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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF RECORDS MANAGEMENT
(WHORM): SUBJECT FILE

Withdrawer

DLB 2/5/2010

File Folder CO002 (475000-476999)

FOIA

S10-306

Box Number 37

SYSTEMATIC

170

ID Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
84196 MEMO	FRANK CARLUCCI TO THE PRESIDENT, RE: LETTER ON AFGHANISTAN FROM ZBIG BRZEZINSKI AND JUDGE CLARK	2	7/10/1987	B1
84197 MEMO	FRITZ ERMARTH TO FRANK CARLUCCI, RE: LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT ON AFGHANISTAN FROM BRZEZINSKI AND JUDGE CLARK	2	7/7/1987	B1
84198 MEMO	UNDATED, EARLIER VERSION OF #84196	2	ND	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

RFH

C.F. 4994. ①

475321

PY

1111

1121-4640

C0002

C0165

F0006-11

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 13, 1987

Dear Zbig:

I much appreciate the letter you and Judge Clark sent me on June 16. I fully share your view that Afghanistan remains a matter of first-rank importance in East-West relations. I said so in my address of April 10 in Los Angeles and challenged Gorbachev to set a date for withdrawal. Secretary Shultz and others in my Administration say so every time we speak or write to the Soviet leadership. Afghanistan is intrinsically important; it is strategically and regionally important; and it is perhaps most important as a test of Moscow's claims to seek a more stable and cooperative relationship with the outside world.

There is good news to report. The military effectiveness of the Resistance continues to improve; its morale is high; and its attention is increasingly focused on winning the political, as well as military, struggle with Moscow and Kabul. The Pakistanis continue to be firm and courageous, despite awful pressures on them. The Kabul regime remains a shaky and altogether unreliable base for lasting Soviet control of Afghanistan. Even Soviet political maneuverings bespeak a painful predicament for Moscow. Our policy on Afghanistan continues to have strong support in the Congress and U.S. public. We were able to get a good statement from our allies in Venice.

Yet, I agree with you that we need to put more political pressure on the Soviets. They are using the diplomacy that surrounds this war and loss of interest by much of the world to encourage a worldwide sense that somehow they


47532155

NSC #8704994

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Along with other forms of support to the Resistance and solidarity with Pakistan, our problem is how to increase the political pressure without transforming the war into a purely East-West issue or giving the Soviets additional scope for duplicitous maneuvers. The prospect of major achievements in arms reduction and the possibility of another summit makes the exertion of such pressure all the more urgent. I appreciate your advice and shall give it close consideration in the weeks ahead.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Ronald Reagan", written in a cursive style. The signature is positioned to the right of the word "Sincerely,".

The Honorable
Zbigniew Brzezinski
Center for Strategic and
International Studies
1800 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1987

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
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Zbigniew Brzezinski
Center for Strategic and
International Studies
1800 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

870714

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ID 8704994

REFERRAL

DATE: 13 JUL 87

MEMORANDUM FOR: WHITE HOUSE STRIPPING DESK

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

TO: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

SOURCE: THE PRESIDENT

DATE: 13 JUL 87

KEYWORDS: USSR

AFGHANISTAN

MP

HUMAN RIGHTS

SUBJ:

REQUIRED ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DUE DATE: 14 JUL 87

COMMENTS:

Zbigniew Brzezinski
FOR GRANT S. GREEN, JR.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

475321
1111
1121
C00021
C0165
HU
FG006-12

WVS

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 13, 1987

Dear Bill:

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AME 301 55

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Sincerely,



The Honorable
Judge William P. Clark
Rogers & Wells
1737 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

870714

REFERRAL

DATE: 13 JUL

MEMORANDUM FOR: WHITE HOUSE STRIPPING DESK

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

TO: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SOURCE: THE PRESIDENT

DATE: 13 JUL 87

WORDS: USSR

AFGHANISTAN


MP

HUMAN RIGHTS

REQUIRED ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DATE: 14 JUL 87

NOTES:



FOR

GRANT S. GREEN, JR.

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF RECORDS MANAGEMENT
(FORM): SUBJECT FILE

Withdrawer

DLB 2/5/2010

File Folder

1002 (475000-476999)

FOIA

S10-306

SYSTEMATIC

Page Number

170

<i>Document Type</i>	<i>No of</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restrictions</i>
<i>Document Description</i>	<i>pages</i>		<i>tions</i>
.96 MEMO	2	7/10/1987	B1
FRANK CARLUCCI TO THE PRESIDENT, RE: LETTER ON AFGHANISTAN FROM ZBIG BRZEZINSKI AND JUDGE CLARK			

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Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~SECRET~~
4954

June 16, 1987

The Honorable Ronald Reagan
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We are concerned that in the ongoing U.S.-Soviet negotiations, pointing perhaps even to a summit in the United States between yourself and the Soviet leader, the issue of Afghanistan is fading into the background. This poses the danger, we fear, that the Soviet leadership and the world will gain thereby the impression that the continuing Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is a matter of secondary importance to the United States.

We feel confident that you share the view that Afghanistan is not a far-away land in which Americans have little at stake. It is a key conflict in the American-Soviet geostrategic rivalry as well as a key challenge to the West's dedication to the cause of human rights.

On the geostrategic level, the war in Afghanistan involves the future of southwest Asia, including the Persian Gulf. Thus ultimately the conflict is not so much about Afghanistan itself but about the future of Pakistan and Iran. Soviet control over Afghanistan would place Moscow in a geostrategically favorable position from which to exercise decisive leverage on the adjacent countries of Pakistan and Iran. That in turn would make it possible for the Soviet Union to attain a preponderant position in the Persian Gulf region.

On the humanitarian level, the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan amounts to genocide. Over one million Afghans -- mostly civilians -- have apparently already been killed. Another five million have been driven as refugees from their homes. That means that over a third of the prewar population has died or has been displaced.

In the light of the foregoing, it follows that any genuine improvement in the American-Soviet relationship has to involve also a constructive resolution of the Afghan issue, as we know you also truly believe.

Presumably, that would require some arrangement which guarantees the genuine neutrality of Afghanistan after a Soviet withdrawal and the right of the Afghan people to determine the nature of their own internal government. In brief, the basis of a solution must be a formula which combines external neutralization with internal self-determination.

Sharing your desire to attain a genuine improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations, we urge you, Mr. President, to give the issue of Afghanistan higher visibility in your public and private diplomacy and to be particularly careful not to generate the impression, especially through a summit meeting in the United States, that the question of Afghanistan is only of peripheral significance to the United States. One concrete step to that end would be for you or the Secretary of State to outline publicly in more detail the specifics of an acceptable resolution of the Afghan problem. By laying a concrete and reasonable proposal on the table, so to speak, the Soviet side would be placed under greater international pressure to clarify its position. At the same time, this would also underline your own commitment.

Respectfully,



Zbigniew Brzezinski



William P. Clark


THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

9 Jul



GRANT, FRITZ,

REVISE TO DELETE
MTGS w/ FCC + "possib.
R.R." The reply show
"ANSWER THE MAIL," NO.
OVERKILL IT.



done
7/9 6

Frank
McDonald



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Ronald Reagan Library

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SYSTEMATIC

Page Number

170

Document Type

Document Description

*No of
pages*

Doc Date

Restrictions

.97 MEMO

2

7/7/1987

B1

FRITZ ERMARTH TO FRANK CARLUCCI, RE:
LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT ON AFGHANISTAN
FROM BRZEZINSKI AND JUDGE CLARK

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UNDATED, EARLIER VERSION OF #84196			

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I want more advice from both of you on this critical issue at this critical time, and suggest that you meet with Frank Carlucci and his key staff aides to discuss it further in greater detail. Schedule permitting, I might try to join you.

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Rogers & Wells
1737 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

**National Security Council
The White House**

17 JUL 13 4:48 PM

System # _____
 Package # 4994
 DOCLOG NO

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Courtney	<u>1</u>	<u>WTK</u>	<u>R</u>
Marybel Batjer	_____	_____	_____
Grant Green	_____	_____	_____
Colin Powell	_____	_____	_____
Paul Thompson	_____	_____	_____
Frank Carlucci	_____	_____	_____
Grant Green	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>	<u>SP 7/13</u>	<u>D</u>
West Wing Desk	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
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_____	_____	_____	_____

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Baker Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
 (Date/Time)
 date: today? Yes

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

9 Jul

GRANT, FRITZ,

REVISE TO DELETE

MTGS w/ FCC + "possibly
Pl." The reply should
"ANSWER THE MAIL," NOT
OVERKILL IT.

~~FRITZ~~
done
7/9 6

FRANK,
Redover

2

jm

National Security Council
The White House

97 JUN 7 10:59

System # _____
Package # 4994
DOCLOG jm A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Courtney	<u>1</u>	<u>WTC</u>	<u>X</u>
Marybel Batjer			
Grant Green	<u>2</u>	<u>G</u>	
Colin Powell	<u>3/5</u>		
Paul Thompson			
Frank Carlucci	<u>4</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Grant Green			
NSC Secretariat			
West Wing Desk	<u>5</u>		
Situation Room			

This is over full. I agree. Lets just answer the mail. reverse of [Signature]

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Baker Other _____

COMMENTS
FRANK, OFFENDING A meeting w/ you AND POSSIBLY THE PRESIDENTS SEEMS TO OVER-RESPOND TO THE MODEST PROPOSAL IN THE LETTER.
Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)
[Signature]

AC

National Security Council
The White House

07 JUL 10 08:09

System # _____
Package # 4994
DOCLOG AC NO

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Courtney	_____	_____	_____
Marybel Batjer	_____	_____	_____
Grant Green	_____	_____	_____
Colin Powell	_____	_____	_____
Paul Thompson	_____	_____	_____
Frank Carlucci	_____	_____	_____
Grant Green	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>5</u>	<u>7/10 AC</u>	<u>D</u>
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

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cc: VP Baker Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

RECEIVED 30 JUN 87 14

TO PRESIDENT FROM BRZEZINSKI, ZBIGNIEW DOCDATE 16 JUN 87
 CLARK, WILLIAM P 16 JUN 87
 ERMARTH 07 JUL 87

KEYWORDS: USSR AFGHANISTAN
 MP HUMAN RIGHTS

SUBJECT: LTR TO PRES RE U S SOVIET NEGOTIATION

ACTION: RECOMMENDATIONS TO RALPH DUE: STATUS C FILES WH

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
ERMARTH	TAHIR-KHELI ROSS	DANZANSKY
	RODMAN	KELLY, B
		STEINER
		COBB
		LEDISKY

COMMENTS

REF# LOG N5CIFID (RB IB)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>C</i>	<i>7/13</i>	<i>Per 190 ltr</i>		<i>FWB/CHROW</i>

DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C)