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BERLIN

000006-1400

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TO: AmEmbassy Bonn, Department of State

INFO: AmEmbassy Berlin, AmEmbassy Moscow, AmEmbassy Belgrade

FROM: USBERLIN

DATE: 1/27/82

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PFOR, WB, SU, US

SUBJECT: A Soviet View of U.S. Policy in Berlin

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1. The August 1981 issue of the Soviet journal "USA--Economics, Policies and Ideology" contained an article on U.S. policy toward Berlin written by an officer of the Soviet External Relations Branch (SERB) of the Group of Soviet Forces Germany. SERB is the organization charged with dealing with the Allied military missions in Potsdam and with supervising Allied access to Berlin.

2. Conforming to well-known Soviet views on Berlin and Germany, the article is interesting in its attempt to present a comprehensive view of the U.S. presence in the city which the author sees as an instrument to "consolidate the American military-political position in Central Europe." Berlin is portrayed as a pressure point which the U.S. uses to influence FRG, and even Soviet, policies. The author attributes the calm which has prevailed in and around the city to Soviet restraint in the face of West German violations of the Quadripartite Agreement and American attempts to use Berlin as a platform to undermine the GDR and other socialist states.

However unconvincing and self-serving this point of view strikes Western observers, it probably accurately reflects what many Soviets actually believe.

Attachment: Informal Translation of August 1981 Article.
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The USA and West Berlin

West Berlin occupies a special place in the European policy of the USA. One course or another which official Washington has pursued in relations involving West Berlin has always depended on the general direction of US policy in Europe and, in the final analysis, on the way US-Soviet relations are shaping up at any given time. The course of confrontation with the socialist states of Europe adopted by the imperialist powers following the Second World War has constantly been manifested in the area of West Berlin. During the years of the "cold war" ruling circles in the USA, using that city for various types of provocations and attempts to pressure the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, often made the international situation more difficult by their actions.

However the changed correlation of forces in the world, parity in strategic weapons between the USA and the USSR and growth of the process of detente in Europe have made further use of West Berlin as a generator of conflict situations progressively more difficult and risky for the USA and her allies.

Gradually, under the influence of the new situation, the US government recognized the necessity to change its foreign policy line. In the late 1960's and early seventies, the Nixon administration, having announced a changeover from an "era of confrontation" to an "era of negotiations" with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, became committed to implementation of concrete steps directed towards reduction of international tensions. Among these was reaching an understanding in September 1971 among the USSR, USA, France and Great Britain on questions concerning West Berlin.

"Agreements between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of Poland with the FRG, the Quadripartite Agreement on West Berlin, the working-out of agreements by the GDR on issues brought there by the FRG and the West Berlin Senate--all of these have led to the attainment of the postwar period of European growth," said LEONID BREZHNEV in December 1971. "We are making the beginnings of the passage of Europe into a new historical phase, which, we believe will develop under the sign of peaceful coexistence and mutually beneficial cooperation."¹

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Strict observance of the provisions of the Quadripartite Agreement by all participants, especially the provision stating that West Berlin is not a ~~consistent~~ ^{CONSTRUCTIVE} part of and is not governed by the Federal Republic of Germany, is an important condition for the preservation of peace in Europe. In this matter the government of the USA bears a great responsibility.

The role and place assigned to West Berlin by ruling circles in the USA in various periods of postwar history have changed. But this city has always been regarded in Washington as an object of both the global and the European policy of the United States. And closely linked to political and strategic considerations have been "prestige" considerations. Often-repeated statements about the "critical importance" of the city to the security of the United States are primarily propagandistic in nature, however, as Henry Kissinger emphasized while he was Secretary of State, the positions and actions of the USA relating to West Berlin have a substantive meaning both from the perspective of US-Soviet relations and in the interrelations between the USA and west European nations belonging to NATO.²

A more realistic US approach to the Berlin question was formulated in the late sixties and early seventies, although the then Nixon administration, having already begun negotiations with the USSR on the problem of limitation of offensive strategic weapons, still showed no desire to include questions of European security in the program of future negotiations. There was concern in Washington that in the course of discussion of European problems the question of the continued presence of American troops in Europe would arise. All of this foreordained the restrained attitude of the USA towards the idea of convocation of a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe proposed by the USSR and other member nations of the Warsaw Pact. However the interest of the United States in the successful conduct of negotiations with the USSR on the one hand, and the renewed interest of the western European countries in detente, on the other hand, promoted commitment of American diplomacy to efforts in favor of consolidation of peace on the European continent.

In addition to this the USA linked participation in a Europe-wide conference to the West Berlin problem. The Nixon administration decided to use this problem as a "touchstone" of detente. "A mutually acceptable agreement (on questions concerning Berlin--author's comment) could become a precondition for serious negotiations in other areas," wrote American researcher D. Bark.³

In the course of his first official visit to Europe in February 1969, President Nixon visited West Berlin. The speech which he addressed to the city's residents at that time gave evidence of a certain evolution of the American approach to the West Berlin question. Once again stating the unfailing commitment of the USA to "defend its rights" in West Berlin and the "freedom" of the city's inhabitants, the President not only acknowledged that the conditions surrounding the city at that time were unsatisfactory (Dwight Eisenhower made analagous admissions in the late 1950's), but declared a readiness for negotiations to put an end to the tension which had been generated by "a past era."

The US administration considered the situation in central Europe to be of first-line importance to the Soviet Union from the point of view of security interests. But that situation also is of considerable importance to the USA.

The USA entered into negotiations on West Berlin calculating on acquiring additional levers for "adjustment" of the process of Europe-wide detente and, to a great extent, with the goal of keeping her allies "in harness." The fact is that the coming to power in Bonn in the fall of 1969 of an SPD/FDP coalition that announced a correction of the FRG's "Ostpolitik" troubled Washington in spite of the fact that, in the final analysis, the concept of an "era of negotiations" had much in common with and reflected the accommodating reaction of the ruling circles of the USA and the FRG to the changing correlation of forces in the world. There was concern in Washington about the actions of the Brandt-Scheel cabinet which objectively led to the achievement of greater political independence for the Federal Republic of Germany. Here there was apprehension that as a result of such a policy the leadership role of the USA in the imperialist block of nations would be weakened. American ruling circles considered that in negotiations with the East, in all cases, the USA should set the tone. The role of the allies was to

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follow it and not to "run out in front." Meanwhile the facts of the situation, the urgent interests in the securing of and consolidation of peace in Europe pushed both the USA and its allies towards formulation of a realistic approach to European matters, including the West Berlin problem.

Negotiations by representatives of the USSR, USA, Great Britain and France concerning West Berlin began in March 1970 and concluded with the signing on 3 September 1971 of the Quadripartite Agreement.

The agreement on West Berlin and treaties concluded from 1971-1973 between the socialist countries and the FRG drew the last issue of the Second World War to a close. The West Berlin settlement removed a dangerous source of tensions in the center of Europe, substantially diminished confrontation between the USSR and USA, facilitated preparation and convocation of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The principle of peaceful coexistence was confirmed in practice, and the possibility of settlement of complex international problems by means of negotiations was demonstrated. Negotiations on West Berlin and reaching an agreement became possible under conditions of a transition to detente. At the same time the treaty became the first real achievement of the policy of detente to be achieved with the participation of the USA.

The code established by the Quadripartite Agreement reflects a precisely measured balance of the interests of its participants. The structure of the agreement is such that it can only be considered in its entirety. Any other approach represents a step backwards, a step in the direction of tension, instability and distrust. However, as USSR Foreign Minister A. Gromyko noted in his address at the 34th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, the agreement on West Berlin "is tested for durability from time to time."⁴

There is a question of attempts at deliberate misinterpretation, avoidance and even direct violations of the principal provisions of the agreement taking place, particularly in the FRG. With the aim of "correcting" the agreement, one-sided interpretation of its provisions are made by Western leaders, selecting those points which, when taken out of the context of the whole distorts its essence; it

is also condoned that anything not expressly forbidden by the treaty is allowed by it; and finally, the Russian text of the agreement is, at times, disregarded.⁵ In this situation the United States either occupies the position of a "sidelines observer," or justifies the actions of those circles of the FRG which attempt to get around the main point of the document, which states that West Berlin is not a constituent part of and is not governed by the Federal Republic of Germany.

Officially and unofficially Washington tries to interpret its position on the ties between West Berlin and the FRG as broadly as possible. The American government in fact concurs with Bonn's interpretation of these ties as a type of specific "harness."⁶ In the words of a high-ranking representative of the American occupational forces in West Berlin, a "unique commonality" exists between the city and the FRG. These "reins," in the opinion of a number of American experts should compensate for the fact that West Berlin is not a part of the FRG and may not be governed by her.

Washington looks through its fingers at attempts by the FRG to strengthen its so-called "federal presence" in the city. The US tries to demonstrate that although the exercise of direct state authority by the FRG in West Berlin is forbidden, "functioning" of federal organs and institutes there is carried out on a supposedly "legal" basis.⁷ American authorities essentially do not hinder the conduct of ostentatious meetings of party factions and Bundestag committees, as well as Landestag factions in which matters are discussed which have nothing to do with West Berlin. Official representatives of the USA do not suppress attempts to extend the control of FRG laws to the city, to include it in measures of the EEC, etc. In defiance of the provisions of the Quadripartite Agreement, in January 1981, former Minister of Justice Fogel was "imported" from the FRG to assume the position of governing Mayor of West Berlin, and a number of other federal politicians were assigned to senators' duties.

Legally, however, the USA regards West Berlin as a special territory. In this matter the point of view of the American government differs from the position of the FRG, expressed in the 31 July 1973 decision of a federal constitutional court, in accordance with which the city is considered "the soil" of the FRG.⁸ The USA

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can not fail to understand that concurrence with such pretenses by the FRG, other considerations aside, would undermine the basis for the presence of occupational forces of the three powers in West Berlin. Nevertheless the fact that American diplomacy sometimes permits itself use of the term "the land Berlin" is itself a definite concession to Bonn and disregards the existing legal and factual state of affairs.

The USA position is unrealistic particularly with relation to the supposedly still-preserved "quadripartite status of all of Berlin." Attempts are made to maintain, without substantiation, that agreement of the four powers extends as well to the former Soviet sector of Berlin. This is not at all consistent with reality. In fact, and several American researchers recognize this, Berlin, capital of the GDR, "is not touched on in the Quadripartite Agreement. Actually nowhere in the Quadripartite Agreement are Greater Berlin or the eastern sector mentioned as such."⁹

The conclusion of the Quadripartite Agreement meant, in essence, official recognition of the German Democratic Republic by the governments of the USA, Great Britain and France. The three western powers "for the first time in a binding way spoke about the German Democratic Republic as if they were speaking about a sovereign state," noted Eric Honecker, "concerning her borders and her relations with the Federal Republic of Germany and West Berlin."¹⁰ Having recognized the sovereignty of the GDR over the transit routes connecting West Berlin and the FRG, the western powers could no longer put aside the question of an exchange of diplomatic representatives with the GDR. In February 1973 the British and French governments announced the forthcoming establishment of their embassies in the German Democratic Republic, but not until 4 September 1974, exactly three years after the signing of the Quadripartite Agreement, was there an announcement of establishment of diplomatic relations between the USA and GDR. The United States was one hundred eleventh, in terms of nations establishing diplomatic relations with the German Democratic Republic. That meant, in fact (American authors also emphasize), the recognition of Berlin, excluding its western sectors, as the capital of a sovereign state, the GDR."

After the signing of the Quadripartite Agreement Washington prefers, remaining in the background, to grant considerable freedom of action to Bonn in matters concerning West Berlin. This is explained, it seems, by the strategic significance of the FRG for the USA as her most important military-political ally. Support of the FRG is needed as a guarantee for many of Washington's actions in the international arena, particularly in the sphere of East-West relations. Guaranteeing the "interests of the FRG" in West Berlin is a singular form of payment by the Americans for this support.

Granting to Bonn a certain freedom of action in West Berlin matters, Washington, at the same time keeps for itself a lever for exerting influence on the policy of the FRG, in the form of the so-called "rights and responsibilities in Germany," to which the USA always has recourse.

In conclusion, the fulfillment in practice by the American side of the conditions of the Quadripartite Agreement attests to the fact that, to a certain extent, the USA is interested in maintaining stability in the area of West Berlin. Nevertheless it must be emphasized again that Washington has more than once knowingly condoned attempts by Bonn to get around or to violate one provision of the agreement or another.

In exchange the United States has demanded of the leading circles in West Germany more active support of its actions in other areas of the world, for example in the Middle East. At the same time the United States, for reasons which are well known, does not mind playing on difficulties arising in relations between the FRG and the USSR, as well as those between the FRG and the GDR.

All such attempts and calculations, regardless of what motives are behind them, do damage to those common long-term interests which formed the basis for the Quadripartite Agreement.

The Quadripartite Agreement did not resolve and cannot resolve all of the matters connected with West Berlin. West Berlin remains the only territory of the former Hitlerist Reich, where there is still an occupational regime in action.

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The three powers--the USA, Great Britain and France, represented by a separate Allied Kommandatura, which they created on 6 May 1949 after the splitting up of Berlin, keep broad powers in the city for themselves.

The military administrations of the USA, Great Britain and France turned over certain functions of government to the West Berlin Senate in the 1950's, but reserved for themselves the right to once again assume total authority within the city, "should they consider that it is absolutely necessary to guarantee safety, for protection of the democratic social order or should the international commitments of their governments so require."¹² Reserved to the competence of the authority of the three powers are security matters, disarmament and demilitarization, internal relations in West Berlin and control of the city's police.

The USA possesses the most powerful occupational mechanism in the city. The American sector is made up of six of the twelve communities of the city, with a population of 800,000. US representatives play a central role in the Allied Kommandatura and in the joint allied military staff. The US military administration in West Berlin is the main instrument for carrying out American policy in West Berlin. American troops arrived in West Berlin on 1 July 1945. They were consolidated organizationally in 1961 into the Berlin infantry brigade. The American garrison currently numbers 5,700 persons--roughly as many as the combined strength of the British and French garrisons (5,300). High-ranking representatives of the American forces in Western Europe frequently visit West Berlin. In the period of aggravation of the international situation in the "cold war" years, the leaders of the USA actively utilized the American garrison of the city for military-political demonstrations. "We ran the risk of nuclear war more often in West Berlin than in any other place,"¹³ stated American researcher Eleanor Dulles.

The American presence in Berlin includes a political, an economic and an ideological component. Political presence is embodied by the US Mission in Berlin.

In terms of US economic interests in West Berlin, approximately 50 enterprises are active there, controlled by such corporations as IBM, Litton Industries, General Motors, Gillette, Otis Elevator, Warner Lambert, Continental Can, Kaiser Aluminum, National Cash Register and ITT. The share falling to American companies is 7% of the city's industrial production and 15% of the investment capital.¹⁴ It was announced in January 1980 that "Ford Motors" was beginning production of auto parts in West Berlin. The corresponding investments comprise about 70 million dollars.

The machinery for American ideological influence in West Berlin was created at the height of the "cold war." In the city there are American television and radio stations, libraries, clubs, schools and movie theaters. Contacts are stimulated between US soldiers and the population (so-called "American-German national holidays," "allied forces days," "open house days" in military units). Ties are developed along the lines of sister cities, for instance between West Berlin and Los Angeles. The main thrust of this "internal propaganda" is to advertise the American way of life and to create pro-American sentiment in all strata of the city's population. Washington attaches particular significance to the propaganda directed "to the outside" and aimed at "erosion" of the socialist system in the GDR. The geographic situation of West Berlin allows FRG television programs to be sent to 80% of the territory of the German Democratic Republic. The radio station RIAS, created by the Americans in 1946 and broadcasting in the German language, serves as an important instrument of US ideological diversion in West Berlin.

As in the "cold war" years, West Berlin is extensively used by ruling circles of the USA for espionage/intelligence activity. These circles attempt to use the increased volume of contacts between East and West which have resulted from the success of the policy of detente for their unseemly purposes.

Thus the United States has at its disposal in West Berlin a multi-faceted apparatus which it utilizes to solve US military-political and ideological problems in the center of Europe.

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At the end of the seventies and the beginning of the eighties, through the fault of US ruling circles, the world situation became strained. Washington opted for a course of acceleration of the arms race with the aim of achievement of military superiority over the Soviet Union. The decision reached by the NATO council in December 1979 concerning deployment of new American intermediate-range missiles on the territory of several West European nations, including the FRG, constitutes an attempt to destabilize the status quo on the continent which had taken shape since the Second World War. For the population of West Berlin this decision is fraught with especially grave dangers. As D. Arens, Deputy Chairman of the Socialist Unity Party of West Berlin, noted in his speech at the Paris meeting of the Communist and Workers' Parties of Europe, "West Berlin is situated to the East of (the intended launching sites of--author's comment) these missiles, in the very area in which they will be targeted."¹⁵

At the beginning of 1980 the USA intensified its activity in West Berlin. First of all, they exerted pressure on the city's political parties to obtain their public support for the foreign policy course of the current administration at that time of Jimmy Carter. Essentially American ruling circles demanded that the parties represented in the West Berlin House of Representatives join the White House's anti-Soviet "crusade." Secondly, Washington made an attempt to utilize the West Berlin question to exert pressure on Bonn. Taking into consideration the strong position traditionally occupied by the West Berlin SPD organization in the leadership of that party, the Americans organized a visit in April 1980 by the governing Mayor of West Berlin, D. Stobbe, to the USA. The US government was ready to show "solidarity" with the FRG in problems linked to West Berlin in exchange for Bonn's solidarity with the American policy in relations with the USSR. Certain circles of the FRG supported putting the question in this way. However, some people could well imagine the price in West Berlin for such "solidarity." There, many understand that normal existence of the city as a special formation is closely linked to detente. "many people are only now comprehending," admitted former governing Mayor of West Berlin D. Stobbe on returning from the USA, "what the policy of detente brought with it."¹⁶ The desire of West Berlin's ruling circles to remain a "peaceful haven" in the present international situation contradicts, however, their calls for solidarity with

Washington, which bound the city's problems "to any frosts, which arose in connection with relapses of the "cold war."¹⁷ But many responsible West Berlin politicians comprehend that no threat whatsoever to the city exists, neither from the USSR nor from the GDR; that ruling circles in the USA are not concerned with the interests of West Berliners, but with the problem of consolidation of the American military-political position in Central Europe. As D. Anderson, former Chief of the US Mission in West Berlin, bluntly stated recently, for the USA West Berlin "serves as a bastion of strength against the USSR."¹⁸

In late April 1980 on the territory of the city the largest scale military exercise in recent years was held, with approximately 1,400 American and French soldiers participating. The political aim of these maneuvers primarily consists of re-establishing the psychological climate of a "frontline position." The visit of American General B. Rogers, Supreme Allied Commander of NATO Forces in Europe, to West Berlin in late October 1980, in which he made militaristic anti-Soviet statements, was overtly provocative in character. "The attempt was made," noted the USSR Ambassador to the GDR in his protest to the British, US and French authorities in West Berlin, "to draw the western sector of Berlin into the sphere of action of NATO, to which, as is known, West Berlin has no relation whatsoever. It does not constitute territory of that military block and NATO is not competent in West Berlin affairs."¹⁹

In spite of the new super-charging of international tensions by Washington, the situation surrounding West Berlin at the transition from the seventies to the eighties remained quiet on the whole. There are several reasons for this.

The decisive factor is the consistent peace-loving policy of the Soviet Union, directed towards continuation and deepening of detente on the European continent as well as in other areas.

"We are for strict and full adherence to the agreements reached in the seventies,"²⁰ L. I. Brezhnev emphasized at the 26th Congress of the CPSU, speaking about 'occasional attempts by the West to get around provisions of the Quadripartite Agreement on West Berlin.

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As a result of the strengthening of the world socialist system, the possibility for American imperialism to resolve international problems by means of force or threatening the use of force decreased significantly, just as the policy of "tests of strength," among other places in the area of West Berlin, had produced no results in the past. In the present decade Western Europe has "tasted" the fruits of detente, strengthened security and stability on that continent. Attempts to artificially stimulate a crisis around West Berlin would inevitably disrupt this stability and the entire process of detente. This is not desired by the population of any of the nations of Europe, and European leaders understand this. In addition to these successes of the policy of detente, if not finally at least to a significant extent, it cut the ground out from under those who had an interest in heating up tensions in the area of West Berlin, in part for creation of fertile soil for revanchist plans for the "absorption" of the GDR by West Germany. The USA cannot fail to take all of these factors into consideration.

There is still another reason. The concept of detente, worked out by influential FRG political forces, and primarily by the leadership of the SPD, includes as an integral element a quiet situation around West Berlin. A destabilization of the status quo in this area would shake the foundations of the entire concept.

In spite of all the difficulties and complications, and of attempts by the USA and FRG to interpret in their own way the Quadripartite Agreement on West Berlin, an assessment of compliance by the signatories with the agreement, which in 1981 completes 10 years from the date of ratification, eloquently attests to the possibility of political solution of the most complex and acute international problems, when all interested parties take a constructive approach.

Several statements by high-ranking members of the new US administration attest to a certain disregard on their part for the achievements of detente, which are valued in Europe. In West Berlin, as in most of the countries of Western Europe, this causes alarm: its population cannot be gladdened by the prospect of aggravation of the international situation. The peace-loving community of the

city supports the appeal of the Soviet Union to Western nations and to the new administration in Washington, to constructive dialog, to include dialog at the highest levels, on matters concerning deepening of detente and restraining the arms race. The most expeditious and purposeful conduct of such a dialog would also be of great importance to West Berlin.

This article was translated by Mr. Geoffrey Giles.

FOOTNOTES

1. L. I. BREZHNEV. The Leninist Course. Speeches and Articles, Vol. 3. Moscow, 1972, page 467.
2. H. KISSINGER. The Necessity for Choice. N. Y., 1961, pp.99-168.
3. D. BARK. Agreement on Berlin. A Study of the 1970-1972 Quadripartite Negotiations. Washington-Stanford, 1974, p.33.
4. "Pravda," 26 SEP 79.
5. See H. CATUDAL, Jr. A Balance Sheet of the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin, vol. 2. Berlin, 1978, p.11.
6. Ibid., p.21.
7. Ibid., pp.12, 126-127.
8. "The Quadripartite Agreement on West Berlin and its Realization, 1971-1977." Documents." Moscow, 1977, p.133.
9. Ibid., p.135.
10. "Neues Deutschland," 4 SEP 71.
11. See D. BARK. Op. Cit., pp.99, 104.
12. Quotation from: "The Issues in the Berlin-German Crisis." Ed. by L. Tondel, N. Y., 1963, p.20.
13. E. DULLES. Berlin. The Wall is Not Forever. Chapel Hill, 1967, p.3.
14. D. BARK. Op. Cit., p.113.
15. "L'Humanite," 9 MAY 80.
16. "Die Welt," 19 APR 80.
17. "Izvestiya," 13 FEB 80.
18. "Die Welt," 24 JUN 80.
19. "Pravda," 24 OCT 80.
20. "Pravda," 24 FEB 81.

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Berlin control zone (encompasses both W. Berlin & E. Ger.)
 (Berlin Air Safety C.)
 3 corridors (20 miles wide) control zone - ceiling of 10,000 ft. (Sov. & E. Ger. around)
 no floor / no ceiling
 > 180 flights a day (commercial air) mil. air
 Fr. - airport Tegel } commercial
 Br. - Tempelhof } 3 airports.
 Cottbus (Br. mil. aircraft)

1946 - Quad. Agmt. - unrestricted right to fly in corridor
 to be run by BASC.

* Legally Sovs etc. adhered to this agmt.

Sovs. say illegal (corridors) - only set up to supply garrisons.

Sovs say mil. exercises to be conducted
 above 2500 ft commercial air traffic
 should halt.
 over 10,000 ft
 floor 2500 ft

Sov. airspace reservation - limit to center segments (prohib. w/ ascent - descent)
 aircraft like flying above 10,000 ft. -

Feb. 20, 1954 * Sovs. ann'd in BASC that they wanted
 thru Dec. 10, 1954 full length of the corridor. - Sovs. abandon

Quad. Agmt. - no discussion before, unilateral
 attempt to assert their authority over US & Allies.

(reas. - WTD airsp., GDR territory, orig. changed w/ safety
 of corridors)

Activities -

- 1) Central corridor - supply activities.
- 2) N/S transits (over W corridor)

(Br. airways - near mids w/ 2 migs - on N/S transits) - so then wanted to
 extend airspace reservations. to prevent collisions.

BASC (weekly chief control mtg.)

- 1) alter standard flight procedures (landing/taking off - w/in 20 mile limit)
 (not legitimate use of airspace)

RATIONALE

- 2) tripartite demands (april, sept.)

a) Miles / Bort.

Dec. 8, 1954 - introduced prop. limits 6.2 miles to 8.7 miles. (around BASC
 area of 20 miles)

✓ US wanted 20 miles added to circumference. - enables standard
 operating flights procedure.

Sovs have rejected Quad. Agmt.

Probs: ① Tech - 20 miles vs. 6.2 / 8.7
 ② Accept. of Quad. Agmt.

US - have even suggested 15

Sous want to est. their total auth. of the air corridors

(reject their right to make exclusive use of the airspace) -

We would stop harping on this issue.

mil. advantage of corridor is marginal -

14 months of ^{US / Allies} displeasure - seeking auth. over air regime.

> PAN AM - 60/70%
of all air
traffic.
> most technical
prob. - airport
closest
↑

> British - conservation
only
> French - 2 flights
a day

// * Another high-level demarche in Moscow - (1st) for
to be presented 1st (2nd) - for
Switz / Gromyko note.

(Switz - raised in to Dobrynin in context of Nicholson)

Quadrip. Agmt. - difficulties, (Br. worried about demonstrations flights)

~~Br.~~ Br. dragging feet on completely contingency paper on ↓ ↓

(disc. in the Bonn group) - Br. want to solve this prob. -

agenda for Lisbon Quad. mtg.

↓ willing to accept 8.7 (redefining the
prob.)

NSC/S PROFILE

CONFIDENTIAL

FILE BERLIN

ID 8402085

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 14 MAR 84 07

DOCDATE 09 MAR 84

TO

HERRINGTON, J

FROM SPIERS, R

19

KEYWORDS BERLIN

SUBJECT. INTERNAL STATE MEMO ON COMMEMORATION OF BERLIN AIRLIFT ON 12 MAY 1984

ACTION. ANY ACTION NECESSARY

DUE. 20 MAR 84 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

SOMMER

DOBRIANSKY

COMMENTS LOGGED PER WH

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(V)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

DISPATCH W/ATTCH FILE (C)

Phyllis: ~~NS/S~~

Send copy to ~~Log~~

~~Peter Sommer~~

to
Sommer

~~in Sys I for~~

action --

then to Bud.

21

National Security Council
The White House

04 MAR 13 P 6:45

System # I

Package # 2085

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Martin			
Bob Kimmitt	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter			
Wilma Hall	<u>2</u>		
Bud McFarlane	<u>3</u>		<u>I</u>
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			

I = Information

A = Action

R = Retain

D = Dispatch

N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____

Here is what we have turned up on the
Berlin Airlift commemoration. (Date/Time)

Washington, D. C. 20520

March 9, 1984

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~MEMORANDUM~~

TO: Mr. John S. Herrington
FROM: Ronald I. Spiers *RIS*
SUBJECT: Delegation to Commemoration of Berlin Airlift:
May 12, 1984

May 12 will mark the thirty-fifth anniversary of successful conclusion of the Berlin Airlift. The event will be marked with considerable ceremony in Berlin and will draw special attention to the important American contribution to the survival of the city.

Such notice to the positive American role in Berlin continues to be especially important during the period of debate which follows successful implementation of the NATO dual-track decision. The Soviets continue a massive effort to influence Berliners, especially younger residents of the city, and the Department believes that the United States should make an extra effort to be well represented at the anniversary celebration.

After consideration of possibilities, Secretary Shultz has decided that we should seek a Presidential delegation headed by a senior personality traveling as the President's personal representative. In our view, a most appropriate candidate for this role would be former President Ford.

~~The Department requests White House approval for a Presidential delegation to the commemoration of the Berlin Airlift, and suggests former President Ford be contacted to determine whether he is willing to lead the delegation. The delegation should consist of 6-8 individuals, without wives, although Mrs. Ford could be included appropriately. One or two Congressional figures should be in the delegation. The Department believes that Eleanor Dulles, whose long-term involvement with Berlin is well-known, and David Klein, Executive Director of the American Council on Germany, would be suitable delegation members as well. The UK and French, as they participated in the Allied Airlift, will send delegations also. Their delegations' levels will be strongly influenced by the level of our own.~~

DECLASSIFIED

Dept. of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
BY *AUS* NARA, DATE *12/21/16*~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECL: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

23

-2-

We understand that Berlin's new Mayor, Eberhard Diepgen, intends to announce the commemoration during his visit to the United States in early April. Since it would be especially useful for press purposes in Germany to have the head of the U.S. delegation announced at the same time, the Department requests an early approach to the former President.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HS
Drafted:EUR/CE:HVSimon:dj
3/8/84 x21484 W6380A

Cleared:EUR/CE:JCKornblum
EUR:TMTNiles

HS

The Situation in Berlin

The quadripartite status of Berlin was established by a series of wartime and early post-war agreements reached by the four wartime Allies--Britain, France, the United States and the Soviet Union. The most important of these agreements were the London Protocols of 1944 and 1945. The earlier of these two documents divided Germany as a whole into three zones for occupation by British, Soviet, and American Forces. In recognition of its special status as the capital of Germany, Greater Berlin (the term refers to the boundaries of Greater Berlin established under German law in 1920; Greater Berlin represented by a fusion of twenty city districts which were previously separate administrative units) was to be divided into sectors administered joint by the three Powers. Subsequently, in 1945, the London Protocols were amended to include a French occupation zone in Germany and a French Sector in Berlin.

As World War II drew to a close, it was Soviet Forces which first reached Berlin and ended German military resistance in the city. Following contacts between American, British, and Soviet officials, troops of these three Powers withdrew in June 1945 from battle lines to the occupation zones foreseen for each of the wartime Allies. U.S. Forces arrived in Berlin and hoisted the U.S. flag on July 4, 1945. The Soviet Sector of Berlin contained eight city districts; the American, six; the British, four; and the French, two. Although each Power exercised supreme authority in its own Sector, the four Powers were at the same time jointly responsible for the administration of Berlin as a whole. This responsibility was exercised through establishment of a four-Power Allied Kommandatura (an Allied Control Council also established in the late summer of 1945 was responsible for the Allied administration of Germany as a whole). The Soviets withdrew their participation in 1948, first from the Allied Control Council and subsequently, after the Western Allies countered the Soviet blockade of Berlin by beginning the Berlin Airlift on June 28, 1948, from the Allied Kommandatura as well.

Government of the Western Sectors of Berlin

The Western Allies still maintain the Allied Kommandatura as the mechanism through which they exercise Allied rights and responsibilities in West Berlin, recognizing, however, that because of Soviet obstructionism, it has not been possible since 1948 to apply Allied laws and decisions in the Soviet Sector of Berlin (i.e., East Berlin). It should be noted, however, that the Western Allies, in May 1949, issued a "Statement of Principles" which turned over to the Governing Mayor and the Berlin Senat broad authority in all areas of municipal government. The Senat is not, as the name suggests to English speakers, a parliamentary body; it is composed rather of the Senators or Ministers responsible for the equivalent of various cabinet departments such as economic affairs, finance, schools, etc. West Berlin's legislature is unicameral and is known as the House of Representatives. The current Berlin Senat is composed of a minority all CDU government.

Richard von Weizsaecker serves as Governing Mayor and the Free Democratic Party supports his government with 5 abstentions in the Berlin House of Representatives.

Allied Rights and Responsibilities

It is an important principle of the Western Allies, and vital to maintenance of the Allied position in Berlin, that Allied rights and responsibilities in the city derive from the Allied victory over Germany in 1945 (and as such are "rights of conquest") and were not extended as concessions by the Soviet side. Because of this, the Western Allies have never accepted that the Soviets could unilaterally yield their responsibility in the Soviet Sector of Berlin to authorities of the German Democratic Republic (GDR). It is true, of course, that the East German Government claims that East Berlin is its capital and that many Western countries (including the U.S., Britain, and France) have established embassies "to the GDR" which are physically located in East Berlin, and that the GDR Government has established its Foreign Ministry and other governmental structure in that part of the city. Nonetheless, the Western Allies continue to exercise their rights throughout Berlin, including East Berlin, and the three Powers deal exclusively with Soviet authorities on matters affecting Berlin and Allied rights and responsibilities there.

A practical example of these continuing Allied rights is free circulation for the troops of all four wartime Allies in the four Sectors of Berlin. Another aspect of Allied rights in the city is the right of access by land and air for troops and officials of the Allied Powers from the Western Zones of Germany (now the Federal Republic of Germany--FRG) to Berlin without undergoing East German controls. (Allied travel orders are stamped instead by Soviet military authorities for individuals traveling by surface means.)

The basic point in the Western view of the current Berlin situation is that Berlin's legal situation has not changed and cannot be changed save by agreement of all four Powers. The FRG shares this point of view. Although the legal position of Berlin has been scrupulously respected by the three Western Allies, it has been repeatedly violated by the Soviet Union and the GDR with respect to East Berlin. A case in point involves the demilitarized status of the entire city established by the four Powers in 1945. This law provides that only troops from the four Powers may wear uniforms or carry arms in Greater Berlin. (German troops--whether West or East German--are thus not authorized to wear uniforms or bear arms in Greater Berlin; the Western Allies have, of course, made an exception to this law as regards police in West Berlin, who are authorized to carry arms while on duty.) The GDR has repeatedly staged military parades of its forces in East Berlin, in violation of this Allied law.

U.S. Mission Berlin

The U.S. Mission is located in West Berlin, and is the organization through which the U.S. manages its participation in four Power responsibilities for

Berlin as a whole. The Mission, which is composed primarily of officers and staff from the U.S. Army and members of the U.S. Foreign Service from the Department of State and International Communications Agency, also supports the approximately 7,000 U.S. troops stationed in the city, and makes arrangements with municipal authorities for dealing with the issues created by the presence of such a garrison.

Chief of the U.S. Mission in Berlin is the United States Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany, Arthur F. Burns. Ambassador Burns maintains a residence in Berlin, and in his role as chief of the U.S. Mission also carries out residual responsibilities as U.S. High Commissioner for Germany. The U.S. High Commissioner was the senior United States official in Germany during the post-war occupation period. Since return of sovereignty to the Federal Republic in 1955, the tasks of the High Commissioner have concentrated on matters dealing with continuing four Power rights and responsibilities for Berlin and Germany as a whole. These responsibilities include management of four Power relationships concerning Berlin, and in this role the U.S. Ambassador in Bonn negotiated the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin with his British and French colleagues and with the Soviet Ambassador in East Berlin, who maintains the "high commissioner" function on the Soviet side.

The Deputy Chief of the U.S. Mission is Major General James G. Boatner, who is also United States Commandant in Berlin and Commander, U.S. Army Berlin. The next most senior United States official in Berlin is Minister Nelson C. Ledsky, who is Assistant Chief of the U.S. Mission and Deputy United States Commandant for Berlin.

This integration of military and civilian officials in the U.S. Mission ensures close coordination between the two major aspects of the U.S. presence in the city.

--The vital military presence of the United States is signified by the U.S. Commandant who, as Deputy Chief of Mission, is also the senior U.S. official resident in the city.

--The operational political presence is supervised by the U.S. Minister, who is the senior State Department official resident in Berlin. In his role as Deputy Commandant, the U.S. Minister also represents the military aspect of our presence.

The operating sections of the U.S. Mission are organized much as in any other Foreign Service post. However, the normal reporting and representational functions of the Mission are accompanied by the task of managing the civilian aspects of the U.S. presence in the city. Officers at the Mission carry titles such as Political Adviser, Economic Adviser, Legal Adviser and Protocol Officer, which suggest the rules which they play in the Berlin "occupation" regime. These functions are carried out in conjunction with our British and French Allies, who maintain similar establishments in the city. Although each Ally is responsible for one sector of the city, administration of the three Western Sectors is carried out jointly and all decisions are taken by

consensus. Over the years a complicated mechanism of committees and ad hoc bodies have developed to manage the Allied role in the city.

The Quadripartite Agreement

The Quadripartite Agreement of September 3, 1971 was concluded by the four Powers "acting on the basis of their quadripartite rights and responsibilities, and of the corresponding wartime and post-war agreements and decisions of the four Powers." The Quadripartite Agreement itself in no way changed the legal status of the city. The purpose of the Agreement was to contribute to practical improvements in Berlin and a lessening of tensions between the East and West. The experience since the Agreement was signed shows that these aims have been successfully achieved. As a result of the Quadripartite Agreement and of the associated inner-German agreements, it has become substantially easier for West Berliners and residents of the FRG to travel to East Berlin and to the GDR to visit relatives or for other purposes. Furthermore, Berlin has ceased, for the moment at least, to be source of major conflict between the East and the West.

The Quadripartite Agreement has brought an era of unprecedented prosperity and stability to the Western Sectors of Berlin. It has also forced the Berliners to find a new role for themselves and their city in Germany and between East and West. This period of adjustment was not without difficulties, and Berliners have begun looking carefully at many questions about their economic future, the attractiveness of their city to young persons and about the many local problems which often went unnoticed in the periods of tension between East and West.

Role of the Federal Republic of Germany

An important provision of the Quadripartite Agreement was confirmation of the important economic, cultural and social ties which have grown up during the past thirty years between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Western Sectors of Berlin. The Western Allies have sanctioned development of these ties as the best means of ensuring West Berlin's membership in a larger Western framework and of providing for the economic viability of the Western Sectors. The Federal German government provides substantial subsidies to the operating budget of the West Berlin Senat and the economic, social and legal system of the FRG applies virtually unchanged in the Western Sectors.

In order to maintain their ability to exercise their rights and responsibilities on behalf of West Berlin and West Berliners, the Western Allies have, however, established certain limitations on the political ties between West Berlin and the Federal Republic. These include the fact that West Berlin deputies in the German Bundestag may not vote in plenary sessions and are not elected directly. Certain West German legislation, especially in the military field, may also not be applied to Berlin.

Under terms of the Bonn/Paris conventions of 1954/55, the three Allies do, however, commit themselves to consult with the Federal Government on exercise of their rights and responsibilities in Berlin. This consultation is carried

out in Bonn among representatives of the three Allied embassies and the German Foreign Office.

As is appropriate for a city which formerly was the capital of the unified German state, management and defense of West Berlin in the 1980's is very much a joint effort between the Western Allies, the Federal Republic of Germany and the West Berliners themselves. This effort is one of the prime examples of the close cooperation which has developed among the nations of the NATO alliance and serves well the interests of all concerned. Above all, it ensures that West Berlin will continue to prosper as a Western outpost in the Communist world.

November 1, 1984

BACKGROUND ON BERLIN

In 1244 the first documented mention of Berlin was made in connection with her sister trade village Coelln, which was founded between the arms of the Spree river in 1237. In 1432 the villages united and Berlin was born. Through the centuries the city grew slowly, becoming in 1701 the residence of the King of Prussia. With Frederick the Great the city began to prosper. As Prussia became a great power within Central and Eastern Europe, Berlin, known then as an "Athens on the Spree", became a major European capital.

In 1861, the childless Prussian king, Friedrich Wilhelm IV, abdicated and Wilhelm I assumed the throne. King Wilhelm I appointed Otto von Bismarck as his Prime Minister in 1862. In 1871, following the France-Prussian war, King Wilhelm I was crowned Emperor of Germany in the Versailles Palace's Hall of Mirrors. This marked the unification of Germany, and the founding of the Second Empire, with Emperor Wilhelm I as titular head of the monarchical government and Bismarck, the "Iron Chancellor", wielding the governmental power until 1890. Berlin was now recognized as the capital of the German Empire.

Between 1871 and 1945, Berlin's fortunes were tied to those of Germany as a whole. With the ending of World War II in 1945, Berlin lay devastated, prostrate before the Soviet Army. In August it was divided into four sectors, and administered to by the four protecting powers.

The Soviets walked out of the Allied Kommandatura on 16 June 1948, and on 24 June of the same year the Soviets began the Berlin Blockade. The allied response to the blockade was designed by Generals Clay and Wedemeyer. For the next eleven months every pound of food, clothing, and fuel needed by the people of West Berlin and the forces of the Western Allies in Berlin was transported by air. In a total of 277,728 flights, American, British and French airmen brought in 2,343,257 tons of food and supplies. At the peak of the airlift, planes were landing in West Berlin at the rate of one every 63 seconds. Nevertheless, the airlift had its casualties: 78 men, including 31 Americans, lost their lives in accidents. Their names are perpetuated on a soaring monument in front of Tempelhof Central Airport.

The Berlin airlift effectively countered the Soviets and the blockade was lifted on May 19, 1949.

On 27 November 1958, in a note from the Soviet Union to the Western Powers, the Soviet Union said that it considered all of its agreements with the Western Allies concerning Berlin null and void and demanded the withdrawal of Western military forces from the city. In December of the same year, the U. S. rejected the Soviet demands and said that it could not embark on discussions with the Soviet Union "under menace or ultimatum".

On 13 August 1961, the communists sealed the Berlin sector border against East Germans and East Berliners. Shortly after midnight a communiqué was published by the Warsaw Pact nations calling for such an action, accompanied by a decree of the "German Democratic Republic" prohibiting East Germans and East Berliners from entering West Berlin. East German troops and armed police, with armored cars and tanks, were deployed along the entire sector border and barbed wire barriers were erected. A few days later they began to build a wall of cement blocks. Other East German troops were deployed on the edges of the city. These in turn were backed by a ring of troops from three Soviet divisions, including one tank division. These large-scale supporting deployments were obviously intended to inhibit a popular arising, such as has occurred in East Berlin and East Germany in 1953 and in Hungary in 1956.

Though a few thousand people have since managed to cross this barrier, the outflow has been drastically reduced. More than ninety have paid with their lives for their efforts to be free.

Though willing enough to negotiate on an equitable and sincere basis, the United States has never been willing to renegotiate the basic rights which the three Western Powers have in Berlin, rights based on wartime victory and subsequently reaffirmed by solemn pledges and agreements. In the words of President Kennedy: "We cannot and will not permit the communists to drive us out of Berlin, either gradually or by force. For the fulfillment of our pledge to that city is essential to the morale and security of West Germany, to the unity of Western Europe, and to the faith of the entire free world"

The Allies have maintained access to East Berlin by dispatching motorized patrols daily. Interference with Allied flights in the air corridors has been quickly and firmly protested, and unfounded Soviet complaints dismissed. Once refugees have gained the West Berlin sanctuary, they have been quickly shielded and assisted.

The United States remains firm in its commitment to West Berlin and its people. The Four Power Agreements have alleviated some of the tension between East and West.

THE BERLIN AGREEMENT

The Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin, which entered into force in June 1972, consists of three parts: a basic Quadripartite Agreement concluded in September 1971 by the four postwar occupation powers (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union); implementing and supplementing arrangements negotiated between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic and between the Senat of West Berlin and the GDR; and a Final Quadripartite Protocol, signed by the Foreign Ministers of the Four Powers, which ties the first two parts together and gives the entire Agreement force.

The Preamble and Part I of the Agreement of September 1971, embody, most significantly, a reaffirmation of the validity of Four Power rights and responsibilities and of the corresponding wartime and postwar agreements. In these sections the signatories also undertake not to change unilaterally "the situation which has developed in the area", and to settle all disputes that arise "in the area" solely by peaceful means. Part II, entitled "Provisions relating to the Western Sectors of Berlin", constitutes the core of the Agreement. In it the Soviet Union provides a guarantee that civilian surface traffic between the FRG and West Berlin, which has often been harassed in the past, will henceforth proceed unimpeded and "in the most simple and expeditious manner", and will receive preferential treatment. The Soviet Union also undertakes a commitment that communications between West Berlin on the one hand and East Berlin and East Germany on the other will be improved, and that West Berlin residents will be able to travel to these adjacent areas under conditions comparable to those applicable to other persons. The USSR authorizes minor exchanges of territory in the environs of Berlin. For their part the three Western Powers affirm in Part II - for the first time in a contractual context - that the Western Sectors of Berlin are not a constituent part of the FRG, a statement balanced, however, by a declaration to the effect that existing ties between West Berlin and the FRG are to be "maintained and developed".

The first three of four Annexes to the Agreement of September 1971 consist essentially of detailed provisions relating to the obligations undertaken in Part II. In the case of access traffic, basic procedures are outlined for speedier inspections procedures, for the sealing of freight vehicles, and for the lump-sum payment of tolls and other fees. Certain limits are defined for the exercise of direct state authority by the FRG in West Berlin. In Annex IV, the Soviet Union and the three Western Powers take on further basic commitments: the former agrees that the FRG may, with certain exceptions, represent the interests of West Berlin residents abroad, and the latter authorize the establishment of a Soviet Consulate General in the Western Sectors. Further details concerning the functioning of this Consulate General and of other Soviet offices in West Berlin are provided in an Agreed Minute.

Two sets of Inter-German negotiations were initiated in September 1971 to implement and supplement several of the major provisions of the Four Power Agreement. In December, the FRG and the GDR concluded a "Transit Agreement" that consists of detailed and technical arrangements regarding border inspections, payment of fees, and the powers of the GDR to prevent "misuse" of the access routes. At the same time, the Senat of West Berlin reached agreement with the GDR on the twin subjects of territorial exchanges and visiting and travel arrangements for West Berliners. The agreed exchange of small parcels of land in the vicinity of Berlin's boundaries - intended as a matter of practical convenience - includes provision for a "land bridge" between West Berlin proper and the exclave of Steinstuecken. The arrangement on visits allows West Berliner residents an annual quota of thirty days for visiting and travelling in East Berlin and the GDR.

In general, the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin has been faithfully implemented by all parties since its entry into force in June 1972. Most significantly, surface access to West Berlin has indeed become simpler, faster, and more reliable, with the result that the number of passengers carried on the air routes between the FRG and West Berlin has dropped quite sharply. The visit arrangements for West Berliners are likewise proceeding satisfactorily. The agreed exchanges of land have been consummated, and arrangements have been concluded for the opening of the Soviet Consulate General (March 1973).

RESTAURANTS AND ENTERTAINMENT IN BERLINRESTAURANTS

<u>NAME</u>	<u>ADDRESS</u>	<u>PHONE</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
Alt-Berliner Schneckenhaus	37 Kurfuerstendamm	883-5937	Good food; good service; very pleasant atmosphere
Alte Liebe	39 Grolmanstr.	882-2995	Fish specialties
Alter Krug Dahlem	52 Koenigin-Luise- Str.	832-5089	Good food; good service; warm atmosphere
Blockhaus DESTROYED Nikolskeer BY FIRE	Nikolskeer Weg, 6/19/84 Wannsee	805-2914	Excellent lake side dining, Russian Batscha style atmosphere
Chalet Swiss	Koenigin-Luise- Str./Im Jagen	832-6362	Swiss specialties; good food
Grillroom Hotel Berlin	62 Kurfuerstenstr.	26-9291	Excellent international cuisine
Hardtke	27 Meinekestr. 48 Hubertusallee	881-9827 892-5848	Rustical; typical German food
Hecker's Deelee	35 Grolmanstr.	8890-1	Rustical German-type food; nice bar
Heinz Holl	26 Damaschkestr.	323-1404	Excellent food, served in a bar atmosphere
Hong Kong	210 Kurfuerstendamm	881-5756	Excellent Chinese food
Il Gattopardo	5 Schorlemerallee	741-8500	Good Italian food; good service
Juedisches Gemeindehaus	79/80 Fasanenstr.	881-3031	Jewish food; kosher kitchen; Israelic specialties
Kopenhagen	203 Kurfuerstendamm	881-6219 883-2503	Danish food and beer; light lunches available
Maitre	31 Podbielskiallee	832-6004	Good food - French style; good French wines and French service
Ritz	26 Rankestr.	24-7250	Cosmopolitan menu
Schultheiss Braeuhaus	220 Kurfuerstendamm	881-7050	Typical Berliner beer and food
Tegernseer Toennchen	34 Mommsenstr.	323-3827	Bavarian food and beer
Tessiner Stuben	33 Bleibtreustr.	881-3611	Swiss specialties; excellent food

RESTAURANTS AND ENTERTAINMENT IN BERLINRESTAURANTS

<u>NAME</u>	<u>ADDRESS</u>	<u>PHONE</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
La Vernaccia	4 Am Breiten- bachplatz	824-5788	Delicacies of the Mediterranean; Sardinian specialties
Zlata Praha	4 Meinekestr.	881-9750	Typical Austrian, Hungarian, Czecho- slovakian food and Czech beer

BARS

Dachgarten	Hotel Inter- Continental Berlin	26-020	Dining; dancing; show band; beautiful view of the city
I-Punkt	21st floor, Europa Center	261-1014	Dining; dancing; beautiful view of the city
La vie en rose	Europa Center	323-6006	Revue "Paris style"

SHOPPING IN BERLIN

Europa Center	At the Memorial Church	Shopping Center
Forum Steglitz	1-2 Schloss Strasse	Shopping Center
KaDeWe	21 Tauentzienstrasse	Department Store
Sperlingsgasse	82-84 Lietzenburger St.	Boutique Shopping Area
Horn	213 Kurfuerstendamm	Fashion House for Women
Bonhoff	18 Tauentzienstrasse	Fashion House for Women
Niquet	Europa Center	Umbrellas and Gloves
Gold Pfeil	16 Tauentzienstrasse and Europa Center	Leather Goods
Radio-Foto-Wegert	Europa Center and 29 Ihnestrasse	Cameras
Rosenthal	226 Kurfuerstendamm	China
Staatliche Porzellan- Manufaktur (KPM)	205 Kurfuerstendamm	China
Gipsformerei der Staatlichen Museen Preussischer Kultur- besitz	17 Sophie-Charlotten-St. (Mon-Fri 0900-1600 hrs.)	Exhibition and sale of copies of sculptures of museum pieces
Sedlatzek	165 Kurfuerstendamm	Watches and jewelry
Groschupp	Europa Center	Gifts
Berliner Flohmarkt	U-Bahnhof Nollendorfplatz (Wed-Mon 1100-1930 hrs.) (also Saturdays & Sundays)	Antiques and Bierstuben

Kurfuerstendamm, Tauentzienstrasse and Schloss Strasse are attractive shopping districts.

Shops are open: weekdays from 0900 - 1830 hrs.;
Saturdays from 0900 - 1400 hrs.

The first Saturday of each month the larger stores are open from 0900-1800 hrs.

SIGHTSEEING IN BERLIN

MUSEUMS

BERLIN MUSEUM - 14 Lindenstrasse, Berlin 61; Tel.: 251-4015.
(Open daily 1100-1800 hrs.; Mon closed)

Located in former Supreme Court Building. Houses art and cultural objects relating to Berlin's history dating back to the 17th century.

"BRUECKE MUSEUM" - 9 Bussardsteig, Berlin 33; Tel.: 831-2029.
(Open daily 1100-1700 hrs.; Tue closed)

Devoted to the art of German "expressionist" group "Die Bruecke".
Changing exhibitions.

EGYPTIAN MUSEUM - 70 Schloss Strasse, Berlin 19; Tel.: 3201-1.
(Open daily 0900-1700 hrs.; Fri closed)

Located in the two Stueler buildings opposite the Charlottenburg Castle.
Houses Nefertiti and other ancient works of art from Tell el-Amarna.

MUSEUM DAHLEM - 23-27 Arnimallee, Berlin 33; Tel.: 8301-1.
(Open daily 0900-1700 hrs.; Mon closed)

Houses the Ethnographical Museum and one of the most famous picture galleries in the world, comprising German, French, Dutch and Italian paintings from the 13th to the 18th century. The collection of Rembrandt includes 26 of his paintings.

NEUE NATIONALGALERIE - 50 Potsdamer Strasse, Berlin 30; Tel.: 266-6.
(Open daily 0900-1700 hrs.; Mon closed)

Houses a collection of painting and sculpture of the 19th and 20th century.
Changing exhibitions. Building by Mies van der Rohe.

SCHLOSS CHARLOTTENBURG - Luisenplatz, Berlin 19; Tel.: 3201-1.
(Open daily 0900-1700 hrs.; Mon closed)

Built between 1695-1699 for the first Queen of Prussia, Sophie Charlotte, as a summer residence. Later enlarged and embellished by Eosander von Goethe, Knobelsdorff and Langhans. Historic rooms can be viewed. The museum of early- and prehistory is located in the Langhans building. The Knobelsdorff wing houses the museum of arts and crafts. In the courtyard the equestrian statue of the Great Elector. the work of Andreas Schlueter, a superb example of German baroque art.

SIGHTSEEING IN BERLIN

ACADEMY OF ARTS - 10 Hanseatenweg, Berlin 21; Tel.: 391-1031.
(Open Mon 1300-1900 hrs.; Fri 1000-2100 hrs.;
all other days 1000-1900 hrs.)

Built in 1960 and designed by Werner Duettmann and financed by the German-American Henry H. Reichhold. Includes a hall for concerts and theater performances, a library, archives and exhibition rooms.

AIR-LIFT MEMORIAL - Platz der Luftbruecke, Berlin 42

Erected for men who lost their lives when Berlin was blockaded in 1948-1949. 77 Allied airmen and German ground staff gave their lives for Berlin. Almost 300,000 flights were flown and over 2 million tons of goods carried. More than 100 planes were always in the air, while a plane landed every minute of the day and night.

AQUARIUM - 32 Budapester Strasse, Berlin 30; Tel.: 261-1101.
(open 0900-1700 hrs. during the winter months; 0900-1900 hrs.
during the summer months)

Largest collection of live fishes and sea fauna, of chameleons, snakes, tortoises and crocodiles in their natural tropic surroundings.

BELLEVUE CASTLE - Spreeweg, Berlin 21; Tel.: 39-1051

Built in 1785 by Daniel Philipp Bouman for Prince Ferdinand, youngest brother of Frederick the Great. Used as VIP hotel during the 3rd Reich. Now residence of the President of the Federal Republic of Germany when visiting Berlin.

BERNAUER STRASSE - Berlin 65

Houses in East Berlin, sidewalk in West Berlin. Residents compulsorily evacuated by the "People's Police". On 24 September 1961, alone, nearly 2,000 people were evicted from their homes. Dramatic view of the division of Berlin.

BOTANICAL GARDENS - 6-8 Koenigin-Luise-Strasse, Berlin 33; Tel.: 831-4041.
(Open 0900-1600 hrs.)

14,000 different kinds of plants (trees and flowers). Small scale landscape with their native flora. Large glass houses for palm trees, orchids, insect eating plants and Victoria Regia. Botanical museum with herbarium and library.

SIGHTSEEING IN BERLIN

BRANDENBURG GATE - Strasse des 17. Juni, Berlin 21.

Symbolic emblem of Berlin. Erected by Langhans in 1788-1791 in imitation of the Propyleum in Athens. The quadriga by Schadow, which was destroyed during the war, was reproduced from the still remaining plaster molds in 1958.

CHECKPOINT "CHARLIE" - Friedrichstrasse/corner of Zimmerstrasse, Berlin 61.

Allied checkpoint between East and West Berlin. Of the 7 crossing points to East Berlin, the only one for Allies and non-Germans.

CONGRESS HALL - John-Foster-Dulles-Allee, Berlin 21

A bold design by American architect Hugh A. Stubbins, with a large auditorium for 1,200-1,400 persons, smaller conference halls, offices, a restaurant and an exhibition hall. Referred to as the "Pregnant Oyster" by the Berliners. Partly collapsed in May 1980.

FREE UNIVERSITY - Garystrasse, Berlin 37; Tel.: 838-1.

Founded in 1948 after the old Berlin University (Humboldt University) had come entirely under communist influence. Over 14,500 students from Berlin, the Federal Republic and abroad.

FUNKTUM (RADIO TOWER) - Messedamm/Masurenallee, Berlin 19
(Visitors' platform open daily 1000-2330 hrs.)

Built 1924-1926. The tower is 450 ft. high. Around its base are exhibition halls and the International Congress Center. Beautiful view of Berlin.

GRUNEWALD HUNTING LODGE (JAGDSCHLOSS-GRUNEWALD) - Near Huettenweg, Berlin 33;
Tel.: 813-3597.
(Open daily 1000-1600 hrs.; Mon closed)

Was built in 1542 for Elector Joachim II by Caspar Theyss in the Renaissance style. It has a fine collection of paintings and hunting trophies. Outdoor concerts are held in the courtyard during the summer. In the midst of one of Berlin's huge forests.

HANSA QUARTER - Berlin 21

International Building Exhibition of 1957. International architects of 14 nations combined with leading German architects built 1,200 housing units ranging from one-family houses to 16-storied buildings, as well as a school, a kindergarten, 2 churches, a library, shops, and a cinema.

SIGHTSEEING IN BERLIN

INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS CENTER (ICC) - Messedamm, Berlin 19; Tel.: 3038-1.

Opened in 1979 as one of the world's largest Congress Centers with 80 smaller and larger conference halls, with offices and a restaurant. Cultural events also take place here.

KAISER WILHELM MEMORIAL CHURCH - Breitscheidplatz, Berlin 30.

Destroyed during World War II and rebuilt in 1961 according to the plans of the architect Prof. Egon Eiermann. The 207 ft. tower ruin remains as a memorial. A carillon plays, on the hour, a melody composed by Prince Louis Ferdinand. The new buildings include the place of worship, the clock tower, the chapel and foyer.

MARIA REGINA MARTYRUM CHURCH - 230/232 Heckerdamm, Berlin 13.

Unusual modern architecture representing concentration camps and commemorating their victims.

OLYMPIC STADIUM AND ADJOINING CLOCK TOWER - Berlin 19; Tel.: 304-0676.
(Open 0900-1600 hrs.)

Built for the Olympic Games of 1936, with seats for 100,000 spectators, swimming and riding stadium. One of the biggest sports grounds in Europe.

PHILHARMONIC CONCERT HALL - Mattheikirchplatz, Berlin 30; Tel.: 261-4383.

Inaugurated in the fall of 1963. Its seating capacity is 2,200. Architect of this bold structure was Hans Scharoun. It should be seen from the inside. Please call for information on guided tours.

PLOETZENSEE PRISON - Huettigpfad, Berlin 13.

Built 1868-1878. Political prisoners, including the men and women of the revolt of 20 July 1944 were executed in the prison courtyard. A monument to 2,000 victims of Nazism has been erected here.

POTSDAMER PLATZ

Once, heart of Berlin's traffic system. Today it is cut by the wall. On 17 June 1953, it was center of popular uprising of workers in East Berlin. The next day it spread all over the Soviet Zone. The uprising was crushed by Soviet tanks. (From here one can see Hitler's bunker and the Propaganda Ministry of the 3rd Reich.)

SIGHTSEEING IN BERLIN

RATHAUS SCHOENEBERG - John-F.-Kennedy-Platz, Berlin 62; Tel.: 783-1.

Governing Mayor's office. Built 1911-1914. The seat of the Berlin Senat and House of Representatives since 1948. The Freedom Bell, donated by the United States of America and presented by General Lucius D. Clay, hangs in the 280 ft. tower (rung daily at noon). It bears the inscription "That this world under God shall have a new birth of freedom".

REICHSTAG BUILDING - Platz der Republik, Berlin 21; Tel.: 3977-1.
(Open daily 1000-1700 hrs.; Mon closed)

Built 1884-1894. Partly destroyed by arson in 1933 and during the fighting in 1945. Soviets confiscated the red marble interior and used it for the Soviet Garden of Remembrance and the Moscow University. Has been reconstructed.

SOVIET WAR MEMORIAL - Strasse des 17. Juni, Berlin 21.

Built by the Soviets in 1945 before the city was divided into the occupation sectors.

TEMPELHOF CENTRAL AIRPORT - Platz der Luftbruecke, Berlin 42.

First airplanes demonstrated here in 1909 by the Wright brothers. First commercial flights in 1923.

TIERGARTEN

Once a royal hunting park. In pre-war days one of the most beautiful parks in Europa. Totally destroyed during the war and subsequently replanned in 1950.

VICTORY COLUMN - Am Grossen Stern, Berlin 21; Tel.: 391-2961.

Built in 1873 to commemorate the wars of 1864, 1866 and 1870-1871. Situated until 1938 at Koenigsplatz, now Platz der Republik. 220 ft. high (a winding staircase with 285 steps leads to the top). The Goddess of Victory is over 25 ft. tall and weighs almost 7 tons.

WESTHAFEN - 1 Westhafenstrasse, Berlin 65.

Constructed 1914-1923. Due to the harbor's importance as a means of supplying the city, it is called the "Larder of Berlin". Three docks and more than 20 cranes, 12 miles of railway lines, customs and grain warehouses, silos and an administrative building with a 170 ft. tower.

SIGHTSEEING IN BERLIN

ZOOLOGICAL GARDENS - 8 Hardenbergplatz, Berlin 12; Tel.: 261-1101.
(Open 0900-1800 hrs.)

Oldest and most extensive Zoo in Germany with the most beautiful aviary.
Since 1981, home of one panda.

CHURCH SERVICESLUTHERAN

Kaiser Wilhelm Memorial Church, Kurfuerstendamm at the Europa Center. Services held Monday through Friday at 5.30 p.m. and 6 p.m., Sunday at 10 a.m. and 6 p.m.

CATHOLIC

Saint Franziskus Hospital Chapel, 1 Burggrafenstrasse, located one block south of the Hotel Inter-Continental Berlin. Daily mass at 6.15 a.m., Sunday masses are at 6.30 a.m., 9 a.m., and 11 a.m., the latter in Spanish.

CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE

First Church of Christ, Scientist, 112 Wilhelmsaue, Berlin-Wilmersdorf. Services held on Sunday morning at 11.30 a.m. and Wednesday evening at 6.30 p.m.

JEWISH

Synagogue, 13 Joachimstaler Strasse. Services held daily at 7.15 a.m. and 6.30 p.m.

INTERDENOMI-
NATIONAL

The American Community Chapel, Huettenweg, Berlin-Dahlem, conducts services for all religious faiths. Information can be obtained by calling 819-6761.



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EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, EAIR, BQG, BZ, UR
SUBJECT: BERLIN AIR CORRIDORS

REFS: (A) BONN 09092
- (B) USBERLIN 528

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Waiver 11/6/15
BY RW NARA DATE 12/21/16

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES MISSION COMMENTS ON THE DIFFERING ALLIED POSITIONS AS REPORTED REF A WITH RESPECT TO DEMONSTRATION FLIGHTS. WE ARE PARTICULARLY CONCERNED ABOUT BRITISH PROPOSALS. THESE SEEM INTENDED TO DELAY DEMONSTRATION FLYING INDEFINITELY BY SETTING FORTH TIME-CONSUMING AND UNNECESSARY PRECONDITIONS AND BY ESTABLISHING PROCEDURES FOR FLYING WHICH WOULD IN FACT MAKE THE FLIGHTS MORE CONFRONTATIONAL THAN DEMONSTRATIVE. END SUMMARY.

DEMONSTRATION FLIGHT CONTINGENCY PLAN

3. FLIGHT PATH: EMBASSY BONN HAS LAID OUT THE TWO SIDES OF THE FLIGHT PROFILE ISSUE WELL. MISSION BERLIN BELIEVES WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO PRESS THE BRITISH AND FRENCH TO ADOPT OUR POSITION IN FAVOR OF FLIGHTS THROUGH THE FULL LENGTH OF A RESERVATION. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THE AIR SAFETY RISKS ARE ANY GREATER, AND THAT THE REAL ISSUE IS NOT ONE OF NUMBERS OF MILES BUT HOW THE CORRIDORS ARE MANAGED AND HOW CORRIDOR PROBLEMS WILL BE HANDLED IN THE FUTURE. WE HAVE REJECTED SOVIET RESERVATIONS OVER THIS PAST YEAR BECAUSE THEY FORCE US TO DEPART FROM SAFE, NORMAL FLIGHT PROCEDURES, AND CONSTITUTE SOVIET DICTATES AS TO HOW AND WHERE WE CAN FLY. DEMONSTRATION FLIGHTS ARE DESIGNED TO SHOW THAT WE WILL NOT OBSERVE RESERVATIONS WHICH DO NOT MEET OUR NEEDS AND WHICH ARE IMPOSED IN A UNILATERAL MANNER.

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PAGE 02 OF 02 USMISSION USBERLIN 0892 DTG: 011346Z APR 85 PSN: 003299

4. NOTIFICATION OF DEMONSTRATION FLIGHTS: WE AGREE WITH EMBASSY BONN THAT PUTTING THE SOVIETS ON NOTICE IN THIS WAY WOULD TURN WHAT WE INTEND AS A STRAIGHTFORWARD DEMONSTRATION OF RIGHTS INTO A CHALLENGE, AND COULD INVITE A CONFRONTATION.

5. STRATEGY: BEING MORE SPECIFIC IN THE BASIC: ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS, WE HAVE TOLD THE SOVIETS THAT A COMPROMISE BETWEEN THE LIMITS THE SOVIETS HAVE GENERALLY BEEN APPLYING (6.2-8.7 MILES OUTSIDE THE BCZ), AND THE 20 MILES THE ALLIES HAVE PROPOSED, SHOULD BE POSSIBLE. WE HAVE EVEN INDICATED THAT 15-16 MILES OUTSIDE THE BCZ (FOR 3,500-FOOT RESERVATIONS) SHOULD BE ADEQUATE FOR ALLIED FLIGHTS UNDER MOST CIRCUMSTANCES. WE HAVE ALWAYS STRESSED, HOWEVER, THAT AN ACCEPTABLE ARRANGEMENT HAD TO INCLUDE A SOVIET COMMITMENT TO LIMIT GEOGRAPHICALLY ALL RESERVATIONS. THEY HAVE RESPONDED TO THESE OVERTURES CONSISTENTLY BY STATING THAT THEY WILL MAKE NO COMMITMENTS AND INTEND TO KEEP CONTROL OVER RESERVATIONS. THAT DOES NOT RULE OUT THEIR GIVING US MORE SPACE ON OCCASION, BUT IT WILL BE THEIR CALL WHEN AND HOW MUCH.

- AS REGARDS THE FIGURE THE BRITISH HAVE PROPOSED--50 KILOMETERS FROM THE CENTER OF THE BCZ (18 KILOMETERS, OR 11.2 MILES, OUTSIDE THE BCZ)--OUR AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS WANT AT LEAST 56 KILOMETERS (24 KILOMETERS, OR 15 MILES, OUTSIDE THE BCZ). THEY HAVE CONSIDERED THIS CAREFULLY, AND INCLUDED IN THEIR CALCULATIONS SPACE FOR "AIR TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT"--FOR MANEUVERING WHEN MORE THAN ONE AIRCRAFT AT A TIME ARE BEING HANDLED. THEY CONSIDER THIS REASONABLE AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH STANDARD, SAFE TRAFFIC CONTROL PRACTICES.

- THE INTRODUCTION OF THIS 50-KILOMETER FIGURE INTO THE BASIC DISCUSSIONS WOULD NARROW THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES TO A FEW MILES. BY GIVING US A LITTLE MORE SPACE, THE SOVIETS COULD CLAIM THAT THE PROBLEM WAS RESOLVED, DETRACTING ATTENTION FROM THE ISSUE OF QUADRIPARTITE MANAGEMENT. THE DEADLOCK OVER GEOGRAPHIC LIMITS IS NOT SIMPLY OVER THE DISTANCES BEING PROPOSED AND APPLIED; IT IS OVER THE WAY THE SOVIETS ARE PROCEEDING. THEY ARE TRYING TO ESTABLISH A NEW AIR REGIME TO SATISFY THEIR INCREASING MILITARY TRAINING NEED; WHILE THEY ARE NOT CHALLENGING OUR BASIC RIGHT TO USE THE CORRIDORS, THEY ARE MAKING A CONCERTED EFFORT TO INCREASE THEIR

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EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, EAIR, BQG, BZ, UR
SUBJECT: BERLIN AIR CORRIDORS

CONTROL OVER THAT USE. URGING THE SOVIETS TO WORK OUT
AN ARRANGEMENT WITH US WHICH SATISFIES OUR REQUIREMENTS,
AND WHICH THEY ARE COMMITTED TO ABIDE BY, SHOULD CONTINUE
TO BE OUR GOAL.

6. DEMARCHES IN CAPITALS: WE HAVE NO OBJECTION IN
PRINCIPLE TO FURTHER DEMARCHES; WHEN DONE EFFECTIVELY,
HIGH-LEVEL EXPRESSIONS OF CONCERN MAY HAVE SOME INFLUENCE
ON THE SOVIETS. BUT IF THE BRITISH MANAGE TO MAKE A
MINISTERIAL-LEVEL DEMARCHE (AND RESPONSE) A PRECONDITION
FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF DEMONSTRATION FLIGHTS, THE
LATTER MAY BE PUT OFF INDEFINITELY. WE AGREE WITH THE
FRENCH THAT PLANNING DEMARCHES AND FLIGHTS AS A PACKAGE
IS UNREALISTIC. IT'S UNLIKELY THAT ALL THREE ALLIES
WOULD BE ABLE TO AGREE ON WHETHER THE DEMARCHES HAD
BEEN "SUCCESSFUL" OR NOT, AND THUS WHETHER, AND WHEN,
THE SECOND STEP (FLIGHTS) WOULD TAKE PLACE.

7. DEMONSTRATION FLIGHTS ARE NOT THE ANSWER TO A
PROBLEM; THEY ARE MERELY A FURTHER SIGNAL OF ALLIED
DISSATISFACTION AND RESOLVE. AT THIS POINT, THE SOVIETS
SEEM WELL DUG IN. WE DON'T KNOW WHAT THE EXACT FORMULA
IS THAT WILL CONVINCE THEM THAT THE COSTS OF THEIR
PRESENT COURSE OUTWEIGH THE BENEFITS. WE DO KNOW,
HOWEVER, THAT THEY'RE NOT GOING TO BACK DOWN UNTIL
THEY'RE CONVINCED THAT ALLIED GOVERNMENTS (PARTICULARLY
THE U.S.) CONSIDER THIS A SERIOUS PROBLEM, WHICH IS GOING
TO BURDEN RELATIONS UNTIL IT IS RESOLVED. LISSFELT
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PBTS, PREL, EAIR, AKB, BQG, BZ, GC, UR
SUBJECT: BERLIN AIR CORRIDORS: SOVIETS ANNOUNCE FULL-
CORRIDOR RESERVATIONS

REF: USBERLIN 476 AND 495

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. AT AN APRIL 15 SPECIAL MEETING OF BERLIN AIR
SAFETY CENTER (BASC) CHIEF CONTROLLERS, CALLED BY THE
ALLIES TO PROTEST FULL-CORRIDOR-LENGTH AIRSPACE RESERVA-
TIONS NOTIFIED FOR APRIL 16, SOVIET CONTROLLER PROKOFIEV
SAID THE SOVIETS NEEDED THE SPACE AND THE EXERCISE WOULD
TAKE PLACE AS PLANNED. END SUMMARY.

3. AT 5:10 PM (ALL TIMES LOCAL) ON APRIL 15, THE SOVIETS
IN THE BASC NOTIFIED TWO RESERVATIONS FOR APRIL 16. BOTH
WERE TO COVER THE ENTIRE LENGTHS OF ALL THREE CORRIDORS,
UP TO AN ALTITUDE OF 3500 FEET. THE FIRST WOULD BEGIN AT
12:30 AND END AT 2:30 PM; THE SECOND WOULD BEGIN AT 5:30
AND END AT 11:00 PM. SAFETY OF ALLIED FLIGHT WOULD BE
GUARANTEED BETWEEN 4,500 AND 12,000 FEET.

4. ALLIED CONTROLLERS REJECTED THE RESERVATIONS, AND A
MEETING OF CHIEF CONTROLLERS WAS CALLED FOR THAT EVENING.
THESE ARE THE FIRST FULL-CORRIDOR-LENGTH RESERVATIONS SINCE
FEBRUARY 22 (SEE REFTELS). SINCE EARLY DECEMBER, MOST
SOVIET AIRSPACE RESERVATIONS HAVE BEEN GEOGRAPHICALLY
LIMITED--LEAVING RESERVATION-FREE AREAS OF BETWEEN 6.2 AND
8.7 MILES AT THE EASTERN ENDS OF THE CORRIDORS, ADJACENT
TO THE BERLIN CONTROL ZONE (BCZ), TO PERMIT MORE GRADUAL
ALLIED DESCENTS AND ASCENTS.

5. AT THE MEETING, ALLIED CONTROLLERS TOLD PROKOFIEV THAT
THEY CONSIDERED THIS NOTIFICATION A MAJOR STEP BACKWARD,
THAT RESERVATIONS WITH NO GEOGRAPHIC LIMITS WERE UNACCEP-
TABLE TO THE ALLIES, AND THEY EXPECTED THE COVERAGE AREA
TO BE REVISED. PROKOFIEV SAID HE DID NOT CONSIDER IT A
STEP BACKWARD. HE HAD TOLD ALLIED CONTROLLERS REPEATEDLY
THAT GEOGRAPHIC LIMITS WOULD VARY AND IN SOME CASES THERE
WOULD BE NO LIMITS. THE COVERAGE AREA IN THIS CASE HAD
BEEN DICTATED BY THE NEEDS OF SOVIET AVIATION; THE EXERCISE
PLANS INCLUDED SOME FLIGHTS IN THE SPACE CLOSE TO THE BCZ.

6. THE U.S. CONTROLLER POINTED OUT THAT IT WAS NOT
NECESSARY FOR THE SOVIETS TO FLY THROUGH THIS SPACE. THEY
COULD JUST AS EASILY ROUTE THEIR PLANES FARTHER WEST.
PROKOFIEV SAID NEITHER HE NOR THE ALLIES KNEW HOW AIR
ROUTES WERE SELECTED. SOVIET AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL HAD
ASSURED HIM THAT THEY WERE AWARE OF ALLIED FLIGHT REQUIRE-
MENTS, -BUT IN THIS CASE THERE WAS NO OTHER ALTERNATIVE TO
FULL-CORRIDOR RESERVATIONS. IN MOST CASES, HE ADDED,
RESERVATIONS WERE GEOGRAPHICALLY LIMITED; IT WAS ONLY ON
VERY RARE OCCASIONS THAT LIMITS COULD NOT BE GIVEN. HE
STRESSED THAT THERE WOULD BE NO CHANGE TO THE SOVIET PLANS
UNLESS THE EXERCISE WAS CANCELLED DUE TO WEATHER.

7. THE BRITISH CONTROLLER REMINDED PROKOFIEV THAT THE
SIDES HAD BEEN DISCUSSING THIS ISSUE OF GEOGRAPHIC LIMITS
FOR THE PAST 14 MONTHS. HE WANTED TO KNOW WHEN THE SOVIET
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TAGS: PGOV, PBTS, PREL, EAIR, AKB, BQG, BZ, GC, UR
SUBJECT: BERLIN AIR CORRIDORS: SOVIETS ANNOUNCE FULL-

SIDE WAS GOING TO TRY SERIOUSLY TO RESOLVE IT. PROKOFIEV SAID IF THE ALLIES WERE NOT SATISFIED WITH HIS ANSWERS, THEY SHOULD GO TO HIGHER SOVIET COMMANDS OR THROUGH POLITICAL CHANNELS. HE SAID THAT EXERCISES AND AIRSPACE RESERVATIONS WERE PLANNED COLLECTIVELY ON THE SOVIET SIDE; THERE WAS NO "HAWK GENERAL" WHO WAS OUT TO CAUSE THE ALLIES PROBLEMS. NO ONE IN THE SOVIET AIR FORCE WANTED TO INCREASE TENSIONS OR CAUSE CONFRONTATION. THE ALLIES' ONLY CHANCE OF CHANGING THE SITUATION, HE SAID, WAS TO PERSUADE SOVIET AUTHORITIES TO REDUCE THE NEEDS OF SOVIET AVIATION. THOSE NEEDS WERE DEPENDENT ON MANY FACTORS, INCLUDING THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION. ALLIED CONTROLLERS SAID THE SOVIETS MAY NOT BE SEEKING TROUBLE, BUT THEY HAD

8. PROKOFIEV SAID HE WAS AMAZED THAT THE ALLIES THOUGHT ALLIED FLIGHT OPERATIONS IN THE CORRIDORS AND BCZ SUFFERED AS A RESULT OF AIRSPACE RESERVATIONS. THERE WAS A FAR GREATER IMPACT ON SOVIET AVIATION. MOREOVER, THE SOVIETS DID NOT BELIEVE ALLIED RIGHTS WERE BEING INFRINGED UPON. THE CORRIDORS WERE RELICS OF WORLD WAR II. CORRIDORS OF THIS SIZE (20 MILES WIDE) WERE UNNECESSARY AND DID NOT EXIST ANYWHERE ELSE IN THE WORLD. PILOTS ON ROUTES ELSEWHERE ENCOUNTERED GREATER DIFFICULTIES THAN THE ALLIES DID WHEN RESERVATIONS WERE IN EFFECT.

9. THE BRITISH CONTROLLER REMINDED PROKOFIEV THAT THEIR FOUR NATIONS HAD SIGNED AN AGREEMENT WHICH WAS THE BASIS OF AIR CORRIDOR OPERATIONS (1946 RULES OF FLIGHT), AND WHICH GAVE ALL PARTIES UNRESTRICTED ACCESS. PROKOFIEV SAID THE SOVIETS HAD NOT BEEN THE FIRST TO VIOLATE THAT AGREEMENT. THE ALLIES HAD DONE THAT WHEN THEY BEGAN USING THE CORRIDORS FOR PURPOSES OTHER THAN SUPPLY OF THEIR MILITARY GARRISONS. THEY HAD TURNED THE CORRIDORS INTO "MUGS, WIDE AIR ROUTES," BUT THE SOVIETS HAD "NEVER BRANDISHED THAT STICK IN ANY CONFERENCE." PROKOFIEV SAID THE '46 AGREEMENT WAS NOT AN ADEQUATE BASIS FOR BASIC OPERATIONS TODAY; INSTEAD, THEY HAD TO PROCEED FROM PRESENT REALITIES. THE DISCUSSION ENDED AT THIS POINT, WITH THE ALLIES POINTING OUT THAT THEY WEREN'T GETTING ANYWHERE. PROKOFIEV SAID HE HAD KNOWN HE COULDN'T TELL THE ALLIES ANYTHING NEW; HE HAD AGREED TO ATTEND ONLY BECAUSE THEY HAD INSISTED.

10. WE PLAN TO TAKE UP THESE FULL-CORRIDOR RESERVATIONS

AT THE REGULAR WEEKLY MEETING OF CHIEF CONTROLLERS ON APRIL 17. AT 8:30 AM ON APRIL 16, THE SOVIETS ANNOUNCED IN THE BASIC THAT THE RESERVATIONS WOULD GO INTO EFFECT AS NOTIFIED, AND THERE WOULD BE NO GEOGRAPHIC LIMITS. LEDSKY
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2. USSR/BERLIN AIR CORRIDORS: A YEAR'S WORTH OF PRECEDENT

Over the past twelve months, the Soviets have been systematically asserting a right to alter procedures in the Berlin air corridors. They acknowledged at the start that their ultimate purpose was to alter the corridor regime on terms that would better adjust Allied traffic patterns to Soviet military requirements in the GDR. Apparently satisfied that its ability to effect unilateral change has been registered, the USSR is now prepared to discuss four-power arrangements alleviating some of the air-safety problems caused.

* * *

Unilateral traffic rules. On February 20, 1984, the Soviet controller at the Berlin air safety center (BASC) began filing air-space reservations in the Berlin corridors on a regular basis (in previous years it had been done only sporadically) and offering Allied traffic the use of alternate altitudes during the periods involved. Since then, the practice has become routine on all three Berlin routes, with the reservations frequently extending the entire length of the corridors. The compensatory altitudes offered generally extend well above the 10,000-foot ceiling Moscow imposed on Allied traffic some 25 years ago--a ceiling that the Western powers have consistently rejected in principle but generally observed in practice. Where an entire corridor is reserved, Allied aircraft have had to use steeper descent or ascent patterns on entering or exiting the Berlin control zone, creating potential safety problems.

The number of reservations dropped off substantially during the last few months, but whether by policy decision (e.g., in reaction to the resumption of US-USSR dialogue) or because bad weather reduced military air activity in the GDR is a matter for debate. In any event, the Soviet controller at BASC concurrently seemed more amenable to discussing the matter with his Allied colleagues, and a series of amiable, albeit inconclusive exchanges has commenced.

Formalizing the changes. The stance adopted by the Soviet controller now suggests readiness to address some of the Allied complaints about traffic safety. The Soviets may even be prepared to regularize flight ceilings above their self-imposed 10,000 feet. For Moscow, however, the very fact of even a technical understanding on this score will be treated as an implicit recognition of the USSR's ultimate say over the corridor regime. The latest position advanced by the Soviet controller was in essence simply a restatement of what the Soviets had proposed last February when the Allies first protested the reservations. Meanwhile, the Soviet side has registered a year of precedents in changing corridor procedures to its liking and will start from that point in any future discussion of air traffic to Berlin.

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