Subject: White House School of the Association for Retarded Citizens, Williamsburg, VA, declining their Autistic Special Needs on May 32, 72. We agree with their decision to change their date due to the White House, Economic Seminar in Williamsburg on 28-30 May 1982.

Comments: 

Keep this worksheet attached to the original incoming letter. 
Send all routing updates to Central Reference (Room 75, OEOB). 
Always return completed correspondence record to Central Files. 
Refer questions about the correspondence tracking system to Central Reference, ext. 2590.
Dear Paul:

Thank you for your letter of December 8 outlining the problems facing the Association for Retarded Citizens for the Greater Williamsburg Area with respect to their plans for holding an antiques show and sale in May. In your letter you indicated that the Association had been requested to alter their plans in order to accommodate the Economic Summit Meeting.

I appreciate your interest in contacting us in this matter. In order to ensure that these concerns are afforded prompt and careful consideration, I have taken the liberty of bringing your letter to the attention of the appropriate advisory staff members. You should be hearing further as additional information becomes available.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

Kenneth M. Duberstein
Assistant to the President

The Honorable Paul Trible
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

KMD:CMP:KRJ:rs--

cc: w/copy of inc to Bill Henkel - for DIRECT response

WH RECORDS MANAGEMENT HAS RETAINED ORIGINAL
Mr. Kenneth M. Duberstein  
Assistant to the President for Legislative Affairs  
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. Duberstein:

I am writing in behalf of the Association for Retarded Citizens for the Greater Williamsburg Area in Williamsburg, Virginia. This very worthwhile organization has one major fund raising project each year which provides approximately 70 per cent of its yearly budget. This fund raising event is the sponsorship of an antiques show and sale in William and Mary Hall on the campus of The College of William and Mary.

A problem has arisen with the next antiques show which is scheduled for May 20-22, 1983. This is one week prior to the White House planned Economic Summit meeting in Williamsburg, May 28-30, 1983. Although the Association for Retarded Citizens had reserved William and Mary Hall as early as May, 1982, they have been asked to move the date or location of their antiques show so that preparations can be made to use William and Mary Hall for press coverage of the Economic Summit Meeting.

While I realize that the Summit is of major international importance, it would appear that preparations could be made without placing an undue hardship on the Association for Retarded Citizens. This group has strong community backing and has worked hard for the past five years to make the antiques show grow into a profit-making project which allows them to serve the needs of the retarded citizens. To move the date would be most detrimental since that involves the schedules of over 75 antiques dealers from many of the east coast states who have already signed contracts to do this show. Moreover, there is no other adequate space in Williamsburg to house a show of this magnitude. The show has become so popular that visitors to Williamsburg have actually planned their vacations and made reservations to coincide with the event.
Mr. Kenneth M. Duberstein

December 8, 1982

It would appear that holding an antiques show in one portion of one building one week prior to the Economic Summit Meeting would pose no security problems and not seriously hamper preparations for the meeting. I am sure you would agree that raising unnecessary community resentment over this situation is undesirable.

I would appreciate any assistance you can offer in satisfactorily resolving this problem for the Association for Retarded Citizens. Thank you very much for your help.

Sincerely,

Paul Trible

PST:dsj

Tower Box 59
2101 Executive Drive
Hampton, Virginia 23666
# Staffing Memorandum

**Date:** 3/14/83  
**Action/Concurrence/Comment Due By:** FYI

**Subject:** Williamsburg Summit

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**Remarks:**

*Please return this tracking sheet with your response*

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**Edwin L. Harper**  
Assistant to the President  
for Policy Development
MEMORANDUM FOR ROGER PORTER

FROM: ED HARPER

SUBJECT: Williamsburg Summit

- Logistics in good shape
- Substance has problems
- Sherpa meeting today at 3 p.m. and discussion with President on Monday

Historic Perception

Economic and Foreign Policy will be the back dogs as opposed to problems and promises at prior meetings.

Theme

- Informal business like working summit.
- Thus no spectacles ... low profile.
- Holistic approach.
- Jobs and Growth.
- East - West relations.

Sherpa Meetings 16th - 18th of March in San Diego

- January 28th, letter from the President to other participants urging focus on 1) Economic Policy, 2) Economic Institutions, and 3) East - West relations.
- A. Wallis has lead.
- No pre-negotiated communique.
- Heads alone one third to one half of time.
Action Possibilities

- Finance and Trade Ministers meet regularly as multilateral task initiative - wise man's group may lead.

- Department strategy: support IMF, encourage reform by debtors, economic expansion.

Prenegotiated Papers and Activities

- Papers prepared by Ministers for their principals.

- If principals agree to reconsideration in the papers, then these can be put out as Summit products.

Logistics

- Plan: No note takers or interpreters in the Principals - only sessions. Use TV/audio book-ups.

The type of issues which the President needs to be briefed on:

- International Debt

- GATT: International Banking System Forbes articles

* one half hour every Friday to brief the President

Press

- 6,000 press people are expected to cover the Summit.

Bilaterals

- Trudeau in April early.

- Kohl in late April.

- Other proposals expected for late May.

- Thatcher: last week before Williamsburg.
# Staffing Memorandum

**Date:** 3/14/83

**Subject:** Various Summit Topics

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**Remarks:**

Please return this tracking sheet with your response

Edwin L. Harper  
Assistant to the President  
for Policy Development
MEMORANDUM FOR ROGER PORTER

FROM: EDWIN L. HARPER

SUBJECT: Various Summit Topics

Domestic Issues
Interest Rates
Fiscal Policy
Monetary Policy

International Policies
Debt
Export Subsidies
Protectionism
East-West Trade
North-South Relationships
Exchange Rate Coordination
OFFICE OF POLICY DEVELOPMENT

**STAFFING MEMORANDUM**

**DATE:** 3/14/83  **ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY:** __FYI________

**SUBJECT:** Various Summit Topics

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**REMARKS:**

Please return this tracking sheet with your response

Edwin L. Harper
Assistant to the President for Policy Development
(x6515)
MEMORANDUM FOR ROGER PORTER

FROM: EDWIN L. HARPER

SUBJECT: Various Summit Topics

Domestic Issues
Interest Rates
Fiscal Policy
Monetary Policy

International Policies
Debt
Export Subsidies
Protectionism
East-West Trade
North-South Relationships
Exchange Rate Coordination
**STAFFING MEMORANDUM**

**DATE:** 3/16/83  
**ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY:** OPEN

**SUBJECT:** Williamsburg Issue Papers

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**Action/Concurrence/Comment**

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**ACTION:**

- DRUG POLICY
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- D. LEONARD
- OFFICE OF POLICY INFORMATION
- HOPKINS
- PROPERTY REVIEW BOARD
- OTHER

**REMINDERS:**

- Please return this tracking sheet with your response

---

Edwin L. Harper  
Assistant to the President for Policy Development
A corrective from Gatt

The GATT secretariat's first retrospective glance at 1982, a year in which world trade volume declined by an estimated 2 per cent, could hardly have been expected to be cheerful. But its gloomy prognosis for the impending economic recovery is quite another matter.

The secretariat has genuine doubts about how far the monetary stimulus that began last summer will be translated into output rather than prices. It also makes an implicit assertion that the building blocks for sustained non-inflationary recovery in output and employment are far from being in place.

Seen from Geneva, the signs of an upturn in the construction and consumer sectors look real enough. The GATT economists also draw some comfort from the recent change in the relationship between real wages and real interest rates: the disappearance of negative rates should help whittle down the existing bias in favour of labour-saving investment.

Their worry is rather that the focus of policy is both too short-term, and too heavily weighted on the macro-economic stimulus, to make the best of the opportunity which this cyclical upturn presents.

Backlog

In a thinly veiled critique of recent American and British policy the secretariat argues that both demand management and monetarist policies have been a soft option for politicians: they appear to remove the obligation to confront the special interest groups that put a brake on micro-economic change. The outcome is that relative prices have become less flexible, market signals are weakened and investment, both in plant and machinery and in labour skills, fails to respond adequately to changes in demand.

The result of these distortions is that a backlog of structural adjustment has built up. Attempts to escape from recession via expansionary policies has increased inflation to levels that will feed back into the economy and reduce the chances of a non-inflationary recovery.

Reforms

The GATT analysis is perhaps too narrowly confined to those constraints on investment that stem from the baroque panoply of trade restrictions, subsidies and other politicised forms of pricing. Investment decisions can also be affected by prices that are the very opposite of inflexible, most notably in the foreign exchange markets where volatile currency movements can wreck the investor's assumptions about relative costs in no time. The uncertainty over oil, which bears crucially on so many investment decisions, also deserves greater emphasis.

Indeed, much of the appeal of protectionism today lies in its proponents' claim that it can help stabilise conditions in an otherwise dangerously uncertain world.

It follows that the key GATT policy prescriptions for the world economy and the debt crisis—budgetary reform and trade policy reform directed towards rehabilitating the price system—are not, in themselves, enough. Moves towards currency stabilisation and continuing efforts to promote investment in non-OPEC energy sources are a precondition of lasting recovery.

Together these proposals represent an ambitious prospectus for the Williamsburg summit in May. But a meeting of minds at Williamsburg is only the first step. The assault on the micro-economic distortions implicit in the policies of the IMF, the World Bank and the GATT itself will have to be matched by a much more serious commitment from the financial markets.
How to raise steel costs

WHEN politicians override commercial decisions - the results are likely to be expensive. That is the message from the report published yesterday by the House of Commons Trade and Industry Committee on the British Steel Corporation.

British Steel has five large integrated works, including three strip mills, one of which is at Ravenscraig in Scotland. When the committee asked Mr Ian MacGregor, chairman of BSC, how much excess capacity he had on the strip mill side of the business, he replied "about two strip mills." Yet last December Mr Patrick Jenkin, Secretary of State for Industry, instructed Mr MacGregor to keep Ravenscraig open.

The committee took the view that this was a political rather than an economic decision. Members were not impressed by Mr Jenkin's attempts to justify the decision on economic grounds. They regarded Mr MacGregor's assessment of likely trends in demand - not much change in annual steel requirements for the foreseeable future - as more realistic than that of the Secretary of State.

Penalty

BSC's installed capacity in 1982-83 is 21.2m tonnes of liquid steel per annum, while milled capacity is 15.2m tonnes and production is expected to be only 11.8m tonnes. In other words 44 per cent of installed capacity is standing idle. The only sensible course, given the outlook for demand, is to concentrate production on fewer sites. The committee estimates that the Ravenscraig decision will add more than £10 to the cost of each tonne of finished steel sold, before taking into account the effects of inflation in the future. Losses will be increased, of profits reduced, by about £20m a year.

This could make it difficult for the Secretary of State to accept and agree to further terms of a friendly management team, let alone increase its size. The Government is interested in the development of the steel industry, but the Government to finance directly the increased operating costs arising from the Ravenscraig decision since they result from non-commercial actions imposed on the Corporation.

Mr MacGregor, not surprisingly, regarded that suggestion as somewhat academic. After all he, or his successor, has to live with the practical consequences of the decision, as with other government interventions which increase the BSC's costs.

An interesting appendix to the committee's report contains a BSC estimate of the impact of government intervention on steel industries in Europe. In 1981 BSC received grants and loans equivalent to a subsidy of £40 per tonne of crude steel, far higher than any other EEC steel industry. France was the nearest with grants and loans of £11 per tonne. BSC argues that this figure has to be taken together with the costs of state intervention, such as maintaining surplus plant for reasons of employment protection; this "negative subsidy" amounted to £7 per tonne for BSC in 1981. In addition, according to BSC, a further penalty of £5 per tonne arises from the fact that, through government policy, it pays higher prices for gas, electricity and fuel oil than its rivals on the Continent.

The detailed figures may be open to question, but they do illustrate how the Government can take away with one hand what it gives with the other - and is doing so damage the prospects of the steel industry and its customers.

Even with the most favourable government policies British Steel faces a difficult future. As Mr MacGregor pointed out to the committee, some of the newer steel-producing countries have much lower costs than those faced by the older industrial countries. It is conceivable, he suggested, that in the long run production of crude steel will shift towards areas where the raw material is cheap and energy is available, while finishing and processing activities will remain close to the major markets. But this is no more than a long-term possibility. In the meantime British Steel has some advantages, not least the fact that its biggest crude steel works have good deepwater locations and thus can receive raw materials at competitive costs. If Mr MacGregor's drive for higher productivity is - according to Mr Jenkin - a viable industry drive, the Government should be careful not to make the task harder than it need be.
**White House Correspondence Tracking Worksheet**

- **Date Correspondence Received (Y/M/D):** 1/1

- **Name of Correspondent:** Michael A. Macarthur Jr.

- **User Codes:** (A) (B) (C)

- **Subject:** Possibility Of Copyrighting the 1983 Summit Of Industrialized Nations Log

### Route To:

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### Action

- **Originator:** 83/03/29
- **Referral Note:** D 83/03/29 0 83/04/06 FF A83/04/06
- **Referral Note:**

### Disposition

- **Completion Date and Code:**
  - **Type:** Answered
  - **Originator:**
  - **Date of Outgoing Response Code:**

### Action Codes:

- A: Appropriate Action
- C: Comment/Recommendation
- D: Draft Response
- F: Furnish Fact Sheet
  to be used as Enclosure

### Disposition Codes:

- A: Answered
- B: Non-Special Referral
- C: Completed
- S: Suspended

### Comments:

Keep this worksheet attached to the original incoming letter.
Send all routing updates to Central Reference (Room 75, OEOB).
Always return completed correspondence record to Central Files.
Refer questions about the correspondence tracking system to Central Reference, ext. 2590.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 6, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR MICHAEL A. McMANUS
DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: FRED F. FIELDING Orig. signed by FFF
COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Protection of Williamsburg Summit Logo

You have asked for our thoughts on the possibility of copyrighting the 1983 Summit of Industrialized Nations logo in order to prevent its commercialization. Under 17 U.S.C. § 105, "[c]opyright protection . . . is not available for any work of the United States Government . . . ." This precludes copyrighting the Summit logo.

If it is really necessary to protect the Summit logo, it may be possible to establish the logo as the official seal of the Economic Summit office. As a seal the logo would be protected by 18 U.S.C. § 506. This provision imposes criminal penalties on anyone who falsely makes, forges, or counterfeits an agency seal, or uses or possesses such a falsely made seal. Unfortunately, there is no established "agency" known as the "Economic Summit".

Designating the logo as an official seal would be highly unusual for a temporary, ad hoc office such as the Summit office. In light of these facts you should consider how serious the threat of commercialization of the logo actually is. There are, of course, criminal and civil penalties for any person or organization that attempts to promote any article if it fraudulently misleads the public to believe it is connected with, or sanctioned by, the Federal government. But you can imagine the problems of proof in that!

In short, our best bet for control is to strongly discourage inquiries, and to be quite free in our statements that no one is "authorized". Given the article in the NYT we discussed, the press may help in that effort.

Sorry . . .

FFF: JGR: FFF: dgh 4/6/83

cc: FFPfielding
    JGRoberts
    Subj
    Chron
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
April 1, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR FRED F. FIELDING

FROM: JOHN G. ROBERTS

SUBJECT: Protection of Williamsburg Summit Logo

Michael McManus has asked for your thoughts regarding the possibility of copyrighting the logo of the Williamsburg Summit, to prevent its commercialization. Copyright protection is not available for any work of the United States government, 17 U.S.C. § 105, nor would trademark protection appear available, since the logo is not to be used in commerce, see 15 U.S.C. § 1051.

If it is necessary to protect the logo, the best approach would seem to be to establish the logo as an official seal. The logo would then be protected by 18 U.S.C. § 506, which provides:

Whoever falsely makes, forges, counterfeits, mutilates, or alters the seal of any department or agency of the United States; or

Whoever knowingly uses, affixes, or impresses any such fraudulently made, forged, counterfeited, mutilated, or altered seal to or upon any certificate, instrument, commission, document, or paper, of any description; or

Whoever, with fraudulent intent, possesses any such seal, knowing the same to have been so falsely made, forged, counterfeited, mutilated, or altered —

Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

The term "agency" as used in 18 U.S.C. § 506 is defined broadly in 18 U.S.C. § 6 to include "any department, independent establishment, commission, administration, authority, board or bureau of the United States," which would seem to embrace the Economic Summit office.

The logo could be established as a seal by executive order. Seals have been so established, to cite a few examples, for the Office of Administration of the Executive Office of the
Those agencies, and most agencies with a seal, are "permanent" entities, unlike the ephemeral Economic Summit, which will be of only historic interest after Memorial Day. I can, however, think of no way to protect the logo other than establishing it as a seal. As an initial matter, I would question whether such protection is really necessary. It is hard for me to imagine commercialization of the logo. The Summit is not a tourist event, and I think any concern about Economic Summit T-shirts, pennants, and caps is probably exaggerated.

I have prepared a memorandum to McManus advising him that no copyright protection is available. The draft memorandum notes the possibility of establishing the logo as a protected seal, but questions the need to do so.

Attachment
MEMORANDUM FOR MICHAEL A. McMANUS  
DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT  

FROM: FRED F. FIELDING  
COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT  

SUBJECT: Protection of Williamsburg Summit Logo

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copyrighting the 1983 Summit of Industrialized Nations logo 
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any work of the United States Government . . . ". This  
precludes copyrighting the Summit logo.

If it is really necessary to protect the Summit logo, it may  
be possible to establish the logo as the official seal of  
the Economic Summit office. As a seal the logo would be  
protected by 18 U.S.C. § 506. This provision imposes  
criminal penalties on anyone who falsely makes, forges, or  
counterfeits an agency seal, or uses or possesses such a  
false seal.

Designating the logo as an official seal would, however,  
require a formal executive order, and it would be highly  
unusual for a temporary, ad hoc office such as the Summit  
ofic to have an official seal. In light of these facts  
you should consider how serious the threat of commercializa-
tion of the logo actually is.

In short, our best bet for control is to strongly  
disapprove piracies, and to be quite free in our  
statements that no one is "authorized." Given the  
control in the NYT we discussed, the Press may help in  
Sirry...
MEMORANDUM FOR FRED F. FIELDING
FROM: MICHAEL, A. McMANUS, JR.

March 28, 1983

I would appreciate your thoughts regarding the possibility of copyrighting the 1983 Summit of Industrialized Nations logo in order to prevent the commercialization of it. If this is feasible, please let me know what steps need to be taken to accomplish obtaining the copyright.

Thank you.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: MARTIN FELDSTEIN

SUBJECT: EUROPEAN CONCERNS AT WILLIAMSBURG

May 4, 1983

Last week, while I was in Europe for an OECD meeting, I spoke with key government officials in London, Paris and Rome. In these conversations I repeatedly heard six comments that I think you are likely to hear at Williamsburg. Here is a summary of these comments and of the points that I made in reply:

1. "The United States should expand more rapidly."
   - We expect the U.S. economy to grow at more than 4.5 percent this year, faster than any of the major European countries.
   - Using more expansionary monetary or fiscal policy would be a mistake because it would cause inflation to rise.
   - Higher inflation could lead to a subsequent slowdown which could cause an early end to the recovery.

2. "We need a coordinated policy of expansion among the major industrial countries."
   - That's just a disguised way of saying that the U.S., Germany and Japan should expand faster.
   - While we'd be pleased to see a strong recovery in Europe and Japan, that would not change U.S. policy. Coordination is therefore irrelevant for us.
   - We don't want to tell other countries how to manage their affairs, but we hope that countries will converge toward a policy of price stability.
3. "The United States should lower its interest rates."
   - Our interest rates have come down substantially since Versailles, reflecting the fall in expected inflation in the United States. Further declines in expected inflation will reduce interest rates further.
   - The real long-term interest rate -- the difference between the interest rate on bonds and the expected rate of inflation -- will come down when the prospective budget deficit in the out-years is reduced. The Administration has proposed spending cuts and tax increases that would eliminate two-thirds of the budget deficit by 1987-88.

4. "The United States should intervene more actively in foreign exchange markets to stabilize the dollar."
   - Exchange rate intervention cannot offset the substantial exchange rate shifts that are caused by such fundamental factors as changes in inflation, budget deficits, and the price of oil.
   - To reduce these swings, countries should converge to stable prices at home.
   - Businesses can protect themselves from much of the exchange risk involved in trade by using forward markets and overseas financing. Countries that limit such transactions (France and Italy) are hurting their own businesses.

5. "The United States should reduce the value of the dollar relative to other currencies."
   - We do not favor an artificially strong dollar which hurts U.S. exporters and U.S. firms that compete with imports from abroad.
   - When Congress agrees to the Administration's request to reduce out-year budget deficits, the long-term interest rate in the U.S. will decline. This will make it less attractive for foreigners to invest in dollars and the dollar will decline.
   - Exchange rate intervention cannot reduce the dollar's value as long as the real interest rate remains high.
6. "The strong dollar keeps our import costs high and prevents us from getting our inflation down." (Italy and France made this point.)

- A drop in the dollar would give only a relatively small one-time decline in import costs.
- The only way to get inflation down is by controlling domestic monetary policy and domestic demand.
- Several European countries have reduced inflation to six percent or less despite the strong dollar (e.g., Germany, U.K., Holland).
**WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM**

**DATE:** 5/5/83

**SUBJECT:** EUROPEAN CONCERNS AT WILLIAMSBURG — CEA MEMO OF 5/4

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**Remarks:**

The original has been forwarded to the President.

**Response:**

File Closed

Richard G. Darman  
Assistant to the President  
(x2702)
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: MARTIN FELDSTEIN

SUBJECT: EUROPEAN CONCERNS AT WILLIAMSBURG

Last week, while I was in Europe for an OECD meeting, I spoke with key government officials in London, Paris and Rome. In these conversations I repeatedly heard six comments that I think you are likely to hear at Williamsburg. Here is a summary of these comments and of the points that I made in reply:

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   - Higher inflation could lead to a subsequent slowdown which could cause an early end to the recovery.

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- The real long-term interest rate -- the difference between the interest rate on bonds and the expected rate of inflation -- will come down when the prospective budget deficit in the out-years is reduced. The Administration has proposed spending cuts and tax increases that would eliminate two-thirds of the budget deficit by 1987-88.

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- To reduce these swings, countries should converge to stable prices at home.

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- The only way to get inflation down is by controlling domestic monetary policy and domestic demand.

- Several European countries have reduced inflation to six percent or less despite the strong dollar (e.g., Germany, U.K., Holland).
# Staffing Memorandum

**Date:** 3/27/83  
**Action/Concurrence/Comment Due By:** FYI  
**Subject:** Williamsburg Summit Briefings with the President

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**Remarks:**

Mar 22 memo to Earl Harper from Roger Porter

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Edwin L. Harper  
Assistant to the President for Policy Development (x6515)
MEMORANDUM FOR EDWIN L. HARPER
FROM: ROGER B. PORTER
SUBJECT: Williamsburg Summit Briefings with the President

Since our conversation this morning I have spoken with Allen Wallis, Under Secretary of State of Economic Affairs and our chief sherpah for the Williamsburg Summit, and with some people at Treasury.

Allen informs me that the session tentatively scheduled for this Friday, March 25, is the first in a series of briefings with the President scheduled over the next six weeks. The March 25 session will focus on the economic policies and prospects of the other summit countries.

The Departments of State and the Treasury are taking responsibility for the preparation of papers for the session. Wallis was grateful for our offer of assistance but said that you would be enough and that they had the paper preparation well in hand.

I also learned that the tentative schedule of subjects for the coming weeks includes:

1. Economic Policies and Prospects of Other Summit Countries
2. Economic Policy Coordination Initiative
3. Exchange Rate Policies
4. Trade
5. Debt and Finance
6. Economic Institutions
7. East-West Issues
# Staffing Memorandum

**DATE:** 4/5/83  
**ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY:** fyi FyI  
**SUBJECT:** Williamsburg Preparation  

## Remarks:

Attached are charts—change in short-term interest rates of Summit Countries.

Please return this tracking sheet with your response.

Edwin L. Harper  
Assistant to the President  
for Policy Development  
(x6515)
MEMORANDUM FOR ROGER PORTER
FROM: EDWIN L. HARPER
SUBJECT: Williamsburg Preparation

History
Roumboulet Summit decisions included in IMF.

Savings in Capital Movement Make $ Stronger Than Trade Justifies

- Strong $ or weak Yen.
- Inflation kept interest rates high and encouraged inflow of capital to the U.S. keeping $ high.

"Surveillance" (result of Roumboulet)

- Orderly growth & price stability responsibility of individual countries.
- Exchange rate system is a legitimate subject for discussion. But not the extensive intervention that Mitterand wants.

Attachments
CHANGE IN SHORT-TERM INTEREST RATES OF SUMMIT COUNTRIES

NOTE: Change is difference between observation and rate of January 1981. Short-term interest rates used are monthly averages of three-month rates on Wednesdays, except latest observation which is March 28, 1983. Short-term interest rates shown are: U.S. - New York C.D.; U.K. - London Interbank; France - Paris Call Money; Germany - Frankfurt Interbank; Italy - Milan Money; Canada - Canada Finance Paper.
NOTE: All short-term interest rates are monthly averages of three-month rates on Wednesdays, except latest observation which is March 28, 1983. Short-term interest rates shown are: U.S. - New York C.D.; U.K. - London Interbank; France - Paris Call Money; Germany - Frankfurt Interbank; Japan - Yen Call Money; Italy - Milan Money; Canada - Canada Finance Paper.