

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

WHORM Subject File Code: FO006-04
(Economic Summit, Versailles, France, 06/05/1982-06/06/1982)
Case file Number(s): 093000 – 129999

To see more digitized collections visit:
<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digitized-textual-material>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/white-house-inventories>

Contact a reference archivist at: **reagan.library@nara.gov**

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/research-support/citation-guide>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF RECORDS MANAGEMENT
(WHORM): SUBJECT FILE

Withdrawer

DLB 12/16/2019

File Folder FO006-04 (ECONOMIC SUMMIT, VERSAILLES, FRANCE,
06/05/1982-06/06/1982) (09300-129999)

FOIA

F16-011

Box Number

BIERGANNIS

92

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
244088	MEMO	ROBERT HORMATS TO WILLIAM CLARK, MICHAEL DEEVER, RE: REPORT ON PREPARATORY MEETING FOR VERSAILLES SUMMIT	5	3/6/1982	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 9, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: CRAIG L. FULLER

SUBJECT: Follow-up Actions from Treasury
on the Versailles Summit

This memo was delayed from receiving attention when it first arrived and then held pending determination of the role of the SIG/IEP. Since the SIG/IEP will be involved with the coordination of summit preparation and the Cabinet Council on Economic Affairs will continue to review the items described in the attached memo, I consider this memo somewhat overtaken by events. I did, however, want you to have an opportunity to review it in the event you believe it requires additional attention.

II/12

093389CA

1120

FD0006-04

FD0006

FG012

FG0006-22

FG010-02

8/19

A - send Reagan's
memo to
to Meese &
Harper ✓ who
my cover
memo
CL

Memo for the Pres.
from Sec. Treasury
Aug 15 attached



THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON

June 15, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: Donald T. Regan

Subject: Follow-Up Action from Versailles Summit

Several initiatives agreed at the Versailles Summit will require detailed U.S. implementation. We will be hosting the 1983 Summit and should start planning and preparation promptly. The following are under way or planned.

° Economic Policy Coordination -- The Summit agreed on strengthened economic policy coordination, in cooperation with the IMF, in an effort to achieve lower inflation, higher employment and faster growth. I have instructed Treasury Under Secretary for Monetary Affairs Beryl Sprinkel to set up a meeting with his colleagues from the other key finance ministries to develop a framework and procedures for this effort. The group will meet in early July; establish contact with IMF Managing Director de Larosiere on his role in the process; and report to Ministers during the IMF/IBRD Annual Meetings in Toronto in early September. U.S. participation in this effort will be coordinated in the Cabinet Council on Economic Affairs.

° Study of the Impact of Past Foreign Exchange Market Intervention -- The Summit participants agreed also to initiate a study of exchange market intervention. Beryl Sprinkel and his foreign counterparts have established an experts group to develop terms of reference and procedures for the intervention study. The experts group will meet first on June 17-18 and further as needed over the summer, and report to Finance Ministers in Toronto. U.S. participation will be coordinated in the CCEA.

° Improved Controls on Strategic Exports -- The Summit agreed on work to strengthen the COCOM process for controlling exports of strategic goods to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. State has the lead on work in this area, in cooperation mainly with Commerce and Defense, and negotiations are already underway internationally. I believe it is sensible to continue with existing interagency coordination arrangements in this area, with general CCEA oversight as needed to assure consistency with other Summit-related efforts.

° Information Exchange on Russia and Eastern Europe --

The Summit agreed to exchanges of information on all aspects of economic, commercial, and financial relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, in the OECD. Several agencies now participate in OECD work in this area, including both Treasury and State. I plan to have the CCEA oversee development of U.S. views on the types of information to be exchanged and the procedures for the exchanges.

° Review of Financial Relations with Russia and Eastern Europe -- Economic and financial relations between the Summit countries and the East are to be subject to periodic ex-post review. We will need to get agreement among the seven Summit countries on the procedures and substance of these reviews. I recall that these reviews are to be handled by Finance Ministers. This has an obvious link with the OECD information exchange, and I plan to coordinate U.S. participation in the review process in the CCEA as well.

° Technology Working Group -- The Summit agreed to set up a technology working group to prepare a report by end-1982, which would be considered at the 1983 Summit. Most work in the high technology area has been carried on in the CCCT, with Commerce in the lead. It makes sense to keep the basic work to develop the Summit initiative in that track, with periodic progress reports to the CCEA to assure coordination with overall Summit planning.

Other action issues or events mentioned in the Versailles Summit communique are: the GATT Ministerial, renewal of the OECD Export Credit Consensus, Global Negotiations, IDA Replenishment, and the review of IMF quotas. U.S. work on all of these, including participation in international discussions, has been underway for some time. I plan to monitor progress on all of these Summit-related points in the CCEA, but do not believe new follow-up mechanisms are needed.

Information Exchange on Russia and Eastern Europe --
The United States is interested in information on all aspects of
economic, commercial, and financial relations with the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe. It is particularly interested in
information on the Soviet Union's economic and financial
situation. It is also interested in information on the
Soviet Union's political and military situation.

Copy of this file sent to Adell Gonzalez 8-19-82 in

Information Exchange on Russia and Eastern Europe --
The United States is interested in information on all aspects of
economic, commercial, and financial relations with the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe. It is particularly interested in
information on the Soviet Union's economic and financial
situation. It is also interested in information on the
Soviet Union's political and military situation.

Information Exchange on Russia and Eastern Europe --
The United States is interested in information on all aspects of
economic, commercial, and financial relations with the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe. It is particularly interested in
information on the Soviet Union's economic and financial
situation. It is also interested in information on the
Soviet Union's political and military situation.

094285

ID #

F0006-04

WHITE HOUSE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

☐ O - OUTGOING☐ H - INTERNAL☒ I - INCOMINGDate Correspondence
Received (YY/MM/DD)

821 08116

Name of Correspondent:

Robert J. Lagomarsino

☐ MI Mail Report

User Codes:

(A)

(B)

(C)

Subject:

Enclosure a letter from George B. (Bush) regarding the
attendance of the Economic Summit Meeting in Paris by the
President and 600 other U.S. representatives. appases the
Cost incurred as same.

ROUTE TO:

ACTION

DISPOSITION

Office/Agency (Staff Name)	Action Code	Tracking Date YY/MM/DD	Type of Response	Code	Completion Date YY/MM/DD
LA Duke	ORIGINATOR	821 08116	KD	A	820820
	Referral Note:				
	Referral Note:				
	Referral Note:				
	Referral Note:				
	Referral Note:				

ACTION CODES:

A - Appropriate Action
C - Comment/Recommendation
D - Draft Response
F - Furnish Fact Sheet
to be used as Enclosure

I - Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary
R - Direct Reply w/Copy
S - For Signature
X - Interim Reply

DISPOSITION CODES:

A - Answered
B - Non-Special Referral
C - Completed
S - Suspended

FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:

Type of Response = Initials of Signer
Code = "A"
Completion Date = Date of Outgoing

Comments:

Keep this worksheet attached to the original incoming letter.
Send all routing updates to Central Reference (Room 75, OEOb).
Always return completed correspondence record to Central Files.
Refer questions about the correspondence tracking system to Central Reference, ext. 2590.

RECORDS MANAGEMENT ONLY

CLASSIFICATION SECTION

No. of Additional Correspondents: _____ Media: L Individual Codes: 1240 _____

Prime Subject Code: EQ 006.04 Secondary Subject Codes: FI001.02 _____
TR039 _____

PRESIDENTIAL REPLY

Code	Date	Comment	Form
C		Time: _____	P. _____
DSP		Time: _____	Media: _____

SIGNATURE CODES:

CPn - Presidential Correspondence
 n - 0 - Unknown
 n - 1 - Ronald Wilson Reagan
 n - 2 - Ronald Reagan
 n - 3 - Ron
 n - 4 - Dutch
 n - 5 - Ron Reagan
 n - 6 - Ronald
 n - 7 - Ronnie

CLn - First Lady's Correspondence
 n - 0 - Unknown
 n - 1 - Nancy Reagan
 n - 2 - Nancy
 n - 3 - Mrs. Ronald Reagan

CBn - Presidential & First Lady's Correspondence
 n - 1 - Ronald Reagan - Nancy Reagan
 n - 2 - Ron - Nancy

MEDIA CODES:

B - Box/package
 C - Copy
 D - Official document
 G - Message
 H - Handcarried
 L - Letter
 M - Mailgram
 O - Memo
 P - Photo
 R - Report
 S - Sealed
 T - Telegram
 V - Telephone
 X - Miscellaneous
 Y - Study

August 20, 1982

Dear Bob:

Thank you for your letter in behalf of Mr. George B. Page of Santa Barbara, California, regarding costs associated with the Presidential trip to Europe.

Unfortunately, it is simply not possible to provide an accurate estimate of the costs or number of persons associated with a Presidential trip. As I am sure you realize, for any given trip there are variable costs as well as fixed costs. The use of personnel and facilities for such trips represents fixed costs which remain substantially the same whether the President is traveling or not.

The number of persons traveling with the President also varies. For example, more than 200 members of the press traveled with the President in Europe as well as White House and Administration officials, Secret Service representatives, and support from our Embassies and military establishments overseas. Each agency pays for its own employees, and it would be impossible to aggregate these costs. Also, the press traveling with the President pay their own expenses.

The cost of the President's travel is greater than the average American citizen because he is leader of a nation of more than 220 million people and is Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the most powerful nation in the world. The security, communications and staff support that are necessary in connection with these responsibilities account for the added costs, which are classified for national security reasons.

Please be assured that every effort is made to keep costs and numbers of personnel to a minimum consistent with the President's wishes to economize whenever possible.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

Kenneth M. Duberstein
Assistant to the President

The Honorable Robert Lagomarsino
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

KMD:CMF:NAP

ROBERT J. LAGOMARSINO
19TH DISTRICT, CALIFORNIA

2332 RAYBURN BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515
202-225-3601

ASSISTANT REGIONAL WHIP, PLAINS AND
WESTERN STATES

Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, D.C. 20515

August 12, 1982

COMMITTEE ON
FOREIGN AFFAIRS

SUBCOMMITTEES:
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY
AND TRADE
RANKING MINORITY MEMBER
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS

COMMITTEE ON
INTERIOR AND INSULAR
AFFAIRS

SUBCOMMITTEES:
INSULAR AFFAIRS
RANKING MINORITY MEMBER
PUBLIC LANDS AND NATIONAL PARKS

094285

Kenneth M. Duberstein
Assistant to the President
for Legislative Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. Duberstein:

Enclosed is a self-explanatory letter from my constituent, George B. Page, regarding the attendance of the Economic Summit Meeting in Paris by the President and 600 other U.S. representatives.

As you will note, Mr. Page feels the costs incurred by attending this meeting were unnecessary considering the present economic situation in this country.

Your comments and any information you can provide concerning this matter will be greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,

ROBERT J. LAGOMARSINO
Member of Congress

RJL:mjf

Encl.



**Mission
Linen
Supply**

HOME OFFICE
P.O. Drawer MM
702 E. Montecito Street
Santa Barbara, CA 93102
(805) 963-1841

Uniforms for the food
and lodging industry
Career apparel for all
professions
Table linen rental
Wiping towels for all
uses
Bed/bath linen rental
Dust control systems
Restroom service

AUG 06 '82

August 3, 1982

The Honorable Robert J. Lagomarsino
The United States House of
Representatives
19th District, California
2332 Rayburn Building
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Bob:

I have been informed that the Economic Summit Meeting in Paris, France held June 2-6, 1982, was represented by President Ronald Reagan and 600 other representatives of this country and the administration. They reportedly occupied the George V, Crillon, Ritz, and Royal Monceau Hotels, at rates of \$100.00 and up per day.

If this is true, I wonder why the administration is continually talking economics and conservation? Also if true, it is ridiculous that a group this size should be attending the meeting at the taxpayers expense. I feel that if economics are going to enter into it, then it should start at the top. I do not feel that it is fair for the taxpayers to bear the economic responsibility.

I would appreciate a reply to this letter.

Sincerely,

George B. Page *ju*
Founder/Consultant

GBP:jr

cc: File



MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

4115

095722

FO006-04

FG006-12

INFORMATION

June 11, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM:

HENRY NAU *HN*

SUBJECT:

Q's and A's on the Versailles Summit

I have attached a set of Q's and A's on the economic issues at the Versailles Summit. Since I am on leave next week, I thought it best to leave this material behind for your use, both as an overall assessment of the Summit from the U.S. perspective and as material for a press conference should the President call one.

I have also provided copies to Mort Alin and to my counterparts in the agencies.

cc: N. Bailey
D. Gregg
J. Rentschler
D. Blair
W. Martin
R. Robinson
T. Reed

NSC#8204115

VERSAILLES ECONOMIC SUMMIT

Q. What did you accomplish at the Versailles Economic Summit?

A. This Summit took place under the worst economic circumstances since the recovery from World War II. Despite this fact, the leaders addressed every one of the controversial issues among us -- interest and exchange rates, budget policy, inflation, unemployment, protectionism, East-West trade, and relations with developing countries, particularly Global Negotiations. And they reached some element of agreement on each one of these issues. That fact alone, I think, is testimony to the health and unique character of the community we share with our Summit partners. The Summit country partnership is strong enough to embrace controversy and to forge from it meaningful agreement.

Now what specifically did we accomplish? Let me give you a few examples:

- We agreed that beating inflation convincingly and enduringly is still the key to strong recovery of growth and employment.
- We agreed that all countries must make more progress in lowering inflation and therefore will consult more closely in association with the IMF to coordinate our medium-term economic policy aimed at lower inflation, greater discipline, and more stable exchange rates.

- We have committed ourselves to improve and expand the GATT in the 1980s, recognizing the monument to Western cooperation represented by the post-war multilateral trading system.
- We reaffirmed our commitment to make our economic relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe fully consistent with our political and security objectives and stated for the first time the need to limit our economic activity with the East specifically in the area of export credits.
- We strengthened our commitment to work together on energy and development problems.

In addition, of course, the Summit provided an invaluable opportunity to discuss pressing political issues -- the Falkland crisis, the Lebanon conflict which began while we were at the Summit, and the persisting problems of Soviet actions in Poland, Afghanistan and Southeast Asia.

This Summit showed more clearly than most Summits in the past that political unity among our countries is the essential basis for economic cooperation and prosperity, while economic interdependence is a solid support for our common security interests and democratic societies.

BUDGET POLICY

Q. Did the other countries criticize your budget policy?

A. In diplomatic parlance, we had a frank exchange on this issue. I welcomed their views and especially their concern as expressed in the communique that we achieve greater control of budget deficits. I suggested to them that I would convey this message to Congress and to the American people. I think they left Versailles with no doubt whatsoever that I am committed to reducing our budget deficits in the United States and that I believe the American people no less than the people of other countries support me in this effort to achieve more responsible policies.

INTERVENTION IN EXCHANGE MARKETS

Q. Did the U.S. change its policy for intervening in exchange markets?

A. No. The U.S. policy on intervention remains the same. We will intervene in exchange markets to counter disorderly market conditions. On this basis, we have intervened in the past and have been prepared to intervene on other occasions but decided not to do so when market forces corrected themselves. We stand ready to intervene in the future if required under these same policy guidelines.

What the U.S. did agree to do is to study together with its Summit country partners the effects of past intervention in exchange markets. We do not believe that such intervention has had a significant effect. In this study we intend to present evidence to that effect. We are ready to consider the experiences of other countries and any evidence they may have that suggests the utility of intervention. This study implies no commitment on our part to intervene more frequently nor on the part of the other governments to intervene less frequently.

The most important point to remember is that the U.S. believes that sound economic policy produces stable exchange rates. This is why I proposed closer consultations, in association with the IMF, to coordinate medium-term economic policy and help all countries to achieve lower inflation and greater monetary and fiscal discipline. If this effort succeeds, there will be less instability in exchange markets and less need for

TRADE ISSUES

Q. Did the Summit resolve any outstanding trade issues like the steel or agriculture issues with the European Community or the bilateral trade balance with Japan?

A. At the Summit, we sought to give political impetus and long-term direction to the further development of the multilateral trading system. Our purpose was not to dwell on specific issues but to chart a course for the improvement and expansion of the trading system. Such expansion would enable the GATT to deal more effectively with specific problems and would create a forward momentum that places specific issues in context.

We agreed:

- First of all to resist protectionist pressures and trade distorting practices.
- Secondly, to complete the work of the Tokyo Round.
- Thirdly, to improve the capability of the GATT to solve current and future trade problems. The U.S., as you know, seeks to extend the GATT discipline to future areas such as services, investment-related trade issues, agriculture and high technology.
- Fourthly, we pledged to work towards the further opening of our markets, implying that we would not be satisfied with merely solving existing problems.
- Fifthly, we indicated the need to bring developing countries more effectively into the multi-

lateral trading system and to expand trading opportunities with these countries.

All of these commitments apply to the forthcoming GATT Ministerial Conference where we pledged to take concrete steps to achieve our common goals.

The Summits have traditionally played a vitally important role in preserving and enhancing the free trade system. I am pleased that this Summit, despite the severe economic problems that currently exist, was able to take such a strong position on free trade. And I am further pleased that the U.S. played a leadership role, sometimes quite alone, in achieving these results.

EAST-WEST TRADE AND EXPORT CREDITS

Q. Why did the other Summit countries reject your views on East-West trade and export credits?

A. They did not reject my views on this subject.

Despite the differences among the Summit countries on this issue, the final communique expressed agreement on the following points:

- The need to pursue a prudent approach to East-West economic relations consistent with our political and security interests.
- In this context we endorsed the progress made since Ottawa on the strengthening of strategic export controls and of national arrangements for enforcing these controls.
- Further, we agreed to exchange information in the OECD on all aspects of East-West trade.
- And finally, we agreed to handle cautiously financial relations with the East, including also the need for commercial prudence in limiting export credits.

Let me elaborate a bit on this last commitment. I have felt for sometime that for Western governments to subsidize credit to the Soviet Union was unwise. This is so not only for political reasons since it makes Soviet military expenditures easier at the margins. But it is also unjustified on purely economic grounds. We now have a commitment from the Summit governments to exercise commercial prudence in limiting export credits. I interpret commercial prudence to mean economic or

market standards, namely no subsidization of credits provided by governments to the Soviet Union. Moreover, it is clearly stated in the communique that the exercise of commercial prudence should have the effect of "limiting export credits." Now limits imply certain ceilings and we will have to proceed quickly to define what these ceilings are. I expect that the U.S. will ask that the periodic ex post revision process referred to in the communique be convened as soon as possible in order to consider these issues of subsidy and limits of export credits to the Soviet Union.

GLOBAL NEGOTIATIONS

Q. Has the U.S. now agreed to launch Global Negotiations? And isn't this reversal of your policy not to engage in negotiations to redistribute the world's wealth?

A. The U.S. has never believed that the political dialogue with the developing countries was the most important aspect of the development process. I have stressed the practical and complex dimensions of the development problem to include trade, private investment, as well as aid, and to include bilateral and regional as well as global relations. The Caribbean Basin Initiative is a clear example of the development approach that the U.S. believes is most effective.

At the same time, the U.S. does not wish to ignore the role of the political dialogue. At Cancun, I stated that the U.S. took seriously its commitment to conduct a dialogue with developing countries, also in the United Nations, if certain essential understandings were reached. Those understandings included the need for explicit protection and guarantee of the independence of the specialized agencies. After our discussions at the Summit, we have reason to believe that the Summit countries agree on how to provide for these guarantees. On that basis, we are ready to work with other countries both developed and developing in the UN to see if these discussions can be started under circumstances that offer the prospect of meaningful progress.

The U.S. has not yet agreed to launch Global Negotiations. That is a decision which must be taken by

the 155 or so countries in New York. Nor have we agreed to negotiate anything until we have defined what it is we are negotiating. We will not negotiate, for example, a redistribution of the world's wealth.

GLOBAL NEGOTIATIONS: SECRET AGREEMENT?

Q. Did the United States conclude a secret agreement with the other Summit countries on this issue?

A. If your question concerns a secret agreement, I cannot of course confirm or deny its existence. Our experts discussed this issue thoroughly at the Summit, and the heads of government and state focused briefly on the results of this work. The Summit countries have increased their common understanding of what is needed to protect the specialized agencies in Global Negotiations, and it is on that basis that the Summit leaders expressed their belief that there is now a good prospect for launching global negotiations.

POLICY TOWARDS THE MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTIONS

Q. Given the fact that the communique talks about supporting the World Bank and especially IDA, has the United States changed its policy towards the multilateral development institutions?

A. The U.S. has always considered the work of the multilateral development institutions and the role of concessional assistance to be important in the development process. We have never believed however that concessional aid was sufficient to address the complex problems and challenges of development. Much more is needed. Hence, the United States has stressed trade, private investment, commercial financing and most importantly the domestic economic policies of the developing countries themselves. All of these factors, along with concessional assistance, are critical to sustained and independent development in the developing world.

If you read the communique carefully, you will notice that in addition to stressing the need for practical cooperation with the developing countries in the World Bank, IDA and the IMF, it also calls for the encouragement of private capital flows, including international arrangements to improve the conditions for private investment. This is a major step forward in recognizing the predominant role of private capital in financial exchanges with the developing countries. Currently some 70% of all financial flows to these countries occur through the private market. Without improved conditions for the flow of private capital,

there is little prospect of significant economic progress in the developing countries.

RECEIVED 14 JUN 82 16

TO

CLARK

FROM NAU

DOCDATE 11 JUN 82

KEYWORDS: FRENCH SUMMIT

ECONOMICS

Q+A

SUBJECT: Q'S & A'S ON VERSAILLES SUMMIT

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(N /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

C 8/12 0 NR

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH

FILE

WJ (C) m

Copy 1 this file sent to L. Brakton 12-1-82
NSC

C. F. ^{uw}~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3183

128088

FO 006-04

C0001-05

FG006-12

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~INFORMATION

May 7, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

THROUGH: CHARLES P. TYSON

FROM: HENRY R. NAU

SUBJECT: EC Participation at Versailles

You should be aware that the European Community decided and the other Summit countries apparently agreed that both Prime Minister Martens of Belgium, the sitting President of the European Council, and President Thorn of the EC Commission would participate in the restricted dinners and lunches among the heads of government and state at Versailles. Thus, there will be nine participants at these meetings in Versailles (rather than eight as at Ottawa).

This is an unfortunate decision, since the dinner discussions are the best opportunity for frank exchanges. The Community, hardly a political and economic power on the same footing as the individual member states, is now disproportionately represented. Presumably, this will happen only once because in other years, one of the Summit countries has always held the Presidency of the European Council either during the first or second half of the year. The Summit was then scheduled for either June or July in order to insure that a Summit country was in the Presidency. This year non-Summit countries are in the Presidency for both halves of the year -- Belgium now and the Netherlands after June.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review 5/7/88

NSC # 8203183

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC State Waiver

BY dh DATE 12/2/2017~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

168

National Security Council
The White House

RECEIVED

Package #

3183

02 MAY 10 12: 51

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	<u> </u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>m</u>	<u> </u>
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<u>g</u>	<u> </u>
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	<u>I</u>
John Poindexter	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
Staff Secretary	<u>5</u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
Sit Room	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver

Other

COMMENTS

~~UNCLASSIFIED UPON REVIEW
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE~~

RECEIVED 10 MAY 82 13

12/2/2019

TO CLARK

FROM NAU

DOCDATE 07 MAY 82

KEYWORDS: FRENCH SUMMIT

EC

MARTENS, WILFRIED A

THORN, GASTON

SUBJECT: EC PARTICIPATION AT VERSAILLES DINNERS & LUNCHEONS

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

RENTSCHLER

TYSON

BAILEY

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(H /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

5/17

Cable notes

RE CT, NB

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH

FILE

(C)

✓

MEMORANDUM

~~SECRET~~
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

128178
FO006-04
1445
16011
FO006-12
7

~~UNCLASSIFIED
WITH SECRET
ATTACHMENT~~

March 15, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR MICHAEL K. DEEVER

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK *Bill*

SUBJECT: Versailles Summit

Bob Hormats has forwarded to both you and me a summary report of the Summit preparatory meeting in Paris on February 27-28.

I am attaching your copy of this report.

~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

DECLASSIFIED
Sec. 3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2008
BY NARA *ch*, DATE 12/2/2017

NSC #8201445

~~SECRET~~



WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF RECORDS MANAGEMENT
(WHORM): SUBJECT FILE

Withdrawer

DLB 12/16/2019

File Folder

FO006-04 (ECONOMIC SUMMIT, VERSAILLES, FRANCE,
06/05/1982-06/06/1982) (09300-129999)

FOIA

F16-011
BIERGANNIS

Box Number

92

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
244088	MEMO ROBERT HORMATS TO WILLIAM CLARK, MICHAEL DEEVER, RE: REPORT ON PREPARATORY MEETING FOR VERSAILLES SUMMIT	5	3/6/1982	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

MEMORANDUM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE

dl 12/20/17 #3663

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~
~~WITH CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT~~

C. F.

128327

F0006-04

FG006-12

ACTION

May 24, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

THROUGH: CHARLES P. TYSON *CH*

FROM: HENRY R. NAU *HRN*

SUBJECT: Cover Memo for the President's Briefing Book

Attached is the cover memo from you to the President which will go into the President's Versailles Summit briefing book. If you could sign it and return it to me, I will see that it is married up with the President's briefing book which Chuck Tyson is receiving today from State.

RECOMMENDATION: That you sign the attached memo to the President and return it to me.

APPROVE

CH

DISAPPROVE

Attachment

Tab I Cover Memo to the President

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~
~~WITH CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT~~

NSC# 8203663

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~INFORMATION

May 24, 1982

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC/State Waivers

BY dir NARA DATE 12/2/2011

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

WILLIAM P. CLARK *Bm*

SUBJECT:

Versailles Economic Summit, June 4-6, 1982

You meet again at Versailles with the same six leaders of the Western world who assembled last year at Ottawa.

Since Ottawa, economic and political events have magnified the challenges faced by the Western world. Unemployment in the West has increased by some 5 million people and stands at an all-time postwar high in the Summit countries. Soviet-backed martial law in Poland has imposed new requirements and strains on Alliance solidarity.

In the same year, however, you have put into place many of the fundamental, long-term programs that will lead the United States and its sister democracies to sustained economic recovery and strengthened security cooperation. Your domestic economic program has gone into effect and already achieved dramatic gains in the fight against inflation. At Versailles you will be proposing, on the basis of this program, closer consultations with the other Summit countries under the umbrella of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to ensure that these countries too pursue similar basic policies to reduce inflation, maintain fiscal and monetary discipline, and strengthen market forces. You will also be advocating the continued and expanded liberalization of trade through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the GATT Ministerial in November, the first since 1973. Further, you will be pressing for new rules for international investment and approval of the OECD compromise on export credits. Finally, you will seek agreement to limit officially supported credits to the Soviet Union.

By strengthening Western economic cooperation and institutions, Versailles establishes the essential foundation for strengthening Western political and security cooperation. The underlying economic and technological strength of our economies reflects our shared values of liberty and human dignity and sharply distinguishes our societies from those of the East. This underlying economic vitality is also an essential safeguard of our security and an important means of limiting the growth of dangerous dependencies on markets and resources in the East.

Prepared by:
Henry Nau

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review May 22, 1988

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

189
National Security Council
The White House

RECEIVED

Package #

3663

22 MAY 24 A10:55

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	1	☒	
Bud McFarlane	2	☒	
Jacque Hill	3	☒	
Judge Clark	4	☒	A
John Poindexter	5	☒	
Staff Secretary	6		
Sit Room			

send to
Henry Han

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver

Other

COMMENTS

URGENT URGENT

ASAP This will go in a
third book on the Versailles
Economic Summit.

NSC/S PROFILE

UNCLASSIFIED

ID 8203663

RECEIVED 24 MAY 82 17

TO CLARK FROM NAU
TYSON

DOCDATE 24 MAY 82

24 MAY 82

KEYWORDS: FRENCH SUMMIT

ECONOMICS

SUBJECT: COVER MEMO FOR PRES BRIEFING BOOK FOR VERSAILLE SUMMIT

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 25 MAY 82 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(M /)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

<i>Pres</i>	<i>IP 5/24</i>	<i>Info</i>		
<i>C</i>	<i>7/20</i>	<i>OKR</i>		

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE *28* (C)