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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name		WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF RECORDS MANAGEMENT (WHORM): SUBJECT FILE			Witho DLB	drawer 2/5/2010	
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		R	4/19/2019	WH GUIDELINE	5		

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose Internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA] B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA] B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA] B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

2362 🍙

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

RODNEY B. MCDANIEL Bol Ar

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

March 24, 1986

TO:

FREDERICK J. RYAN, Director Presidential Appointments and Scheduling

FROM:

REQUEST:

Meet with leadership delegation of the Afghan resistance alliance.

PURPOSE:

To underscore US support for the alliance on the eve of a key round in Geneva of UN talks on Afghanistan.

BACKGROUND: A meeting was scheduled last fall, after the President's UNGA speech, but it fell through. A meeting now would help to refute rumors that US policy on Afghanistan is changing. It would also counter Soviet efforts to negotiate a settlement without the participation of the resistance, which has no role in the UN talks. The rotating chairmanship of the alliance will be held after April 1 by the leader who best combines political and military support, religious legitimacy, and a postive view of the West. Other leaders might accompany him, but he would act as spokesman. The visit would include other meetings with US officials, as well as Congressional events.

PREVIOUS: The President has met other Afghan resistance leaders, but none since the formation last year of a political alliance of resistance groups.

DATE & TIME: April 21 (or any day of week before the President's departure for Asia). DURATION: Thirty minutes.

LOCATION: Oval Office.

PARTICIPANTS: The President, Secretary Shultz, Admiral Poindexter, Mr. Regan

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: Discussion of Afghan situation

REMARKS REQUIRED: To be provided

MEDIA COVERAGE: Full coverage at outset of meeting; President might accompany to Press Room afterwards.

RECOMMENDED BY: John M. Poindexter

NGC #8602362

84155

2362

March 24, 1986

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: STEVE SESTANOVICH

SUBJECT: Afghan Alliance Visit

Since the visit of Afghan leaders fell through last fall, we have been looking for a moment when a rescheduled meeting with the President would support our policy. Recent events -- above all, the likely resumption of the UN "proximity talks" in early May -suggest that a visit before the President's Asia trip would be best. An early date (perhaps April 21, for 30 minutes) would:

° give the resistance alliance needed visibility at a time when the Soviets want to keep them totally out of the picture;

° show Pakistan we are hanging tough on the Afghan issue;

° protect the meeting from unexpected developments at Geneva;

° exploit the fact that after April the rotating alliance chairmanship will be held by Burhannudin Rabbani, the leader who best combines political effectiveness, religious legitimacy, and a positive view of the West.

We need approval for the visit before raising it with the alliance. Because of rumors of a change in our policy since Geneva, it would be disastrous to probe Rabbani's interest only to have the meeting turned down by schedulers later.

Although we have not vetted this specific date at State, the idea of a visit was strongly supported by all agencies last fall (and since then in our SIG sub-group on relations with the alliance). Some at State may expect the Paks to be uncomfortable with this gesture as talks resume. The longer we wait, however, to make the point that the resistance cannot be excluded from a settlement, the more it will look like a bad-faith objection when we finally do. It would be a mistake to wait further.

Don Fortier and Shirin Tahir-Kheli concur.

Recommendation

That you approve the attached schedule proposal.

Approve

Disapprove

Attachment: Tab A Schedule Proposal

CONFIDENTIAL Declassify: OADR



DECLASSIFIED Authority Nisc/State Warvers By do NARA DATE 4/19/2019

CISM:16~



Bob: I have concurred, but think 30 minutes is too long. Rechaps we should forward it , however , and let how lage on Fred cut it . gelten

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Rodney McDaniel			
Don Fortier			
Paul Thompson			
Florence Gantt			
John Poindexter			• ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
Rodney McDaniel			
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POINDEXTER

COMMENTS

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WASHINGTON



MEMORANDUM

TO:JOHN POINDEXTERFROM:FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR.SUBJECT:APPROVED PRESIDENTIAL ACTIVITYMEETING:The Meeting with Afghan Resistance Leaders,

DATE: The Meeting with Argnan Resistance Leaders, previously scheduled for April 21, is cancelled.

TIME:

DURATION:

LOCATION:

REMARKS REQUIRED:

MEDIA COVERAGE:

FIRST LADY

PARTICIPATION:

NOTE: PROJECT OFFICER, SEE ATTACHED CHECKLIST

 K. Barun P. Buchanan D. Chew M. Coyne E. Crispen M. Daniels T. Dawson D. Dellinger B. Elliott J. Erkenbeck L. Faulkner C. Fuller W. Barbal 	C. Hicks J. Hooley A. Kingon J. Kuhn C. McCain W. Ball R. Riley G. Walters R. Shaddick B. Shaddix L. Speakes J. Courtemanche
C. Fuller W. Henkel	J. Courtemanche WHCA Audio/Visual WHCA Operations

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Its cracelled. Now

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

4/16/86

MEMORANDUM

TO: JOHN POINDEXTER

FROM:

۰.

APPROVED PRESIDENTIAL ACTIVITY

FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR.

MEETING:

SUBJECT:

The Meeting with Afghan Resistance Leaders, previously scheduled for 11:30 am on April 21, is moved to 1:30 pm on the same day for 20 minutes.

DATE:

TIME:

DURATION:

LOCATION:

REMARKS REQUIRED:

MEDIA COVERAGE:

FIRST LADY PARTICIPATION:

NOTE: PROJECT OFFICER, SEE ATTACHED CHECKLIST

K.	Barun
Ρ.	Buchanan
D.	Chew
Μ.	Coyne
E.	Crispen
Μ.	Daniels
T.	Dawson
D.	Dellinger
В.	Elliott
J.	Erkenbeck
L.	Faulkner
C.	Fuller
W.	Henkel

C. Hicks J. Hooley A. Kingon J. Kuhn C. McCain W. Ball R. Riley G. Walters R. Shaddick B. Shaddix L. Speakes J. Courtemanche WHCA Audio/Visual

WHCA Operations

This warren and

R. McDaniel

REVISED

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

4/7/86

R. McDaniel

MEMORANDUM

TO:	JOHN POINDEXTER
FROM:	FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR. 1
SUBJECT:	APPROVED PRESIDENTIAL ACTIVITY
MEETING:	with Afghan Resistance Leaders
DATE:	April 21, 1986
TIME:	11:30 am
DURATION:	20 minutes
LOCATION:	Oval Office
REMARKS REQUIRED:	To be covered in briefing paper
MEDIA COVERAGE:	Coordinate with Press Office
FIRST LADY PARTICIPATION:	No

NOTE: PROJECT OFFICER, SEE ATTACHED CHECKLIST

K. Barun	C. Hicks
P. Buchanan	J. Hooley
D. Chew	A. Kingon
M. Coyne	J. Kuhn
E. Crispen	C. McCain
M. Daniels	W. Ball
T. Dawson	R. Riley
D. Dellinger	G. Walters
B. Elliott	R. Shaddick
J. Erkenbeck	B. Shaddix
L. Faulkner	L. Speakes
C. Fuller	J. Courtemanche
W. Henkel	WHCA Audio/Visual
	WHCA Operations

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

Fred --

I talked with Bob Pearson re the attached.

He said that Don Fortier had talked with Don Regan about this last week and Regan had signed off on it.

I asked what the urgency was.

Bob said - as best he could without being on a secure line - that unless we get the word to these folks soon they will not be available. There are also a series of meetings leading up to this meeting which need to be arranged and which hinge on our giving a date and time.

Is there anything else that Bobbcould do to move this along faster than waiting for LRSM?

Do you want to talk with Don Fortier? (x6534)

Jean

4/1





Fred --

This is the schedule proposal which goes with Bob Pearson's cable that he is hot to trot about.

Jean

(entry to be hader

LRSM Ann Helen Joh?

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

March 24, 1986

TO:

FREDERICK J. RYAN, Director Presidential Appointments and Scheduling

FROM:

RODNEY B. MCDANIEL Bol for

Meet with leadership delegation of the Afghan resistance alliance.

PURPOSE:

REQUEST:

To underscore US support for the alliance on the eve of a key round in Geneva of UN talks on Afghanistan.

BACKGROUND: A meeting was scheduled last fall, after the President's UNGA speech, but it fell through. A meeting now would help to refute rumors that US policy on Afghanistan is changing. It would also counter Soviet efforts to negotiate a settlement without the participation of the resistance, which has no role in the UN talks. The rotating chairmanship of the alliance will be held after April 1 by the leader who best combines political and military support, religious legitimacy, and a postive view of the West. Other leaders might accompany him, but he would act as spokesman. The visit would include other meetings with US officials, as well as Congressional events.

PREVIOUS: The President has met other Afghan resistance leaders, but none since the formation last year of a political alliance of resistance groups.

DATE & TIME: April 21 (or any day of week before the President's departure for Asia). DURATION: Thirty minutes.

LOCATION: Oval Office.

PARTICIPANTS: The President, Secretary Shultz, Admiral Poindexter, Mr. Regan

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: Discussion of Afghan situation

REMARKS REQUIRED: To be provided

MEDIA COVERAGE: Full coverage at outset of meeting; President might accompany to Press Room afterwards.

RECOMMENDED BY: John M. Poindexter

4/21/86 11:30-20 min 00

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

Fred --

We apparently have a schedule proposal floating around about this one.

Pearson wants your sign off on the language of the message, which in essense says there will be a meeting.

Pearson says that Regan supports Not when the this one.

Jean

Jean Jackson: Per your discussion with Bob Pearson. Need Cleara Carty Millison ASAP





SEGRET

#TC

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3. TO FURTHER THE ALLIANCE'S EFFORTS AT POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, THE PRESIDENT HAS DECIDED TO INVITE RADBANI TO VISIT HIM IN WASHINGTON IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO DEPARTING THE U.S. FOR THE TOKYO ECONOMIC SUMMIT MEETING. THE WHITE HOUSE HAS SET ASIDE TIME ON THE PRESIDENT'S CALENDAR FOR THE MEETING ON APRIL 23. WE RECOGNIZE THAT THIS DATE MAY BE EARLIER IN RABBANI'S TENURE AS SPOKESMAN' THAN WOULD BE IDEAL, BUT THE PRESIDENT'S SCHEDULE DENIES US OTHER ALTERNATIVES.

SECRET

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4. PLEASE ADVISE THE GOP OF THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION AND SOLICIT THEIR COOPERATION: YOU SHOULD ALSO NOTE THAT TIME IS SHORT, SO THAT YOUR INTENTIONS ARE TO TENDER THE INVUATION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER THE NEW SPOKESMAN TAKES OFFICE (I.E., ON APRIL L OR 2 IF POSSIBLE). OUR HOPE IS THAT THE PAKISTANIS, SINCE THEY HAD NO ODJECTION TO SUCH A MEETING LAST FALL, WILL DE SUPPORTIVE. YOU MIGHT REMIND THE PAKISTANIS THAT GULDUDIN URGED US TO INVITE THE ALLIANCE SPOKESMAN AT A LATER DATE AND SAY THAT VARIOUS CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE PREVENTED US FROM TAKING HIM UP ON THIS SUGGESTION UNTIL NON. YOU COULD ALSO MENTION RABBANI'S APPARENT INTEREST IN TRAVELLING ABROAD.

ASSUMING THE GOP VELCOMES THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE. 5. PLEASE CONVEY THE INVITATION IN THE COURSE OF THE CALL DISCUSSED IN STATE 7126L AND ISLAMABAD LOD4. YOU SHOULD INFORM RABBANI THAT THE PRESIDENT AND OTHER USG OFFICIALS WITH WHON RABBANI WOULD REET WANT TO NAVE SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS WHICH WOULD PERRIT FURTHER ELABORATION OF THE ISSUES TO BE DISCUSSED DURING THE ISLAMABAD OFFICER'S CALL (INCLUDING THE U.S. ROLE IN THE U.N.-SPONSORED HEGOTIATIONS AND U-S--SOVIET CONTACTS ON AFGHANISTAN) AS WELL AS AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE PROSPECTS FOR ALLIANCE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT. YOU SHOULD ADVISE RABBANI THAT WE DEFERTO RABBANI'S JUDGRENT ON COMPOSITION OF THE DELEGATION. (FYI: NE BELIEVE A SMALLER GROUP WOULD MAKE FOR A BETTER MEETING BUT DO NOT IN ANY SENSE WANT TO DICTATE ON THIS POINT } YYY

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON



MEMORANDUM

TO:

477/86

1

FROM:	FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR. W		
SUBJECT:	APPROVED PRESIDENTIAL ACTIVITY		
MEETING:	with Afghan Resistance Leaders		
DATE:	April: 21, 1986		
TIME:	11:30 am		
DURATION:	20 minutes		
LOCATION:	Oval Office		
REMARKS REQUIRED:	To be covered in briefing paper		
MEDIA COVERAGE:	Coordinate with Press Office		
FIRST LADY			

JOHN POINDEXTER

PARTICIPATION: NO

NOTE: PROJECT OFFICER, SEE ATTACHED CHECKLIST

K. Barun P. Buchanan D. Chew M. Coyne E. Crispen M. Daniels T. Dawson D. Dellinger B. Elliott J. Erkenbeck L. Faulkner C. Fuller W. Henkel

A. Kingon J. Kuhn C. McCain W. Ball R. Riley G. Walters R. Shaddick B. Shaddix L. Speakes J. Courtemanche WHCA Audio/Visual WHCA Operations

R. McDaniel

C. Hicks

J. Hooley

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THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON October 16, 1985

Dear Mr. Skorupsky:

Thank you for your very powerful letter of June 20. It was eloquent, and I found mary a word to disagree with.

I've asked one of my aides to get from the State Department an account of U.S.-backed shipments to the Afghan freedom-fighters. He will also find out exactly why we continue to grant MFN to Afghanistan's regime.

I certainly agree that one of the last governments on earth to deserve any privileges is the colonial regime in Kabul. My aide will be back in touch with you before Thanksgiving.

Sincere1

Patrick J. Buchanan Assistant to the President

Mr. Peter M. Skorupsky 274 Lowell Avenue Mercerville, New Jersey 08619

October 16, 1985

Dear Mr. Skorupsky:

Thank you for your very powerful letter of June 20. It was eloquent, and I found mary a word to disagree with.

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I certainly agree that one of the last governments on earth to deserve any privileges is the colonial regime in Kabul. My aide will be back in touch with you before Thanksgiving.

Sincerely,

Patrick J. Buchanan Assistant to the President

Mr. Peter M. Skorupsky 274 Lowell Avenue Mercerville, New Jersey 08619

PJB/KF/jfc (10PJB)

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

Date: 10/22/85

3

TO: Frank Gregorsky

FROM: PAT BUCHANAN

Action

Comment

□ Let's Discuss

FYI

For your follow-up.

Thanks.

Peter M. Skorupsky 274 Lowell Avenue Mercerville, NJ 08619

Mr. Patrick J. Buchanan The White House Office Washington, DC 20500

June 20, 1985

Dear Mr. Buchanan:

I wish to bring to your attention a matter of utmost urgency. This is an update to my previous letter concerning Afghanistan. I have studied many materials. I have gathered press clippings, studied the transcripts of Senate hearings on Afghanistan, the Helsinki Watch reports, etc. The atrocities continue unabated.

But as I discussed in that previous letter, the Russians only want the land. They have no conscience regarding acts of massive, barbarous depopulation. They have long aspired to reach warm water ports, establish military bases, etc. in their push toward the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea, and increasing their territorial controls to surround--indeed strangle--the Persian Gulf and control Mideast oil and mineral resources. They are succeeding. What disturbs and hurts me most is that the free world ignores this crisis, and does practically nothing.

Wasn't it Lenin who said that the roads to Paris and London were through the streets of Kabul [in Afghansitan]?

[In Africa, instead of aiding those groups opposing Soviet backed governments and takeovers, we have militarily and economically supported the Communists! This has permitted the Soviets to gain control of strategic mineral and land resources vital to our defense, and control shipping routes vital to us, that follow the contour of Africa's coast.]

The continued occupation of Afghanistan deeply saddens and distresses me. I know the Afghan people's suffering, and what hurts most is that thousands are dying daily under the most horrible circumstances: and that this genocide can be stopped. I implore you to communicate to the Congress and the American people this reality of utmost urgency.

My research strongly affirms my belief that Afghanistan need not perish, its peoples need not die. But the time remaining for this possibility is quickly disappearing. If we do not act <u>immediately</u>, it will be too late. If too late for Afghanistan, then we must act none-the-less to prevent more Afghanistans.

The United States has lacked the resolve to act decisively for decades. But little time is left us in which to rescue not only Afghanistan, but many nations and peoples held captive by Russian slavemasters. No, this does not require World War III. It requires courage, conviction, and a stand.

The Soviet state, their projection of power and colonial expansion was made possible, and continues today only because the West--primarily England, the United States and now Israel--has funded, cooperated with and permitted their existance. It has done so by public and private agreements and treaties in areas of territorial appropriation, trade, armaments, strategy policy, and ideological, political, tactical and military subversion... and by remaining silent.

Non-Soviet nations, particularly in the West have nearly single-handedly supported, directly and indirectly, the machines of Soviet expansionism by lending and <u>granting</u> billions of dollars, feeding them and their armies, supplying and permitting them to steal our industrial resources and technologies, permitting capture, influence and control of territories--valuable geopolitically, economically and for their natural resources, military position, etc.--all vitally strategic to our survival, and essential for the Soviets as means for our destruction and demise.

Without taking the requisite thousands of pages to detail our complicity, and frequent ignorance in dealing with the USSR, I trust you perceive the bases upon which the USSR has become world conquerer since tsarist times and continues its ruthless expansion.

One must understand Russian history comprehensively in order to recognize all their ploys, strategies and manipulation in dealing with nations still free. Realizing this, they have even succeeded in re-writing history--theirs and of their intrigues--to the extent that Western strategists and analysts are often mislead and our government manipulated. Unfortunately, most all primary Russian historiographic source materials, especially those of captive nations and those once available in Europe, have been revised, forged or destroyed over several hundred years of Russian aspirations for world domination. <u>Their goals are not</u> <u>new</u>. Despite dozens of attempted invasions and overthrows of Afghanistan throughout history, one should be cognizant that one of Russia's first attempts dates back to 1791, and that Russia has always included Afghan and Pakistani territory in its essential strategy for expansion.

The Russians are opportunists. They plan for the long term, but are flexible in the short term and remain patient... and pounce when the opportunity presents itself. We have not learned to think or plan in the long term. Having failed to formulate a cogent, cohesive, clearly-defined national policy, we react to their initiatives instead.

However, in many circumstances unbiased, unblinded common sense suffices to identify and solve problems. It is with such sense that our government---and Congress---must immediately address the root causes and sources of Soviet power, and neutralize our highly significant support that powers and empowers Russian conquests.

A bill is before the Congress to revoke Most Favored Nation trade status against the oppressive puppet government in Afganistan. Its passage needs be expedited! Perhaps an Executive Order could be issued restraining trade until Congress acts decisively. But we need do more. If the innocent, captive peoples really were to benefit from our aid and granting of MFN status, I would very much favor said. But the people are not benefitting, and these monies are turned against them.

But more must be done. We must take a stand, share tears with the Afghans, and like the courageous insurgents, tell the Russians to get the *** out or else we're coming in! If we properly supported the Afghan freedom fighters, we would need not come in, and Afghanistan need not die! It remains a fact, that the Russian audacity is largely explainable by our timidity and timerity. While the State Department may try to keep details of aid low key--particularly as most aid must funnel through Pakistan, (therein extant a precarious balance of alliance, agreements and hazards for a hesitant, Soviet-targetted Pakistan), I am beginning to suspect the possibility that the U.S. State Department's efforts have been sabotaged. I hope I am wrong. My understanding is that the Israeli Mossad has been delegated to coordinate weapons procurement and distribution. One would certainly agree they were technically qualified.

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Yet adequate weapons and logistical supplies are not reaching the Afghan freedom fighters. Weapons supplied are often 30 to 100 years old, dysfunctional, damaged, without firing pins, ammo, rockets with useless accuracy, etc.

There is little evidence that but for an exiguous fraction, our previous one-half billion dollars of aid, or this year's 280 million is reaching those intended. I would hope that aid is given the some 6,000,000 displaced persons and refugees, many--some 3,000,000--crossing borders into Pakistan, as the Pakistani government needs help managing the refugee crisis. Some 800,000 Afghan refugees are in Iran.

I commend our Department of State for attempting to administer this refugee relief under these most difficult conditions.

Yet, despite my research, I cannot account for most of this aid, <u>and find nothing</u> <u>concerning military aid</u>. The Afghan freedom fighters also are saying that <u>they</u> cannot find the military aid we are supposedly providing. Although it is granted that supplying those in central Afghanistan is extremely difficult, practically nothing of military use is reaching any freedom fighters.

My worst fears would be that the Mossad is diverting <u>THIS</u> money to wage its own wars; or that there is a quiet understanding in Washington that effectual, decisive aid must never reach the Afghan patriots... that at the expense of the Afghan people, we would deliver only enough aid to provide the Russians with a thorny, prolonged diversion. I say the latter because last year, <u>at the same time</u> our government gave hundreds of millions in aid to Afghan refugees and freedom fighters, they sold the evil Soviet-run Kabul government 2.8 million dollars in jet aircraft parts and supplies for their state airline, part of a total of some \$6,000,000 of U.S. sales to the Soviet-puppet government.

How can I, a concerned patriot, obtain accounting of funds and evidence of intended distribution? What can I do to influence our government to actively and decisively save a nation that is bleeding and dying every day---and whose defeat will hasten our demise?

We must threaten to immediately halt <u>ALL</u> trade with the USSR if they do not vacate Afghanistan <u>unconditionally</u>. <u>They must not be allowed to leave any threads of</u> <u>puppet government in Kabul</u>. I urge you, Mr. Buchanan, to press for the issuance of an immediate emergency executive order to halt all trade and prohibit assistance to the Soviet-puppet government of Afghanistan. I ask you to do everything you can to inform the Congress and the American people, and make every effort immediately to save Afghanistan. We can do it if we resolve to do it.

3

POSTSCRIPT: on Nicaragua, and strategy considerations for Afghanistan too.

The Russians make little attempt at covert aid, nor do they concern themselves with public opinion regarding Afghanistan, etc.--they simply lie and maintain they are liberators. We need not accept their propaganda as the last word. Americans must be made to understand, and our aid then should be overt. Yet even congressmen have naively believed the Soviet's propaganda planted in our news media. But as pointed out in the "strategy" paragraph below, money alone cannot combat communist propanganda and ideology.

Wars of guerrilla resistance and insurgency, while heavily dependent on military logistics, deal with maintaining morale of the freedom fighters and the general population, demoralizing occupying troops and puppet governments, and effective counter-propaganda, etc. We must accept the cold reality that is war. We must offer that aid, and support our CIA--and its "manuals." We cannot afford another Cuba.

[When I say that, my heart grieves because, frankly, I fear that most Americans do not realize the extreme threat to our national security and freedom in the West, that Cuba and other Soviet surrogates pose. Nor do they understand insurgent/guerrilla warfare. We <u>are</u> at war--Castro and Gorbachev think so <u>and act</u> thusly, even if we do not. We cannot afford another Cuba!]

As you know, if we do not support Nicaraguan freedom fighters now, then circumstance may force American troops to intervene. This is one of Moscow's intentions. If Moscow's ploy to force our boys into Central America succeeds, then we are inviting our own economic destabilization, weakening our deployments and preparedness abroad—thereby inviting AN INVASION INTO WESTERN EUROPE or strategic Pacific and Indian Ocean islands at indecisive moments like future presidential elections. The subversion of Europe and Africa is nearing completion, and unknown to many, dozens of Pacific islands and coastal territories have been targeted and already usurped by Russia. These are strategically vital to our defense and survival!

MISSING STRATEGY

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Why doesn't our government realize (or act as if it does) that generally, in child-like simplicity, an excellent indicator of what the United States should not do or want is often the opposite of what Moscow proclaims we should--what it wants us to do? The Kremlin lobbies our Congress sometimes far better than domestic lobbies, and brainwashes our citizens through our own news media. They have been obligingly overt in announcing their intents and plans for centuries, and particularly in the last 68 years. The price paid in failing to learn from history and failure to listen is that the majority of the world's peoples, at least three billion human beings, are enslaved. A look at a "freedom" map should sober almost anyone, but too few have awakened, too few have looked.

Our nation has become so brainwashed that we feel guilty or embarrassed to speak up when we see a Communist, or the results of the evil that is Russian and Communism. And over 68 years they have methodically infiltrated every area and level of our society to exert their malevolent influence.

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I don't always agree with him, but H. Rositzke has aptly said of our policy of containment:

... Containment is not a positive policy designed to advance our national interest, but a defensive policy designed to react to Soviet initiatives. We have followed this defensive strategy against a cautious but persistant forward strategy carried out by a young and powerful nation-state devoted to changing the status quo in the interests of its own security and prosperity, We have followed a policy of military containment against what is essentially a political, economic, and ideological crusade. We have relied on military hardware and regional alliances to counter an adversary that has never employed its own troops outside its defense perimeter. We have throughout been deprived of a clear-headed view of reality by a military-mindedness blind to the powerful nationalist, racial, religious and economic forces at work in the world that have little to do with the Soviet-American confrontation.

Between being goaded into policies of containment, detente and MAD, and into agreements such as Yalta... and ourselves failing to develop and exercise clear (short and long range) national goals, sense of purpose and identity, we have both initiated our own demise, and engendered and encouraged the USSR's use highly their successful "divide and rule" methodology against us.

We must not repeat and promulgate our mistakes of the past. We must preserve our freedom today and for tomorrow.

Sincerely,

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TETER M. proyony

Response to Peter Skorupsky (form letter was rejected) FG 10/6

Dear Mr. Skorupsky:

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Thank you for your very powerful letter of June 20. It was eloquent, and I found nary a word to disagree with.

I've instructed one of my aides to get from the State Department an account of U.S.-backed weapons shipments to the Afghan freedom-fighters. He will also find out exactly why we have a pro MFN position regarding Afghanistan's generation.

I certainly agree that the last government in the world to deserve will privileges is the colonial regime in Kabul. will be back in touch with you before Thanksgiving.

Sincerely,