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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF RECORDS MANAGEMENT
(WHORM): SUBJECT FILE

Withdrawer

DLB 1/3/2020

File Folder FO006-07 (238371) (3 OF 6)

FOIA

F16-011

Box Number

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
244193	CARDS	TALKING POINTS RE: EAST-WEST RELATIONS IN CARD FORMAT	2	ND	B1
244194	PAPER	EAST-WEST RELATIONS (SUMMARY)	1	ND	B1
244195	PAPER	EAST-WEST RELATIONS (TALKING POINTS)	3	ND	B1
244196	CARDS	TALKING POINTS RE: TERRORISM IN CARD FORMAT	1	ND	B1
244197	PAPER	TERRORISM (TALKING POINTS)	2	ND	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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11. Arms Control

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ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

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Authority State Waiver
BY dh NARA DATE 1/2/2020

SETTING

-- Most key Allies, including Japan, believe a Western concession on INF would be counterproductive at this time. Nevertheless, continued Soviet refusal to return to the table as long as US INF deployments remain -- and efforts to put relations in the deep freeze generally -- has led some Allies to seek gestures that would signal Western openness to new approaches. Italian PM Craxi's ill-considered remarks about a moratorium on deployments have been quietly buried. Our most pressing problem remains Dutch waffling on INF basing. This is not an appropriate issue for Summit deliberations, but you will want to stress in your bilaterals with key Allies the importance of the Dutch meeting their obligations.

-- Outer space is emerging as a potentially divisive arms control area for the West. There is concern about some aspects of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), which we have tried to allay in bilateral consultations with all of the Summit countries, as well as in regular NATO channels. Similar concerns have been raised by some Allies about our position on anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, with several (most notably the Germans, Italians and Canadians) calling for the US to agree to an ASAT arms control initiative.

-- Our Allies are pleased with US introduction of a draft chemical weapons treaty into the Conference on Disarmament (CD); nevertheless, Japan, the FRG, and France have privately objected to the intrusiveness of our challenge inspection provisions. The NATO Allies also agreed to table a new Western MBFR proposal based on a US concept. The FRG would have preferred greater concessions to the East, while the UK was concerned that our proposal went too far. There is continued disagreement in the Alliance on what further verification measures should be adopted.

-- The Western position in the Stockholm European security conference (CDE) has held firm thus far. We and the Allies presented early a package of concrete confidence- and security-building measures, while the Soviets have finally come forward with proposals of their own, which focus on unverifiable but politically attractive measures, such as non-use of force. The Germans and Italians want Western agreement to explore these measures, in order to improve prospects for final agreement. We have told the Allies we want to focus discussion on the concrete Western proposals, but do not rule out some treatment of non-use of force in a final document.

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ARMS CONTROL: INF/START

-- Have come thru difficult period, emerged in strong position. Sovs compounding their mistakes.

-- Williamsburg Declaration helped confirm Western unity; must sustain it.

-- On INF, must continue to fulfill 79 decision, stress readiness to negotiate.

-- Cannot accept Sov position that negotiations only possible if they are given veto over our security decisions.

1 of 2

ARMS CONTROL: START/INF

-- Our position on START/INF flexible; always willing discuss ways to bridge gaps.

-- Negotiating record, and NATO decision to reduce nuke stockpile by 1400 weapons, evidence of commitment to maintain deterrence at lowest possible force level.

-- Bottom line: Sov intransigence, not Western initiative, responsible for impasse.

-- Western firmness and solidarity are keys to restoring full arms control process.

2 of 2

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INF/START

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Authority State Waiver
BY dlz DATE 1/2/2020

Your Objectives

-- Strengthen Western unity and resolve on central security/arms control issues.

-- Deepen Allied confidence in our willingness to negotiate without preconditions, and to be flexible when talks resume, and underscore the need to increase public understanding of our position.

Watch Out For

-- Suggestions to reconsider the exclusion of British and French systems from US-Soviet nuclear arms talks.

Talking Points

-- We have come through a very difficult period on INF, and emerged in a strong position. The Soviets are compounding their miscalculation of last year by continuing to play the heavy.

-- Williamsburg helped establish strong Western unity of last fall, when the pressure was greatest. Equally essential now to maintain solidarity.

-- On INF, implementing 1979 NATO decision is solid basis for our policy. Beyond that, we must emphasize West's many actions to foster a more productive dialogue with the East.

-- We must stress our readiness to negotiate on INF, and to pursue serious discussions when the Soviets return to the talks. Soviet position amounts to saying they can only negotiate if NATO gives them a veto over our security decisions. If we make this clear, publics will understand that we cannot accept preconditions.

-- Our position in both INF and START is flexible. We have repeatedly expressed willingness to discuss ways to bridge gaps between the two sides -- any time, any place.

-- Our record in the INF talks, together with the reductions in NATO's nuclear stockpile resulting from the Montebello Decision, is evidence of our serious approach to maintaining deterrence at the lowest possible level of forces.

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- 2 -

-- We can help make our case by citing our flexibility and seriousness in arms control negotiations still open. CDE has most interesting opportunities.

-- Bottom line is that Soviet intransigence, not lack of Western initiative, is responsible for current East-West situation. It would be completely misguided to negotiate new concessions with ourselves in a vain effort to please the Soviets.

-- (if raised) The West cannot agree to including British and French systems in U.S. negotiations with the Soviets. In effect, the Soviets are trying to legitimize and codify a "right" to nuclear weapons equal to those of the rest of the world combined.

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ARMS CONTROL: SDI/OSAC

I. Strategic Defense Initiative

-- Program necessary, prudent response to long-term Sov R&D program; consistent with treaty obligations.

-- SDI may enhance deterrence, free us from threat of nuke retaliation to prevent war. Objective: enhance security for all.

-- No decision on SDI till research complete, next decade. Any decision made with close consultations. Deployment itself would be for next century. Any system could be extended Europe.

1 of 2

ARMS CONTROL: SDI/OSAC

-- Have told Sovs of interest in discussions of SDI; haven't agreed to talk.

II. Outer Space Arms Control

-- As March 31 Report to Congress indicated, must consider problems before deciding whether specific measures verifiable and compatible with security interests.

-- Study continues; must consult closely to maintain unity at CD and UN.

2 of 2

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STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE/OUTER SPACE ARMS CONTROL

Your Objectives

-- Reassure the Allies that we will protect their interests while carrying out Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) research.

-- Note that US is actively considering whether space arms control measures beyond those already in effect would be verifiable and in US/Allied security interest.

Watch Out For

-- Continuing doubts, particularly from FRG and possibly UK, about SDI's implications.

-- Allied eagerness to move ahead with a Western initiative on outer space arms control, especially as several (Canada, FRG, Italy) are on record favoring a ban on high-altitude anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons.

Talking Points

I. SDI

-- The Soviets have for years been heavily engaged in R&D on military applications of lasers, other beam weapons.

-- Our long-term SDI research program -- fully consistent with treaty obligations -- is a necessary, prudent response.

-- SDI may also offer promise of enhancing deterrence, freeing us from reliance on threat of instant nuclear retaliation to prevent war. We won't know that until research is complete.

-- No decision on SDI deployment possible until research is completed, in next decade. Any such decision would be made in close consultation with our Allies. Deployment itself would be for the next century.

-- Meanwhile, we will continue to consult closely with all of you. SDI objective is to increase security of our Allies as well as the U.S.

-- We have told the Soviets of our interest in government-to-government discussions on defensive technology implications, and made specific suggestions. They have not yet agreed to discussions, engaging instead in a propaganda attack against our research program while pursuing their own.

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II. Outer Space Arms Control

-- As our March 31 Report to Congress notes, several problems of ASAT arms control must be considered fully before deciding whether specific measures are verifiable and compatible with US and Allied security interests.

-- We are not opposed to negotiations toward ASAT arms control; however, we have not yet identified any such specific measures.

-- Our study of possible space arms control options is continuing.

-- We must consult closely on this issue in order to maintain unity within the CD and at the UN.

ARMS CONTROL: Chemical Weapons

-- Appreciate strong backing for CW initiative in Geneva; essential to sustain it. Will be as flexible in negotiations as security requirements permit.

-- Verification essential. Welcome Soviet movement on on-site inspection, but key issues remain.

-- Not surprised by Sov negativism. In time will offer more considered response.

-- Have offered Sovs supplementary bilateral discussions; they haven't responded.

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CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW)

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BY ds NARA DATE 1/2/2020

Your Objectives

-- Sustain Allies' strong public support for US draft treaty; reaffirm US commitment to global CW ban.

-- Underscore importance of verifiability.

Watch Out For

-- Signs that some Allies wish us to revise our verification provisions, on grounds of either intrusiveness or non-negotiability.

Talking Points

-- Our CW initiative shows US commitment to effective arms control which will protect and strengthen security of Allies.

-- Appreciate strong Allied backing for our draft treaty; this will be essential to mobilizing widespread support for our initiative.

-- Within the dictates of our security requirements, we will be as flexible as possible in the Geneva negotiations.

-- We welcome indications Soviets might accept on-site inspection of stockpile destruction, but other key verification issues are still unresolved.

-- We strongly believe that an effective CW ban must contain effective verification provisions. Without such provisions, necessary confidence would be undermined.

-- Our "open invitation" challenge inspection provisions (for government owned and controlled facilities) are designed to heighten confidence in treaty compliance.

-- Preliminary negative Soviet reaction to our draft come as no surprise. We believe they will offer a more considered, constructive response in time.

-- As you are aware, we have offered to discuss supplementary bilateral arrangements with the Soviets on a multilateral ban. They have not yet responded to our offer.

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ARMS CONTROL: MBFR

-- Strongly committed to progress in Vienna talks, as in a/c generally.

-- MBFR long stalled on "data" issue (number of Eastern troops in area).

-- New NATO proposal effort to break deadlock by seeking initial accord only on combat and combat support forces and relaxing demand for precise agreement on manpower.

-- Must insist on stronger verification package to compensate for this offer. Now up to East to respond.

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MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS TALKS (MBFR)

Your Objectives

-- Underscore our commitment to progress in the MBFR talks, as means to achieve stabilizing troop reductions in Europe to equal levels.

-- Impress on the Allies the importance of unity behind our MBFR proposal of last April.

Watch Out For

-- Suggestions (particularly from the Germans) that since Chernenko has already sharply criticized the Western proposal, we may need to consider modifications to make it more acceptable to the East.

Talking Points

-- We are strongly committed to progress in MBFR, as in the arms control process generally.

-- Talks have long been stalled on question of how many men the East has in the reductions area.

-- The new NATO proposal is a forthcoming effort to break this deadlock by seeking initial agreement only on combat and combat support forces and by relaxing demand for precise agreement between Eastern and Western manpower figures.

-- We must insist upon stronger package of verification measures to compensate for offer on manpower data.

-- It is now up to the East to respond constructively to our proposal; willingness to do so will indicate East's degree of commitment to MBFR.

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ARMS CONTROL: CDE

-- Western measures for prior notification and observation of military activities will reduce risk of attack, contribute to security.

-- Must be wary of Soviet attempts to deflect conference onto unverifiable and meaningless "declaratory" measures (non-use of force, no-first-use of nuclear weapons).

-- But open to discussion of Sov non-use of force proposal as part of dialogue including concrete NATO package.

-- Western unity key to success.

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Your Objective

-- Bolster Alliance unity and patience in support of NATO package of measures in the face of Soviet bluster and threats.

Watch Out For

-- Possible pressure from Italians and perhaps others to appear more forthcoming than we would desire on non-use of force in hopes of placating Soviets and getting arms control negotiations going again.

Talking Points

-- Concrete Western measures which focus on prior notification and observation of military activities will reduce threat of surprise attack and contribute to European security.

-- Close and cooperative Alliance consultations are the key to our success so far in Stockholm.

-- We are ready for serious negotiations at CDE.

-- We have indicated our readiness to agree to a working group formula which would consider Soviet non-use of force proposal, along with NATO proposals.

-- As always in CSCE process, firmness, unity and patience in defense of principled Western position will pay dividends in the long run.

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12. Non-Proliferation

NON-PROLIFERATION

I. Comprehensive Safeguards

-- Gratified by decision of 7 and others to attend July Luxembourg meeting on ways to strengthen peaceful nuclear cooperation. Meeting should strengthen common commitment to non-proliferation goals.

-- Hope for good discussions, including on US comprehensive safeguards proposal.

-- Comprehensive safeguards requirement for significant new nuclear exports to non-nuclear weapon states would greatly improve non-proliferation regime.

-- Believe U.S. agreement with PRC will bring China closer to NPT regime.

1 of 2

NON-PROLIFERATION

II. Non-Proliferation Treaty

-- NPT one of most important barriers to spread of nukes; serves interests of all.

-- One important way NPT could be strengthened would be for all states (especially France and Spain) to sign.

-- In preparation for 1985 Review Conference and at the Conference must guard against efforts to alter or weaken NPT and any suggestion West not living up to NPT obligations.

2 of 2

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NON-PROLIFERATION

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SETTING

-- In your March 31, 1983, arms control address, you called upon nuclear suppliers to agree to comprehensive safeguards as a condition of significant new nuclear exports to non-nuclear weapons states. ("Comprehensive" safeguards are IAEA safeguards on all of a recipient non-nuclear weapon state's nuclear activities, not just on the nuclear item being supplied.) Later in 1983 you wrote to the leaders of many major nuclear supplier countries noting the need to strengthen the framework for peaceful nuclear cooperation within a sound and effective safeguards regime. You suggested an early meeting of suppliers to discuss concrete proposals for advancing that goal.

-- All 12 governments to which you wrote have indicated that they will participate in multilateral discussions to be held July 11-13 in Luxembourg. The participants will be the Summit Seven plus Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and Australia.

-- It is generally agreed that the discussions should address the question of comprehensive safeguards, together with other nuclear export matters, and that the talks should proceed in stages, with the initial phase being one of "assessment" of the non-proliferation regime. We have circulated a proposed agenda.

-- Only 3 participants (US, Canada, Australia) already require comprehensive safeguards as a condition for major nuclear exports; most others would subscribe to a policy requiring such safeguards if all major suppliers did so. France and the FRG are not enthusiastic about the proposal.

-- On a separate non-proliferation topic, an international conference will be held in 1985 to review implementation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The last review conference, in 1980, was less than successful, failing to agree on a concluding document.

-- We attach great importance to the NPT as the central element of the international non-proliferation regime, and want to ensure the success of the 1985 conference. Several NPT parties are certain to criticize us for alleged failure to live up to the obligation of nuclear powers to pursue "good faith" negotiations toward disarmament, however, as provided for in Article VI of the NPT. In response, we plan to note our flexibility in START and INF, and Soviet responsibility for breaking off those talks.

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- 2 -

NON-PROLIFERATION

Your Objectives

-- Impress on the Seven the importance you attach to making a success of the July nuclear suppliers meeting in Luxembourg.

-- Mobilize agreement that the 1985 NPT Review Conference should reaffirm importance of NPT and of complying with it.

Watch Out For

-- Possible EC Commission query regarding its non-participation in the July Luxembourg meeting (we have left this question entirely up to the European participants).

-- Any suggestion that the US may be in violation of its nuclear arms control commitments under the NPT or assertions that there is a need to amend the Treaty.

Talking Points

Comprehensive Safeguards

-- Gratified by decision of Summit Seven and others to participate in Luxembourg meeting on ways to strengthen the framework for peaceful nuclear cooperation within a sound and effective safeguards regime.

-- US looks forward to productive discussions, including on our comprehensive safeguards proposal.

-- A comprehensive safeguards requirement for significant new nuclear exports to non-nuclear weapons states would greatly improve the non-proliferation regime.

-- Meeting should enhance understanding of each other's views and result in strengthening our common commitment to non-proliferation goals.

Non-Proliferation Treaty

-- NPT is one of the most important barriers to spread of nuclear weapons and thus serves the security interests of all.

-- In preparation for the 1985 Review Conference and at the Conference itself we must guard against any efforts to alter or weaken the NPT, and against suggestions that the West is not living up to its obligations under the treaty.

-- One important way in which the NPT could be strengthened would be for all states (including particularly France and Spain) to sign the Treaty.

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13. Terrorism

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