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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF RECORDS MANAGEMENT
(WHORM): SUBJECT FILE

Withdrawer

DLB 11/5/2019

File Folder FO006-01 (018699) (4 OF 4)

FOIA

F16-011

Box Number

BIERGANNNS

43

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
243460	PAPER	NUCLEAR POLICY	1	ND	B1
243461	PAPER	NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION	1	ND	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

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iii.(C)--1e)iv)
NUCLEAR POLICY

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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III.(C)--2)a) US COMMITMENT TO
ARMS CONTROL

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Authority State Warrier
BY dlr PARADATE 11/1/2019

U.S. COMMITMENT TO ARMS CONTROL

Background

Other Summit participants, particularly the FRG, may well criticize us for our "slowness" in completing internal policy reviews on arms control issues and in resuming arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union. Our readiness to engage in serious arms control efforts with the Soviets on TNF will be the main issue of concern to most of the European leaders, although SALT is increasingly a matter of concern also. European leaders were generally dismayed at ACDA Director Rostow's estimate that it would be nine months before we would be ready to resume SALT negotiations.

Talking Points

-- We believe that meaningful, balanced and verifiable arms control agreements can enhance the security of our nations and of the world. We intend to pursue such agreements, if the Soviet Union is also willing.

-- We believe it is crucial, however, before resuming a particular negotiation, to re-examine thoroughly its rationale, to set ourselves clear objectives, and to have a sense of how we are going to achieve them. Our approach should be prudent and measured. Moreover, arms control efforts, if they are to be successful, must be integrated into defense programs and plans, which are also currently undergoing thorough review within the Administration.

-- Our review of SALT policy is actively underway, but we cannot yet say when we would be ready to resume SALT negotiations. We are still in the process of reaching decisions on major strategic force modernization programs, and cannot realistically establish SALT objectives until these decisions have been taken. But we are determined to do everything necessary to arrive at balanced reductions in the strategic arsenals of both sides.

-- In the case of TNF, we of course already have an agreed modernization program. We have proposed to the Soviets that formal TNF negotiations be initiated between mid-November and mid-December. We are moving ahead with systematic preparations for negotiations, and have begun preliminary discussions with the Soviets.

-- You can be sure that we will continue to consult with you as our arms control policies are developed.

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GDS 7/15/87

iii.(C)--2)b)
U.S. POLICY IN
CENTRAL AMERICA AND
THE CARIBBEAN

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Authority State Waiver

BY do N/A DATE: 11/1/2019

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U.S. Policy in Central America and the Caribbean

Our allies have increased their involvement with the Caribbean gradually both bilaterally and through the regional assistance mechanisms. The allies have been less involved in Central America and view political instability there largely as the inevitable result of rising popular expectations being suppressed by local authoritarian groups. They are hesitant to support the Salvadoran Government in spite of its major efforts to institute reforms because of strong opposition among European socialist parties and the public. While most allies accept our point on Cuban intervention and are increasingly concerned by Nicaraguan developments, they are concerned that the U.S. may pursue a military, rather than a political solution in El Salvador and all of Central America. They generally prefer to keep the assistance door open to both Nicaragua and Grenada, to provide an alternative to Cuba. Our allies have reacted positively to the Caribbean Basin initiative because it focuses on social and economic roots of the region's problems.

Talking Points

-- A successful beginning was made at Nassau in Caribbean Basin Plan consultations among the U.S., Canadian, Mexican, and Venezuelan Foreign Ministers. We will be consulting the allies as planning goes forward. Cooperation among the leading nations in the hemisphere and outside will be important to address the region's economic and social problems.

-- The U.S. has not given up on Nicaragua. However, we are concerned by the Cuban influence in the military and security fields, the Nicaraguan military buildup and continuing support for Salvadoran guerrillas, and disrespect for commitments to pluralism. We urge our allies to press the Nicaraguans on these points.

-- In El Salvador, the U.S. supports consolidation of economic reforms and development of the electoral process as offering the best hope for a democratic outcome. The insurgency should not be allowed to undermine what has already been achieved. Unfortunately, clandestine arms flows are continuing to the insurgents who are seeking to impose a military solution.

-- We encourage efforts by our allies to facilitate contacts among different Salvadoran groups within the elections framework. International participation in the elections process could enhance prospects for success. We hope our allies would consider participation in such an effort.

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GDS 7/13/87

iii.(C)--2)c)
U.S. POLICY IN
EL SALVADOR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority State Waiver
BY: *ell* NAW DATE 11/1/2017

US POLICY IN EL SALVADOR

Background

Our allies have no direct interest in El Salvador and have been hesitant to support the Duarte government because of strong opposition among European socialist parties and public opinion which favor the insurgents. Some allied leaders are concerned that US security assistance is prolonging the violence and that the US is pursuing a military solution in El Salvador, rather than using its influence to encourage a political settlement.

Talking Points

-- The US wants the process of political and economic reforms consolidated. The insurgency should not be allowed to undermine or reverse what has already been achieved. Unfortunately, clandestine arms flows are continuing to the insurgents who are seeking to impose a military solution.

-- We do not believe peace can be achieved by arranging negotiations which would lead to power sharing among a few political factions. The elections proposed by the government provide the framework within which the political debate can begin and an eventual democratic, pluralistic solution can be achieved. The next few weeks are important to the government in reaching an agreement with the private sector and with other groups on participation in the elections.

-- We encourage efforts by our allies to facilitate contacts among different Salvadoran groups within the elections framework.

-- An international observer group to oversee the elections process could enhance its prospects for success. We hope our allies would consider participation in such an effort.

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III. (C)--2) d)
NAMIBIA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NAMIBIA

Criticism: The US has not been consulting with or informing fully its Contact Group colleagues (France, Great Britain, Canada, and West Germany) about our extended bilateral dialogue with South Africa over possible implementation of a Namibian settlement.

Response:

1. Secretary Haig is discussing the subject in depth with his counterparts in the course of the Ottawa Summit, both bilaterally and at a Contact Group meeting on Tuesday evening.
2. We remain committed to an internationally acceptable solution for the Namibia problem and hope to make progress toward such a settlement soon.

Facts: We have seen our protracted dialogue with the South Africans as a mandate from the Contact Group to explore Pretoria's seriousness about a settlement and the circumstances under which they would be willing to move forward to such a settlement.

There is no doubt that our discussions with the South Africans have been more difficult and have taken more time than we originally envisioned. Recently, however, we have made some progress with them.

The parallel travel of the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary has made it difficult to consult with our colleagues as much as they might have liked.

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BY dlh NARA DATE 11/1/2019

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GDS (7/15/87)

III.(C)--2)e)
PROSPECTS FOR U.S.
MIDDLE EAST PEACE
POLICY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PROSPECTS FOR U.S. MIDDLE EAST PEACE POLICY

Background

Our allies generally remain skeptical about our overall approach to expanding the peace process beyond the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty of Peace. Mitterrand's assumption of the French Presidency may blunt the close cooperation between France and the U.K. on the EC's Middle East efforts. Nevertheless, the virtual certainty that Begin will form the next Israeli government and that it will continue to forge ahead with its settlement's policy in the occupied territories can only reinforce the doubts of our friends about the prospects for success of the autonomy negotiations. They remain concerned that our approach does not offer the prospect of a satisfactory solution for the Palestinian problem.

Talking Points

-- We are seeking in a number of ways to strengthen Western influence in the Middle East and to block Soviet moves to increase its presence there.

-- We fully understand the need to continue with the peace process and build upon what has already been accomplished. We remain committed to the Camp David framework and wish to proceed with autonomy negotiations later this year in view of the support of Israel and Egypt for their continuation.

-- I will have the opportunity later this summer to meet with both Sadat and Begin. This will give me the opportunity to explore with them ways in which we can structure the autonomy talks in order to minimize the risk of deadlocks and ruptures.

-- Our objective is to bring the autonomy negotiations to a successful conclusion, thereby taking an important first step toward resolving the issue of the Palestinian people in a manner satisfactory to all concerned. In this regard, the Camp David Accords explicitly recognized that the Palestinian issue must be resolved in all its aspects.

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BY dlr MARCONE 11/20/7

III.(C)--2)f)
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iii.(C)--2)g)
LAW OF THE SEA

LAW OF THE SEA

Background

On March 2, 1981, we announced that we were not prepared to resume substantive negotiations on a Law of the Sea treaty until completion of an internal Government review of the treaty. We took this action because of our serious concerns over several aspects of the nearly completed draft text. Other Summit participants expressed concern over our action. Much of that concern has been dissipated in our recent meeting with France, Japan, the Federal Republic of Germany and Great Britain. While these governments are prepared to cooperate along a broad front at the upcoming session scheduled for August 3-28, 1981 in Geneva, they are urging us to come to the meeting prepared to negotiate on at least a few issues. One or more Summit participants may take the opportunity to emphasize the importance they attach to a Law of the Sea treaty. Concerns over the slow pace of our review and over the possibility that the U.S. will reject the treaty approach may also be voiced, and the United States may be urged to complete the review as soon as possible. You may use this opportunity to assure them that the review is proceeding as rapidly as possible, and that the U.S. has not rejected the treaty option.


Talking Points

-- We appreciate the concerns you have expressed and the importance your governments attach to the successful completion of the Law of the Sea Conference. We, too, are deeply conscious of the significance of the issues at stake in Law of the Sea.

-- That is why we decided that the policy review we have initiated is essential.

-- Our government is proceeding with this review as rapidly as possible. The August session of the Law of the Sea Conference will provide the opportunity to determine what aspects of the draft Law of the Sea treaty are negotiable. As such, the session will be an important part of our review process.

--- We look forward to cooperating with you at the August session of the Conference. At that time, we expect to discuss several aspects of the draft treaty that give us particular problems.



III. (C)--2)h)
POLISH POLITICAL
SITUATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

POLISH POLITICAL SITUATION

Background

The Summit will take place against the background of a Party Congress, which will probably confirm the leadership of Kania and Jaruzelski, and the renewal process in the Party and nation. Given a new Central Committee in tune with the national consensus and given also the continued strong support of the Church, now led by Bishop Glemp, for moderation and compromise, the chances for achieving social peace appear better than they have been in the past year. As already indicated by the July 13 expression of "confidence" in the Polish Party by Soviet Congress Delegate Grishin, the Soviets are now taking a moderate wait-and-see attitude toward the Congress. Given the unity of the Polish nation and the unity of the allies on countermeasures, the Soviets may well continue to eschew military force while maintaining a moderate level of political pressure on Poland over the long haul.

Talking Points

-- Poland is calm for now, and its people increasingly unified. However, the situation remains basically unpredictable, as it has been for the past year.

-- Following a Party Congress that should avoid radical extremes, the Soviets will review their options. We doubt that they will resort to military force, while, of course, always reserving this as a future option if they perceive a threat to their basic security interests.

-- The unity of the Polish people and of the Western alliance remain key deterrents to rash Soviet action.

-- It will be important to maintain Western unity in the face of Soviet threats.

-- Additional Western assistance is necessary in helping overcome Poland's continuing economic crisis. The U.S. has provided more credits this year than any other Western nation.

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State Waiver

BY *dlb*

11/1/2019

iii.(C)--2)i)
AFGHANISTAN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AFGHANISTAN

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Authority State Waiver
BY ds NAWADATE 11/1/2019

BACKGROUND:

The Summit provides an excellent opportunity to keep international public opinion focused on the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan. It will remind the Soviets that Afghanistan remains at the heart of East-West relations and that Soviet intransigence serves as a serious impediment to the betterment of these relations. The recent EEC initiative, which Moscow has not yet rejected outright, will be discussed -- and hopefully strongly endorsed -- by the Summit.

TALKING POINTS:

-- It is vital that the Summit reaffirm publicly Allied agreement that Afghanistan will remain a central element in the East-West relationship in the face of Soviet unwillingness to move toward genuine negotiations.

-- We are very pleased with the substance and handling of the EEC proposal on Afghanistan. We agree that the EEC should continue to promote it rather than accepting the initial Soviet response as definitive. We hope the Summit will strongly endorse the proposal.

-- We shall raise Afghanistan and the need to take seriously the EEC proposal in our bilateral discussions with the Soviets. We urge you also to make clear in bilateral contacts with the Soviets the importance we all attach to Afghanistan.

-- It is important that the Soviets, as well as Third-World observers, understand that this is not a propaganda exercise but a serious attempt to initiate negotiations towards a settlement acceptable to all.

-- Pakistan has a vital stake in the resolution of the crisis in Afghanistan. While Pakistan is bearing up surprisingly well under Soviet pressure, we are concerned about possible limited cross-border strikes to "punish" Pakistan. It would be very helpful if you would also make clear in your bilateral contacts with the Soviets the severe consequences which this would have on East-West relations.

-- We recognize that you have already made substantial contributions to the Afghan refugees in Pakistan. It is important in order to sustain Afghan resistance to Soviet aggression that we continue to maximize support of the refugees. US contributions in cash and food total \$93 million during this fiscal year.

-- In our new relationship with Pakistan, we are also prepared to provide about \$3 billion in assistance during the next six years and accelerate military sales even though this means some diversion from our own forces. We recognize that you too have increased your economic assistance. We hope that you will continue to be supportive of Pakistan at this critical time.

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III.(C)--2)j)
LATEST IRANIAN
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

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Authority State Waiver
BY dlw DATE 11/1/2019

LATEST IRANIAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

Background

A longstanding power struggle between the religious forces of the Islamic Republican Party (IRP) and those opposed to IRP dominance erupted in street violence and demonstrations following Ayatollah Khomeini's June 21 dismissal of President Bani-Sadr. Those supporting the President responded to the IRP power grab with a series of bombings culminating in a massive explosion at the IRP headquarters building on June 28 killing IRP leader Beheshti (considered the second most powerful man in Iran after Khomeini) and other leaders. The situation in Iran is fluid at this point with the IRP directing its efforts towards destroying opposition groups, particularly the militant left which it blames for the bombings. The IRP appears to have the upper hand but much will depend upon Khomeini's continued hold over the masses and the IRP's ability to crush the left and, at the same time, remain sufficiently unified to run the country.

Talking Points

-- The political power struggle in Iran has caused further instability in that country.

-- Khomeini remains the dominant political figure due to his hold on the masses.

-- The death by a terrorist bomb explosion of Islamic Republican Party (IRP) leaders deprives Khomeini of needed political cadres.

-- The situation in Iran is fluid and much will depend on how effectively Khomeini and the weakened IRP can counter opposition forces and remain unified to run the country.

-- The USSR might be tempted to exploit the current situation in Iran.

-- We have put the USSR on notice that the U.S. supports strongly Iran's territorial integrity, sovereignty, and independence, and that we expect Moscow to abide by its own assurances of non-interference.

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RDS-3 7/13/01

iii.(C)--2)k)
PERSIAN GULF

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Authority State Waiver

BY db UPGRADE 11/1/2019

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PERSIAN GULF

Background

While most of our allies generally share our view of the Soviet threat to the Persian Gulf region, they look to the US to take the lead in responding to the threat. The UK and France have taken some concrete steps to increase their military presence in the area, complementing our own actions. With some notable exceptions, the countries in the region are reluctant to appear to be cooperating too closely with the US. The Israeli raid on the Iraqi reactor has heightened the sensitivity to Arab states to such a relationship. At the same time, most regional states are eager to cooperate with the US in the economic and technical fields to attack the basic causes of local instability and to consult and cooperate with us discreetly in the political and military fields to contain intra-regional threats to their security.

Talking Points

-- Against the background of continuing turmoil in Iran, the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan and the dependence of the industrial and third worlds on Persian Gulf oil, this region is of vital concern to all the countries attending this summit.

-- Given the high stakes and the heavy burden involved, we must all do more to cooperate with the countries in the region to defend themselves and to increase our capability to deter potential Soviet aggression.

-- Our cooperation with regional states should take the form of political consultations to deal with the causes of instability, economic assistance and technology transfer through official and commercial channels for their development and support for regional defense.

-- Since the regional states do not have the capability to counter and deter direct Soviet aggression, the US and our allies must be prepared to do so. This means maintaining a significant air and naval presence in the area and increasing our ability to project additional forces when necessary.

-- The US is improving the rapid deployment force by designating certain units to be under its control, improving our strategic mobility by upgrading our C-5 and C-141 fleet, and acquiring access to facilities we need in the region and on the way there.

CONFIDENTIAL

iii.(c)--2)1)
MILITARY EXPORTS
TO CHINA

CONFIDENTIAL

MILITARY EXPORTS TO CHINA

DECLASSIFIED
State Waiver
BY dr DATE: 11/2019

Background

Some foreign leaders may express concern that Chinese purchases of U.S. weapons could harm our relations with China's smaller neighbors and with the Soviet Union. They may also wonder whether we will take their interests into account in considering Chinese requests to purchase U.S. defense equipment.

TALKING POINTS

-- In China, Secretary Haig found a remarkable convergence of strategic interests, and we look forward to a quicken pace of dialogue on a wide range of issues.

-- A close, healthy U.S. relationship with China is a global strategic imperative and a key to stability in Asia.

-- In this context, we consider China as a friendly nation with whom we are not allied. It is in our strategic interest to assist China's modernization, including its defense modernization

-- We have adjusted our export control regulations to reflect our strategic relationship with China.

-- We will now consider on a case-by-case basis any Chinese requests to purchase military equipment, including weapons. This does not mean that we will approve every Chinese request; it does mean that we have removed a barrier to discussions in this area.

-- We expect that this aspect of our relationship will develop in a careful, gradual way.

-- We will, where appropriate, consult with affected allies and friends in order to hear their views before making major sales to China. Also, while we cannot allow the Soviet Union a veto over our policy, one consideration in our review of specific cases will be the effect on the Soviet Union.

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GDS 7/9/87

IV. (A) REMARKS AND TOASTS

TO BE PROVIDED IF NECESSARY

IV. (B) STATEMENT AT SUNDAY DINNER

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