

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: Bailey, Norman A.: Files
Folder Title: Eastern European Policy
(02/01/1982-02/02/1982)
Box: RAC Box 1

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digitized-textual-material>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:

<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/white-house-inventories>

Contact a reference archivist at: **reagan.library@nara.gov**

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/research-support/citation-guide>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name BAILEY, NORMAN: FILES

Withdrawer

RBW 2/5/2013

File Folder EASTERN EUROPEAN POLICY 02/01/1982-02/02/1982

FOIA

M452

Box Number 1

SHIFRINSON

15

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
153288	MEMO	WILLIAM STEARMAN TO WILLIAM CLARK RE. U.S. POLICY TOWARDS ROMANIA	2	2/1/1982	B1
153290	CABLE	BUCHAREST 0652 R 12/7/2016 M452/1	4	1/29/1982	B1
153292	MEMO	RICHARD PIPES TO CLARK RE. POLISH STRATEGY R 12/7/2016 M452/1	2	2/2/1982	B1
153293	SUMMARY	RE. POLAND R 12/7/2016 M452/1	2	ND	B1
153294	PAPER	RE. STRATEGY ON POLAND R 12/7/2016 M452/1	13	ND	B1
153296	PAPER	RE. WORKING GROUP ON POLISH DEBT [TABS A-C]	7	ND	B1
153298	MEMO	PAUL BREMER TO WILLIAM CLARK RE. STRATEGY ON POLAND R 12/7/2016 M452/1	1	2/1/1982	B1
153299	MEMO	NORMAN BAILEY TO CLARK RE. PROPOSED HAIG VISIT TO ROMANIA R 12/7/2016 M452/1	1	2/2/1982	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name BAILEY, NORMAN: FILES

Withdrawer

RBW 2/5/2013

File Folder EASTERN EUROPEAN POLICY 02/01/1982-02/02/1982

FOIA

M452

Box Number 1

SHIFRINSON

15

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
153300	MEMO	CLARK TO ALEXANDER HAIG RE. PROPOSED TRIP TO ROMANIA <i>R 12/7/2016 M452/1</i>	1	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

BAILEY, NORMAN: FILES

Withdrawer

RB 2/5/2013
W

File Folder

EASTERN EUROPEAN POLICY 02/01/1982-02/02/1982

FOIA

M452
SHIFRINSON

Box Number

1

15

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
153288	MEMO WILLIAM STEARMAN TO WILLIAM CLARK RE. U.S. POLICY TOWARDS ROMANIA	2	2/1/1982	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

15 3210

3

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER

PAGE 01 OF 02
EOB160

BUCHAREST 0652
AN002851

DTG: 291905Z JAN 82 PSN: 051890
TOR: 030/0206Z CSN: HCE848

DISTRIBUTION: BALY-01 NAU-01 PIPE-01 RENT-01 RUSS-01 SHOE-01
STER-01 TYSN-01 MYER-01 /009 A2

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
SIT: MCF NAN JP VP PUBS SIT EOB
EOB:

OP IMMED
STU1994
DE RUDKAR #0652/01 0291910
O 291905Z ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0000

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 BUCHAREST 0652

EXDIS
EUR/EE FOR DAS/SCANLAN
E. O. 12065: RDS-1 1/29/2002 (FUNDERBURK, DAVID B.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, RO, US
SUBJECT: MANIFESTATION OF ROMANIA'S RELATIVE INDEPENDENCE
REF: BUCHAREST 0638

1. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. BEGIN SUMMARY: THIS MESSAGE AMPLIFIES THE EMBASSY'S VIEWS PROVIDED IN REFTEL CONCERNING CEAUSESCU'S INVITATION TO THE SECRETARY TO VISIT BUCHAREST IN APPROXIMATELY 10 DAYS, AND DISCUSSES ROMANIAN PERCEPTIONS OF OUR CURRENT RELATIONSHIP AND OUR POLICY OF DIFFERENTIATION IN EASTERN EUROPE. END SUMMARY.
3. TO ASSIST THE DEPARTMENT IN ASSESSING THE ADVISABILITY OF ACCEPTING PRESIDENT CEAUSESCU'S INVITATION TO THE SECRETARY TO VISIT BUCHAREST, WE WANT TO STRESS THAT THIS IS A MATTER OF THE UTMOST SERIOUSNESS, IMPORTANCE AND URGENCY FOR CEAUSESCU AND THE FOREIGN POLICY LEADERSHIP, AND THAT FUNDAMENTAL ROMANIAN PERCEPTIONS OF THE WESTERN CONNECTION AND SPECIFICALLY RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES ARE AT STAKE HERE. WE HAVE BEEN GETTING MANY SIGNALS IN THE LAST FEW DAYS THAT THERE IS VERY STRONG CONCERN IN THE ROMANIAN LEADERSHIP THAT WE ARE TACITLY WITHDRAWING FROM OUR POLICY OF DIFFERENTIATION IN EASTERN EUROPE. ALL OF THIS IS COALESCING WITH FURTHER PERCEPTIONS HERE OF OUR APPARENTLY NEGATIVE REACTIONS TO ROMANIA'S VARIOUS REQUESTS OVER THE PAST FEW MONTHS FOR SOME MEASURE OF ASSISTANCE DURING THIS PERIOD OF INTENSE ECONOMIC/FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES.
4. WE BELIEVE THAT THE U. S. IS AT AN IMPORTANT DECISION POINT IN ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH ROMANIA AND THE PLACE THAT ROMANIA WILL OCCUPY IN OUR FOREIGN POLICY FRAMEWORK. IF THE DECISION IS TOWARDS IN EFFECT DISMANTLING THE DIFFERENTIATION POLICY BETWEEN EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND THE USSR, THE FUNDAMENTAL BASIS OF OUR PRESENT RELATIONSHIP WITH ROMANIA IS UNDERCUT. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT ROMANIA'S PURSUIT OF AN "INDEPENDENT" FOREIGN POLICY AND A CLEAR CUT WESTERN CONNECTION ON BALANCE HAS POSITIVE ASPECTS FOR OUR SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY INTERESTS.
5. WE OFFER THE FOLLOWING MANIFESTATIONS OF ROMANIA'S PURSUIT OF A POLICY OF RELATIVE FOREIGN POLICY INDEPENDENCE BELIEVING THAT AS A WHOLE THEY ILLUSTRATE THAT THIS INDEPENDENCE HAS BEEN IN OUR OWN INTEREST AND

DECLASSIFIED

NLRM4521 #153290

BY RW NARA DATE 12/1/00

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER

PAGE 02 OF 02 BUCHAREST 0652

DTG: 291905Z JAN 82 PSN: 051890

IN THE OVERALL WESTERN INTEREST AND THAT WE SHOULD
CONTINUE TO ENCOURAGE IT.

(A) ROMANIA, THOUGH A MEMBER OF THE WARSAW PACT,
DOES NOT ALLOW ITS TROOPS TO PARTICIPATE IN
MANEUVERS IN OTHER COUNTRIES NOR OTHER PACT FORCES TO
ENTER ITS OWN TERRITORY.

(B) ROMANIA REFUSED TO INCREASE ITS DEFENSE
EXPENDITURES IN NOVEMBER OF 1978 WHEN THE SOVIETS URGED
ALL PACT MEMBERS TO DO SO. SINCE THEN IT HAS PUBLICLY
REDUCED ARMS EXPENDITURES.

(C) ROMANIA HAS TAKEN A RELATIVELY EVEN-
HANDED STANCE TOWARD THE INF ISSUE, OUTLINING BOTH
THE AMERICAN AND SOVIET POSITIONS AND URGING SUCCESSFUL
NEGOTIATIONS.

(D) ROMANIA, UNLIKE OTHER WARSAW PACT STATES,
NEVER ATTACKS AMERICAN MOTIVATIONS ON FOREIGN POLICY
QUESTIONS. WHEN IT DOES CRITICIZE US, AS IN THE CASE OF
THE POLISH SANCTIONS, IT ADDRESSES ITSELF TO OUR
ACTIONS, BUT NOT TO OUR BASIC ATTITUDE.

(E) ROMANIA HAS MADE IT PLAIN THAT WERE THERE A
WARSAW PACT INTERVENTION IN POLAND, IT WOULD NOT
PARTICIPATE, JUST AS IT DID NOT JOIN IN THE 1968
INTERVENTION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER

PAGE 01 OF 02 BUCHAREST 0652
EOB158 AN002852

DTG: 291905Z JAN 82 PSN: 051891
TOR: 030/0208Z CSN: HCE849

DISTRIBUTION: BALY-01 NAU-01 PIPE-01 RENT-01 RUSS-01 SHOE-01
STER-01 TYSN-01 MYER-01 /009 A2

DISTRIBUTION: ISEC-01 /001 A2

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
SIT:
EOB:

OP IMMED
STU1961
DE RUDKAR #0652/02 0291935
O 291905Z ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0000

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 BUCHAREST 0652

EXDIS

(F) ROMANIA IS THE ONLY COMMUNIST NATION WHICH HAS DIPLOMATIC AND TRADE TIES WITH ISRAEL. IT HAS PLAYED A USEFUL ROLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST DIPLOMATICALLY (EASING THE SADAT-BEGIN RAPPROACHMENT) AND IN OTHER WAYS (FACILITATING THE SHAH'S OIL SHIPMENTS TO ISRAEL.)

(G) ROMANIA REFUSED TO GO ALONG WITH THE SOVIET EFFORT TO GAIN UNANIMOUS SUPPORT FOR AN ANTI-AMERICAN DECLARATION ON CUBA AT A NOVEMBER 1981 MOSCOW CONFERENCE OF SECRETARIES OF RULING COMMUNIST PARTIES.

(H) ROMANIA HAS REFUSED TO RECOGNIZE THE VIETNAMESE INSTALLED REGIME IN PHNOM PENH AND HAS GENERALLY FRUSTRATED SOVIET EFFORTS TO GAIN GREATER ACCEPTANCE OF THAT ENTITY, EVEN WITHIN THE WARSAW PACT AND CEMA.

(I) ROMANIA, UNLIKE THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE WARSAW PACT, HAS EXCELLENT RELATIONS WITH THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

(J) ROMANIA HAS MADE A SERIOUS LONG-TERM EFFORT TO INCREASE ITS PARTICIPATION IN THE WORLD ECONOMY AND TO AVOID DEPENDENCE ON THE SOVIETS AND THE REST OF CEMA. WITNESS:

--- ROMANIA HAS OVER ONE BILLION DOLLARS A YEAR IN BILATERAL TRADE WITH THE U.S.M;

--- ROMANIA PARTICIPATES IN THE IMF, THE WORLD BANK, AND THE GATT;

--- ROMANIA BROKE RANKS WITH THE REST OF CEMA AND ENTERED INTO A BILATERAL AGREEMENT WITH THE EEC;

--- ROMANIA IN 1975 WAS THE FIRST CEMA COUNTRY TO SIGN A TRADE AGREEMENT WITH THE U.S.;

--- ROMANIA HAS OVER 50 PERCENT OF ITS TRADE WITH THE WEST AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD AND THE AMOUNT IS INCREASING;

--- SINCE 1972 ROMANIA HAS QUALIFIED UNDER THE GENERAL SYSTEM OF TARIFF PREFERENCES (GSP) GRANTED BY THE U.S. AND OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES TO THE DEVELOPING WORLD;

(K) ROMANIA WAS THE ONLY WARSAW PACT STATE WHICH REFUSED TO SUPPORT THE SOVIET POSITION ON THE UNGA RESOLUTIONS ON AFGHANISTAN.

(L) ROMANIA IS THE ONLY WARSAW PACT COUNTRY TO MAINTAIN THAT INTERNATIONAL DISCUSSION OF ITS HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES IS LEGITIMATE AND, IN FACT, TO ENGAGE IN A HUMAN RIGHTS ROUNDTABLE WITH THE U.S.

(M) ROMANIA WAS THE ONLY WARSAW PACT NATION TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER

PAGE 02 OF 02 BUCHAREST 0652

DTG: 291905Z JAN 82 PSN: 051891

CRITICIZE THE SOVIET INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND THE
VIETNAMESE INVASION OF KAMPUCHEA.

(N) WE HAVE CONSTRUCTED WITH THE ROMANIANS A NETWORK
OF POLITICAL, COMMERCIAL, CULTURAL AND SCIENTIFIC TIES WHICH
HAVE OPERATED TO OUR BENEFIT AND WHICH MAY, IN TIME, CAUSE SOME
OPENING UP ON THE PART OF THE REGIME. IN THE MEANTIME, WE HAVE
BEEN ABLE TO CARRY OUT A SIGNIFICANT REFUGEE PROGRAM AND MAKE
REPRESENTATIONS, OFTEN SUCCESSFULLY, ON BEHALF
OF INDIVIDUAL DISSIDENTS.

IN SUM, ROMANIA IS A NATION WHICH, WHILE MAINTAINING ITS OWN
ORTHODOX COMMUNIST REGIME AND EVER MINDFUL OF THE FACT THAT
GEOGRAPHY HAS MADE IT A NEIGHBOR OF THE SOVIET UNION, HAS SOUGHT
TO ASSERT ITS INDEPENDENCE. IT HAS DONE SO ECONOMICALLY AS WELL
AS POLITICALLY. IT IS IN OUR INTEREST TO DO WHAT WE CAN IN A
CAREFULLY CONSIDERED AND PRAGMATIC WAY, TO ENCOURAGE THIS EFFORT.
HOW WE BEHAVE TOWARD ROMANIA NOW WILL NOT JUST BE NOTED BY ITS
PRESENT RULERS, BUT BY THEIR SUCCESSORS AND THOSE WHO MAY IN TIME
LEAD THE OTHER STATES OF EASTERN EUROPE. SHOWING THAT SUCH A
POLICY OF INDEPENDENCE WILL ELICIT A POSITIVE RESPONSE FROM THE
CHIEF POWER OF THE WEST IS IN OUR STRATEGIC AND POLITICAL IN-
TEREST AS WELL AS IN OUR ECONOMIC INTEREST.

FUNDERBURK

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

February 2, 1982

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: RICHARD PIPES *RP*

SUBJECT: State Papers on our Polish Strategy and Next Steps Against the USSR

Attached are two papers: a longer one (Tab I), which discusses at some length sensitive aspects of our options vis-a-vis Poland, the Soviet Union and other unfriendly powers; and a briefer appendix (Tab II) which deals with the Polish debt and the punitive options still available. (TS)

The "Top Secret/Sensitive" version of the paper "Strategy on Poland: Possible Next Steps Against the USSR" (Tab I) provides a comprehensive and realistic assessment of the following topics: the current situation in Poland; U.S. policy objectives in the current crisis; the actions taken so far and their impact; the options for further action with their benefits and costs. The paper does not make specific recommendations. (TS)

I find myself in overall agreement with the description of the current situation, the assessments of the impact of the measures so far taken by us, and analysis of the pros and cons of further sanctions. I do have a few critical observations, however, most of them of a minor nature, one more significant:

- The paper exaggerates the importance of a "friendly" Poland to the Soviet Union when it declares it to be "absolutely critical to the USSR's vital security interests" (page 1). A neutral Poland could well serve the same end: we need not accept Soviet rhetoric at face value.
- A Soviet invasion of Poland is far more likely to be triggered by the mutiny of the Polish armed forces than by civil disturbances (page 2).
- In discussing the impact of actual and potential sanctions on Soviet behavior, one should consider how they will affect future Soviet actions rather than actions already taken in Poland.
- The threat of a boycott of Soviet grain shipments by the Longshoremen deserves greater consideration than here given considering its impact on our possible decision to embargo grain and other commodities. (TS)

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Derivative from State

Review January 30, 2012

677

Barkley

MW
7

153292

*EE unless
already filed*

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M4521 #153292

BY *RW* NARA DATE *12/7/16*

My main objection applies to a critical statement in the section on "U.S. Objectives" (page 3, Tab I): "We seek to establish a sense that the U.S. is prepared to accept responsibilities of political and moral leadership -- without provoking confrontations with the USSR which could carry unacceptable risks in the nuclear age". This is language of the detente era which runs entirely contrary to the rest of the paper where a variety of options is discussed every one of which entails confrontation with the Soviet Union. If the drafters of this document mean "military confrontation" they ought to say so. Otherwise, it should be obvious that political and economic confrontation is inherent in our current reactions to the Polish crisis as well as to Soviet actions in other parts of the world. The insertion of this fundamental (and fundamentally inappropriate) phrase in this document indicates that there is urgent need for the NSC to take up before too long the whole issue of our basic strategy toward the Soviet Union. An ambitious interagency paper on "East-West Relations" has been awaiting such discussion since last spring. There is also my more theoretical paper "Reagan Soviet Policy", which the President has read. (TS)

Norman Bailey, William Stearman and Henry Nau concur.

*NB
See Attached
memo*

15329

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Executive Summary

We are approaching an important crossroads in response to the situation in Poland. Our response will have a critical impact on our relations with the Allies, the Soviets and the Poles. The Soviets consider a "friendly" Poland vital to their security interests and unless they accurately perceive the seriousness with which we view their actions, we will lose any chance for influence over the outcome of the Polish crisis and undermine our international credibility.

The situation in Poland is deteriorating. We foresee four general types of scenarios: 1) large scale bloodshed followed by a Soviet invasion; 2) short term maintenance of order by force but longer term instability; 3) an incremental but largely cosmetic restoration of human rights; 4) return to dialogue and reform;

The overall objective of the US is to maintain our capacity for world leadership by countering adverse trends in the world power balance. Our specific objectives for the Polish crisis are:

--To induce the Soviets and Poles to permit a restoration of important pre-December 13 gains in Poland.

--To drive home to Moscow that the price will be high in U.S.-Soviet relations if it stays on its present course. We should not be diverted by cosmetic adjustments of martial law.

--To gain allied support for strong action against Moscow, such as a selective embargo or a halt of the pipeline.

--To demonstrate to the American people that we are living up to our moral and political responsibilities.

The measures we have already taken have sent a strong political signal to Moscow and have imposed some cost. Our Allies are moving in the right direction, although slowly and unevenly. In considering options for next steps we must realize that:

--It is possible that nothing we do in the short-term may be enough, but over the longer-term united Western action can have an important impact.

--There is no compelling reason to hold back on tough measures. The time to exercise maximum leverage is now.

--The West's primary leverage is economic, but it is effective only if the Alliance is united.

DECLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

NLRR M45211 #153297
BY RW NARA DATE 12/7/00

--There is no hope of getting tough Allied action unless we are willing to take new tough steps ourselves.

--Our sanctions--and those of the Europeans--will have to be linked to Poland. Thus we will have to accept the principle of reversibility, while making clear that we continue to object to the pipeline.

--We are facing considerable domestic pressure to move forward with more energetic measures.

Beyond judicious use of the limited leverage inherent in the massive Polish debt to the West, our options are:

(1) To hold in abeyance new unilateral measures, while we continue to seek Allied agreement on specific actions. This would maximize the likelihood of united Western action. We would, however, be vulnerable to the charge that we are long on rhetoric and short on action.

(2) To take new intermediate steps against the USSR, possibly including a selective embargo on non-agricultural exports. This would have an economic impact on the Soviets with a minimal cost to us. This would not entail U.S. sacrifices sufficient to induce strong action by our Allies.

(3) To ban all exports to the USSR not covered by existing contracts, including or exempting grain. If grain were included and other exporters cooperated, this would impose substantial economic costs on the Soviets. Without such cooperation, it still increases our chances of strong Allied actions. In either case it could trigger the Farm Bill parity payment provision.

(4) To impose a total export embargo against the USSR. This would have the greatest economic impact on the Soviets with Allied support and could influence the course of events in Poland. U.S. farmers would be hurt and if the Allies did not join us, anti-European sentiments in the U.S. would grow.

(5) Take actions to hit the Soviets in other regions, such as Afghanistan, Cuba, and Libya. These actions would not require Allied cooperation, and they are likely to be required in any event on their own merits. There is a risk of a wider confrontation with Moscow and a shift of attention from Soviet to U.S. "aggression". Also they would not immediately be linked to Poland, and as a legal matter, some of them could be regarded as an unlawful use of force.

~~TOP SECRET~~

/SENSITIVE

153294
~~DECLASSIFIED~~

NLRR M4521 #153294
BY RW NARA DATE 12/7/16

STRATEGY ON POLAND:
POSSIBLE NEXT STEPS AGAINST THE U.S.S.R.

I. ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION

We are approaching a crossroads over Poland, and our handling of the situation will have far-reaching implications for U.S. foreign policy, particularly the future of our relations with the Soviets, the Poles, and the Western Alliance. Unless we continue clearly to demonstrate our seriousness in this crisis, the Soviets may draw conclusions that could lead them to test our resolve at other critical points over the next three years.

The Soviet Stake in Poland:

The Soviets consider a "friendly" Poland absolutely critical to the U.S.S.R.'s vital security interests. Poland has historically been an avenue for invasion of Russia, and, since World War II, it has been the essential line of communication to Soviet ground forces in Germany. From the political perspective, maintenance of the status quo in Poland preserves the post-war division of Germany and ensures the continued existence of a "world socialist community".

Although the Soviets have historically been willing to tolerate some deviations from the Poles, the Soviet-instigated Polish crackdown demonstrated that Moscow remains prepared to risk bloodshed and increased international tension in order to retain control over events in Poland. This was true after Yalta; it is still true after Helsinki.

West European Dimension:

In defending what it sees as its critical interests in Poland, Moscow seeks to play upon divisions of the West. The Soviets see West Europeans as inclined to accept Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe and less willing than the United States to forgo the benefits of "detente." These divisions in the West were one among many reasons why the U.S.S.R. rejected the option of a direct invasion--which would have united us and the allies--instead pressuring the Polish Government into brutal repression. This suggests that allied support for U.S. policy toward Poland can have an important impact on Soviet conduct.

The Outlook in Poland:

Moscow will continue to press the Polish martial law regime to crush Solidarity and restore the kind of orderly, if economically inefficient, Polish dictatorship the Soviets feel they

~~TOP SECRET~~

/SENSITIVE

RDS-3 1/28/12

can comfortably control. The martial law regime has achieved its initial objective of suppressing active resistance, but is perplexed as to where to go from there. Even regime spokesmen admit privately that the generals in charge have neither a policy for solving the country's problems nor the political talent to develop and implement one. Despite the decapitation of Solidarity, passive resistance continues and there are signs that it could become active. The economy was in shambles before December 13; it has steadily worsened since. Little or no progress has been made in rebuilding the shattered Polish Communist Party, and conflict continues between orthodox hardliners and more pragmatic elements within the leadership. The regime has been moving to fend off resistance and further Western sanctions by cosmetic adjustments of the martial law regime, but the generals know they have not yet begun to deal with Poland's overwhelming problems.

It is impossible to predict with any certainty what will occur in Poland in the next 12-18 months. There are a wide range of possible scenarios. But we believe these can be grouped within four broad categories:

(1) A Soviet invasion, most probably resulting from large scale bloodshed among the Poles. Such bloodshed could occur in a variety of ways: as a consequence of intensified repression, from increased food shortages, or from some other triggering of the pent-up bitterness and frustration now held in check by Polish security forces. Should the Soviets intervene, Western leverage for any amelioration of repression would largely vanish. But the likelihood of bringing the Allies along in the imposition of major, far reaching sanctions against the Soviets would greatly improve.

(2) Continuation, largely unchanged, of Martial Law. While economic deterioration would continue, the government might succeed in keeping the lid on by heavy reliance on its security organs. Despite its potential instability, such an outcome would represent a victory, albeit perhaps temporary, for the Soviets. This situation would be the most susceptible to Western leverage. But the instability inherent in martial law would make Polish leaders fearful of moving too far, too rapidly. The Soviets could be expected to keep heavy pressure on Jaruzelski not to make substantial compromises.

(3) An incremental and partial restoration of human rights. In an effort to undercut our efforts to gain allied support, the Polish Government might move to restore a sense of normalcy to Poland by taking highly publicized steps such as the release of a large number of prisoners and the opening of a limited dialogue with the Church and some elements of Solidarity. The central aspects of martial law - e.g. the high degree of control currently being exerted by Polish security organs - would continue. If carried out well by the Poles, this would be the most difficult scenario for the West to deal with. It would particularly complicate efforts to maintain a

unified Western position toward returning to business as usual with Moscow and Warsaw.

(4) A return to dialogue and reform, holding open the possibility for further political and social evolution. This would require that the Polish regime (with at least tacit Soviet acquiescence) see no viable long-term alternative to developing a relationship with the Church and the working class that preserves a significant number of the gains made since August 1980, and which guarantees the Soviets' basic interests. The security apparatus would undoubtedly remain active enough to assure the Soviets and the Polish establishment that control would not again be threatened. But, if this resulted in real latitude for trade unions and the Church, it would preserve the possibility of future peaceful change in Poland and other East European countries. The Soviets, however, could be expected to maintain their campaign of calculated pressure to limit the extent of the Polish Government concessions.

It is becoming clear that the Soviets now foresee a lengthy process with an uncertain outcome. Whatever the next year brings for Poland, the Soviets face inevitable long-term pressure for change throughout Eastern Europe. However, recent events in Poland suggest that the Soviets will continue to react to such pressures by taking whatever steps are necessary, including the use of force, to preserve their hegemony in Eastern Europe. Gromyko's categoric rejection of Secretary Haig's presentation on Poland at their Geneva meeting is further evidence of Soviet determination to implement this view of its security interests in Eastern Europe. Thus, Poland in the near term, and the entire region over time will remain a source of tension in East/West relations.

II. U.S. OBJECTIVES

Poland relates to so many fundamentals (the future of Eastern Europe, the Alliance, Soviet security, American political and moral leadership) that our objectives must be placed in the context of our overall foreign policy. Our overall objective is to maintain U.S. capacity for world leadership by halting and if possible reversing adverse trends in the world power balance over the last decade or more. But we recognize that we must navigate through a period of some vulnerability as we rebuild our strength.

Thus we seek to establish a sense that the U.S. is prepared to accept the responsibilities of political and moral leadership --without provoking confrontations with the U.S.S.R. which could carry unacceptable risks in the nuclear age. Since our response to the Polish crisis will inevitably be regarded as a critical test of our ability to meet this longer-term challenge, our policy must be both prudent and effective. In this sense, we face an historic juncture in Poland, and our

~~TOP SECRET~~

/SENSITIVE

- 4 -

actions will have profound consequences for the future across a broad front of basic U.S. interests.

This strategic objective and the analysis of the concrete situation set forth in Section I dictate the following specific objectives for the U.S. response to the Polish crisis:

- Toward the situation within Poland, to secure the agreed Western objectives of lifting martial law, release of detainees, and restoration of a minimum of freedom (e.g. for trade union activity), without creating a public perception that we are responsible should there be a violent ending.
- Toward the Soviet Union, to drive home that the U.S.S.R. will pay a heavy price in U.S.-Soviet relations if it continues on its present course in Poland, without seeming to threaten vital Soviet security interests to the point of direct confrontation.
- Toward the Alliance, to exert strong pressures and leadership for concrete measures, without pushing so hard that we tear the Alliance apart (recognizing that a divided alliance deprives us of much of our ability to affect Soviet behavior).
- Toward the American people, to demonstrate that we are living up to our moral and political responsibilities, without creating expectations that cannot be fulfilled given the present balance of forces, Poland's geographical situation, the State of the Alliance, our economy, etc.

III. ACTIONS AND IMPACT TO DATE

We must view the situation to date both in terms of our own actions and the overall situation facing the U.S.S.R. and Poland.

A. Specific Actions

The specific actions we and our Allies have taken to date represented a measured response which has imposed a cost on the USSR.

--The package of economic and political measures against the Soviet Union announced on December 29 was deliberately restrained in order to send a primarily political signal to Moscow of our readiness to impose more substantial costs if the repression was not brought to an early end. Specifically, we: (1) suspended Aeroflot service; (2) closed the Soviet Purchasing Commission; (3) suspended issuance of licenses for high-technology exports; (4) halted exports for the oil and gas industry;

~~TOP SECRET~~

/SENSITIVE

(5) suspended talks on a new maritime agreement and imposed strict controls on Soviet access to U.S. ports; (6) refused to set a date for talks on a new long-term grains agreement; (7) decided not to renew three bilateral cooperation agreements that expire this year. We also have stepped up VOA broadcasting to the U.S.S.R. by the introduction of medium-wave frequencies.

--At the January 11 Ministerial and follow-up meeting on January 23, the Allies moved closer to getting on board with modest political actions versus the Soviets. A number of Allies, under EC-10 aegis, are prepared to limit selected imports of manufactured and luxury goods from the USSR (although not oil or other raw materials). The EC Foreign Ministers have decided to recommend to the OECD a more restrictive status for the USSR, effectively raising the interest rate for credits to that country. Several Allies are considering tightened travel controls on Soviet diplomats and nonrenewal of exchange agreements. On the most prominent economic issue, the Siberian Pipeline Project, the Italians have advocated "a pause" in negotiations, but French companies on January 23 signed a major contract with the Soviets for purchase of natural gas from the future pipeline. Meanwhile, the Allies have agreed to suspend rescheduling of the Polish debt, as well as to suspend all export credits to Poland.

B. IMPACT

This listing of specific actions misses the larger consequences for the Soviets. Prior to the December 13th repression, US-Soviet INF negotiations were moving ahead, it appeared that a beginning date for START might be announced at the Haig/Gromyko meeting, there were massive demonstrations in Europe primarily directed against U.S. nuclear deployments, and the Soviets' "Peace" offensive threatened to drive a wedge between the Allies. Since then, START has been postponed indefinitely and another burden added to INF, there have been significant demonstrations against the repression, the "peace movement" in Western Europe is, at least for the moment, less effective, and the Allies have been moving, albeit slowly and unevenly, in an anti-Soviet direction. Allied Ministers will be at our side condemning the Soviets when the CSCE meeting resumes.

In terms of Poland itself, before December 13th the West had provided Poland with some assistance in dealing with its massive economic problems. Now the future of Western aid is much more problematical, thus adding to the economic drain of the Polish crisis on the Soviet Union. It is clear that the Polish regime is already feeling pain as a result of this stance. We should, of course, do everything possible to maximize these economic and political costs to the Soviet Union.

Within Poland, even our modest response has given heart to those who wish to save as much of the achievements of the past year and a half as can be saved. The Polish Council of Bishops and leading Polish intellectuals recently denounced the regime in language that reads like an echo of the President's December 23 statement and the January 11 NATO declaration.

On the other hand, the Soviets have achieved their minimum objectives in Poland -- restoring order and Soviet control over the situation -- without having to resort to direct military intervention. Thus they have staved off, at least for the present, a strategic loss in Poland at the cost of exposing the bankruptcy of the Soviet-imposed system, as well as a potentially serious turn-down in East-West relations, and a new crisis in relations with the largest communist party in Western Europe.

IV. OPTIONS

The following general considerations will have to be taken into account as we review our options:

1. It is possible that nothing we can do in the short term will be enough to induce Moscow to back away from its determination to crush Polish renewal. However, over the longer term there is a chance that, by imposing real costs on Moscow, we can exert some leverage in inducing Soviet and Polish moderation.
2. There is no reason to hold tough economic measures in reserve pending direct Soviet military intervention. Once a Soviet decision to intervene is made, we will not be able to reverse it by imposing additional economic and political sanctions.
3. We will be under considerable domestic pressure to move forward with more energetic measures in the near future. If Lane Kirkland should follow through on his threat to create a de facto embargo through labor action (which he may not be able to do), the costs to the domestic economy would be as great as if we had instituted a de jure embargo, but we would have gained little or no leverage vis a vis our allies or the Soviets. The result would be a blow to our international credibility which could have far reaching implications.
4. The primary, although still marginal, leverage available to the West is economic, but the U.S. alone cannot do enough to produce an effective response (although leverage can be exercised unilaterally on the debt issue). If we cannot bring the Allies along, we may well not be able to achieve the objectives outlined above.
5. There is no hope of getting European agreement on tough and painful action, unless they believe we are making corresponding sacrifices ourselves. Specifically, they see a direct relationship between the kind of tough European sanctions we are asking for and our grain sales. Without a grain embargo, we have no hope of stopping or even suspending the pipeline or of gaining European agreement to other tough measures, such as a partial embargo. At the same time, while tough U.S. action is necessary to achieve comparable European measures, it still may not be sufficient. We may also have to express our willingness to share the costs of sanctions that penalize our Allies disproportionately.

6. We will have to wrestle with two thorny aspects of the question of reversibility--the sure growth of pressure to reverse and the adverse effects on our international credibility of doing so. Our sanctions are linked to Soviet behavior toward Poland and should be reversible, to give the U.S.S.R. an incentive to moderate its repression, but the sorry post-Afghanistan experience suggests that erosion is almost inevitable over time, whether or not the Soviets change the behavior which caused sanctions to be imposed. We and the Allies are certain to disagree on when the lifting of sanctions is justified, and these differences undoubtedly will be exacerbated by Soviet and Polish adjustments of the martial law regime designed to create an appearance of improvement. Moreover, erosion of sanctions over time could force us to consider a reversal of our policy without evidence of real improvement in Poland, thus acknowledging the defeat of our strategy.

7. It may not serve our interests to suggest that all sanctions should be reversible. This is particularly true of the pipeline, since we would continue to oppose the project (while working to develop energy alternatives) independent of the Polish situation. On balance, however, the Europeans will only agree to sanctions if they are linked explicitly to Poland, and we will have to accept the principle of reversibility if we are to obtain the cooperation of Europeans -- and Americans -- who will be asked to sacrifice. Thus, we have to be prepared to accept a reversible halt to the pipeline.

8. In political terms, reversing at some future point in time sanctions we impose will carry a heavy price, both domestically and internationally, if the objectives we attach to them now have not been met. If erosion of sanctions or domestic political pressure forced us to remove the sanctions without achieving our objectives, the implications for our credibility with Moscow and in our international relationships more generally would be immense and long-lasting. In economic terms, the cost of many possible sanctions is not reversible -- trade, major contracts and associated jobs lost and future US competitiveness diminished by casting a shadow across the image of the United States as a reliable trading partner. The economic effects feed back into and reinforce the domestic political cost already noted.

Polish Debt:

A possibility which should be considered whatever else we choose to do is to continue to refuse to reschedule Poland's 1982 debt.

The act of calling in Poland's debt would have highly negative consequences. The Soviets may have to choose between paying off the Polish debt or being open to the risk that other creditors (private and/or official) would then call a formal default on Poland's other loans and thereby undermine the credit position of the entire Eastern Bloc. However, an SSG

~~TOP SECRET~~

/SENSITIVE

- 8 -

paper (at TAB A) concludes that the Soviets in all likelihood would be affected only indirectly (through reduced availability of Western credit) by a Polish default and that the international monetary system would suffer a severe blow if the default spread to other Eastern European countries. The irreversible step of calling in Poland's debt or an overt threat to do so would also provoke a serious fissure in the Alliance. An overt threat carries the additional risks of panicking private creditors into precipitating default and encouraging the Allies to settle with the Polish Government as preferred creditors.

This suggests that the leverage we derive from Poland's massive foreign debt is both limited and difficult to use. Nevertheless, a Presidential reiteration of our established policy that Government-to-Government debt cannot be rescheduled until internal conditions in Poland warrant should be considered as an adjunct to the following specific options.

OPTION 1

Continue with our current efforts to gain Allied agreement to take specific actions against the U.S.S.R., while for the present holding in abeyance new unilateral U.S. steps. Our interim objective would be to bring the Allies as close as possible to the point we reached with our December 29 measures, while holding open our options for future U.S. actions either with or without the Allies. At the same time, we would use events such as the February 9 resumption of the Madrid meeting, on which we have already achieved a considerable degree of Allied unity, to keep public pressure on the Soviets.

Pros:

This course would build upon the degree of Allied unity already achieved, and thus maximize the likelihood of united Western action against the Soviets and the Polish military. It would avoid the political fire we would come under if we announced another series of "half-measures." It would not preclude our taking more severe steps at a later stage, if conditions in Poland warrant.

Cons:

This option would expose us to further charges that we are long on rhetoric but short on action. It might also lead to increased pressure or unilateral action by Kirkland. Depending on how long we delayed and on the course of events in Poland, this course could have profound consequences for our credibility with the Poles, the Soviets, the Allies and the American people.

OPTION 2:

Further intermediate measures against the U.S.S.R. There are numerous mixes of measures which could be adopted within

~~TOP SECRET~~

/SENSITIVE

~~TOP SECRET~~

/SENSITIVE

- 9 -

this option, the effects of which can be tailored to fall at various points within the broad gap between Options 1 (no new actions) and 3 (a relatively sweeping action package). A list and brief discussion of a number of such measures is at Tab C. In order to make clear that U.S. policy is steadily building, these could be implemented almost immediately and accompanied by a Presidential reiteration of the existing policy to suspend Polish debt rescheduling. They include:

- embargoing all industrial exports to the U.S.S.R. or at a minimum imposing more selective economic sanctions, such as a ban on chemical exports which focuses on the agricultural sector, including pesticides, fungicides, fertilizers and fertilizer ingredients (especially phosphates which alone could have a significant impact in the short to medium term on Soviet grain production), revoking already-issued licenses for exports such as International Harvester/Combine technology, suspending joint-venture fishing operations, etc.
- declaring a state of national emergency and imposing an embargo on all non-strategic imports from the Soviet Union;
- discouraging tourism to the USSR;
- reducing Soviet commercial representation in the U.S. to a skeletal force;
- suspending activities under existing bilateral exchange agreements, or even abrogation of all remaining agreements;
- not setting date for grain consultations scheduled this spring. Up to now we have avoided violating any existing agreements with the USSR. This step and the one above would be a departure from this policy.

Pros:

An embargo on all industrial exports, particularly on chemicals, would impose significant costs on the Soviets, although it would not affect the item that accounts for two-thirds of our exports to the U.S.S.R., grain. The other measures would enhance the political impact of this step and would involve only minimal costs to us. Taken together, however, these steps would seem to foreshadow a full embargo, thus possibly increasing our leverage.

Cons:

Singling out industrial exports would be a departure from the President's position that all sectors should share equally the burden of any future economic sanctions against Moscow. At

~~TOP SECRET~~

/SENSITIVE

~~TOP SECRET~~

/SENSITIVE

- 10 -

the same time this would not entail U.S. sacrifices sufficient to induce the Allies to curtail their own far more extensive exports to the U.S.S.R. Cuts in exchanges and commercial representation might be emulated by the Allies, but these steps could be criticized by the U.S. public as inadequate half-measures that fail to live up to our rhetorical condemnation of Soviet actions in Poland.

Option 3:

A ban on all exports to the USSR not covered by existing contracts either covering all items or exempting agricultural trade. Exempting agricultural trade would involve less domestic costs, but would make our action less credible to our Allies, who allege that the U.S. is only taking actions which don't hurt itself. Including agricultural trade, however, could trigger the legal obligation to compensate producers under the Farm Bill, which is not clear on this point.

Pros:

This would impose substantial economic costs on the Soviets (particularly if agricultural trade were included) by grinding U.S. trade with the USSR slowly to a halt without forcing suppliers with signed contracts to abrogate legal obligations. It would be consistent with our early 1981 discussions with the Allies in NATO, and thus easier for them to accept. If followed by Allies this would give real meaning to their pledge not to undercut U.S. restrictions.

Cons:

It would not have an immediate impact because of the exemption for deliveries under existing contracts. If it included grains, they would be affected faster than industrial goods. It could encourage our allies to increase pressure on us to exempt existing contracts from our previously announced oil and gas sanctions. Though this step would have a real bite over time, it might not be seen as forceful enough by our domestic critics. It could trigger the obligation to compensate producers under Section 1204 of the Farm Bill.

OPTION 4:

Total export embargo against the Soviets. One bold action would be for the U.S. to embargo all exports, including grain, to the U.S.S.R. Under current legislation, in order to embargo grain without triggering USG parity price payments (30 billion dollars per year), there must be a total export embargo. (see Tab B).

Pros:

This would impose the greatest economic costs on the Soviets of any option available to us. By demonstrating our

~~TOP SECRET~~

/SENSITIVE

~~TOP SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

- 11 -

readiness to make substantial economic sacrifices (especially in grain sales), it could help induce the Europeans to take comparably tough measures against Moscow, such as suspension of the pipeline project or a partial but significant embargo on their own industrial trade with the Soviets. Taken together, the U.S. and Allies actions might be costly enough to the Soviets, if sustained over time, to influence them to ease the repression in Poland.

Cons:

A total export embargo may not be enough to bring the Europeans along, and if implemented unilaterally, could exacerbate severe strains in the Alliance. Even if the Europeans did take parallel action, the Western embargo could begin to erode quickly with the Europeans undercutting or circumventing the restrictions as they did after Afghanistan, and with U.S. farmers ending up sacrificing billion of dollars in grain sales without comparable sacrifices by the Europeans. This is certain to amplify already growing anti-European sentiments in the U.S., leading to demands for U.S. troop withdrawal and ultimately weakening the Alliance to the point of irrelevancy. Moreover, to be fully effective, other grain exporting countries would have to join in. This may be possible with Australia, but unlikely with Canada and Argentina. Finally, a grain embargo could cost thousands of jobs in the U.S., and increase USG farm price support payments by 3 billion dollars per year.

Option 5

Actions to hit the Soviets in other regions. Recognizing that even the most serious U.S. and Allied sanctions may not succeed in changing Soviet behavior toward Poland, we should also give serious consideration to action in other regions to drive up the costs to Moscow of its international irresponsibility. These steps could be taken as an alternative to any of the actions set forth in options 1-4 or as a complement to them. In many cases, we have already made decisions to act against Soviet allies and proxies, and the actions we will be taking could be explicitly or implicitly linked to Poland either with the Soviets are publicly. We could also consider expanding the scope of action already decided upon as a direct response to the Polish crisis. In this connection, we would stress that our decisions reflect the overall determination of the Administration to counter Soviet use elsewhere of the kind of indirect military force which crushed the renewal movement in Poland. Possibilities include:

Actions Against Libya: The NSC is already scheduled on February 4 to consider new actions against Libya, including imposition of a U.S. oil boycott and termination of U.S. exports to Libya. We are also taking steps which could have the effect of making it illegal for American citizens to reside in Libya or work for the Libyan government. Since it is public

~~TOP SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

knowledge that these steps were under consideration before the Polish crackdown, it would be difficult for us to portray them as directly related to the Polish crisis. We could also hold another naval exercise in the Gulf of Sidra which would be a departure from our established yearly pattern of such exercises, and thus could be portrayed as a response to Poland. Such an exercise would, however, risk another U.S.-Libyan military confrontation and would be viewed as provocative both in Europe and in the Arab world.

Actions Against Soviet Forces in Afghanistan: We have already decided to increase assistance to the Afghan resistance. While this action was taken in connection with the Polish crisis, implementation of the program with the Pakistanis will have to be related to the requirements of the Afghan insurgency and Soviet troop reinforcement in Afghanistan. Given the logistical problems involved, there will almost certainly be a lead time of several months before the impact of our increased assistance is felt by the Soviets. This might be reduced somewhat by greater use of air shipment of items already committed in the pipeline. We have also approved plans for wider distribution of arms, particularly to insurgents along the Soviet border and to training insurgents for attacks on specific Soviet targets in Kabul, but these, also will require lead time. While immediate shipments of arms can come from the pipeline, ultimately supplementary funding will be required. Our relationship with Pakistan, on whom we are dependent for the arms supply program, requires that we maintain the covert character of these activities. This, of course, makes it impossible for us to use increased assistance to the Afghan resistance as an element in our public response to the Polish crisis.

Actions Against Cuba: There are a number of steps which we could take against Cuba or the Soviet presence in that country, some of which are already in the works. In accordance with NSDD 21, we will be moving in mid-February to black list ships calling at Cuban ports and restrict U.S. tourism to Cuba. We are also considering new restrictions on personnel assigned to the Cuban U.N. mission. It is public knowledge that steps of this type have been under consideration for some time, making it difficult for us to link them explicitly to Poland. We could move further in the political field by closing the U.S. and Cuban Interests Sections in Washington and Havana. There are also a number of military options: reinforcement of Guantanamo Naval Base construction of new military facilities in the region (Columbia, Honduras, Jamacia), increased U.S. naval and air presence in the area, accelerated covert actions in Central America, and the redeployment of U.S. military assets to the Gulf Coast states.

At the extreme, the U.S. could use military force against Cuba: air strikes against the recent delivery of Soviet MIG-23s, the naval base at Cienfuegos or Soviet radio and SIGINT installations in Cuba; a full scale strike to destroy

~~TOP SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

- 13 -

23

the Cuban air force and navy; and stepped up actions against Cuban forces in Africa through increased military assistance and expanded covert operations.

Analysis

The major issue in choosing this option is the tension between a) the desirability of our choosing where to respond so as to maximize our strengths and Soviet vulnerabilities, and b) the disadvantages of diverting attention from Soviet actions in Poland. In consideration of this tension, two factors are:

--the visibility of the U.S. action: covert actions may not become visible and may not, therefore, divert moral indignation from the Soviet action to our own. At the same time, covert actions do not permit us to make a public display of our determination which could be helpful in bringing the Allies along or in satisfying domestic political demands for tough action.

--the Allied response to Poland: the reason we do not want to divert attention from Poland is so that the Allies will not find an excuse to do less in response to the Soviet action there. If the Allies ultimately do little, or if what they do is largely irreversible, we may be less constrained.

Pros:

These actions would have the advantage of not requiring direct NATO cooperation, which would be difficult to achieve in the case of a total export embargo or an effort to call in Poland's debt. This option might therefore pose fewer risks of creating profound fissures within NATO (depending on the severity and success of the actions we take), and would drive up Soviet costs without dismantling the framework of the U.S.-Soviet bilateral relationship. The anti-Soviet sentiment aroused by the Polish crisis could result in greater public understanding and support for actions against Cuba and Libya.

Cons:

These actions would entail considerable risk and costs, including the risk of a wider confrontation with Moscow and a backlash on the part of the U.S. public and Allied publics and governments. By taking action against Cuba and Libya, we would shift attention from Polish and Soviet repression to "U.S. military aggression." Such actions could be seen more as an attempt to exact retribution than to affect outcomes in Poland. Because these actions may be justifiable on other grounds and were, in some cases, publicly discussed before the Polish crackdown, they would be difficult to reverse and thus questionable as responses to the Polish crisis.

The disadvantages of this option would be compounded because we could not, as a legal matter, rely on an asserted linkage to Poland to justify our actions against other countries.

~~TOP SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

BAILEY, NORMAN: FILES

Withdrawer

RB 2/5/2013
W

File Folder

EASTERN EUROPEAN POLICY 02/01/1982-02/02/1982

FOIA

M452
SHIFRINSON

Box Number

1

15

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
153296	PAPER RE. WORKING GROUP ON POLISH DEBT [TABS A-C]	7	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

National Security Council The White House

Package # 677

02-10-4 A 7: 21

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>X</u>	<u> </u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>M</u>	<u> </u>
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<u>2</u>	<u> </u>
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>I</u>
John Poindexter	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
Staff Secretary	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
Sit Room	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>

I-Information A-Action

DISTRIBUTION

CY To VP	<u> </u>	Show CC	<u> </u>
CY To Meese	<u> </u>	Show CC	<u> </u>
CY To Baker	<u> </u>	Show CC	<u> </u>
CY To Deaver	<u> </u>	Show CC	<u> </u>

Other

COMMENTS

IN THURSDAY'S N.C. MEMO
POLAND.

~~TOP SECRET~~

153290

32



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

0677

February 1, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Strategy on Poland: Possible Next Steps Against the USSR

Attached are two versions of the State paper on "Strategy on Poland: Possible Next Steps Against the USSR" which has been revised in light of the SIG meeting on Friday, January 29. One version of the paper, which is classified TOP SECRET, contains extremely sensitive information, and distribution of this version should be limited to Weinberger and Casey. The second version, which is classified SECRET, should be circulated to all other participants in the NSC which will consider this subject. The paper is provided for discussion at the NSC meeting this week.

L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

As stated

DECLASSIFIED

FILED M452/1 #153298

~~TOP SECRET~~

BY RW NARA DATE 12/1/84

CVU: mb



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

February 1, 1982

~~TOP SECRET~~

0676

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Draft Communique; Strategy On Poland

Following up your conversation a few minutes ago with the Secretary, attached are copies of a proposed draft U.S.-PRC communique, as well as a strategy paper on Poland considered by the Poland SIG. May we have your comments as soon as possible on these items.

[Signature]

L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

Attachments: as stated

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
Dept. of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
BY RW NARA, DATE 2/5/13

**National Security Council
The White House**

REF

Package # _____

82

I

A 9: 50

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Jacque Hill	_____	_____	_____
Judge Clark	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Staff Secretary	_____	_____	<u>VP sent</u>
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____

I-Information A-Action

DISTRIBUTION

CY To VP	_____	Show CC	_____
CY To Meese	_____	Show CC	_____
CY To Baker	_____	Show CC	_____
CY To Deaver	_____	Show CC	_____

Other _____

COMMENTS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

648

only 35
EE
153299

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

February 2, 1982

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: NORMAN A. BAILEY *NAB*
SUBJECT: Proposed Haig Visit to Romania

Secretary Haig apparently plans to visit Romania during the period February 12-13. The U.S. Embassy in Bucharest is strongly in favor of such a trip.

It would seem, at the least, highly questionable for the Secretary of State to visit an East European capital at this time. Although Romania is a foreign policy maverick within the Soviet Bloc, it has a very repressive domestic policy and has just admitted international bankruptcy by asking for rescheduling of its debts.

Additionally, it is clearly inappropriate for the Secretary to visit Romania before the Administration has decided on its policy towards Romania. It would be highly embarrassing for Haig to show up right after we turn Romania down for CCC and/or Exim credits, for example.

Given the late hour, you may wish to call Secretary Haig on the matter, assuming you agree that the trip is a bad idea. If you prefer to write, I have attached a memo from you to Haig (Tab I).

RP Richard Pipes, *WJ* William Stearman and *PD* Paula Dobriansky concur.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you call Secretary Haig and urge him to drop plans to visit Romania at this time.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Alternatively, that you sign the attached memo to Haig (Tab I).

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

cc: Tom Reed
Don Gregg

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review February 2, 1982

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M452/1 #153299
BY RW NARA DATE 12/1/86

153 300

36

THE WHITE HOUSE

648

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR.
The Secretary of State

SUBJECT: Your Proposed Trip to Romania

It has come to my attention that you are planning a trip to Romania about February 12-13.

Although Romania is something of a foreign policy maverick within the Soviet Bloc, it has a very repressive internal policy, severe social and economic problems and is, in effect, internationally bankrupt.

A visit at the Secretarial level at this time, when we are imposing sanctions on Poland and the USSR, would leave us open to charges of hypocrisy by our allies as well as by domestic groups.

Additionally, there are questions pending which have not been resolved, such as CCC and Exim credits to Romania. A visit while these matters are not yet resolved could prove embarrassing.

I urge you to reconsider your decision to visit Romania at this time.

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

William P. Clark

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review February 2, 1988

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M452/1#153300

BY RW NARA DATE 12/2/16