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(Foreign Affairs: Twenty-Two Nation Summit, 10/21/1981-10/23/1981 Cancun, Mexico)

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**FOIA** 

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Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
MEMO	ALEXANDER HAIG TO THE PRESIDENT RE: MEETING WITH UK PRIME	2	ND	B1
	MINISTER MARGARET THATCHER AT THE CANCUN SUMMIT, DRAFT			•
PAPER	NORTHERN IRELAND	1	10/13/1981	B1
PAPER	UNILATERALISM AND THE UK DEFENSE EFFORT	1	10/13/1981	B1
PAPER	YUGOSLAVIA, DRAFT	. 1	ND	B1
MEMO	RICHARD ALLEN TO THE PRESIDENT, RE: CANCUN SUMMIT, OCTOBER 22-23, 1981	4	ND	B1
MEMO	DUPLICATE OF THE #163086; ALEXANDER HAIG TO THE PRESIDENT, RE: A STRATEGY FOR CANCUN	4	10/8/1981	B1
	MEMO  PAPER  PAPER  PAPER  MEMO	MEMO  ALEXANDER HAIG TO THE PRESIDENT RE: MEETING WITH UK PRIME MINISTER MARGARET THATCHER AT THE CANCUN SUMMIT, DRAFT  PAPER  NORTHERN IRELAND  PAPER  UNILATERALISM AND THE UK DEFENSE EFFORT  PAPER  YUGOSLAVIA, DRAFT  MEMO  RICHARD ALLEN TO THE PRESIDENT, RE: CANCUN SUMMIT, OCTOBER 22-23, 1981  MEMO  DUPLICATE OF THE #163086; ALEXANDER HAIG TO THE PRESIDENT,	MEMO  ALEXANDER HAIG TO THE PRESIDENT RE: MEETING WITH UK PRIME MINISTER MARGARET THATCHER AT THE CANCUN SUMMIT, DRAFT  PAPER  NORTHERN IRELAND  1  PAPER  UNILATERALISM AND THE UK DEFENSE EFFORT  PAPER  YUGOSLAVIA, DRAFT  1  MEMO  RICHARD ALLEN TO THE PRESIDENT, RE: CANCUN SUMMIT, OCTOBER 22-23, 1981  MEMO  DUPLICATE OF THE #163086; 4 ALEXANDER HAIG TO THE PRESIDENT,	MEMO ALEXANDER HAIG TO THE PRESIDENT RE: MEETING WITH UK PRIME MINISTER MARGARET THATCHER AT THE CANCUN SUMMIT, DRAFT  PAPER NORTHERN IRELAND 1 10/13/1981  PAPER UNILATERALISM AND THE UK DEFENSE EFFORT  PAPER YUGOSLAVIA, DRAFT  1 ND  MEMO RICHARD ALLEN TO THE PRESIDENT, RE: CANCUN SUMMIT, OCTOBER 22-23, 1981  MEMO DUPLICATE OF THE #163086; ALEXANDER HAIG TO THE PRESIDENT,

#### The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

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ID	Document Type	
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ALEXANDER HAIG TO THE PRESIDENT RE: MEETING WITH UK PRIME MINISTER MARGARET THATCHER AT THE CANCUN SUMMIT, DRAFT

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243583 PAPER

1 10/13/1981

B1

NORTHERN IRELAND

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	Document Description	pages		tions

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1 10/13/1981

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UNILATERALISM AND THE UK DEFENSE EFFORT

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# DRAFT

#### UNITED KINGDOM



#### Background

The UK recession has probably hit bottom, and gross domestic product should rise about 1.5% in 1982, following a decline in 1980 and 1981. Inflation is down to about 11%, and productivity has begun to increase. Unemployment, however, has grown to 11.1%, and has provided Thatcher's opposition with needed political ammunition. She is determined to stay the course, and at the Commonwealth meeting in Melbourne she gave a ringing endorsement to the virtues of free enterprise and to your economic policies, strikingly similar to hers. Economic recovery in the UK in 1982 will be modest. The British remain skeptical about the opportunities for real progress on most development issues; share with us a strong desire to protect the international trading system and financial institutions; and support more reliance on the private sector. Their presidency of the EC and their political and economic stake in the Commonwealth have led them to accept resumption of Global Negotiations in the UN. British foreign aid, constrained by budget cuts, is viewed with an eye toward its tangible economic and political gains.

#### Questions

- -- I UNDERSTAND UNEMPLOYMENT IN THE UK IS A POLITICAL PROBLEM. WILL YOU BE ABLE TO CONTINUE TO RESIST PRESSURE TO CHANGE YOUR POLICIES?
- -- YOU HAVE EXPRESSED A SPECIFIC INTEREST IN ADEQUATE GLOBAL PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION OF FOOD SUPPLIES. I AGREE. HAVE YOU IDEAS AS TO HOW WE CAN WORK TOGETHER MORE CLOSELY TO THIS END?
- -- YOU ARE A NET EXPORTER OF ENERGY. DO YOUR DEVELOPMENT

  ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS EMPHASIZE ENERGY CONSERVATION AND

  PRODUCTION?
- -- IS YOUR CONCESSIONAL ASSISTANCE DESIGNED TO ACHIEVE SELF-SUSTAINING GROWTH?

RDS - 3 10/13/01

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# THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON



MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

Alexander M. Haig, Jr.

SUBJECT:

Your Meeting with Venezuelan President

Herrera in Cancun, October 21

#### I. THE SETTING

Our bilateral relations with Venezuela, an important trading partner and source of oil, are at what may be an all time high. Venezuela, a stable democracy, has been our principal ally on El Salvador and is one of the Nassau Four of the Caribbean Basin Initiative. Its foreign policy goals in the hemisphere largely coincide with ours but have stressed the economic, social and political rather than the military dimensions of Central American and Caribbean problems.

President Herrera Campins needs to boost his declining prestige at home. He has come under increasing fire for his economic policies which have resulted in stagflation and for his strong stand on Caribbean Basin issues. This has led to charges by opposition parties that the GOV is acting as a U.S. surrogate. Herrera is a friend of the United States. My and the Vice President's recent talks with him have gone very well.

#### II. OBJECTIVES

Develop a personal relationship with President Herrera and emphasize the positive U.S. program for addressing the problems of developing countries.

Explain how we see the Summit arriving at a successful conclusion, including how we would handle the issue of Global, Negotiations (GNs) in the UN General Assembly (UNGA) and a possible follow-on to the Summit.

Recognize the closeness of the U.S.-Venezuelan relationship, emphasizing the mutuality of our interests in the Caribbean Basin region.

GDS 10/13/87

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#### III. ISSUES

l. <u>Develop a personal relationship with President</u>
Herrera and emphasize the positive U.S. program for addressing the problems of developing countries.

Since our strategy for the Summit emphasizes functional, regional, and bilateral contacts over multilateral political participation, we need to impress Herrera with our sensitivity to the economic development problems of developing countries and to develop a useful relationship. The U.S. has a positive record of support, and -- as outlined in your speech in mid-October -- your Administration has a substantive program which integrates trace, investment, and international cooperation (especially in the areas of energy, food, and assistance for por countries) and advocates an international effort toward a "new era of growth." Our objective is to search for a genuine solution to the problem of development and to avoid the North vs. South polarization which too frequently has occurred in the past.

2. Explain how we see the Summit arriving at a successful conclusion, including how we would handle the issue of Global regotiations (GNs) in the UN General Assembly (UNGA) and possible follow-on to the Summit.

Herrera believes that the Summit will not be successful unless hereceives a clear indication that the industrialized countries as well as the LDC's are politically committed to GN within the UN framework. We believe that the informal exchange of views in themselves will be extremely valuable and that the two co-chairmen will have ample opportunity to proclaim a large measure of agreement on broad principles (interdependence, open trade, importance of food and energy problems), despite the lack of specific arrangements.

#### 3. Closeness of U.S.-Venezuelan Relations.

President Herrera will be making a state visit here in mid-November. Within the Caribbean Basin Venezuela has supported the Seaga government in Jamaica, encouraged democratic forces in Nicaragua and taken a strong stand against Cuban adventurism: The GOV is firmly committed to achieving a political solution in El Salvador through credible elections. Venezuela is one of the Nassau Four and has already established with Mexico a facility to assure oil supply and provide concessional financing to countries of this region.





# DRAFT

# THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON

State Warver 11/12/2017

#### CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Alexander M. Haig, Jr.

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Yugoslav President Kraigher

at Cancun

#### I. THE SETTING

Politically, Yugoslavia has come through the post-Tito period reasonably smoothly. However, severe economic difficulties and ethnic conflict, in the predominantly Albanian province of Kosovo, concern the regime. Yugoslavia is of critical importance to the United States both because it is a Communist state independent of Moscow and because of its leadership of moderate states within the Nonaligned Movement. Although we disagree with the Yugoslavs on some international issues, notably the Middle East and Southern Africa, our bilateral relations are good. The Yugoslavs support our stance against terrorism and are grateful for our efforts to halt attacks on Yugoslav diplomats in the U.S. They have spoken out strongly against Soviet attempts to pressure the Poles. On my visit to Belgrade in September, I reaffirmed U.S. support for Yugoslavia's independence, territorial integrity, and truly nonaligned foreign policy. We have encouraged U.S. commercial bankers to consider Yugoslav loan requests objectively, without being unduly influenced by problems in Poland and Romania.

Kraigher is an important member of the collective leadership in Yugoslavia. He is serving a one-year term as head of the Yugoslav Presidential Council. He will encourage you to be forthcoming in dealing with the underdeveloped countries at Cancun, and stress the importance the Yugoslavs place on U.S. participation in Global Negotiations. He may wish to discuss Southern Africa and U.S.-Soviet relations. Kraigher does not seem to have the degree of understanding for our positions that many other leading Yugoslavs have.

#### II. OBJECTIVES

- 1. Discuss the U.S. position on North-South dialogue, and underline our desire to work with Yugoslavia on the issue.
- 2. Declare support for Yugoslavia's efforts to cope with its economic problems and our desire to be helpful in this area.
- 3. Encourage the Yugoslavs to support U.S. efforts to pursue the Middle East peace process following Sadat's death.

#### CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

4. Explain briefly our position on the resumption of disarmament talks with the U.S.S.R.

#### III.ISSUES

#### 1. North-South Dialogue

Kraigher will press the Yugoslav view that Cancun is a great opportunity for the U.S. to take advantage of the developing nations' disenchantment with recent Soviet actions in the Third World. He will urge us to be forthcoming at Cancun and to agree to Global Negotiations. Your Administration has a substantive program which integrates trade, investment, and international cooperation. Our objective is to search for a genuine solution to the problem of development and to avoid the North vs. South polarization which too frequently has occurred in the past.

#### 2. The Yugoslav Economy

To cover Yugoslavia's hard currency balance of payments deficit, the Yugoslav Government has sought this year to obtain loans totaling over \$2 billion through commercial banks and foreign governments, over \$400 million of which they hope to borrow from U.S. banks. We will support these efforts, and at the Yugoslavs' request, have encouraged U.S. bankers to view these loan applications objectively. The Yugoslavs may come close to obtaining the financing they seek on the U.S. market. We are supportive of Yugoslav efforts to rationalize their economy and become more competitive in Western markets. We will continue to back their efforts to obtain financing.


#### 3. Middle East

The Yugoslavs have differed with us on our strong support for Israel in the past, and reacted ambivalently to the murder of President Sadat. However they fear for stability in the region. We want to underline our determination to support Egypt and to pursue the peace process. We wish to encourage the Yugoslavs to use their influence with the nonaligned, and particularly Arab states, to support our efforts in the area.

#### 4. U.S. - Soviet Arms Talks

The Yugoslavs have expressed understanding for our need to rebuild our armed forces before opening disarmament negotiations with the Soviets. They have, however, expressed concern that the resumption of disarmament talks will be extremely difficult if we wait too long. They may seek reassurance of our oft-stated position that, once the proper groundwork has been laid, we intend to negotiate with the Soviets toward substantial reductions in nuclear armaments.

# DEPARTMENT OF STATE BRIEFING PAPER



#### THE YUGOSLAV ECONOMY

By 1980 the Yugoslav economy had deteriorated following several years of growth. The Government adopted a three year stabilization program which restored somewhat the confidence of Western bankers. The Yugoslavs raised a large syndicated loan, and more than \$1 billion from Western governments. By the end of 1980, exports were up and imports declined, and the balance of payments deficit was cut about one-third. Inflation, though, continued at a rate of 40 %, despite a slowdown in overall economic activity.

In mid-January 1981, the IMF agreed to a three-year, \$2 billion standby arrangement. However, in the first five months of the year hard currency exports declined in real terms, and the cost of living was up 46% on an annual basis. The Government responded with tougher price controls, and serious consideration is now being given to rewriting both the 1981 plan and the 1981-85 plan. Guidelines are expected to remain the same in developing energy and raw material resources, converting agriculture into a net export earner and further development of tourism.

The poor economic results in 1981 have jeopardized Yugoslavia's borrowing plans. With an anticipated balance of payments deficit of \$1.8 billion, they hope to repeat their borrowing of 1980. But it appears that many U.S. banks, already edgy due to events in Poland and the Romanian financial crisis, are reluctant to increase their lending to Yugoslavia. While the Yugoslavs claim to have raised two-thirds of their borrowing needs, they need to show better results in the second half to avoid endangering the entire stabilization program.

The Yugoslav Government faces several long-term problems. Most serious of these is the extreme regional disparity in living standards, and another is ensuring future energy supplies. Regional differences make implementation of a centralized program difficult. A third problem is Yugoslavia's trade relations with the European Community and the Soviet Union. Yugoslavia's trade deficit with the EC is almost \$3 billion. The Soviet Union accounts for approximately 17% of Yugoslavia's trade, and supplies large amounts of Yugoslavia's energy imports. The Yugoslavs wish to prevent overdependence on USSR as an export market and as a supplier.

October 10, 1981

GDS 10/10/87

# DEPARTMENT OF STATE BRIEFING PAPER

State Warder

#### YUGOSLAVIA AND THE NORTH - SOUTH DIALOGUE

Yugoslavia is a founding member of the Nonaligned Movement (NAM) and, under the leadership of the late President Tito, played a significant role in the early phases of the North-South talks. Since Tito's death, Yugoslav influence with Third World states has waned somewhat, but Yugoslavia remains a leading spokesman for moderate states among the Nonaligned. The Yugoslavs are concerned that radical states are attempting to lead the NAM toward an increasingly pro-Soviet orientation.

The Yugoslavs have long viewed the North-South dialogue and Global Negotiations as means through which the Western nations, and particularly the United States, could restore their influence with the nonaligned and undercut the influence of the pro-Soviet radical nations. They feel that Cancun represents a unique opportunity for the U.S. to take advantage of the developing nations' disenchantment with recent Soviet policies and actions in the Third World by being sensitive to their needs and concerns. They stress that they view Global Negotiations not as a means of redistributing wealth, but of creating new wealth.

We value Yugoslav views on relations with the developing countries and are anxious to continue close consultations with Yugoslavia on the subject. While we consider that the key to economic progress for each nation lies in establishing a rational and fundamentally sound domestic economic policy, we also realize the value of international cooperation. We will want to assure the Yugoslavs that we approach the Cancun talks with an open mind, and that we are willing to discuss any reasonable proposals.

October 9, 1981

GDS 10/9/87

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
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
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YUGOSLAVIA, DRAFT

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State Treasury			Allen		
Defense Attorney General			Anderson		
Interior Agriculture			Garrick	0,	
Commerce Labor			Darman (For WH Staffing)	B	
HHS HUD			Gray		
Transportation Energy			Beal		
Education Counsellor					
OMB CIA			\ <u></u>	□ .	
UN USTR					

Remarks:

The attached just arrived and should be considered in revising Cancun briefing materials.

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**RETURN TO:** 

Craig L. Fuller

Deputy Assistant to the President

Director,

Office of Cabinet Administration

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# The International Meeting on Cooperation and Development


October 1981





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MR. FULLER



#### DEPARTMENT OF STATE



Washington, D.C. 20520

#### PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PARTICIPATION

IN

#### THE INTERNATIONAL MEETING ON COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT

CANCUN, MEXICO OCTOBER 21-23, 1981

PLENARY SESSIONS: MULTILATERAL ECONOMIC ISSUES

#### Table of Contents

- I. OVERVIEW/OBJECTIVES (Scope Paper)
- II. SCENARIO/SCHEDULES
  - -- Skeleton Schedule
  - -- Scenario
  - -- List of Delegations

#### III. OFFICIAL STATEMENTS

- -- Departure Statement
- -- National Statement at Cancun
- IV. MULTILATERAL ECONOMIC ISSUES -- SUMMIT PLENARY SESSIONS
  - -- Food Security and Agricultural Development
    - 1. President's Briefing Memorandum
    - 2. Point Papers
      - -- Developing Country Food Production
      - -- Agricultural Development Assistance
      - -- Food Aid
      - -- International Grain Reserves

#### -- Commodities, Trade and Industrialization

- 1. President's Briefing Memorandum
- 2. Point Papers
  - -- Multifiber Arrangement
  - -- International Commodity Agreements and the Common Fund
  - -- Developing Countries in GATT
  - -- MTN and Developing Countries
  - -- Generalized System of Preferences (GSP)
  - -- EC Trade Policy

#### -- Energy

- 1. President's Briefing Memorandum
- 2. Point Papers
  - -- Energy Development in Developing Countries
  - -- World Bank "Energy Affiliate" and Expanded Energy Lending
  - -- Lopez Portillo World Energy Plan

#### -- Monetary and Finance

- 1. President's Briefing Memorandum
- 2. Point Papers
  - -- Total Financial Flows to Developing Countries
  - -- U.S. Contributions to the Multilateral Development Banks
  - -- IMF Issues
  - -- Developing Country Debt Burden
  - -- U.S. Economic Assistance Program

#### -- Global Negotiations (GNs)

- 1. President's Briefing Memorandum
- 2. Guidance on Global Negotiations (for external use)
- Guidance on Global Negotiations (for <u>internal</u> use):
   October 13, 1981, Cabinet Council Memorandum

- 4. Point Papers
  - -- Excerpts from U.S. National Statement at Cancun
  - -- UNGA Resolution 34/138
  - -- U.S. Statement on Resolution 34/138
  - -- The UNGA President's Text on Procedures and Agenda for Global Negotiations (von Wechmar paper), December 14, 1980
  - -- Ottawa Summit Communique, July 1981
  - -- Cancun Foreign Ministers' Statement, August, 1981
  - -- The President's Invitation to Cancun
  - -- The President's Reply to the Invitation

#### -- Additional Point Papers

- -- Table: Economic Relations with Developing Country Participants
- -- Implication of the U.S. Economic Recovery Program for Developing Countries
- -- Role of the Private Sector
- -- Brandt Commission Report
- -- Population
- -- Development-Oriented Science and Technology
- -- Law of the Sea

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RICHARD ALLEN TO THE PRESIDENT, RE: CANCUN SUMMIT, OCTOBER 22-23, 1981

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4 10/8/1981

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