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The Summit: Missiles and Other Matters

A Scorecard on Weapons

Arsenals Eliminated in This Pact

Ground-launched cruise missile

Range: About 1,550 miles
Warheads: 3
Destructive force: Equivalent to 200,000 tons of TNT.
Number deployed: 256 in Western Europe (Britain, West Germany, Belgium and Italy).

Pershing 2

Range: 1,120 miles
Warheads: 1
Destructive force: Adjustable, equivalent to 5,000 to 50,000 tons of TNT.
Number deployed: 108 in West Germany.

SS-20

Range: About 3,100 miles
Warheads: 3
Destructive force: Each warhead equivalent to 150,000 tons of TNT
Number deployed: NATO says there are 441 — 270 in the European part of the Soviet Union and 171 in the Asian part. Moscow says it has 405 — 243 in the European part and 162 in the Asian part.

SS-4

Range: About 1,220 miles
Warhead: 1
Destructive force: Equivalent to 1 million tons of TNT
Number believed deployed: 112 (being phased out)

SS-12/22 Scafeboard

Range: About 650 miles
Warheads: 1
Destructive force: Equivalent to 500,000 tons of TNT
Number deployed: Between 110 and 120; more than 50 deployed in East Germany and Czechoslovakia; 40 along the border of China, 10 opposite southwest Asia and eastern Turkey; 10 are maintained in strategic reserve.

SS-23

Range: About 300 miles
Warheads: 1
Destructive force: Equivalent to 100,000 tons of TNT.
Number deployed: 20 or more, all in Soviet Asia.

Arsenals Likely to Figure in Summit Talks

ICBM Launchers

3,000 intercontinental ballistic missiles
640 submarine-launched ballistic missiles
324 bombers

ICBM Launchers

1,390 intercontinental ballistic missiles
948 submarine-launched ballistic missiles
160 bombers

ICBM Warheads

2,368 on intercontinental ballistic missiles
5,632 on submarine-launched ballistic missiles
3,886 in bombers

ICBM Warheads

5,388 on intercontinental ballistic missiles
3,668 on submarine-launched ballistic missiles
840 in bombers

Very-short-range nuclear forces

700 missiles
700 heavy tactical aircraft
850 artillery shells

There are no reliable figures for the Soviet Union in this category.

Source: Arms Control Association, "The Weapons Systems: Information from the Institute for Strategic Studies, Department of Defense."



An MX intercontinental ballistic missile in a silo at Warren Air Force Base, Wyo.

A Key Hurdle

Though the United States and the Soviet Union have said they are willing to negotiate a treaty on strategic long-range nuclear forces, debate over the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty has become a formidable obstacle. There are three main points of contention:

The Soviet Union has proposed adherence to a strict interpretation of the ABM treaty, which would severely limit the scope of testing for a space-based missile defense. The Reagan Administration has developed a new "broad" interpretation of the treaty, which would allow unlimited testing of new types of antimissile systems.

The Soviet Union wants each side to promise not to withdraw from the treaty for 10 years. The United States has offered a pledge of non-withdrawal through 1994.

Once the pledge of non-withdrawal expires, the United States wants to be free to immediately deploy a space-based missile defense system on the assumption that the treaty is no longer in force. The Soviet Union, which objects to any plans for deploying such a system, wants the treaty to remain in force, with current restrictions on withdrawal applying. These require six months' notice and the justification that supreme national interests are involved.

FILE COPY

Other Issues On the Table



Afghanistan The United States has strongly opposed the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan since it happened in December 1979. The United States insists on a complete withdrawal of Soviet troops. Mr. Gorbachev has said he would like to withdraw the troops, but seeks terms favorable to the continuance of the Soviet-supported regime there. Najibullah, the Afghan leader, proposed a 12-month timetable for Soviet withdrawal last month. A date for completion of the Soviet withdrawal will be one of the key issues for negotiation during regional talks at the summit meeting.



Persian Gulf Iran and Iraq have been at war since September 1979, with more than one million casualties to date. The United States has diplomatic relations with Iraq but not with Iran, though official U.S. policy is one of strict neutrality. Last year it was discovered that the United States had secretly been sending missiles to the Iranians. The American-led initiative in the United Nations to impose a global arms embargo on Iran has been opposed by the Russians. The Soviet position is thought to be an outgrowth of the increased Western naval presence in the Persian Gulf and Soviet efforts to improve relations with Teheran, including the recent economic cooperation accord under which the Russians are to improve Iranian transportation links and build an oil pipeline from Iran to the Soviet Union.



Protesters marching at rally on behalf of Soviet Jews Sunday in Washington.

Human Rights The United States has repeatedly charged that the Soviet Union does not live up to the commitments of the Helsinki human rights accord, which both nations signed in 1975. The Russians respond that questions on their human rights practices constitute interference in their internal affairs.

The United States has called on the Soviet Union to improve its human rights record in four areas: the emigration of Jews and other ethnic groups, the reuniting of families and spouses that have been separated because of emigration restrictions, the release of political and religious prisoners and the free exercise of civil rights by all Soviet citizens.

A Few of the Actors in the Summit Spotlight

THE REAGAN TEAM



George P. Shultz
Secretary of State, 68; was in Geneva last month to resolve the final details on the intermediate-range missile treaty; a former Secretary of Labor, Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and Secretary of the Treasury.



Frank C. Carlucci 3d
Secretary of Defense, 50; a career Foreign Service officer who has served in Africa, Latin America and Europe; held posts in Department of Health, Education and Welfare and C.I.A.



Lieut. Gen. Colin L. Powell
National security adviser, 50; Army officer; will coordinate among the senior policy and technical advisers during the summit meeting; was a corps commander in West Germany before becoming deputy national security adviser and then national security adviser this year.



Martin Fitzwater
White House spokesman, 45; former writer, editor and public relations official for government agencies; became a White House press assistant in 1983, left in 1985 to become a spokesman for Vice President Bush, and took current post this year.



Paul H. Nitze
Special adviser on arms control, 80; going teams at the summit meeting; took part in negotiations for the first strategic arms pact in 1972; fought ratification of the 1979 arms treaty.



Jack F. Matlock Jr.
Ambassador to the Soviet Union, 56; President Reagan's chief adviser on Soviet affairs; was in a major position at the Geneva and Reykjavik summit meetings.



Richard Schifter
Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, 64; previously U.S. representative to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights.

THE GORBACHEV TEAM



Eduard A. Shevardnadze
Foreign Minister, 59 years old; full Politburo member and Foreign Minister since July 1985; accompanied Mr. Gorbachev to two previous summit meetings.



Aleksandr A. Besicovich
A Deputy Foreign Minister, 54; worked in United Nations Secretariat from 1960 to 1966, when he became first secretary to Andrei A. Gromyko, the longtime Foreign Minister; held posts at Soviet Embassy in Washington.



Sergei A. Akhromeyev
First Deputy Defense Minister and Chief of General Staff, 64; became Defense Ministry official in 1974 and a marshal in 1985; promoted to his current posts in 1984; went to one previous summit meeting.




Yuri V. Dubinin
Soviet Ambassador to the United States, 57; in diplomatic service since 1955; Ambassador to Spain and then chief delegate at the United Nations. Named Ambassador to USSR in May 1987.




Aleksandr N. Yakovlev
Central Committee Secretary and Politburo member, 64; was an exchange student at Columbia University in 1959; Central Committee secretary for propaganda and the press since March 1986; accompanied Mr. Gorbachev to two previous summit meetings.




Vladimir M. Kaminskiy
Deputy Prime Minister and Chairman of State Foreign Economic Commission, 59; named Chairman of the State Foreign Economic Commission last January.



Gennadi I. Gerasimov
First Deputy Chief of Central Committee's International Department, 62; counselor at Soviet Embassy in Washington from 1960 to 1966; returned to Foreign Ministry and rose to First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, a post he held from 1977 to 1986.



Anatoly F. Dobrynin
Central Committee Secretary responsible for foreign affairs, 66; Ambassador to Washington from 1962 to 1966; has probably had a role in every Soviet-American summit meeting since the war.



Col. Gen. Nikolai F. Chervov
Chief of Treaty and Legal Directorate at Soviet Defense Ministry; an army officer who has long dealt with military participation in arms negotiations; has held current post since 1982.

The Summit: Ready to Raise the Curtain

In Stopover to See Thatcher, Celebration Rules the Air

By HOWELL RAINES
Special to The New York Times

BRIZE NORTON AIR BASE, England, Dec. 7 — Mikhail S. Gorbachev, stopping here briefly today on his journey to Washington, said the treaty that he and President Reagan are to sign on Tuesday is an expression of a yearning everywhere for a "nonnuclear world."

The Soviet leader's host, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, used the occasion to praise Mr. Gorbachev and to promote her ideas for removing United States-Soviet disagreement over the Strategic Defense Initiative as an obstacle to further arms control agreements.

At a news conference after the leaders met for two hours, Mrs. Thatcher said the disagreement on a space-based system of defense against missiles, popularly called "Star Wars," could be overcome through "confidence-building measures."

Such measures, she said, would open the way for the superpowers to agree next year to cut their arsenal of intercontinental ballistic missiles by half.

Adhere to ABM Treaty, She Says

Mrs. Thatcher called on both sides to agree not to withdraw from the 1972 antiballistic missile treaty for at least seven years and to inform each other in advance of their research activities to be conducted on an agreed timetable. She said this "common sense" approach offered a way around the disagreements.

The Soviet Union has maintained the ABM treaty prohibits the testing of a space-based defense system, while the Reagan Administration has

insisted that it had the right to conduct such tests.

In a clear effort to maintain the momentum toward further accords, Mrs. Thatcher suggested that Mr. Gorbachev had opened the door to a compromise on "Star Wars" when he acknowledged last week in an interview with NBC News that the Soviet Union was conducting research on space-based defense systems.

"I think that of itself was a significant step," she said, "a quite significant step, which makes further arrangements of the kind of I've indicated possible." It was one of several remarks she made suggesting that Mr. Gorbachev has now pointed a way toward resolving the conflict over "Star Wars."

The Soviet Union had previously called for a halt in testing and development of the American program as a precondition for an agreement to cut strategic arsenals by half.

No 'Surprises' by Gorbachev

"It's a way ahead in my view," Mrs. Thatcher said of her proposal, which she first outlined early this year. She added that she had received no word from Mr. Gorbachev that any such "surprises" were in store on "Star Wars" or other issues.

Foreign policy analysts said Mr. Gorbachev's visit here was intended to signal his concern for European opinion and also to bind a relationship with Mrs. Thatcher that has proved useful to both of them.

From the moment Mr. Gorbachev's Il'yushin 62 rolled to a stop at 11:28



Mikhail S. Gorbachev being applauded before leaving Brize Norton Air Base, England, after talks with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, right.

A.M. at this British base 13 miles west of Oxford in south-central England, his visit had a striking air of celebration.

Mrs. Thatcher stood hatless and coatless in a biting wind as the General Secretary emerged from the plane. When he was halfway down the steps, he raised both hands toward her and clinched his fists in an athlete's gesture of affirmation. After a hurried luncheon of chilled salmon and asparagus in the officers' mess, the two leaders emerged from their talks at 1:30 P.M. for their departure suits.

"We are living in historic times and the treaty Mr. Gorbachev is going to

sign is a historic treaty," Mrs. Thatcher said. Noting that it brings "extra joy" to the Christmas season, she added, "And it's a promise of more progress to come."

In his response, Mr. Gorbachev was careful to promote Mrs. Thatcher's role as an interlocutor, saying, "We have covered this road together, the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain, our allies and your partners."

So friendly was the atmosphere that the normally combative Mrs. Thatcher did not flinch at the mention of a "nonnuclear world," a prospect that is anathema to her. She contends that some weapons must remain a deter-

rent. Later, however, she said she had urged Mr. Gorbachev to push for a treaty on a 50 percent cut in strategic weapons along with measures to eliminate chemical weapons and to reduce the superiority of the Warsaw Pact's conventional forces in Europe.

But atmospherics seemed as important as details for Mrs. Thatcher today. As often happens when she is in high spirits, the Prime Minister took personal charge of the event, waving the limousine drivers into line and bantering in a playful tone about braving the 39 degree weather without a coat. "I was very cold," she said, "but I hope I didn't show it."

After seeing Mr. Gorbachev on his way, Mrs. Thatcher went even further than she did in Moscow last spring in praising his programs of glasnost and perestroika, or openness and restructuring. She said that there were "two sets of politicians in whichever country you are" — the defeatists and the achievers — and that she and Mr. Gorbachev belonged to the same group.

"He's a bold, a determined and courageous leader," she said, "and I hope that he succeeds in his colossal task, for in doing so he will enhance the sum of human freedom and happiness."

Lafayette Park Protests: Something for Everyone

By BERNARD WEINRAUB
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 7 — There were Ukrainian-Americans gripping black balloons as they denounced Mikhail S. Gorbachev. There were conservative women's groups supporting the Strategic Defense Initiative. There were demonstrators seeking less money for missiles and more for AIDS research. There were immigrants from Vietnam, Ethiopia and Afghanistan. And there was Edwin Wagner, a 35-year-old beekeeper from New Castle, Del., who carried a sign above his bicycle reading: "Dec. 8 — John Lennon Lived and Died for This Day."

"We knew what John Lennon stood for: Give peace a chance," said Mr. Wagner, standing in Lafayette Park, across from the White House. "And that's what's happening December 8th. Gorbachev and Reagan are giving peace a chance."

A Disparate Array

On the clear, crisp day that the Soviet leader arrived in the United States, Lafayette Park, the landscaped rectangle facing the White House, was crammed with a disparate array of demonstrators. The largest number, hundreds of Ukrainian-Americans, concluded their protest with a march along 16th Street toward the Soviet Embassy that ended at a police barricade a block from the mission.

The protests marked the start of demonstrations and vigils that will continue in Lafayette Park and elsewhere until Thursday, the day Mr. Gorbachev is scheduled to depart. At the National Cathedral, hundreds gathered for a vigil for peace that began Sunday with the lighting of an eight-foot candle.

In Lafayette Park, the scene was a bit of a circus. American Buddhist monks in saffron robes sat cross-

legged, chanting peace hymns, while Ukrainian demonstrators shrieked that Mr. Gorbachev was an "arch-deceiver" and a "butcher."

A dozen representatives of four conservative national women's organizations, who claimed a membership of 750,000, began the protests with expressions of support for President Reagan's space-based shield, the Strategic Defense Initiative. The women carried broken umbrellas without fabric that symbolized, they said, the United States without "Star Wars."

"We have no nuclear umbrella, we have no system to save American lives, it's immoral, it's unacceptable, and that's why we need the Strategic Defense Initiative," said Phyllis Schlafly, president of the Eagle Forum.


Other demonstrators included Bob Kunst of Miami, director of the Cure AIDS Now lobby, and Barry Ganap of Washington, with a sign reading, "Summit — Commit 10 Missiles Each to Cure AIDS." "The value of each MX missile is \$180 million," said Mr. Kunst. "Why can't we put the money for 10 missiles in AIDS research?"

Israelis Rally for Soviet Jews

TEL AVIV, Dec. 7 (AP) — About 10,000 Israelis held a rally today to demand that the Kremlin open the gates for Soviet Jews to emigrate.

"We say to the Soviet leader, free my people," Foreign Minister Shimon Peres told the crowd. "We want him to know we will not forget our brethren in the Soviet Union."

"No more gestures, no more tokens," President Chaim Herzog said. "For us, the outcome of the discussion of human rights will be the litmus test for the success of this summit."



Amalia Bany of Bayside, Queens, demonstrating in Lafayette Park, across from the White House, against visit by Mikhail S. Gorbachev.

Soviet Might Break Up Anti-Zionist Committee

By ANDREW ROSENTHAL
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 7 — The Soviet Government plans to disband its officially sanctioned Anti-Zionist Committee, which has been an irritant in relations between the Kremlin and Jews in Israel and the United States since it was created more than four years ago, an American official said today.

The official, as well as Soviet Jewish émigrés and an American Jewish spokesman, suggested that the reported plan was a recognition by the Kremlin that the committee was an embarrassment and had failed in its avowed purpose: to publicize the Soviet campaign to equate Zionism

with racism.

"I don't think it means much," said the official, who spoke on condition of anonymity. "In terms of overt activity of an anti-Semitic nature, they may want to end that. That doesn't mean they won't continue it in a surreptitious fashion."

The official said he was informed of the plan to dissolve the Anti-Zionist Committee of the Soviet Public by its deputy chairman, Samuil Ziv, who is in Washington for the summit meeting between President Reagan and Mikhail S. Gorbachev.

Russian Won't Confirm Report
Mr. Ziv declined to confirm or deny the report, but said "there is a possibility" the committee would be disbanded. "No public organization can last forever," he said.

A Soviet official said plans have been announced in Washington for a new committee that would focus on a wide range of human rights issues, and suggested that the Anti-Zionist Committee could be incorporated into that organization.

"It's not a gesture to anyone," the official said. "The idea is to take a broader approach to all humanitarian problems, to find new ways of doing things."

The Anti-Zionist Committee is referred to as a "public organization," meaning it purportedly is not a government organ. But the Soviet Union has not tolerated unsanctioned ethnic organizations. Moreover, the committee held news conferences at Foreign Ministry offices and used government-run printing houses in publishing pamphlets on Israeli foreign policy. Many Jews considered the pamphlets anti-Semitic.

Shortly after the committee was formed in April 1982, Mr. Ziv announced that nearly all Soviet Jews who wished to emigrate had done so. The statement drew an angry reaction from Jews in Israel and the United States. Mr. Ziv has since retracted the statement.

"The committee was seen by many as far as we are concerned as anti-Semitic, an accusation that Mr. Ziv said was 'absolutely false.'"

'No Impact on Soviet Jews'

Jerry Goodman, executive director of the National Conference on Soviet Jewry, said he believed the committee "has outlived its usefulness as far as the Soviets are concerned."

"The committee became an embarrassment and I think they have found an effective way of disbanding it, which is as far as we are concerned, it has almost no impact on Soviet Jews."

Ida Nudel, a Soviet Jew who emigrated to Israel this year, said disbanding the committee would show that the Soviet government realizes "there is a lot of attention in the West to the problem of anti-Semitism in Russia."

"But because anti-Semitism has very deep and historically long-term roots, nothing is really changing," she said. "For me, it's a cosmetic move." Another recent émigré to Israel, Irina Bratlovsky, said: "In the same way that this committee appeared on the scene with a special order, it was easy to put them away with another order. It proves only that the members are puppets, and nothing more."

Prague Said to Bar Protest

VIENNA, Dec. 7 (AP) — Czechoslovak authorities have banned a demonstration planned by the independent human rights group Charter 77 and ordered members of the group to a hearing, émigré sources said today. The group had planned to hold the demonstration Dec. 10 in Prague to mark International Human Rights Day.

Seeking Hopeful Symbol to Match Soaring Mood

Continued From Page 1

guy," grumbled the ABC News correspondent Sam Donaldson, who had bet \$1 on Mr. Fitzwater at 7-to-5 odds to outshine his Soviet counterpart. "So far my horse has come up lame." Mr. Gerasimov, who speaks fluent English, got off to a fast start today when he appeared on the ABC program "Good Morning America" and quipped that the President's S.D.I. program, short for Strategic Defense Initiative, now stood for "Save the Defense Industry."

As part of the Soviet charm offensive, Mr. Gerasimov appeared Sunday night on a C-SPAN call-to show and fielded calls from American citizens.

When Bob Clark, the host, told one caller from Spar, Fla., that his question — about cable companies influencing local zoning ordinances to ban satellite antennas in residential neighborhoods — was "too domestic," Mr. Gerasimov objected, marveling at American freedom of speech.

"No, no, I like this," he said. "You just call in from different places with any question?"

Nancy Reagan Explains

Round 2 of the battle of wills between the two first ladies came today when Nancy Reagan, wearing the bright green coat she takes out of her closet every Christmas, conceded that she had been irritated by Raisa Gorbachev's long delay in letting her know if she would come to tea at the White House.

"I did say I had to know," Mrs. Reagan told reporters at a photo opportunity for the arrival of the White House Christmas tree, adding that it got to the point where she had to "fill in the schedule."

She hedged when asked if she liked her Soviet counterpart, saying she did not know her very well, but finally allowed as how she "seems very nice."

She hedged again when asked about a section of a book by Larry Speakes, the former Presidential press secretary, in which he said that Mrs. Reagan

did not care for Mrs. Gorbachev and thought she was "a dogmatic Marxist" who had "used" her by not letting her know in time that she would attend the Iceland summit meeting until Mrs. Reagan's schedule was locked in. "I didn't read it that way," Mrs. Reagan said, finally.

The Gorbachevs caused more last-minute schedule juggling for Mrs. Reagan's office when they asked that the formal state dinner be curtailed so that they could get to bed early. The White House cut out the private time the couples were to have spent before the dinner and their ritual entrance down the grand staircase, as well as the post-dinner "mix and mingle."

The White House did not, however, ask the pianist Van Cliburn, who will entertain at the dinner, to play faster.

Capitalists' Pleasures


The scene around town often resembled the classic Greta Garbo movie "Nipotchka," in which a group of Russian officials learned to love capitalist pleasures on an official trip to Paris. Russians are seen happily being interviewed in the plush, tapestried surroundings at the Madison Hotel, where many are staying, and feted at Washington's finest homes.

Esther Coopermitch and Ina Ginsburg, two of the city's leading hostesses, teamed up Sunday night to give a large dinner party for some of the Soviet officials at Mrs. Coopermitch's Potomac estate.

The mood was jolly, full of glaucoma jokes. When one of the Russians combined jokingly that only the Americans were being allowed to make speeches, Leonid Zolotarevsky of Soviet television riposted: "That's because when Americans talk, it's propaganda."

At the end of the evening, Mrs. Coopermitch presented her guests with gifts that she said contained the key to understanding Washingtonians: Redskin beer mugs and plastic footballs.

The Schedule Today	
10:00 A.M.	Summit begins with the signing of the ABM Treaty and the Strategic Defense Initiative Agreement.
10:00 A.M.	Planned meeting at the White House between Mrs. Reagan and Mrs. Gorbachev.
11:00 A.M.	Summit continues with the signing of the SALT II Treaty.
1:45 P.M.	Mr. Gorbachev's press conference.
2:30 P.M.	Summit continues with the signing of the SALT II Treaty.
3:30 P.M.	Summit continues with the signing of the SALT II Treaty.
7 P.M.	Summit continues with the signing of the SALT II Treaty.



Amended

Committee on
THE PRESENT DANGER®

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Press Contact: Suzanne M. Crow
(202) 628-2409

HOLD FOR RELEASE
9:30 A.M. MONDAY, 30 NOVEMBER 1987

COMMITTEE RELEASES NEW POLL ON PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD THE U.S.-SOVIET
MILITARY BALANCE, THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE AND CENTRAL AMERICA

The Committee on the Present Danger today released the results of a national, in-depth public opinion poll on "Public Attitudes Toward the U.S.-Soviet Military Balance, the Strategic Defense Initiative and Central America." The poll was conducted for the Committee earlier this month by the independent polling organization, Penn + Schoen Associates.¹

The results of the nationwide, scientific sample of 803 Americans show overwhelming support for the research and development of the Strategic Defense Initiative and a belief that the United States should withdraw from the ABM Treaty to deploy SDI.

Seven out of ten respondents believe that SDI should be used to protect both cities and missiles from attack. Although a plurality indicate their belief that the illegal Soviet radar facility at Krasnoyarsk is in itself an insufficient reason for the United States to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, a similar plurality believe that successful development of SDI should be followed by deployment, even though that would require U.S. withdrawal from the treaty.

With respect to Central America, two out of three respondents (67%) see a communist government in the region as a security threat to the United States. An even greater percentage (80%) believe it is important for the United States to eliminate communism from Central America. Although seven out of ten Americans know that the United States supports

¹Penn + Schoen Associates is a leading, independent, national polling organization which has conducted polls for, among others, former Vice President Walter Mondale, Senator Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts, Senator Frank Lautenberg of New Jersey, Senator Patrick Moynihan of New York, Senator Jay Rockefeller of West Virginia, Mayor Edward Koch of New York City, Mayor Marion Barry of the District of Columbia, several foreign political leaders, as well as a broad spectrum of corporate clients and public interest groups.

the contras against the Sandinista government in Nicaragua, the number of respondents who believe the U.S. is supporting the communist insurgents in neighboring El Salvador (35%) is greater than the number who correctly believe the U.S. is supporting the Salvadoran government (27%).

Among the poll's specific findings:

-- 50% believe that the United States now has a stronger military than the Soviet Union. Only 32% believe the Soviets are stronger.

-- 70% support research and development of SDI.

-- 58% favor deployment of SDI once developed, and a plurality (43%) favor SDI deployment even though it would violate the ABM Treaty.

-- 70% believe that SDI should be used to protect both cities and missiles from attack.

-- Support for the contras was almost evenly divided with 43% favoring and 41% opposed.

A full analysis of the poll's findings and copies of the complete results are available at the Committee's offices at 905 Sixteenth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006. Contact: Suzanne M. Crow, Research and Education Associate, (202) 628-2409.

(Note: The materials referred to above are attached.)

* * * * *

The Committee on the Present Danger is a non-profit, bipartisan research and educational organization of private citizens founded in November 1976 to facilitate a national discussion of U.S. foreign and national security policies and programs directed toward a secure peace with freedom.

Penn + Schoen Associates, Inc.

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Robert Green
Vice-President
Washington Office

M E M O R A N D U M

TO: The Committee on the Present Danger

FROM: Mark Penn
Penn + Schoen Associates, Inc.

RE: National Poll on the Strategic Defense Initiative and
Central America

DATE: November 30, 1987

This memorandum summarizes the highlights of a national poll conducted by Penn + Schoen Associates, Inc., for the Committee on the Present Danger. The 803-interview poll was conducted on October 31st through November 5th at our telephone interviewing facility in New York City.

Overall, the poll shows that the American public:

1) is strongly in favor of going ahead with the research and development phases of SDI;

2) favors withdrawing from the ABM treaty if necessary to deploy SDI;

3) firmly believes that a communist government in Central America poses a security threat to the United States, and that it is important for the U.S. to eliminate communism from that region;

4) in contrast to surveys conducted last year by other national polling firms on U.S. policy toward Nicaragua, in which most of the public could not identify which side the Reagan administration supports, the public now definitely knows that the U. S. supports the contras fighting in Nicaragua, and the public narrowly favors the Congress granting military aid to the contras;

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memorandum to the Committee
on the Present Danger

5) in part, perhaps, because of all the attention paid in recent months to Reagan administration support for the contras in Nicaragua, the public is quite confused about our support for the government in El Salvador. In general, public understanding of Central American issues seems to be largely limited to those involving Nicaragua;

6) finally, the public believes the U.S. military is stronger than that of the Soviet Union.

DETAILED DISCUSSION OF THE POLL

WHICH NATION IS STRONGER: THE U.S. OR THE U.S.S.R?

A majority of Americans (50%) think the United States has a stronger military now than the Soviet Union. Thirty-two percent say the Soviets have a stronger military.

Better-educated Americans are less likely to say we have a stronger military than the Soviets. A majority (56%) of those with less than a high school education think that the U.S. has a stronger military, compared with 49% of those with at least a college degree. Moreover, Republicans (40%) are clearly more likely than Democrats (28%) to say that the U.S.S.R. has a stronger military than the U.S.

THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE

Fully seven in ten Americans (70%) are in favor of the U.S. going ahead with research and development of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Almost a quarter of the public (24%) oppose research and development.

Americans who describe themselves as conservatives (77%) are more favorable to research and development of SDI than are liberals (64%), as are Republicans (82%) vis-a-vis Democrats (65%). Men (77%), too, are more likely than women (63%) to favor research and development of the Strategic Defense Initiative.

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By a 58%-25% margin, Americans say that the U.S. should deploy S.D.I. once it is developed. Once again, ideology, party identification, and sex are the keys to understanding support for S.D.I. Nearly two-thirds (66%) of those who term themselves conservatives support deployment, while 50% of liberals favor deployment of SDI. Republicans (67%) are much more favorable to SDI than are Democrats (53%). And males (65%) are more apt to support SDI than females (51%).

The public believes that S.D.I. should be used to protect both civilian and military targets. Seven in ten Americans (70%) say that SDI should be used to protect both American missiles and cities from attack. Fifteen percent say only cities should be protected by this defensive system. Five percent say missiles only.

Americans tend to believe that the building of a new radar station in Siberia in violation of the ABM treaty should not, by itself, change our commitment to stand by the treaty. Forty-four percent of the public want the U.S. to continue to unilaterally abide by the ABM treaty, while 37% say the U.S. should not abide because of the radar station.

By a 43%-35% margin, the public favors the withdrawal of the U.S. from the ABM Treaty in order to deploy SDI if the system proves to be successful, while 35% would not want us to violate the ABM treaty in any case.

As in several previous questions concerning SDI, ideology and gender best illustrate variations in public attitudes. Conservatives (49%) favor the deployment of SDI somewhat more often than liberals (39%) do. By the same token, Republicans (54%) are more likely to support deployment than Democrats (37%), even if it means withdrawing from the ABM treaty. And 52% of males support deployment, compared with 35% of women.

COMMUNISM AND CENTRAL AMERICA

Americans are very concerned about communist governments in Central America. Fully two-thirds (67%) say a communist government in Central America is a security threat to the United States, while 23% disagree.

Though majorities of almost every demographic sub-group are concerned by the threat to American interests posed by a communist government in Central America, ideology and race are key factors in determining attitudes on this subject.

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For example, by a 78% to 57% margin, conservatives are more likely to think that a communist government in Central America presents a threat to the U.S. than are liberals. Similarly, 81% of Republicans hold this view, compared with 64% of Democrats. And while 70% of whites view the prospect of a communist government in Central America with alarm, slightly less than half (49%) of blacks hold this view.

Fully 80% of Americans say it is important to eliminate communism from Central America (with 55% saying it is "very" important). Support for eliminating communism is strong across every demographic group.

CENTRAL AMERICA POLICY: NICARAGUA AND EL SALVADOR

In large part due to the Iran-Contra hearings, and the widespread public interest in the testimony of Col. Oliver North, the public knows more about the Reagan administration support for the contras fighting in Nicaragua than it did, if polls taken before the hearings are any guide.

However, awareness of Reagan administration support for the anti-government forces in Nicaragua seems to only add confusion to the public perceptions of our pro-government stance in El Salvador, and probably points to a lack of public understanding of most Central American issues, except those that directly concern the contras and the Sandinistas.

For example, only 27% of the public correctly stated that the U.S. supports the government of El Salvador, while 35% erroneously say that the U.S. supports the opposition. Almost four in ten (38%) don't know.

By contrast, by a 14-1 margin, Americans (70%) know that we support the contras in Nicaragua's civil war, rather than the Sandinista government, which only 5% incorrectly believe we support.

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Finally, the public is closely divided on the issue of military aid to the Nicaraguan contras, with a slight majority favoring the Congress granting aid. Forty-three percent of the sample favors granting aid to the contras, while 41% are opposed.

Not surprisingly, certain key demographic sub-groups are sharply split on the military aid issue. By a 56% to 33% margin, conservatives are much more likely than liberals to support aid to the contras. Similarly, 60% of Republicans would favor military aid to the contras, while only 33% of Democrats would take this position. And males, by 50% to 35%, are more likely than females to support the granting of military aid to the contras.

OVERVIEW OF THE PROJECT/METHODOLOGY

Penn + Schoen was commissioned to undertake a national poll of 803 U.S. residents on attitudes toward current arms control negotiations and related issues. The firm drew a national, random probability sample of U.S. households in the continental United States and conducted the detailed survey by telephone.

The questionnaire was designed in conjunction with the Committee on the Present Danger to cover a wide range of areas fully and fairly. All interviewing was done by our professional interviewers out of our offices in New York between October 31st and November 5th, 1987.

The results have an overall statistical accuracy of plus or minus 3.5% at the 95% confidence interval. The exact text of the questions asked and their full results accompany this report.

Penn + Schoen Associates, Inc.

Corporate + Political Survey Research

New York City: 1501 Third Avenue, 10028 (212) 734-3000
Washington, D.C.: 1200 E. Capitol Street, N.E. 20002, (202) 546-2500

Robert Green
Vice-President
Washington Office

NATIONAL POLL #1141 FOR THE COMMITTEE ON THE PRESENT DANGER

This volume contains the general summary and detailed crosstabular results of a national survey conducted for the Committee on the Present Danger by Penn + Schoen Associates, Inc. In all, 803 interviews were conducted from October 31 to November 5, using a random sample of U.S. residents that accurately reflects a typical cross-section of American citizens. All interviews were conducted from the central telephone facilities of Penn + Schoen.

Mark Penn and Douglas Schoen
November 30, 1987

QUEST: Now we would like to ask you a few questions about Central America.
Do you think that a communist government in Central America presents a security threat to the United States or not?

	threat	not a threat	don't know
ALL	67	23	10
AGE			
18-24	56	35	9
25-34	67	25	8
35-49	70	21	9
50-64	68	23	10
65 and over	68	17	16
EDUCATION			
Less than HS	66	22	12
HS grad	68	18	14
Some college	72	21	7
College grad +	62	30	7
UNION			
Non-union	67	23	10
Pub emp union	62	28	10
Other union	78	13	9
IDEOLOGY			
Liberal	57	33	10
Moderate	65	21	14
Conservative	78	16	6
PARTY REG			
Democrat	64	26	10
Republican	81	12	7
Independent	59	31	10
RELIGION			
Protestant	72	19	9
Catholic	67	22	12
INCOME			
< \$20,000	66	23	11
\$20-\$29,999	66	25	9
\$30-\$39,999	70	22	8
\$40,000 +	70	22	9
RACE			
White	70	20	10
Black	49	34	17
REGION			
Northeast	62	28	11
South	69	21	9
Midwest	66	23	11
West	73	19	8
SEX			
Male	69	25	6
Female	66	21	13

QUEST: How important is it for the government of the United States to eliminate communism from Central America -- very important, somewhat important, not very important or not important at all?

	very	somewhat	not very	not at all	don't know
ALL	55	25	7	7	6
AGE					
18-24	46	26	6	17	5
25-34	56	26	5	7	5
35-49	53	27	8	6	6
50-64	56	26	8	4	7
65 and over	60	19	6	4	11
EDUCATION					
Less than HS	68	16	1	7	8
HS grad	62	23	4	3	8
Some college	56	23	8	6	7
College grad +	42	32	11	11	4
UNION					
Non-union	55	24	8	6	7
Pub emp union	48	31	5	13	3
Other union	63	26	1	3	7
IDEOLOGY					
Liberal	46	25	10	13	7
Moderate	52	30	5	6	7
Conservative	63	24	5	3	5
PARTY REG					
Democrat	53	24	8	8	7
Republican	68	21	2	3	6
Independent	45	31	11	9	4
RELIGION					
Protestant	59	24	5	5	7
Catholic	54	26	8	6	6
INCOME					
< \$20,000	61	19	7	5	8
\$20-\$29,999	58	23	6	7	6
\$30-\$39,999	56	25	6	6	6
\$40,000 +	45	35	9	8	3
RACE					
White	55	27	7	5	7
Black	55	17	9	12	7
REGION					
Northeast	48	22	11	11	9
South	64	23	5	3	5
Midwest	53	32	6	4	5
West	53	26	5	9	7
SEX					
Male	54	28	8	7	3
Female	55	23	5	6	10

QUEST: Do you happen to know which side the U.S. is supporting in El Salvador,
is it the government or those opposing it?

	the gov't	opposition	don't know
ALL	27	35	38
AGE			
18-24	12	37	51
25-34	28	37	35
35-49	27	36	37
50-64	33	27	40
65 and over	26	34	40
EDUCATION			
Less than HS	16	31	53
HS grad	26	30	44
Some college	28	37	36
College grad +	31	37	32
UNION			
Non-union	27	35	38
Pub emp union	32	32	36
Other union	22	36	42
IDEOLOGY			
Liberal	26	36	38
Moderate	28	33	39
Conservative	28	35	37
PARTY REG			
Democrat	30	33	37
Republican	24	39	37
Independent	30	32	38
RELIGION			
Protestant	28	35	38
Catholic	28	36	36
INCOME			
< \$20,000	24	32	45
\$20-\$29,999	29	32	39
\$30-\$39,999	32	36	32
\$40,000 +	29	37	35
RACE			
White	26	35	39
Black	26	31	43
REGION			
Northeast	28	36	35
South	32	30	39
Midwest	21	35	45
West	26	40	34
SEX			
Male	36	34	30
Female	18	35	46

QUEST: There is a conflict in Nicaragua between the Sandinista government and the contras. Do you happen to know which side the U.S. is supporting, the Sandinista government or the contras?


	Sancinistas	Contras	don't know
ALL	5	70	25
AGE			
18-24	4	57	39
25-34	4	73	23
35-49	6	73	21
50-64	6	68	26
65 and over	4	71	25
EDUCATION			
Less than HS	8	51	41
HS grad	5	63	32
Some college	5	72	23
College grad +	4	82	14
UNION			
Non-union	5	70	25
Pub emp union	10	65	26
Other union	3	78	19
IDEOLOGY			
Liberal	4	69	26
Moderate	4	67	29
Conservative	5	75	20
PARTY REG			
Democrat	3	68	29
Republican	3	78	19
Independent	9	67	24
RELIGION			
Protestant	5	71	24
Catholic	5	72	24
INCOME			
< \$20,000	5	62	33
\$20-\$29,999	4	74	23
\$30-\$39,999	5	70	25
\$40,000 +	4	79	18
RACE			
White	5	72	23
Black	6	49	45
REGION			
Northeast	4	71	25
South	7	65	29
Midwest	5	72	23
West	2	76	22
SEX			
Male	4	80	16
Female	6	61	34

QUEST: Do you generally favor or oppose the U.S. Congress granting military aid to the Nicaraguan contras?

	favor	oppose	don't know
ALL	43	41	16
AGE			
18-24	40	51	9
25-34	48	39	12
35-49	42	42	16
50-64	41	42	17
65 and over	39	37	24
EDUCATION			
Less than HS	30	45	25
HS grad	44	38	18
Some college	41	43	16
College grad +	44	43	13
UNION			
Non-union	43	40	16
Pub emp union	36	53	11
Other union	45	36	19
IDEOLOGY			
Liberal	33	51	16
Moderate	33	46	22
Conservative	56	32	12
PARTY REG			
Democrat	33	49	18
Republican	60	24	16
Independent	43	47	10
RELIGION			
Protestant	48	37	15
Catholic	41	45	14
INCOME			
< \$20,000	36	45	19
\$20-\$29,999	42	44	15
\$30-\$39,999	48	38	13
\$40,000 +	46	39	15
RACE			
White	45	39	17
Black	20	65	15
REGION			
Northeast	40	42	18
South	47	38	14
Midwest	42	46	12
West	39	40	22
SEX			
Male	50	36	14
Female	35	46	19

Soviet Active Measures, People-To-People Contacts, & The Helsinki Process

Armen (R/W)




**Roy Godson
Iain Elliot
Francoise Thom**

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PREFACE

As belief in divinity has diminished, it has been replaced in some intellectual circles by uncritical reverence for lesser gods and panaceas: Marx and Mao, Freud and Skinner—and conflict resolution through relentless good will. The self-conviction of those who postulate the innate, benign intent of communist regimes—if only they are approached with openness and generosity—cannot be outdone in fervor or tenacity. Yet there are many others in the West, under no illusions about the true nature of dictatorships—of the left and the right—who nonetheless believe that people-to-people meetings are inherently useful. Despite a wealth of evidence to the contrary, many continue to argue that the free flow of ideas and human contacts play an important role in reducing misunderstandings that can lead to conflict and perhaps even war.

With this in mind, the Western nations in 1975 signed and ratified the Human Contacts provisions of the Helsinki Accords. It was hoped that the Accords in general, and especially the provisions for the free flow of ideas and movement of people, would provide some relief for the human casualties of East-West tension, as well as to enhance world peace and freedom. Although skeptics warned in 1975 that these agreements would achieve little except to ratify the postwar division of Europe, there was consensus in the West about the utility of detente and the Helsinki Accords.

Enthusiasm for detente has waned in the intervening decade, and it has become all too apparent that compliance with treaties of all sorts by the East has fallen far below Western expectations. Some now maintain, rather forcefully, that the Helsinki Accords are not serving their intended purposes and should be abandoned entirely. They point to those in the USSR who have been thrust into the Gulag prisons for daring to form Watch Committees to monitor the Politburo's adherence to the Accords. Others take the view that, while the Soviet bloc is exploiting the Accords, the West should not abandon them. With care and attention, they argue, some sections, particularly the Human Contacts and Human Rights provi-

sions, can be better utilized to “fulfill the aspirations” of ordinary citizens in both East and West.

As the Helsinki signatories were preparing in 1986 to review the overall Accords, and specifically to consider the provisions about Human Contacts, the National Strategy Information Center convened an international panel of distinguished experts in Bern, Switzerland. The purpose of this panel was to determine if Moscow was exploiting the Human Contacts provisions of the Accords for active measures, propaganda, and disinformation and, if so, to discuss what could be done to prevent more of the same.

Based on the evidence from the specialists from the United States, Sweden, France, the United Kingdom, Greece, and the USSR, there is ample reason for the West to be concerned. The papers here demonstrate that inside the USSR and in the West, from Scandinavia to the Balkans, Moscow has been using the Accords to maintain and even increase its influence, not only over the Soviet people, but also over unsuspecting Western society as well.

No student of dictatorship—fascist or communist—should have been surprised, but the examples and data here make for depressing reading. Moreover, they indicate that Moscow, while not always successful, is becoming increasingly sophisticated in its use of propaganda, active measures, and disinformation. If we in the West are to obtain some advantages from exchanges and contacts, the Soviet ploys and the proposals for a Western response enumerated in these pages deserve to be well understood.

Frank R. Barnett, President
National Strategy Information Center, Inc.
September 1986

1

SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES, DISINFORMATION, AND HUMAN CONTACTS

Roy Godson

A massive Soviet active measures and disinformation apparatus, consuming at least \$3–4 billion annually and employing well over 15,000 people, has been established to conceive and execute the Kremlin leadership’s strategy not only to control the behavior of the Soviet people, but also to influence people and governments in the West.

During the past several years, Western awareness of this Soviet capability has risen sharply. Only recently scholars and journalists who wrote about or attempted to investigate Soviet active measures and disinformation were treated with extreme skepticism, ignored, or accused of practicing what in the United States is called “McCarthyism.” That is no longer the case. In Europe and North America, Soviet active measures and disinformation are subjects of serious scholarly inquiry and regular media reporting.

It is true that there are differing opinions regarding the importance and effectiveness of Soviet active measures. Increasingly, however, policymakers, scholars, and journalists agree that the So-

viet Union does expend impressive resources to influence Western attitudes and actions through the use of active measures and disinformation. Some Western analysts suggest that such instruments of Soviet statecraft are even more important than Moscow's growing military power and the activities of its intelligence and security services. Others, while not according them such weight, nonetheless maintain that these activities are important elements in Soviet strategy, especially when viewed in concert with Soviet military and police power.

These papers examine Soviet active measures and disinformation campaigns that are conceived to exploit Human Contacts across East-West frontiers to influence the behavior of political leaders, the media, and activists in the United States and Western Europe, as well as in the USSR. The contributors discuss how Moscow has sought to use Human Contacts to maintain its hold over the peoples of the Soviet Union and to manipulate the West. The participants also consider certain steps the West can take to prevent Moscow from utilizing the Helsinki Human Contacts agreements for active measures and disinformation purposes, while at the same time promoting human rights and contacts through the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) agreements.

Definitions: Active Measures, Disinformation, and Human Contacts

For the past two decades, Soviet leaders and KGB professionals have used the term "active measures" (*aktivnyye meropriyatiya*) to describe overt and covert attempts to influence events and the behavior of their adversaries. Active measures may entail attempts to influence policies of a target government, undermining confidence in its leaders and institutions, disrupting relations between nations, and discrediting or weakening governmental or non-governmental opponents at home and abroad. Active measures transcend propaganda and psychological warfare, which are aimed primarily at influencing attitudes and only indirectly at changing behavior. In addition to propaganda, active measures may include, separately or in combination—the Soviets refer to this as *kombinatsia*—written

or oral disinformation, the use of front organizations, political influence operations, agent-of-influence operations, and forgeries. The application of these techniques is constantly assessed and revised to further Soviet strategic ends.

"Disinformation" is deliberately false, incomplete, and misleading information (possibly combined with true information) which is designed to deceive or mislead governmental and non-governmental elites and/or mass audiences. Disinformation is, first and foremost, intentional and operational falsification. It is not misinformation, i.e., the dissemination of false information by a source who is not consciously aware that he is passing on falsehoods. Forgeries, for example, are a pure form of disinformation. The forger is absolutely conscious that the false information and the fabricated document are deliberately designed to deceive or mislead the target audience. A politician or a journalist who disseminates information he or she believes to be true, when in fact it is false or misleading, would not, however, be engaging in disinformation.

Disinformation can be disseminated overtly as well as covertly. Overt disinformation emanates from acknowledged sources, such as a press spokesman or a government ministry, but contains intentionally false information to achieve special purposes. Examples of overt disinformation are the statements made by Soviet spokesmen maintaining that they did not know the whereabouts of KAL flight 007 in early September 1983, when in fact they knew the aircraft had been shot down by a Soviet jet fighter.

Covert disinformation is non-attributed or falsely-attributed oral or written communication (i.e., rumors, forgeries, articles, pamphlets, or books) circulated by someone other than the purported author or sponsor, to affect a given target. A classic example of the covert disinformation technique was the image creation campaign on behalf of Yuri Andropov after he became Soviet leader in November 1982. Until the early 1980s, Andropov's image in the Western press was that of a hardened secret police boss who had crushed the Hungarian Revolution—the man who, in a fit of creativity that surely rivals Heinrich Himmler and Joseph Mengele, had developed the use of psychiatric hospitals to suppress dissidents. In the Spring of 1983 rumors were intentionally circulated to journalists in Mos-

cow and elsewhere that former KGB chairman Yuri Andropov was in fact a "closet liberal" who—after a hard day at KGB headquarters—invited refuseniks and dissidents to his home for relaxed discussions about human rights. This portrait of Andropov was promoted in several Western countries simultaneously. As a prominent US weekly magazine put it, "a short, burly thug almost overnight became a tall, dapper Chubby Checker fan."

We are using here the term "Human Contacts." A fairly narrow and legalistic definition of the term can be found in the Helsinki Final Act (see Appendix A). The Helsinki signatories agreed to facilitate family reunification and meetings, marriages between citizens of different states, and wider travel for business and professional reasons. Furthermore, the signatories pledged to facilitate tourism, encourage meetings among young people, and promote sporting and cultural gatherings. Although these are vital concerns, we should not confine ourselves to this strict interpretation of the term "Human Contacts." We should also consider the whole range of human contacts at the non-governmental level that cross East-West boundaries.

I begin with the proposition that the Soviet leadership has been and will continue to use human contacts, in a cynical and exploitative manner, for active measures and disinformation purposes. This statement is not particularly shocking. The members of the Soviet elite, unlike most Western leaders, believe that conflict is the natural state of human relations until bourgeois-imperialist systems have been destroyed. Soviet ideology does not define conflict, war, and turmoil as abnormal conditions. Since the Bolshevik seizure of power—and even before that—Party leaders have taken full advantage of any and all relationships to protect and enhance the power of the Party. Hence, it is quite natural—or rather we should not regard it as aberrant behavior—for them to try to utilize human contacts for their strategic purposes. Indeed, any Party leader who did not would be failing to serve the Party.

Soviet Exploitation of Human Contacts

How are Soviet leaders exploiting human contacts? Let me suggest there are at least three major strands in Moscow's approach. First,

the Kremlin, especially through the internal media and KGB, uses human contacts across its borders to control and influence people inside the Soviet Union. Moscow seeks to ensure that only those human contacts that enhance its control of the Soviet people will be permitted. Reunification of families, sports, and exchanges of young people are controlled and designed to maintain and increase CPSU power. They are also designed to ensure that the Soviet people do not come to believe that free exchanges and contacts will become a normal part of life. Moscow also restricts the flow of information internally, so that the perceptions of the Soviet people are affected only in ways the Party finds useful at any given time. Details such as the routes, timing, hotels, meeting places, travel, and the newspaper coverage of all human contacts are carefully regulated by a regiment of Party and KGB officials. Of course, sometimes they make mistakes; Soviet officials, as we all know, are not ten feet tall. But they go to great lengths to control and dominate the Soviet people, and usually they do it well.

Second, Moscow seeks to affect Western perceptions and behavior through human contacts. Activities such as releasing spouses, reunifying families, and arranging exchanges are orchestrated to increase the power of the CPSU at home, to portray a particular image of the Soviet Union abroad, and to secure favorable conditions in the West to help achieve Soviet foreign policy objectives. Almost all human contacts permitted by the Soviets are designed for one or more of these purposes. Some examples fulfill domestic goals, such as not allowing a two-year old baby to join her parents who decided not to return to the Soviet Union from a trip abroad, and threatening her grandmother, still in the Soviet Union, to place that child in an orphanage (Kaisa Randpere). Refusing for 28 years to allow a Russian woman and her daughter to join her Western husband abroad (Anatol and Galina Michelson) is an example of Soviet behavior on the binational marriage issue. Sending an eleven-year old actress (Katerina Lycheva) to the US was part of a long-term effort to affect the debate about defensive weapons in the US. Indeed, it is hard to find examples where the KGB and the CPSU have not tried to use human contacts for their own purposes whenever the opportunity has arisen. And, moreover, there is no sign

that Moscow is about to change its stripes. All, or almost all human contacts, including sporting events, cultural centers, and scientific exchanges will be exploited by the International Department of the CPSU, the Propaganda Department of the CPSU, and the First and Second Chief Directorates of the KGB.

Third, Moscow also pursues opportunities presented by human contacts in the broader sense to acquire Western technology and other forms of information and to recruit individuals for active measures and espionage. A great deal of information has become available in recent years on Soviet exploitation of human contacts and exchanges. According to former Soviet bloc intelligence officials who now live in the West, Moscow will scrutinize and assess almost all foreigners who enter the Soviet Union for their actual or potential value as sources of information. The KGB will then decide who they will try to recruit immediately and who they will target for later approaches.

It is difficult to review the Soviet record and not recognize the highly orchestrated nature of their behavior and the strategic purposes for which human contacts are used. One need only recall the large number of family reunifications and proposals for exchanges surrounding the 1985 Reagan-Gorbachev summit, all of which were designed to demonstrate Soviet "goodwill." Other examples include the patterns and timing of Jewish emigration in periods of detente; the appearance in the West of covertly made films of Andrei Sakharov; disseminating disinformation that the plane crash which killed Samantha Smith (the American girl invited to the Soviet Union by Yuri Andropov) was no accident. In reality, however, individuals are used as pawns, saved for optimum use at the "right" time. Rumors are often floated to the effect that, if the West were to mute its public criticism on human rights, more releases would follow. Particularly celebrated cases, such as that of Shcharansky, are bound to attract concentrated Western media attention, pushing more "difficult" issues, such as Afghanistan, off the front page.

The kinds of human contacts which really interest the Soviets are those from which they expect to benefit, such as exchanges of scientific information or "people-to-people" meetings that provide media platforms for Soviet points of view. Individual cases are held

hostage to progress in these areas. Understanding the Soviet approach to human contacts is, unfortunately, rather like listening to a sophisticated and well-tuned musical instrument playing a most cynical tune.

If Moscow is using human contacts for active measures purposes, what should we in the West do? There seem to be three major choices. First, we could denounce the Human Contacts provisions of the Helsinki agreements, and refuse to implement them. Second, we could try to increase human contacts with little regard to the nature of Soviet objectives and manipulation. Or, third, we could fashion a human contacts and exchange strategy to promote human liberty on both sides of the Berlin Wall, in spite of the dogs, the minefields, and the massive special police and security services which do so much to divide us.

I do not favor cutting off human contacts just because Moscow has enormous capabilities to exploit them. The lives of individuals are at stake. Indeed, some people have already benefited. Human contacts also offer the opportunity to break the Soviet monopoly on internal information. There are some instances during the Helsinki negotiations, in which Western governments and non-governmental organizations decided that they would not involve themselves in exchanges because such contacts would disadvantage people inside the Soviet bloc. For example, the American government and the American labor movement (AFL-CIO) made it clear that there would be no visas or exchanges with Soviet bloc labor organizations, because these were government-controlled instruments and because the exchanges would affect those workers in the East who wanted to create genuine, independent trade unions (see Appendix B).

Principles of Human Contacts

This does not mean, of course, that we should practice *laissez-faire* regarding exchanges and contacts. If we were dealing with free peoples on both sides of the frontier, one could make a case for such a policy. Instead, a series of principles that may be useful in guiding exchanges and contacts should be considered.

The first principle is to speak the truth fearlessly about Soviet

objectives and Moscow's exploitation of contacts and exchanges. No matter how difficult it is, especially for diplomats, Western governments have an obligation to reveal what they know and not to obscure Soviet purposes and manipulation. They know a great deal about these techniques, and on occasion they make this information available. For example, the US government in 1979 and in 1982 issued major reports on Soviet active measures and disinformation. Periodic reports have appeared since. In 1985 a major report on Soviet acquisition of technology (which came about in part through Moscow's exploitation of human contacts in the broad use of the term) was released. Starting in 1982, the West German government also began issuing reports on attempts to manipulate its citizens. We should ask all our governments, within the limits of security, to provide relevant information on how Moscow is exploiting human contacts.

Specifically, we should be told, among other things, how the Soviet bloc legally and covertly regulates the behavior of foreigners visiting their countries. The story is fascinating, and almost unbelievable to people raised in peacetime in liberal Western societies. We also should be informed about the procedures and preparations that Moscow imposes on its own citizens traveling abroad. Who is selected? What is the approval process? What kinds of agreements and papers do individuals sign before they are allowed to participate in exchanges? What kinds of surveillance and control are exercised over them during and after these human contacts?

We should also be better informed about how the Soviet bloc uses exchanges and other contacts for acquiring technology and other forms of espionage. The US and French governments have released some information about this subject. Still, much more could and should be done if we are going to expand scientific and other exchanges that are particularly vulnerable to Soviet bloc maneuvers.

A second principle is that we should not be a party to Soviet attempts to limit human contacts and exchanges to official organizations. We should insist on meeting with the individuals and groups that we want to contact. If Moscow refuses, we should make such actions public, and, in most circumstances, refuse to participate. Under *no* circumstances should we allow Soviet authorities

to dictate who shall and shall not travel to their country, or who can and cannot participate in our delegations and meetings. Some time ago, the American author Norman Mailer, in his capacity as President of the US Pen Center, a writers' group, invited the Soviet Writers' Union to participate in the Pen Congress in New York in 1986. In declining, the Soviet Writers' Union criticized the invitation of "people [including former Soviet citizens] who for a number of years have been engaging in kindling hostility and hatred between peoples." Their behavior, it was claimed, was "ultimately directed against the universal desire for peace and mutual understanding between peoples in general, and writers in particular."

It should not be permissible for the KGB to decide who is and is not fit to meet with Soviet bloc citizens. This is quite different from legitimate decisions of governments which, in the interests of security, occasionally deny visas to individuals because of a reasonable belief that these people may be participating in illegal activities.

Third, we should insist on greatly expanding the numbers of human contacts. Let us go beyond a few carefully controlled and orchestrated meetings and media "happenings." For example, let us insist on arranging annual meetings among large numbers of young people, say 50,000 to 100,000 people between the ages of 16 and 21. Let them travel not in tightly knit and monitored groups, but rather live in each others' homes, spending a few weeks in school together, learning how leisure time is spent, and sharing a variety of experiences. In time this process will open up a whole new generation to other cultures. Also, young people are impressionable. Let the American and European youngsters learn about life in the Soviet bloc first hand, and let Soviet bloc youths judge for themselves the "evils of capitalism" without the benefit of "official guides and tutors." I would hope we could insist on these broader contacts, which are completely in tune with the spirit of Helsinki, and which Moscow should accept.

2

DISINFORMATION IN THE USSR ABOUT THE HELSINKI PROCESS

Vladimir Bukovsky

When we discuss methods employed by the Soviet elite to control its population, it is senseless to single out disinformation as a separate tactical instrument. Virtually all Soviet propaganda is based on deliberate lies and distortions. At best, such propaganda may be characterized as intentionally biased interpretations of real events. Repression, propaganda, disinformation, and other tools of social manipulation are interwoven to such an extent that any attempt to distinguish among them is bound to be confusing. Even repression is carried out in order to serve the purpose of Soviet propaganda, while propaganda justifies repression.

Thus, in the early 1960s, when the need to import grain became embarrassingly obvious, Nikita Khrushchev launched a propaganda campaign. Initially, he blamed bad weather, as if bad weather had occurred for the first time in Russian history. Then he blamed peasants for using bread as fodder for cattle. Indeed, under Khrushchev, peasants were allowed to keep the cattle, but were prohibited from procuring the fodder, requiring additional purchases of bread in the state shops to keep the cattle alive. Finally, a few local scapegoats were conveniently rounded up and put on public trial,

while bread was rationed in the cities as well as in the countryside. Meanwhile, numerous books and films were issued about the need "to respect bread" and to respect the peasants' heroic labor under bad weather conditions. Somebody received a Lenin Prize for writing a novel called "Bread," while someone else was criticized in the press for leaving a piece of bread unfinished. Thus a pattern of propaganda was established for the next twenty years.

When dealing with more portentous problems and issues of foreign policy however, Soviet external and internal propaganda themes require explicit coordination. This can be achieved only within the confines of a closed society, in which all the channels of communication with the outside world are strictly controlled (and often disguised as "independent public organizations"). Such a system works as a kind of semi-conductor, exchanging lies about Soviet Union and its policy for lies about the West. War, peace, and liberation movements in the third world are the critical issues of Soviet foreign policy, and hence the subjects of the most concentrated Soviet propaganda effort.

Historically, the Soviet regime could not have survived without the manipulation of an ever-present *threat of war*, which gradually became a substitute for communist ideology both at home and abroad. At home, the threat of war is the rationalization for totalitarian practices, deprivation of rights, misery for the masses, and privileges for the ruling elite. Abroad, the incessant war scares became the only device to keep the empire together, to expand Soviet global influence, and to blackmail the West into providing credits, goods, and technology. Therefore, "peace" became the main theme of Soviet propaganda and disinformation, while the "struggle for peace" became a substitute for "class struggle."

How do propaganda and disinformation work in practical terms? First, the Soviet Union generates constant conflict and a threat of war, either by tipping the balance of forces with the West or by its adventures in the Third World. The Western response is then used for a dual purpose: to generate military hysteria at home and to utilize "peace hysteria" abroad. These two hysterias feed upon each other: when Soviet citizens see millions of Westerners marching against American missiles on television, clashing with

police, and chanting slogans against their war-mongering governments, many begin to believe Soviet propaganda about the aggressive plans of "American imperialism." Indeed, nuclear war must be just around the corner if so many people brave the police and risk their freedom in anti-government demonstrations (as would be the case in the USSR, if people tried to demonstrate against their government's policy).

On the other hand, when thousands of peace activists, "bridge builders," and "citizen diplomats" visit the Soviet Union, they are confronted by genuinely concerned and frightened people. The Westerners hear questions such as, "Why do Americans want to burn us in a nuclear war?" These visitors will see only the people craving for peace, traumatized by the losses of World War II, endless monuments and museums dedicated to the war casualties, and Soviet officials offering the inevitable toasts to "peace and friendship." These peace activists would never understand the differences between the people and the system, and will go home firmly convinced that "Russians" do not want war.

Who is going to change their mind? After all, they are witnesses, they have "been there" and seen everything. Of course, during their trip these visitors are interviewed by the Soviet media at every location. Surely, as respectful guests, they are not going to mention SS-20s or Afghanistan. They will condemn Reagan's "militarism" and "Star Wars program," thus reinforcing even further the military hysteria among Soviet population.

Exactly the opposite happens when Soviet people are allowed to visit the West. With their families left at home as hostages, these specially selected people will simply repeat old *Pravda* clichés. Westerners, as polite hosts this time, will yet again refrain from asking about Afghanistan. Once again, hosts and guests will arrive at a consensus about the militarism of Reagan and the purely peaceful intentions of the Soviet Union.

These introductory remarks should provide a general background, and put into a realistic context our main subject of discussion—disinformation in the Soviet Union about the Helsinki process. It must be clear from the above that the Soviet system cannot relax for a prolonged period without eroding. Detente is necessary for

Moscow to catch a breath, to diminish Western vigilance, to gain access to Western technology and credits, to gain as many concessions from the "imperialists" as possible, to improve the military balance in their favor, and to grab as many new countries in the third world before the West is alerted once again. Then, a period of "cold war" will follow, with all "progressive mankind" blaming American "imperialists" for "over-reacting" and for "not recognizing political reality."

Meanwhile, it must be equally clear that, even at the apogee of Detente, the Soviet system did not relax internally. For the Soviet population, detente meant an increase in repression, propaganda, disinformation, and manipulation. Detente must always be one-sided, because, as Leonid Brezhnev put it in a 1977 speech at the 25th Party Congress, "Detente in no way rescinds, or can rescind, the laws of the class struggle."

Given such a background, it comes as no surprise that the Soviet people welcomed the Helsinki Final Act with a great deal of skepticism. Few believed the Soviet leadership would comply with its obligations. Moreover, the definitions used in the Helsinki Accords were much more fuzzy and riddled with loopholes than even the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights. There were vague promises to "favorably consider" and "to deal in a positive and humanitarian spirit"—hardly appropriate language to use in dealing with the Soviet state. Unlike the previous human rights agreement, the Helsinki Act did not uphold the right of everyone to travel freely, but restricted this right to cases of family reunification. The free flow of information and ideas was replaced by a promise to "facilitate the improvement" and to "contribute to the improvement" of communications—a clear retreat from the positions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights adopted by the UN in 1966.

Still, the fact that the three Helsinki "baskets" (security, cooperation, and human rights) were proclaimed to have equal importance and were interconnected, that periodic review conferences were to monitor compliance, and that the text of the Final Act was published in full by several Soviet newspapers, convinced many Soviet people that the West would enforce compliance by linking

"cooperation" to Soviet performance. That, I am afraid, was a delusion.

Be that as it may, and whatever uncertainty might be inserted into treaty language, the Final Act was published in the Soviet Union for everyone to read. How did the Soviet system handle the problem?

First, a number of general "interpretations" of the Accords were given by the leadership and were widely publicized by the Soviet propaganda machine:

1. The Final Act was presented to the Soviet public as a substitute for a postwar peace treaty in Europe and, therefore, as a new victory for the Soviet diplomacy. Thus, Brezhnev announced that the Act was a final "recognition of the postwar borders," although in the text there is only a clause about "inviolability of the European borders," that is, a promise not to use force in border disputes. That was a clear message to the Baltic nations, Ukrainians, Germans, and East Europeans that the world would not support their aspirations for national independence, territorial integrity, and sovereignty. Therefore, in the Brezhnev interpretation, the Final Act became a logical conclusion to Yalta and Potsdam, and perpetuated the division of Europe. Unfortunately, the Western powers never protested loudly against such an interpretation, thus leaving the impression that they agreed with it.

2. Since the Final Act suggested that the participating countries should readjust their national legislation in accordance with the new agreement, the Soviet leaders made it clear that the Soviet Union had nothing to change, as all provisions of the Act were already included in the Soviet Constitution. "It is the West that must change their legislation," said Brezhnev on one occasion. This interpretation also was never overtly disputed by the West.

3. As usual, Soviet propaganda reinterpreted the notion of human rights, deliberately mixing them up with socio-economic "rights." Thus, the late General Secretary Chernenko even wrote a book entitled, "Human Rights in Soviet Society" (published in English in 1981 by International Publishers, New York). In usual Soviet fashion, he argued that "socialist democracy" is far superior to capitalist society. We are reminded that communism has given "real power" to workers, i.e., not to be "parasites"; that it pro-

motes "fraternity of people" instead of capitalist "exploitation" and hatred; that women became truly emancipated only under socialism. But, most importantly, socialism endowed the people with their "basic" rights: to work, to have a free education, free medical care, nearly free housing, and so on.

"What, indeed," Brezhnev once asked, "can the apologists of the capitalist system oppose . . . real achievements of developed socialism? What real rights and freedoms are guaranteed to the masses in present-day imperialist society? The 'right' of tens of millions to unemployment? Or the 'right' of sick people to do without medical aid, the cost of which is enormous? Or the 'right' of ethnic minorities to humiliating discrimination in employment and education, in political and every-day life?"

"The Soviet conception of human rights in no way contradicts the principles of the most important international documents," writes Chernenko. "In fact, Soviet legislation in this sphere goes much further than the international covenants. . . ." Regrettably, this latter Soviet assertion has never been rejected unequivocally by the international community, leaving the agreement open to most ridiculous interpretations.

4. Finally, the Soviet occupation of Afganistan, violations of arms control treaties, and deployment of hundreds of SS-20s put an end to the detente era. The "cold war" was revived, with its inevitable threat of nuclear holocaust and "struggle for peace." The first task of Soviet propaganda is to make people, at home and abroad, forget these troublesome questions about human rights. Accordingly, a new slogan was invented by the professionals of agitprop: "The people have the power to preserve peace—their basic right" (*Pravda*, September 24, 1980). The message was unmistakable and very effective: if you want to survive at any price, forget about human rights. And so "better red than dead" become an acceptable, if implicit rule once again.

In justifying his decision to renew scientific exchanges with the Soviet Union at the very moment when Andrei Sakharov was reportedly dying in internal exile, the President of the American National Academy of Sciences, Frank Press, wrote:

"Despite our continuous concern for Sakharov, there are some

issues of such deep importance to the future of mankind that we have felt the necessity to continue talking about them with our Soviet counterparts. In this respect, arms control and international security are certainly of high priority." (*The Washington Post*, May 11, 1983).

In explaining the decision to invite one Dr. Vartanyan, a person legally responsible for the abuse of the psychiatry in the Soviet Union, to the United States, a member of the US group "Physicians for Social Responsibility" wrote: "Although mistreatment of dissidents is repugnant to us, it won't result in the extinction of the species, as the nuclear issue will. There is no issue that is worth the annihilation of life on earth". (*Peninsula Times Tribune*, September 24, 1985). Suddenly, "security" became more equal than the other baskets of Helsinki Agreement.

Meanwhile, the Soviets, using the "struggle for peace" as a screen, decided to eliminate the visible part of the human rights movement in the Soviet Union. The mass arrests which occurred between 1979 and 1981 eliminated all openly operating groups, including the Helsinki Watch Groups. Sakharov was exiled, and emigration was virtually stopped. Almost everything achieved by the Soviet human rights movement at such an enormously high price was destroyed.

What have been the key domestic Soviet disinformation techniques in recent years?

Two are most evident, one dealing with uncontrolled contacts between Soviet citizens and foreigners, or foreign countries, and a second concerning emigration. Both, and in combination, were aimed at sealing Soviet borders more tightly than ever.

The first technique included a propaganda campaign which presented those Soviet citizens who tried to maintain independent contacts with the West as spies, and condemning those Western public organizations still encouraging such contacts as "subversive centers." As usual, this campaign made use of public revelations by people in custody who could not withstand the pressure of interrogation and torture, and preferred to recant. Once again, as in the days of Stalin, a military hysteria became a dominant feature of Soviet life. At the same time, new legislation was introduced

which made it a criminal offense to give any information to a foreigner, or to invite a foreigner to stay overnight at one's apartment, or even to give a foreigner a lift in one's car. With such measures in place, even a return of "detente" will not make contacts easier.

The second major disinformation priority was directed against emigration, and included several different campaigns. One tactic was a particularly vicious propaganda campaign against "Zionism," which encouraged anti-Semitism. Another campaign was aimed at discouraging Soviet emigration in general. A surplus of books and films were made about the miserable lives of emigrants in Israel and America. A more sinister aspect of this campaign included "voluntary returns" of former emigrants and defectors to the Soviet Union. Later they appeared on Soviet television with incredible stories of horror and degradation in the West. We will probably never learn how many of these people actually returned voluntarily.

Quite in tune with these major propaganda themes were disinformation campaigns conducted against certain well-known individuals. Thus, Sakharov was publicly accused of "inviting imperialists to start a nuclear war against the Soviet Union." Shcharansky was accused of being an agent of American intelligence services. And recently, I was accused of organizing criminal anti-communist gangs in America and murdering an American journalist sympathetic toward the Soviet Union.

The question remains: do the Soviet people believe these endless lies and propaganda campaigns? I don't know. They do believe, however, that the West does not care about the human rights situation in the Soviet Union, and that Westerners are quite happy to be deceived by empty Soviet promises. The Helsinki Final Act lost any meaning as soon as it became obvious that the West would not enforce its implementation. A new stage has arrived, in which the Helsinki Act has become a useful instrument for the Kremlin. It is, therefore, not a coincidence that Gorbachev devoted a whole paragraph in his speech to the 27th Party Congress to the Helsinki Accords.

3

DETENTE AND DISINFORMATION IN SOVIET STRATEGY

Iain Elliot

Detente and disinformation are so closely intertwined in Soviet practice that even Kremlinologists would find it impossible to distinguish the two. To quote from a 1985 book by an expert on East-West relations:

Reality is such that we must deal with a country where freedom is suppressed, where violence flourishes, where trade unions are persecuted . . . and where the basic rights of the individuals are hampered: the right to work, the right to live, the right to get objective information, the right to have materially guaranteed access to true culture and the right to personal security. This is a nation in which militarism and war are the basic means of achieving foreign policy goals.¹

The author, Aleksandr Yakovlev, was promoted by Mikhail Gorbachev to the key Soviet administrative body, the Central Committee Secretariat, at the CPSU Congress in March 1986. He is head of the Central Committee Propaganda Department. And, of course, the country he was describing is the United States.

Having accused "the bulwark of capitalism" of violations of

human rights normally associated with his own state, Yakovlev then argues that there was no alternative to detente:

But one must take a sober view of reality. There is no reasonable alternative to living together in peace. The Soviet Union stands for equal relations and mutually profitable cooperation, for a peaceful solution of all problems and disputes, for the free choice of all people on earth of a way of life to their liking, and without it being forced on them by outside powers.²

A very reasonable declaration, if it were true. Unfortunately, Yakovlev actually stands reality on its head. There are two contrasting words for "lie" in Russian: *lozh*, which is a deliberate attempt to mislead, and *vranyo*, which is quite clearly a falsehood both to speaker and to listener, although the latter is expected to be too polite to denounce the falsehood openly. The fact is that at the signing of the Helsinki Final Act on August 1, 1975, the "High Representatives" of both East and West knew that the communist states had no intention of adhering to the humanitarian principles of Basket Three. Genuine observance of human rights as normally understood in Western societies is incompatible with the preservation of the communist system of government.

Leonid Brezhnev claimed at the Helsinki ceremonials, "The results of the prolonged negotiations are such that there are neither victors nor vanquished, winners or losers. This is a victory of reason."³ Yet for the Soviet leadership the inclusion of Basket Three was a distinct setback, grudgingly accepted in order to achieve the recognition of postwar frontiers and to gain access to Western credits and technology.

As stipulated in the Helsinki accords, the Soviet government made the Final Act available to its citizens by publishing it in full in *Pravda* and *Izvestiya*,⁴ but the actual attitude of the Politburo became clear when it was summarized in all the other Soviet dailies. Almost a full page was devoted to the first two baskets, while Basket Three was granted one dismissive sentence: "The document contains a section on cooperation in humanitarian and other fields, including contacts between people, exchange of information, cooperation and exchanges in the field of education."

Soviet ideology stresses the need to educate a New Man, capable of constructing communism and fit to live in communist society. This requires the "conditioning of the individual by society" or, in reality, the controlling of the citizen's mind by professional propagandists. Vast resources are devoted to censorship in order to exclude unsuitable materials from the news and entertainment media. Much of this effort has proved ineffective, as has been increasingly admitted by Soviet authorities under Gorbachev. Still, it is clearly counterproductive for the Kremlin to attempt to control every word a citizen is permitted to hear or read, while at the same time allowing the "free flow of people and information" as promised in the Helsinki Accords. How many Soviet citizens would watch over five hours of a Gorbachev speech at the 27th Party Congress, if, for example, "Dallas" were on the other channel? How many would read *Pravda* if a range of Western newspapers were available on the local newsstand?

What have been the results of a decade of the Helsinki process? Of eighty Soviet citizens who joined unofficial groups to monitor observance of human rights in the USSR, sixty were imprisoned, fifteen forced into exile, four died in prison, and one was killed in a mysterious accident. The number of Soviet citizens permitted to emigrate rose to a peak of some 62,000 in 1979 (51,500 Jews; 7,200 Germans; 3,600 Armenians). But after the invasion of Afghanistan and the Solidarity crisis in Poland, the Soviet authorities decided that there was nothing to be gained by making further gestures to the West, and so returned to more normal practices of repression. By 1985 emigration was down to roughly 2000.

It should be noted, however, that even at the height of detente repression remained the Soviet norm; it was simply not given much coverage in the Western media. The number of political activists known in the West who were arrested for "crimes" of conscience was never less than eighty per year, and by 1980 there were over 250 political arrests. Whole nations continued to suffer persecution, as the case of the Crimean Tatars graphically illustrates. Banned from returning to their homes in the Crimea from which they were brutally transported by Stalin, they could not even bury their dead in the graveyards of their ancestors. Yet their protests, which in-

cluded cases of self-immolation, went largely unreported in the West, despite the availability of carefully documented *samizdat* (clandestine, literally "self-published") accounts.

In late 1985 one *samizdat* author pointed out that Crimean Tatars were refused the necessary official residence permission (*propiska*) to return to their native Crimea from their place of exile in Central Asia. In addition, children of parents who by some exceptional means had obtained permission to live in the Crimea could not marry a partner registered in other parts of the USSR, unless they themselves agreed to leave their Crimean homeland. In August 1985 members of the Dzhannarov family were forcibly exiled from the Crimea, and the house they had bought there was demolished. Many similar cases have been documented. Is it not overly optimistic to expect the Soviet leadership to further human contacts and family reunification across Soviet borders when such obstacles to normal human relations as the *propiska* system are the practice inside the USSR?

A January 1986 *samizdat* document describes the reality of "people to people contacts" in Gorbachev's USSR:

Both night and day, at every railway station, harbor, and airport linking the Soviet Union with the outside world, thousands of people rummage through the contents of bags and suitcases, not so much to discover valuables, as to find books and other items containing "forbidden" information. Both night and day, tens of thousands of soldiers, sailors, and pilots patrol the borders so that no one, from inside rather than abroad, can cross. Dozens of people carefully examine the past history and every relationship of any citizen applying to go abroad. Every ministry and department has a special section to check the personal affairs of candidates for business or tourist trips, and there is a vast directorate subordinated to the CPSU Central Committee which decides who is to be allowed abroad.⁵

Official Soviet publications do not deny these claims. In fact, each year the Soviet media celebrate May 28 as "Border Guards' Day," with articles and programs praising the glorious exploits of the KGB border troops. For the most part the Western press is silent on this phenomenon, although Soviet leaders' statements on the Helsinki process are duly recorded.

There are hundreds of cases of divided families, not only because of Soviet borders but also because Soviet prisoners of conscience are given additional terms of imprisonment on trumped-up charges, or are refused permission to have visitors. And, of course, none of this information is published in official Soviet sources. On the contrary; Moscow produces books in the major Western languages which give currency to a new Russian word, *re-emigrant*:

Representatives of various emigre strata returned. There were those who had been part of the pre-revolutionary "worker" emigration together with their children and grandchildren, there were the post-revolutionary emigres, and there were those that had been driven abroad by the storms of the Second World War. There were intellectuals, workers, peasants, and artisans. There were those who believed in God and those who did not. . . .

They returned to a country, the corner-stone of whose foreign policy is peace. A country, whose whole domestic policy consists in raising the material and cultural standards of the people. A country, whose face is turned ever towards the future and which boldly plans and decisively carries out grandiose transformations. A country, in which real human rights are implemented, like the right to work, to rest, to education, to security in old age. A country, where the only privileged class are the children.⁶

The book is silent on the large numbers of people who returned to end their lives in Soviet prison camps, or the prominent individuals such as the poet Maria Tsvetaeva, who committed suicide. Nor does the volume include references to articles in the Soviet domestic press which describe Soviet emigres living in wretched conditions in the USA or Israel; they supposedly long to return to the USSR, but realize that returning is impossible. In fact, they are banned by Soviet regulations from doing so, although the Helsinki Accords, and other obligatory United Nations agreements stipulate that citizens would be free to leave and to return to their own countries. For the Kremlin, however, people who have seen an alternative social system is a potential threat to party control, since they are in a position to refute empirically Soviet allegations about life in the capitalist West. As is usual in Soviet practice, there is one line in the domestic media and another for dissemination abroad.

Another significant aspect of Soviet exploitation of the Helsinki Human Contacts clause has been the suspiciously large number of cases of returning defectors, such as Messrs. Bitov from Britain, Yurchenko from the United States, and Shuvalov from West Germany. All have accused "Western special services" of kidnapping them and forcing them to ask for asylum. By ensuring the maximum press coverage for such cases, the Soviet authorities clearly hope to cast doubt on all subsequent defectors.

Moscow also attempts to manipulate Western public opinion by circulating various propaganda publications in the major languages of the world. In Britain, for example, the USSR has for forty years published a newspaper called *Soviet Weekly*, provided free of charge to schools and libraries. Western countries are not allowed to publish anything on a reciprocal basis in the USSR. Typical articles in these publications accuse the CIA of being behind crimes such as the assassination of Indira Gandhi.⁷ Another article admits that the USSR has separated hundreds of Afghan families by taking Afghan children to educate them in a peaceful, happy environment, far removed from the wicked agents of Western imperialists who threaten their young lives. A photograph shows daggers, guns, and bombs disguised as dolls beside another photo of a little Afghan girl sleeping peacefully in the USSR. The caption reads, "And these are dolls and other toys with which 'teachers' from Washington wanted to kill her and other girls her age in Afghanistan."⁸

The Soviet emphasis in the Helsinki process has invariably been on limiting human contacts to those between official organizations and institutions, since contacts between individuals are less easily controlled. But human rights should be measured in terms of individual perceptions, and not determined by institutions or rationed by governments. There is a need for more open discussion so that Soviet claims can be publicly exposed.

Moscow should have to explain the new article in the Soviet criminal code on "delivery to foreign organizations of information constituting work-related secrets" which carries a punishment of up to eight years' imprisonment for Soviet citizens who meet foreigners and say virtually anything about their jobs. Another decree,

issued on May 25, 1984, specifies fines for citizens who provide foreigners with "accommodation or transportation, or have rendered them other services in violation of established rules". Such legislation is quite clearly not aimed at promoting human contacts.

The Soviet constitution, as well as international accords, forbids interference with international letters and parcels. But there is clear evidence that letters and packages have been illegally delayed, tampered with, or returned to the sender without due cause. Vladimir Lifshits, a Jewish mathematician, was arrested in February 1986 and accused of slandering the USSR in five letters which had been intercepted and opened by Soviet authorities.⁹ Customs regulations on parcels also have been made more burdensome. Since August 1984, for example, Soviet regulations require customs duty be paid by the recipient rather than allowing prepayment by the sender. A large range of publications, many with no obvious anti-Soviet content, are confiscated by Soviet customs officials.

Increased restrictions have been placed on telephone communications as well. There is an official instruction issued by the Ministry of Communications forbidding the use of the telephone "for purposes contrary to state interests and public order." Calls made by dissidents are regularly monitored pursuant to this instruction. Soviet citizens are still denied the right to emigrate or to go abroad on holiday without submitting to a long and tedious bureaucratic process in order to receive an exit visa. In some cases the very act of applying is enough to lead to dismissal from the applicant's place of employment.

Throughout this period of Helsinki review meetings, Soviet propagandists in the West promoted the idea that if Western governments protested violations of the Helsinki accords too strongly, the "hawks" in the Kremlin would be strengthened and repression would be intensified. The Party leader was invariably a decent chap, trying to introduce liberal reforms in the face of resistance by military and KGB "hardliners" opposed to any deal with the West. A second line was that human rights were all very well, but the main thing was the right to life. The neutron bomb, a nuclear freeze, or a test ban were all vital issues that must take precedence over human rights. The Jackson-Vanik Amendment, linking the granting of

most-favored-nation status to a country's emigration policies, is under constant attack by Soviet spokesmen, who claim that it is "unwarranted interference" in Soviet internal affairs. Yet a third strain of propaganda was as follows: how could the West criticize the USSR when Western societies had millions of unemployed, the Ku Klux Klan, sectarian strife in Northern Ireland, race riots, and so on? It was merely a case of the pot calling the kettle black. The USSR had its Sakharov, the USA had Angela Davis. Moscow persecuted the Jews or the Crimean Tatars, the USA deprived the Indians of their rights and imprisoned Leonard Peltier, the campaigner for Indian rights (who actually was confined in connection with the murder of FBI agents.)

The fact that such arguments were illogical mattered little to Kremlin propagandists. Why grant concessions to a Kremlin "dove" merely to prevent a "hawk" from taking over and demanding the same concessions, especially if there is actually no such thing as a "dove" in the Kremlin? Second, arms limitation talks should not exclude discussions of human rights; on the contrary, trust and verification lie at the heart of both areas of negotiations, and it is greatly to be regretted that the Helsinki process has been divided into security issues (at Stockholm) and humanitarian issues (at Ottawa or Bern). Third, there are many serious infringements of human rights in Western societies, but the Western media draw attention to them and governments are obliged to answer criticisms and attempt to rectify the situation. It is simply unacceptable to dismiss both East and West as equally at fault; the degree of guilt is vastly different.

The crucial difference between East and West lies precisely in Moscow's refusal to allow the free flow of people and information, lacking which the Soviet population is in no position to place democratic restraints on the actions of the regime. It is arguable that Soviet interventions along the lines of Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Afghanistan in 1979 would be less lightly undertaken were there free domestic media comment to encourage discussion of the issues among the population. Therefore, when the West speaks out in defense of the humanitarian provisions in the Helsinki Final Act, it is both underlining its commitment to the

principles on which the United Nations is based, as well as practising enlightened self-interest by furthering the security of the democracies.

NOTES

1. Aleksandr Yakovlev, *On the Edge of the Abyss: From Truman to Reagan, the Doctrines and Realities of the Nuclear Age* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1985), p. 400.
2. Ibid.
3. *Pravda*, August 1, 1975.
4. *Pravda*, August 2, 1975; *Izvestiya*, August 2, 1975.
5. *Socialism—Promises and Reality: The Tragedy of Deceived Generations* (samizdat paper, January 1986, 80 typewritten pages).
6. *Why We Returned to the Soviet Union: Testimonies from Russian Emigres* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1984), pp. 14–15.
7. *New Times*, April 7, 1986.
8. *New Times*, April 31, 1986.
9. See *Human Contacts, Reunion of Families and Soviet Jewry* (London: London Institute of Jewish Affairs, 1986), p. 13.

4

GREECE'S POLITICAL REFUGEES FROM THE EAST BLOC

Paul Anastasi

Greece, a strategically located NATO member country on the crossroads between Europe and the Middle East, has undoubtedly experienced more military and political turmoil than any other Western country in the post World War II period. The 1944–49 Greek Civil War constitutes the only failed attempt by Soviet-backed communists to seize a European nation by force. Another feature unique for a Western country resulted from this Civil War: after defeat, some one hundred thousand Communist partisans and their families fled across Greek borders into Eastern Europe. This exodus led to a human drama which is still not totally resolved, and one which is worth examining in the context of Soviet exploitation of human contacts and in relation to disinformation and active measures.

The hard-line left views the Greek political refugees in Eastern Europe as heroes, victims of Greek conservative governments and of British and US involvement, whose military and economic aid was decisive in bringing about the communist defeat. The hard-line right sees them as traitors responsible for mass murder and the bloodiest period in modern Greek history. In the decades since the

war, a more moderate and widely accepted view has evolved, that these persons have regretted their involvement with the Soviet-backed communist guerilla forces, that they have suffered enough hardship, and deserve to return to their own country. Most of these refugees no longer appear to support the Soviet-style system of government and have little interest in active politics in Greece. Their main concern seems to be securing a means of livelihood in Greece and keeping a low political profile.

Since we are discussing Human Contacts in the context of the Helsinki Accords, this case deserves attention for both its human and political dimensions. Families were divided, and there was minimal contact between those who fled and those who continued to live in Greece. Those political refugees who expressed remorse were unable to return due to the unwillingness of both Greek governments and Eastern European regimes. Many were not even allowed to return to attend the funerals of their relatives for fear of political vendettas. And many other refugees died in exile.

The situation changed radically in 1974, following the collapse of the seven-year rightist dictatorship in Greece and the restoration of democracy. The elected conservative government at that time decided to permit the return of the refugees upon individual application and consideration. There were about 60,000 individuals at the time, and some 25,000 returned over the next seven years. Then, in 1982, the Socialist government of Andreas Papandreou permitted mass repatriation with minimal bureaucratic formalities. A few thousand more returned, and today more than half of the 60,000 refugees have settled in Greece. However, some 3,500 have had their requests rejected since the advent of the Socialist government, on the grounds that they could pose a threat to national security. And the rate of return has slowed considerably, due mainly to the failure of Eastern bloc regimes to transfer the refugees' pensions and other social security rights to Greece. Most of the 20,000 still in Eastern Europe were born outside of Greece or were too young to have participated in the Civil War. Most of them are in the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, with other Greek communities of about 2,000 in Poland, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria, and about 1,000 in East Germany.

The Soviet Bloc and the Refugee Issue

There are two political refugee committees in Greece today, each bitterly opposed to the other and sharply divergent in political views. The Panhellenic Union for the Repatriation of Greek Political Refugees (PEEPE), which is officially sponsored by the pro-Soviet Greek Communist Party (KKE), argues that gratitude is due to the Soviet bloc because of the refuge, work, education, and homes provided for the refugees. On the other hand, the Committee for the Repatriation for Greek Political Refugees, sponsored by the independent-line "Interior" Communist Party, says the whole problem stems mainly from the Soviet bloc's political and economic exploitation of the refugees and from the economic weaknesses of these regimes.

Indeed, over the past decade the whole problem has revolved less around the question of whether Greek refugees can return—since this has been settled without any significant social or political upheaval—but more over how they will survive financially. Beyond the difficulties of finding a home and employment, the main problem is the unwillingness of East bloc regimes to transfer the refugees' pensions and social security rights to Greece. This contrasts sharply with the existing bilateral agreements for the transfer of such benefits to Greeks who have returned from Western Europe, the United States, Canada, and Australia.

At first, the Soviet bloc countries indicated that they could not afford to export the badly needed foreign currency involved. The payments owed to the refugees from the USSR amount to \$38 million, and those from the other five Warsaw Pact countries total another \$65 million. Soviet bloc authorities then argued in favor of the principle of "territoriality," namely that the countries where the refugees chose to live should be responsible for their social welfare payments. The refugees reacted angrily, stating that under such circumstances they could never afford to leave their host countries for an uncertain future in Greece without the hope that they would eventually receive their pensions there. Many pointed out that an immediate initial solution was available in view of the fact that more

than \$3 million in foreign currency and jewels remained in Eastern European banks as a leftover from the collections made to help the families of leftist political detainees in Greece. They also pointed out that the Soviet Union and its allies had contributed vast sums for the establishment of luxurious new Communist Party headquarters in Greece and for advanced-technology publication facilities.

Greek governments made a further effort to solve the problem by accepting payments from the Eastern bloc in goods—in machinery and other products which could be sold or exploited to finance the pensions. This system was attempted for a while before it proved to be impractical.

Finally, over the past eighteen months, and some ten years after the refugees began to return, a series of agreements have been signed with the Soviet bloc countries. (The exception is Romania, which still refuses even to discuss the issue.) The agreements specify that the sums due for the 3,500 pensioners involved will be paid in annual installments over the next three-to-seven years, according to the Eastern European countries involved. So far, only some payments from Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany have been made. But the Greek government, in order to help resolve the social and economic problems involved, has already started paying pensions out of its own funds in anticipation of the arrival of the sums due.

In the meantime, the years have taken their toll. Four hundred of the repatriated refugees have died without ever receiving their pensions. Nine committed suicide as a result of their financial plight.

Why has such unfair treatment continued at a time when the political problem has been resolved? From the Greek side, responsibility lies in the fact that there was undue suspicion of what the return of the refugees would mean in terms of political reaction from revenge-seeking rightists and in terms of unemployment or general social dislocation. Once this apprehension was overcome, blame appears to lie exclusively on the side of the Soviet bloc. Returning refugees said Eastern European regimes were anxious to discourage the return of skilled workers, technocrats, and others who made a positive contribution to the local economies. They also say that the Eastern bloc countries facilitate the departure of those who they

know will help the pro-Soviet Greek Communist Party as opposed to the independent-line “Interior” party or any other non-communist political force. In other words, argue the refugees, after using the partisans as a military instrument in attempting to seize power by force, the Soviet bloc was then exploiting them to the maximum political and economic extent. At the same time, the refugee issue served as a lasting means of exploiting the emotional idea that the left was part of a prolonged human tragedy. There was propaganda value in perpetuating the claim that the “good side” in the Greek Civil War was still being persecuted by the American-backed “anti-democratic” victors. Large sections of the Greek press, which are strongly influenced by the Communist Party and pro-Soviet sympathizers, were used extensively in this campaign throughout this period.

The exploitation of this issue by the Soviets was described in no uncertain terms in a recent statement by Mitsos (Dimitris) Papadimitris and Elias Alevras, leaders of the non-Moscow-line refugee repatriation group. Criticizing the Communist Party for demonstrating “false concern” over the fate of the Greek political refugees, they said:

In reality, the Communist Party again is trying to hide the real reason for the delay (in paying the pensions), blaming others and not those who are really responsible. These are the governments of the Soviet Union, Poland, Bulgaria, and Romania, which persistently refuse even to accept discussion of transferring the pensions of the political refugees who worked for a whole thirty years in their enterprises.

As we have stressed before, the tragedy of the political refugees lies in the fact that they have not yet received their pensions, that the years are going by and that many of them are dying while waiting for the pension which never comes. . . .¹

Adding that agreements with most East bloc countries have now been signed, Papadimitris and Alevras continue:

Therefore, the other countries now remain. With the Soviet Union, an agreement for \$38 million was signed to clear up the debt on the pensions for the political refugees who worked there. However, in some strange way, it was decided that this sum should be delivered

in installments as if it were some commercial exchange or other debt from the Soviet Union, and not a debt from the payments made by the political refugees during those years when they worked in Soviet enterprises. Did the so-called "protectors" of the refugees say anything about this unacceptable stand? Can they not see that this attitude is unacceptable in exchanges between the state and working people?

The money which the Soviet Union assumed the obligation to pay for the refugees' pensions is not a give-away grant, nor is it a loan to them. It is money from the payments of the refugees over many years to the Soviet work funds, in accordance with Soviet labor laws. Now, with the agreement, they have assumed the responsibility to pay it back piece-by-piece. In other words, the political refugees are being compelled to lend their funds to the great Soviet state without even any interest rate.

Tackling this delicate issue in such a way constitutes a provocation of international principles, international and domestic laws, and international labor laws which secure the inviolable human right of work and its protection against any violation.

Why, therefore, do the so-called "protectors" not care and why do they not protest over these human rights violations? And why do they shed crocodile tears over the pain and ill-treatment of the political refugees?

Let's not be naive. The Communist Party and its Union for the Repatriation of Political Refugees are keeping their mouths shut and, no doubt, are being rewarded in return. All those things that were kept in deep darkness have now become known to all. . . . They should aim their fire against those who are really to blame for the delays. And they should concern themselves at least as much with the issues troubling the political refugees as they do with their enterprises, the purchase of privately-owned buildings, and other profitable businesses.²

The extent to which the Soviet Union would like to exploit the refugees once they return to Greece is perhaps best demonstrated by the stand adopted by the most prominent among them, General Markos Vafiades, the leader of the Civil War communist armies

and self-appointed prime minister of the government they set up in the communist-held areas of Greece.

Vafiades returned to Greece in 1983, at age 77, after almost 34 years in exile in the Soviet Union. Since his return, he has tried to serve as a bridge not only between the two communist parties, but also with the ruling Socialists. In recent years, such a policy has been a key means of spreading Soviet influence among non-communist, center-left, and liberal forces and was given key emphasis at the Soviet Communist Party's 27th Congress held in Moscow in February 1986.

Speaking at a public rally in September 1983, a few months after his return, Vafiades attacked the United States and NATO for "cold war adventurism" and for "backing juntas in Latin America." He also said the Socialist government had his support when it came to challenging NATO and the United States, and he expressed the hope that the US bases soon would be removed from Greece. His strongest pro-Soviet statement came when he praised the Socialist government for refusing to condemn the Soviet downing of the Korean passenger jet. "I stand beside the government when it refuses to join the cold war adventurism of the United States and its allies, NATO and the EEC, on the Korean jetliner incident," Vafiades said. Prime Minister Papandreou, who initially claimed that the Korean airliner was understandably shot down because it was on a CIA espionage mission, soon after retracted his statement and conceded that he had been misled. General Vafiades had no comment.

In addition to the case of the Eastern European political refugees, there are a great number of other examples of Soviet manipulation of human contacts with the Greeks. Such exploitation is facilitated by three basic factors:

1. The proximity of Greece to the Eastern bloc (it borders on Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria);
2. the relative cheapness this implies in communication by air, road or train between Greece and these countries; and
3. the existence of a relatively large and intensely pro-Soviet Com-

munist Party (KKE), which very actively organizes events between Greeks and Eastern European bodies.

For example, the deficiencies of the Greek higher educational and health systems lead many Greeks to go abroad for education and for medical treatment. Although there is by far a preference to go to Western countries for schooling and medical care, the proximity and low cost of these services in Soviet and Warsaw Pact countries are such that many Greeks find it easier to go there. This is encouraged by frequent praise of East bloc educational and medical standards which appear in several large-circulation Greek publications. Similarly, it is much cheaper for Greeks to organize sports and cultural exchanges with these countries.

A prominent recent example of how someone could be recruited for intelligence purposes is that of Greek entrepreneur Michael Megaloeconomou, who was employed with the Greek branches of major American computer and technology firms. Megaloeconomou was identified as an agent passing technology secrets to the Soviets by Sergei Bokhane, the Deputy Director in Athens for Soviet Military Intelligence (GRU) who defected to the United States in May 1985. Upon his arrest, Megaloeconomou explained that he was offered free medical treatment in the Soviet Union, signed a receipt for these services, and subsequently was blackmailed into cooperating with the Russians.

Finally, the return of many Greeks from Eastern Europe, and the many pro-Soviet sympathizers both in the Communist Party and in the ruling Socialist Party, have enabled a significant number of journalists from these parties to assume key positions in prominent Greek publications, which they use as a base for cultivating pro-Soviet views among the public and opinion-makers. Indeed, the growing international focus on the Greek press, and particularly on *Ethnos*, the country's largest circulation daily newspaper, makes evident that more pro-Soviet propaganda and disinformation is aired in Greece than in any other Western country. This, inevitably, facilitates the creation of a climate which offers numerous opportunities for the exploitation of human contacts.

What can be done to prevent Soviet exploitation of such human contacts, without discouraging them altogether? In considering the unique situation in Greece, which has no parallel in the West, I believe that it is imperative not to put up a wall of hostility against these political refugees, despite such examples as General Vafiades. One must not dismiss them as "armed bandits" or "criminals" or "communist puppets." It is undoubtedly true that the Soviet Union and its allies want to use the Greek refugees when they return to Greece, even to the point of serving East bloc intelligence and political interests. The great majority, however, as I am convinced from meeting with many of them as well as studying their problems over the past years, are anxious to spend their lives peacefully and to make a positive contribution in their homeland.

Moreover, the great majority of Greek refugees are deeply disillusioned with the political and economic systems of their former host regimes. These are people who, in their determination to fight for the establishment of a Soviet-style regime in Greece, risked their lives, suffered injuries, lost family members and close friends, and were uprooted from their homes. Then, for three decades, they lived under the type of regime they had previously worshiped. Now, most of them are quite contemptuous of this system of government and are deeply resentful over having been misled. Their perspectives are extremely valuable, therefore, for an understanding of how the practical experience of a Soviet bloc regime often makes a mockery of the theory, ideology, and propaganda surrounding communism. For in this unusual case offered in Greece, the individuals were not armchair socialists who had a change of heart, but rather were dedicated, front-line armed revolutionaries and guerillas.

In order to neutralize Soviet exploitation of their situation, the West should help these people to adjust to their new lives, and to overcome their inbred suspicions resulting from decades of propaganda. They should not be isolated, but rather welcomed. In addition, their experiences should serve as a major subject of research and subsequent writing, which would constitute an immensely valuable contribution to the cause of pursuing human contacts in the interest of *genuinely* human ideals.

NOTES

1. Statement published in *AVGI*, the official organ of the "Interior" Communist Party, February 8, 1986.
2. *Ibid.*

5

HUMAN CONTACTS AND ACTIVE MEASURES: AN ASPECT OF THE SOVIET THREAT TO SCANDINAVIA

Bertil Haggman

For many centuries Sweden and Russia contested the control of the Baltic Sea with other nations along this vital lane of communication. The growth of the successor state to Czarist Russia—the Soviet Union—into a superpower during the 20th century has naturally also affected Sweden, Russia's old enemy, as well as the other Scandinavian countries—Denmark, Finland, Iceland and Norway. The geopolitics of Scandinavia—its proximity to Leningrad and the huge naval and nuclear bases of Murmansk on the Kola Peninsula, the Baltic approaches, and the importance of the Norwegian Sea area in the northern Atlantic—has made Northern Europe one of the world's strategically most important areas.

The stranding on October 27, 1981, of the Soviet U137 submarine close to the Karlskrona naval base in southeastern Sweden highlighted the contrast between the peace-loving statements of Soviet leaders and the intense Soviet military preparations and

buildup of forces in the Scandinavian area. The main political line of the Kremlin in Northern Europe is the creation of a Nordic nuclear-free zone, the dominant purpose of which is to weaken NATO's northern flank. Leonid Brezhnev in 1981 went as far as offering the possibility of including some Soviet territory in such a nuclear-free zone, a sign of the importance Moscow attaches to the establishment Scandinavian "zone of peace."

Along with the zone campaign, the Soviet Union is conducting extensive subversion in Scandinavia, including espionage and active measures. Heavy Soviet transport vehicles, for example, are used to collect military intelligence. These vehicles are crammed with electronic equipment designed to monitor military communications. The trucks tend to have temporary breakdowns in the neighborhood of sensitive defense installations.

Poland and East Germany, aided by the USSR, have developed extensive espionage networks in Sweden and other Scandinavian countries. Swedish communists reportedly have been trained in sabotage techniques at schools in Moscow, Karlshorst, and Dresden. Moscow also takes great care to develop bilateral relations with the Scandinavian countries. Of course, the Soviets utilize the provisions in the Helsinki Final Act pertaining to Human Contacts for subversive purposes.

Family contacts and meetings

Aigar Lepiks, a Soviet citizen and Estonian native who defected to Sweden in November 1985, has stated that he was contacted by Soviet military intelligence (GRU) because he had relatives in Sweden.¹ If he agreed to work for the Soviets, Lepiks later explained, he would be allowed to visit relatives there. Lepiks refused. He was later contacted by Soviet naval intelligence. In 1983 Lepiks decided to pretend to cooperate, and underwent several GRU espionage training courses, receiving detailed information concerning Estonian anti-communist activities in Sweden. When he received permission to go to Sweden with his wife in 1985, Lepiks was under orders to travel around Sweden as much as possible. Lepiks decided to seek political asylum in Sweden rather than return to Soviet Estonia.

He believes there are many other Estonians who have been forced to undertake similar missions on behalf of the GRU.

Reunification of families

There are roughly 75,000 refugees from the Soviet bloc in Sweden, 24,000 from the USSR alone. Of the rest, there are approximately 13,000 Hungarians, 2,500 Romanians, 8,000 Czechs and Slovaks and 25,000 Poles. Many of these have access to highly detailed information about Swedish industry, defense, academic research, politics, administration, economics, and a number of other fields. There are many cases in which Soviet and East European intelligence services attempt to use reunification of families in order to gain important information about Sweden.

The case of one anonymous Estonian engineer is typical. He came to Sweden in 1943, and after World War II was employed by one of Sweden's largest export companies. He was contacted by Soviet intelligence for the first time in the 1960s. The Soviet officer knew a great deal about his relatives in Estonia. The engineer was offered a free trip to Estonia and the Soviet intelligence officer brought him letters and parcels from his relatives there. The Estonian engineer in the end refused to co-operate, but persistent Soviet approaches continued well into the 1970s.²

Tourism

Soviet intelligence has long exploited tourist exchanges for espionage purposes. The office of the Soviet international tourist organization, Intourist, located at Sergelsgatan 21 in central Stockholm, and the Soviet Airline Aeroflot offices at Sveavagen 20 and at the Arlanda Stockholm airport play an important part in KGB and GRU activities in Sweden. An ex-KGB agent (codenamed "Eva") in a 1979 book published in Sweden, stated that Intourist is a functioning unit of the KGB and GRU.³ The book suggests that every Intourist tour-guide and driver is directly employed by Soviet intelligence and security services. Their task is to "see and hear" tourist activities and to deliver written reports. According to the book, all guided

tour itineraries are monitored by the KGB. In Tallinn, for example, there is a guided tour from which no divergence is permitted. When tourists are taken to Pirita or the old Birgitta monastery, the airfield located close by is assiduously avoided. All Soviet hotels are equipped with hidden microphone systems connected to central listening posts and many hotel and service personnel are in the employ of the Soviet secret police.

Meetings among Young People

The Soviet Union and its East European satellites maintain bilateral agreements with the individual Scandinavian countries on exchange of students. In 1981 there were 207 students from Warsaw Pact countries in Norway, broken down as follows: Bulgaria (10), East Germany (14), Poland (66), Romania (3), USSR (20), Czechoslovakia (30), Hungary (32), Yugoslavia (32). In addition, a number of students come for shorter periods to do research in Norway. East European students tend to concentrate on scientific and technological areas, while Norwegian exchange students in the Soviet bloc generally focus on the humanities.⁴ Students from the Warsaw Pact countries have been tasked by Soviet intelligence services with industrial espionage activities in the Scandinavian countries.

The geographical proximity of Scandinavia to the heartland of the Soviet Union plus the fact that two Nordic countries (Sweden and Finland) are neutral, have made this area a target of opportunity for a Soviet elite interested in human contacts provisions for purposes of espionage and subversion. Moscow's ultimate objective is to separate the Scandinavian countries from the West, or to "Finlandize" Denmark, Iceland, and Norway. One important way for western nations to combat this Soviet strategy is to make information available to the public on the various methods, including active measures, used to achieve this goal.

NOTES

1. "Aigar Lepik: Tvingad till att samarbeta med GRU" (Aigar Lepik: Forced to Cooperate with GRU), *Osteuropa-Solidaritiet* (East European Solidarity), Stockholm, (No. 1, 1985), p.7.
2. "Flyktingar pressas att spionera i Sverige" (Refugees Forced to Spy in Sweden), *Osteuropa-Solidaritiet* (East European Solidarity), Stockholm (No. 4, 1984), pp. 2-3.
3. Einar Sanden, *Eva-Agent for KGB* (English edition: *KGB calling Eve*), (Stockholm, 1979).
4. Thorleif Andreassen-Gunnar Moe, *Spioner og spionmal i Norge* (Spies and Espionage Targets in Norway), (Oslo, 1984), p. 209.

6

SOVIET PROPAGANDA UNDER GORBACHEV

Francoise Thom

After the 27th Soviet Party Congress in 1986, one can be fairly sure that few essential changes will emerge in Soviet domestic and foreign policy. Can we expect the same continuity in the field of propaganda? One fact should draw our attention. Since Yuri Andropov's tenure as the Soviet leader in 1982-84, the influence of the KGB on the Soviet power apparatus has risen considerably. This could explain certain changes in the propaganda themes and techniques which are already apparent.

The KGB is the only institution in the Soviet Union which charts both domestic and foreign opinion. Increased KGB influence means that Soviet propaganda will become more subtle and more differentiated. The latter seems especially important. Soviet propaganda is becoming more precisely targeted; sociological studies are clearly taken into account, even at the top level. This is quite obvious in the field of internal propaganda, which should always be followed closely, as it is intimately linked to external propaganda. We in the West tend to underestimate the fact that internal purposes play a significant role in many external active measures.

Western observers have been thoroughly puzzled by many contradictions in Gorbachev's slogans and pronouncements. On one hand we have the enthusiastic praise of Stakhanovism, the Stalinist

work ethic, and the solemn celebration of Krylenko's birthday. On the other hand, Vavilov's life is portrayed in a film, the poet Yevtushenko denounces censorship and collectivization, and there is much talk about Lenin's New Economic Policy (NEP). There have been many such contradictions in recent years, and that is apparently new and unprecedented. The explanation lies in the fact that serious studies of domestic opinion have been made, and have determined the new propaganda lines. Nostalgia for law and order is quite common among a certain category of Soviet citizens, and that accounts for some Stalinist accents; collectivization has remained unpopular, which explains Yevtushenko's and the "rural" writers's criticism; Gorbachev is trying to win support from the technical intelligentsia, and therefore Stalinist excesses in Soviet science are denounced. In short, there only appears to be contradictions in Soviet pronouncements. As soon as we recognize this overall demagogic preoccupation, Gorbachev's policy becomes as consistent, as logical as any Leninist policy.

The same sort of developments can also be observed in international affairs, where Soviet propaganda also has become more carefully targeted. It is quite clear that Soviet officials realize that traditional communist slogans have less and less appeal, even in the third world. Recent articles in *Pravda* acknowledged as much, though in the usual veiled terms.¹ The Soviets understand now that one language is required for the average American, another for officials, still another language for the French, Germans and so on, and yet another language for sovietologists, among whom, according to the Soviet journal *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, there are quite a number of "realists" who must be encouraged.² For the Third World there is a proper lexicon as well, which speaks less of Marxism-Leninism and more about defaulting on debts to Western banks, a much more alluring prospect for the Kremlin.

Let us examine the European line of propaganda more closely. The first step is to induce Europeans, both East and West, to believe there is a symmetry between the two superpowers, and a parallelism in the relationship between the United States and West Europe on the one hand and that of the USSR and East Europe on the other. This is an old line; what is more recent is the distribution of roles

among the "little brothers." In this new version Hungary and East Germany are cast as states which would gladly be more independent and must therefore be encouraged financially, technologically and culturally by the West. Czechoslovakia and Poland, however, (and now also Romania), are cast as the "bad guys" (though their case is not hopeless: they can be helped by the West to get better.) A few examples can demonstrate how consistently and simultaneously Hungary and the GDR have tried to build up their "liberal" image.

On November 2, 1985, one Matyas Szuros, the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (HSWP) Central Committee secretary in charge of foreign relations, wrote a much noticed article stressing national interests in interparty relations, and pleading for "closer attention to national peculiarities." This article appeared a week after the Sofia meeting of the Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Committee at which Moscow ostensibly defined the "collective interests of the bloc." Significantly, excerpts from the Szuros article were promptly published in *Neues Deutschland*, indicating that East Germany was associating herself conspicuously to Hungarian aspirations for "independence." A few days later, HSWP Politburo member Ferenc Havasi published an article in the Party daily strongly advocating reforms. The same line was taken up by Istvan Huszar, member of HSWP Central Committee, in an interview with a Yugoslav weekly in December 1985. Huszar pleaded for a more market-oriented economy, stressing that there is no "model" of socialism, and that "different interests" exist in all communist countries. Soon thereafter, Soviet press organs expressed concern about "antisocialist propaganda" in Hungary caused by the influx of Western tourists.³

Since Hungary is the champion of "reform" and "liberalism," East Germany is left with the role of advocating of "overtures to the West." The removal in November 1985 of Konrad Neumann, former Central Committee secretary for East Berlin and a notorious "hard liner," was interpreted in the West as a victory for Party leader Honecker over the "hawks." This was considered even more remarkable due to the fact that Neumann allegedly had strong "backing" in Moscow. (It would probably be more reasonable to link Neumann's sacking to that of Moscow Party Chief Grishin and

to the widespread criticism of local city central committees at the time.) In an interview in *Die Zeit* on January 31, Honecker stresses his "unlimited room for manoeuvre."⁴ During his visit to Bonn in February 1986, the President of the East German People's Chamber, Horst Sindemann, pointedly avoided raising the issue of SDI and discussed concessions on travel between the two Germanies. The Polish government promptly expressed concern about "revisionism" in East Germany in a commentary in the Polish daily *Rzeczpospolita*.

Western observers noted that East Germany displayed a certain lack of enthusiasm during the Warsaw Pact defense ministers' meeting in December 1985. As for Hungarian military leaders, they were quoted as claiming that Budapest would meet its obligations within the alliance, but only "in proportion to the capabilities of our national economy and our realistic possibilities."⁵

The themes developed both by Hungarian leader Kadar (for example during his visit to Great Britain) and by Honecker are as follows:

1. The division of Europe is attributed to the differences between the "social systems." The West should never accept this false and misleading statement. The division of Europe is political. The governments of the Western states are legitimate, whereas the regimes in the East have been imposed by force, and therefore, illegitimate.

2. "Small and medium size nations" play an important role in maintaining the dialogue between East and West. (Honecker insists more specifically on the significance of inter-German ties for peace in Europe.) This would make sense if there existed a real symmetry between East and West, if the East European states were really independent of the Soviet Union, and if they represented themselves. We know that it is far from being the case.

3. "Reducing international tensions" and "strengthening trust." These are much used and typical examples of communist newspeak: but they bear totally unacceptable implications. Behind these expressions is the implicit assumption that: a) both "superpowers" are equally responsible for "international tensions"—thereby denying the aggressive nature of communism and the le-

gitimate democratic resistance to Soviet expansionism; and b) that a relationship of trust can develop with a communist system—which is utterly naive. When disguised in diplomatic jargon, communist newspeak is very dangerous because many in the West fail to perceive it as such.

These are some of the recent lines of Soviet propaganda: Western Europe is invited to "overcome Yalta" by establishing closer ties with Eastern European states, which are in fact the hostages of the Soviet Union. Of course, it cannot be denied that there are real centrifugal tendencies among the East European countries. But in a typically Leninist way, the Soviets are trying to turn this minus into a plus. "Reformist" Hungary and "patriotic" East Germany are therefore allowed to stress their commitment to detente, and to inter-European exchanges of all kinds, in the shadow of the two allegedly reluctant superpowers. But if we recall that Moscow has recently placed great emphasis on "technological and economic integration" with Eastern Europe, it is not hard to tell who will ultimately benefit from "inter-European" detente.

This example illustrates our main contention. Soviet propaganda is growing more sophisticated. It seems to display a greater willingness than ever before to make concessions, even unexpected ones, to achieve its goals. We must remember, however, that the great concessions made by the Bolsheviks in the treaty of Brest-Litovsk were the initial basis of the Soviet empire.

NOTES

1. See, for example, *Pravda*, January 10, 1986.
2. *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, January 29, 1986.
3. *Pravda*, January 22, 1986.
4. See *Radio Free Europe Research*, February 14, 1986, part III.
5. See *Radio Free Europe Research*, December 20, 1985, Part I.

APPENDIX A

Excerpts From Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Final Act, Helsinki, 1975

Co-operation in Humanitarian and Other Fields

The participating States,

Desiring to contribute to the strengthening of peace and understanding among peoples and to the spiritual enrichment of the human personality without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion,

Conscious that increased cultural and educational exchanges, broader dissemination of information, contacts between people, and the solution of humanitarian problems will contribute to the attainment of these aims,

Determined therefore to co-operate among themselves, irrespective of their political, economic and social systems, in order to create better conditions in the above fields, to develop and strengthen existing forms of co-operation and to work out new ways and means appropriate to these aims,

Convinced that this co-operation should take place in full respect for the principles guiding relations among participating States as set forth in the relevant document,

Have adopted the following:

1. Human Contacts

The participating States,

Considering the development of contacts to be an important element in the strengthening of friendly relations and trust among peoples,

Affirming, in relation to their present effort to improve conditions in this area, the importance they attach to humanitarian considerations,

Desiring in this spirit to develop, with the continuance of detente, further efforts to achieve continuing progress in this field

And conscious that the questions relevant hereto must be settled by the States concerned under mutually acceptable conditions,

Make it their aim to facilitate freer movement and contacts, individually and collectively, whether privately or officially, among persons, institutions and organizations of the participating States, and to contribute to the solution of the humanitarian problems that arise in that connection,

Declare their readiness to these ends to take measures which they consider appropriate and to conclude agreements or arrangements among themselves, as may be needed, and

Express their intention now to proceed to the implementation of the following:

(a) Contacts and Regular Meetings on the Basis of Family Ties

In order to promote further development of contacts on the basis of family ties the participating States will favourably consider applications for travel with the purpose of allowing persons to enter or leave their territory temporarily, and on a regular basis if desired, in order to visit members of their families.

Applications for temporary visits to meet members of their families will be dealt with without distinction as to the country of origin or destination: existing requirements for travel documents and visas will be applied in this spirit. The preparation and issue of such documents and visas will be effected within reasonable time limits; cases of urgent necessity—such as serious illness or death—will be given priority treatment. They will take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that the fees for official travel documents and visas are acceptable.

They confirm that the presentation of an application concerning contacts on the basis of family ties will not modify the rights and obligations of the applicant or of members of his family.

(b) Reunification of Families

The participating States will deal in a positive and humanitarian spirit with the applications of persons who wish to be reunited with members of their family, with special attention being given to requests of an urgent character—such as requests submitted by persons who are ill or old.

They will deal with applications in this field as expeditiously as possible.

They will lower where necessary the fees charged in connection with these applications to ensure that they are at a moderate level.

Applications for the purpose of family reunification which are not granted may be renewed at the appropriate level and will be reconsidered at reasonably short intervals by the authorities of the country of residence

or destination, whichever is concerned; under such circumstances fees will be charged only when applications are granted.

Persons whose applications for family reunification are granted may bring with them or ship their household and personal effects; to this end the participating States will use all possibilities provided by existing regulations.

Until members of the same family are reunited meetings and contacts between them may take place in accordance with the modalities for contacts on the basis of family ties.

The participating States will support the efforts of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies concerned with the problems of family reunification.

They confirm that the presentation of an application concerning family reunification will not modify the rights and obligations of the applicant or of members of his family.

The receiving participating State will take appropriate care with regard to employment for persons from other participating States who take up permanent residence in that State in connection with family reunification with its citizens and see that they are afforded opportunities equal to those enjoyed by its own citizens for education, medical assistance and social security.

(c) Marriage between Citizens of Different States

The participating States will examine favourably and on the basis of humanitarian considerations requests for exit or entry permits from persons who have decided to marry a citizen from another participating State.

The processing and issuing of the documents required for the above purposes and for the marriage will be in accordance with the provisions accepted for family reunification.

In dealing with requests from couples from different participating States, once married, to enable them and the minor children of their marriage to transfer their permanent residence to a State in which either one is normally a resident, the participating States will also apply the provisions accepted for family reunification.

(d) Travel for Personal or Professional Reasons

The participating States intend to facilitate wider travel by their citizens for personal or professional reasons and to this end they intend in particular:

—gradually to simplify and to administer flexibly the procedures for exit and entry;

—to ease regulations concerning movement of citizens from the other participating States in their territory, with due regard to security requirements.

They will endeavour gradually to lower, where necessary, the fees for visas and official travel documents.

They intend to consider, as necessary, means—including, in so far as appropriate, the conclusion of multilateral or bilateral consular conventions or other relevant agreements or understandings—for the improvement of arrangements to provide consular assistance.

* * *

They confirm that religious faiths, institutions and organizations, practising within the constitutional framework of the participating States, and their representatives can, in the field of their activities, have contacts and meetings among themselves and exchange information.

(e) Improvement of Conditions for Tourism on an Individual or Collective Basis

The participating States consider that tourism contributes to a fuller knowledge of the life, culture and history of other countries, to the growth of understanding among peoples, to the improvement of contacts and to the broader use of leisure. They intend to promote the development of tourism, on an individual or collective basis, and, in particular, they intend:

—to promote visits to their respective countries by encouraging the provision of appropriate facilities and the simplification and expediting of necessary formalities relating to such visits;

—to increase, on the basis of appropriate agreements or arrangements where necessary, co-operation in the development of tourism, in particular by considering bilaterally possible ways to increase information relating to travel to other countries and to the reception and service of tourists, and other related questions of mutual interest.

(f) Meetings among Young People

The participating States intend to further the development of contacts and exchanges among young people by encouraging:

—increased exchanges and contacts on a short or long term basis among young people working, training or undergoing education through bilateral or multilateral agreements or regular programmes in all cases where it is possible;

—study by their youth organizations of the question of possible agreements relating to frameworks of multilateral youth co-operation;

—agreements or regular programmes relating to the organization of

exchanges of students, of international youth seminars, of courses of professional training and foreign language study;

—the further development of youth tourism and the provision to this end of appropriate facilities;

—the development, where possible, of exchanges, contacts and co-operation on a bilateral or multilateral basis between their organizations which represent wide circles of young people working, training or undergoing education;

—awareness among youth of the importance of developing mutual understanding and of strengthening friendly relations and confidence among peoples.

(g) Sport

In order to expand existing links and co-operation in the field of sport the participating States will encourage contacts and exchanges of this kind, including sports meetings and competitions of all sorts, on the basis of the established international rules, regulations and practice.

(h) Expansion of Contacts

By way of further developing contacts among governmental institutions and non-governmental organizations and associations, including women's organizations, the participating States will facilitate the convening of meetings as well as travel by delegations, groups and individuals.

Appendix B

US-Soviet Exchanges and Trade Unions

The policy (of denying US visas to Soviet labor officials) and rationale were restated in a letter from Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations Robert J. McCloskey to Representative Donald M. Fraser on July 6, 1976, who sought clarification of US policy. The letter also indicated that the policy did not violate the agreement on the free exchange of persons embodied in CSCE (Helsinki) Final Act of 1975. McCloskey wrote that "the provision for contacts and exchanges in the labor field was raised and discussed during the CSCE negotiations. In signing the agreement, all the participants were then aware of our longstanding policy and they accepted our position against inclusion of any reference to such exchanges. . . . We do not consider that the denial of visas to the Soviet labor representatives in any way diminishes our efforts to encourage the Soviet Union to improve its performance in the area of human rights embodied in the 'Basket Three' provisions of the Final Act." This position was restated by the Carter Administration. See the Secretary of State's *Second Annual Report to the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe*, December 1, 1976–June 1, 1977. Special Report No. 34, June 1977, p. 21.

[Excerpted from Roy Godson, *Labor in Soviet Global Strategy* (New York: National Strategy Information Center, 1984), pp. 69–70.)]

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Soviet human rights leader who was incarcerated in Soviet psychiatric hospitals. He is the author of *To Build a Castle* (Viking Press) and *Letters of a Russian Traveller* (Khronika Press). He was first arrested in June 1963 and was confined to a special psychiatric prison in Leningrad. He was released in February 1965, only to be imprisoned in December and was confined to various psychiatric prisons for eight months. After six months of freedom he was arrested once again and sentenced to a concentration camp for three years. After his release in January 1970 he spent a year extensively documenting the use of Soviet psychiatry as a means of repressing political dissenters. In March 1971, his famous "Appeal to Psychiatrists" was presented to the Western press. Nineteen days later he was once again arrested and was sentenced to two years in prison, five years in a concentration camp, and five years of internal exile. In December of 1976, he was exchanged for imprisoned Chilean Communist Party Secretary, Luis Corvalan Lepe.

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The 1975 Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, better known as the Helsinki Accords, was signed by the nations of Europe, the United States, and the Soviet Union. It contained three parts, or "baskets." An objective of the third "basket" was to provide for the free flow of ideas and movement of people in order to enhance East-West understanding and increase the chances for enduring peace and freedom.

As the Helsinki signatories were preparing in 1986 to review the overall Accords, and specifically to consider the Human Contacts provisions, the National Strategy Information Center convened an international panel to determine whether Moscow was exploiting the Accords, and, if so, to discuss an appropriate Western response. The resulting volume includes papers by *Roy Godson* on Soviet Active Measures; *Vladimir Bukovsky* on Soviet domestic propaganda regarding the Helsinki process; *Iain Elliot* on Soviet disinformation during the detente era; *Paul Anastasi* on the plight of Greek refugees from the Soviet bloc; *Bertil Haggman* on Soviet manipulation of East-West exchanges in the Scandinavian countries; and *Francoise Thom* on the evolution of Soviet propaganda themes under Mikhail Gorbachev.