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Dept. of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
BY *dr*
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MEMORANDUM FOR COLIN L. POWELL
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Afghanistan: Our Public Affairs Handling of a Signature at Geneva

In anticipation of signature at Geneva next week, we have prepared a series of papers for public use. These include statements by Secretary Shultz at Geneva, themes for public use, and responses for answering public queries.

The following are attached:

1. Public Statement (Tab 1): This statement may be read by Secretary Shultz at Geneva immediately following signature. The key purpose is to put on record our position on symmetry, but the statement also repeats the themes in the draft Presidential statement.
2. Public Themes (Tab 2): These would be used in domestic and overseas public affairs efforts to explain the accords and our interpretation of them; symmetry is a central theme throughout.
3. Press Points (Tab 3): These were used by Secretary Shultz at his April 11 press conference.
4. Contingency Qs and As (Tab 4): These would be drawn upon as needed in responding to media and congressional queries.

We are prepared to move quickly to incorporate these papers in informational programming overseas and in our media and congressional public affairs efforts.

Melvyn Levitsky

Melvyn Levitsky
Executive Secretary

Attachments:
As Stated.

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DECL: OADR

STATEMENT TO THE PRESS AFTER SIGNATURE

History has been made today. For over eight years, the Afghan people have suffered a brutal war which has brought unmeasureable death, dislocation, and destruction. The world community has long sought to remove the cause of this agony, the Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan. This effort has succeeded, and the Soviet Union is committed to firm dates to commence and complete the withdrawal of its forces.

This achievement reflects the courage and determination of the Afghan people, who have paid a very high price to recover their national independence. In this cause nearly a million precious lives have been sacrificed, and many millions of Afghans have spent years in exile from their homeland. Their accomplishment enhances the security of all peoples, for their epic struggle is a timely reminder that a major power cannot impose its will on even a small country by force of arms when its citizens are united in their resistance.

The removal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan will set the stage for the Afghan people once again to determine their own future, and for the refugees to return to their homes. We urge

all concerned to support the efforts of the Afghans to rapidly achieve the creation of a government in Kabul that genuinely reflects the will of the Afghan people.

Pakistan has been constant in its support for the Afghan cause. It has generously hosted millions of Afghan refugees on its territory; it has looked after their needs and provided them essential support -- often in the face of coercive threats, military incursions, and terrorist acts. And Pakistan has vigorously and diligently pursued peace through the Geneva talks. We hope that the agreements concluded here today will rapidly lead to a reduction of tensions in the region and to the rapid resettlement of the Afghan refugees.

I offer my congratulations for their part in this great achievement to the Pakistani people, to President Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq, to Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo, and to Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Zain Noorani. These accords are a ringing endorsement of Pakistan's courage, dedication to principle, and resolve.

For the world community, the accords concluded today demonstrate that concerted action can achieve results. The consistent calls of the United Nations General Assembly for Soviet withdrawal, and the astute and persistent efforts of the Secretary General of the United Nations, and his personal representative Diego Cordovez, have borne fruit. These accords reaffirm the importance of the United Nations and the principles of the Charter in the settlement of international disputes. And I want particularly to commend Mr. Cordovez, whose patience and perservance have been essential to the success of this negotiating process.

We also welcome the decisions of the Soviet leadership which have contributed to this achievement. The presence of Soviet forces in Afghanistan has been an affront to the world and a major burden of Soviet-American relations. We look forward to the faithful implementation of these accords.

The United States is pleased to be associated with this settlement, which we believe offers hope and a process for restoring control of Afghanistan to the Afghan people. We have supported the Afghan cause with determination, and we will continue to do so. We will maintain our humanitarian aid to

the Afghans. And we will do what we can to contribute to reconciliation and reconstruction in Afghanistan. It is our hope that the Soviet Union will contribute to this process by ending the flow of arms to its client regime in Kabul. But we have made clear to Soviet leaders that, should they continue their military assistance, it is our right to provide military aid to the resistance, and that we will exercise that right consistent with our obligations under these accords. . . .

Much remains to be done if peace is to return to Afghanistan. Today, we have taken the first step toward a more secure future for the Afghan people. But we cannot rest until the promises of this day are fully realized, first of all by the withdrawal of Soviet forces, by the establishment in Afghanistan of a government that reflects the will of the Afghan people, and by a major effort by all concerned to seek resettlement and reconstruction. As conditions are created for the refugees to return, we will join in an international effort to meet their needs. For our part, we are ready to begin the process of healing the wounds of war.

AFGHANISTAN GENEVA SETTLEMENT

POST SETTLEMENT PUBLIC DIPLOMACY THEMES:

1. -- GENEVA SETTLEMENT A MAJOR ACHIEVEMENT/A FIRST STEP: EXPLAIN THAT A GENEVA SETTLEMENT BASED ON A FORMAL SOVIET COMMITMENT TO WITHDRAW THEIR TROOPS FROM AFGHANISTAN MEANS THAT AFTER NEARLY NINE YEARS OF HEROIC STRUGGLE THE AFGHAN PEOPLE, WITH THE STEADY SUPPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, ARE CLOSER TO ACHIEVING THEIR OBJECTIVE OF FREEDOM;

-- COMPLETE SOVIET WITHDRAWAL IS ONLY A FIRST STEP THAT WILL OPEN THE WAY FOR REALIZATION OF RETURN OF THE REFUGEES AND THE GOALS OF INDEPENDENCE AND SELF-DETERMINATION THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAS REPEATEDLY ENDORSED THROUGH SUCCESSIVE UN RESOLUTIONS.

-- PAKISTAN DESERVES GREAT CREDIT FOR ITS DETERMINED AND COURAGEOUS PURSUIT OF A NEGOTIATED POLITICAL SETTLEMENT; SO DO UN SECRETARY GENERAL PEREZ DE CUELLAR AND UNDER SECRETARY DIEGO CORDOVEZ FOR SUCCESSFULLY CONDUCTING THE GENEVA PROXIMITY TALKS;

2. -- SETTLEMENT/WITHDRAWAL AN AFGHAN SUCCESS: UNDERSCORE THAT IT IS THE AFGHAN PEOPLE AND MUJAHIDIN WHO HAVE BORNE THE HEAVY COSTS OF THIS LONG WAR AND THE CREDIT FOR THIS ACHIEVEMENT IS THEIRS; THEIR COURAGEOUS DEDICATION TO THEIR COUNTRY'S INDEPENDENCE AND TO THEIR ISLAMIC TRADITIONS AND THE JUSTNESS OF THEIR CAUSE HAVE EARNED THEM WELL DESERVED ADMIRATION AND SUPPORT FROM NEIGHBORING PAKISTAN AND FROM THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY;

3. -- SOVIET TROOP WITHDRAWAL: EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SOVIETS GETTING OUT OF AFGHANISTAN PROMPTLY [BY THE END OF 1988], COMPLETELY, AND IRREVERSIBLY; NO REASON FOR THE SOVIETS TO BE BOUND BY THE OUTER LIMITS OF THE TIMEFRAME; AN ACCELERATED WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE POSITIVE AND WELCOME; WITHDRAWAL IS ONLY A FIRST STEP;

4. -- PEACE NOT HERE YET: EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT THE SOVIETS WILL GIVE RESTORATION OF PEACE AND STABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN A GREATER CHANCE BY SUSPENDING MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THE KABUL REGIME; WHAT THE SOVIETS DO AS THEY WITHDRAW IS IMPORTANT;

-- THUS OUR PREFERENCE WOULD BE FOR A MORATORIUM ON FURTHER SUPPLIES TO ALL AFGHANS, FOR A SPECIFIED PERIOD OF TIME; BUT IF SOVIETS CONTINUE ASSISTANCE TO THE KABUL REGIME THEN THE US RETAINS THE RIGHT TO CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE RESISTANCE;

5. -- A NEUTRAL, NON-ALIGNED AFGHANISTAN: SOVIET WITHDRAWAL OPENS THE WAY FOR GENUINE AND CREDIBLE PROCESS OF AFGHAN SELF-DETERMINATION; WE HOPE FOR THE EMERGENCE OF AN INDEPENDENT, NEUTRAL, NON-ALIGNED AFGHANISTAN;

6. -- SELF-DETERMINATION/BROAD BASED INTERIM GOVERNMENT: EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF THE AFGHANS GETTING THE PROCESS OF SELF-DETERMINATION STARTED; OF AFGHANS GETTING THE BANKRUPT KABUL REGIME OUT AND AGREEING ON A BROAD BASED INTERIM REGIME; OF AFGHANS ESTABLISHING THE MEANS TO SELECT A BROADLY ACCEPTABLE SUCCESSOR GOVERNMENT; SOVIET WITHDRAWAL GIVES AFGHANS AN OPPORTUNITY TO BEGIN THE DIFFICULT TASK OF REBUILDING THEIR NATION;

-- NOTE THAT THE AFGHAN PEOPLE ARE ENTITLED TO BE REPRESENTED INTERNATIONALLY -- SUCH AS AT THE UNGA, OIC, NAM -- BY A GOVERNMENT THAT REPRESENTS THEM, THE SOONER THIS IS DONE THE BETTER.

7. -- REFUGEE REPATRIATION/RESETTLEMENT: PUTTING AFGHANISTAN BACK ON ITS FEET AFTER NEARLY A DECADE OF WAR WILL BE AN ENORMOUS CHALLENGE; THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WILL HAVE TO RALLY AROUND A MULTILATERAL, UN LED EFFORT TO EXTEND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO THE MILLIONS OF RETURNING REFUGEES, THUS RELIEVING PAKISTAN OF THE BURDEN IT HAS WILLINGLY ASSUMED DESPITE THE SACRIFICES ENTAILED; IN THIS WAY GIVE THE AFGHANS A CHANCE TO REBUILD THEIR COUNTRY AND ESTABLISH A PRODUCTIVE, STABLE SOCIETY; THE US IS READY TO DO ITS SHARE IN CONTRIBUTING TO RESETTLEMENT AND RECONSTRUCTION;

8. -- SETTLEMENT OF REGIONAL CONFLICTS: IF THE AFGHAN SETTLEMENT SUCCEEDS IT WILL BE AN IMPORTANT ACHIEVEMENT IN SETTLING REGIONAL CONFLICTS; NEED TO PRESS ON TO ADDRESS OTHER SUCH PROBLEM AREAS ON SIMILAR BASIS - WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES, SELF-DETERMINATION, GENUINE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION, ALLOWING PEOPLE OF COUNTRIES INVOLVED TO SETTLE THEIR OWN AFFAIRS WITHOUT OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE;

9. -- BENEFIT FOR US-SOVIET RELATIONS: SOVIET WITHDRAWAL WILL REMOVE A MAJOR IRRITANT IN US-SOVIET RELATIONS; WILL MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO ADDRESS OTHER ISSUES WITH GREATER CONFIDENCE THAT CONSTRUCTIVE SOLUTIONS CAN BE FOUND; THIS IS ESPECIALLY THE CASE IN APPROACHES TO REGIONAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION.

Drafted: SRJohnson

ext:76520

4/8/88

Clearances: NEA:EDjerejian/RFlaten/JMEalum)

EUR/SOV:SYoung

IO:HKirby

S/P:ZKhalilzad

L:PNorton

PA:POAKLEY/ADas

P:GBHelman/AEastham/SCoffey

USIA:JDixon

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GENEVA SETTLEMENT ON AFGHANISTAN: PRESS POINTS

-- The President has agreed the United States will guarantee the negotiated political settlement on Afghanistan. I expect to leave shortly for Geneva for the signing of the accords.

-- We now appear on the verge of an historic national success. The United States pays tribute to the valiant Afghans who have fought and the many who died to rid their country of its Soviet invaders. Pakistan also deserves our praise and admiration for the heroic support its people have given to the Afghans.

-- Our objectives throughout the eight year occupation have been: prompt and complete withdrawal of Soviet forces; restoration of Afghanistan to independent, non-aligned status; self-determination for Afghans; and return of the refugees in safety and honor. These are the same objectives adopted by overwhelming majorities in the UN General Assembly year after year.

-- The key point always has been the need to secure Moscow's agreement to withdraw all its troops. With the signing of a Geneva Agreement, Soviet withdrawals will begin on May 15.

Why sign as a Guarantor?

-- The Geneva instruments include a commitment by the Soviet Union to withdraw completely its forces from Afghanistan in nine months, with fifty percent of the troops out within the first ninety days. That means withdrawal must be completed by February 15, 1989.

-- Foreign Minister Shevardnadze has informed us that, if the accord enters into force by May 15, he expects Soviet withdrawal will be complete in 1988.

-- In addition, General Secretary Gorbachev assured the President that Soviet forces will not conduct offensive military operations once the accords come into effect.

-- This agreement satisfies a key U.S. and Pakistani objective -- rapid withdrawal on a fixed, irreversible timetable; it provides the preconditions for the prompt return home of the Afghan refugees in safety and honor and for Afghan self-determination.

-- Without a Geneva agreement, Soviet withdrawal could be protracted and incomplete. This would prolong the agony of the Afghan people, and probably expose Pakistan to continued cross-border reprisals. For all these reasons, it is in our interest to sign onto the Geneva agreements. The Paks have urged us to participate, and we have agreed to do so as a guarantor.

The Geneva Accords

- The Geneva Accords are composed of four documents.
- Instrument One is a bilateral agreement to be signed by the Government of Pakistan and the Republic of Afghanistan authorities, which affirms that they will manage their relationship on the basis of established principles of non-interference and non-aggression.
- Instrument Two, to be signed jointly by the United States and Soviet Union, calls on the signatories to likewise respect the sovereignty of Pakistan and Afghanistan and to respect the commitments the two nations make in the first accord.
- Instrument Three, to be signed by the GOP and Kabul, will facilitate the voluntary return of the refugees, and guarantees their right of full participation in the affairs of the country.
- Instrument Four, to be signed by Pakistan and the Kabul authorities, and witnessed by the Soviet Union and U.S., is an interrelationships document tying together the first three and providing for the Soviets to begin phased withdrawals May 15, to withdraw 50% of their troops within three months, and to complete the withdrawal of all troops by February 15, 1989.
- The Afghan position not long ago was that withdrawal would require up to four years.
- Now we have a withdrawal within a reasonable time; half the troops out early, making the withdrawal irreversible; and a written understanding that U.N. monitors will verify compliance with the accords.

U.S. Commitments

- The President made clear to General Secretary Gorbachev last winter in Washington, and I have repeatedly told Shevardnadze, that the obligations of guarantors must be symmetrical.
- The Soviets rejected our preferred means of establishing symmetry, a moratorium on arms supplies to parties in Afghanistan, which I proposed to Shevardnadze on March 23.

-- We have informed the Soviets and I will make a statement when the guarantees are signed that we retain the right to continue military support to the resistance, and will exercise it if the Soviets continue to arm Kabul.

-- Moscow understands that this is the only basis on which we are prepared to serve as guarantor, and they have indicated that on that basis they are prepared to proceed.

Pakistan's Position

-- From the beginning we have worked closely with Pakistan, one of the two negotiating parties. Pakistan's leaders are the architects of the Geneva accords. Pakistan bore the costs of providing refuge to over three million Afghans who were driven from their homes. The Kabul regime sought to break the moral support Pakistan offered the Afghan people. Pakistan was subjected to bombings, by aircraft violating its territory and by terrorists operating in its cities.

-- Pakistan's vital national interests were at stake. The GOP was resolute in its diplomacy at Geneva, and we took our lead from them. President Zia and Prime Minister Junejo deserve enormous credit for their statesmanship, and for their courage in resisting pressures to sign an agreement before the key elements of fairness and balance were assured.

-- These conditions are now met. Pakistan has asked us to participate as a guarantor of the Geneva accords. We supported their efforts to shore up the resistance; we should support this diplomatic move to assure an early Soviet withdrawal.

-- We have stood firmly with Pakistan throughout this war, and we will continue this support as we work toward the future.

What About the Future?

-- Soviet withdrawal is not the end of the Afghan saga. The departure of Soviet troops should enable the Afghan people to regain control over their own future through a process of genuine self-determination.

-- Diego Cordovez issued a statement on April 8 promoting an interim government. We fully support him.

-- We expect the Soviet withdrawal will trigger a massive movement by refugees outside and inside Afghanistan.

-- When they return, there will certainly be enormous social dislocation, and suffering.

-- We and the international community have a moral obligation to help ease this transition. We have urged the appointment of a UN coordinator to oversee this effort.

-- Above all, the Soviets, having inflicted so much suffering on the Afghan people, have a special obligation to finance refugee resettlement.

-- We have stood by the Afghan people during these past eight and a half years and we are prepared to be generous in the coming months to help Afghans return home and begin to rebuild.



1984

Press Points on Geneva Agreement
NEA/RA:JSWolf; MDScheland
doc 0757a 4/11/88 x74589
clear EUR/SOV:SYoung
P:SCoffey

NEA/PAB:RAFlaten
NEA:JMEalum



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AFGHANISTAN

HARD QUESTIONS: INDEX

I. Why Geneva?

1. Why do we need a Geneva Agreement? Wouldn't it be better not to have any Geneva agreement at all, but simply to make the Soviets leave Afghanistan on their own?
2. Have the Soviets been militarily defeated in Afghanistan?
3. What's in the Geneva Agreements for the Soviets?
4. Don't the Geneva Accords signal an American (and Pakistani) sellout of the mujahidin?
5. Won't the Soviets attempt to subjugate Afghanistan by other means, even after their troops have withdrawn?
6. Is the U.S. compelling Pakistan to sign at Geneva when Islamabad is not really satisfied with the Accords?
7. How can you argue that the Geneva Accords solve the Afghan problem when they leave a communist government in power in Kabul?
8. Doesn't a U.S. acceptance of the Geneva Agreement negate the UN General Assembly vote calling for the total withdrawal of the Soviets from Afghanistan?

II. Soviet Troop Withdrawal Timetable and Modalities

9. How can you say your objective of prompt withdrawal has been met when it is taking the Soviets nine months to get out? Is this withdrawal based on logistical considerations?
10. Do the Soviets still agree that their troops will not engage in military action after withdrawal begins? Will they stand down?

III. Guarantors' Obligations and Arms Supplies

11. What are the guarantor's obligations under the Geneva Accords?
12. What are the Pakistani undertakings? Don't they preclude military supplies to the resistance?
13. How can you exercise your right to supply military assistance to the resistance without compelling Pakistan to violate its obligations under the Geneva Accords?

14. How can the U.S. sign the Geneva Accords if it intends to violate them afterwards?

15. The legal adviser of the State Department is reported to be strongly opposed to an interpretation of non-intervention which allows the U.S. and Pakistan to continue sending arms across the border. Isn't this a violation of an international agreement.

16. Hasn't the U.S. changed its objective in Afghanistan from getting the Soviets out to overthrowing the regime in Kabul? Wouldn't we be prolonging the bloodshed by continuing to supply arms to the Resistance?

IV. Pakistani Obligations

17. If the U.S. decides to continue supplying arms to the mujahidin following signature of the Geneva Accords, will Pakistan go along?

18. Won't Pakistan be put in a box if the Soviets accuse it of violating the Geneva Agreement and indicate that, as a result, Moscow will not be bound either?

19. Couldn't Moscow mobilize world public opinion against Pakistan and bring pressure on it in the UN and other international bodies if Pakistan continues permitting arms supplies to reach the Resistance?

V. Soviet-PDPA Relations

20. Doesn't Moscow have a plan to annex the northern part of Afghanistan and turn it into a buffer zone?

21. What is the status of the many agreements recently signed between the Soviet Union and the Kabul regime?

22. What will become of the thousands of Afghan children that have been sent to the Soviet Union?

VI. Interim Government

23. Why have the U.S. and Pakistan abandoned their insistence on prior formation of an acceptable interim government?

24. What if no agreement can be reached on an interim government? What if a civil war breaks out in Afghanistan? Will this negate the Geneva Accords?

25. Do you foresee a place for the PDPA in such an interim government?

VII. Recognition of PDPA

26. Hasn't it always been the U.S. and Pakistani position that you wouldn't sign an agreement with the PDPA?

27. What about President Zia's February statement?

28. How can the U.S. and Pakistan sign agreements with the Kabul regime and not recognize that regime?

29. Why has the U.S. Government retained an embassy in Kabul? Doesn't this imply recognition of the PDPA regime?

30. Doesn't signing the Geneva Accords confer legitimacy on the PDPA?

VIII. Resistance and Geneva

31. Has the Afghan Resistance been consulted on this agreement?

32. Why does the resistance oppose this agreement?

33. Doesn't the resistance want the PDPA government replaced by an interim regime before any agreement can be accepted?

34. On what basis will the U.S. distribute arms after the mujahidin political parties leave Peshawar? In particular, how do you respond to the charge that from the very beginning, a disproportionately large share of U.S. military aid has gone to the most radical, fundamentalist, anti-American faction, Hesb-e-islami (H), which has no popular support among the Afghan population at large?

IX. U.S. Recognition of a Provisional Government

35. Why hasn't the U.S. government recognized the resistance as the legitimate representatives of the Afghan people?

36. If the Afghan Resistance Alliance establishes a provisional government inside Afghanistan, recognized by the U.S. or Pakistan, wouldn't this be a violation of the Geneva Accords?

X. Iran and Afghanistan

37. Won't U.S. and Pakistani signing of Geneva only drive the resistance into Iran's arms?

38. Won't a future Islamic government in Afghanistan be like Iran and therefore hostile to the U.S.?

39. What is Iran's attitude toward a Geneva agreement?

XI. Refugees

40. Isn't signing the Geneva Accords without settlement on an acceptable interim regime a betrayal of the more than five million Afghan refugees? Will they return home so long as the PDPA is in power?

41. If the refugees are forced to return home to Afghanistan against their will, won't they be drafted into the PDPA's military and be forced to fight against the mujahidin?

42. There are upwards of five million Afghan refugees to be repatriated and resettled and people are talking of a rough estimate of \$600 million dollars or more? What is the US planning to do about this problem?

43. Won't this be a very complicated job in light of both its magnitude and the unsettled conditions in Afghanistan?

44. Where is the US going to find the money in light of the tight budget situation?

45. How rapidly do you expect refugee return to get underway?

46. What will be the role of the RA in this process?

47. What about the role of the GOP?

XII. Afghan Terrorism against Pakistan

48. Will the PDPA regime stop its campaign of terrorist bombings in Pakistan?

XIII. Verification

49. How can we be sure the Soviet Union is living up to its side of the bargain under a Geneva settlement?

50. What is to prevent the Soviet Union from reinvading Afghanistan once the Geneva Agreement has succeeded in cutting off all military aid to the resistance?

XIV. U.S.-Pakistani Relations after Geneva

51. Will U.S. assistance to Pakistan be reduced now that an agreement on Afghanistan has been signed?

XV. Factual Questions about Agreement

52. What is in the Geneva Accords?

53. Will all military assistance to the Resistance be terminated once the Geneva Accords are signed? When?

54. What about humanitarian aid?

55. What about Soviet advisers? Are they covered by the Geneva Accords?

56. Won't the Congress have to ratify the Geneva Accords?

57. What is the role of the UN in all of this?

58. Why have the Geneva Agreements been negotiated without the participation of the resistance and has the political fate of the Afghans been determined over their heads?

59. How about Soviet prisoners? Are we going to allow them to be returned to the USSR against their will?

Q: 1. Why are we signing the Geneva Agreement? Wouldn't it be better not to have any Geneva agreement at all, but simply to make the Soviets leave Afghanistan on their own?

A: -- THE GENEVA ACCORDS CONTAIN A WRITTEN, SIGNED POLITICAL COMMITMENT BY THE SOVIET UNION TO COMPLETELY WITHDRAW THEIR FORCES FROM AFGHANISTAN IN A FIXED (9 MONTH) PERIOD WITH FIFTY PERCENT OF THEIR TROOPS OUT OF THE COUNTRY WITHIN THE FIRST NINETY DAYS. THIS SATISFIES A KEY U.S. AND PAKISTANI OBJECTIVE AND PROVIDES THE PRECONDITIONS FOR THE PROMPT RETURN HOME OF AFGHAN REFUGEES WITH SAFETY AND HONOR AND AFGHAN SELF-DETERMINATION FREE FROM OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE.

-- GORBACHEV HAS PUBLICLY STATED THE SOVIETS INTEND TO LEAVE AFGHANISTAN IN ANY EVENT, BUT, WITHOUT A GENEVA AGREEMENT, SOVIET WITHDRAWAL COULD BE PROTRACTED AND MIGHT NOT BE COMPLETED -- PROLONGING THE AGONY OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE, PARTICULARLY THE FIVE MILLION REFUGEES WAITING TO RETURN HOME -- AND COULD EXPOSE PAKISTAN TO ADDITIONAL CROSS BORDER REPRISALS.

-- THIS AGREEMENT, WHICH IS BEING SIGNED BY PAKISTAN AND GUARANTEED BY THE U.S. AND USSR, IS OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO PAKISTAN WHICH REQUESTED THAT THE U. S. GUARANTEE THE AGREEMENT AND HAS URGED THAT IT BE CONCLUDED IN ITS PRESENT FORM.

-- FOR THE PAST EIGHT YEARS, WE HAVE WORKED TOGETHER VERY CLOSELY WITH PAKISTAN TO OBTAIN OUR COMMON GOALS OF SOVIET TROOP WITHDRAWAL, RESTORATION OF AFGHAN INDEPENDENCE AND THE SAFE RETURN HOME OF AFGHAN REFUGEES. THE SOVIET WITHDRAWAL IS THE FIRST STEP IN -- AND CRITICAL TO -- THIS PROCESS.

Q: 2. Have the Soviets been militarily defeated in Afghanistan?

A: -- YOU WOULD GET ONE ANSWER FROM THE SOVIETS AND ANOTHER FROM THE RESISTANCE; THE SOVIETS PRESUMABLY WOULD HAVE THE RESOURCES TO CONTINUE A WAR OF ATTRITION WITH MOUNTING CASUALTIES ON BOTH SIDES.

-- NEVERTHELESS, THE SOVIETS SEEM TO RECOGNIZE THAT THEIR MILITARY PRESCRIPTION FOR A POLITICAL PROBLEM -- PROPPING UP AN ILLEGITIMATE AFGHAN REGIME WHICH LACKS FUNDAMENTAL SUPPORT OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE -- HAS FAILED IN THE FACE OF DETERMINED AFGHAN OPPOSITION. THEY PRESUMABLY HAVE DRAWN THE APPROPRIATE CONCLUSIONS.

Q: 3. What's in the Geneva Agreements for the Soviets?

A: -- YOU REALLY SHOULD ASK THE SOVIETS WHY THEY ARE SIGNING THIS AGREEMENT. AT A MINIMUM, HOWEVER, IT PROVIDES AN ORDERLY, PERHAPS SAFER PROCESS FOR THEIR TROOP WITHDRAWAL AND COULD PROVIDE A RATIONALE AT HOME AND ABROAD FOR A REVERSAL OF POLICY WHICH HAS PRESUMABLY BEEN VERY PAINFUL AND CONTROVERSIAL.

Q: 4. Don't the Geneva Accords signal an American (and Pakistani) sellout of the mujahidin?

A: -- TO THE CONTRARY, ACHIEVEMENT OF THE GENEVA ACCORDS SIGNIFIES THE SUCCESSFUL CULMINATION OF THE RESISTANCE'S VALIANT EFFORTS, WITH U.S., PAKISTANI AND VERY WIDE INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT, TO RID AFGHANISTAN OF ALL FOREIGN TROOPS, ENCOURAGE THE RETURN OF SOME FIVE MILLION REFUGEES AND ENABLE AFGHANS TO TURN THEIR ATTENTION TO THE PRESSING INTERNAL TASKS OF SELF-DETERMINATION AND ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION.

-- THE INTERESTS OF THE RESISTANCE HAVE BEEN FULLY PROTECTED IN THIS AGREEMENT. AS WE HAVE MADE CLEAR IN OUR UNILATERAL STATEMENT AT THE TIME OF SIGNING, THE UNITED STATES HAS ADVISED THE SOVIET UNION THAT, IF THE USSR UNDERTAKES, AS CONSISTENT WITH ITS OBLIGATIONS AS GUARANTOR, TO PROVIDE MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO PARTIES IN AFGHANISTAN, THE U.S. RETAINS THE RIGHT, AS CONSISTENT WITH ITS OWN OBLIGATIONS AS GUARANTOR, LIKEWISE TO PROVIDE SUCH ASSISTANCE.

-- WE FULLY INTEND TO EXERCISE THIS RIGHT IF MOSCOW CONTINUES TO SUPPLY ARMS TO THE KABUL REGIME.

--WE HOPE AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT CAN BE ESTABLISHED WHILE SOVIET TROOPS ARE LEAVING. IF NOT, THE MUJAHIDEEN WILL PRESUMABLY KEEP UP THE BATTLE AGAINST THE NAJIB REGIME. THE GENEVA ACCORDS DO NOT PROHIBIT THIS; THEY DEAL WITH THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS.

Q: 5. Won't the Soviets attempt to subjugate Afghanistan by other means, even after their troops have been withdrawn?

A: -- THE SOVIETS HAVE LONG SOUGHT TO RETAIN INFLUENCE IN A COUNTRY ON ITS BORDERS. THEY MAY WELL TRY TO DO SO THROUGH ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL TIES OF THE SORT THAT HAD EXISTED LONG BEFORE THE 1978 COUP. BUT HAVING FAILED TO SUBJUGATE AFGHANISTAN MILITARILY, THEY WILL HAVE ONLY LIMITED MEANS TO INFLUENCE AFGHANISTAN IN THE POST-GENEVA ENVIRONMENT.

-- THEIR KABUL ALLY, THE PDPA, IS WEAK AND INTERNALLY DIVIDED, HAVING FORFEITED THE NATIONALIST BANNER TO THE AFGHAN OPPOSITION. THAT IS WHY 120,000 TROOPS HAVE BEEN REQUIRED TO PROP UP THE KABUL REGIME. A HIGH RATE OF DESERTION AND MUTINIES CONTINUES WITHIN THE RA ARMY. IN THE PAST YEAR, THE MILITARY FORTUNES OF THE KABUL REGIME HAVE FURTHER DECLINED. MORE THAN 80 PERCENT OF AFGHANISTAN IS NOW CONTROLLED BY THE RESISTANCE.

-- AFGHAN MEMORIES OF SOVIET BRUTALITY DURING THE PAST EIGHT YEARS HAVE LEFT A LEGACY WHICH WILL NOT SOON BE FORGOTTEN. OVER A MILLION AFGHANS HAVE BEEN KILLED.

-- IN THE FACE OF SOVIET OCCUPATION, OVER HALF THE POPULATION OF AFGHANISTAN HAS FLED THEIR HOMES, MORE THAN FIVE MILLION OF THEM LEAVING THE COUNTRY ALTOGETHER. THESE PEOPLE WILL REMEMBER THIS PERIOD AND THE SOVIET CONTRIBUTION TO THEIR SUFFERING.

Q: 6. Is the U.S. compelling Pakistan to sign at Geneva when Islamabad is not really satisfied with the Accords?

A: ABSOLUTELY NOT. THE PAKISTANIS HAVE TAKEN THE LEAD IN THE NEGOTIATING THE GENEVA AGREEMENT, HAVE MADE CLEAR THEIR SUPPORT FOR IT AND HAVE URGED OUR PARTICIPATION AS A GUARANTOR.

Q: 7. How can you argue that the Geneva Accords solve the Afghan problem when they leave a communist government in power in Kabul?

A: -- THE GENEVA ACCORDS DO NOT "SOLVE" THE AFGHAN PROBLEM. THEY DO RETURN IT TO THE HANDS OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE, WHERE IT RIGHTFULLY BELONGS.

-- ONCE SOVIET FORCES ARE WITHDRAWN, A PRINCIPAL IMPEDIMENT TO AFGHAN SELF-DETERMINATION WILL HAVE BEEN REMOVED. THIS WITHDRAWAL WILL POSE A STERN TEST FOR THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT. UNABLE TO EXTEND ITS EFFECTIVE AUTHORITY MUCH BEYOND KABUL AND A FEW OTHER CITIES WITH THE HELP OF 120,000 SOVIET TROOPS, IT IS DIFFICULT TO IMAGINE HOW IT CAN RETAIN POWER AFTER THE SOVIET MILITARY POWER PROPPING IT UP HAS BEEN REMOVED.

Q: 8. Doesn't U.S. acceptance of the Geneva Agreement negate the UN General Assembly vote calling for the total withdrawal of the Soviets from Afghanistan?

A: -- THE GENEVA ACCORDS, WHICH HAVE BEEN REACHED THROUGH THE GOOD OFFICES OF UN MEDIATOR DIEGO CORDOVEZ, IMPLEMENT BOTH IN SPIRIT AND LETTER THE ANNUAL UNGA RESOLUTION CALLING FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL SOVIET TROOPS FROM AFGHANISTAN. THEY WILL ALSO FACILITATE THE RETURN OF THE REFUGEES AND SELF-DETERMINATION AS CALLED FOR IN THE RESOLUTION. SYG PEREZ DE CUELLAR, MR. CORDOVEZ AND ALL THE NATIONS OF THE UN WHO HAVE SUPPORTED THIS RESOLUTION, DESERVE CREDIT FOR THIS AGREEMENT.

Q: 9. How can you say your objective of prompt withdrawal has been met when it is taking the Soviets nine months to get out? Is this withdrawal based on logistical considerations?

A: -- WHILE THE SOVIET WITHDRAWAL TIMETABLE OF NINE MONTHS AGREED UPON IN THE GENEVA ACCORDS IS NOT STRICTLY BASED ON LOGISTICAL CONSIDERATIONS, SEVERAL THINGS MUST BE KEPT IN MIND:

- o ABSENT A GENEVA AGREEMENT, THE TIMETABLE COULD WELL BE PROLONGED, DRAGGING OUT THE AGONY OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE.
- o THERE IS SIGNIFICANT FRONTLOADING -- FIFTY PERCENT OF ALL SOVIET TROOPS WILL DEPART AFGHANISTAN DURING THE FIRST NINETY DAYS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION PERIOD.
- o THE SOVIETS HAVE ASSURED US THAT THEY EXPECT ALL THEIR TROOPS TO BE HOME BY THE END OF 1988 -- THIS WOULD MAKE IT A SEVEN AND A HALF MONTH TIMETABLE.
- o ONCE WITHDRAWAL BEGINS, THE TIMETABLE MAY WELL ACCELERATE.

Q: 10. Do the Soviets still agree that their troops will not engage in military action after withdrawal begins? Will they stand down?

A: WHILE THIS MATTER IS NOT DEALT WITH DIRECTLY IN THE GENEVA ACCORDS, THERE HAVE BEEN ASSURANCES THE SOVIETS WOULD REFRAIN FROM OFFENSIVE MILITARY ACTIVITY DURING THE WITHDRAWAL.

-- FROM OUR PERSPECTIVE, THIS WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO A SMOOTH AND ORDERLY WITHDRAWAL.

-- IT WOULD SEEM TO BE IN SOVIET INTERESTS TO OBSERVE A STAND-DOWN, AS THIS WOULD FACILITATE LOCAL CEASEFIRES AND MINIMIZE THE RISK TO SOVIET MILITARY UNITS AS THEY WITHDRAW.

-- THE SYG IN HIS APRIL 8 STATEMENT CALLED ON ALL PARTIES CONCERNED TO REFRAIN FROM ANY ACTIONS THAT MIGHT FUEL HOSTILITIES OR CONTRAVENE THE SPIRIT OF THE AGREEMENT.

Q: 11. What are the guarantors' obligations under the Geneva Accords?

A: -- BOTH GUARANTORS ARE CALLED UPON TO REFRAIN FROM ANY FORM OF INTERFERENCE OR INTERVENTION IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN AND THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN AND TO RESPECT THE SPECIFIC UNDERTAKINGS OF PAKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN.

-- AS WE HAVE MADE CLEAR IN OUR UNILATERAL STATEMENT, THE OBLIGATIONS UNDERTAKEN BY THE GUARANTORS ARE BALANCED AND SYMMETRICAL. IN THIS REGARD, THE UNITED STATES HAS ADVISED THE USSR THAT, IF THE USSR UNDERTAKES, AS CONSISTENT WITH ITS OBLIGATIONS AS GUARANTOR, TO PROVIDE MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO PARTIES IN AFGHANISTAN, THE U.S. RETAINS THE RIGHT, AS CONSISTENT WITH ITS OWN OBLIGATIONS AS GUARANTOR, LIKEWISE TO PROVIDE SUCH ASSISTANCE.

-- WE HAVE DISCUSSED THIS WITH THE SOVIETS, WHO UNDERSTAND OUR VIEW, AND WE DO NOT EXPECT THEM TO CHALLENGE THIS VIEW OF OUR RIGHTS.

Q: 12. What are the Pakistani undertakings? Don't they preclude military supplies to the resistance?

A. -- THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF PAKISTAN UNDER THE ACCORDS ARE ITS OWN TO INTERPRET. THE U. S. HAS NO RESPONSIBILITY IN THIS REGARD. THE U. S. POSITION THAT ASSISTANCE TO THE RESISTANCE SHOULD CONTINUE UNLESS THE SOVIETS AGREE TO STOP ASSISTANCE TO KABUL IS ENDORSED BY PAKISTAN.

Q: 13. How can you exercise your right to supply military assistance to the resistance without compelling Pakistan to violate its obligations under the Geneva Accords?

A: -- WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT WE HAVE THE PRACTICAL MEANS TO EXERCISE THIS RIGHT. I AM NOT GOING TO GO INTO DETAILS.

Q: 14. How can the U.S. sign the Geneva Accords if it intends to violate them afterwards?

A: -- THE UNITED STATES HAS NO INTENTION OF VIOLATING THE GENEVA ACCORDS.

-- AS WE HAVE MADE CLEAR IN OUR UNILATERAL STATEMENT, THE OBLIGATIONS UNDERTAKEN BY THE GUARANTORS ARE BALANCED AND SYMMETRICAL. IN THIS REGARD, THE UNITED STATES HAS ADVISED THE USSR THAT, IF THE USSR UNDERTAKES, AS CONSISTENT WITH ITS OBLIGATIONS AS GUARANTOR, TO PROVIDE MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO PARTIES IN AFGHANISTAN, THE U.S. RETAINS THE RIGHT, AS CONSISTENT WITH ITS OWN OBLIGATIONS AS GUARANTOR, LIKewise TO PROVIDE SUCH ASSISTANCE.

-- WE HAVE DISCUSSED THIS WITH THE SOVIETS, WHO UNDERSTAND OUR VIEW, AND WE DO NOT EXPECT THEM TO CHALLENGE THIS VIEW OF OUR RIGHTS.

Q: 15. The legal adviser of the State Department is reported to be strongly opposed to an interpretation of non-intervention which allows the U.S. and Pakistan to continue sending arms across the border. Isn't this a violation of an international agreement?

A: -- ALL U.S. POSITIONS HAVE BEEN APPROVED BY OUR LAWYERS.

Q: 16. Hasn't the U.S. changed its objective in Afghanistan from getting the Soviets out to overthrowing the regime in Kabul? Wouldn't we be prolonging the bloodshed by continuing to supply arms to the Resistance?

A: -- OUR LONGSTANDING OBJECTIVES IN AFGHANISTAN HAVE NOT CHANGED. WE SEEK RAPID AND COMPLETE SOVIET TROOP WITHDRAWAL, AFGHAN SELF-DETERMINATION AND RETURN OF THE AFGHAN REFUGEES.

-- AS BOTH WE AND THE SOVIETS HAVE STATED, IT IS UP TO THE AFGHAN PEOPLE NOW TO DETERMINE THEIR OWN POLITICAL FUTURE, FREE FROM OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE. THIS IS WHAT GENEVA IS ALL ABOUT.

-- AS TO THE QUESTION OF CONTINUING ARMS SUPPLIES, WE HAVE MADE CLEAR IN OUR UNILATERAL STATEMENT THAT WE WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPLY THE RESISTANCE SHOULD THE SOVIET UNION CONTINUE SUPPLYING ARMS TO THE PDPA REGIME.

-- WE HAVE ALSO MADE CLEAR, HOWEVER, OUR PREFERENCE FOR A COMPLETE CESSATION OF MILITARY AID BY BOTH GUARANTORS. WE SUPPORT THE SYG'S APRIL 8 CALL ON ALL THE PARTIES TO TAKE NO ACTION WHICH WOULD TEND TO FUEL HOSTILITIES.

Q: 17. If the U.S. decides to continue supplying arms to the mujahidin following signature of the Geneva Accords, will Pakistan go along?

A: -- WE MADE OUR POSITION CLEAR WHEN WE SIGNED THE GENEVA ACCORDS. TO REPEAT, THE UNITED STATES RETAINS THE RIGHT TO PROVIDE MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE AND, SHOULD THE SOVIET UNION CONTINUE ITS MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO FACTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN AFTER ENTRY INTO FORCE, WE WILL EXERCISE THAT RIGHT.

-- I AM NOT GOING TO GET INTO ANY FURTHER DETAIL.

Q: 18. Won't Pakistan be put in a box if the Soviets accuse it of violating the Geneva Agreement and indicate that, as a result, Moscow will not be bound either?

A: -- THIS IS A HYPOTHETICAL SITUATION AND WE ARE NOT GOING TO SPECULATE ON IT.

-- IT IS OUR ASSESSMENT THAT THE SOVIETS SIGNED AT GENEVA IN ORDER TO FIND A POLITICAL COVER FOR WITHDRAWAL RATHER THAN TO FIND A PRETEXT TO REMAIN IN AFGHANISTAN.

-- IN ANY EVENT, THERE ARE MECHANISMS WITHIN THE UN MONITORING STRUCTURE FOR DEALING WITH ALLEGED VIOLATIONS.

Q: 19. Couldn't Moscow mobilize world public opinion against Pakistan and bring pressure on it in the UN and other international bodies if Pakistan continues permitting arms supplies to reach the Resistance?

A: -- I WON'T DEAL WITH HYPOTHETICAL QUESTIONS.

-- BUT WE NOTE THAT THE SOVIETS UNDERSTAND OUR POSITION AND RECOGNIZE THAT WE ARE NOT BARRED FROM CONTINUING TO SUPPLY IF WE WANT TO. HOW WE DO THAT IS OUR BUSINESS. WHETHER OR NOT WE EXERCISE OUR RIGHT DEPENDS ENTIRELY ON THE SOVIETS.

-- WORLD OPINION HAS CONSISTENTLY CONDEMNED THE SOVIET OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN SINCE 1979 AND WILL HOLD MOSCOW ACCOUNTABLE FOR ANY FAILURE TO WITHDRAW ITS TROOPS.

Q: 20. Doesn't Moscow have a plan to "Lebanonize" Afghanistan and to annex the northern part of Afghanistan and turn it into a buffer zone?

A: -- THE GENEVA ACCORDS ENVISION PRESERVATION OF AFGHAN TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS FROM AFGHANISTAN. ANYTHING SHORT OF THIS WOULD VIOLATE THE GENEVA ACCORDS, RESULT IN CONTINUATION OF THE WAR, AND ELIMINATE WHATEVER PUBLIC RELATIONS AND DIPLOMATIC BENEFITS THE SOVIETS HOPE TO GAIN FROM WITHDRAWAL.

-- KABUL AND MOSCOW MAY HAVE A STRATEGY AIMED AT PRESERVING PDPA CONTROL IN KABUL BY STRENGTHENING PROVINCIAL AUTONOMY AND APPEALING TO AFGHANISTAN'S VARIOUS ETHNIC GROUPS. KABUL MAY HAVE RECENTLY TAKEN A FIRST STEP IN THIS PROCESS BY CREATING A NORTHERN ADMINISTRATIVE ZONE, CONTAINING THE TEN PROVINCES NEAREST THE SOVIET BORDER.

-- BUT WE DOUBT THE EFFICACY OF THIS STRATEGY BECAUSE IT IGNORES THE FACT THAT THE PDPA'S ASSOCIATION WITH A FOREIGN INVADER HAS DISCREDITED IT AMONG ALL AFGHAN GROUPS. THE RESISTANCE IS STRONG IN ALL THE REGIONS OF AFGHANISTAN. IN PARTICULAR, THE NORTHERN REGION OF THE COUNTRY HAS BEEN A CENTER FOR SOME OF THE FIERCEST OPPOSITION TO SOVIET INTERVENTION.

Q: 21. What is the status of the many agreements recently signed between the Soviet Union and the Kabul regime?

A: -- THIS ISSUE IS NOT ADDRESSED IN THE GENEVA ACCORDS.

-- MANY OF THESE AGREEMENTS SEEK TO INSTITUTIONALIZE CLOSE ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN AND THE SOVIET UNION. WHILE THE U.S. HAS NO OBJECTION IN PRINCIPLE TO SUCH RELATIONS, THE NATURE OF FUTURE AFGHAN RELATIONS WITH THEIR NORTHERN NEIGHBOR WILL BE UP TO THE AFGHAN PEOPLE TO DECIDE.

Q: 22. What will become of the thousands of Afghan children that have been sent to the Soviet Union?

A: -- WHY DON'T YOU PUT THAT QUESTION TO THE SOVIETS?

-- WE OBVIOUSLY BELIEVE STRONGLY THAT THEY SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO RETURN HOME AT ONCE.

Q: 23. Why have the U.S. and Pakistan abandoned their insistence on prior formation of an acceptable interim government?

Q: -- WE HAVE NOT CHANGED OUR VIEW THAT FORMATION OF AN ACCEPTABLE INTERIM GOVERNMENT IS CENTRAL TO THE PROCESS OF GENUINE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION IN AFGHANISTAN.

-- WE HAVE LONG BELIEVED THAT A KEY TO SERIOUS EFFORTS AT NATIONAL RECONCILIATION WAS ESTABLISHMENT OF A FIRM TIMETABLE FOR COMPLETE, EARLY WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET FORCES. NOW WE HAVE THAT.

-- ALL PARTIES TO THE GENEVA ACCORDS HAVE AGREED ON THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTINUING WORK ON INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS FOLLOWING SIGNING OF THE ACCORDS. CORDOVEZ HAS AGREED WITH THE PARTIES TO WORK ON THIS IN HIS PRIVATE CAPACITY, NOT AS A UN REPRESENTATIVE. WE HOPE THIS CAN BE ACHIEVED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

Q: 24. What if no agreement can be reached on an interim government? What if a civil war breaks out in Afghanistan? Will this negate the Geneva Accords?

A: -- THE GENEVA ACCORDS DO NOT GUARANTEE THAT ALL VIOLENCE WILL END. WE MUST RELY ON THE AFGHANS TO DETERMINE THEIR OWN POLITICAL FUTURE, BUT THERE WILL BE NO END TO THE BLOODSHED IN AFGHANISTAN UNLESS ALL FOREIGN TROOPS ARE WITHDRAWN AND THERE IS SOME FORM OF SELF-DETERMINATION. THE GENEVA ACCORDS PROVIDE FOR THIS.

Q: 25. Do you foresee a place for the PDPA in such an interim government?

A: -- THIS IS UP TO THE AFGHAN PEOPLE TO DECIDE. HOWEVER, IT IS OUR IMPRESSION THAT THE PDPA LACKS POPULAR SUPPORT AMONG THE AFGHAN PEOPLE.

Q: 26. Hasn't it always been the U.S. and Pakistani position that you wouldn't sign an agreement with the PDPA?

A: -- NO. OUR LONGSTANDING POSITION HAS BEEN THAT WE WOULD SUPPORT AN AGREEMENT WHICH GETS SOVIET TROOPS OUT OF AFGHANISTAN AND WILL FACILITATE RETURN OF THE REFUGEES AND THE EXERCISE OF AFGHAN SELF-DETERMINATION.

-- AS WE MADE CLEAR IN OUR UNILATERAL STATEMENT, BY ACTING AS A GUARANTOR OF THE SETTLEMENT, THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT INTEND TO IMPLY IN ANY RESPECT RECOGNITION OF THE PRESENT REGIME IN KABUL AS THE LAWFUL GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN.

(FYI: The United States does not recognize the legitimacy of the Kabul regime. We have said repeatedly that it is an illegitimate puppet government imposed on the Afghan people by the Soviet Army. We have not broken off all diplomatic relations with the Kabul regime, however, because we find it in our own national interests to maintain a small embassy presence there. We do not maintain normal diplomatic relations with the Kabul regime and deal with it through our embassy in Kabul only at a low level in the foreign ministry protocol department on essential administrative and consular matters.

The Kabul regime has imposed a limit of 20 U.S. personnel at our embassy. Our embassy provides some visa and other consular services to Afghans wishing to travel to the United States and looks after our chancery and other buildings owned by the United States in Kabul. The Afghan regime maintains a small embassy in Washington.)

Q: 27. What about President Zia's statement, reported in the January 24 issue of the Washington Post, that Pakistan would not sign a Geneva Agreement with either Najibullah or a PDPA-dominated government?

A: -- YOU HAD BETTER ASK PRESIDENT ZIA ABOUT THAT. I WOULD
NOTE THAT THE PAKISTANIS HAVE SIGNED THE GENEVA ACCORDS.

Q: 28. How can the U.S. and Pakistan sign agreements with the Kabul regime and not recognize that regime?

A: -- RECOGNITION IS ALWAYS A MATTER OF INTENTION. WE ACKNOWLEDGE THERE IS A KABUL REGIME AND ARE GUARANTEEING ACCORDS TO WHICH IT IS A PARTY. BUT WE CLEARLY DO NOT INTEND TO RECOGNIZE THAT REGIME AS A LAWFUL GOVERNMENT. OUR INTENTIONS IN THIS REGARD ARE SET OUT CLEARLY IN THE U.S. STATEMENT AND ARE REFLECTED IN OUR REFUSAL TO SIGN THE SAME DOCUMENTS.

Q: 29. Why has the U.S. Government retained an embassy in Kabul? Doesn't this imply recognition of the PDPA regime?

A: -- THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT RECOGNIZE THE LEGITIMACY OF THE KABUL REGIME. WE HAVE SAID REPEATEDLY THAT IT IS AN ILLEGITIMATE PUPPET GOVERNMENT IMPOSED ON THE AFGHAN PEOPLE BY THE SOVIET ARMY. WE MADE OUR POSITION CLEAR MOST RECENTLY AT THE TIME OF SIGNATURE.

-- WE DO NOT MAINTAIN NORMAL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE KABUL REGIME, AND DEAL WITH THEM THROUGH OUR EMBASSY IN KABUL ONLY AT A LOW LEVEL IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY PROTOCOL DEPARTMENT ON ESSENTIAL ADMINISTRATIVE AND CONSULAR MATTERS. OUR MISSION IS HEADED NOT BY AN AMBASSADOR, BUT BY A CHARGE D'AFFAIRES.

-- WE HAVE NOT BROKEN OFF ALL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN BECAUSE WE FIND IT USEFUL TO OUR OWN NATIONAL INTERESTS TO MAINTAIN A SMALL EMBASSY PRESENCE THERE. NO POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE SHOULD BE ATTACHED TO THIS FACT.

Q: 30. Doesn't signing the Geneva Accords confer legitimacy on the PDPA?

A: -- NO. IT DOES NOT DO THAT, AS OUR UNILATERAL STATEMENT MAKES CLEAR. THERE IS AMPLE INTERNATIONAL PRECEDENT FOR THIS.

Q: 31. Has the Afghan Resistance been consulted on this agreement?

A: -- PAKISTAN HAS KEPT IN REGULAR CONTACT WITH THE RESISTANCE AT EVERY STAGE IN THE GENEVA PROCESS. WE HAVE ALSO BEEN IN REGULAR CONTACT WITH THE RESISTANCE.

Q: 32. Why does the resistance oppose this agreement?

A: -- THE RESISTANCE BELIEVE THE GENEVA ACCORDS WOULD CONFER LEGITIMACY ON THE PDPA REGIME IN KABUL.

-- THE RESISTANCE HAS NEVER LIKED THE GENEVA PROCESS BECAUSE IT DIDN'T WANT TO DEAL WITH THE PDPA, EVEN INDIRECTLY. THE U.S. AND PAKISTAN HAVE SUPPORTED THE GENEVA PROCESS BECAUSE THIS WAS THE ONLY REALISTIC WAY OF ADDRESSING THE CRUCIAL QUESTION OF SOVIET TROOP WITHDRAWAL.

-- ALTHOUGH WE SHARE THE RESISTANCE'S AVERSION FOR THE PDPA, WE BELIEVE THAT SOVIET TROOP WITHDRAWAL IS AN ESSENTIAL PRECONDITION FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF A LEGITIMATE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT. THE GENEVA AGREEMENTS PROVIDE FOR THAT TROOP WITHDRAWAL.

-- WE HAVE PRESERVED THEIR RIGHT TO CONTINUE TO SUPPLY THE RESISTANCE IF THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO SUPPLY KABUL.

Q: 33. Doesn't the resistance want the PDPA government replaced by an interim regime before any agreement can be accepted?

A: -- THE RESISTANCE WOULD HAVE PREFERED TO HAVE AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT IN PLACE BEFORE THE GENEVA PROCESS WAS CONCLUDED. THAT OBJECTIVE WAS NOT ACHIEVED. NEITHER THE PAKISTANIS NOR WE WISHED TO DELAY THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET FORCES LONGER BY MAKING SIGNATURE CONDITIONAL UPON PRIOR AGREEMENT ON SUCH AN INTERIM REGIME.

-- WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT FORMATION OF AN ACCEPTABLE INTERIM GOVERNMENT IS CENTRAL TO THE PROCESS OF GENUINE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION IN AFGHANISTAN. SOVIET WITHDRAWAL WILL CREATE AN ENVIRONMENT MORE CONDUCIVE TO A GENUINE PROCESS OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND ESTABLISHMENT OF A MORE BROADLY BASED GOVERNMENT.

-- ALL PARTIES TO THE GENEVA ACCORDS HAVE AGREED ON THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTINUING WORK ON INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS FOLLOWING SIGNING OF THE ACCORDS. CORDOVEZ HAS AGREED WITH THE PARTIES TO WORK ON THIS IN HIS PRIVATE CAPACITY, NOT AS A UN REPRESENTATIVE.

Q: 34. On what basis will the U.S. distribute arms after the mujahidin political parties leave Peshawar? In particular, how do you respond to the charge that from the very beginning, a disproportionately large share of U.S. military aid has gone to the most radical, fundamentalist, anti-American faction, Hezb-e-Islami (H), which has no popular support among the Afghan population at large?

A: -- THIS QUESTION GETS INTO INTELLIGENCE MATTERS. WE DO NOT DISCUSS SUCH SUBJECTS.

(ON BACKGROUND ONLY)

-- IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT ARMS DISTRIBUTION HAS BEEN NOT ON THE BASIS OF POPULARITY, WHICH WOULD BE HARD TO DETERMINE IN ANY CASE, BUT ON THE BASIS OF WHICH GROUPS ARE THE MOST EFFECTIVE IN THE FIELD. THE RECORD CERTAINLY SUPPORTS OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT THE FUNDAMENTALIST PARTIES HAVE FIT IN THAT CATEGORY.

Q: 35. Why hasn't the U.S. government recognized the resistance as the legitimate representatives of the Afghan people?

A: -- CLEARLY, WE VIEW THE RESISTANCE AS POPULARLY BASED AND HENCE ENTITLED TO PLAY A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE POLITICAL FUTURE OF AFGHANISTAN. HOWEVER, IT IS UP TO THE AFGHAN PEOPLE, NOT THE U.S., TO DECIDE UPON THEIR POLITICAL SYSTEM AND THEIRS POLITICAL LEADERS.

Q: 36. If the Afghan Resistance Alliance establishes a provisional government inside Afghanistan, recognized by the U.S. or Pakistan, wouldn't this be a violation of the Geneva Accords?

A: -- NO. THIS QUESTION IS NOT DEALT WITH IN THE GENEVA ACCORDS.

Q: 37. Won't U.S. and Pakistani signing of Geneva only drive the resistance into Iran's arms?

A: -- WE SEE NO REASON WHY IT SHOULD. THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE LEADERS ARE VERY DEVOUT MUSLIMS, BUT THERE IS ONLY A SMALL SHIITE MINORITY AND RELATIONS BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAN HAVE NOT USUALLY BEEN CLOSE.

Q: 38. Won't a future Islamic government in Afghanistan be like Iran and therefore hostile to the U.S.?

A: -- THE FUTURE GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN WILL CERTAINLY BE ISLAMIC, BUT WILL NOT RESEMBLE IRAN.

-- UNLIKE IRAN, THERE IS NO UNIFIED CONCEPT OF ISLAM OR AN ISLAMIC GOVERNMENT IN AFGHANISTAN. ONLY 15-20 PERCENT OF AFGHANS ARE SHIAS. AFGHANS THEREFORE DO NOT ACCEPT, AS IN IRAN, A CENTRALIZED HIERARCHICAL CLERGY WITH THE RIGHT TO PRONOUNCE DEFINITELY ON ISLAM.

-- A FUTURE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT WILL HAVE TO REFLECT THE DIVERSITY OF AFGHAN SOCIETY. THIS INCLUDES DIFFERENCES BETWEEN VARIOUS FUNDAMENTALIST GROUPS, AS WELL AS DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THOSE GROUPS AND MORE TRADITIONALIST MUSLIMS.

-- WE EXPECT A FUTURE ISLAMIC GOVERNMENT IN KABUL TO HAVE NORMAL, FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH THE US.

Q: 39. What is Iran's attitude toward a Geneva agreement?

A: -- IRAN HAS REFUSED FROM THE START TO PARTICIPATE IN THE GENEVA PROCESS, BUT DID AGREE TO BE KEPT INFORMED BY THE UN AND PAKISTAN OF EVENTS IN THE TALKS. IRAN BASES ITS REFUSAL TO PARTICIPATE ON THE LACK OF MUJAHIDIN REPRESENTATION.

-- IRAN HAS STATED THAT IT CONSIDERS THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS FROM AFGHANISTAN TO BE THE SOLE ISSUE.

-- IRAN PROBABLY WILL NOT FORMALLY ASSOCIATE ITSELF WITH THIS AGREEMENT AND WILL LIKELY CRITICIZE IT. BUT WE DO NOT BELIEVE IT HAS THE ABILITY TO DISRUPT SIGNIFICANTLY A SOVIET WITHDRAWAL.

-- IRAN WILL NO DOUBT WISH TO MAXIMIZE ITS INFLUENCE IN POST-WITHDRAWAL AFGHANISTAN, AND WILL TRY TO CULTIVATE THE RESISTANCE TO THAT END. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE MAIN RESISTANCE GROUPS AND IRAN HAVE NEVER BEEN WARM, HOWEVER.

Q: 40. Isn't signing the Geneva Accords without settlement on an acceptable interim regime a betrayal of the more than five million Afghan refugees? Will they return home so long as the PDPA is in power?

A: -- BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND PAKISTAN ARE FIRMLY COMMITTED TO ENSURING THE RETURN WITH DIGNITY AND HONOR OF THE MILLIONS OF AFGHAN REFUGEES FORCED TO FLEE THEIR COUNTRY DUE TO THE SOVIET INVASION. THE COUNTRIES OF THE UN HAVE OVERWHELMINGLY SUPPORTED THIS OBJECTIVE AS AN ELEMENT OF A SETTLEMENT.

-- WE CAN ONLY SPECULATE ON THE REQUIREMENTS FOR RETURN OF THE REFUGEES, BUT WE BELIEVE CHIEF AMONG THEM ARE SOVIET TROOP WITHDRAWAL, AN END TO THE FIGHTING AND CREATION OF STABLE CONDITIONS IN THE AREAS FROM WHICH THE REFUGEES FLED.

-- THE GENEVA AGREEMENT HELPS MEET THESE CONDITIONS FOR RETURN OF THE REFUGEES BY SETTING A TIMETABLE FOR SOVIET TROOP WITHDRAWAL AND ACKNOWLEDGING THE NEED FOR AN ORDERLY RETURN.

-- THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WILL PLAY A KEY ROLE BOTH FINANCIALLY AND ADMINISTRATIVELY IN FACILITATING THIS PROCESS.

-- WE WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPORT GENUINE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION IN AFGHANISTAN AS A MEANS OF SPEEDING UP THIS PROCESS OF REFUGEE REPATRIATION. IN THIS RESPECT, WE ENDORSE DIEGO CORDOVEZ' ONGOING PRIVATE EFFORTS TO REACH AN ACCEPTABLE INTERIM GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ALL THE AFGHAN PEOPLE.

Q: 41. If the refugees are forced to return home to Afghanistan against their will, won't they be drafted into the PDPA's military and be forced to fight against the mujahidin?

A: -- NO ONE IS TALKING ABOUT FORCIBLE REPATRIATION OF REFUGEES.

-- FURTHERMORE, THE PREMISE OF THE QUESTION IS FALSE. IT WOULD NOT ARISE SINCE MOST AFGHAN TERRITORY -- UPWARDS OF EIGHTY PERCENT -- IS ALREADY UNDER RESISTANCE CONTROL. PDPA POWER WILL BE FURTHER ERODED AS SOVIET TROOPS WITHDRAW.

Q: 42. There are upwards of five million Afghan refugees to be repatriated and resettled and people are talking of a rough estimate of \$600 million dollars or more. What is the U. S. planning to do about this problem?

A: -- WE HAVE BEEN VERY MUCH AWARE THAT THE MASSIVE CHALLENGE OF REFUGEE REPATRIATION COULD BE UPON US ALL VERY SUDDENLY IN THE EVENT OF A SETTLEMENT AND SOVIET TROOP WITHDRAWAL.

-- THE UN AND ITS SPECIALIZED AGENCIES ARE THE LOGICAL ORGANIZATIONS TO COORDINATE THIS JOB. WE HAVE BEEN URGING THESE AGENCIES AND OTHER GOVERNMENTS TO ENGAGE IN SERIOUS CONTINGENCY PLANNING.

-- IN SO DOING, WE ARE SEEKING TO ENCOURAGE A MULTILATERAL, UN-LED RELIEF EFFORT TO ASSIST IN REPATRIATION, RESETTLEMENT AND RECONSTRUCTION; VERY REAL HUMANITARIAN ISSUES ARE INVOLVED.

-- WE KNOW THAT UN SECRETARY GENERAL PEREZ DE CUELLAR IS CONSIDERING THE APPOINTMENT OF A SPECIAL COORDINATOR TO PROVIDE LEADERSHIP AND FOCUS AND WE HAVE ENCOURAGED HIM TO ACT QUICKLY.

Q: 43. Won't this be a very complicated job in light of both its magnitude and the unsettled conditions in Afghanistan?

A: -- WE FULLY APPRECIATE THE COMPLEXITY OF THE EFFORT AND HAVE BEEN GIVING THOUGHT TO HOW BEST TO UNDERTAKE IT; THE JOB CAN ONLY BE DONE BY MAINTAINING GREAT OPERATIONAL FLEXIBILITY AND ACKNOWLEDGING THAT THE AFGHAN REFUGEES WILL MAKE THEIR OWN DETERMINATION ON HOW AND WHEN TO RETURN.

-- WE ARE PREPARED TO ADAPT AND EXPAND OUR EXISTING HUMANITARIAN AID AND REFUGEE BUREAU PROGRAMS AND WILL ALSO CONTRIBUTE TO ANY BROAD MULTILATERAL UNDERTAKING.

Q: 44. Where is the U. S. going to find the money in light of the tight budget situation?

A: -- WE HAVE BEEN HELPING THE REFUGEES ALL ALONG AND, AS I MENTIONED, HAVE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS ALREADY UNDERWAY. THESE CAN BE ADAPTED TO THE EVOLVING CIRCUMSTANCES.

-- CONGRESS AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE HAVE ALWAYS BEEN GENEROUS; PRESIDENT REAGAN STATED IN HIS AFGHANISTAN DAY PROCLAMATION THAT WE WILL JOIN WITH OTHER COUNTRIES AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS TO HELP THE AFGHANS REBUILD THEIR COUNTRY.

Q: 45. How rapidly do you expect refugee return to get underway?

A: -- ANY EFFORT THAT IS UNDERTAKEN MUST RESPOND TO THE REFUGEE FLOW AS DETERMINED BY THE REFUGEES THEMSELVES; WE DO NOT KNOW WHETHER IT WILL BE RAPID OR SLOW; WE MUST BE PREPARED FOR EITHER CONTINGENCY.

Q: 46. What will be the role of the RA in this process?

A: -- THE RA'S AUTHORITY DOES NOT EXTEND BEYOND THE RANGE OF SOVIET TROOPS AND THE RA IS HATED BY THE REFUGEES.

-- INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES MUST RESPOND TO POLITICAL REALITIES AND BE WILLING TO DEAL WITH DE FACTO AFGHAN REGIONAL AUTHORITIES IN THOSE AREAS TO WHICH THE REFUGEES RETURN.

Q: 47. What about the role of the GOP?

A: -- THE GOP HAS DONE A MASTERFUL JOB SINCE THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN IN HANDLING THE LARGEST REFUGEE POPULATION ANYWHERE; THE UN AND ANY OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES WILL HAVE TO WORK CLOSELY WITH THE GOP IN ASSISTING IN THE REPATRIATION PROCESS; WE INTEND TO CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE GOP IN ITS EFFORT TO DEAL WITH THE REFUGEE PROBLEM.

Q: 48. Will the PDPA regime stop its campaign of terrorist bombings in Pakistan?

A: -- THE NONINTERFERENCE OBLIGATIONS ARE MUTUALLY BINDING ON THE TWO CONTRACTING PARTIES TO THE GENEVA ACCORDS -- PAKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN. SO ANY SUCH ATTACKS WOULD BE A VIOLATION OF THE AGREEMENTS AND AN EXTREMELY SERIOUS DEVELOPMENT.

Q: 49. How can we be sure the Soviet Union is living up to its side of the bargain under a Geneva settlement?

A: -- WE WILL BE WATCHING VERY CLOSELY THROUGH A VARIETY OF MEANS -- INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS -- TO ENSURE THAT THE SOVIETS ARE LIVING UP TO THEIR GENEVA OBLIGATIONS. WE HAVE THE MEANS TO TRACK SOVIET PERFORMANCE THROUGH THE GENEVA IMPLEMENTATION PERIOD AND BEYOND.

-- THE UN AGREEMENT ALSO CONTAINS A PROVISION FOR MONITORING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT AND A PROVISION FOR ADDRESSING CHARGES OF VIOLATIONS.

Q: 50. What is to prevent the Soviet Union from reinvading Afghanistan once the Geneva Agreements have succeeded in cutting off all military aid to the Resistance?

A: -- THIS IS ALWAYS A THEORETICAL POSSIBILITY.

-- WE WILL BE CLOSELY MONITORING SOVIET BEHAVIOR, AND WILL LEAVE OUR OWN OPTIONS OPEN TO RESPOND APPROPRIATELY.

-- BUT IT CUTS AGAINST THE GRAIN OF WHAT THE SOVIETS APPEAR TO BE TRYING TO DO HERE. AFTER EIGHT YEARS OF UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPTS AT SUBDUING THE BROAD, POPULAR OPPOSITION BOTH TO SOVIET OCCUPATION AND TO THE PDPA PUPPET REGIME, MOSCOW HAS DRAWN THE REALISTIC CONCLUSION THAT IT IS BETTER TO GET OUT.

-- I VIEW IT AS UNLIKELY THAT GORBACHEV AND HIS ADVISERS WOULD TURN AROUND AND GO BACK IN TO THE MORASS ONCE THEY HAVE LEFT AFGHANISTAN.

-- WE NOTE WITH INTEREST VARIOUS SOVIET AND PDPA STATEMENTS IN SUPPORT OF A NEUTRAL AFGHANISTAN, MOST RECENTLY IN THE APRIL 7 TASHKENT COMMUNIQUE.

-- WE HAVE IN THE PAST EXTENSIVELY DISCUSSED NEUTRALITY ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE SOVIETS WHICH WOULD INCLUDE PROVISIONS GUARDING AGAINST THE REINTRODUCTION OF SOVIET TROOPS INTO AFGHANISTAN. WE REMAIN INTERESTED IN PURSUING THIS QUESTION WITH MOSCOW.

Q: 51. Will U.S. assistance to Pakistan be reduced now that an agreement on Afghanistan has been signed?

A: -- WE HAVE HAD A LONGSTANDING AND DURABLE SECURITY RELATIONSHIP WITH PAKISTAN.

-- IT IS IN OUR LONG-RANGE INTEREST, AS WELL AS IN THE INTEREST OF THE REGION AS A WHOLE, TO HAVE STRONG, COOPERATIVE RELATIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENT IN PAKISTAN.

-- THE MILITARY COOPERATION THAT WE HAVE BETWEEN THE U.S. AND PAKISTAN CONTRIBUTES TO THAT KIND OF STABILITY.

-- THEREFORE, I CAN CONFIDENTLY STATE THAT THE SIGNING OF THE GENEVA ACCORDS WILL NOT AFFECT OUR TRADITIONAL COMMITMENT TO AN ONGOING SECURITY RELATIONSHIP WITH PAKISTAN.

Q: 52. What is in the Geneva Accords?

A: -- THE GENEVA ACCORDS CONSIST OF FOUR AGREEMENTS:

-- IN THE FIRST, PAKISTAN AND THE RA AGREE ON PRINCIPLES OF NONINTERFERENCE AND NONINTERVENTION. THE AGREEMENT SETS OUT IN SOME DETAIL SPECIFIC UNDERTAKINGS CONSISTENT WITH THESE PRINCIPLES.

-- IN THE SECOND AGREEMENT -- THE "DECLARATION OF INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES" -- THE U.S. AND USSR AGREE:

- o THAT THEY WILL REFRAIN FROM INTERFERENCE AND INTERVENTION IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN; AND
- o THAT THEY WILL RESPECT THE PAKISTAN/RA AGREEMENT ON NONINTERFERENCE AND NONINTERVENTION.
- o BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND THE USSR RETAIN THE RIGHT TO PROVIDE MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO PARTIES IN AFGHANISTAN. THIS RIGHT IS REFLECTED IN A U.S. STATEMENT MADE AT THE TIME OF SIGNING.

-- IN THE THIRD AGREEMENT, PAKISTAN AND THE RA AGREE ON ARRANGEMENTS PERMITTING THE REPATRIATION OF AFGHAN REFUGEES.

-- FINALLY, PAKISTAN AND THE RA HAVE ENTERED INTO AN "INSTRUMENT ON INTERRELATIONSHIPS," WHICH THE U.S. AND THE USSR HAVE WITNESSED AND "CONSENTED TO."

- o THE INSTRUMENT IS WHAT ITS NAME SUGGESTS -- AN AGREEMENT ON THE INTERRELATIONSHIPS OF THE VARIOUS PARTS OF THE GENEVA ACCORDS.

- THE INSTRUMENT CLEARLY INDICATES THAT THE FOUR AGREEMENTS ARE PART OF A SINGLE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, AND THAT SOVIET WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS FROM AFGHANISTAN IS AN ESSENTIAL PART OF THAT SETTLEMENT.
- IT ALSO SPECIFICALLY RECORDS SOVIET AGREEMENT ON THE WITHDRAWAL TIMETABLE: THAT WITHDRAWAL WILL COMMENCE ON MAY 15 AND BE COMPLETED NO LATER THAN FEBRUARY 15, 1989; AND THAT HALF OF ALL SOVIET TROOPS WILL BE WITHDRAWN FROM AFGHANISTAN BY AUGUST 15.

Q: 53. Will all military assistance to the Resistance be terminated once the Geneva Accords are signed? When?

A: -- ACCORDING TO THE GENEVA AGREEMENT, ALL OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE AND INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN IS TO CEASE UPON THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE AGREEMENT.

-- AS THE U.S. UNILATERAL STATEMENT RELEASED AT THE TIME THE ACCORDS WERE SIGNED MAKES CLEAR, THE OBLIGATIONS UNDERTAKEN BY THE GUARANTORS ARE BALANCED AND SYMMETRICAL.

AS THE UNITED STATES HAS ADVISED THE SOVIET UNION IN THIS REGARD, THE UNITED STATES RETAINS THE RIGHT TO PROVIDE MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THE PARTIES IN AFGHANISTAN. WE

BELIEVE THE RESTORATION OF PEACE IN THAT COUNTRY IS BEST SERVED IF BOTH GUARANTORS REFRAIN FROM PROVIDING MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO AFGHANISTAN. SHOULD THE SOVIET UNION

CONTINUE ITS MILITARY ASSISTANCE AFTER THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THESE AGREEMENTS, WE INTEND TO EXERCISE OUR RIGHTS.

-- WE HAVE MADE THIS POSITION ABUNDANTLY CLEAR IN OUR UNILATERAL STATEMENT AND IN OUR PRIVATE EXCHANGES WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

Q: 54. What about humanitarian aid?

A: -- THE U.S. AND OTHER NATIONS MAINTAIN THE RIGHT AND FULLY EXPECT TO RENDER HUMANITARIAN AID TO AFGHAN GROUPS BOTH IN PAKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN. THIS IS NOT A CONTROVERSIAL ISSUE.

-- GIVEN THE MASSIVE TASK OF REPATRIATING 3-5 MILLION AFGHAN REFUGEES AND HELPING THE AFGHANS REBUILD THEIR WAR-RAVAGED COUNTRY, WE ANTICIPATE THAT INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND A NUMBER OF OTHER COUNTRIES (E.G. JAPAN, EC COUNTRIES, ISLAMIC NATIONS, ETC.) WILL BE ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN THESE EFFORTS.

Q: 55. What about Soviet advisers? Are they covered by the Geneva Accords?

A: -- SOVIET ADVISERS ARE NOT SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED IN THE GENEVA ACCORDS, BUT BOTH WE AND THE PAKISTANIS HAVE MADE CLEAR TO THE SOVIETS OUR EXPECTATION THAT THEIR MILITARY ADVISERS WILL LEAVE ALONG WITH REGULAR MILITARY TROOPS.
-- AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, ANY SOVIET ADVISERS WOULD BE VULNERABLE TO REPRISALS AND OTHER HOSTILE ACTIVITY IF THEY SOUGHT TO REMAIN BEHIND IN AFGHANISTAN FOLLOWING TROOP WITHDRAWAL.

Q: 56. Won't the Congress have to ratify the Geneva Accords?

A: -- NO. AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, HOWEVER, THE ADMINISTRATION HAS CONSISTENTLY SOUGHT TO KEEP KEY MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE AND SENATE CLOSELY INFORMED OF DEVELOPMENTS CONCERNING THIS QUESTION. WE HOPE AND EXPECT THAT THERE WILL BE BROAD BIPARTISAN SUPPORT FOR THE GENEVA ACCORDS.

Q: 57. What is the role of the UN in all of this?

A: -- THE UNITED NATIONS HAS PLAYED A CENTRAL ROLE IN THE ENTIRE GENEVA PROCESS. THE SYG AND DIEGO CORDOVEZ DESERVE GREAT CREDIT FOR THEIR TIRELESS EFFORTS TO BRING THIS DIFFICULT PROBLEM TO AN ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION.

-- THE UN WILL PLAY A KEY ROLE IN MONITORING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT BY THE PARTIES. IT WILL OVERSEE A MULTINATIONAL MONITORING FORCE OF SOME 50 PERSONS IN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN. UN AGENCIES, INCLUDING THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER ON REFUGEE MATTERS, WILL ALSO HAVE A ROLE TO PLAY IN FACILITATING THE RETURN WITH SAFETY AND HONOR OF THE MORE THAN FIVE MILLION AFGHAN REFUGEES TO THEIR HOMES.

-- THE UN WILL ALSO PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN RESTORING NORMAL CONDITIONS IN AFGHANISTAN.

Q: 58. Why have the Geneva Agreements been negotiated without the participation of the resistance and has the political fate of the Afghans been determined over their heads?

A: -- THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN HAS POSED SERIOUS PROBLEMS FOR PAKISTAN. SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE IN A NEIGHBORING COUNTRY CONSTITUTES A SERIOUS SECURITY THREAT; AND THE MORE THAN THREE MILLION REFUGEES IN PAKISTAN HAVE PLACED A HEAVY ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL BURDEN ON PAKISTAN..

-- IN 1982 UNDER UN AUSPICES, THE GOP ENTERED INTO INDIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE KABUL REGIME AS THE BEST MEANS THEN AVAILABLE FOR NEGOTIATING THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS FROM AFGHANISTAN. THE SOVIETS, RESISTANCE AND KABUL REGIME HAD REFUSED TO NEGOTIATE WITH EACH OTHER.

-- THE GOP ACTIVELY SUPPORTED THE RESISTANCE IN ITS EIGHT-YEAR WAR AGAINST THE SOVIET INVADERS. ALTHOUGH THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE HAS NOT PARTICIPATED IN THE GENEVA TALKS, NO "POLITICAL DEAL" HAS BEEN NEGOTIATED OVER ITS HEAD.

-- GOP PARTICIPATION IN THE GENEVA PROCESS HAS BEEN AIMED SOLELY AT OBTAINING SOVIET TROOP WITHDRAWAL AND RETURN OF THE REFUGEES. THE GOP HAS NEVER ATTEMPTED TO NEGOTIATE WITH KABUL FUTURE AFGHAN POLITICAL ARRANGEMENTS. THOSE ARRANGEMENTS MUST BE DETERMINED BY THE AFGHANS THEMSELVES. SOVIET TROOP WITHDRAWAL WILL MAKE THAT POSSIBLE.

Q: 59. How about Soviet prisoners? Are we going to allow them to be returned to the USSR against their will?

A: -- WE HAVE LET THE GOP, THE RESISTANCE AND OTHERS KNOW THAT WE EXPECT THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS TO APPLY TO ALL CAPTIVES. THIS MEANS THAT NO SOVIET SOLDIER SHOULD BE REPATRIATED AGAINST HIS WILL. WE LOOK TO THE ICRC TO PLAY ITS TRADITIONAL ROLE IN IMPLEMENTING THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS. WE ARE PREPARED TO ASSIST IN RESETTLING THOSE SOVIET SOLDIERS WHO REFUSE REPATRIATION.

HARD Q&A'S ON AFGHANISTAN

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L/NEA:PNorton

P:SJohnson:AEastham:SCoffey:Cross

NSCS:ROakley

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 TAHIR-KHELI
001

Z 88041410 PREPARE MEMO FOR POWELL
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ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR POWELL DUE DATE: 18 APR 88 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: TAHIR-KHELI LOGREF: 8802802

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COMMENTS: *4/22/88*
Per Tahir-Kheli. "Powell doesn't need a memo, O.B.F." If need arises - return for action. Cj/Burton

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