW status, but the Government refused to recognize them as POW's because many of the Geneva Convention rules would have been violated. Also, it should be noted that German and Italian "enemy aliens" --- who incidentally, were free to become United States citizens --- were not similarly imprisoned.

Q. WEREN'T MOST OF THE CITIZENS WHO WERE INCARCERATED CHILDREN WHO HAD TO ACCOMPANY ENEMY ALIEN PARENTS?

- A. Under our legal system, children are not locked up just because their parents are imprisoned. The basic rights of United States citizens cannot be deprived due to age: the Constitution protects children as well as adults. The Government did not give the children, nor their parents, any choice in the matter. All persons of Japanese ancestry were ordered incarcerated, including orphans and other children with non-Japanese guardians, foster parents, or adoptive parents. The military arbitrarily decided that a person with as little as 1/16 Japanese "blood" was condemned to be evicted and incarcerated. This, by the way, is twice as harsh as Hitler's formula for determining those of the Jewish faith.

Q. WEREN'T YOU PLACED IN THESE CAMPS FOR YOUR OWN PROTECTION AGAINST MOB VIOLENCE?

A. In a case of mob violence, the law-breakers should be locked up--not their innocent intended victims. There was no basis for believing that the Japanese American population was in grave danger. There were just 28 isolated cases of assault against Japanese Americans on the West Coast during the first months of the war, and only one was committed by a white person. The general public may have been prejudiced, but they were law-abiding people. Any small need for security should have been readily handled by the local law enforcement agencies. The physical arrangement of the camps prove that the purpose was detention--not protection. Despite being in the middle of isolated deserts with no others around, the camps were surrounded by barbed wire fences with the tops tilted inward to keep the prisoners in; the guards in the watchtowers had their weapons pointed into the camps, and the searchlights were directed inside the camps.

Q. WEREN'T THESE CAMPS JUST RELOCATION CENTERS TO GIVE YOU TEMPORARY SHELTER UNTIL YOU COULD FIND NEW HOMES? WEREN'T YOU NOT ONLY FREE TO LEAVE, BUT ENCOURAGED TO DO SO?

A. Detainees were explicitly prohibited from leaving under Civilian Restrictive Order 1 and Public Proclamation 8 issued by General John L. DeWitt (Commander of the Western Defense Command), and Public Proclamation WD-1 issued by Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson. Anyone leaving without permission was shot, as evidenced by the eight inmates killed by guards. Another illustration of the fact that people were confined against their will is Mitsuye Endo's case. Upon finding herself involuntarily detained, she petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in July 1942, but her plea for release was denied by the federal courts for almost three years. Temporary work of harvesting crops or education furloughs under strict parole conditions were granted to approximately 33% of the detainees at one time or another, but the majority of detainees were not actually "free" and "encouraged" to leave until after January 1945 when the camps began to close down.

Q. CONSIDERING ALL THE PRESENT PROBLEMS WHICH NEED TO BE WORKED ON, ISN'T IT BETTER TO FORGIVE AND FORGET THE PAST AND CONCENTRATE ON THE PRESENT AND FUTURE?

A. Many of the present problems affecting our youth and elderly are the direct result of injustices suffered in the past. We are inextricably linked to all that has happened before and cannot forget unresolved grievances. As long as we have

not received personal redress, our reputations are tainted, and unfortunately, many Americans still believe that we were disloyal and that the Government was justified in its actions.

Q. AREN'T YOU BEING MATERIALISTIC AND GREEDY? WHAT HAPPENED TO THE PRIDE OF THE JAPANESE PEOPLE?

A. It does not seem unreasonable to ask for \$20,000 in compensation for two to three years' lost freedom without justifiable cause. At best, we are only seeking partial compensation for actual losses incurred. We ask for no more, and undoubtedly a great deal less, than what any other American would demand under similar circumstances. And it isn't a matter of greed or the loss of pride. We are demanding that our rightful place as first class citizens of this country be recognized and that the taint of dishonor as Americans inflicted upon us by the accusation of betrayal be rectified. Setting the record straight is a matter of deeply felt honor for Japanese Americans.

Q. ISN'T IT TRUE THAT MONEY CANNOT RESTORE LOST FREEDOM? BY PLACING A PRICE TAG ON FREEDOM, AREN'T YOU CHEAPENING WHAT IS PRICELESS?

A. The basis of American jurisprudence is founded upon the principle of monetary redress for lost freedom. Because freedom is considered so precious, false imprisonment has been compensated with large sums of money. For example, in 1971 a Washington, D.C. court awarded \$10,000 per person in damages to the 1,318 Vietnam peace demonstrators for just two to three days of false imprisonment. Refusing to arrive at an estimate is the functional equivalent of assessing the damages at zero. The Commission recognized the difficulty in determining a dollar amount: "No amount of money can fully compensate the excluded people for their losses and sufferings. Two and a half years behind barbed wire of a relocation camp, branded potentially disloyal because of one ethnicity alone --- these injustices cannot neatly be translated into dollars and cents...It is well within our powers, however, to provide remedies for violations of our own laws and principles." The Commission recommended several forms of remedies which included the establishment of a special foundation and individual compensation of \$20,000 to each of the surviving persons affected by the issuance of Executive Order 9066. The proposed \$20,000 individual monetary compensation is an important symbolic recognition of the personal suffering loyal Americans were forced to experience. The total \$1.5 billion recommended by the Commission would leave a lasting impression on the nation that constitutional rights cannot be violated so cheaply.

Q. VICTIMS OF NAZI PERSECUTION ARE RECEIVING COMPENSATION, ARE THEY NOT?

A. The United States Government was instrumental in pressuring West Germany to pay restitutions. West Germany has paid to date \$25 billion and is yet to pay another \$20 billion. Furthermore, the United States is urging Poland, the poorest of the East bloc nations, to pay a similar type of restitution to Jews for their experiences in Polish camps during WWII.

Q. JAPANESE AMERICANS HAVE A HIGH INCOME, SO DO YOU REALLY NEED THE MONEY?

A. Present average income is not relevant to the issue. If that argument were applied in practice in our courts, it would preclude anyone of means from exercising his or her right to seek justice through the courts. Our case is not based upon need, and we are not asking for welfare. Right to just compensation for wrongs inflicted does not depend upon whether the victim is rich or poor.

Q. WOULD YOU BE SATISFIED WITH AN OFFICIAL STATEMENT ADMITTING ERROR AND TENDERING AN APOLOGY?

A. We have already secured such statements many times over. Each time one of the bills for partial redress passed, there were admissions of error and expressions of regret: in 1948, the property loss claims bill was passed, in 1971 when the Emergency Detention Act was repealed, in 1972 when the Social Security retirement credit bill was passed, in 1976 when Executive Order 9066 was rescinded and in 1978 when the federal civil service retirement credit bill was enacted. The investigative report by the U.S. Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians as well as the motion to vacate the Supreme Court decision in the Korematsu, Hirabayashi and Yasui cases recognize the "error" and the grave injustice committed against Japanese Americans. What we need now is tangible compensation. The Commission recommended several forms of redress which included the establishment of an educational and humanitarian trust fund as well as individual monetary compensation as an act of national apology. Those recommendations have been introduced in the House of Representatives (HR4110, the Civil Liberties Act of 1983) and the Senate (S.2116). The JACL has endorsed both bills as a means to acknowledge and partially remedy the wrongs inflicted upon Japanese Americans.

Q. WHY SHOULD WE HAVE TO PAY FOR THE WRONG COMMITTED BY OUR PARENT'S GENERATION? WE HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH INCARCERATING JAPANESE AMERICANS.

A. We must remember that "we" also included Americans of Japanese ancestry. As citizens of America, all of us are responsible for the acts of our Government. As a nation and as individuals, we are the products of the past. As citizens, we inherit the responsibilities, debts, etc., as well as benefits, passed on to us by our ancestors.

Q. WOULDN'T IT BE BETTER TO FUND COMMUNITY PROJECTS RATHER THAN TO GIVE THE MONEY TO INDIVIDUALS WHO WILL SQUANDER IT IN A SHORT TIME?

A. Such a concept for a lasting trust fund is incorporated in both the House and Senate bills (HR4110 and S.2116). While the JACL has always maintained that a trust fund could serve as a lasting reminder of the injustice suffered by an entire group of people, the JACL has also maintained that it was individuals who suffered and each individual has a right to redress. That right cannot legitimately be taken away. We are not limiting ourselves to one or the other - we've endorsed HR4110 and S.2116 which include both individual payment and the establishment of a humanitarian and educational trust fund.

Q. WHY SHOULD THOSE WHO WERE CHILDREN AT THE TIME RECEIVE REDRESS?

A. Children's constitutional rights were violated too. Children have a right to redress for false imprisonment, defamation of character, and emotional damages. Children were burdened with the life-long stigma of having spent their childhood in captivity. One part of an entire generation of Japanese Americans spent its most formative years in prison camps and grew up with the stigma of having been prisoners in their own country. In the camps, family structures disintegrated; children were deprived of normal parental nurturing and guidance; children grew up without a sense of security usually provided by parents. The schools were sub-standard, and the Government stripped children of their self-identity by prohibiting or discouraging Japanese language, religion, culture, and sports.

Q. WEREN'T THERE NUMEROUS OF DISLOYAL PEOPLE, LIKE THOSE WHO REFUSED THE LOYALTY OATH, RESISTED THE DRAFT, RENOUNCED THEIR CITIZENSHIP, AND EXPATRIATED TO JAPAN? WHY SHOULD THEY BE REDRESSED?

A. There were very good legal, moral, and psychological reasons for resisting the Government. Each act of resistance was a protest against injustice. The loyalty oath was imposed after they had been imprisoned for nearly a year; the draft was instituted while they and their families were still incarcerated and American citizenship had proved to be worthless. The Government later recognized the mitigating circumstances surrounding these cases, and granted full pardons to the draft resisters and restored citizenship to the renunciants.

Q. HOW MUCH SUPPORT DO YOU EXPECT FROM THE AMERICAN PUBLIC?

A. We fully expect some bitter opposition. However, through the Commission's public hearings and investigation, we found many supporters among the general public. Churches, local city councils and board of supervisors, civil rights organizations, and others, --- have publicly endorsed the redress effort. Numerous editorial boards throughout the country which supported the 1942 eviction and detention of Japanese Americans have recently re-examined their roles during the 1940's and have published editorials recognizing the wartime injustice and supporting compensation. We are finding that for the most part, Americans are not afraid to admit to the mistakes of their country.

Q. WHO DO YOU REPRESENT? AREN'T THERE MANY JAPANESE AMERICANS WHO OPPOSE REDRESS?

A. Based upon five separate surveys conducted throughout the United States, we represent the views of the vast majority of Japanese Americans. Some form of redress was favored by 94% of the respondents, and direct payment to individuals was desired by 83%. This was further confirmed through the public hearings conducted by the CWRIC in major cities across the nation. Over 700 persons of Japanese ancestry testified before the Commission and hundreds more submitted written statements. The Japanese American population nationwide has taken interest in the legislative redress campaign.

Q. IF JAPANESE AMERICANS RECEIVE REDRESS, WOULD THAT NOT SET A PRECEDENT FOR OTHERS, LIKE BLACKS AND NATIVE AMERICANS, TO MAKE SIMILAR CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT FOR PAST GRIEVANCES?

A. The circumstances involving the World War II exclusion and detention of Japanese Americans does not set any kind of precedent for other ethnic minorities who suffered injustices in the United States. Specifically, the Japanese American internment is a unique case in the constitutional history of this country. Blacks were brought here under a free enterprise system (i.e., not by Government order), and Native Americans suffered a series of broken treaties between nations. In a similar manner, Hispanic Americans did not experience the same kinds of constitutional abrogations as citizens of this country. This is not to say that Blacks, Native American, Hispanics and other ethnic minorities did not suffer immensely. However, it is only in the case of Japanese Americans that there occurred a total abrogation of constitutional guarantees inflicted against a single group of citizens solely on the basis of race. In this sense, Japanese American redress does not set any kind of a precedent for other groups. It is a unique case in the history of this country.

Q. IF YOU FAIL TO OBTAIN REDRESS, WILL THIS CAMPAIGN HAVE BEEN A TOTAL FAILURE?

A. No, because the ultimate principle of the redress campaign is to help insure that what we experienced in 1942 does not ever happen to any other group of people in this country. Consequently, one of the objectives of our redress campaign was to educate the American public of our experiences and thereby to fortify the principles of the Bill of Rights and the Constitution. The media exposure gained by the hearings of the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians has helped achieve this. Another objective of our redress campaign is for Congress to "acknowledge that the actions taken against American citizens and legal residents of Japanese ancestry during 1942-46 were wrong and contrary to the Constitution of the United States." We think it unlikely that Congress would deny this basic objective of redress for such a denial would represent approval of the right of the Government to abrogate the Constitution during a national emergency. Then the rights of all Americans will be in jeopardy.



Clem Albers WRA
Los Angeles, California
April, 1942



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The Japanese American Incarceration: A Case for Redress

Japanese American Citizens League



Dorothea Lange, WRA
Manzanar Relocation Center
July 8, 1942

Manzanar. Minidoka. Heart Mountain.

Unfamiliar names of remote and desolate places, etched permanently in the minds of some, forgotten by many.

Yet history records in 1942, the forcible eviction of 120,000 men, women and children of Japanese ancestry from their homes on the West Coast.

Without trial, without charges of wrongdoing, without the basic protections guaranteed by law, an entire group of loyal Americans became the tragic victims of a government action solely because of their ancestry.

And in the course of their detention Japanese Americans suffered severe losses—freedom, dignity, income, careers—and for some, a mental anguish that would last a lifetime.

Manzanar, Minidoka, Heart Mountain, Poston, Tule Lake, Gila River, Granada, Topaz, Jerome, Rohwer—these were America's concentration camps.

In 1980, a Federal Commission was established to review the facts surrounding the exclusion and detention of Japanese Americans and to recommend appropriate

remedies. Following exhaustive research and hearings, the Commission concluded that the Government's wartime policies were without justification. Their recommendations form the basis for congressional legislation—U.S. Senate Bill, S.2116, and U.S. House of Representatives Resolution, HR 4110—which seek to redress civil rights violations against an American ethnic group.

The evacuation experience of Japanese Americans during World War II is a harsh reminder of the frailties of constitutional guarantees: That wherever and whenever civil liberties can be taken from one group or individual, they can be taken from any group or individual.

Passage of these bills will be a significant step toward rectifying a mistake of the past in the hope a similar tragedy will never again be repeated.

**The Japanese American
Incarceration:
A Case for Redress**
Japanese American Citizens League

(CG98) 11/17/83

READY FOR NEW COMMAND

S. 2116

SEN MATSUNAGA, (COSP=19)

SENATE GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

ALL OPTIONS

ITEM 1 OF 1 IN SET 3

OFFICIAL TITLE(S):

AS INTRODUCED:

(DATA FURNISHED BY THE SENATE)

A BILL TO ACCEPT THE FINDINGS AND TO IMPLEMENT THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMISSION ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS.

SHORT TITLES:

AS INTRODUCED:

ALEUTIAN AND PRIBILOF ISLANDS RESTITUTION ACT

COMMITTEE(S) OF REFERRAL:

SENATE GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

SUBCOMMITTEE(S) OF REFERRAL:

SSC CIVIL SERVICE, POST OFFICE, AND GENERAL SERVICES

ABSTRACT AS INTRODUCED:

STATES THAT THE CONGRESS ACCEPTS THE FINDING OF THE COMMISSION ON WARTIME
PAGE 1 OF 6. READY FOR COMMAND, OPTION OR PG #(FOR NXT PG, XMIT):

S. 2116 (CG98) CONTINUED:

RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS. ESTABLISHES WITHIN THE TREASURY THE CIVIL LIBERTIES PUBLIC EDUCATION FUND AND THE ALEUTIAN AND PRIBILOF ISLANDS RESTITUTION FUND.

AUTHORIZES THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR TO CONVEY TO THE ALEUT CORPORATION ALL RIGHT, TITLE, AND INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN ATTU ISLAND, ALASKA.

DETAILED STATUS STEPS:

"SENATE ACTIONS"

Nov 17, 83 READ TWICE AND REFERRED TO THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS.

FEB 6, 84 REFERRED TO SUBCOMMITTEE ON CIVIL SERVICE AND GENERAL SERVICES.

FEB 29, 84 COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS REQUESTED EXECUTIVE COMMENT FROM CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, GSA, OMB, DEFENSE DEPARTMENT, INTERIOR DEPARTMENT, JUSTICE DEPARTMENT, TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT, TREASURY DEPARTMENT.

ALL, PAGE 2 OF 6. READY FOR COMMAND, OPTION OR PG #(FOR NXT PG, XMIT):

S. 2116 (CG98) CONTINUED:

DIGEST AS INTRODUCED:

TITLE I: RECOGNITION OF INJUSTICE AND AN APOLOGY ON BEHALF OF THE NATION - STATES THAT THE CONGRESS ACCEPTS THE FINDINGS OF THE COMMISSION ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS AND RECOGNIZES THAT A GRAVE INJUSTICE WAS DONE TO BOTH CITIZENS AND RESIDENT ALIENS OF JAPANESE ANCESTRY BY THE EVACUATION, RELOCATION, AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS DURING WORLD WAR II.

TITLE II: UNITED STATES CITIZENS OF JAPANESE ANCESTRY AND RESIDENT JAPANESE ALIENS - REQUESTS THE PRESIDENT TO OFFER PARDONS TO THOSE CONVICTED OF VIOLATING LAWS DURING THE INTERNMENT PERIOD WHOSE VIOLATION WAS BASED ON A REFUSAL TO ACCEPT RACIALLY OR ETHNICALLY DISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT.

PROVIDES THAT FEDERAL DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES THAT REVIEW APPLICATION FOR RESTITUTION OF POSITIONS, STATUS, OR ENTITLEMENT LOST DURING THE INTERNMENT PERIOD SHALL REVIEW SUCH APPLICATIONS GIVING FULL CONSIDERATION TO THE FINDINGS OF THE COMMISSION.

ESTABLISHES WITHIN THE TREASURY A CIVIL LIBERTIES PUBLIC EDUCATION FUND. AUTHORIZES APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE FUND. REQUIRES THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TO PAY \$20,000 FROM THE FUND IN COMPENSATION TO SURVIVING INTERNEES. ESTABLISHES A BOARD OF DIRECTORS WHICH SHALL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR MAKING DISBURSEMENTS FROM THE FUND. PROVIDES THAT DISBURSEMENTS FROM THE FUND SHALL BE USED TO: (1)
ALL, PAGE 3 OF 6. READY FOR COMMAND, OPTION OR PG #(FOR NXT PG, XMIT):

S.2116 (CG98) CONTINUED:

SPONSOR RESEARCH AND PUBLIC EDUCATIONAL ACTIVITIES DEALING WITH THE INTERNMENT; (2) FUND STUDIES OF SIMILAR CIVIL LIBERTIES ABUSES; (3) PREPARE AND DISTRIBUTE HEARINGS AND FINDINGS OF THE COMMISSION; AND (4) PROMOTE THE GENERAL WELFARE OF THE ETHNIC JAPANESE COMMUNITY IN THE UNITED STATES.

TITLE III: ALEUTIAN AND PRIBILOF ISLANDS RESTITUTION - ALEUTIAN AND PRIBILOF ISLANDS RESTITUTION ACT - ESTABLISHES WITHIN THE TREASURY THE ALEUTIAN AND PRIBILOF ISLANDS RESTITUTION FUND. DIRECTS THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE FUND (THE ALEUTIAN/PRIBILOF ISLANDS ASSOCIATION) TO MAKE RESTITUTION FOR CERTAIN ALEUT LOSSES SUSTAINED IN WORLD WAR II. REQUIRES THE ADMINISTRATOR TO ESTABLISH A TRUST OF \$5,000,000 AND TO DISTRIBUTE THE INTEREST OF SUCH TRUST FOR: (1) THE BENEFIT OF THE ELDERLY, DISABLED, OR SERIOUSLY ILL; (2) STUDENTS IN NEED OF SCHOLARSHIP ASSISTANCE; (3) PRESERVATION OF ALEUT CULTURAL HERITAGE AND HISTORICAL RECORDS; (4) THE IMPROVEMENT OF COMMUNITY CENTERS OF AFFECTED ALEUT VILLAGES; AND (5) OTHER PURPOSES TO IMPROVE ALEUT LIFE.

AUTHORIZES THE ADMINISTRATOR TO REBUILD AND RESTORE CHURCHES AND CHURCH PROPERTY DAMAGED OR DESTROYED IN ALEUT VILLAGES DURING WORLD WAR II.

REQUIRES THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY TO MAKE PAYMENTS OF \$12,000 FROM THE FUND TO ELIGIBLE ALEUTS FOR ANY UNCOMPENSATED PERSONAL PROPERTY LOSSES. PROVIDES THAT SUCH PAYMENTS SHALL NOT BE CONSIDERED INCOME OR RECEIPTS FOR ALL, PAGE 4 OF 6. READY FOR COMMAND, OPTION OR PG # (FOR NXT PG, XMIT):

S.2116 (CG98) CONTINUED:

PURPOSES OF FEDERAL TAXES OR DETERMINING ELIGIBILITY FOR FEDERAL BENEFITS OR ASSISTANCE. AUTHORIZES APPROPRIATIONS.

AUTHORIZES THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY TO IMPLEMENT A PROGRAM FOR THE REMOVAL AND DISPOSAL OF LIVE AMMUNITION, OBSOLETE BUILDINGS, ABANDONED MACHINERY, AND OTHER HAZARDOUS DEBRIS REMAINING IN POPULATED AREAS OF THE LOWER ALASKA PENINSULA AND THE ALEUTIAN ISLANDS. AUTHORIZES APPROPRIATIONS.

AUTHORIZES THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR TO CONVEY TO THE ALEUT CORPORATION ALL RIGHT, TITLE, AND INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN ATTU ISLAND, ALASKA.

TITLE IV: MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS - PROVIDES THAT ALL DOCUMENTS, PERSONAL TESTIMONY, AND OTHER MATERIAL COLLECTED BY THE COMMISSION SHALL BE DEPOSITED IN THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES OF THE UNITED STATES.

COSPONSOR	COSPONSORED ON	WITHDRAWN ON
SEN INOUE	11/17/83	
SEN STEVENS	11/17/83	
SEN MURKOWSKI	11/17/83	
SEN CRANSTON	11/17/83	
SEN MELCHER	11/17/83	

ALL, PAGE 5 OF 6. READY FOR COMMAND, OPTION OR PG # (FOR NXT PG, XMIT):

S.2116 (CG98) CONTINUED:

SEN METZENBAUM	11/17/83	
SEN RIEGLE	11/17/83	
SEN TSONGAS	11/17/83	
SEN MOYNIHAN	11/17/83	
SEN LEVIN	11/17/83	
SEN PROXMIRE	11/17/83	
SEN DENTON	11/17/83	01/23/84
SEN D'AMATO	11/17/83	
SEN SARBANES	02/02/84	
SEN GORTON	02/02/84	
SEN DENTON	03/26/84	
SEN HATFIELD	04/05/84	
SEN EVANS	04/11/84	
SEN HART	04/25/84	
SEN KENNEDY	05/02/84	

ALL, PAGE 6 OF 6. READY FOR NEW COMMAND, OPTION OR PG #:

ALL OPTIONS

ITEM 1 OF 1 IN SET 1

OFFICIAL TITLE(S):

AS INTRODUCED:

(DATA FURNISHED BY THE HOUSE)

A BILL TO ACCEPT THE FINDINGS AND TO IMPLEMENT THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMISSION ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS.

SHORT TITLES:

AS INTRODUCED:

CIVIL LIBERTIES ACT OF 1983

COMMITTEE(S) OF REFERRAL:

HOUSE JUDICIARY

SUBCOMMITTEE(S) OF REFERRAL:

HSC ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS

ABSTRACT AS INTRODUCED:

STATES THAT THE CONGRESS ACCEPTS THE FINDINGS OF THE COMMISSION ON WARTIME
PAGE 1 OF 10, READY FOR COMMAND, OPTION OR PG #(FOR NXT PG, XMIT):

H.R. 4110 (CG98) CONTINUED:

RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS. ESTABLISHES WITHIN THE TREASURY THE CIVIL LIBERTIES PUBLIC EDUCATION FUND AND THE ALEUTIAN ISLANDS EDUCATION AND RESTORATION FUND.

DIRECTS THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR TO CONVEY TO THE ALEUT NATIVE CORPORATION ALL RIGHT, TITLE, AND INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN ATTU ISLAND, ALASKA.

DETAILED STATUS STEPS:

"HOUSE ACTIONS"

OCT 6, 83 REFERRED TO HOUSE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY.

OCT 14, 83 REFERRED TO SUBCOMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS.

MAY 2, 84 EXECUTIVE COMMENT REQUESTED FROM DOD, INTERIOR, JUSTICE.

DIGEST AS INTRODUCED:

CIVIL LIBERTIES ACT OF 1983 - TITLE I: RECOGNITION OF INJUSTICE AND AN APOLOGY ON BEHALF OF THE NATION - STATES THAT THE CONGRESS ACCEPTS THE ALL, PAGE 2 OF 10, READY FOR COMMAND, OPTION OR PG #(FOR NXT PG, XMIT):

H.R. 4110 (CG98) CONTINUED:

FINDINGS OF THE COMMISSION ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS AND RECOGNIZES THAT A GRAVE INJUSTICE WAS DONE TO BOTH CITIZENS AND RESIDENT ALIENS OF JAPANESE ANCESTRY BY THE EVACUATION, RELOCATION, AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS DURING WORLD WAR II.

TITLE II: UNITED STATES CITIZENS OF JAPANESE ANCESTRY AND RESIDENT JAPANESE ALIENS - REQUESTS THE PRESIDENT TO OFFER PARDONS OF THOSE CONVICTED OF VIOLATING LAWS DURING THE INTERNMENT PERIOD WHOSE VIOLATION WAS BASED ON A REFUSAL TO ACCEPT RACIALLY DISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT.

PROVIDES THAT FEDERAL DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES THAT REVIEW APPLICATIONS FOR RESTITUTION OF POSITIONS, STATUS, OR ENTITLEMENT LOST DURING THE INTERNMENT PERIOD SHALL REVIEW SUCH APPLICATIONS GIVING FULL CONSIDERATION TO THE FINDINGS OF THE COMMISSION.

ESTABLISHES WITHIN THE TREASURY A CIVIL LIBERTIES PUBLIC EDUCATION FUND. AUTHORIZES APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE FUND. REQUIRES THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TO PAY \$20,000 EACH FROM THE FUND IN COMPENSATION TO SURVIVING INTERNEES. ESTABLISHES A BOARD OF DIRECTORS WHICH SHALL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR MAKING DISBURSEMENT FROM THE FUND. PROVIDES THAT DISBURSEMENT FROM THE FUND SHALL BE USED TO: (1) SPONSOR RESEARCH AND PUBLIC EDUCATIONAL ACTIVITIES DEALING WITH THE INTERNMENT; (2) FUND STUDIES OF SIMILAR CIVIL LIBERTIES ABUSES; (3) ALL, PAGE 3 OF 10, READY FOR COMMAND, OPTION OR PG #(FOR NXT PG, XMIT):

H.R.4110 (CG98) CONTINUED:

PREPARE AND DISTRIBUTE HEARINGS AND FINDINGS OF THE COMMISSION; AND (4)
PROMOTE THE GENERAL WELFARE OF THE ETHNIC JAPANESE COMMUNITY IN THE UNITED STATES.

TITLE III: THE ALEUTS - REQUIRES THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TO IDENTIFY, LOCATE, AND PAY A SUM OF \$5,000 EACH TO SURVIVING INTERNEES OF ALASKAN ALEUT ANCESTRY. ESTABLISHES WITHIN THE TREASURY THE ALEUTIAN ISLANDS EDUCATION AND RESTORATION FUND. AUTHORIZES APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE FUND. PROVIDES FOR A BOARD OF DIRECTORS TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR MAKING DISBURSEMENTS FROM THE FUND. AUTHORIZES DISBURSEMENTS FOR COMMUNITY AND INDIVIDUAL PURPOSES THAT WILL BE COMPENSATORY FOR THE LOSSES AND INJURIES SUFFERED AS A RESULT OF THE EVACUATION OF THE ALEUTS.

DIRECTS THE ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS TO REBUILD AND RESTORE CHURCHES AND BUILDINGS DAMAGED OR DESTROYED IN THE ALEUTIAN ISLANDS AND CLEAR AWAY THE MILITARY DEBRIS THAT REMAINS THERE FROM THE EVACUATION AND RELOCATION PERIOD.

DIRECTS THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR TO CONVEY THE ISLAND OF ATTU, ALASKA, TO THE ALEUT NATIVE CORPORATION.

TITLE IV: MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS - PROVIDES THAT ALL DOCUMENTS, PERSONAL TESTIMONY, AND OTHER MATERIAL COLLECTED BY THE COMMISSION SHALL BE DEPOSITED IN THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES OF THE UNITED STATES.
ALL, PAGE 4 OF 10. READY FOR COMMAND, OPTION OR PG #(FOR NXT PG, XMIT):

H.R.4110 (CG98) CONTINUED:

COSPONSOR	COSPONSORED ON	WITHDRAWN ON
REP FOLEY	10/06/83	
REP LONG, G.	10/06/83	
REP RODINO	10/06/83	
REP MINETA	10/06/83	
REP MATSUI	10/06/83	
REP LOWRY	10/06/83	
REP ACKERMAN	10/06/83	
REP AKAKA	10/06/83	
REP BATES	10/06/83	
REP BERMAN	10/06/83	
REP BOSCO	10/06/83	
REP BOXER	10/06/83	
REP BURTON, S.	10/06/83	
REP COLLINS, C.	10/06/83	
REP CONYERS	10/06/83	
REP CORRADA	10/06/83	
REP CROCKETT	10/06/83	

ALL, PAGE 5 OF 10. READY FOR COMMAND, OPTION OR PG #(FOR NXT PG, XMIT):

H.R.4110 (CG98) CONTINUED:

REP DASCHLE	10/06/83
REP DELLUMS	10/06/83
REP DIXON	10/06/83
REP DYMALLY	10/06/83
REP EDGAR	10/06/83
REP EDWARDS, D.	10/06/83
REP FAUNTROY	10/06/83
REP FAZIO	10/06/83
REP FEIGHAN	10/06/83
REP FERRARO	10/06/83
REP FISH	10/06/83
REP FOGLIETTA	10/06/83
REP FRANK	10/06/83
REP GARCIA	10/06/83
REP GRAY	10/06/83
REP HAYES	10/06/83
REP HEFTTEL	10/06/83
REP HUGHES	10/06/83
REP KASTENMEIER	10/06/83

ALL, PAGE 6 OF 10. READY FOR COMMAND, OPTION OR PG #(FOR NXT PG, XMIT):

H.R. 4110 (CG98) CONTINUED:

REP KILDEE	10/06/83
REP KOLTER	10/06/83
REP LANTOS	10/06/83
REP LEVINE	10/06/83
REP MARKEY	10/06/83
REP MARRIOTT	10/06/83
REP MARTINEZ	10/06/83
REP MILLER, G.	10/06/83
REP MITCHELL, P.	10/06/83
REP MOAKLEY	10/06/83
REP MORRISON, B.	10/06/83
REP MURPHY, A.	10/06/83
REP OTTINGER	10/06/83
REP OWENS	10/06/83
REP PATTERSON	10/06/83
REP RANGEL	10/06/83
REP ROE	10/06/83
REP ROYBAL	10/06/83
REP SAVAGE	10/06/83

ALL, PAGE 7 OF 10, READY FOR COMMAND, OPTION OR PG #(FOR NXT PG, XMIT):

H.R. 4110 (CG98) CONTINUED:

REP SCHEUER	10/06/83
REP SCHUMER	10/06/83
REP SHANNON	10/06/83
REP SIMON	10/06/83
REP STARK	10/06/83
REP SUNIA	10/06/83
REP TORRES	10/06/83
REP TORRICELLI	10/06/83
REP TOWNS	10/06/83
REP UDALL	10/06/83
REP VENTO	10/06/83
REP WAXMAN	10/06/83
REP WEISS	10/06/83
REP WIRTH	10/06/83
REP WON PAT	10/06/83
REP WILSON, C.	10/06/83
REP JEFFORDS	10/06/83
REP LEHMAN, W.	10/06/83
REP LELAND	10/06/83

ALL, PAGE 8 OF 10, READY FOR COMMAND, OPTION OR PG #(FOR NXT PG, XMIT):

H.R. 4110 (CG98) CONTINUED:

REP YATES	10/18/83
REP BONIOR	11/02/83
REP REID	11/02/83
REP GEJDENSON	11/16/83
REP ORTIZ	11/16/83
REP STOKES	11/16/83
REP FORD, H.	11/16/83
REP CLAY	01/24/84
REP MAVROULES	01/24/84
REP WOLPE	01/24/84
REP GILMAN	01/24/84
REP HOWARD	01/24/84
REP COELHO	02/01/84
REP MOODY	02/09/84
REP BARNES	02/09/84
REP WILLIAMS, L.	02/09/84
REP MIKULSKI	02/21/84
REP SILJANDER	02/21/84
REP PANETTA	03/01/84

ALL, PAGE 9 OF 10, READY FOR COMMAND, OPTION OR PG #(FOR NXT PG, XMIT):

H.R. 4110 (CG98) CONTINUED:

REP HAWKINS	03/21/84
REP KOSTMAYER ✓	04/05/84
REP WHEAT ✓	04/05/84
REP HALL, T. ✓	04/05/84
REP BIAGGI ✓	04/26/84
REP HALL, K. ✓	04/26/84
REP LUKEN ✓	06/04/84
REP SIKORSKI ✓	06/06/84
REP SMITH, L.	06/06/84
REP DOWNIE	06/06/84

Bonnie