

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library  
Digital Library Collections

---

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

---

**Collection:** Bailey, Norman A.: Files  
**Folder Title:** Eastern European Policy (August  
1983)  
**Box:** RAC Box 2

---

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digitized-textual-material>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:

<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/white-house-inventories>

Contact a reference archivist at: **reagan.library@nara.gov**

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/research-support/citation-guide>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** BAILEY, NORMAN: FILES

**Withdrawer**

RBW 2/11/2013

**File Folder** EASTERN EUROPEAN POLICY AUGUST 1983

**FOIA**

M452

**Box Number** 2

SHIFRINSON

40

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
153883	REPORT		2	8/2/1983	B1
153884	REPORT		1	8/4/1983	B1
153878	REPORT	RE. EAST GERMAN ECONOMY	20	8/1/1983	B1
153879	REPORT	RE. EAST EUROPEAN HIGHLIGHTS: JULY 1983 <i>R 6/2/2015 M452/2</i>	19	8/11/1983	B1
153880	CABLE	161444Z AUG 83	1	8/16/1983	B1 B3
153881	CABLE	200042Z AUG 83 <i>PAR 6/21/2013 M452/2</i>	1	8/20/1983	B1 B3
153885	REPORT		3	8/23/1983	B1
153886	REPORT		2	8/23/1983	B1
153882	CABLE	261554Z AUG 83	1	8/26/1983	B1 B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

*Collection Name*

BAILEY, NORMAN: FILES

*Withdrawer*

RB 2/11/2013  
W

*File Folder*

EASTERN EUROPEAN POLICY AUGUST 1983

*FOIA*

M452  
SHIFRINSON

*Box Number*

2

40

---

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
153883	REPORT	2	8/2/1983	B1

---

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]**
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]**
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]**
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]**
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]**
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]**
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]**
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]**

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

*Collection Name*

BAILEY, NORMAN: FILES

*Withdrawer*

RB 2/11/2013  
W

*File Folder*

EASTERN EUROPEAN POLICY AUGUST 1983

*FOIA*

M452  
SHIFRINSON

*Box Number*

2

40

---

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
153884	REPORT	1	8/4/1983	B1

---

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]**
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]**
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]**
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]**
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]**
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]**
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]**
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]**

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

*Collection Name*

BAILEY, NORMAN: FILES

*Withdrawer*

RB 2/11/2013  
W

*File Folder*

EASTERN EUROPEAN POLICY AUGUST 1983

*FOIA*

M452  
SHIFRINSON

*Box Number*

2

40

---

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
153878	REPORT  RE. EAST GERMAN ECONOMY	20	8/1/1983	B1

---

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]**
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]**
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]**
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]**
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]**
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]**
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]**
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]**

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

153879

23

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

EE



BUREAU OF  
INTELLIGENCE  
AND RESEARCH

CURRENT  
ANALYSES

THIS ADVANCE COPY IS PROVIDED FOR  
YOUR PERSONAL USE PRIOR TO APPROVAL  
FOR WIDER DISTRIBUTION. DO NOT  
FURTHER REPRODUCE, DISTRIBUTE, OR  
QUOTE.

(U) EAST EUROPEAN HIGHLIGHTS: JULY 1983

Summary

(C) The formal lifting of martial law on July 22, Poland's national day, did little to relax restrictions on personal liberties. Despite some releases, the principal political prisoners remain incarcerated.

(C/NF) Hungary was unusually active on both foreign and domestic fronts: Kadar met separately with Andropov, the premier of France, and the premier of Turkey. Kadar endorsed Warsaw Pact countermeasures to any Western deployment of intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF), although earlier he reportedly was opposed to deployment of Soviet nuclear missiles in Hungary. A party plenum endorsed liberalization of election laws and revamped the foreign policy hierarchy on the party and state level.

(C/NF) FRG Christian Social Union leader Strauss appeared unexpectedly and forcefully on the Ostpolitik scene with visits to Czechoslovakia, Poland, and East Germany, including a meeting with Honecker.

(C) A trial of Muslim activists in Yugoslavia evidently was directed against Iranian-fostered pan-Islamic influences, although the regime avoided making this fact public.

(C) As of mid-year, none of the East European countries had managed to achieve planned rates of economic growth.

\* \* \* \* \*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify: OADR (Mautner, M.)

Report 664-CA  
August 11, 1983

DECLASSIFIED  
NLRR M45R12 #153879  
BY RW NAD DATE 6/2/15

(C) Poland: Martial Law Lifted

Less than one month after the tumultuous papal visit, martial law was formally ended in Poland on July 22, 19 months and 9 days after it was introduced. The regime had been hinting that it would do so ever since the papal visit. But the legislation, adopted at three plenary sessions of the Sejm (parliament), raised serious questions regarding its practical meaning. By month's end, reaction at home and abroad ranged from indifference to disappointment.

Tough Legislation Replaces Martial Law. The legislative process abolishing martial law began with the July 14 Sejm meeting and continued through its July 20-21 and July 28 sessions. On the 28th, Jaruzelski completed the process of officially lifting martial law and replacing it with a variety of new legislative acts.

The Sejm on July 14 passed bills consolidating central control over the police and streamlining and better defining the role and authority of the cabinet. But of even greater import were the constitutional amendments, press law, and assorted temporary regulations that were submitted to legislation. The amendments included the incorporation of PRON (Patriotic Movement of National Rebirth) in the Constitution, an expansion of workers' rights in government, guarantees of the right to private property, and a provision for a "state of emergency" in case of internal disorder. The other regulations included restrictions on employment practices and education. All drafts were endorsed unanimously and referred to the appropriate committees.

The Sejm reconvened on July 20 to consider the passage of the July 14 legislative package amid widespread speculation that this would constitute the last step permitting Jaruzelski to end martial law. The Sejm voted 368 to 1 to pass the constitutional amendments and on the 21st approved both the omnibus bill which encompassed a variety of temporary regulations and an amnesty bill applicable to political prisoners. Significantly, the omnibus bill, which was enacted unanimously, stipulated that its provisions were to be in force during the "period of overcoming socio-economic crisis" and terminated not later than the end of 1985.

Provisions of the bill included:

--restrictions on employees' rights to change jobs;

- strengthening the "social parasite" law;
- increasing the power of the state to control education by restricting student associations, and giving cabinet ministers the right to fire faculty members;
- granting to factory managers the authority to increase the length of the workday; and
- giving the authorities the power to freeze producer prices of goods deemed essential.

At the behest of Polish Catholic Church officials, the Sejm did agree to postpone consideration of changes to the penal code. These deletions included:

- a proposed expansion of the censorship law; and
- a proposed amendment to the penal code which would imprison persons responsible for the circulation of rumors or for participation in banned organizations.

Conditional Amnesty Decreed. The Sejm also on July 21 approved an amnesty bill which provided for the release of all eligible prisoners within 30 days (subsequently extended to October 31). Under the amnesty program:

- Women and all political prisoners sentenced to less than three years would be released.
- Political prisoners sentenced to more than three years would have their sentences halved.
- All persons in hiding would be given amnesty if they turned themselves in by October 31, 1983; gave an account of their activities; and promised to cease criminal activity--a provision apparently designed to break the underground.

The amnesty bill failed to define "political prisoners" or "political crimes" clearly, thus making it difficult to determine how many people would be eligible. Further, as the regime later admitted, the amnesty law excluded a prominent group of political prisoners--especially those considered dangerous to the regime, such as members of KOR (Workers Self-Defense Committee), KPN (Federation for Independent Poland), and the Solidarity Seven.

Nevertheless, the temporary legislation set the stage for Jaruzelski to abolish martial law in time for the national holiday. In an address to the Sejm on July 21, Jaruzelski said "anarchy will not return to Poland" and "attempts at undertaking

anti-state activity will be crushed no less firmly than during martial law." He also stated that he planned to give up his position as defense minister after October 12. At the same time, Jaruzelski announced that the Military Council for National Salvation (WRON), the governing mechanism during martial law, had been dissolved.

The regime then announced that the Sejm would meet on the 28th to consider additional pieces of permanent legislation:

- Beefing up the penal code by making it a crime to belong to an outlawed union, to spread rumors, or to post handbills or posters in violation of legal regulations. Such crimes were to be punishable by sentences of 3-5 years.
- Alterations in the tax code which seemed largely cosmetic and aimed at alleged abuses of firms operating under Polonia (organization of Poles living abroad) auspices.
- Technical provisions to make the news agency PAP more responsive to the regime's needs.
- Additions to the censorship law (adopted during the Solidarity period) which would give the regime wide leeway to crack down on persons found responsible for materials which "endanger the security of the state" or "obviously constitute a crime."

Once again, the provisions of the censorship law outraged the church, which reacted by publishing a strongly critical article in the Catholic weekly Tygodnik Powszechny (Universal Weekly) and by sending numerous letters to the Sejm asking for elimination or weakening of several provisions. Pro-Solidarity quarters also were unhappy, because the legislation gave the authorities the power to break up a July 31 demonstration by hundreds of people at Warsaw's St. Anna's Church. But the police did not intervene the following day, when tens of thousands gathered at Warsaw's military cemetery,

Reaction. As realization set in that the special powers amounted to codification of martial law rigors, much of the political benefit the regime had hoped to gain began to evaporate. An editorial in The Times (London) pointed out: "General Jaruzelski did not expect to fool the Polish people with his measures, nor has he succeeded in deluding completely western public opinion." Lech Walesa denounced the measures as "worse than martial law."

The regime reacted somewhat defensively to the criticism and emphasized that even though the government had the legal authority to exercise these new powers, it would not do so unless absolutely necessary. Police presence around the US Embassy compound was

reduced beginning July 20. Also, prominent Solidarity figures were released--e.g., former spokesman Onyszkiewicz and Walesa adviser Geremek--and hundreds of less prominent prisoners. By the end of the month, the number of political and other prisoners who benefited from the amnesty was close to 3,000, a figure substantially higher than anticipated.

Paris Club Meeting. Despite public disillusionment over the regime's new repressive measures, Poland's Western creditors--the so-called Paris Club--announced after a meeting on the 28th that they agreed in principle to open rescheduling talks and to reconvene in September to work out details. They cautioned, however, that Western consideration of whether to reschedule would depend heavily on Warsaw's behavior during the period immediately following the abolition of martial law--particularly late August and early September, which are replete with Solidarity anniversaries.

The Balance Sheet on the July Legislation. It remained unclear how the new statutes would be implemented. The censorship law was worded vaguely enough to allow the authorities either to quash virtually all expression of dissent or allow a great degree of freedom.

Despite such ambiguity, a balance sheet of the post-martial law situation shows on the positive side that:

- Large numbers of political prisoners were eligible for release and were being set free, though the final number would not be known for months.
- Foreign travel and obtaining passports were made much easier.
- The right to private property and privately owned farms was enshrined in the Constitution for the first time.
- The superficial manifestations of martial law (e.g., troops in the streets, WRON) disappeared.

On the negative side:

- The regime retained many powers it possessed during martial law, such as the right to control written and spoken dissent, employment, and education.
- Many of the most "dangerous" members of the underground and of Solidarity were not eligible for amnesty.
- Solidarity was not recognized, nor did the government acknowledge other than verbal commitment to the Gdansk labor accords.

(C/NF) Hungary: Hectic Activism

After hosting the premier from Turkey (the first such visit) and the premier from France, party leader Kadar led a party-state delegation to Moscow for the first bilateral summit since 1979. Meanwhile, the regime pushed ahead with its tougher line against domestic opposition, and the Central Committee endorsed new electoral reform measures and a shakeup in the foreign policy establishment.

A Summit of Few Surprises. Despite suggestions prior to the July 18-23 summit that Hungarian-Soviet relations were strained over security issues, the published communique gave no indication of problems. The available evidence indicates that the "official, friendly visit" was used by Kadar and Andropov to cement their longstanding close ties. The communique noted that the talks had produced a unanimity of views on all questions discussed, including a strong public endorsement by Kadar of a Warsaw Pact response to INF deployment. It stressed that the two sides pledged to expand their political and economic links and announced signature of a number of accords aimed at boosting trade and technical and scientific cooperation. Some of the cooperative agreements apparently involved the transfer of Hungarian expertise in the fields of agriculture, microelectronics, and robotics.

The communique gave relatively short shrift to international topics, reflecting Hungary's low-key involvement with Third World trouble spots, a stance Moscow has long accepted. Concerning intrabloc and communist affairs, the communique called for the convening of a Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA) summit and--probably reflecting Kadar's strong commitment to detente--endorsed the idea of dialogue with socialist and social-democratic parties. But the most important aspect of the communique, and possibly of the visit, was Hungary's explicit endorsement of the need to take "effective retaliatory measures" in response to a US deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe. This appeared to contradict reports (mostly of Hungarian origin) that Kadar was opposed to any deployment of Soviet nuclear missiles in Hungary.

Given his vested interest in maintaining and even expanding Hungarian ties with the West, Kadar may have argued--as some Hungarian diplomats abroad suggested--in favor of not rushing into counterdeployment until all other possible avenues have been exhausted; he may even have sought to exclude Hungary from the scheme as a country that borders on neutral Austria. In the last analysis, Soviet interests would prevail.

Regardless of what transpired between the two leaders on the contentious INF deployment issue, Kadar's alleged reservations apparently were not serious enough to deprive him of the Order of

Lenin, which he received during the visit. Moreover, the summit garnered him Soviet backing for further economic and some modest political reforms as a way of coping with growing problems in both domains.

Party Plenum Endorses Electoral Reform, Personnel Changes.

The Central Committee on July 6 adopted in principle a proposal calling for nominating at least two candidates in all but 10 percent of Hungary's parliamentary constituencies and for all positions on regional and local councils. The exclusion of 10 percent of the seats, which are to be reserved for the 30-35 figures in the top hierarchy, evidently was intended to ensure that the leadership could run unopposed during the elections scheduled to take place in 1985.

In fact, the Hungarian electoral system already allowed multiple candidacies. During the June 1980 general elections, 15 out of the 352 seats to the National Assembly were contested. Indeed, the new electoral procedure was introduced in the early 1970s, but the experiment fell victim to the overall retrenchment that also affected economic reforms in 1973. Where the 1983 proposed reform departs from its predecessor is that it requires--as distinct from allows--that the great majority of the seats be contested by at least two candidates. Even so, while the electoral reform appears to be more than cosmetic, no prospective candidate can present himself as opposed to the platform of the Patriotic People's Front (PPF), the communist-dominated mass organization.

The Kadar regime apparently hopes to stimulate greater public participation by upgrading the National Assembly from a mere rubber stamp to a meaningful forum for debate. The electoral reform idea had been the subject of discussion for some time, with its advocates arguing that the set speeches in parliament were grossly out of step with the often lively media discussion of important issues.

The plenum's other decision included the replacement of Frigyes Puja, foreign minister for 10 years, by Peter Varkonyi, age 52, former party secretary in charge of international relations. Varkonyi is a far more sophisticated official than his unimaginative, orthodox predecessor; he is also a longtime Kadar confidant. Varkonyi's post at the secretariat was filled by Matyas Szuros, former head of the Central Committee foreign affairs department, whose job was taken over by his deputy, Gyula Horn.

There was some indication that these changes, which involve the foreign affairs establishment at both the party and state level, had been under quiet preparation for some time; Kadar wished to give Hungarian diplomacy a more polished look to facilitate relations with the West. Moreover, the timing of the changes, which included the replacement of Ambassador to the US

Petran by Deputy Foreign Minister Hazi, suggested that they were related in part to upcoming first-time visits to Washington by Foreign Minister Varkonyi and to Budapest by Vice President Bush. Although the personnel changes do not signal a new foreign policy, which still adheres loyally to the Moscow line on major issues, they do suggest the ascendancy of professionalism and expertise over mere ideological commitment.

Pressure on Dissent Maintained. Even as Kadar moved to reassure Moscow while courting the West, he maintained steady pressure on the varied political opposition elements at home with a finesse that has been a hallmark of his long but controversial career. Police harassment of members of the Democratic Opposition (Demokratikus Ellenzek) continued and was augmented by repressive measures against members of other opposition groups. According to the West German daily Die Tageszeitung (July 22), Hungarian police on July 16 expelled some 15 Western guests of the unofficial Hungarian antinuclear peace movement known as Peace Group for Dialogue (PGD). Police also arrested some 20 PGD members in what appeared to be the most sweeping crackdown in Hungary in years. The PGD was thus prevented from holding a summer camp in north-western Hungary that was to be devoted to antinuclear themes, with leading members of Western peace movements (including the US) participating.

The PGD's difficulties with the authorities presumably reflected Kadar's accommodation to Soviet pressure. Regardless of the motive behind the police pressure, it apparently caused a split within the fledgling, unsanctioned peace movement, with the majority of its leaders voting in favor of more radical tactics.

Meanwhile, Neue Zuericher Zeitung of July 9 reported that Sandor Csoori, one of Hungary's most prominent poets and an heir apparent to the late Gyula Illyes, was banned from publishing (other than poems) for one year. Csoori was charged with having written a politically sensitive introduction to a book by Miklos Duray, a dissident member of the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia. Duray's autobiographical novel Dog Muzzle was recently published in the US. Paradoxically, neither Csoori nor, until recently, members of the PGD movement were anxious that they not be regarded as dissidents. This situation could change if the regime's already tough line becomes even harder in the coming months.

(C/NF) Federal Republic of Germany: Strauss Embraces Ostpolitik

Bavarian Prime Minister, CSU party chief, and one-time East bloc bete noire Franz Josef Strauss sparked considerable controversy on the East-West scene by arranging a \$400 million government-backed bank credit to the GDR (despite having just

called the East Germans "murderers") and then visiting Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the GDR.

- In Czechoslovakia, Strauss was received only by Bohuslav Kucera, deputy chairman of the parliament and chairman of the puppet Socialist Party. The two exchanged views on "typical international problems" and "some issues" relating to FRG-Czechoslovak relations. Prague media gave the visit scant mention.
  
- In Poland, Strauss gave an interview in which he seemed to endorse martial law by saying that the "chaos...had to be ended." He later amended his comment to the effect that, while chaos had to be ended, martial law was the wrong way to do it.
  
- In East Germany, Strauss was received by party and state leader Honecker, an obvious political gesture given Strauss' role in the FRG loan. Strauss subsequently told reporters that inner-German relations would not be negatively affected by NATO's INF deployment (the East Germans present demurred) and noted progress on inner-German cultural and environmental agreements. But he seemed to play down speculation that the East Germans might lower their compulsory exchange requirement for Western visitors when he noted that a change in the "shoot to kill" order at the border took "priority" over the levy.

Responding to criticisms from right-wing supporters, Strauss subsequently asserted that his basic attitudes toward detente and Ostpolitik remained unchanged; only his "choice of means" for bringing about change in East-West relations had shifted. For the East German leadership, however, Strauss' apparent metamorphosis was a welcome sign that the new coalition government in Bonn was interested in a working relationship with East Berlin. But the Honecker regime still faced the problem of coming up with sufficient concessions in the inner-German area to tamp down the controversy that is swirling around Strauss' actions. His apparent aim to carve out a national role for himself in competition with his nemesis, Foreign Minister Genscher, has led to more bickering--such as Economics Minister Lambsdorff's charge that Strauss had turned over "cash for hope."

(C) Trial of Muslim Activists Under Way in Yugoslavia

Thirteen Muslim activists--11 of whom had been arrested in early April for possession of subversive pan-Islamic propaganda materials obtained while visiting Iran--went on trial July 18 in Sarajevo, capital of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The defendants are charged with crimes ranging from carrying out

"hostile propaganda" to organizing a counterrevolutionary group seeking to establish an "ethnically pure" fundamentalist Islamic state in Bosnia-Herzegovina. They are also said to have sought support from the ambassador of an Islamic country serving in Vienna--a country not named by Yugoslav media, but widely believed to be Iran. Yugoslav authorities have not surfaced the defendants' alleged Iranian ties in the trial proceedings (at least not publicly), in an effort to maintain good relations with Tehran, a nonaligned capital. Yugoslav and Bosnian media did criticize "pan-Islamic" ideology and "Iranian-style fundamentalism" during the trial.

Some Bosnian officials maintain privately that pan-Islamic ideology is increasing in that republic because of the susceptibility of youth to indigenous and foreign Muslim fanatics; others claim that pan-Islamism is still a marginal "cafe/intellectual" topic rather than a mass problem. Nevertheless, the decision to move against Muslim activists reflects official concern over increasing signs of "Greater Muslim nationalism" among the country's Muslim population and over links between Yugoslav Muslim activists and radical elements in Iran, Libya, and other militant Arab states. Thus far, pan-Islamism in Bosnia has not become a rallying point for popular disaffection.

(C) Midyear Economic Results

East European economies continued to operate under severe strains during the first half of 1983. Efforts to service or reschedule hard-currency debt forced sharp cutbacks in imports, which in turn affected industrial output. Recession, particularly in Western Europe, reduced demand for the region's exports. None of the countries was able to achieve planned rates of growth, although East Germany reported an acceleration from last year's pace.

Poland's economy appears to be faltering after only a modest rebound from 1982 lows. The government's modest goal of 2.5-percent growth in national income this year under the revised 1983-85 plan is unlikely to be met. Industrial production in the first quarter was up by 2 percent over the last quarter of 1982, but results for April and May showed average daily production again on the decline. On the other hand, the agricultural sector appeared set to rebound from a poor 1982 harvest, despite shortages of fertilizers and pesticides. Still, in real terms, national income was 25 percent below the 1979 level.

The GDR reported a slight rise in the pace of economic growth, with produced national income 4 percent higher in the first half of 1983 than in the first half of 1982. This compared favorably with a growth rate of only 3 percent recorded for the

ms

first half of 1982, but was still slightly under plan. The reported figures showed steady growth, in contrast to much poorer results reported in most of the other countries of the region. A notable exception, however, was the retail turnover aggregate, which showed no growth. This was an indication that consumer goods had been somewhat less available, particularly when price increases were taken into account.

The Czechoslovak economy showed some modest growth, but it is questionable whether the planned annual increases of 1.7 percent (reduced from 2.4 percent in January) in industrial production and 2 percent in national income will be achieved. According to officially reported statistics for the first five months of the year, industrial production was up more than 3 percent over the same period in 1982, but a considerable portion of this growth was due to inflation. Favorable growing conditions should result in a good harvest in 1983.

Hungary continued its slow-growth policy, implemented in an effort to restore the country's balance of payments. National income is targeted to grow by only 0.5-1 percent this year and domestic consumption is to be reduced by 3-4 percent. First-quarter results showed an 0.8-percent drop in industrial production when compared with first-quarter 1982 results, while exports increased. Although grain production may fall short of the 1982 record harvest, the agricultural sector should turn in a good performance.

President Ceausescu, at a recent Central Committee plenary, claimed that Romania's industrial production increased by 5 percent in the first half of 1983. This seems unlikely given the steep cuts in imports that the economy was forced to sustain as it weathered a severe liquidity crisis. Drought conditions will reduce the grain harvest, further aggravating food shortages. Bucharest's financial situation appears to be improving, however. Knowledgeable observers believe that Romania will be able to avoid rescheduling its 1984 hard-currency obligations.

The Yugoslav economy, beset by severe balance-of-payments problems, staggered through the first half of the year while Western governments, commercial banks, and the international lending institutions tried to put together a complex financial rescue package. The crisis has invalidated the 4.5-percent economic growth target set under the current five-year plan. Economic planners now hope for a 1-percent growth in 1983, but even this may be too optimistic. Cuts in imports caused industrial production through May to drop 1 percent from 1982 results. A tough International Monetary Fund adjustment program has thus far failed to contain inflation, currently running at a 35-percent annual rate. Living standards are expected to decline for the fifth consecutive year.

Bulgaria probably continues to lead the region in economic growth, although it is doubtful that the planned 4.8-percent growth rate was achieved in the first half. (Statistics are not yet available.) Drought will reduce grain crops by as much as 25 percent, but stocks from last year's record harvest and ample hard-currency reserves will prevent food shortages.

(C) Developments in Brief

- East and West on July 15 agreed on the text of a concluding document to the second follow-up Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). At month's end, however, Malta continued to stall final agreement by insisting that the document include a call for a follow-up meeting on Mediterranean security issues. Barring further delays, the Madrid conference is expected to end with a meeting of foreign ministers on September 9. The concluding document calls for several follow-up meetings, including: a preliminary meeting on a Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) in Helsinki in October; a first-stage CDE meeting in Stockholm in January 1984; experts meetings in 1986 on human rights in Ottawa and on human contacts in Bern; a cultural forum in Budapest in 1985; a CSCE anniversary (10th) meeting in Helsinki in 1985; and the third CSCE follow-up session in Vienna in 1986.
  
- The Soviet Ministry of Defense notified military attachés from CSCE signatory states of an exercise planned by the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany (GSFG): July 25-30, in the area of Magdeburg, Dresden, and Frankfurt-on-Oder, 26,000 men. Like the June 8 Soviet notification of a national land and sea exercise in the western USSR and the Baltic Sea (June 29-July 4, 50,000 men), the announcement complied only minimally with the CSCE regime: it did not designate a code name for the exercise and, according to Soviet defense ministry officials, the host country (GDR) did not plan to invite observers. (A Warsaw Pact exercise, Soyuz-83, held May 29-June 8, involving Soviet, East German, Polish, and Czechoslovak forces, was not announced, presumably because the number of forces was below the 25,000-troop threshold.)
  
- Roman magistrate Martella finally accepted a persistent Bulgarian invitation to visit Sofia to question three Bulgarians and a Turk accused by convicted papal assailant Mehmet Ali Acqa in connection with the 1981 assassination attempt. Martella confined his interrogations to the assassination attempt and avoided pursuing other Bulgarian activities, such as gun or drug smuggling. Reuters reported that the questioning "had not yet revealed any new elements"; the Bulgarian media carried an interview with Martella in which he suggested that Antonov's testimony was

inconsistent. The Bulgarians sought as usual to depict themselves as slandered innocents.

Just as Martella was preparing to return to Rome, a July 18-19 appeals hearing in Sofia for two Italians convicted last spring on espionage charges resulted in an apparently prearranged reduced sentence for one of them. This display of benign "socialist justice" was clearly aimed at encouraging Italian concessions in the Antonov case.

--The most recent spate of rumors of Albanian leader Enver Hoxha's death were put to rest by his appearance and speech at the July 10 festivities marking the Albanian Army's 40th anniversary. Hoxha had been making few public appearances (one in April, three in May, two in June), fueling speculation that, at age 74, he would soon be passing from the scene. Although some delay in announcing his death might be expected from a not-yet unified successor Albanian leadership, only a few hours or days would be likely to pass before announcement of national mourning for the only leader communist Albania has ever known. Ranking second only to Hoxha's death in the rumor mill is contemplation of the possible results of the subsequent in-fighting and its consequences for Albanian foreign policy.

Prepared by I. Matusek, 632-2877; F. Foldvary, D. Sommers,  
R. Farlow, P. Costolanski, J. Bodnar, J. Floyd,  
W. Griffith

Approved by M. Mautner, 632-9536

Chronology

July

- 1 (U) The Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic signed an agreement whereby the FRG guaranteed a \$400 million bank credit to the GDR.
- 1 (LOU) Polish authorities extended by two months the suspension of the pro-Solidarity Polish Writers Union rather than dissolve it completely or allow it to resume its work. The union's leadership was cited as the main obstacle to lifting the suspension.
- 1 (C) Turkish Prime Minister Uluu concluded a state visit to Hungary. He met with party chief Kadar, Premier Lazar, and other senior officials to discuss international security issues in what was described as a "useful, frank and friendly" atmosphere.
- 2 (U) Bulgarian media announced the visit of four representatives of US East Coast labor groups to discuss labor questions and preparations for an international conference on "Peace and Trade Unions," to be held in Bulgaria next fall. The Bulgarians want as much international participation as possible.
- 2-3 (LOU) Polish Premier Jaruzelski and senior party and state officials addressed a party youth conference in Gdansk in a surprise rebuttal to the Pope's claim during his recent visit that Polish youth was becoming disillusioned and had little to look forward to.
- 3-8 (C) George Habash, secretary-general of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, visited Bulgaria. The ongoing rift within Palestinian ranks presumably dominated his talks; Bulgaria has not publicly followed the Soviet line of support for Yasir Arafat. Habash reportedly thanked Sofia for its material aid.
- 4 (C) Lech Walesa went on unauthorized leave from his recently reacquired job as an electrician at the Gdansk Lenin Shipyards. Polish authorities wanted him to take leave during the August anniversary of the 1980 shipyard strike and the signing of the Gdansk labor accords which gave birth to Solidarity.
- 4 (U) The Soviet Ministry of Defense notified military attachés from CSCE signatory states of a 26,000-man exercise planned by the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany (GSFG), July 25-30.

July

- 5 (C) Jaruzelski received the Order of Lenin from the Soviet Union on his 60th birthday, an indication that Moscow was generally satisfied with his performance. The East European countries followed suit in awarding him major decorations.
- 6 (C) The Hungarian party's Central Committee plenum was highlighted by the announcement of a series of proposed electoral reforms including the introduction of limited competitive elections.
- 6 (C) Bulgarian leaders feted outgoing Soviet Ambassador Nikita Tolubeyev and awarded him the Dimitrov Order. Tolubeyev was not well liked by the Bulgarians, who hope for better relations with his replacement, Leonid Grekov, the former No. 2 in the Uzbek party.
- 7-9 (U) Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs Frigyes Puja was replaced by Peter Varkonyi.
- 7-11 (U) Hungarian Deputy Premier and head of the State Planning Administration Faluvegi visited Bulgaria for talks with his counterparts on greater planning cooperation and coordination of the two countries' plans for 1986-90. Faluvegi also met with Premier Grisha Filipov.
- 9 (LOU) The Polish Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth (PRON) issued an appeal for the lifting of martial law on July 22, Poland's national day. A similar appeal was issued prior to the suspension of martial law. Press reports indicated that the decision to lift martial law was made at a Politburo meeting on July 5.
- 10 (U) Polish Cardinal Glemp, in Rome to discuss the June 1983 papal visit to Poland, used his Sunday sermon at a local Polish church to criticize international media coverage of the Pope's trip. He described it as overly political and missing the pastoral nature of the pilgrimage.
- 10 (U) Albania celebrated the 40th anniversary of its army with fanfare and flowery speeches. Enver Hoxha and the party were hailed as "creators, organizers, and leaders of our people's army."
- 10-12 (C) French Prime Minister Mauroy made an official visit to Hungary.

July

- 11 (U) The Hungarian forint was devalued by 3.6 percent against the US dollar, the third time this year that the forint has been devalued.
- 11-18 (U) Italian magistrate Martella traveled to Sofia to investigate allegations of Bulgarian involvement in the 1981 papal assassination attempt. Meanwhile, press speculation on the case was renewed by an impromptu press conference with convicted assailant Mehmet Ali Acga in which he renewed charges of KGB and Bulgarian involvement.
- 12 (U) Polish Government spokesman Jerzy Urban warned during his regular press conference that Poland would seek compensation from the US for losses suffered because of "unilateral severance" of an economic cooperation agreement. The Poles say the agreement contained a clause disassociating economic from political conditions.
- 12 (U) The Polish parliament found no grounds to instigate proceedings against disgraced former leaders Gierek and Babiuch for misconduct, but accompanying commentary reflected official scorn for them.
- 12-23 (U) Romanian President Ceausescu visited Ethiopia (12-14), Zimbabwe (14-17), Mozambique (18-20), Zambia (21), and Somalia (22-23).
- 13 (U) The Polish Clemency Commission announced that only 122 out of 809 clemency requests have been denied--and only to those who had "leading and organizing roles" in public disturbances or used "terror and intimidation." Some of those denied were said to have criminal records.
- 13-17 (U) FRG Foreign Minister Genscher visited Bulgaria at the invitation of his Bulgarian counterpart, Petur Mladenov. Their discussions centered on East-West tensions and called for a summit between Reagan and Andropov.
- 14 (LOU) The Polish parliament paved the way for the technical lifting of martial law by enacting omnibus legislation providing for martial law-style constraints until December 1985.
- 15 (U) At the Madrid CSCE talks, 34 participating states provisionally agreed on the text of a concluding document. (Malta's insistence on the inclusion of Mediterranean security issues has delayed agreement on a final text.)

July

- 15 (U) The Hungarian Csepel Iron and Metal Works was broken up into 13 independent companies. The decision to decentralize one of Hungary's largest firms represents an attempt to improve profitability and efficiency.
- 15-31 (U) Czechoslovak President and party leader Husak spent two weeks vacationing in the USSR "at the invitation of the Soviet party Central Committee." No announcement of a Husak-Andropov meeting has been made.
- 17 (U) According to Polish figures, communist party (PUWP) membership reached 2.327 million, or 9 percent of the adult population. In July 1980 the membership was more than 3.149 million. But not even the numerical decline illustrates accurately the current moribund state of the party.
- 18 (U) Thirteen Muslims went on trial in Sarajevo, capital of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, on charges of plotting to establish a fundamentalist Islamic state in that republic.
- 18 (U) Bulgarian prosecutors agreed to a reduced sentence for one of two Italians jailed for espionage in Bulgaria last summer. The move apparently was politically motivated in the hope of gaining reciprocal concessions from the Italian Government for Sergei Antonov, a Rome-based Balkan airline official implicated in the 1981 papal assassination plot.
- 18-22 (U) Bulgarian leader Zhivkov played host to a Guinea delegation led by President Toure. The two countries signed a five-year economic cooperation agreement, and the visit provided a forum for reiteration of standard Bulgarian foreign policy lines.
- 18-23 (U) Hungarian leader Kadar headed a party-state delegation on an official visit to the USSR, where he met with Andropov; this was the first such trip since 1979.
- 21 (U) Jaruzelski granted an interview to ABC's Barbara Walters which the Polish media hailed as an opportunity for a "broad and objective presentation of Poland's present problems."
- 21 (C) Polish Foreign Minister Olszowski received Franz Joseph Strauss, leader of the FRG's Christian Social Union and premier of Bavaria, who was in Poland on a private

July

visit. Their discussions reportedly focused on bilateral relations and the current international situation.

- 21 (U) The Polish parliament approved an amnesty for some political prisoners, excluding leading Solidarity figures and advisers. It also passed "special regulations" extending for 2 1/2 years several martial-law restrictions.
- 21 (U) Zhivkov granted an interview to Leo Sulzberger (who was described by the Bulgarians as "the outstanding journalist and public figure of the United States").
- 21 (U) A Czechoslovak court sentenced Charter 77 human rights spokesman Ladislav Lis to 14 months' imprisonment on charges of incitement against the state and distributing literature for the Charter movement.
- 22 (U) Poland's official national day, the first day without martial law since December 13, 1981, passed in a subdued atmosphere.
- 22 (U) The new Soviet Ambassador to Poland, Aleksandr Aksienov, presented his credentials to Polish head of state Jablonski.
- 24 (U) Strauss met with East German leader Honecker in the GDR--in the aftermath of Strauss' apparent initiative in arranging a \$400 million FRG bank credit to the GDR as well as his visits to Czechoslovakia and Poland.
- 26 (LOU) Italy issued arrest warrants for two Italians and three Bulgarians accused of espionage for Sofia. The Italians, active in labor union matters, were supposedly regular contacts for Bulgarian intelligence operatives, possibly involved in a plot to assassinate Polish labor union leader Walesa. The three Bulgarians reportedly were functionaries of the Bulgarian Embassy in Rome.
- 27 (U) The Yugoslav News Agency announced that price controls would be lifted and that price increases on about 47 percent of the country's industrial products would be allowed. The price freeze had been imposed last July 31 for six months, then was extended in the form of various controls.
- 27 (C) Hungary's "Peace Group for Dialogue" (PGD), an unofficial antinuclear group of mostly university students, started a new campaign in which people declare the streets

July

and squares where they live nuclear-free zones, according to Hungarian dissident sources. The PGD's new tactic followed the expulsion by Budapest of some 15 Western antinuclear campaigners to foil the holding of an international camp under PGD aegis.

- 28 (LOU) The Polish parliament gave the government expanded powers to jail opposition activists and censor materials on a permanent basis, despite strong opposition from the Catholic Church.
- 29 (U) Poland's Western creditor nations, including the US, agreed in principle to open rescheduling talks on the country's debts. Poland was not invited to the Paris Club meeting, which was to resume next September. Rescheduling talks with Western governments were broken off in January 1982 in retaliation for the imposition of martial law.
- 29-30 (C) Pact Commander in Chief Kulikov made an official visit to Berlin, probably in connection with the GSFG exercise announced earlier.
- 30 (U) Cardinal Hoeffner, Archbishop of Cologne, consecrated the first Jesuit center for teaching and meditation to open in Hungary since World War II. The center was expected to receive about 1,500 laymen and laywomen annually. Hungary dissolved all religious orders in 1950, but the Vatican never recognized their closure.

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

*Collection Name*

BAILEY, NORMAN: FILES

*Withdrawer*

RB 2/11/2013  
W

*File Folder*

EASTERN EUROPEAN POLICY AUGUST 1983

*FOIA*

M452  
SHIFRINSON

*Box Number*

2

40

---

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
153880	CABLE 161444Z AUG 83	1	8/16/1983	B1 B3

---

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

153881

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
MESSAGE CENTER

PAGE 01 DIA WASHINGTON DC// 3728 DTG: 200042Z AUG 83 PSN: 028188  
EOB845 TOR: 232/0134Z CSN: CRI550

DISTRIBUTION: BALY-01 MYER-01 DOBR-01 LEVN-01 ROBN-01 MINN-01  
LENC-01 MAT-01 /008 A2

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:  
SIT:  
EOB:

ROUTINE  
DE RUEKJCS #3728 2320123  
R 200042Z AUG 83

TO DIACURINTEL  
AIG 7011  
AIG 7046  
AIG 7032

SE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJ: YUGOSLAVIA: MILITARY ON ECONOMIC PROGRAM. (U)

DOI: 19 AUG 83 (AS OF 1911 EDT)

TEXT: 1. (C) IN A 25 JULY SPEECH TO A LEAGUE OF COMMUNISTS OF YUGOSLAVIA (LCY) PARTY PLENUM, DEFENSE MINISTER ADM MAMULA PUT THE MILITARY ON RECORD IN SUPPORT OF THE COUNTRY'S PROGRAM OF "ECONOMIC STABILIZATION" (AUSTERITY MEASURES).

2. (C) IN HIS REMARKS, MAMULA CRITICIZED THE LACK OF SUPPORT AT ALL LEVELS OF LEADERSHIP FOR THE ECONOMIC STABILIZATION PROGRAM. MAJOR TARGETS OF HIS CRITICISM INCLUDED REPUBLIC AND LOCAL-LEVEL OFFICIALS WHO HAVE BEEN LAX IN BACKING THE PROGRAM.

3. (C) MAMULA STATED THAT THE MILITARY WILL WORK FOR THE SUCCESS OF THE STABILIZATION PROGRAM AND "... WILL REMAIN A STRONG FACTOR OF INTERNAL STABILITY." HE FURTHER NOTED THAT THE MILITARY HAS BEEN ABLE TO SAVE 3 PERCENT OF ALLOCATED FUNDS BY IMPLEMENTING ECONOMY MEASURES.

4. (C) COMMENT: MAMULA'S REMARKS WERE CRITICAL OF THE LEADERSHIP'S FAILURE TO BUILD SUPPORT FOR THE STABILIZATION PROGRAM, BUT THEY DID NOT APPEAR TO BE AN ATTACK BY THE MILITARY ON THE PARTY. ON THE CONTRARY, HE MADE CLEAR HIS ASSOCIATION WITH THE LCY, AND HE AFFIRMED THE ARMED FORCES' COMMITMENT TO THE ECONOMIC PROGRAM AND TO INTERNAL SECURITY IN GENERAL.

5. (C) IN THEIR EFFORTS TO DEAL WITH THE COUNTRY'S PROBLEMS, THE CENTRAL AUTHORITIES HAVE GENERALLY BEEN REBUFFED AT THE REPUBLIC LEVEL WHEN ATTEMPTING TO INTRODUCE UNPOPULAR ECONOMIC MEASURES. THE MILITARY HAS LONG BEEN CONSIDERED A UNIFYING FORCE IN THE HETEROGENEOUS YUGOSLAV SOCIETY. BECAUSE THE MILITARY ELEMENT OF THE LCY LEADERSHIP IS NOT USUALLY SO VOCAL ON ECONOMIC ISSUES, MAMULA'S REMARKS ARE SIGNIFICANT IN THEIR EMPHASIS OF THE MILITARY'S SUPPORT FOR THE LCY STABILIZATION PROGRAM. THIS MAY SIGNAL A MORE ACTIVE AND VOCAL ROLE FOR THE ARMED SERVICES IN SUPPORT OF THE CENTRAL LEADERSHIP'S ECONOMIC PROGRAM.

PREP:  
DECL: OADR  
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
NLRN M452/2 #153881  
BY RW NARA DATE 6/21/13

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

*Collection Name*

BAILEY, NORMAN: FILES

*Withdrawer*

RB 2/11/2013  
W

*File Folder*

EASTERN EUROPEAN POLICY AUGUST 1983

*FOIA*

M452  
SHIFRINSON

*Box Number*

2

40

---

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
153885	REPORT	3	8/23/1983	B1

---

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

*Collection Name*

BAILEY, NORMAN: FILES

*Withdrawer*

RB 2/11/2013  
W

*File Folder*

EASTERN EUROPEAN POLICY AUGUST 1983

*FOIA*

M452  
SHIFRINSON

*Box Number*

2

40

---

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
153886	REPORT	2	8/23/1983	B1

---

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

*Collection Name*

BAILEY, NORMAN: FILES

*Withdrawer*

RB 2/11/2013  
W

*File Folder*

EASTERN EUROPEAN POLICY AUGUST 1983

*FOIA*

M452  
SHIFRINSON

*Box Number*

2

40

---

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
153882	CABLE 261554Z AUG 83	1	8/26/1983	B1 B3

---

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified Information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]