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FOIA

M452

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
153597	CABLE	WARSAW 9483 <i>R 6/2/2015 M452/2</i>	1	10/1/1982	B1
153598	MEMO	PAULA DOBRIANSKY TO WILLIAM CLARK RE. DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL ANNOUNCEMENT <i>R 6/2/2015 M452/2</i>	1	10/8/1982	B1
153599	MEMO	CLARK TO RR RE. PRESIDENTIAL ANNOUNCEMENT ON BAN OF SOLIDARITY <i>R 6/2/2015 M452/2</i>	1	ND	B1
153601	REPORT	RE. EAST EUROPEAN HIGHLIGHTS: SEPTEMBER 1982 <i>R 9/25/2018 M452/2</i>	15	10/12/1982	B1
153602	MEMO	PAUL BREMER TO CLARK RE. RECENT FRENCH REACTIONS <i>R 6/2/2015 M452/2</i>	2	10/27/1982	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [6 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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153597

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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PAGE 01 WARSAW 9483 DTG: 011620Z OCT 82 PSN: 055550
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USNMR FOR INTAF
E.O. 12356: DECL: 10/1/88
TAGS: PGOV, PINT, PINS, ELAB, PL
SUBJ: SOLIDARNOSC AND THE NEW TRADE UNION LEGISLATION
REF: A) WARSAW 9316; B) WARSAW 9482

1. C - ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY: SOLIDARNOSC SUPPORTERS SEE PITFALLS IN
ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION IN RESPONSE TO THE REGIMES
TRADE UNION LEGISLATION. END SUMMARY.

3. SOLIDARNOSC SEEMS TO BE IN AS MUCH CONSTERNATION
ABOUT THE PROSPECTIVE TRADE UNION LAW AS THE REGIME. WE
HAVE HEARD OF SOME LATE-NIGHT BARNSTORMING SESSIONS GOING
ROUND AND ROUND WITH NO CLEAR COURSE OF ACTION EMERGING.
THE UNION IS CAUGHT IN A DILEMMA. IF SOLIDARNOSC GOES
ALONG WITH THE NEW LEGISLATION, COMPETES IN THE SHOP FLOOR
ELECTIONS, AND PLAYS THE GAME ACCORDING TO THE RULES LAID
DOWN BY THE GOVERNMENT, THEN IT WILL HAVE BLESSED THE
NEW STRUCTURE WITH CONSIDERABLE LEGITIMACY. SINCE NO ONE
EXPECTS THE REIME TO TOLERATE ANY ACTIVITY OR ORGANIZATION
NOT FULLY UNDER ITS CONTROL, SOLIDARNOSC WILL HAVE NO HOPE
OF WINNING THE RIGGED ELECTIONS OR ENJOYING ANY VICTORIES.

4. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF SOLIDARNOSC BOYCOTTS THE NEW
UNIONS LAWS FROM THE BEGINNING, THE GEIME CAN:
--POINT THE FINGER;
-- LABEL THE ACTION AS FURTHER EVIDENCE THAT SOLIDARNOSC
NEVER WANTED TO PARTICIPATE LEGITIMATELY IN
THE COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC LIFE; AND
-- ASSERT THAT SOLIDARNOSC'S TRUE CHARACTER AS A
POLITICAL OPPOSITION HAS BEEN UNMASKED.

5. SOME ROMANTIC SOLIDARNOSC MEMBERS SEE ANOTHER OPTION
SEVERAL MONTHS DOWN THE ROAD, WHEN COAL-STREAKED SNOW
BLANKETS THE STAGNATING FACTORIES, AND PEOPLE HAVE NO
SHOES AND NOTHING TO EAT. IF THE LEVEL OF STREET
DISRUPTIONS AGAINST ECONOMIC DEPRIVATION IS SO HIGH
AND WIDESPREAD THAT THE REGIMES FORCES ARE STRETCHED

BEYOND THE BREAKING POINT, GENERAL JARUZELSKI WILL BE
FORCED TO CHOOSE BETWEEN SOVIET INTERVENTION OR DOMESTIC
LIBERATLIZATION, AND WILL SELECT THE LATTER. THE DEMANDS
PUT TO HIM WILL NOT BE EXTREME, BUT WILL BE SIMILAR TO THOSE
VOICED IN NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 1980. THE REGIME SHOULD BE
WILLING, SO THIS REASONING GOES, TO GRANT THESE CONCESSIONS
IN ORDER TO AVOID THE IMPOSITION OF "AN EXTERNAL SOLUTION".

6. COMMENT: WE PASS ON THESE SPECULATIONS AS AN EXAMPLE
OF SOME OF THE THOUGHTS WITHIN AND DIFFICULTIES CONFRONTING
SOLIDARNOSC AT THIS TIME. MORE IMPORTANTLY, THEY ALSO
REFLECT THE DISORIENTED NATURE OF ELEMENTS OF SOLIDARNOSC
ACTIVITS IN LIGHT OF THE RELATIVE ABSENCE OF TALENT AND
EXPERIENCE WITHIN THE MOVEMENT FOLLOWING MATIAL LAW,
INTERMENTS AND SUBSEQUENT ARRESTS. WHAT REMAINS FLOUNDERS
IN PURSUIT OF UNCERTAIN OBJECTIVES, WITH PROBLEMS OF ITS
OWN PERHAPS COMPARABLE IN THEIR PERCEIVED DIFFICULTY TO
THOSE FACED BY THE REGIME. MEEHAN
BT

SW

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M452/2 #153597

BY RW NARA DATE 6/2/15

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

6833

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

October 4, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR MICHAEL O. WHEELER

FROM: NORMAN A. BAILEY *mb*

SUBJECT: Romanian-U.S. Economic Council

Dodie Livingston has asked for our comments on whether an exception should be made to issue a Presidential message for the Romanian-U.S. Economic Council's Ninth Plenary Session in Bucharest, Romania. I see no reason to make an exception and recommend that a message not be issued.

Richard Pipes, Paula *P*Dobriansky and Roger *R*Robinson concur.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum to Livingston at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memo to Livingston
Tab A Memo from Livingston

MEMORANDUM

6833

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

MEMORANDUM FOR DODIE LIVINGSTON

FROM: MICHAEL O. WHEELER

SUBJECT: Romanian-U.S. Economic Council

With regard to your request for comments on whether an exception should be made to issue a Presidential message for the Romanian-U.S. Economic Council's Ninth Plenary Session (Tab A), we see no reason to make an exception and recommend that a message not be issued.

Attachment

Tab A Your Memo to Me

6833

4

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON


September 30, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR MICHAEL WHEELER, NSC

SUBJECT: Romanian-U.S.Economic Council - Ninth Plenary
Session in Bucharest, Romania

I understand that Presidential messages for these Economic Councils have only been sent when the meeting is held in the United States. If you think an exception should be made in this instance, I would appreciate your comments as soon as possible.

Thank you.



DODIE LIVINGSTON
Room 480-OEOB/EXT. 2941

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PROPOSED TEXT FOR PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE

I am pleased to greet the members of the Romanian-U.S. Economic Council as you convene for your Ninth Plenary Session in Bucharest, Romania.

I welcome this opportunity to commend the Council for fostering goodwill and mutual confidence in U.S.-Romanian business relations, and particularly to recognize the American delegation for promoting among our Romanian friends an appreciation for the strength and vitality of American industry.

Economic and commercial relations between the United States and Romania have advanced impressively in recent years. Bilateral trade surpassed one billion dollars in 1980 and again in 1981. The U.S.-Romanian Economic Council has made an important contribution to the realization of these favorable developments.

I know the Council is interested in improving economic and financial conditions which this year have hindered bilateral commerce. A good start has been made toward achieving the desired improvements, and I am sure that the Ninth Plenary Session will further this effort.

I strongly support and encourage the work of the Council and wish you success in all of your endeavors.

Ronald Reagan



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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Office of Public Affairs
Washington D.C. 20230

September 29, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR DODIE LIVINGSTON

FROM: Mary A. Nimmo //

Gus Knowles discussed the attached request for a message for the Romanian-U.S. Economic Council with Claudia. Please return the signed message to me. We need it in time for it to be hand carried to Bucharest on October 14.

Enclosure

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

October 8, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY *PD*

SUBJECT: Draft Presidential Announcement on Ban of Solidarity

To respond to the Polish Government's declaration that the free trade union Solidarity is illegal, attached at Tab A is a draft Presidential statement. Specifically, it alerts the Polish Government that we are sharply opposed to the government reneging on its promises and declaring Solidarity illegal, and states that the Administration is taking steps to bring about the suspension of Poland's MFN tariff status as well as other measures. This additional sanction would be a strong, needed response to the Polish Government's egregious act. Depriving Poland of MFN status would hurt it economically as well as politically.

To maximize domestic and overseas attention to the President's action, the statement should be audiotaped for media release. The statement could be taped by the President at the time he gives his Saturday radio talk. If the Sejm has already taken its action, the President's statement and the audiotape could be released immediately. If the Sejm has not taken its action, or if it is desirable to delay for other reasons, the statement and audiotape could be held for release later.

A memorandum to the President on this subject is at Tab I. Speechwriters have cleared the text. State, Bailey, Robinson and Sims concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum at Tab I to the President with the proposed statement.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Draft Presidential statement

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 17452/2 #153598

BY *LW* NARA DATE *6/2/85*

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Presidential Announcement on Ban of Solidarity

It is expected that the Polish Government will declare the free trade union Solidarity illegal this afternoon. Attached at Tab A is a draft statement which alerts the Polish Government that we are sharply opposed to the government reneging on its promises and declaring Solidarity illegal and states that the Administration is taking steps to bring about the suspension of Poland's MFN tariff status as well as other measures. This additional sanction would be a strong, needed response to the Polish Government's egregious act. Depriving Poland of MFN status would hurt it economically as well as politically.

To dramatize your action and achieve maximum public impact here and overseas, I recommend you read the statement for audiotaping when you do your Saturday radio talk. The written statement and audiotape could be released immediately, or held for later release.

Speechwriters have cleared the text. State concurs.

RECOMMENDATIONYes No

- | | | | |
|-----|-----|----|---|
| ___ | ___ | 1. | That you approve the draft statement at Tab A. |
| ___ | ___ | 2. | That you agree to audiotaping of the statement prior to release, or at time of release. |

Attachment:

Tab A Proposed statement on Solidarity

Prepared by:
Paula Dobriansky

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR 11452/2 #153599
BY RW NARA DATE 6/2/15

DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL ANNOUNCEMENT ON BAN OF SOLIDARITY

The decision of the Polish government to declare the free trade union Solidarity illegal is a matter of profound concern to myself, this government, and the American people. Ever since martial law was brutally imposed last December, Polish authorities have been assuring the world that they are interested in a genuine reconciliation with the Polish people. But the Polish regime's action today reveals the hollowness of its promises. By outlawing Solidarity, an organization to which an overwhelming majority of Polish workers and farmers belong, they have made it clear that they never had any intention of restoring one of the most elemental human rights -- the right to belong to free trade unions. The so-called new trade union legislation under which this contrary and backward step has been taken claims to substitute a structure and framework for the establishment of free trade unions in Poland. But it is clear that such unions, if formed, will be merely a mouthpiece and extension of the Polish Communist Party. The Polish military leaders and their Soviet backers have shown that the hopes and aspirations of the majority of the Polish people would be continuously and maliciously trampled upon.

I do not intend to stand idly by in the face of these latest acts of repression by the Polish government, I am therefore today directing steps to bring about the suspension of Poland's Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) tariff status.

The Polish junta should understand that we are prepared to take further steps as a result of this indication of further repression in Poland. We are also consulting urgently with our Allies on steps we might take jointly in response to the Polish government's action. While taking these steps, I want to make clear, as I have in the past, that they are not directed against the Polish people. We will continue to provide humanitarian assistance to the people of Poland through organizations such as Catholic Relief Services and CARE as we have been doing since the beginning of martial law. At the same time, I stand by my earlier offer to provide large-scale assistance to help the Polish economy back on its feet, once Warsaw restores the human rights of the Polish people.

There are those who will argue that the Polish government's action marks the death of Solidarity in Poland. I don't believe this for a moment. Those who know Poland well understand that as long as the flame of self-determination burns as brightly and intensely in the hearts of Polish men and women as it does today, the spirit of Solidarity will remain a vital force in Poland. Of course, the Polish government can try to legislate this heroic labor union out of existence. But I suspect that like the ostrich, when the Polish government pulls its head out of the sand, it will find that Solidarity remains alive and well. In fact, until Warsaw's military authorities move to restore Solidarity to its rightful and hard-won place in Polish society, Poland will continue to be plagued by bitterness, alienation, instability and a stagnant economy.

There can only be one path out of the current morass in Poland. And that is for the military regime to stand up to its own statements of principle, even in the face of severe outside pressure from the Soviet Union to lift martial law, release the modern-day father of Polish trade unionism, Lech Walesa, and his colleagues now languishing in prison, and begin again the search for social peace through the arduous, but real, process of dialogue and reconciliation with the Church and Solidarity.

I join with my countrymen, including millions of Americans whose roots are in Poland, in praying for an early return to a path of moderation in Poland.



BUREAU OF
INTELLIGENCE
AND RESEARCH

CURRENT
ANALYSES

~~SECRET~~

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

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Bailey

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(U) EAST EUROPEAN HIGHLIGHTS: SEPTEMBER 1982

Summary

(C) Reacting to the late-August disturbances, the Polish regime embarked on a tough course: plans to delegalize Solidarity moved to the forefront and the decision on a date for a papal visit was left in abeyance. The church responded by placing the blame for last month's bloodshed on the regime for its failure to start a dialogue with the society. Solidarity for its part remained uncharacteristically quiet. The USSR and Czechoslovakia again took the lead in criticizing Catholic Church activities both in Poland and at home.

(C) Poland and most other European countries meanwhile continued to grapple with a variety of credit problems.

(LOU) All the East European media, except for those in Yugoslavia and Romania, joined the USSR in charging US complicity in the Beirut Palestinian massacre. East Germany became jittery over the impending collapse of Chancellor Schmidt's coalition in the FRG.

(S/NF) "Shield-82," the largest Warsaw Pact maneuver held in recent years in Bulgaria, created considerable unease in Yugoslavia and Albania. The latter also reported the unrelated "liquidation" of a group of criminal "invaders."

* * * * *

(C/NF) Poland: Regime Prepares To Delegalize Solidarity

In the wake of the August 31 disturbances, Poland remained relatively calm with only minor skirmishes in Lubin and Czestochowa early in the month and at five industrial cities on the

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Declassify: OADR (multiple sources)

Report 478-CA
October 12, 1982

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M452/2 #153601
BY FW NARA DATE 9/25/18

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September 13 martial law anniversary. Both the regime and Solidarity claimed victory in the August 31 demonstrations; both used the following weeks to try to regroup their forces, with the government increasingly firm in its efforts to restore normalcy.

Rumors that martial law would be lifted before the end of the year continued to circulate, echoing the sentiments expressed by Jaruzelski in his July 21 speech. Polish diplomats in Western Europe alleged that the state of emergency would be ended just before December 13. Government spokesman Jerzy Urban reiterated this line in Budapest when he told a Hungarian journalist (September 25) that "the Polish leadership still seeks to lift the state of emergency this year." Observers noted, however, that any lifting of martial law would probably be preceded by the enactment of extraordinary powers for the government and that repression would thus continue.

There were, however, also indications of impending enactment of new trade union legislation that would delegalize Solidarity. The new law, which would allow for a three-year phase-in, would permit only industrial-branch-centered new trade unions and would prohibit--at least in 1983--the regional and national union superstructure that gave Solidarity its strength. This would in effect disband Solidarity and require workers to start again from scratch. Many, including Archbishop Glemp, believed that this "zero option" would prove the spark for a new wave of violent confrontations between the regime and the people. Glemp told visiting American journalists that the outlawing of Solidarity would lead to "very dangerous events" and also warned that he would cancel his October trip to the Vatican and the US if Solidarity were banned. (Glemp had been heavily criticized for going ahead with a long-planned visit to West Germany immediately following the August 31 clashes.)

The fate of Lech Walesa was also the subject of numerous rumors. Western media reported claims that Walesa had been given mind-altering drugs. A Polish diplomat claimed he would be released in October; Urban implied that when martial law was lifted, all internees--including Walesa--would be released. He did, however, cast some doubt on whether Walesa would be allowed to "play a public role and whether he will still be active in the trade union movement."

On the economic front, the government reportedly was considering expanding self-management in enterprises, an effort that heretofore had been hamstrung by regime fears that Solidarity would dominate any self-management group. To speed up Poland's economic recovery, a return to the six-day work week in most sectors was also under consideration, although such a move likely would only increase resentment and discontent among the workers.

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(C/NF) Papal Visit Still Unsettled

The uneasy, and occasionally hostile, relations between church and state came to the fore with a series of highly charged polemics over responsibility for the August 31 violence and the stalemate in starting a dialogue. The antagonism was further highlighted by a continuing impasse over the scheduling of the papal visit. No agreement was reached on exactly when or even where the Pope would visit. A September 7 meeting of the church-state commission reported that "progress was made regarding [the visit's] conditions and program," but Cardinal Macharski, head of the church delegation, privately claimed that the government was "deliberately prolonging the uncertainty" and had even threatened to cancel the visit to bring the church to cooperate.

Despite such pressures, the regime continued to depict the church as being supportive of regime policies. In a September 16 speech to the Sejm, Interior Minister Kiszczak sought to align the church with the regime in efforts to negotiate with Solidarity. He also told the Parliament that since last April the regime (and by implication, the church) had been trying to draw Solidarity to the negotiating table, but Solidarity had refused to cooperate and instead had organized the street riots which led to bloodshed and death.

In what seemed to be a direct rebuttal of the Kiszczak implications, the Polish Episcopate in full session adopted a statement September 15-16 which was more critical of the regime than some statements made by individual clergy. The statement included a warning that the lack of movement toward alleviating the continuing series of crises which gripped the country could threaten Poland's existence. More importantly, the bishops laid most of the blame for the August 31 bloodshed on the regime and renewed their call for the resumption of dialogue and for a reinstatement of Solidarity in the spirit of "mutual concessions, reconciliation, and forgiveness." In an apparent allusion to Kiszczak's speech, the bishops stated that so far "no proper steps have been made" by the authorities for resuming the dialogue with Solidarity.

(C) Foreign Reactions

The sensitivity of the Soviet Union to the strength and importance of the Catholic Church in Poland was reinforced by the play Soviet media gave to the latest criticisms of individual clergy in the Polish press. In addition, a Belorussian paper carried an unusually specific and heavy-handed attack on the church in that Polish-Soviet border region. While no direct links were drawn with Poland, the message was clear. The Czechoslovak press also entered the battle with an article entitled "Legend and Fact about the Black Madonna" in Tribuna, a communist party weekly

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known for extremist opinions. Among its other charges, Tribuna characterized Catholicism in Poland as "a confirmed enemy of human conscience, human reason and human dignity."

The September 13-14 visit of Polish Foreign Minister Olszowski to Moscow provided another opportunity for airing more general Soviet reactions to the situation there. Emphasizing the continuity in Soviet-Polish relations, Olszowski repeated the standard lines about Poland's fidelity to the East bloc and its great respect for Brezhnev, a "great friend of Poland," and, on his return to Warsaw, said the visit had been "useful." The joint communiqué stressed international over regional matters, but did touch briefly on the "concretization" of earlier bilateral agreements. Interestingly, it also specified that the Soviet Union would help Poland "within the limits of its ability," implying that there would be constraints on such aid.

On the day of Olszowski's departure from Moscow, Pravda published an article on the Polish working class movement which clearly reflected Soviet dissatisfaction with the situation in Poland. The reader was reminded of the important advice and help rendered the Poles by Lenin and his followers, and the Poles were warned that yielding to nationalism--inflamed by Western powers and false "saviours"--could only lead to disaster. Although coached in historical terms, the analogy to today was unmistakable.

(C) Moving Toward Commercial Debt Rescheduling

Western bankers continued to iron out the remaining details of an agreement to reschedule Poland's 1982 commercial debt payments. The tentative accord involves three agreements covering a deferral of 95 percent of the \$2.4 billion in principal payments due the banks, a three-installment approach to payment of Polish interest (some \$1.1 billion), and recycling back to Warsaw of half of the interest paid. The 5 percent of principal not rescheduled is to be paid in two payments in 1983. Interest due in 1982 will be paid upon signing of the rescheduling agreement (October 20 is the target date) and, subsequently, in December and in March 1983. Administrative delays in verifying interest due individual creditors and in paying the 500 banks involved suggest that the target date may slip.

The agreement on trade credits requires that the Poles use the new loans to purchase Western goods needed by the Polish export industries. The funds must be used to finance goods from the country of the lending bank. A senior Polish official has indicated that the US banks' share of the trade credits would be \$50-70 million. The Poles intend to use the funds to finance imports of US grain--to support exports of processed meats--and some industrial goods. Meanwhile, some US banks have drawn on

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Polish assets to obtain payment of interest on CCC loans, heightening concern by other banks that such action threatens creditor unity on the credit facility.

Payment of the remaining interest is more uncertain, although the short-term credit facility relieves some of the pressures on Poland's meager hard-currency resources. But the outlook for a substantial surplus through the end of the year is not promising, given soft Western markets and the effect of cutbacks in needed imports on Poland's ability to produce goods for export. Moreover, the Poles have few credit lines remaining and will have to trade largely on a cash basis.

(C) Other Countries Cope With Credit Problems

On September 27, Hungary obtained the approval of Western central banks for a \$300 million short-term loan channeled through the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). Last spring, central banks from 13 Western countries (excluding the US) lent Hungary \$210 million under the auspices of the BIS. Hungary continued to negotiate with the IMF on possible credits to be drawn later this year or early in 1983. Meanwhile, the Kadar regime has made it clear that further austerity lies ahead, including increases in interest rates and in the prices of some consumer goods.

Romania's efforts to conclude bilateral rescheduling agreements with its individual official Western creditors called for by the Paris Club agreement signed in late July encountered obstacles, principally concerning Bucharest's attempt to include its short-term obligations in the official rescheduling. Romanian September repayments of short-term debt to governments provoked concern on the part of the commercial creditors that Romania was meeting its obligations to official creditors at the expense of banks and suppliers.

The bid by Yugoslavia for a \$200 million syndicated loan from Western banks appeared on the verge of success in mid-month, only to suffer a setback as the Privredna Bank of Zagreb (PBZ) slipped into arrears on payments on a syndicated loan from a group of major Western banks involved in the new financing effort. Despite assurances by senior Yugoslav officials that the PBZ arrearages would be eliminated quickly, banker concern over the PBZ problems and the failure of the Yugoslav central bank to provide an adequate guarantee for the new loan (which is being negotiated with a group of Yugoslav regional banks) forced cancellation of tentative plans for signing the loan agreement. Meanwhile, significant cuts in Yugoslav imports resulted in further difficulties in Yugoslav industry with the less than 1 percent growth in production through August falling far below the 3.5 percent annual target.

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(LOU) East European Responses to the Beirut Massacre

All of the Warsaw Pact states, except Romania, charged the US and Israel with responsibility for the massacre of Palestinians in the Beirut refugee camps.

- Czechoslovakia's party daily Rude Pravo (September 21) and a Bulgarian news agency statement carried in the party daily Rabotnichesko Delo (September 22) termed the massacre a "direct result" of US-Israeli machinations.
- A Hungarian news agency statement, carried in the party daily Nepszabadsag (September 21), contained an unusually pointed criticism of US policy and charged both Prime Minister Begin and President Reagan with responsibility for the killings; East Germany's party daily Neues Deutschland (September 20) also asserted US complicity.
- A Polish government statement (September 21) did not accuse the US of direct complicity but said that US protection of Israel set the stage for subsequent events.

The Yugoslav Government and media lambasted Israel but not the US. The Romanian news agency's statement (September 20) on the massacre only indirectly accused Israel. Both Bucharest and Belgrade tend to be sparing in their foreign policy criticism of the US. Bucharest, moreover, given its diplomatic ties to Israel, often tries to strike a balance that will permit it to seek out a role in Middle East developments.

(C) East Germany's Concerns Over Inner-German Relations

Neues Deutschland (September 22) praised the FRG's international behavior during the period of SPD predominance as generally "positive." But it bemoaned the prospective conservative government as one that might be "unpredictable" and given to "rabble rousing confrontation." Although East Berlin does not expect the conservatives to unravel previous inner-German accomplishments, it suspects that they will:

- abandon much of the positive atmospherics (e.g., inner-German summits) favored by the SPD;
- put inner-German relations on hold while consolidating power; and
- demand at least marginally greater concessions on the easing of inner-German contacts in return for economic favors.

The West German Government crisis occurs at a time when the GDR is experiencing major economic troubles. Some \$4 billion of

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its \$13-14 billion hard-currency debt falls due in 1983. Western credits are drying up, and export growth--the key to easing payments problems--will be hard to achieve given soft Western markets. Energy also will be tight because of the 10 percent cutback in Soviet oil deliveries this year and next. At the same time, reductions of grain imports have exacerbated the agricultural sector's problems and contributed to increasing shortfalls in food and consumer goods.

The Honecker regime no doubt regrets that it stonewalled Schmidt following the 1981 inner-German summit. By refusing to lower the GDR's minimum currency exchange requirement for Western visitors (a sum quadrupled in 1980), Honecker undercut Bonn's willingness to entertain major new inner-German economic agreements. It will be more difficult for Honecker to move on that issue now (still an indispensable condition for a CDU government) because he does not want to appear to be caving in to Bonn's harder line.

(S/NF) Major Warsaw Pact Exercise in Bulgaria

Except for Romania--which was represented at the staff level only--Warsaw Pact countries provided combat elements for Shield-82, which was held between September 25 and October 1 in Bulgaria and in territorial and adjacent waters of the Black Sea. Shield-82 was the largest Warsaw Pact exercise since the signing of the 1975 Helsinki accords and the 16th announced by the East under the CSCE notification regime. There were no observer invitations issued but, as on previous occasions, military delegations from Cuba, Mongolia, and Vietnam attended.

As announced by Bulgaria on September 4, Shield-82 was commanded by Bulgarian Defense Minister and Army General Dzhurov, involved "about 60,000" personnel, and was intended to improve combat coordination and interaction between allied staffs and armies. The announcement was minimal, omitting information on the specific area for the exercise and on the countries participating in it. (On September 21 Bulgaria announced a "temporary restricted area" for the exercise, closing an area from Nikopol to Plovdiv to the Turkish border--the whole eastern portion of the country.) Most exercise announcements by the East have been minimal, if not inadequate, e.g., the Soviets' Zapad-81 omitted the troop figure entirely. But some, like Czechoslovakia's Druzhiba-82, have been relatively comprehensive.

Shield-82 set two precedents:

--the participation of northern tier and central region forces in an exercise, presumably testing the Pact's capabilities against Turkey and NATO's southern flank, e.g., the seizure

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of Turkish Thrace, the Dardanelles, and the Bosphorus Straits, a scenario new to the Pact's northern forces;

- the use of the Ilichevsk (Odessa)-Varna ferry system (possibly supplemented by Soviet and Bulgarian transport vessels) to transport troops and equipment to Bulgaria, thereby circumventing Romania's generally restrictive policy on transit of Pact forces through its territory. (Despite rumors to the contrary, Romania appears not to have yielded on land transit of foreign forces, but presumably it did allow overflights by foreign transports carrying personnel and equipment to Bulgaria.)

According to various attaché reports, Hungary and East Germany each provided elements of a motorized rifle regiment; Czechoslovakia, elements of two tank battalions; Poland, an airborne unit; Bulgaria, elements of its first and second armies; and the USSR, elements of two motorized rifle divisions and naval personnel. The Soviet aircraft carrier Kiev also participated.

The opening staff phase of the exercise may have been delayed because of the absence of Pact Commander-in-Chief Marshal Kulikov, who was in Moscow September 23-26 for the funeral of Army Gen. Bagramyan. Tactical play began on September 27 following the arrival of Soviet Defense Minister Ustinov and defense ministers and officials from other Pact countries. The Poles sent Deputy Defense Minister Siwicki. Romania's Defense Minister Olteanu headed up that country's staff contingent. The tactical phase, which included amphibious landings and paradrops, concluded with a parade on October 1.

Shield-82 presented several interesting anomalies:

- Bulgaria attempted to depict Romania's participation as being at the "troop" level, referring to the arrival of Romanian "troops" and "soldiers" and incorporating the Romanian flag in the logo for the exercise.
- Bulgarian Foreign Ministry officials strongly denied rumors that Soviet troops would remain in Bulgaria after the exercise and claimed that Shield-82 was not inconsistent with Bulgaria's Balkan peace offensive.
- At the conclusion of the exercise on October 1, TASS-BTA issued a joint announcement which briefly evaluated Shield-82 as a "brilliant manifestation of the socialist internationalism...to defend the acquisitions of socialism" (shades of the Brezhnev doctrine). The announcement did not, as had been the practice at the end of some previous exercises, mention the return of all forces to their respective

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countries. (Subsequently, however, Bulgaria did refer to their departure.)

Albania, as expected, criticized the exercise sharply. Yugoslavia also reacted to the question of the Soviet troop presence. Its Politika correspondent openly chastized Bulgaria for not publicizing information on the scenario for the exercise and expressed particular concern over the "political necessity...for the sojourn of Soviet troops in allied countries for long and unlimited periods." Although the correspondent also took a slap at the then-ongoing NATO exercises, his remarks--even though unofficial--seemed to reflect heightened Yugoslav concern over the implications of Shield-82, the largest Pact exercise in Bulgaria since 1967.

(LOU) Albania: "Liquidation" of Exile Invasion Reported

The Albanian Ministry of Internal Affairs announced September 27 that a band of "exiled Albanian criminals" had entered Albania by sea September 23, were discovered the next day, and were "totally liquidated" by Ministry forces, the army, and the local population. A cache of automatic pistols; binoculars; radio transmitters; US, Italian, and Albanian currencies; and various disguises was allegedly found. The group was reportedly led by one Xhevdet Mustafa, who is said to have left Albania in 1944 after the communist takeover. An Albanian diplomat in Vienna told a Reuters reporter that Mustafa worked with "reactionary" Albanian emigre groups and foreign (not further indentified) intelligence services.

The very announcement of such an "invasion" by Tirana was odd, but the matter was further confused when the pretender to the throne of Albania, Leka I, claimed responsibility for the attempt. He told reporters that he had tried to discourage such a venture on the part of Mustafa, whom he described as head of a "national liberation army." But Leka also seemed to question whether the "invasion" had even taken place when he ambiguously noted that such an invasion "could be an affair fabricated by the Albanian services to distract world attention from the crisis currently affecting the regime."

Similar invasions were mounted--and failed--in the 1950s, and there are a number of Albanian emigre groups who would support such an attempt now. Whether true or not, Tirana's announcement reinforces Western speculation about internal dissension within the Hoxha regime. These tensions have been widely blamed for the death (reportedly by suicide) of the number-two strong man, Mehmet Shehu, last December. The announcement probably reflects a mounting domestic vigilance campaign and is a warning to internal dissenters as well as future foreign "invaders."

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In an unrelated event, the Albanian leaders used the 40th anniversary of the founding of the National Liberation Front (September 16) to confirm Albanian rejection of both "imperialist" America and the "revisionist" Soviet Union, noting that "we [Albanians] neither have nor will we ever maintain any relation of whatever kind and nature with the superpowers." Vice-Chairman of the General Council for the Democratic Front of Albania, Ramiz Alia, scored the Soviet Union for its "aggression" in Afghanistan and the US for its "interference" in the Middle East. At the same time, however, Albania pledged to seek "normal relations [with other states] on the basis of equality, non-interference and mutual respect."

The regime also voiced support for the formation of a Kosovo republic in Yugoslavia from the ethnically Albanian Kosovo region. Both "Serb chauvinism" and "Macedonian reactionary nationalism" were denounced for their attacks on Yugoslavia's Albanian population.

Developments in Brief

- (C/NF) Plans for a CEMA "summit" are still being bruited about, but enthusiasm for it seems to be on the wane. All East European party chiefs have endorsed the idea, but only Czechoslovak party leader Husak, who visited Budapest (September 13) and Sofia (September 21-23) seems to be an ardent advocate lately. The Husak-Kadar communiqué did, however, state that plans for the "highest level meeting of the leaders of the CEMA member states are currently in the preparatory state." The communiqué on the Husak-Zhivkov talks also ascribed importance to it but without mentioning a timeframe. Although Brezhnev's health remains a factor, the interests of various CEMA states in focusing on energy issues--as opposed to broader Soviet interests, e.g., increased economic integration--also probably account for the delay of a "summit," which some Soviet officials have claimed may not occur until next March.
- (C) Qadhafi's hasty forays in Eastern Europe (September 8-10) resulted in a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Czechoslovakia--the first with a Warsaw Pact state--and a Libyan offer of credits to the Poles for the purchase of oil. During his visit to Prague, the Libyan leader and Husak signed a 10-year treaty of friendship similar to those signed by Czechoslovakia with Angola and South Yemen. It calls for consultations on major problems affecting mutual interests and forswears participation in any military or other alliance hostile to one or the other.

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In Poland, Qadhafi and Jaruzelski stated that both also planned to conclude a similar treaty, but the focus of their meeting (September 9) was economic. The sale of 1 million tons of Libyan crude oil would serve to offset the growing Polish trade surplus with Libya achieved thus far in 1982. Poland's lower petroleum requirements--which the Soviets have largely met by maintaining deliveries at last year's levels--suggest that Warsaw may sell the Libyan crude in the West rather than take actual delivery.

--(S/NF) Hungary and Mozambique signed a military cooperation agreement on August 30 in Maputo. The Hungarians will provide--as outright "gifts" in the first tranche of the agreement--military logistical, hospital, and communications equipment as well as small arms, according to Mozambican Defense Minister Chipande. The material and level of cooperation are typical of Hungary's modest military assistance programs with Third World countries and do not appear to reflect any significant change in its existing military cooperation with Mozambique. Chipande's subsequent visits to Romania (September 13-16) and Yugoslavia (16-21), where he conferred with Presidents Stambolic and Ceausescu and defense officials, further reflected Mozambique's apparent desire to seek out new sources of arms supply.

Prepared by I. Matusek, x22877; J. Miller, M. Mozur, R. Farlow,
J. Bodnar

Approved by M. Mautner, x29536

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Chronology

September

- 1 (U) Wladyslaw Gomulka, who rose to Polish party chief (1956-70) but fell because of worker unrest, died after a long battle with cancer. He was buried with full honors.
- 1-2 (U) Bulgarian Premier Filipov conferred with his counterpart Strougal in Czechoslovakia.
- 1-3 (U) Polish disturbances continued. Authorities sealed off the city of Lubin after at least 3 protesters had died in clashes with militia on August 31. Random demonstrations also took place in Czestochowa.
- 1-3 (U) Norwegian Foreign Minister Stray met with his Hungarian counterpart Puja in Budapest to discuss various international topics. No new agreements were reached.
- 2 (U) The Polish Politburo met to discuss the August 31 disturbances. Government reaction to the street unrest scored foreign, especially US, involvement, played up youth and nonworker participants, and included vows never to negotiate with the Solidarity leadership.
- 3 (U) Polish dissident Jacek Kuron and other KOR leaders were formally arrested. Previously interned, they now face charges of treason and inciting armed rebellion. Lipski, another KOR leader, returned from medical treatment in London on September 15 and was arrested the next day.
- 4 (U) The Bulgarian Foreign Affairs Ministry announced that the Warsaw Pact would conduct an exercise, "Shield-82," involving about 60,000 personnel in Bulgaria, September 25-October 1.
- 4 (U) The temporary Coordinating Committee of Solidarity met and issued a communique claiming a "moral victory" on August 31 and calling for moments of silence on September 30 in commemoration of those who died.
- 6 (U) Polish terrorists seized the Polish Embassy in Berne, Switzerland, threatening to blow up the

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September

building unless martial law in Poland was ended, detention centers closed, all political prisoners freed, and "repression against Poles" halted. On September 9, Swiss forces charged the Embassy, freeing the hostage-diplomats and capturing the terrorists, without casualties. Polish authorities linked the terrorists to Solidarity, Western radio stations, and intelligence services.

- 6-10 (U) Egyptian President Mubarak visited Yugoslavia (6-8) and Romania (8-10) for discussions on bilateral cooperation and the nonaligned movement.
- 6-10 (U) Finnish President Koivisto visited Hungary and conferred with party chief Kadar and other Hungarian officials. No new agreements resulted; both sides stressed traditional, historical ties and mutual support for CSCE.
- 8-10 (U) Libya's chief of state Colonel Qadhafi visited Czechoslovakia and, on 24-hours' notice, Poland. He signed a Friendship and Cooperation Treaty with Czechoslovakia and agreed to provide Poland 1 million tons of Libyan crude.
- 9 (U) A Solidarity radio broadcast briefly (for 10 seconds) interrupted Poznan TV (sound only) to thank Poles for supportive demonstrations on August 31.
- 9 (U) The USSR agreed to build a nuclear power plant in Romania. The project will be in addition to the much larger Romanian-Canadian plans for the construction of a series of nuclear power plants.
- 9 (U) A Turkish attaché was assassinated in Burgas on the Bulgarian National Day; Armenian terrorist groups claimed responsibility. The National Day festivities once again paid homage to Lyudmila Zhivkova.
- 9 (U) Syrian news media reported that some wounded Palestinian soldiers had arrived in Sofia and Budapest for hospital treatment.
- 13 (U) NATO members agreed to continue sanctions against Poland because no visible progress had been made in satisfying the three Western conditions for lifting the sanctions.

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September

- 13 (U) Czechoslovak party chief and President Husak conferred with Hungarian party chief Kadar in Budapest on international issues and bilateral economic cooperation.
- 13-14 (U) Polish Foreign Minister Olszowski visited Moscow on a "brief working visit"; the resultant communique stressed Polish-Soviet ties. An accompanying Pravda piece urged the Polish party to heed Soviet advice and criticism.
- 13-15 (U) Nigerian President Shagari visited Romania.
- 13-17 (C) Hungarian Foreign Minister Puja and visiting Greek Deputy Foreign Minister Patulias agreed "in principle" on a visit to Hungary by Prime Minister Papandreou "early in 1983."
- 15-17 (U) Romanian and Czechoslovak Premiers Dascalescu and Strougal met in Prague.
- 16 (U) A Polish episcopate communique signed by Archbishop Glemp expressed dissatisfaction with the regime's handling of the August 31 disturbances and accused it of doing nothing to end the current political stalemate.
- 17 (U) Romanian President Ceausescu discussed the future of the CSCE review meeting with US Ambassador Max Kampelman.
- 20 (U) Brezhnev, in a speech during Indian Prime Minister Gandhi's visit to Moscow, reiterated a 1980 Warsaw Pact summit proposal that neither the Pact nor NATO extend their activities to Asia, Africa, and Latin America.
- 20-21 (U) Guinean President Toure visited Romania and held talks with Ceausescu.
- 20-23 (U) Turkish President Evren visited Yugoslavia.
- 21 (U) Bulgarian news media announced the establishment of a temporary restricted area (covering some two-thirds of Bulgaria) for the period September 24-October 1 in connection with Shield-82.

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September

- 21-22 (U) CEMA permanent representatives met in Moscow to discuss the current status of cooperation with Poland. According to a PAP article, CEMA's share of Polish foreign trade has risen from 54 percent in 1980 to 63-64 percent today.
- 21-23 (U) Czechoslovak leader Husak visited Bulgaria.
- 22 (U) East Germany's party daily Neues Deutschland bemoaned the possibility of an "unpredictable" conservative government in Bonn, bent on "rabble rousing confrontation."
- 22 (U) East Germany and Laos signed a Friendship and Cooperation Treaty.
- 22-23 (U) Czechoslovak and Bulgarian Presidents Husak and Zhivkov conferred in Bulgaria.
- 22-24 (U) Polish media reporting the new trade union law hinted that Solidarity might be banned.
- 23-26 (U) Warsaw Pact Commander-in-Chief Marshal Kulikov was in Moscow to attend the funeral of Marshal Bagramyan. (Kulikov returned to Bulgaria on September 26, according to the Bulgarian News Agency report.)
- 25 (U) The staff phase of the Warsaw Pact's exercise Shield-82 began in Bulgaria; the field phase began on September 27 following the arrival of Soviet Defense Minister Ustinov, defense ministers from most other Pact countries, and military delegations from Cuba, Mongolia, and Vietnam.
- 25-26 (U) According to an Albanian Ministry of Internal Affairs statement, a band of Albanian exiles landed in Albania armed with automatic pistols and equipped with radio transmitters. Security forces and the local population "liquidated" the "bandits." Albanian diplomats linked the group to unspecified foreign intelligence services, but Leka I, pretender to the Albanian throne, claimed responsibility.
- 27 (U) Hungary received a US\$300 million short-term loan from the Bank of International Settlements.

Analysis Report

The Polish Party: Jaruzelski Treads Fine Line
in Relaxing Martial Law Restrictions



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THE POLISH PARTY: JARUZELSKI TREADS FINE LINE
IN RELAXING MARTIAL LAW RESTRICTIONS

I N T R O D U C T I O N

The Jaruzelski regime may have stirred a sleeping dog in moving over the past few months to restore the communist party to a more active role in Polish national life. Without fanfare, and to a limited degree, the leadership has relaxed the restrictions imposed on party activities when martial law was declared last December. Polish press reports indicate that party plenums on both local and national levels are again voting for or against official nominees for party posts by secret ballot and that substantial "no" votes are being cast.

The party election rules establishing these procedures had been worked out in 1980-81 in response to pressures for the abolition of authoritarian practices that had led to abuses of power and the adoption of disastrous policies. Their application significantly altered the composition of party organizations, seeding their ranks with unorthodox, grassroots representatives whose assertiveness reduced the party's responsiveness to central control. The suspension of the new rules in December empowered the leadership to summarily remove and replace noncompliant party officials in the interests of reestablishing that control.

Jaruzelski did not use his martial law powers, however, to remove more than a handful of people from the unorthodox Central Committee elected in 1981, and he went on record as promising that the suspension of the liberalized 1981 election rules would be "temporary." He has run some risk in making good on that promise. Dissenting votes cast in Central Committee plenum elections this summer, under conditions of a partial return to the 1981 procedures, may reflect the continued presence of the kind of fractiousness and indiscipline that infected the party ranks last year. The phenomenon could prove controllable only by means of a more drastic overhaul of the party than Jaruzelski so far has seemed prepared to undertake.

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THE POLISH PARTY: JARUZELSKI TREADS FINE LINE
IN RELAXING MARTIAL LAW RESTRICTIONS

One of the most notable features of the 1980-81 "renewal" in Poland was the drive for democratization in the ruling Polish United Workers Party, which led to the adoption of new election rules providing for secret balloting, choice between opposing candidates for party office, and a loosening of the reins of central control and manipulation. Application of the new rules in the spring 1981 party elections resulted in widespread defeats of incumbent leaders and brought to power many leaders representing rank-and-file opinion at every level of the party, up to and including the Central Committee and Politburo.

The takeover of much of the party by such unorthodox leaders reduced the party's responsiveness to the central leadership, impelling Premier Jaruzelski to bypass the party and resort to the armed forces to deal with Solidarity and the breakdown in civil order late last year. The party, in effect, had become a part of the problem. Thus one of the key steps taken under martial law was suspension of the liberalized election rules that had undermined party discipline. At the same time, procedures were instituted to reestablish central control over local party organizations.

The democratic election procedures that were written into the party rules in early 1981 were suspended by means of a secret Politburo order issued in December, after the declaration of martial law. It was first mentioned in Polish media in January when local press accounts of provincial party plenums in Wroclaw and Katowice referred to a "Politburo instruction" on the work of party organs under martial law, citing it as the basis for local party leadership changes that had been effected without the customary voting (GAZETA ROBOTNICZA of 11 January and TRYBUNA ROBOTNICZA of the 25th). Jaruzelski acknowledged publicly the following month, in a speech at a late-February Central Committee plenum, that the Politburo had issued "instructions on party activities under conditions of martial law." The reference appeared in an account of his speech in the 25 February issue of the central party daily TRYBUNA LUDU.

Jaruzelski stipulated in his February speech that the martial law instructions "had a temporary character." In fact, within less than three months they appear to have been relaxed. While there was no public announcement of a change, provincial newspapers began to report instances of local party secretaries again being elected by secret ballot. The relaxation of the martial law strictures apparently extended to the Central Committee: press accounts

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indicate that at the most recent plenum, in July, some 60 members took advantage of secret balloting to reassert their independence and vote against some of Jaruzelski's nominees for leadership posts.

The relaxation of the restrictions has been limited. While party committee members are able again to cast negative votes by secret ballot against the regime's nominees for leadership positions, there is no indication that the 1981 rule allowing nomination of more than one candidate for the same post has been applied since martial law was imposed. The regime thus appears to be quietly testing the waters, seeking to demonstrate its good faith by tolerating a partial return to the observance of statutory procedures while leaving open the option of reverting to draconian measures should party organizations again threaten to get out of control.

ELECTIONS AT PROVINCIAL PARTY PLENUMS

The Politburo's December instruction suspending the election statute was used to remove elected regional party leaders without holding new elections or convening new plenums. On 8 January the Polish press reported that the Politburo had "accepted resignations" from Gdansk First Secretary Fiszbach and Katowice First Secretary Zabinski and appointed replacements. The latter were installed at meetings of the province executive committees, a procedure that avoided the convening of provincial committee plenums. The resignation of Legnica First Secretary Jasinski (a member of Solidarity) was similarly announced at a province executive committee meeting on 5 February, and a Warsaw official became first secretary with no mention of election.

By mid-February, when the next provincial party leadership change took place, a local press account indicated a partial return to the 1981 procedures. A plenum was held and balloting took place--though not secret balloting--when Kalisz First Secretary Gawronski resigned, according to the local GAZETA POZNANSKA of 18 February. The paper noted one abstention in the voting on acceptance of Gawronski's resignation and a unanimous open vote for Jan Janicki, a local plant director, as the new first secretary.

By spring, the Polish press was stating directly that the December Politburo instruction on election procedures was being moderated. Katowice First Secretary Messner, who had been installed without election in January, explained the application of the instruction in an interview published in the 23 May issue of the Warsaw weekly

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RZECZYWISTOSC. While he and three other Katowice secretaries were installed on the basis of the instruction, he said, the next Katowice plenum held "secret elections" to choose a province secretary. Asked by a RZECZYWISTOSC reporter when the Politburo instruction would be lifted and internal party democracy restored, Messner replied that the Politburo had already canceled "some elements of the instruction." Wherever appropriate "conditions exist," he added, the instruction is being ignored and the party statutory provisions applied. Only where there are "extraordinary circumstances that make it impossible to apply the statute is the instruction being applied," he said.

Press accounts of ensuing practice appear to bear out Messner's statements. In Poznan, where liberal First Secretary Skrzypczak evidently refused to resign and the province party committee backed him up, the Politburo had recourse to the instruction. Skrzypczak was removed with no mention of his having resigned, and a new first secretary--air force deputy commander General Lukasik from Warsaw--was installed with no election, according to TRYBUNA LUDU of 29-30 May. Subsequently, the 3 June TRYBUNA LUDU and the local GAZETA POZNANSKA reported that Central Committee Organizational Secretary Mokrzyszczak and Central Committee Cadre Department chief Dziekan had traveled to Poznan to explain to a province committee plenum the "motives" behind the Politburo's actions and to respond to "questions and doubts raised in the course of the discussion." The Paris LE FIGARO reported on 19-20 June that the Poznan province committee had adopted a resolution protesting Skrzypczak's removal and rejecting the Politburo's reasons as unconvincing.

Leadership changes reported since then appear to have been effected more smoothly, by means of a partial application of procedures mandated in the party statute and rules. First, a plenum is convened to vote, in open balloting, on whether to accept a first secretary's resignation. A candidate for first secretary is then presented, after he has won the approval of local party officials in preplenum "consultations." A secret yes-or-no vote is then taken on the candidate, with the results of the vote published in the local press and on occasion in TRYBUNA LUDU.

Three province first secretaries have been replaced in this manner since the Poznan first secretary's replacement in May:

† A 5 June Warsaw committee plenum approved the resignation of First Secretary Kociolek by open vote, with three abstentions. Jaruzelski himself nominated Central Committee Secretary Wozniak to be the new Warsaw first secretary, announcing that he had

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consulted with the Warsaw city secretariat and other local secretaries. Wozniak was elected in a secret ballot with 10 voting against, according to TRYBUNA LUDU and the local ZYCIE WARSZAWY of 7 June.

+ A 23 June Lublin plenum accepted First Secretary Kruk's resignation by open balloting with three abstentions and elected Wieslaw Skrzydlo, a longtime local party official, by 85 of 90 votes in a secret ballot. According to the account in the local SZTANDAR LUDU of 24 June, Kruk explained that he had been ready to retire, that after local consultations he had proposed his old friend Skrzydlo to succeed him, and that the Politburo had concurred.

+ A 23 September Torun plenum accepted the resignation of First Secretary Heza by a "significant majority" and his resignation from the local executive committee by a majority with three against and 14 abstentions, according to an account in the local GAZETA POMORSKA on 24-26 September.* Local cadre chief Zenon Draminski, whose nomination met with "general approval" in widespread preplenum "consultations," was elected to replace Heza in a secret ballot with seven dissenting votes out of 99.

Although no cases of contested elections have been reported since December, some elections have produced substantial votes opposing the single candidate. No sharply divided votes at provincial plenums have been reported, but at least one has been noted at the city level--in a 23 June GAZETA POMORSKA account of the replacement of the Torun city first secretary. The outgoing first secretary's resignation was accepted by secret vote of 32 to 14, the paper said, and the new first secretary was elected in a secret vote of 37 in favor, 15 against.

* In contrast to Kruk in Lublin, Heza was forced out in some disgrace. According to accounts in the 24 September TRYBUNA LUDU and 24-26 September GAZETA POMORSKA, he announced that he was resigning because of his "personal responsibility" for "negligence" and "ineffectiveness" of the local leadership exposed during an inspection by a military group. GAZETA POMORSKA had reported on 30 August that Jaruzelski had fired the province governor (*wojewoda*) and vice governor of Torun after a military inspection had exposed profiteering, abuse of position, and lax administration by local government officials. TRYBUNA LUDU reported on 14 September that Heza had submitted his resignation to the Politburo during a 13 September Politburo session on the results of the military inspection.

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CENTRAL COMMITTEE ELECTIONS

The Central Committee seemed submissive and unassertive during the first months under martial law. There was little sign of opposition at the February 1982 plenum, when Jaruzelski proposed Interior Minister Kiszczak and Central Committee Secretary Wozniak as Politburo candidate members. According to the press accounts, even with secret balloting only three Central Committee members out of 182 declined to vote for Kiszczak, and only four voted no or abstained on Wozniak.

By midyear, however, there were indications that the regime had condoned a partial return to the 1981 election practices and that some Central Committee members were beginning to assert a measure of independence. These press accounts have registered nothing like a recurrence of the open defiance of the leadership that occurred during plenums last year, but the facade of unanimity broke down at the latest plenum--held 15-16 July--when the official central press reports registered evidence of opposition to some candidates proposed by Jaruzelski. As reported in these accounts, the voting suggested that a liberal faction was protesting the removal of reformer Jan Labecki from the Politburo and the election of new Gdansk First Secretary Stanislaw Bejger and new Central Committee Secretary Manfred Gorywoda to the Central Committee and other leadership bodies.

At the 15-16 July plenum, the Politburo, after consulting with Central Committee members and province committee first secretaries, presented the Central Committee with several proposed personnel changes: the removal from the Secretariat of liberal Hieronim Kubiak, conservative Stefan Olszowski, and economic reform supervisor Marian Wozniak, who had just been transferred to Warsaw first secretary, and the dropping of reformer Labecki from the Politburo. To replace them, the Politburo nominated Wozniak and Poznan worker Stanislaw Kalkus as Politburo members, ZYCIE GOSPODARCZE editor Jan Glowczyk and Manfred Gorywoda as Secretariat members, Bejger as Politburo candidate member, Czestochowa First Secretary Wladyslaw Jonkisz, Gorywoda, and Bejger as Central Committee members, and Deputy Defense Minister Jozef Baryla as Central Committee candidate member.

The secret vote on accepting the resignations, as reported in TRYBUNA LUDU, produced a notable show of support for Labecki: 31 votes against accepting his resignation and 25 abstentions out of 170 votes cast by Central Committee members. The other resignations met with only minor opposition: Kubiak's was accepted

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with six votes against and seven abstentions, Olszowski's with five against and five absentions, and Wozniak's with two abstentions. Resistance by Olszowski supporters was disarmed by a statement read just before the vote announcing Olszowski's consent to being shifted to government work in order to facilitate a reshuffling of responsibilities in the Politburo.

The results of the secret vote for the candidates proposed by the Politburo also revealed strong resistance to some candidates. Warsaw First Secretary Wozniak was elected to the Politburo easily, with 167 of 170 votes, and Poznan worker Kalkus won with 148. But while Glowczyk was elected to the Secretariat with 163 votes, Gorywoda was elected with only 119 and Bejger with only 110. The unpopularity of the latter two was also evident in the vote to elect them Central Committee members. While Czestochowa First Secretary Jonkisz was added to the Central Committee with 160 votes, Gorywoda got only 113 and Bejger only 105 of the 170 votes. Deputy Defense Minister Baryla was elected Central Committee candidate member with only 133 votes.

The 60-odd votes cast against Bejger and Gorywoda and against accepting Labecki's resignation represent a landmark in the short history of publicly announced secret balloting, which dates from the April 1981 plenum. At that plenum, held shortly after the liberalized election rules had been enacted, the delegates cast only about a dozen votes against two of the Politburo's nominees. The present Central Committee, itself elected by uncontrolled secret balloting at the July 1981 party congress, has been more assertive in availing itself of the opportunity to dissent. At its first plenum, when it elected a new Politburo and Secretariat, candidates were nominated to run against some of those on the slate presented by the outgoing Politburo, and some of the opposition candidates garnered substantial support. One such candidate, liberal Krakow party secretary Kazimierz Miniur, received as many as 57 votes out of 191. In another show of opposition to the official slate, 58 Central Committee members declined to vote for hardline candidate Albin Siwak.

The "no" votes cast by members of the Central Committee this July, with martial law constraints in force, thus register dissent of the same magnitude as opposition votes cast at the "renewal"-era plenum a year earlier.*

* In the recorded history of publicized anti-leadership voting at Central Committee plenums, the largest split vote occurred at the October 1981 plenum where First Secretary Kania's resignation was accepted by a vote of 104 against 79.

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FBIS ANALYSIS REPORT
27 OCTOBER 1982

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The Central Committee has been little altered in the past year. Jaruzelski has ousted only three members, chiefly for openly opposing martial law. It remains an unorthodox body, including elements whose persisting spirit of independence could create problems for the regime in the future. The show of support for the ousted liberal Labecki and the large vote against the unpopular Bejger and Gorywoda may reflect a growing boldness on the part of these independent-minded elements, who may be seeking to test the limits of Jaruzelski's tolerance. The identity of the dissenting members is unknown. Only the numbers of votes are publicized. The dissenters presumably include some representatives of Gdansk and Poznan, where Jaruzelski has removed popular liberal first secretaries.

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TO CLARK FROM BREMER DOCDATE 27 OCT 82

KEYWORDS: FRANCE POLAND
HUMAN RIGHTS

SUBJECT: RECENT FRENCH REACTIONS TO DEVELOPMENTS IN POLAND

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK DUE: 28 OCT 82 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
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		LORD
		BAILEY
		NAU
		GUHIN

COMMENTS

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Washington, D.C. 20520

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October 27, 1982

MEMORANDUM TO MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Recent French Reactions to Developments in Poland

In response to your request, we are providing below a chronological list of recent French statements on Poland. In reaction to the ban on Solidarity the French have reiterated their refusal to provide any new concessional credits to Poland, but have adopted no specific measures.

September 27: Foreign Minister Cheysson reportedly reiterated the French Government's disapproval of the deteriorating situation in Poland in his bilateral meeting at the UNGA with the Polish Foreign Minister.

September 30: Prime Minister Mauroy in his speech to the UNGA said "in a Poland that is occupied by its own army, we see a courageous people prevented from choosing the paths of liberty."

October 9: A French Government spokesman, following publication of the law banning Solidarity, said "The French Government... can only note its total reprobation of these measures" and termed them a "new obstacle in the Franco-Polish dialogue."

October 11: President Mitterrand, returning from his African trip, condemned the banning of Solidarity, terming it an "intolerable regression of law" and said "this decision constitutes a new and dramatic blow to freedoms and to human rights in Poland." He went on to say it was contrary to commitments made by the Polish head of government on December 13, 1981 and to the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act, and that "it is the Polish system itself that must be considered when one passes judgment". Asked what France's attitude toward Poland would be in the future, Mitterrand said that "France will do what it must to help the Polish people to continue against all odds to live without giving up hope."

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October 12: French labor unions, with the exception of the Communist-controlled CGT, staged a large joint demonstration in Paris protesting the dissolution of Solidarity. They were joined by several federations of the CGT acting independently of the union's leadership. In conjunction with this, all political parties, with the exception of the Communists, issued statements condemning the Polish Government action. Even the Communists modified slightly their previous position, expressing the wish that all workers under detention in Poland be freed. The Socialist Party also cancelled a planned official visit to Moscow.


L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

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