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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: ROSTOW, NICHOLAS: Files
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Archivist: cas
FOIA ID: F98-057, Cooper
Date: 11/15/1999

| DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|---------------------|---|---------|-------------------|
| 1. memo | Tyrus Cobb to Robert Perito et al re meeting 1 p. R 1/13/12 F98-057/1 #91 | 9/15/88 | P1, F1 |
| 2. report | attachment to item #1 4 p. R 1/13/12 F98-057/1 #92 | nd | P1, F1 |
| 3. background paper | 6 p. | nd | P1, F1 |
| 4. memo | George Shultz to the President 2 p. | 9/15/88 | P1, F1 |

RESTRICTIONS

P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].

P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

Missile Non Proliferation

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 15, 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: Robert M. Perito
Peter W. Rodman
Alison Fortier
Nelson Ledsky
William J. Burns
James A. Kelly
Douglas H. Paal
D. Barry Kelly
Robert E. Linhard
Judy E. Mandel
Nicholas C. Rostow

FROM: Tyrus W. Cobb *TWC*

SUBJECT: Missile Proliferation Meeting

I am chairing an IG on missile proliferation on Friday, September 16, 3:00pm, Room 208. The purpose of the meeting is to review the attached draft directive. This draft incorporates your comments of September 9 as well as those of State, DOD and ACDA put forth in an informal meeting on September 13.

The draft was sent through Exec Sec channels to the agencies without your specific concurrence since most of you had already cleared the first draft. With few exceptions (and I have contacted the directorates involved), and minor editorial remarks, there were no other substantive changes made to the September 9 NSC-cleared draft. You will still have an opportunity to comment on the attached draft at the Friday meeting.

If all goes as planned, we will meet our deadline to complete the directive before our bilateral on missile proliferation with the Soviets on September 26 here in Washington, and before the President addresses the UNGA.

Thanks for your cooperation.

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NLRRF98-057/L#91

BY KML NARA DATE 1/13/12

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DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F98-057/1 #92

BY KML NARA DATE 1/13/12

STRENGTHENING U.S. POLICY ON
GLOBAL MISSILE PROLIFERATION (S)

I. INTRODUCTION (U)

In 1982, the President, in signing NSDD-70, recognized the dangerous trend toward missile proliferation in the developing world and the threat which this development posed to regional stability and ultimately to the security of the United States. With a few exceptions to friends and allies, NSDD-70 established the policy of the United States "to hinder the proliferation of foreign military missile systems capable of delivering nuclear weapons." Nearly five years later, the U.S. and its Economic Summit partners announced the establishment of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). This was the first multilateral effort to include potential delivery systems and related technologies under nuclear nonproliferation controls. While the MTCR has a close philosophical and to some extent operational tie to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), NSDD-70 is much broader in scope regarding the desire to halt the spread of nuclear capable missile technology. (S)

Despite the timeliness of NSDD-70 and the MTCR, missile proliferation has reached global proportions. Of about twenty non-major military powers, mostly located in the Third World and known to possess missiles, at least ten are located in the Middle East, two in Latin America, two in South Asia, four in East Asia, two in Southern Europe and South Africa. (S)

The dangers posed by missile proliferation call for an intensified effort from the U.S. and its allies to expand the strategic equation for stemming missile proliferation. This directive provides policy guidance in several areas to strengthen U.S. efforts in controlling missile proliferation:

II. POLICY REVIEW AND KEY JUDGMENTS (U)

A senior interagency review of the problem identified the following adverse trends which lead to the conclusion that the United States and its Missile Tech partners must expand the strategic equation by intensifying efforts to control missile proliferation:

MTCR

--The number of Third World countries producing or able to

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produce ballistic and cruise missile is growing at an alarming rate. By the late 1990's, as many as 15 Third World countries will either have produced or be able to produce missiles.

--While most ballistic missiles will be SRBMs, medium or intermediate range ballistic missiles are not far off in the future. Israel is already testing an MRBM and, by the mid-1990's, India and possibly Argentina and Brazil will be able to build MRBM/IRBMs. In addition, with regard to SRBMs, the problem of re-engineering to extend their range has already become a reality with Iraq's adaptation of the Soviet-designed Scud.

--The number of potential suppliers of complete missiles will also grow in the next decade making missiles more available. Potential suppliers will grow beyond the MTCR Seven, Soviet Union, North Korea, Israel and the PRC to include Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, India, Iraq, and possibly Taiwan. Moreover, some of these countries may transfer production technology to others, spurring further proliferation.

--Proliferation may accelerate even further as incentives grow to procure missiles. Although the current generation of export model missiles is relatively inaccurate, they have acquired great symbolic importance. This importance will grow as technological advances improve the accuracy and lethality of ballistic and cruise missiles available for export.

--While some proliferators will be capable of arming their missiles with nuclear warheads, there is a greater probability that some will arm missiles with chemical/biological weapons.
(S)

OBJECTIVES OF THE POLICY (U)

Specific policy guidance is provided for the following areas:

--Scheduling bilateral and multilateral discussions with the MTCR partners to show strong continued support for the MTCR, to improve the implementation of the MTCR and to continue to explore ways and means to expand the MTCR.

--Approaching the Soviet Union and China on stemming missile proliferation. These approaches should provide the Soviets and Chinese with a broad understanding of the missile proliferation problem from our perspective, and seek undertakings from both to policies of restraint, within or outside the context of the MTCR, in-missile transfers and in not undermining the controls established by the U.S. and its MTCR partners.

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--Approaching selected military powers to seek their cooperation in preventing the spread of missiles and related technological know-how. These approaches could also be done within or outside the context of the MTCR as appropriate. Israel, South Africa, India, Pakistan, Argentina and Brazil, with their unsafeguarded nuclear facilities and active ballistic missile programs, and Egypt should head the list of priority countries.

--Approaching the European neutrals to seek their cooperation in stemming missile proliferation, initially, if appropriate, as adherents to the MTCR.

--Improving the effectiveness of U.S. monitoring and coordination with respect to missile proliferation.

--Consulting and briefing the Congress on the initiative and its objectives.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE POLICY (U)

1. The NSC, in consultation with all Executive ^{department and} Branch agencies having responsibilities related to missile proliferation, will oversee the implementation of this policy. (S)

2. The Department of State shall proceed with the scheduled bilaterals with the Soviet Union on both the MTCR and the broader issue of global missile proliferation, stressing the global problem of indigenous development and/or foreign acquisition. (S)

3. The Department of State will debrief the Chinese as soon as possible after the U.S.-Soviet bilateral and should continue to explore undertakings with the PRC on a policy of restraint in missile sales so as not to undermine the controls established by the U.S. and its MTCR partners. (S)

4. The Department of State will approach the Governments of Israel and Egypt to discuss the problem of missile proliferation in the Middle East. The Department will also continue discussions with the GOI to conclude the U.S.-Israel Strategic Trade MOU, which has provisions for controlling strategic technologies for nuclear as well as ballistic missile programs. The Department of State is also authorized to follow its proposal to the GOE to discuss missile proliferation and to make a demarche to the GOE to discuss negotiations on a strategic trade MOU to control the export of strategic technologies. (S)

5. - The Department of State will continue discussions with the Governments of Argentina and Brazil on missile proliferation. (S)

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6. The Department of State will continue in a measured way its negotiations with Pakistan to implement the U.S.-Pakistan strategic trade MOU, and continue talks with India on missile proliferation and on the missile technology side letter to the recently concluded strategic trade MOU between the U.S. and India. (S)

7. The Department of State is authorized to approach the European neutrals, particularly those countries with whom the U.S. Government has entered into strategic trade agreements, to discuss cooperation in stemming missile proliferation. (S)

8. The DCI is requested to assess the adequacy of the collection and analysis resources devoted to missile proliferation. In addition, the DCI should assign an NIO to coordinate and provide intelligence community support in support of this policy. (S)

9. Because the initiative will ask adherents to review their export control systems and make improvements where needed, and target key non-adherents to negotiate strategic trade MOUs, the Departments of State, Commerce and Defense and ACDA will conduct an interagency review of the strengths and weaknesses of our own efforts to control the transfer of technology under the missile tech control regime. The review should include an assessment of the adequacy or inadequacy of the Annex. (S)

10. Nothing in this initiative shall negate or interfere with NATO programs and requirements. (S)

11. The Department of State will brief key Representatives, Senators and staff on the objectives of this policy no later than September 25, the day before the U.S.-Soviet bilaterals (see #4 below). (S)

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TIME STAMP

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT

SYSTEM II
SYSTEM LOG NUMBER: 90724

88 SEP 16 14.17

ACTION OFFICER: LEDSKY

DUE: 19 SEP

- ☒ Prepare Memo For Powell/Negroponte
☐ Prepare Memo For Dawson/Dolan
☐ Prepare Memo _____

- ☐ Prepare Memo Stevens to Peterson / Murr
☐ Appropriate Action
to _____

URGENT

CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS*

PHONE* to action officer at ext. 5112

- FYI**
☐ Addis
☐ Andricos
☐ Batjer
☐ Beers
☐ Brintnall
☒ Brooks
☐ Burns
☐ Childress
☐ Cobb
☐ Cockell
☐ Cohen
☒ Curtin
☐ Danzarsky
☒ Dekok
☐ Donley
☐ Ebner
☐ Farrar
☐ Fortier
☐ Grant
☐ Grimes

- FYI**
☒ Heiser
☐ Henhoeffer
☐ Jameson
☐ Kelly, B
☐ Kelly, J
☐ Kimberling
☐ Leach
☐ Ledsky
☐ Levin
☐ Lewis
☐ Linhard
☐ Lowenkrow
☐ Mahley
☐ McCue
☐ Melby
☐ Menan
☐ Miskal
☐ Oakley
☐ Onate
☐ Paal

- FYI**
☐ Pastorino
☒ Perina
☐ Popadiuk
☐ Porter
☐ Rager
☐ Rodman
☒ Rostow
☐ Saunders
☐ Seiber
☐ Snider
☐ Tahir-Kheli
☐ Tice
☐ Tillman
☐ Tobey
☐ Wiant

INFORMATION

☒ Stevens
☒ Powell (advance)

☒ Perito

☒ Negroponte (advance)

☒ Secretariat

☐ Exec. Sec. Desk

COMMENTS

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