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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection Name WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF RECORDS MANAGEMENT
(WHORM): SUBJECT FILE

Withdrawer

DLB 2/5/2010

File Folder CO002 (400000-402999)

FOIA

S10-306

Box Number 36

SYSTEMATIC

167

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
84160	MEMO	NICHOLAS PLATT TO ROBERT MCFARLANE, RE: APPROACH TO THE U.N. SECRETARY GENERAL ON AFGHANISTAN	1	12/10/1985	B1
84161	CABLE	STATE 373911	2	12/9/1985	B1
84162	PAPER	NSC CHANGES TO CABLE TO ISLAMABAD <i>R 4/19/2019 NSC/DOS WAIVERS</i>	1	ND	B1
84163	PAPER	DUPLICATE OF #84162 <i>R 4/19/2019 NSC/STATE WAIVERS</i>	1	ND	B1
84164	CABLE	DRAFT CABLE RE: SUMMARY OF PRESIDENTIAL MEETING WITH AFGHAN ALLIANCE DELEGATION <i>R 4/19/2019 DEPT. OF STATE WAIVER 11/6/2015</i>	2	6/25/1986	B1
84165	MEMCON	PRESIDENT MEETING WITH PROF. BURHANUDDIN RABBANI AND OTHER LEADERS OF THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE ALLIANCE, JUNE 16, 1986 <i>R 4/19/2019 NSC/STATE WAIVERS</i>	4	ND	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
84166	MEMO	STEVE SESTANOVICH TO JOHN POINDEXTER, RE: MEMCON FROM PRESIDENT'S AFGHAN MEETING R 4/19/2019 NSC WAIVER 8/6/2010	1	6/17/1986	B1
84167	MEMO	STEVE SESTANOVICH TO JOHN POINDEXTER, RE: RESPONSE TO BOSCHWITZ LETTER -- AFGHANISTAN R 4/19/2019 NSC WAIVER 8/6/2010	1	5/28/1986	B1
84168	MEMO	JOHN POINDEXTER TO STEVE SESTONOVICH, RE: POINDEXTER-TELTSCHIK MESSAGE ON AFGHAN DELEGATON R 4/19/2019 NSC WAIVER 8/6/2010	1	6/20/1986	B1
84169	MESSAGE	DRAFT MESSAGE JOHN POINDEXTER TO HORST TELTSCHIK, RE: AFGHAN DELEGATION R 4/19/2019 NSC WAIVER 4/19/2010	1	ND	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

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167

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
84160	MEMO NICHOLAS PLATT TO ROBERT MCFARLANE, RE: APPROACH TO THE U.N. SECRETARY GENERAL ON AFGHANISTAN	1	12/10/1985	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing
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84161	CABLE STATE 373911	2	12/9/1985	B1

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NSC/S PROFILE

~~SECRET~~ XDIS
UNCLASSIFIED UPON REVIEW
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)
012 25110

ID 8509778

RECEIVED 10 DEC 85 14

TO MCFARLANE FROM PLATT, N

DOC DATE 10 DEC 85

~~SUSPENSE~~

KEYWORDS: PAKISTAN AFGHANISTAN CUELLAR, PEREZ
UN USSR

SUBJECT: APPROACH TO UN SEC GENERAL ON AFGHANISTAN NEGOTIATIONS

ACTION: APPROPRIATE ACTION DUE: 11 DEC 85 STATUS S FILES PA

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
TAHIR-KHELI	SESTANOVICH COVEY	RAYMOND

COMMENTS

REF# 8536355 LOG NSCIFID (HW)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	<i>C 6/14</i>	<i>OTB per NSC/S</i>		
	<i>Z 6/16</i>	<i>ONR</i>		

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By

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216110

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

C.F. 4696
Add-on

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PR007-01

FG006-12

June 27, 1986

UNCLASSIFIED

with ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachment

WIS

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROD MCDANIEL

FROM: STEVE SESTANOVICH *SRS*

SUBJECT: Cable on President's Afghan Meeting

Attached at Tab A are NSC changes to a State draft cable (Tab B) on the President's meeting with the Afghan Alliance delegation. The new summary paragraph summarizes the most important points made by the President; the new last paragraph then instructs Embassy Kabul to convey these points to the Government of Pakistan.

N.A.

MR

Shirin Tahir-Kheli and Peter Rodman concur.

Recommendation

That you approve LDX-transmission of these changes to State Secretariat.

Approve *WAPf*

Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab A NSC changes to State cable
- Tab B State draft cable

UNCLASSIFIED

with ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachment

Declassify: OADR

NSC#8604696

NSC changes to Cable to Islamabad -- SUBJECT: Summary of Presidential Meeting with Afghan alliance Delegation.

NEW FIRST PARAGRAPH:

Summary: President Reagan met on June 16 for forty minutes with a delegation of the Afghan resistance alliance, who described the course of the war, their military needs and their opposition to UN negotiations from which they were excluded. The President:

-- described the meeting as the beginning of a regular dialogue between the Alliance and the USG;

-- expressed skepticism toward the Geneva talks, and doubt that the Soviets had made the decision to leave;

-- said we urged the UN to consult the Alliance on the talks and pledged to provide USG briefings on them;

-- rejected separate agreements with Moscow, declaring that a US "guarantee" would be offered only if it provided for a rapid Soviet withdrawal (3-6 months);

-- said an agreement must also provide for self-determination and will not work unless the resistance is consulted and the Afghan people support it; and

-- told the Alliance leaders that more internal cooperation would enable the Alliance to gain the international recognition that we both seek for it. End of Summary.

NEW LAST PARAGRAPH:

Action for Embassy Islamabad. Please brief the Foreign Ministry and President Zia's office on the content of the meeting, especially the key points made by President Reagan (see paragraph 2).

DECLASSIFIED
Sec 3.011, E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2008
BY NARA, DATE

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NSC/State Waiver
BY dn NARA DATE 4/19/2019

WASHFAX RECEIPT

THE WHITE HOUSE

C

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OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S) *db*
2/10/10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION _____ PAGES ONE
~~XXXX~~

FROM RODNEY B. MCDANIEL EXEC SEC / NSC
(NAME) (EXTENSION) (ROOM NUMBER)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION CABLE ON PRES AFGHAN MTG

<u>TO (AGENCY)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO:</u>	<u>DEPT/ROOM NO.</u>	<u>EXTENSION</u>
<u>STATE</u>	<u>KEN QUINN</u>	<u>EXEC SEC</u>	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
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_____	_____	_____	_____

REMARKS TO KEN QUINN S/S STATE PLEASE SUBSTITUTE ATTACHED MATERIAL FOR FIRST
PARAGRAPH AND ADD LAST PARAGRAPH OF CROSSHATCH 8945 (CABLE TO ISLAMABAD)
AS INDICATED AND DISPATCH. BOB P.

URGENT

WASHINGTON RECEIPT

THE WHITE HOUSE

C

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OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

URGENT

B, 3

du 2/15/10

MESSAGE NO. 915 CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL PAGES 1

FROM RODNEY B. MCDANIEL EXEC SEC / NSC 9
(NAME) (EXTENSION) (ROOM NUMBER)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION CABLE ON FREE AFGHAN MTG

<u>TO (AGENCY)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO:</u>	<u>DEPT/ROOM NO.</u>	<u>EXTENSION</u>
<u>STATE</u>	<u>KEN QUINN</u>	<u>EXEC SEC</u>	

REMARKS TO KEN QUINN S/S STATE PLEASE SUBSTITUTE ATTACHED MATERIAL FOR FIRST
PARAGRAPH AND ADD LAST PARAGRAPH OF CROSSMATCH 8945 (CABLE TO DELAWARE)
AS INDICATED AND DISPATCH. BOB P.

URGENT

Note: Not tested w/ s/s # pg

URGENT

86 JUN 27 P 5: 42

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

WASHFAX RECEIPT

THE WHITE HOUSE

C

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OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

alb 2/5/10

URGENT

MESSAGE NO. 915 CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PAGES ONE
 FROM RODNEY B. MCDANIEL EXEC SEC / NSC
 (NAME) (EXTENSION) (ROOM NUMBER)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION CABLE ON PRES AFGHAN MTG

<u>TO (AGENCY)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO:</u>	<u>DEPT/ROOM NO.</u>	<u>EXTENSION</u>
<u>STATE</u>	<u>KEN QUINN</u>	<u>EXEC SEC</u>	

REMARKS TO KEN QUINN S/S STATE PLEASE SUBSTITUTE ATTACHED MATERIAL FOR FIRST
PARAGRAPH AND ADD LAST PARAGRAPH OF CROSSHATCH 8945 (CABLE TO ISLAMABAD)
AS INDICATED AND DISPATCH. BOB P.

URGENT

NSC changes to Cable to Islamabad -- SUBJECT: Summary of Presidential Meeting with Afghan alliance Delegation.

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Summary: President Reagan met on June 16 for forty minutes with a delegation of the Afghan resistance alliance, who described the course of the war, their military needs and their opposition to UN negotiations from which they were excluded. The President:

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-- said we urged the UN to consult the Alliance on the talks and pledged to provide USG briefings on them;

-- rejected separate agreements with Moscow, declaring that a US "guarantee" would be offered only if it provided for a rapid Soviet withdrawal (3-6 months);

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NEW LAST PARAGRAPH:

Action for Embassy Islamabad. Please brief the Foreign Ministry and President Zia's office on the content of the meeting, especially the key points made by President Reagan (see paragraph 2).

'DECLASSIFIED'
Authority NSC/State Weivers
BY du NARA DATE 4/19/2017

WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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S/S #

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6 JUN 26 9:19

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

008945

UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

MESSAGE NO. 008945 CLASSIFICATION Confidential No. Pages 2

FROM: KENNETH M. QUINN - S/S 78448 7224
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Cable to Islamabad -- SUBJECT: Summary of Presidential Meeting with Afghan Alliance Delegation

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
NSC	ROBERT PEARSON	456-6534	
N	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
	<i>McDaniel</i>		
	<i>Teicher</i>		
	<i>Sestanovich</i>		
	<i>Tahr-Khali</i>		

FOR: CLEARANCE INFORMATION PER REQUEST COMMENT

REMARKS: PLEASE CLEAR BY: Friday, June 27, 1986

S/S Officer: *Colman*

CROSSHATCH

RETURN TIME-STAMPED COPY TO:

84164

726

6

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

9366A

BY State Waver 11/6/15
NARA DATE 4/17/81

NEA/PAB:DHILLIKAN:GFD
DL/25/86 EXT. 79552
P:MARMACOST

NEA:RAPECK
S/S:KMUINN

NSC:SESTANOVICH
S/S-O:LTRACY

PRIORITY ISLAMABAD

PRIORITY PESHAWAR, MOSCOW PRIORITY, KABUL PRIORITY, BEIJING
PRIORITY, NEW DELHI PRIORITY, LONDON PRIORITY, RIYADH PRIORITY

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: PREL, AF, US

NAME
DAN
RAP
SS

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF PRESIDENTIAL MEETING WITH AFGHAN
ALLIANCE DELEGATION

1. ~~ENTIRE~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. IN A FORTY-MINUTE MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT ON JUNE 16, AFGHAN RESISTANCE ALLIANCE SPOKESMAN, BURMANUDDIN RABBANI, APPEALED FOR OFFICIAL USG RECOGNITION OF THE RESISTANCE AND MORE EFFECTIVE WEAPONS, PARTICULARLY FOR AIR DEFENSE. RABBANI DESCRIBED SOVIET ATROCITIES IN SOME DETAIL AND THE RESULTS OF CONCERTED - IF VAIN - SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO BREAK THE WILL OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE: ONE MILLION MARTYRS, FIVE MILLION REFUGEES, AND A LAND OF BLOOD AND ASHES. RABBANI LAMENTED THAT DESPITE THEIR SUFFERING AND CONTINUED RESISTANCE THEY WERE DENIED REPRESENTATION AT THE UN AND AT THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS. RABBANI STRESSED THAT NO AGREEMENTS SHOULD BE REACHED THAT WERE AGAINST THE WILL OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE. PARTY LEADER GAILANI ADDED THAT THE AFGHAN PEOPLE'S STRUGGLE, WHICH ANTEDATED THE SOVIET INVASION, WAS FOR SELF-DETERMINATION.

3. RABBANI EXPRESSED DEEP SCEPTICISM ABOUT SOVIET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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INTENTIONS, NOTING THAT GORBACHEV HAS AN IRON FIST BENEATH HIS VELVET GLOVE AND PROMISES OF GOOD WILL. THE ALLIANCE WAS THEREFORE ANXIOUS ABOUT US WILLINGNESS TO GUARANTEE AN AGREEMENT. LEADER MOMANEDI STRESSED THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD SIGN AN AGREEMENT AND THEN NOT ABIDE BY IT. RABBANI CONCLUDED BY THANKING THE PRESIDENT FOR HIS PERSONAL SUPPORT OF THE AFGHAN STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM.

3. PRESIDENT REAGAN SAID IT WAS AN HONOR TO SUPPORT THE AFGHAN STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE. REFERRING TO THE ALLIANCE LEADERSHIP AS THE TRUE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE, THE PRESIDENT NOTED THE ALLIANCE SHOULD COOPERATE MORE CLOSELY TO MOBILIZE THE ENTIRE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IN AN EFFORT TO GAIN THE INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION THAT WE BOTH SEEK FOR IT. RECOGNITION OF THE ALLIANCE BY ONLY ONE COUNTRY WOULD NOT BE VERY HELPFUL. IN THE MEANTIME, MAINTAINING A US OFFICIAL PRESENCE IN KABUL WAS USEFUL FOR OTHER REASONS.

4. THE PRESIDENT STATED THAT THE US HAD NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT SOVIET GOALS AND METHODS WHICH WAS WHY WE REJECTED SEPARATE DEALS WITH MOSCOW. THE PRESIDENT STRESSED THAT THE US WOULD NEITHER ACCEPT NOR GUARANTEE AN AGREEMENT THAT DID NOT PROVIDE FOR A SHORT - 3 TO 6 MONTH - WITHDRAWAL TIMETABLE AND FOR THE PEOPLE OF AFGHANISTAN TO CHOOSE THEIR OWN GOVERNMENT. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT A VIABLE SETTLEMENT REQUIRED ALLIANCE CONSULTATIONS AND THE AFGHAN PEOPLE'S SUPPORT OF THE TERMS OF AN AGREEMENT. HE SAID THE US HAD URGED THE UN TO CONSULT THE ALLIANCE. THE PRESIDENT SAID WE WOULD BRIEF THE DELEGATION ON THE STATUS OF THE TALKS AND HOPED THIS MEETING WAS THE BEGINNING OF A CONTINUING DIALOGUE. THE PRESIDENT ASSERTED THAT THE USSR MUST BE MADE TO REALIZE THAT AGGRESSION DOES NOT PAY. THE BRAVE RESISTANCE OF THE MUJAHIDIN WAS AN EMBARRASSMENT TO THE SOVIETS. THE PRESIDENT PLEDGED CONTINUED US SUPPORT OF AND ASSISTANCE TO THE RESISTANCE UNTIL FINAL VICTORY. YYY

CONFIDENTIAL

**National Security Council
The White House**

System # _____

Package # _____

DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	<u>1</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>A</u>
Rodney McDaniel	_____	_____	_____
Don Fortier	_____	_____	_____
Paul Thompson	_____	_____	_____
Florence Gantt	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Rodney McDaniel	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>	_____	<u>D/LOR</u>
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____

I = Information	A = Action	R = Retain	D = Dispatch	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Regan Buchanan Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

To Ken Quinn S/S State, as indicated
Please substitute attached material for
first ^{paragraph} and ^{add} last paragraph of crosstake 8945
(cable to Islamabad) and dispatch. *Riker*

6/27

See PAR A - please LDX

to state asap
done you
6/27
RZ

NSC/S PROFILE

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ID 8604696

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RECEIVED 17 JUN 86 18

TO POINDEXTER

FROM SESTANOVICH

db
2/5/10

DOCDATE 17 JUN 86

MCDANIEL

20 JUN 86

SESTANOVICH

27 JUN 86

KEYWORDS: AFGHANISTAN

USSR

SUBJECT: MEMCON FM PRES AFGHAN MTG

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

POINDEXTER

COMMENTS

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ACTION OFFICER (S)

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Cable sent to State

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

DECLASSIFIED

Sec. 3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2008
BY NARA dlb, DATE 7/5/10

June 20, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR NICHOLAS PLATT
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memcon of President's Meeting
with Afghani Leaders (C)

Attached is a copy of a memcon of the President's meeting with Afghani Leaders on June 16. If you wish, you may cable a summary of the memcon. We would appreciate your clearing with us a crosshatch of the draft cable. ~~(C)~~



Rodney B. McDaniel
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
As stated

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8

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC/State Wawers
BY ds NARA DATE 4/19/2019

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Prof. Burhanuddin Rabbani and other leaders of the Afghan resistance Alliance (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Secretary of State George P. Shultz
Donald Regan, Chief of Staff
John M. Poindexter, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Michael Armacost, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs
Stephen R. Sestanovich, NSC staff

Prof. Burhanuddin Rabbani, Spokesman, Afghan resistance Alliance, and leader, Jamiat-i-Islami
Sebqatullah Mojadedi, leader, Afghan National Liberation Front
Muhammad Nabi Mohammadi, leader, Islamic Revolutionary Movement
Ahmad Gailani, leader, National Islamic Front for Afghanistan
Mohammed Es'haq, Jamiat-i-Islami

DATE, TIME June 16, 1986
AND PLACE: 11:30 a.m. - 12:10 p.m., Oval Office

The Afghan delegation entered, was introduced to the President and sat through two waves of press coverage. (The Secretary had joked beforehand that when the cameramen entered the delegation would find it like an invasion; the President added, "But without AK-47's.") (U)

Opening the discussion, the President expressed satisfaction that the delegation had been able to break away from its duties to make the trip to Washington. He noted that it was an honor to support their struggle for independence, since the leaders of the resistance were the true representatives of the Afghan people. He said he hoped that this first meeting would be the beginning of a regular dialogue between the U.S. government and the Alliance. He was confident that our goals were identical: both of us seek the freedom of Afghanistan. For the United States it was important that the Soviet Union not believe that aggression pays; this was why we reject separate deals with Moscow. Turning to the U.N.-sponsored peace talks, he declared that no peace agreement that is reached will work unless the alliance has been consulted and unless the the Afghan people support the terms of the agreement. For this reason, the U.S. government urges the U.N. to consult the Alliance on the talks; he pledged that we

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Declassify on: OADR

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would brief the delegation on the talks that have been held to date. The President said that he himself was skeptical of these talks, because he did not believe that the Soviets had made the decision to get out. Concluding, he observed that greater cooperation among the members of the Alliance would bring the international recognition that we both seek for it. At this point, he expressed interest in hearing what the guests had to say. (C)

Professor Rabbani began by expressing thanks, on behalf of the people of Afghanistan, for the President's sincere interest and for the help he had provided. He was sure that the President was familiar with the record of Soviet atrocities in Afghanistan, even though their occupation was hidden by "a curtain of silence." The Soviets had turned the country into a land of blood and ashes. But he was convinced that the Soviet army would never be able to break the Afghan people's will. The Soviets have the power to burn and kill, but they cannot make us slaves. Already one million have been killed, 5 million turned into refugees abroad, and 2 million into refugees within Afghanistan. Yet with all these sad stories, it was especially sorrowful that the mujahidin were not recognized as the representatives of the Afghan people. "The butchers" have their seat at the U.N. and embassies everywhere; meanwhile the people of Afghanistan were denied the privilege of representation. This could be seen at Geneva: the Alliance was only somewhat aware of what was going on in the talks there; it didn't know what went on behind closed doors. It did know that the Soviets didn't want peace; they were warmongers. Gorbachev has made the world believe he wants peace but he has an iron fist beneath his velvet glove and his promises of good will. (C)

Continuing, Rabbani noted that the Alliance had to be anxious about the American offer to guarantee an agreement, because the Soviets are not honest. In the meantime the Afghan people are fighting on their own, becoming martyrs and living in poverty. Children were being kidnapped by the Soviets and taken away for education. Biological warfare was being waged. Villages were set afire, and bombs in the form of toys left to kill the surviving children. He had recently seen a two-month old baby with her face completely burned; she had been sent to the United Kingdom for skin-grafts. To protect themselves the mujahidin need more weapons, especially for air defense. To this, some said that if the freedom fighters had more effective weapons, the Soviets would get mad. But what else could the Soviets do to them? Only nuclear weapons had not been used. Afghanistan had become a testing ground for Soviet weaponry. On the diplomatic side, he asked that the State Department be given instructions to take steps to prepare to recognize the mujahidin officially. No agreements should be reached that are against the wishes of the Afghan people. The people of Afghanistan are the only ones entitled to speak of its future. It was important to avoid a second Yalta. Summarizing, he said that the mujahidin need effective weapons and effective aid of all kinds. They knew of

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the President's previous statements on Afghanistan and were very grateful. The people of Afghanistan would never forget this stand. (C)

The President recalled seeing victims of Soviet atrocities in a hospital in Boston, among them some children horribly disfigured by fire-bombing. One child had only a single arm; another, only one leg. He also told of an Afghan student who recounted her arrest for leafletting; to get her to talk, the police brought in another prisoner and gouged his eyes out in front of her. So, knowing of such things, we could have no illusions about the Soviets, their goals, or their methods. As for the issue of recognition, he noted that it would not be very helpful if only one country recognized the resistance; it was necessary to work to mobilize the whole international community. In the meantime, maintaining a presence in Kabul was useful to us for other reasons. This did not mean we would accept -- or guarantee -- whatever agreement may be produced in Geneva regardless of its terms. For us, the withdrawal timetable should be no more than 3-6 months. Until the Soviets began to propose such an agreement, we could have no faith in their statements. It seemed to us that the brave resistance shown by the mujahidin since the invasion was a humiliating embarrassment to the Soviets; they must be thinking of how to find a face-saving way out. (C)

Secretary Shultz suggested that the President might want to hear from the other members of the delegation. (U)

Dr. Mojadedi began by offering thanks to the American people for their help; the Afghan people appreciate. What worried them were the Geneva talks. The real sides to the war are the defenders of Afghanistan -- i.e., the mujahidin -- and the aggressors against Afghanistan -- i.e., the Soviets. He reminded the President that the resistance antedated the invasion; it was resistance against a Communist regime installed in 1978. The Afghan people would continue this struggle, which was for self-determination. (C)

The President recalled that he had been in Teheran at the time that the Soviets installed this Communist regime; shortly thereafter the American Ambassador had been killed. (U)

Mr. Nabi also expressed thanks for American support. He said that Afghans felt that Americans considered the war to be one of their own problems. It was in fact not a local issue, but a common global problem; not a problem just for the people of Afghanistan but a danger for peace everywhere. The Afghan people were defending against a problem that could become worldwide. They expected support from others, especially Americans, who could help them cut off the hand of the aggressor. The mujahidin wanted to be recognized internationally; they also needed to gain strength on the battlefield, especially by acquiring better air defenses. As for Geneva, he echoed Rabbani's statement that the Soviets were not honest. They would sign an agreement and then not abide by it. They wanted to take full control of Afghanistan

under the pretext of peace. They would accept a political solution only if the mujahidin had enough power to resist on the battlefield. The swords of the mujahidin had to become stronger. The two sides talking at the table should be the Soviets and the resistance. If, on the other hand, the puppet regime were permitted to remain in power, it would only offer the Soviets future excuses for returning. (C)

The President stated emphatically that any agreement must provide not only for the withdrawal of Soviet forces but for the people of Afghanistan to determine the form of government they want. (C)

Ahmad Gailani spoke briefly. After expressing thanks for U.S. aid, he said he hoped that the United States would be behind the resistance until victory. (C)

The President broke in to say, yes. (U)

Gailani continued by expressing hope that America would also support Afghanistan in helping to rebuild after the war. (C)

The President repeated, yes. He recalled a remark by Stalin, that the death of three-quarters of mankind could be justified if the remainder were Communist. It was up to the rest of us to change the Soviets' minds. (C)

With this, the group rose and the meeting ended at 12:10.

84/64

12

DECLASSIFIED

BY NSL Weiver 8/6/10

BY db NARADATE 4/19/2017

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

June 17, 1986

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

SIGNED

FROM: STEVE SESTANOVICH *SRS*

SUBJECT: Memcon from President's Afghan Meeting

Attached is the memcon from the President's meeting yesterday with the Afghan delegation. I believe it would be a good idea to send a copy out to Embassy Islamabad so that they can de-brief the Pakistani foreign ministry. (Needless to say, the memcon would not be turned over to them.)

Briefing the Pakistanis would have the advantage of showing them that we're keeping them completely informed, and of conveying some of the firm positions that the President took in the meeting. For example, it would be good for them to hear that he mentioned 3-6 months for a Soviet withdrawal timetable; this would, I think, add some extra caution to their approach in the Geneva talks.

SRS for Peter Rodman and Shirin Tahir-Kheli concur. *SRS for*

RECOMMENDATIONS

That you approve the memcon as drafted.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

That you approve *letting* the State Department cable *it* out *a summary* to Embassy Islamabad for briefing use with the Foreign Ministry.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment

- Tab I Memo to State
- Tab A Presidential Memcon

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify: OADR

National Security Council
The White House

80

System # 5

Package # 4696

DOCLOG JE A/O _____

86 JUN 17 10 06:55

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	<u>1/3</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>A</u>
Rodney McDaniel	<u>B</u>		<u>F</u>
Don Fortier			
Paul Thompson	<u>2</u>	<u>6</u>	
Florence Gantt			
John Poindexter			
Rodney McDaniel			
NSC Secretariat	<u>4</u>	<u>BT</u>	<u>A</u>
Situation Room			

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Regan Buchanan Other RBM

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

NSC/S PROFILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ID 8604696

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 17 JUN 86 18

TO POINDEXTER

FROM SESTANOVICH

dh
2/6/10

DOCDATE 17 JUN 86

MCDANIEL

20 JUN 86

KEYWORDS: AFGHANISTAN

USSR

SUBJECT: MEMCON FM PRES AFGHAN MTG

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

POINDEXTER

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(TC PS)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

C 6/20 Pearson Log Memo

RBM, SRS

DISPATCH

✓ BTM 6/20

W/ATTCH

FILE

(C)

B/B

C. F.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

WS 400802
1220
C0002
C0119
C0165

June 16, 1986

Rudy

Dear ~~Senator~~ Boschwitz:


Your letter of May 8, which dealt with the Afghan proximity talks, identified what is probably the key issue to be resolved as part of a negotiated end to this war: how to assure that a Soviet withdrawal actually takes place and the rights of the Afghan people are protected. Neither we nor the peoples of Afghanistan and Pakistan would be well served by a phony peace.

Although the United States is not a party to these talks, we have a keen interest in them and keep closely informed as to their progress. Where we have doubts and questions, let me assure you that we do raise these with the Government of Pakistan.

As you know, the latest Geneva round concluded on Friday, May 23; the parties are to reconvene at the end of July. In light of your interest, I would be happy to have someone from my staff brief you on the state of the talks. Please let me know if this would be helpful to you.

With best wishes.

Sincerely,



John M. Poindexter

The Honorable Rudy Boschwitz
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

NSC #8603777

84167

13

3777

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC Waiver 8/6/10

BY elo NARA DATE 4/18/2019

28 May 1986

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

SIGNED

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: STEVE SESTANOVICH *SRS*

SUBJECT: Response to Boschwitz Letter -- Afghanistan

During the last round of Geneva talks on Afghanistan, Senator Boschwitz wrote you of his concern that a settlement might permit continued Soviet occupation while aid to the resistance fighters was cut off. Now that the round is over, we are in a position to be more reassuring, but he has put his finger on a real problem: as drafted, the UN agreement would cut off outside support before any Soviet troops started to move out.

The attached draft acknowledges that this issue will have to be adequately addressed in any peace agreement. Since we are likely to hear more on this point from concerned (but not always fully informed) senators and congressmen, the letter offers Boschwitz a briefing on the talks.

for R
Matlock, Sable and Tahir-Kheli concur. *SK.*

Recommendation

That you sign the attached letter

Approve *[Signature]*

Disapprove _____

Attachment

- Tab I Letter to Senator Boschwitz
- Tab II Incoming letter from Boschwitz

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify: OADR

3777

MAY 12 1986

RICHARD G. LUGAR, INDIANA, CHAIRMAN

JESSE HELMS, NORTH CAROLINA
CHARLES McC. MATHIAS, JR., MARYLAND
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CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONNECTICUT
THOMAS F. EAGLETON, MISSOURI
JOHN F. KERRY, MASSACHUSETTS

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

M. GRAEME BANNERMAN, STAFF DIRECTOR
GERYLD B. CHRISTIANSON, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR

May 8, 1986

Rear Admiral John M. Poindexter
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House

Dear Admiral Poindexter:


I write to express my concern over the direction of negotiations that may occur during the current round of proximity talks between Pakistan and Afghanistan. I am particularly worried over a policy shift that would cut aid immediately to the Afghan resistance forces in exchange for some Soviet promise for a phased withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan.

I must tell you that I would oppose such a policy and in my judgment so would substantial majorities in both houses of Congress. The Afghan freedom fighters deserve more from us than an immediate cessation of aid in exchange for Soviet promises. I am frankly appalled that such a notion would even be considered.

As you know, the Congress will be considering a new multi-year aid request for Pakistan in the relatively near future. That request will inevitably be viewed within the context of the conflict in Afghanistan.

I would appreciate being kept informed on a timely basis of developments in the proximity talks. I share the hope that progress will be made on securing a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, but progress must be rooted in concrete action, not Soviet promises.

Sincerely,



Rudy Boschwitz, Chairman
Subcommittee on Near Eastern
and South Asian Affairs

86 MAY 12 AIO: 25

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
ATTENTION: [illegible]

[Faint, illegible text block]

DEFENSE DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

[Faint, illegible text block]

**National Security Council
The White House**

R

86 JUN 2
All: 24

System # F
Package # 3777
DOCLOG *R* A/O

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	<u> 1 </u>	<u> P </u>	<u> <i>X</i> </u>
Rodney McDaniel	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
Don Fortier	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
Paul Thompson	<u> 2 </u>	<u> <i>✓</i> </u>	<u> </u>
Florence Gantt	<u> 3 </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
John Poindexter	<u> 4 </u>	<u> <i>✓</i> </u>	<u> A </u>
Rodney McDaniel	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
NSC Secretariat	<u> 5 </u>	<u> </u>	<u> D </u>
Situation Room	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Regan Buchanan Other *RBar*

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

STEVE ,

PLEASE SEE NOTE NEXT UNDER .

I TRIED TO CALL YOU, AT WORK &
HOME BUT DIDN'T SUCCEED. PRESUME
YOU CAN HAVE LTR RETURN, W/O
W/OUT CHANGE, & SEND IT BACK TO

BOB PEARSON

MARY KAY
31 MAY

NSC/S PROFILE

UNCLASSIFIED

ID 8603777

RECEIVED 13 MAY 86 10

TO POINDEXTER

FROM BOSCHWITZ, RUDY

DOCDATE 08 MAY 86

SH-506

KEYWORDS: AFGHANISTAN

USSR

PAKISTAN

PCO

SUBJECT: LTR TO POINDEXTER FM SEN BOSCHWITZ RE AFGHANISTAN & PAKISTAN

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR POINDEXTER DUE: 24 MAY 86 STATUS S FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

TEICHER

MATLOCK

SABLE

PEARSON

THOMPSON

GANTT

RODMAN

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (LB)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>Le</i>	<i>S 5/16</i>	<i>transfer to Legation</i>		
<i>Septanovich</i>	<i>S 5/16</i>	<i>Memo for Poindexter</i>	<i>5/26</i>	
<i>Poindexter</i>	<i>S 5/31</i>	<i>Redo</i>	<i>6/2</i>	
<i>Poindexter</i>	<i>X 6/2</i>	<i>for sig</i>		
<i>Le</i>	<i>C 6/15</i>	<i>Poindexter Sgd Str</i>		<i>SRS, RKS, SRT</i>

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE (C)

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C0054-02
F0006-12

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSE Waiver 8/6/10
BY dr NARA DATE 4/19/2015

June 20, 1986

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: STEVE SESTANOVICH *SRS*
WPAST

SUBJECT: Poindexter-Teltschik Message on Afghan Delegation

I mentioned to Paul Thompson that Rabbani and his delegation have yet to hear from Bonn about whether they can meet with the Chancellor in Bonn. (Thatcher and Mitterand are still possibilities.) He said you might be willing to use the channel to Teltschik to weigh in to support the idea.

I have drafted a short, low-key message to this effect.

RC for
Peter Sommer concurs.

Recommendation

That you send the attached message to Teltschik.

Approve *[Signature]*

Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab A Message to Teltschik

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify: OADR

NBC #8604758

84169

15

FROM THE WHITE HOUSE TO THE FEDERAL CHANCELLERY, BONN
VIA PRIVACY CHANNEL

To: HORST TELTSCHIK
From: ADMIRAL JOHN POINDEXTER
Subject: AFGHAN DELEGATION

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NSC Waver 8/6/10
BY dr NARA DATE 4/19/2019

- 1. Dear Horst: I understand the Chancellor is considering a meeting with the Afghan resistance alliance delegation that will be travelling in Western Europe next week.
- 2. If this is at all convenient, we'd urge it strongly. The formation of the Alliance is an important political event in the struggle to induce the Soviets to leave, and the visibility that high-level visits provide will help give the organization greater international legitimacy. As you know, the President saw them here in Washington on Monday.
- 3. Let me know if we can help on this, or answer any questions you may have. (At present the group's next stop is Paris -- I'm sure Bonn would quickly be added if they knew they'd be appropriately received.)
- 4. Many thanks. Regards, John

Released:
John

BT

National Security Council
The White House

System # _____

Package # 4758

86 JUN 20 P 2: 33 DOCLOG BT A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	<u>1</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>A</u>
Rodney McDaniel	_____	_____	_____
Don Fortier	_____	_____	_____
Paul Thompson	<u>2</u>	_____	_____
Florence Gantt	<u>3</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	_____
John Poindexter	<u>4</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>A</u>
Rodney McDaniel	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	<u>6</u>	_____	<u>N</u>
Situation Room	<u>5</u>	<u>MR</u>	<u>XMIT</u>

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Regan Buchanan Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

NSC/S PROFILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ID 8604758

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 20 JUN 86 15

dl
2/6/10

DOCDATE 20 JUN 86

TO POINDEXTER

FROM SESTANOVICH

KEYWORDS: AFGHANISTAN

GERMANY F R

SUBJECT: POINDEXTER / TELTSCHIK MSG RE AFGHAN DELEGATION

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

POINDEXTER

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(TC TC)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

C 6/20 Poindexter Approved Room

SRS

DISPATCH _____

W/ATTCH

FILE _____

(C)