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Canada, 07/19/1981-07/20/1981)  
**Case file Number(s):** 019806 (5 of 5)  
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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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DLB 11/5/2019

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**FOIA**

F16-011

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48

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
243467	PAPER	DUPLICATE OF #243463; DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT	10	ND	B1

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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III. BACKGROUND PAPERS

(C) Points of Special Sensitivity

# 1) Interest Rates, Fiscal Policy and Exchange markets

[To be Retyped]

CEA has provided supplementary

CONTINGENCY POINTS  
Talking points to H. Nau, NSC

(The following is intended for use in addressing specific issues which may arise in the course of formal and informal discussions. The European Council (Heads of Government) will meet prior to the Ottawa Summit to try to agree on a common line. These talking points for responding to other countries' assertions may need to be revised in light of that meeting.)

1. Excessive reliance on control of money growth is causing unnecessarily high U.S. interest rates and downward pressures on foreign currencies, forcing others to adopt unduly restrictive domestic policies.

- HIGH AND FLUCTUATING INTEREST RATES IN THE UNITED STATES ARE, OF COURSE, ONE FACTOR IN EXCHANGE MARKET DEVELOPMENTS AND CURRENT DOLLAR STRENGTH, BUT THEY ARE BY NO MEANS THE ONLY ONE. POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS IN EUROPE AND OTHER AREAS ARE AS IMPORTANT, IF NOT MORE SO.
- I CAN ASSURE YOU, WE DO NOT WANT HIGH INTEREST RATES. WE ARE NOT USING INTEREST RATES AS A POLICY TOOL. HIGH INTEREST RATES ARE HARMFUL TO OUR ECONOMY, AS THEY ARE TO OTHERS BUT THEY ARE ONE OF THE SIDE-EFFECTS OF A LONG PERIOD OF INFLATION.
- OUR AIM IS LOW INTEREST RATES AND INCREASED REAL SAVING. THE RECORD IN THE U.S. IS CLEAR: SLOWER MONEY GROWTH BRINGS LOWER INTEREST RATES, ESPECIALLY OVER THE LONGER RUN.
- I BELIEVE THAT I UNDERSTAND THE POLITICAL PROBLEMS MANY OF YOU FACE FROM RECORD HIGH UNEMPLOYMENT. I AM STRUGGLING WITH SOME OF THE SAME PROBLEMS -- ESPECIALLY IN A FEW DEPRESSED INDUSTRIES AND REGIONS. BUT IF WE HAVE LEARNED ANYTHING FROM THE 1970s IT IS THAT WE MUST LICK INFLATION IF WE ARE TO RESTORE VIGOROUS

GROWTH. THAT TASK WILL TAKE TIME, COURAGE AND PERSISTENCE.

2. Tighten fiscal policy (e.g., defer the tax cuts) to ease the burden on monetary policy.

- THE TAX CUTS ARE AN ESSENTIAL PART OF OUR EFFORT TO ENCOURAGE WORK, SAVING AND CAPITAL FORMATION -- THE UNDERPINNINGS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH.
- THE TAX PACKAGE I HAVE PROPOSED WILL NOT ONLY INCREASE REAL PRODUCTION, HELPING TO REDUCE INFLATION, BUT IT WILL ALSO INCREASE THE POOL OF SAVINGS, TENDING TO PUSH DOWN INTEREST RATES. IN PARTICULAR, THE ACROSS-THE-BOARD CUTS IN PERSONAL TAX RATES WILL HAVE VERY DIFFERENT EFFECTS ON SPENDING AND SAVING DECISIONS THAN TRADITIONAL TAX CUTS FOCUSED ON LOWER INCOME GROUPS.
- WE ARE COMMITTED TO ELIMINATING THE DEFICIT BY 1984. MEANWHILE, WE ARE REDUCING THE DEFICIT BUT CANNOT OVERCOME A LEGACY OF PAST BUDGET MISMANAGEMENT -- DISTORTIONS AND DISINCENTIVES IN A TAX STRUCTURE THAT DISCOURAGES ENTERPRISE, AND EXCESSIVE GROWTH IN GOVERNMENT SPENDING.
- DELAYING ACTION ON THESE LARGER ISSUES FOR THE SAKE OF BALANCING THE BUDGET A YEAR OR TWO EARLIER WOULD BE SHORT-SIGHTED.
- A SMALL GROUP OF MY SENIOR ADVISERS IS CAREFULLY MONITORING THE DEFICIT AS EXPENDITURE AND REVENUE TRENDS DEVELOP. ANY TENDENCY FOR THE DEFICIT TO RISE ABOVE OUR GUIDELINES IS IMMEDIATELY COUNTERED

*Deficit smaller than in Europe*

*D 12 80  
in Capital*

BY NEW PROPOSALS TO CUT SPENDING. OUR RESOLVE TO CUT THE DEFICIT IS STRONG.

3. Intervene in the exchange markets to hold down the dollar and insulate foreign economies from the effects of high U.S. interest rates.

- OUR APPROACH TOWARD THE EXCHANGE MARKETS IS TO ALLOW MARKETS TO OPERATE FREELY AND EFFICIENTLY, IN AN ENVIRONMENT OF STABLE DOMESTIC PRICES AND VIGOROUS ECONOMIC GROWTH. OUR PROGRAM IS DESIGNED TO PROVIDE A LASTING BASIS FOR A STRONG AND STABLE DOLLAR.
- THE EXCHANGE MARKETS FOR MAJOR CURRENCIES ARE BROAD AND EFFICIENT. GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION CANNOT FUNDAMENTALLY AFFECT THEM; ATTEMPTS TO RESIST FUNDAMENTAL TRENDS ARE CERTAIN TO BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE.
- WE QUESTION WHETHER INTERVENTION IS NECESSARILY STABILIZING, EVEN IN THE SHORT RUN. ATTEMPTS TO HOLD RATES AGAINST MARKET FORCES COMBINED WITH UNCERTAINTY ABOUT GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION, MAY WELL INDUCE --RATHER THAN PREVENT -- DESTABILIZING SPECULATION.
- U.S. INTERVENTION TO HOLD THE DOLLAR DOWN -- INJECTING DOLLARS INTO THE MARKET -- WOULD CONFLICT WITH OUR EFFORT TO REDUCE MONEY GROWTH.
- MORE FUNDAMENTALLY, WE DO NOT BELIEVE INTERVENTION CAN EFFECTIVELY SHIELD ECONOMIES AND POLICYMAKERS FROM THE NEED IN THE LONG RUN TO TAKE APPROPRIATE DOMESTIC ECONOMIC MEASURES.

*Did  
intervene  
after  
assess.*

-- WE RECOGNIZE THAT EXCHANGE RATE BEHAVIOR IS A  
PROPER SUBJECT FOR INTERNATIONAL CONCERN AND  
DISCUSSION. IN THIS SPIRIT, WE REMAIN PREPARED  
TO INTERVENE IF CONDITIONS OF SERIOUS MARKET  
DISORDER ARISE. WE ARE NOT, HOWEVER, PREPARED  
TO ENGAGE IN REGULAR INTERVENTION OR TO TRY TO  
MANAGE EXCHANGE RATES.

*back off  
on this  
non-interv.*

## 2) Multilateral Aid

[Asked Tom Dawson in Treasury to provide updated status of legislation and what this Administration has done to secure passage]



### 3) Trade with East

[ Factual Material in CIA papers in Briefing Book Needs to be Integrated with Points President Will Make Based on NSC Decisions before Summit ]

4) Global Negotiations (10 weeks work) -  
giving points to counter pressure to  
GLOBAL NEGOTIATIONS

**CONFIDENTIAL**  
accept Global Negotiations

In December 1979, the US joined in the consensus adopting a 34th UNGA resolution calling for "... a round of global and sustained negotiations on international economic cooperation for development ...". However, we made clear in a statement we would join GN's only if procedures and agenda could be agreed. The purpose of Global Negotiations (GNs) is to create a central forum within the UN system for the consideration of major international economic issues such as raw materials, energy, trade, finance and development. Although the procedures and agenda to be used in conducting GNs have been actively negotiated in New York, it has not been possible to reach agreement.

The basic controversy has involved differing conceptions of the nature of GNs. The US and many other industrialized countries see GNs as a central forum for discussing major issues, with real negotiations being carried out in the specialized bodies within the UN system such as the IMF or GATT, for all of those issues for which such bodies exist. The central forum would only collate and ratify the results of these negotiations. On the other hand, most of the developing countries insist that the central forum should have the power to direct or even renegotiate the results of work in the specialized bodies. Thus, in our view, the major issue has been protecting the authority and responsibility of the specialized bodies.

Although the procedures text, as it now stands, provides for agreement by consensus in the central forum on "all important matters," we believe that this requirement alone would not preclude negotiations in the central forum or provide adequate protection for the specialized bodies. We have become increasingly skeptical that anything of economic value would emerge from GN's. However, assuming that our procedural and agenda points are met, we may be obliged to participate due to possibly overriding political considerations.

At the UNGA Meeting of the Whole in New York on May 5, the US proposed that preparations for GNs be deferred at least until the 36th UNGA Regular Session this fall and after other scheduled intervening meetings including the economic summits at Ottawa and Cancun (October 22-23). All other countries would have been willing to resume preparations immediately as sought by UNGA President von Wechmar (FRG), although several recognized that further meetings would be pointless without US participation. Neither summit is scheduled to discuss GNs formally, but it is probable that the Canadian, French or other delegates will raise this issue at Ottawa and the subject is almost certain to come up at Cancun. At some point, the current 35th UNGA must be reconvened to defer GNs formally to the 36th UNGA. We would like to have this deferral handled as quickly and quietly as possible.

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THE CANCUN SUMMIT

5)

President Reagan will attend a summit on economic cooperation and development in Cancun, Mexico, October 22-23. There will be twenty-one other participants,\* including all Ottawa summit participants except Italy. The USSR declined to attend, and Cuba was not invited at US suggestion.

The eleven co-sponsoring governments have promised that the Summit will be open and informal, with no agenda and no communique, although as host Lopez Portillo may summarize suggestions which "emerge." All Ottawa participants should agree that this format be preserved and that there be no structured preparation such as papers and prior meetings of personal representatives. This agreement would be followed by foreign ministers on August 1-2 at the only preparatory meeting for Cancun.

The U.S. views the Cancun summit as a useful opportunity to meet with most of the more significant heads of government for an exchange of views on global economic problems. The U.S. will want to discuss energy, food, trade, population, and global ecology problems. Other participants will have other problems to suggest.

Such a discussion should be more beneficial than the political dialogue in the U.N. which, for 18 months, has focused on procedures and agenda for the proposed "global negotiations" on all major international economic problems (See separate paper).

Except for the U.S. and the U.K., the Ottawa countries view Cancun and global negotiations as politically necessary parts of a multilateral dialogue among economically interdependent nations. They believe that such a dialogue creates a better atmosphere in which to carry out their bilateral and regional objectives. They would like to include the U.S. in a general endorsement of global negotiations so this will no longer be an issue during the Cancun summit. Prime Minister Trudeau would like to take credit for thus having "settled" the issue in Ottawa.

The United Kingdom shares US views on Cancun and global negotiations. However, the U.K. will chair the EC from July 1 to December 31 and therefore may temper its public support to accommodate the other EC members.

\*Algeria, Austria, Bangladesh, Brazil, Canada, China, France, FRG, Guyana, India, Ivory Coast, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Tanzania, UK, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia (co-sponsors underlined).

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GDS 6/19/87

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11/4/2019

6) Energy Affiliate

[Ask Rud Poats, NSC, to provide points  
on U.S. position]

## 7) Polish Debt

[Ask Rud Poats, NSC, to supply Points President Will make About U.S. Position Toward Aid to Poland in general and New Credits at this time in particular]

8)

AUTOMOBILES

[To be Reorganized]

Talking Points on the Japanese Unilateral  
Restraint on Auto Exports

- o The decision by Japan to restrain unilaterally its auto exports to the United States was based on that government's assessment of its long term interests. Protectionist sentiment was growing in this country, particularly in the U.S. Congress, in response to the depressed state of the domestic industry.
- o The U.S. auto industry is vital to the U.S. economy. The industry and its suppliers account for 8 1/2 percent of our gross national product and employ 4 million, or 1 out of 6, American workers. In 1980, domestic auto production dropped to the lowest point in 19 years and unemployment reached a peak of nearly 1 million. Domestic manufacturers lost \$4.3 billion and suffered a cash flow deficit of \$9 billion.
- o The cash flow deficit occurred just at the time when the auto industry was in the midst of a \$80 billion investment program necessary for it to regain international competitiveness.
- o Japanese import penetration increased to well over 20 percent of the U.S. market before the domestic pressures for Congressional action became overwhelming. This was a level far higher than the Japanese import penetration in any other Ottawa Summit members' auto market.
- o The Japanese government's decision provided U.S. auto manufacturers the breathing space necessary for this retooling effort. [In addition, the decision avoided quota legislation which could have precipitated world-wide retaliatory measures.]

Japanese decision to limit export to U.S. was followed within weeks by Canadian, German, Belgian action to limit Japanese auto imports. France, Italy and UK already have informal arrangements. Suggest dropping sentence.

Japanese Auto Export Restraints: The Japanese have announced the following auto export restrictions. To our knowledge no others are planned.

United States: In Japanese FY 1981 (4/1/81-3/31/82), MITI will restrain auto exports to 1.68 million units. In JFY 1982, this level will be adjusted by 16.5 percent of the change in total U.S. auto sales as forecasted by MITI. Further separate measures will be taken with respect to Japanese exports to Puerto Rico (contained in the U.S. Customs zone) and exports of "vans" (station wagons and utility vehicles) which for statistical purposes the Japanese Auto Manufacturers Association define as cargo carrying vehicles and the U.S. defines as passenger vehicles. The necessity for a third year of restraints will be considered by the Japanese at the end of the second restraint year.

Canada: During JFY 1981, Japan will limit its exports of passenger cars to 174,000 units, a 6 percent decline from JFY 1980, but a 10 percent increase over the 1980 calendar year level. Before the end of JFY 1981, Japan and Canada will consult on the need for a second restraint year.

EC: Due to restrictions on Japanese auto imports by the UK, France and Italy, Japan will not implement an EC-wide export restraint. Japan has taken specific measures with regard to Germany and Belgium.

Germany: Calendar year 1981 passenger car exports are "forecast" not to exceed the 1980 level by more than 10 percent.

Belgium: We believe that Japan has agreed to reduce its 1981 calendar year exports by around 7 percent from the 1980 level.

Truck Cab Chassis: At Japan's request we are currently attempting to schedule a date to begin formal consultations under GATT Article XXII.

Administration's Auto Program: The program rests primarily on the Economic Recovery Program, which should stimulate U.S. auto sales and assist the industry to raise investment capital. Other steps include the modification or elimination of 34 U.S. safety and emission regulations, antitrust actions and other measures.

U.S. Auto Sales: The U.S. auto market continues to suffer from a sluggish economy and high interest rates. Total 1981 car sales through May are down 2.3 percent from the equivalent period last year. Sales of U.S.-made cars declined 3.4 percent while imported car sales increased 0.6 percent from the same period last year. The number of Japanese-made cars sold here has declined by 0.7 percent. On a seasonally adjusted basis, U.S. auto sales through May were running at a 9.3 million unit annual rate (9.0 million autos were sold in the United States in 1980). Sales are likely to remain low until this fall when the U.S. economy is expected to improve and interest rates are expected to decline. The Administration forecasts total U.S. auto sales to be 9.5 million units in 1982.

Japanese Auto Import Penetration  
(Percent of Market)

	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>
United States	16.6	21.3
Canada	8.0	14.8
United Kingdom	10.8	11.9
France	2.2	2.9
West Germany	5.7	10.5
Italy	--	.1
EC Market	6.9	9.0

OISP/ITA  
U.S. Department of Commerce  
July 2, 1981



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or *sk* NARA DATE 11/4/2015

9)

S T E E L

We have had difficult steel trade problems with our major trading partners - particularly the EC - since the 1960's, but they have become especially acute since 1977. Mismanagement of steel trade issues could threaten US-EC trade relations in general and could develop into a major foreign policy problem.

Since 1977, U.S. steel imports have been subject to price and quantitative monitoring under the Trigger Price Mechanism (TPM). This system permits the Commerce Department to respond rapidly if imported steel mill products are sold in the U.S. below fair value (dumping) or if injurious increases in steel imports are the result of subsidization or dumping.

Our steel import monitoring represents a multilateral understanding with our major trading partners - Japan, Canada, and the EC - on the root causes of steel trade distortions. The TPM, which was suspended and then reinstated in 1980, is designed to detect and discourage unfair trade in steel for a period of up to five years. During this time, the European industry is to restructure itself to eliminate inefficient excess capacity. Simultaneously, the U.S. industry will begin modernizing to restore its international competitiveness.

The TPM has not closed our market to steel imports. Total U.S. steel mill product imports grew this year about 4.0 percent through May, compared with last year. Imports from Canada grew by 44 percent and those from the EC were up 15 percent (after sharp declines in 1979 and 1980). These increases reflect our first quarter GNP growth, Canada's efficient production, and strong demand for certain products in relatively short supply here (oil drilling pipe and tube).

The EC Commission is trying to promote the European industry's readjustment. Mandatory and voluntary production quotas are being implemented. The EC has also decided, pending final agreement by West Germany and Belgium, to end all subsidy payments to its steelmakers by the end of 1985. Certain payments will be phased out sooner. These subsidies have propped up inefficient capacity. If the EC can carry out this timetable and reduce its steelmaking capacity, it will go a long way toward meeting our steel industry's concerns about unfair European competition. Failure would put us under strong domestic pressure either to confront the EC over their subsidies or to adopt more restrictive steel trade measures.

10) U.S. Contributions to LDCs in Non-AID Areas

[To be provided by Adrian Basora in  
State]

IV. REMARKS/STATEMENT-COMMUNIQUE

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CLASSIFIED BY: [unclear]

11/4/2019

Document No. 019806SS

WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: July 6, 1981

ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: NOON JULY 8

SUBJECT: Ottawa Summit

	ACTION	FYI		ACTION	FYI
VICE PRESIDENT	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	JAMES	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
MEESE	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	MURPHY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
BAKER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	NOFZIGER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
DEAVER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	WILLIAMSON	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
STOCKMAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	WEIDENBAUM	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
ALLEN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	CANZERI	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
ANDERSON →	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	FULLER (For Cabinet)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
BRADY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	HICKEY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
DOLE	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	HODSOLL	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
FIELDING	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	MC COY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
FRIEDERSDORF	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	CEQ	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
GARRICK	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	OSTP	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
GERGEN	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	USTR	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HARPER	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	ROGERS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Remarks: Attached are preliminary rough drafts for the President's Ottawa briefing book. You have seen the related background papers before. These papers are related but different--intended more directly to prepare the President for the presentation of U.S. views. Would you please provide comments--particularly on papers that are more evidently near completion--by noon Wednesday. We will wish to take these into account in preparations for the Thursday Trudeau visit. The next draft of Ottawa Summit Presidential briefing papers will be circulated at the end of the week. Thank you.

*Revised version  
of Alaska Pipeline  
+ "Acid Rain" sent  
separately  
mca - 7/8/81*

Richard G. Darman  
Deputy Assistant to the President  
and Staff Secretary

~~SECRET~~

(x-2702)

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1981  
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ATTACHMENT

Document No. 019806SS

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No comments  
EN

Richard G. Darman  
Deputy Assistant to the President  
and Staff Secretary  
(x-2702)

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