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Collection Name TAHIR-KHELI, SHIRIN: FILES

Withdrawer

SMF 3/12/2010

File Folder STATE-PAKISTAN-NUCLEAR [11/28/1982-01/31/1983]

FOIA

F96-128/4

Box Number 91890 11

BATTLE

6

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
87320	CABLE	ISLAMABAD 18339	1	11/30/1982	B1
87321	LIST	BIBLIOGRAPHY	9	ND	B1 B3
87322	LIST	PUBLICATIONS	6	ND	B1 B3
87323	MEMO	MALONE THRU KENNEDY TO EAGLEBURGER RE INDIA/PAKISTAN	4	ND	B1
87325	PAPER	RE PAKISTAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM	5	12/2/1982	B1
87327	CABLE	STATE 340456	2	12/7/1982	B1
87330	CABLE	BONN 28932	1	12/28/1982	B1
87332	CABLE	NEW DELHI 00513	2	1/10/1983	B1
87335	MEMO	RE MEMO ON INDIA/PAKISTAN	1	1/31/1983	B1 B3

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
87337	PAPER	DRAFT MEMO RE INDIA/PAKISTAN	23	1/31/1983	B1 B3

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PAKISTAN-AMERICA RELATIONS—II

A NUCLEAR PAKISTAN?

The other day the President of Pakistan avowed that Pakistan would resist discriminatory pressure to curtail its nuclear development. No one in Pakistan would disagree with this resolve. However, it is unfortunate that this issue has been, in the main, analysed either outside Pakistan or when within, in spasmodic responses to outside stimuli which have been often biased, sometimes ill-informed and usually provocative. The importance of nuclear fission for Pakistan's economic and strategic security has yet to be presented as a coherent doctrine to the people of Pakistan. While the status of Pakistan's nuclear development and capability has been of some controversy. The underlying strategy, the various options, their significance and the means to achieve them have yet to be spelled out.

The essential elements of a nuclear fuel cycle are: (1) mining uranium ore and fabricating it into fuel rods for natural uranium/heavy reactors such as Pakistan's sole power reactor at KANUPP in Karachi, (2) a heavy water production plant, (3) a facility to turn the uranium ore into the gas, uranium hexafluoride, so that it can be sent to, (4) a plant, in which it can be enriched to between 2 and 5% for use in a boiling or pressurised water reactor such as the one envisaged at Chashma. (5) a research or power reactor, (6) a reprocessing plant to extract whatever is left over from the spent fuel including plutonium that has been produced, (7) a breeder reactor utilising a plutonium core surrounded by a natural uranium blanket which will not only generate electricity but will breed more plutonium than it consumes.

The world as a whole is running out of fossil fuels and in the first quarter of the next century there will have to be a massive shift to nuclear power. The soft energy paths of solar, wind, sea and geothermal energy will unfortunately only be able to provide a maximum of some 20% of global needs. If nuclear fusion becomes a practical proposition it could provide a way out but there is no guarantee of its eventual success. If utilised in existing nuclear reactors, even the finite quantities of available global uranium will also be exhausted in the near future. Reprocessing of spent fuel with consequent recycling will cut fuel needs for the present generation of reactors from 20 to 50%. While existing reactors only utilise at least 60 per cent of uranium's energy hence stretching existing supplies sixty times. A ton of uranium in a breeder gives the energy equivalent of two million tons of coal.

Energy consumption and socio-economic development go hand in hand. At present Pakistan has one of the lowest per capita and commercial electricity energy consumption levels in the world. It is 1/10th of the world average, 1/3rd of the Asian average and 1/70th of the North American consumption level. Not surprisingly the

per capita GNP in Pakistan is also about 1/70th of the North American equivalent. In the next two decades the demand for per capita energy consumption in Pakistan will increase by at least 400 per cent. How is Pakistan to meet this need? Despite increasing our indigenous oil production by some 40 per cent of our total import 86 per cent which accounts for some 50 per cent of our total annual foreign exchange inflows. Our coal reserves are insignificant, standing at about half a billion tons compared, for example, to India's 81 billion tons of coal reserves. Our natural gas reserves amount to approximately 724 million tons of coal equivalent. We should reserve its use as a feed stock for industrial use, but having no alternative we are depleting this valuable resource at a rate which

denial of advanced nuclear technology given to countries which had signed the NPT, but also confined its scope to potential further proliferation implicitly accepting South Africa, Israel and India as *de facto* nuclear powers. The 15 member Nuclear Suppliers Group, originally the secret London Club, has become the co-ordinating body for this restrictive policy.

The security of Pakistan does not rest on any one solution. There is no magic bullet. There can be no substitute for our building appropriate institutions, for raising our socio-economic levels, for recognising and giving effect to the pivotal role of education, for justice, for a foreign policy which strives constructively to reduce tension with all our neighbours while maintaining our indepen-

predicament is due to the lack of vision of our leaders in the sixties when we were offered facilities to match those being developed elsewhere at affordable prices. The principle draw-back from which we still suffer is that, unlike some other states, we did not go in for a small research reactor which can produce plutonium. Our main priority should not be to build our own small air cooled graphite moderate natural uranium reactor. This would give us the plutonium we would need not only for research for breeder reactors but also to gain credibility as a nuclear capable power as some other developing countries have done.

We, of course, retain the option of reprocessing fuel from KANUPP. It may be recalled that the trilateral safeguards with Canada and the IAEA over this reactor are not only being maintained, but are being extended in severity, in a gesture of unilateral submission unprecedented in the history of international exchanges in nuclear energy. India has taken a firm stand that no safeguards will apply to Tarapur after the original thirty years agreement runs out in 1993. The trilateral safeguards over KANUPP, in terms of international law and practice, could be said to have ended as a consequence of Canada's unilateral cessation of fuel supplies. Furthermore, the safeguards agreement is based on the life of the extendable ten years Pak-Canadian Agreement on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy which itself has been subject since 1969 to a clause allowing the treaty to lapse six months after a unilateral notification by either side. Should Pakistan wish to maintain the safeguards on KANUPP there is still no bar on the reprocessing of its spent fuel although this will be consequently subject to safeguards.

It is also time that we built a heavy water plant not only to service KANUPP but also any other small heavy water natural uranium research reactor which we might wish to build ourselves. Any nation which has the experience of building fertiliser plants should be able to produce a heavy water plant with its derivative technology.

At the same time Pakistan could invite India into a series of peaceful nuclear exchanges. India's experiment reactors would be of value to our nascent efforts. Furthermore our low enrichment experience might one day be of practical value to India. Had our effort in this field been more advanced there was no reason why India should not have turned to Pakistan and not France for separative enrichment work for Tarapur given a climate of detente between our two countries.

Much has been written in India on the potential need for peaceful nuclear devices to unlock fuel reserves which would be otherwise inaccessible. The position is very much geologically the same in Pakistan. Both countries could learn from each other in this field as well.

It is rightly held that leaders with vision decisively effect the quality of life of the people. In the context of Pakistan's economic and strategic security, the nuclear issue holds an unrivalled place. I make hold to state that Pakistan has no option but to develop its nuclear energy cycle which more than any other single factor will give it the economic and strategic security that it has sought since 1947.

By SAJJAD HYDER

may not enable us to use it in the major part of the next century. We are fully utilising hydro-electricity and have reached approximately 50 per cent of its maximum economic utilisation.

Our first great civilisation, which with Sumeria and Egypt laid the foundations of the historic world, the Indus Valley Harappan culture, perished when it could find no constructive response to the challenge of declining fossil fuel supplies at a time when the Aryans were making their first probes. The extinction of the Harappan civilisation which covered an area of most of today's Pakistan and beyond, led to a 1000 years dark Millennium brought down to us only in epic fables before the balance between man, his wants, the environment and man's innovation was restored leading again to the rise of cities in North India. If Pakistan cannot find the answer to its energy needs its people can look forward only to a return to a pastoral life. At the moment nuclear energy provides the only long term answer.

The importance of achieving autarky in the nuclear fuel cycle was brought home in 1976 when Canada unilaterally ended its commitment to supply fuel for Pakistan's Canadian built reactor, KANUPP, in Karachi. Ostensibly the Non-Proliferation Treaty had been negotiated in 1970 to prevent further proliferation whilst encouraging the development of peaceful nuclear energy indigenously and through co-operative efforts. However, soon after the Indian explosion it became clear that the rationale behind the NPT had been the desire to prevent Japan and West Germany from going nuclear by allowing them in return to develop complete nuclear capabilities. In the developed world, Israel, South Africa, West Germany, Japan, Italy and the Netherlands, apart from the five sanctioned nuclear powers possess either or both the reprocessing and enrichment facilities which can provide the plutonium 239 or the 90 per cent plus enriched uranium 235 required to produce nuclear weapons.

INDIAN EXPLOSION: Consequent upon the Indian explosion the thrust of non-proliferation policy changed not only to the

denial of advanced nuclear technology given to countries which had signed the NPT, but also confined its scope to potential further proliferation implicitly accepting South Africa, Israel and India as *de facto* nuclear powers. The 15 member Nuclear Suppliers Group, originally the secret London Club, has become the co-ordinating body for this restrictive policy.

Within these parameters it is clear that Pakistan with its smaller size can never hope to deter a bigger neighbour by building up its purely conventional military capability. A nuclear option, which, in fact, remain a nuclear capability alone, represents the only possible equaliser for Pakistan in this context. The present state of the art allows for computerised trigger mechanism tests using depleted uranium cores doing away with the need for an actual demonstration explosion. In Europe despite the legacy of two world wars, the nuclear balance has deterred any conflict from arising during the last 37 years. It is not hard to postulate that if a similar nuclear balance had existed between Pakistan and India, both countries would not have been forced into a series of conflicts which have turned the Sub-continent into economically the most depressed area in Asia in contrast to its pre-eminence and promise at the moment of independence.

If we are to achieve a credible nuclear capability in the interests of the stability of South Asia and with the goal of thence more realistically being able to persuade our nuclear capable neighbour towards some measure of bilateral nuclear disarmament, how is this to be done?

The first decision that has to be taken is institutional. Pakistan has a very limited technological base in terms of facilities and manpower. The nuclear effort in Pakistan, if it is to succeed must pool all available manpower. All research efforts must be subject to constant peer group evaluation and review. Our financial resources are far too limited to squander without such institutional safeguards. Secondly, as we have an experimental enrichment project we must explore the technology of achieving high strategic enrichment. This is no easy task as it impinges on the frontiers of existing metallurgical technology to ensure that the break down rate of ultra centrifuges with the attendant loss of material does not jeopardise the objective.

To a large extent our present

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87320	CABLE ISLAMABAD 18339	1	11/30/1982	B1

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87322	LIST PUBLICATIONS	6	ND	B1 B3

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87323	MEMO MALONE THRU KENNEDY TO EAGLEBURGER RE INDIA/PAKISTAN	4	ND	B1

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87325 PAPER

5 12/2/1982 B1

RE PAKISTAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM

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87327	CABLE STATE 340456	2	12/7/1982	B1

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OES-09 ACDA-12 USIE-00 SP-02 SPRS-01 /076 R

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APPROVED BY NEA: HBSCHAFFER
NEA/PAB: HEKIRBY
NEA/INS: VTOMSETH
NEA/P: THOMAN

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AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS STATE 353865

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: SOPN, PEPR, PK, IN
SUBJECT: PRESS GUIDANCE ON ALLEGATIONS OF INDIAN PLANS TO
ATTACK PAKISTANI NUCLEAR TARGETS

1. THE FOLLOWING PRESS GUIDANCE WAS ISSUED IN RESPONSE TO
THE ARTICLE APPEARING IN THE WASHINGTON POST ALLEGING THAT
INDIAN LEADERS HAD CONSIDERED A PLAN FOR A PREEMPTIVE STRIKE
AGAINST NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS IN PAKISTAN.

2. Q. DO YOU HAVE ANY COMMENT ON TODAY'S WASHINGTON POST
ARTICLE WHICH SAYS THAT INDIA IS CONSIDERING A PREEMPTIVE
STRIKE AGAINST PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR FACILITIES?

-- A. WE DO NOT COMMENT ON STORIES BASED SUPPOSEDLY ON
INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION. I WOULD NOTE, HOWEVER, THAT
INDIA AND PAKISTAN HAVE BEEN ENGAGED THIS YEAR IN BILATERAL
TALKS ON A NUMBER OF ISSUES INCLUDING A PROPOSED NO WAR PACT
AND A TREATY OF PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP. AS WE HAVE SAID ON
OTHER OCCASIONS, WE SUPPORT THESE NEGOTIATIONS AND HOPE
THAT INDIA AND PAKISTAN CAN CONTINUE TO DEVELOP MUTUALLY
BENEFICIAL TIES. WE HAVE BEEN STRUCK INDISCUSSIONS WITH
INDIA AND PAKISTAN, MOST RECENTLY DURING PRESIDENT ZIA'S

VISIT HERE, BY THE STRONG INTEREST OF BOTH IN IMPROVING
RELATIONS.

3. Q. WHAT IS THE U.S. DOING ABOUT PAKISTAN'S PROGRAM TO
DEVELOP NUCLEAR WEAPONS?

-- A. THIS ADMINISTRATION CONSIDERS PREVENTING THE SPREAD
OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO BE A MAJOR FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVE.

-- PAKISTAN IS WELL AWARE OF OUR CONCERNS ABOUT CERTAIN OF
THEIR NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES AND ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH
TO NON-PROLIFERATION.

-- WE BELIEVE THAT OUR PROGRAM OF MILITARY AND ECONOMIC
ASSISTANCE WILL HELP PAKISTAN MEET SOME OF ITS GENUINE
SECURITY NEEDS AND THUS REDUCE THE INCENTIVE TO EXPLORE A
NUCLEAR WEAPONS OPTION IN THE FUTURE.

-- OUR DISCUSSIONS OF THIS ISSUE WILL CONTINUE AND, OVER
TIME AND IN THE CONTEXT OF OUR NEW RELATIONSHIP, WE HOPE
TO BE ABLE TO INFLUENCE THE DIRECTION OF PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR
PROGRAM.

4. Q. DOES PAKISTAN HAVE AN UNSAFEGUARDED REPROCESSING
FACILITY THAT COULD BEGIN OPERATING AT ANY TIME AND
PRODUCE ENOUGH PLUTONIUM FOR A NUCLEAR WEAPON?

-- A. WE HAVE NO COMMENT ON THIS SPECIFIC ASSERTION.
HOWEVER, AS A MATTER OF GENERAL POLICY, THE U.S. CONTINUES
TO URGE A NUMBER OF NATIONS, INCLUDING PAKISTAN, TO PLACE
ALL THEIR NUCLEAR FACILITIES UNDER SAFEGUARDS. WE BELIEVE
THIS TO BE IN THE INTEREST OF ALL NATIONS, INCLUDING
PAKISTAN. THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN IS AWARE OF THE
UNITED STATES' OPPOSITION TO NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION.

5. Q. IS THE KARACHI NUCLEAR POWER PLANT (KANUPP) STILL
WITHOUT EFFECTIVE SAFEGUARDS?

-- A. IN SEPTEMBER 1981, THE IAEA DETERMINED THAT IT
COULD NO LONGER INDEPENDENTLY VERIFY NON-DIVERSION OF
SPENT FUEL FROM THE KANUPP REACTOR. SINCE THEN, THE
DIRECTOR GENERAL HAS REPORTED PRODUCTIVE DISCUSSIONS WITH
THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN AND WE ARE HOPEFUL THAT WHATEVER
ISSUES MAY STILL BE OUTSTANDING WILL BE RESOLVED SOON.

6. THE FIRST RESPONSE WAS USED AT THE NOON PRESS BRIEFING
ON DECEMBER 20. SHULTZ

EB
TK
file: Pak / Nuclear

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87332	CABLE NEW DELHI 00513	2	1/10/1983	B1

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VIENNA FOR USIAEA

E. O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: MNUC, TNUC, PK, IAEA
SUBJECT: **REPORT OF PAK-IAEA AGREEMENT ON KANUPP SAFEGUARDS**

~~DP~~
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file
Pak Nuclear

1. ARTICLES BASED ON JANUARY 12 PPI REUTERS AND BBC REPORTS, WIDELY PUBLISHED IN THE PAK PRESS JANUARY 13, QUOTE AN IAEA SPOKESMAN AS SAYING THAT "PAKISTAN HAS REACHED A SUBSTANTIAL MEASURE OF AGREEMENT WITH THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY TO UPGRADE AGENCY INSPECTION" OF KANUPP "TO CHECK THAT NO FUEL WILL BE DIVERTED TO MILITARY USE." ARTICLE NOTES THAT THE IAEA WAS CONCERNED IT COULD NOT "CARRY OUT FULL INSPECTION OF KANUPP" AFTER PAKISTAN STARTED USING ITS OWN FUEL IN 1981, BUT THAT FOLLOWING DETAILED DISCUSSIONS BEGINNING IN OCTOBER 1981, "ADDITIONAL SAFEGUARD DEVICES INCLUDING SURVEILLANCE OF RADIOACTIVE FUEL DISCHARGED FROM THE REACTOR" ARE BEING INSTALLED.

2. "MUSLIM" ARTICLE QUOTES A BBC STORY ACCORDING TO WHICH IAEA HAS INDICATED IT HAS SOLID AGREEMENT FOR AN EXTENSIVE VISIT TO KANUPP TO ENSURE NON-DIVERSION. BBC STORY INDICATED THAT ISSUE OF NON-DIVERSION "STILL REMAINS TO BE SETTLED" BUT THAT THE AGENCY "SOON, WITH FULL CONFIDENCE, WOULD BE ABLE TO ENSURE THAT THE ACCOUNTS OF THE ATOMIC FUEL FOR THE PLANT WERE MAINTAINED ACCORDINGLY AND IT WAS NOT USED FOR MILITARY PURPOSES."

3. WE WOULD APPRECIATE ANY BACKGROUND USIAEA HAS ON THIS IAEA STATEMENT. SPIERS

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87335	MEMO RE MEMO ON INDIA/PAKISTAN	1	1/31/1983	B1 B3

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87337	PAPER DRAFT MEMO RE INDIA/PAKISTAN	23	1/31/1983	B1 B3

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