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Collection Name DOBRIANSKY, PAULA: FILES Withdrawer RBW 12/21/2016 File Folder COUNTRY FILES: BULGARIA (1) **FOIA** F1640/3 **Box Number** HERSHBERG **ID Doc Type Document Description** No of Doc Date Restrictions **Pages** 186106 REPORT RE BULGARIA 3 2/26/1981 B1 **B**3 12/21/2016 NLR-145-1-9-1-9#186106 PAR **186115 REPORT** RE. BULKAN NUCLEAR FREE ZONE 1 12/11/1981 B1 **B3** [TABLE AND PG. 5 ONLY] 12/21/2016 NLR-145-1-9-4-6#186106 PAR 186117 REPORT RE. BULGARIA'S NEW FOREIGN POLICY 7 2/11/1982 B1 **B3 ACTIVISM** 186118 REPORT RE. BULGARIA'S NEW FOREIGN POLICY 6 2/15/1982 B1 **B3 ACTIVISM** 186119 REPORT RE. BULGARIA [PGS. 7-12 ONLY] 6 3/16/1982 B1 **B3** 12/21/2016 NLR-145-1-9-7-3#186119 PAR 186120 REPORT RE. BULGARIA'S ISLAMIC MINORITY 7 1/31/1983 B1 **B3** 186121 REPORT RE. THE "BULGARIAN CONNECTION" 7 2/14/1983 B1 **B3** TO WHAT?

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18610	6 REPORT	3 2/26/1981 B1						
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BY FW NARA DATE 12/24/16

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## BULGARIAN REGIME ATTEMPTS TO DEFLECT POLISH-STYLE UNREST

Several high-level government officials have recently been publicly criticized, and some punished by demotions, reprimands, reductions in salary, and so forth, for poor job performance; all of them are connected with sectors which directly serve the consumer, including agriculture, light industry, transportation and internal trade, and public services. The attacks are part of a campaign against bureaucratic incompetence and corruption coupled with highly publicized party promises to raise living standards. Nervousness over the potential implications of Polish developments for Bulgaria has prompted the leadership to demonstrate its concern actively through the ongoing campaign.

Bulgaria is probably not likely to be "contaminated" by events in Poland in the near term. As expressions of worker discontent are rare and food shortages minimal, the regime does not face a threat at this time. We know of no organized dissident elements and any sign of active opposition would be swiftly stifled. Nevertheless, the vigorous consumer welfare campaign illustrates that the leadership is aware that the persistently low standard of living in Bulgaria is a source of potential trouble and has consequently targeted areas of popular complaint.

The agriculture sector has attracted the most official attention thus far. Late last year, the government announced a producer price increase for agricultural products which is to be financed by government subsidies rather than an increase in retail prices. In addition, the Council of Ministers issued a decree last month which is intended to encourage production by the traditionally neglected private farms. These two measures represent significant steps to boost production in order to satisfy the needs of the populace.

26 February 1981

Despite promises to emphasize the consumer sector, it is unclear if the regime will divert the necessary capital from heavy industry. Bulgaria's industrial strategy for the next five-year plan is to bring light industry and food production more into balance with traditionally favored heavy industry. Despite this, the industrial production targets for 1981-82 indicate that growth in heavy industry will increase at a faster rate than light industry, thus widening rather than closing the gap. One usually well-informed source asserts this is because those heavy industrial projects already in progress will be completed in the next two years, but he expects a decisive shift in emphasis away from heavy industry investment for the overall five-year period. According to the same source, Party Leader Todor Zhivkov has severely criticized officials in appropriate key sectors and has emphasized the need to allocate greater resources to consumer goods at the expense of heavy industry.

Despite Zhivkov's reported position, a drastic reorientation of economic policy is unlikely to be implemented soon. As reported, Sofia probably hopes to complete those major projects already under way--although
perhaps on a reduced scale--and allocate more resources
to the consumer-related sectors in the latter part of
the five-year plan period. In the meantime, the campaign against bureaucratic incompetence, and related
efforts to increase productivity, will continue to mark
the regime's attempt to persuade the populace that it
is working to improve consumer welfare.

The example of Poland will undoubtedly sharpen the ongoing debate within the leadership over general economic strategy and particularly resource allocation. Some indications of specific changes in longer term economic priorities may emerge during the 12th Party Congress which will convene on 31 March.

25X \

26 February 1981

Bulgaria

#### NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506 July 27, 1981

4

MEMORANDUM FOR L. PAUL BREMER, III

Executive Secretary Department of State

SUBJECT:

Presidential Message of Condolence on Death

of Bulgarian President's Daughter

The NSC Staff has reviewed and concurs in the Presidential message prepared by the Department of State to President Zhivkov on the death of his daughter, Lyudmila.

Allen J. Lenz Staff Director

# 5

#### DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

July 24, 1981

# LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

# MEMORANDUM FOR MR. RICHARD V. ALLEN THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Presidential Message of Condolence on Death of Bulgarian President's Daughter

Lyudmila Zhivkova, the 38-year old daughter of President Zhivkov of Bulgaria, died on July 21 after what was described as a brief illness. Our Embassy has not been able to learn the exact circumstances of her death. Zhivkova was the head of the Bulgarian State Committee for Cultural Relations, and in this role had showed a considerable openness toward the West.

Ambassador Perry recommends a brief message of condolence to Zhivkov from the President and the Department agrees. A draft message is attached.

L. Paul Bremer, III

Executive Secretary

#### Attachments:

- Draft Presidential Message of Condolence
- 2. Sofia 1981

-LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Authority State Waves 11615

BY AW NARA DATE 12/21/16

Dear Mr. President:

We were saddened to learn of the death of your daughter, Lyudmila. We remember her hard work toward expansion of U.S.-Bulgarian cultural relations and the steady progress that these relations have shown in recent years. I know that this is a deep personal loss for you. On behalf of our government I offer our deepest condolences.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Todor Zhivkov,
Chairman of the Council of State
of the People's Republic of Bulgaria,
Sofia.

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E. O. 12065: N/A TAGS: PDIP, BU, US E. O. 12065: SUBJECT: CONDOLENCES IN DEATH OF LYUDMILA ZHIVKOVA

EF: SOFIA 1965

- I RECOMMEND THAT A CONDOLENCE MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT BE SENT TO PRESIDENT ZHIVKOV IN THE DEATH OF HIS DAUGHTER.
- I SPOKE WITH SEVERAL WESTERN AMBASSADORS AND NEARLY ALL ARE RECOMMENDING A MESSAGE TO EHIVKOV FROM THE CHIEF OF STATE. THE GENERALLY ACCEPTED IDEA IS THAT IT IS SIMPLER TO SKIRT THE PROTOCOLOF LYUDMILA'S OWN POLITICAL POSITION AND TO SEND THE MESSAGE O HER FATHER IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY.
- 3. IN THIS CONNECTION I RECALL THAT ZHIVKOV SENT THE PRESIDENT A MESSAGE OF SYMPATHY AFTER THE ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT, SO THAT A PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT . REAGAN WOULD SEEM APPROPRIATE AT THIS TIME ..
- IN DRAFTING A MESSAGE THE DEPARTMENT MIGHT BEAR IN MIND THAT LYUDMILA ZHIVKOVA HAE VISITED THE UNITED STATES OFFICIALLY, THAT SHE MET WITH SECRETA OF STATE VANCE AT THE UN IN SEPTEMBER 1979, THAT SHE DEVOTED GREAT ATTENTION TO THE CHILDREN OF THE WORLD (E. G. THROUGH VARIOUS UNESCO CONNECTIONS), A

AND THAT SHE WAS A POWERFUL FORCE FOR WORLD RECOGNITION OF BULGARIAN CULTURE. PERRY

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5025 Bulgaria

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506 September 4, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR L. PAUL BREMER, III

Executive Secretary Department of State

SUBJECT:

Presidential Message of Congratulation to President Todor Zhivkov of Bulgaria on his

70th Birthday (S/S 8125278)

The NSC Staff has reviewed and concurs in the suggested text submitted by the Department of State of a message to President Todor Zhivkov of Bulgaria on the occasion of his 70th birthday.

Staff Director

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Copy Attached

Original LDXed.

#### SUGGESTED BIRTHDAY MESSAGE

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Please accept my congratulations on your seventieth birthday and my best wishes for your continued good health and future happiness. I look forward to the future development of relations between our countries in ways that will benefit both our peoples.

Sincerely,

Todor Zhivkov,
Chairman of the Council of State of the
People's Republic of Bulgaria,
Sofia.

#### NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

September 2, 1981

#### ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM:

RICHARD PIPES W

SUBJECT:

Message of Congratulations to President Zhivkov of Bulgaria on his 70th Birthday

I have reviewed and concur in the proposed message prepared by the Department of State, Tab I, to President Todor Zhivkov of Bulgaria on the occasion of his 70th birthday.

#### RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the text of the proposed message at Tab I.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove\_\_\_

#### Attachments:

Tab I

Memorandum and proposed message received

from the Department of State

#### SUGGESTED BIRTHDAY MESSAGE

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Please accept my congratulations on your seventieth birthday and my best wishes for your continued good health and future happiness. I look forward to the future development of relations between our countries in ways that will benefit both our peoples.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Todor Zhivkov,
Chairman of the Council of State of the
People's Republic of Bulgaria,
Sofia.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

August 29, 1981

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

#### MEMORANDUM FOR MR. RICHARD V. ALLEN THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Presidential Message of Congratulations to President Todor Zhivkov of Bulgaria on his 70th Birthday

President Todor Zhivkov of Bulgaria will celebrate his 70th birthday on September 7. An individual's 60th and 70th birthdays are considered particularly important occasions in Eastern Europe, and the Bulgarian Embassy here has taken pains to inform us well in advance that President Zhivkov's birthday is to be treated as an important State event in Sofia this year. Presidential greetings were sent to Leonid Brezhnev on his 70th birthday and to Romanian President Ceausescu on his 60th birthday. President Zhivkov sent a congratulatory message to President Reagan earlier this year on the latter's 70th birthday.

The Department recommends a brief birthday message from the President to President Zhivkov. A draft message is attached.

for L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

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BY PW NARA DATE 12/21/16

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186115	REPORT	1	12/11/1981	B1
	RE. BULKAN NUCLEAR FREE ZONE [TABLE AND PG. 5 ONLY]			В3

#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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Greece.

INTERNATIONAL: Balkan Nuclear-Free	Zone	
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Romania has been a longtime advancear-free zone and will cooperate not expected to participate. Yugos of the Bulgarian initiative and beliviable only as part of an arms reducing conventional arms and extending	e, while Albania is lavia is skeptical ieves it would be ction package includ-	1
The initiative is timed to caps of a Socialist government in Athens Papandreou welcomes the Balkan nucle concept, stating that he is willing negotiations and, if necessary, to	. Prime Minister ear-weapons-free to promote regional remove nuclear weapons ave taken these posi- greater military	
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ID	Document Type Document Description	No of pages	Doc Date	Restric- tions
186117	REPORT	7	2/11/1982	B1
	RE. BULGARIA'S NEW FOREIGN POLICY			B3

RE. BULGARIA'S NEW FOREIGN POLICY ACTIVISM

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186118	REPORT	6	2/15/1982	B1				
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BULGARIA: GROWING STRAINS WITHIN THE LEADERSHIP

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The political stability which has long been a hall-mark of Todor Zhivkov's regime may come under increasing strain as policy differences grow on a number of issues. The key players may attempt to use the clash of views to position themselves for the eventual succession to the 70-year-old Zhivkov.

The lessons of the counterrevolution" in Poland have reinvigorated party conservatives who insist on ideological orthodoxy and a high degree of party control throughout the system. They are essentially trying to consolidate their dominant position



Todor Zhivkov, Chairman of Council of State (U)

against a new group of pragmatists who made gradual inroads over the past four to five years. The pragmatists'
main impact was in the economic arena, when they introduced an economic reform program in the late 1970s that
deviates from strict Marxist-Leninist dogma. Some pragmatists also sought quietly to liberalize cultural ties
and broaden relations with the West.

The conservatives for now are concentrating their attention on a retrenchment in the cultural sector and on blocking improved relations with the West. The economic reform plan, still supported by Zhivkov because it holds promise of easing chronic shortcomings, is safe from attack at the moment but may not remain so.

EUR ER 82-010 16 March 1982

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#### Resurgence of Orthodoxy

The Polish Party's ineffectiveness in combating the challenge to its authority undoubtedly inspired Bulgarian leaders to reassess their own vulnerabilities. While it is extremely unlikely that Bulgaria will experience instability similar to Poland's, the regime in Sofia is, like all its totalitarian counterparts, fundamentally insecure and inclined toward overkill in reacting to any challenge to its monopoly of power. The crackdown in Poland strengthened the position of those Bulgarian leaders most identified with extremely orthodox internal policies.

Leadership changes pending in Moscow and ultimately in Sofia have further reinforced the powerful position of the Bulgarian hardliners. Uncertainties surrounding the looming succession in the Kremlin make it politically risky for Bulgarian leaders to be closely associated with any policies which border on ideological deviation. Moreover, should the long-awaited Bulgarian succession come soon, the hardliners might well become more aggressive in the belief that all innovations will come under closer Soviet scrutiny.

## The Case for Economic Innovation

Although the party appears increasingly inclined toward ideological orthodoxy, the deteriorating economic situation throughout Eastern Europe underscores Bulgaria's need to find an alternative to the Soviet economic model. "Standing pat" is not a viable option because Moscow cannot continue to subsidize the Bulgarian economy with cheap energy and raw materials. This factor along with declining domestic growth rates, low labor productivity, and increased regime awareness of the need to continue improving consumer welfare—a priority heightened by the Polish experience—bolsters the case of the more pragmatic leaders.

Bulgaria's nascent economic reform plan, the New Economic Mechanism (NEM), introduced decentralization in decisionmaking at its inception in 1979. Initially limited to the agricultural sector but extended in January 1982 to cover all sectors of the economy, the NEM transfers considerable authority from centralized ministries to individual enterprises. Salaries are to be linked to productivity and profitability is to become the key indicator

16 March 1982

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of successful management. The ultimate goal is to improve use of increasingly scarce and expensive resources while cutting state subsidies.

As elsewhere in Communist systems, decentralization poses the fundamental question of how the party retains power as authority is dispersed. The Bulgarians apparently are trying to stave off a serious erosion of power by increasing the authority of local party leaders to oversee and direct the local economies. Ultimately, a clash is likely between managers trying to use their nominal authority under the reform and political establishments at the local level.

These fundamental changes have provoked considerable apprehension and resistance within the party, and they are being implemented slowly. Although reform remains a priority for the regime under Zhivkov's firm leadership, differences over "how far to go" undoubtedly remain a stumblingblock. In a recent discussion with the US Ambassador, Bulgarian Prime Minister Grisha Filipov took pains to emphasize that the NEM does not mean the surrender of the economy to free market forces. While individual enterprises will be given greater autonomy, the central plan would continue to establish primary economic goals. Filipov—a career economist and father of the aborted reforms of the mid-1960s—is believed to be among the conservatives who support limited economic reforms but argue that going "too far" would undermine the stability of the regime.

#### Internal Checks and Balances

The regime's efforts to make reforms without losing tight control have led it to pursue seemingly contradictory policies simultaneously. For the present, economic reforms continue—albeit at a cautious, undramatic pace—but the regime seeks to offset the loss of control in economic matters by tightening up elsewhere. The government is moving against liberalization in the arts, intensifying press polemics against the West, cracking down publicly on bureaucratic corruption and crimes against the state, and stepping up political indoctrination of the populace. The regime hopes that this renewed emphasis on ideological purity will immunize the society against any infection from Poland or from the diminished control that will ac-

16 March 1982

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company economic decentralization. The increase in the ideological offensive in recent weeks and calls for increased vigilance are also meant to reassure hardliners in Moscow that, despite some liberalization in economic policies, Bulgaria remains committed to the fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism.

## Shift in Cultural Policy

A budding conservative trend in cultural policy would be a departure from the relatively relaxed guidelines enjoyed by the artistic community under the enthusiastic sponsorship of President Zhivkov's late daughter and former Minister of Culture Lyudmila Zhivkova. It had been unclear what effect her death last July would have on the future of Bulgarian cultural policy, but recent developments suggest a shift back to the traditional use of the arts as a manipulative tool designed to support the party's goals and objectives.

In early February George Yordanov--a candidate member of the Politburo and a Deputy Premier--was elected to replace Zhivkova as the chairman of the Committee for Culture. He has no special cultural or educational expertise and his reputation as an ideologue may foreshadow stricter party controls. Yordanov's retention of senior party and government posts, moreover, suggests that under his guidance the cultural portfolio will continue to hold a high priority for the regime.

Complications surrounding two recent cultural events-cancellation of the Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra's scheduled performance in Sofia and Bulgaria's refusal to host a previously arranged US museum exhibit--provided a rare glimpse of confusion and possible infighting in the leadership. In both cases, Bulgarian negotiations with West German and US officials, respectively, revealed a lack of communication--and perhaps significant policy differences-between the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which favored the projects, and the Ministry of Culture.

Although Zhivkov and other senior Bulgarian leaders recently told US officials that Washington should intensify bilateral cultural contacts, Sofia's inflexible position in these two recent experiences demonstrates the leadership's lack of consistency. The contradiction between

16 March 1982

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the official assurances that enhanced cooperation is desired and this recent display of inflexible, ultra-orthodox attitudes may reflect a tightening of policy by the recently elected leadership in the cultural apparatus.

#### Press Polemics and Jamming VOA

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While anti-US polemics have always been prominent in the Bulgarian press, the deterioration in East-West relations has prompted an increase in the number and negative tone of these attacks and provided yet another opportunity to display hardline policies. The attacks generally reflect Soviet concerns and sensitivities—especially Moscow's accusations of US interference in Poland's internal affairs. In addition, critical commentaries from Bulgaria on US domestic problems—unemployment, crime, scandals—are intended to convince the Bulgarian populace that they are fortunate in comparison to the most decadent capitalist society.

In a new attempt to bolster the party's information monopoly, Bulgaria recently began jamming Voice of America broadcasts. Sofia has consistently jammed Radio Free Europe because it reports directly on internal developments. VOA had not been jammed, however, since the signing of a 1974 agreement with the United States that VOA would not engage in a propaganda "offensive" against Bulgaria. Resumption of the jamming and press attacks on RFE are symptomatic of the return to "internal vigilance."

# Prospects for the Reforms and the Leadership

In the near term, Zhivkov will continue to guide the regime in the cautious implementation of moderate economic reforms. He and his associates all recognize the need to develop an alternative to the status quo, but the dilemma of how liberal or conservative the party should be will persist. This uncertainty could ultimately cripple the reform program as its success depends on consistent implementation of the new measures. While the innovations have the potential to bring about some improvements, conservative resistance to substantial reforms will at least diminish their impact. Moreover, the tightening political atmosphere may predispose the regime to apply the brakes as soon as the slightest problems emerge.

16 March 1982

In the longer term, the success or failure of the reforms in reversing deteriorating economic trends will have major implications for the post-Zhivkov era. The uncertainty resulting from Zhivkov's deliberate avoidance of selecting a number-two man complicates the succession picture and raises the political stakes in any debate over the reform issue. If the NEM falters, the credibility of the most innovative members of the ruling elite will be severely undermined. Against the backdrop of presuccession maneuvering, the pursuit of inherently contradictory policies by innovators and hardliners may provide the framework for a growing power struggle within the regime.

25X1



**EMBASSY OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF** 

# BULGARIA

31

PRESS - RELEASE

EMBASSY OF THE People's Republic Of Bulgaria 1621 22nd Street NW Washington, DC 20008

#### WHO HAS PRODUCED " THE EVIDENCE"?

Sofia, January 12 /BTA / - A number of newspapers which take part in the antibulgarian campaign are now forced to express doubts in the groundness of the accusations against Bulgaria of its being implicated in the papal attempted assassination.

The French journalist Elio Commartain writes in the Paris "Matin": "In Italy an ever greater number of people ask themselves as to whether Ali Agca has not been forced to implicate Sofia in the assassination attempt on the Pope".And "L'Humanite Dimanche" asks: "What exactly is the role of the Italian secret services in the "revelations" of Agca, the author of the attempt? Haven't they produced him evidence "which was ready to be put together".

The Italian agency ANSA which has slightly raised the curtain by reporting a significant fact is also intrested in these questions. According to ANSA, the editors of a daily in Rome have received a letter containing a photo-copy of a document dated March 14,1982, by which the Ministry of justice has allegedly demanded the director of the prison in Ascoli Picceno to give a permission to "three identified persons" to meet Agca "without any limitation of the time". The agency specifies that it was about agents of the secret services who dressed in monks'cassocks came accompanied by the priest of the prison to talk with the Turk.

This mysteriousness in the description of the three "identified persons" is, however, cleared up by the article written by

P.Ficoneriin the latest issue of the Italian "Espresso" headlined "Guess Who Is Coming to the Cell?"In it the author gives an exact register of the visits the assailant Ali Agca has had in the prison.

"At the end of September,1981", Ficoneri writes, "on the day of the jailers, the bishop of Scoli, Monseigneur Morgante wants to talk with the author of the attempt in the prison. The talk proceeded about two hours. The bishop did not visit Agca any more. From this moment on the task of talking and maintaining contacts with Agca was assigned temporarily on father Saverio, a priest in the "Marino del Tronto" prison who shuttles between the Turk's cell and the bishopric."

"On December 29", "Espresso" goes further, "Agca had another visit. These were people of the secret services who introduced themselves: major Petruccelli of SISMI / Intelligence and security service with the Ministry of internal affairs - editor's note / and Dr. Bonagura of SIDE / Information and security service with the Ministry of internal affairs -editor's note /...It is known for certain that on December 29 the two secret agents spent a long time in Agca's cell. What did they want from the Turk and what did they offer him in return? The first answer came 35 days later."

On February 2,1982, lawyer Pietrpaulo of Ascoli/who for some time has been an official defence of the terrorist/ urged Agca to cooperate with the investigators. As pointed out by the "Espresso" magazine, the minister of the interior Rognoni had reportedly ordered the expanding of the possibilities for deriving advantage, provided by the law / for alleviating the verdicts of terrorists who colaborate with the authorities / so that they can cover those who "repented" having begun to collaborate with them after being convicted already. This measure was applied namely to favour Agca, who was promised ten years in prison at the utmost if he speaks out.

The Viennese "Volkstimme" commentary headline reads that "the Italian agents have supplied the evidence" to be used

later by Agca to calumniate Sergei Antonov and Bulgaria. Ali Agca, the newspaper emphasizes, has been informed in the minutest detail about the dwelling of the employee of the Bulgarian embassy in Rome Todor Aivazov. This evidence was supplied to him by Italian agents, because since the autumn of 1981 there have been 15 breakings into the flats in the Bulgarian officials block of flats in Rome.

Of all these violationa, the newspaper goes on, the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been informed in due time, but no one has ever taken the trouble to react and, of course, the violators have not been caught. Already by taking over the defence, Antonov's lawyers paid attention to these "strange" visits. These facts, according to "Volkstimme", were officially confirmed by the Italian Foreign Ministry.

By the montage of the "Antonov affair", the daily points out, the secret services of Italy's defence minister Lagorio obviously did not have any piece of good luck, because Antonov has an alibi confirmed by many witnesses.

And so "the Bulgarian trial, which was impudently pointed by part of the newspapers and magazines, is actually on the way to disappear", states Alain Vasme, correspondent of "L'Humanite Dimanche" in Rome.

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RE. BULGARIA'S ISLAMIC MINORITY

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#### (U) BULGARIAN CULTURAL NATIONALISM REINED IN

#### Summary

The repeatedly delayed Fourth Bulgarian Congress of Culture finally convened on May 25-27 and set the guidelines for Bulgarian cultural policy in the wake of the 1981 passing of Lyudmila Zhivkova and the subsequent retooling of the cultural apparat. Cultural tsarina Zhivkova, once possible heir to her father, sometimes had raised Soviet hackles with her glorification of Bulgaria. Today her policies have been muted or modified in a direction more palatable to domestic hardliners and Soviet mentors. Conservatism and socialist realism have regained preeminence on the Bulgarian cultural scene, to the detriment of nationalist tendencies.

Praise of the unique, ancient, and dynamic nature of Bulgarian culture continues, however. The delay in holding the congress reflected persistent internal bargaining over personnel and policy directions. Although the debate apparently has not been settled, a more orthodox tendency was evident at the congress. Continuing disagreement over the policy questions involved is likely to have direct domestic rather than international repercussions.

A Shift From Zhivkova

The basic thrust of Bulgarian cultural policy since the death of Zhivkova, head of the Committee for Culture, has been to redefine her more liberal, nationalistic approaches. Redefinition (rather than repudiation) has allowed both the preservation of Zhivkova's personal good name and, at the same time, a return to conservative tendencies in the cultural field. Ideology and orthodoxy have prevailed over Zhivkova's openness and experimentation, yet Zhivkova herself has been elevated to almost saint-like status.

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Report 643-AR June 24, 1983 - 2 -

The move back to more doctrinaire attitudes is personified in the individual who replaced her as head of the Committee for Culture--Georgi Yordanov. In his February 1982 acceptance speech, Yordanov foreshadowed what eventually became the official cultural line: Zhivkova and past Bulgarian policy were correct; the Soviet Union and its "culture" have aided Bulgaria; ideological purity must be maintained. The non-compatibility of these tenets was ignored and Zhivkova's uneasy relations with Moscow glossed over. (Yordanov early in his tenure made a visit to the Soviet Union, no doubt to touch base and to solicit Soviet "guidance.")

By late spring and summer 1982, the cultural apparat was under fire in the central press for alleged tendencies toward "ideological amorphism and political infantilism." In April, chairman of the Writers' Union Levchev demanded that socialist realism be central in literature, that party members be positively portrayed as the main protagonists, and that closer control and supervision be exercised over young writers. At the December plenum of the Cultural Committee, Yordanov promised "stricter requirements concerning our work and our individual and joint behavior" at the Fourth Congress of Culture.

In more concrete matters, a number of countries began to encounter foot-dragging and "technical difficulties" in their cultural dealings with Bulgaria. A visit to Sofia of the Berlin Philharmonic was cancelled, as was a Finnish architectural exhibit. Film weeks faced staging problems. Some of Zhivkova's more unusual interests suffered greatly with the cessation of her personal support; most notably, paraperception and parapsychology, the study of which she had strongly encouraged, fell into disrepute and were condemned in the central and scholarly Bulgarian press.

#### The Fourth Bulgarian Congress of Culture

Originally scheduled for early 1982, the congress was initially postponed owing to Zhivkova's sudden death. Two further postponements seemed linked to policy disagreements. The final tone of the congress thus presumably represented a hard-fought compromise on Bulgarian cultural policy for the near term. Along with economic reform, cultural policy in Bulgaria has generally reflected the extent of flexibility and liberalism within the ruling hierarchy. In the case of cultural policy, at least, the hardliners clearly won out.

Three central themes--not always consistent--emerged from the proceedings:

--Culture increasingly is becoming an ideological battlefield, with the West trying to subvert socialism--for example, President Reagan's "crusade" against communism.

- -- The cornerstone of Bulgarian cultural cooperation has been and remains spiritual unity with the people of the Soviet Union.
- --Zhivkova, "inspired patriot and ardent internationalist," and her work are unforgettable (even if her policies have fallen from grace).

The fact that Zhivkova was a major proponent of cultural exchange with the West was not mentioned in Yordanov's call for combatting outside efforts to undermine Bulgarian culture, Bulgaria itself, and socialism in general. Some of his pique certainly can be traced to the international uproar surrounding allegations of Bulgarian involvement in the papal assassination attempt. But even before that story broke, Western countries were having problems with Sofia on cultural exchanges.

The Bulgarian harangue against Western influences probably is seen by the regime as a tactical necessity if Zhivkova's policies are to be changed without criticizing her even slightly. Thus, the West must be portrayed as bad (overlooking that Zhivkova was Oxford-educated and had mounted a major exhibit of Bulgaria's Thracian and Medieval Heritage which toured Western countries under her personal sponsorship). In essence, the congress-confirmed reorientation is a return to pre-Zhivkova paranoia about the West, complete with a push for ideological purity and socialist orthodoxy.

The second theme of the renewed conservatism is a return to slavish admiration of and praise for the Soviet Union. between Moscow and Sofia were sufficiently strained under Zhivkova that the Soviet Union denigrated her main project -- the 1300th Anniversary of Bulgaria. With her passing, the Soviets apparently stepped up their pressure on the cultural front. In any event, their interest in the Fourth Congress was evident in the highlevel delegation sent. Headed by Minister of Culture Demichev, the delegation included Minister of Education Prokofiev -- who had further talks with Bulgarian education officials after the congress--and Vasiliy Shauro, head of the CPSU Central Committee's Cultural Department. Demichev reminded the congress participants of their "social responsibility" and stressed the need for ideological vigilance in the face of Western assertiveness. The Soviet message was clear: Zhivkova's Western-oriented, nationalist, and experimental cultural policies were to be discarded.

#### But Zhivkova Lives On

Although Zhivkova's policies and pet projects have been undercut, she herself has become more and more of an icon.

-- the new Palace of Culture in Sofia was named for her;





- --her efforts in the Banner of Peace Movement (which seeks to promote "international understanding" by every three years assembling talented children from around the world) came to fruition with the convening of its second assembly in August 1982;
- --her writings continued to be published posthumously;
- --in late October 1982 the Lyudmila Zhivkova Foundation was established to "popularize [her] highly noble ideas" by organizing seminars, conferences, and exhibits to feature gifted children and focus on how best to help them become "future creators in the name of peace and progress";
- --when one of her books was published in February 1983, she was praised as "a Bulgarian star shining for all mankind"; and
- --she figures prominently as an "apostle of Bulgarian culture" in the semi-permanent multimedia Panorama of Bulgarian Culture exhibit in Sofia.

Even Yordanov has seen the need to pay homage to Zhivkova. At the December cultural plenum he praised her as embodying "the most precious progressive traditions of our national culture..." At the congress, praise was even more effusive. The very choice of the St. Cyril and Methodius pre-communist holiday for the opening day of the congress played to Zhivkova's nationalist preferences. But the accolades for her personally were not linked to her policy line. The message of the Bulgarian Communist Party Central Committee called for "further implementation of her ideas [as] the best tribute to her," but it also advocated "the perfection of a socialist way of life" and hailed Bulgarian-Soviet cultural cooperation. Thus the congress praised Zhivkova but downgraded, if not derided, her policies.

Despite this turn to a more traditional socialist approach to cultural matters, reminders of Zhivkova's nationalist push have survived and will remain her legacy to Bulgaria. Such projects as the Foundation and the Banner of Peace Movement keep remnants of her efforts in operation. The Foundation in particular should serve to provide some access to and interaction with other cultures and people.

No doubt many within the cultural apparat deeply regretted this eclipsing of Bulgarian nationalism in cultural policy. But those who did have been removed from office, have suppressed their personal interest, or are working surreptitiously to preserve what they can. They currently are not strong enough politically to block the hardliners. They apparently were able, however, to delay the congress and to force the conservatives to pay something

to carry their harder line. Yordanov himself explained the congress delay to the December plenum by noting the need to resolve "important problems related to our cultural development."

#### Toward Cultural Conformism

The return to greater orthodoxy in cultural matters has its counterpart in a general tightening of control throughout Bulgarian society. Not only has there been a noticeable lessening of tolerance for illegal dealings by foreigners but also the Bulgarian militia has begun periodic sweeps of Sofia designed to catch loafers and those illegally in the capital. The latter effort, begun in late April, may have been a simple imitation of Moscow, but it also is symptomatic of Bulgarian efforts to improve labor discipline and tighten controls generally.

Among the reasons for increasing rigidity are fear over possible infection from Poland and chagrin over the derogatory publicity stemming from the "Bulgarian connection" to the papal assassination plot and to arms and drug smuggling. Concern about succession maneuvering in both Moscow and Sofia also plays a role: at times of uncertainty, safety is often sought in a retreat to stricter controls. Cultural policy could easily become the banner under which rival Bulgarian political factions battle out the direction Sofia is to take after the passing of Todor Zhivkov. Opposition to Moscow, openings to the West, liberalism, and reform tendencies can all be read into the subject. Furthermore, the current debate over economic liberalism and reforms could spill over into cultural policy, with a loosening up on one side balanced off by stricter control of the other.

Another domestic facet is the impact that fluctuations in the Bulgarian nationalism theme have on such minority groups as Catholics, Turks, and Pomaks. Repression of these groups can rise or fall depending on the emphasis on Bulgarian nationalism. The attitudes involved have their roots in generations of antagonism and in competition for scarce resources.

Finally, Bulgarian cultural policy can have an impact on bilateral relations with the Soviet Union. As noted, the Soviets felt no great love for Zhivkova and invited Yordanov to Moscow soon after he officially replaced her. They also participated actively in the Fourth Congress. Sofia in turn repeatedly acknowledged Moscow's interests at the congress by generous praise for Bulgarian-Soviet cooperation and affinity. Even earlier, in a July 1982 speech in honor of Zhivkova, Bulgarian Foreign Minister Mladenov went to extremes of exaggeration and inaccuracy to link Zhivkova with promotion of Bulgarian-Soviet cultural ties. He signaled to both Moscow and the Bulgarian cultural community that fealty to Moscow once again was the watchword.



- 6 -

#### Future Shifts?

Bulgaria's largely coopted cultural community has met the move toward conservatism with seeming equanimity. Its members are unlikely to test the limits of the new guidelines. Those more reluctant to accept the harder line will gravitate toward areas in which Zhivkova's legacy is still alive, such as the Foundation. Their importance and impact will mount in any succession jockeying after Zhivkov and in the debate over questions of liberalism and reform in other areas, most notably the economy.

Lyudmila's family connection sheltered her from opposition and her avant garde approach to cultural matters allowed others to attempt experimental policies in other fields. Now, in her absence and with the uncertainty posed by succession questions, the liberals have retreated and orthodoxy has been restored. Yet, the brief flowering of cultural detente and diversity revealed the existence of creative, independent elements within Bulgarian society, albeit weak ones in need of a protective screen such as Zhivkova in order to flourish. The rise of another patron could spark a renaissance of liberalism in cultural matters, and by extension in other fields. Meanwhile, any internal debates over flexibility, reforms, and openness anywhere in the society could strain the cohesiveness of the Bulgarian system and spill over into its bilateral relationship with the Soviet Union.

Prepared by J. M. Floyd 632-9198

Approved by M. Mautner 632-9536

Bulgana

#### **MEMORANDUM**

#### NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

June 27, 1983

#### INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM:

JOHN LENCZOWSKI JC

SUBJECT:

The Bulgarian Connection

Attached is the article that I saw in the <u>International Herald Tribune</u> outlining your position on the Bulgarian connection in the Papal assassination attempt. I have underlined some key passages.

Attachment

# U.S. Security Aides Doubt Bulgarian Tie to Pope's Shooting

By Robert C. Toth Los Angeles Times Service

WASHINGTON - Both William P. Clark, President Ronald Reagan's national security adviser, and William J. Casey, head of the Central Intelligence Agency, now lean to the view that efforts to find a "Bulgarian connection" in the attempted assassination of Pope John Paul II have "run dry," according to administration officials.

Their new attitude follows a review of information available to the CIA. It comes amid signs that the Kremlin has demonstrated unusually visible anger with the Bulgarians, and a report that the Bulgarians will soon send a leading official to Rome to discuss the alleged connection between the May 13, 1981, shooting and Bulgarian intelligence agents.

Soviet displeasure was seen earlier this month in a rare announcement of a visit to Bulgaria by Viktor M. Chebrikov, the chief of the KGB, the Soviet secret police and intelligence agency. There was also a report that Todor Zhivkov, the official, was arrested after being

Bulgarian leader, had been severely chastised by Yuri V. Andropov, the Soviet leader and former head of the KGB.

There is speculation in Washington that both incidents were related to the embarrassing ties found by Italian investigators between the Bulgarian intelligence service and Mehmet Ali Agca, the Turk who shot the pope two years ago. Those links have led to widespread allegations that the Bulgarians hired Mr. Agea to kill the pontiff.

The theory has been that the Bulgarians were acting on behalf of Moscow, which was presumed to blame the pope for helping to foment anti-Soviet unrest in Po-

Adding credence to the speculation was a report from Eastern Europe that a Bulgarian foreign minister was due to visit Rome "probably to discuss a political solution" in the Italian case against Sergei I. Antonov, according to a U.S. official who asked not to be identified. Mr. Antonov, a Bulgarian Airlines

identified by Mr. Agea as an accomplice in the shooting.

Mr. Clark and Mr. Casey, while no longer inclined to believe in a Bulgarian connection, still strongly support the continuing search by the Italian authorities for evidence that could link Mr. Agca with Bulgarian and Soviet intelligence organizations.

There have been other recent developments in the case. The Italian authorities investigating the attempt on the pope's life have now obtained enough photographs of St. Peter's Square to construct a montage of virtually everyone present before, during and after the shooting, according to sources.

Also, a West German television program reported that one man photographed fleeing the square after the shooting, apparently carrying a gun, has been identified as Oral Celik, another Turk, who allegedly helped Mr. Agca to kill a Turkish editor in 1979 and escape from a Turkish prison.

Mr. Celik is reportedly in Bulgaria, and the authorities there are

him to Italy. They have refused extradition in the case of Bekir Celenk, a Turk who supposedly promised Mr. Agea \$1.3 million to kill the pope.

At White House orders, a detailed review of information available to the United States was conducted after broadcast charges that CIA officials were discouraging efforts to find a Bulgarian connection, ostensibly to avoid a disclosure that could prevent a summit meeting between Mr. Andropov and Mr. Reagan.

After the review, Mr. Casey came to agree with the earlier view of CIA professionals, who concluded that the Bulgarians very probably did not direct Mr. Agca to shoot the pope, although they probably knew his intentions and chose not to stop him.

Mr. Casey was also reported in an NBC television account earlier this month to have cited three other factors that caused him to "change his mind" from his earlier inclination to believe in the consaid to have refused to extradite nection; lack of progress in the

Italian investigation of the connection theory; reports from Rome about a possible trade of Mr. Antonov for two Italians jailed in Bulgaria on espionage charges; and the persuasive denials of an April article in The New York Times reporting that a Bulgarian defector in France had provided supporting evidence for the connection theory.

"Casey's view now, which the CIA has presented convincingly, is that Agca was probably not hired by the Bulgarians," a knowledgeable administration official said.

"Clark's position is somewhat short of that," the official added, between one that says there was no connection, and another that holds if there was some connection, we'll never be able to prove it."

Officials flatly deny that the new Clark-Casey positions are related to any desire for a Soviet-American summit conference, although Mr. Reagan has increasingly spoken of such a meeting.

was seen by analysts in the brief the U.S. assumption is that the article in Prayda, the Communist subject was the report of a Bulgar-Party newspaper, this month, re- ian connection.

porting that Mr. Chebrikov led a KGB delegation to Sofia for talks with Mr. Zhivkov.

Veteran diplomats and analysts said they could remember no Soviet news account in recent times that a KGB leader had traveled abroad as head of a KGB delegation to confer with foreign officials.

"Whatever the reason for the trip, announcing it has to be seen as a slap at the Bulgars," a knowledgeable U.S. official said. "The subject may very well have been the papal assassination is-

"When you've got such a big problem as this assassination attempt has become," another official said, "it's only natural to consult on it."

A few weeks ago, a report reached Washington that Mr. Andropov had chastised Mr. Zhivkov in November in talks after the funeral of Mr. Andropov's predecessor, Leonid I. Brezhnev. No reason-Soviet anger at the Bulgarians for Soviet anger was known, but

### Ukrainians, to Get Son, Must Return to U.S.

The Associated Press

SPRINGFIELD, Illinois - Walter Polovchak, 15, who ran away from home rather than return to the Soviet Union with his family, can be returned to his parents' custody if they come to the United States to get him, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled Friday.

However, the justices acknowledged that the youth would not be ent back immediately to the Sovi-

Harvey Grossman, legal director for the American Civil Liberties Union, which represented the boy's parents, said the decision affirmed "the basic principles of law which are guaranteed to all persons, including aliens."

Mr. Grossman said the parents had told him they planned to return to the United States to claim

custody of their son. The case began in 1980 when the



### Walesa Is Questioned, Charges Harassment ©

WARSAW - Police in Gdansk questioned Lech Walesa, leader of the banned Solidarity union, for two hours Wednesday in connection with charges against five dissidents who had acted as union advisers, Mr. Walesa said.

Mr. Walesa complained of "harassment" and told reporters he had to report again Saturday afternoon. He said he had refused to. ill will."

of Mr. Walesa in recent weeks, associating him with what they call the extremist element of Solidarity.

In another development, the minister of internal affairs. General Czeslaw Kiszczak, said in a speech Thursday that although the police had strict rules limiting the use of force it was not possible "to completely avoid mistakes, lapses and sometimes acts resulting from

BUCGARIA

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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August 3, 1983

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CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL

Executive Secretary Department of State

SUBJECT:

Presidential Letter to Mr. D. Tsvetkov of Bulgaria

We have reviewed and concur with your recommendation that a Presidential response be forwarded through our Embassy in Sofia to Mr. D. Tsvetkov and that this exchange of letters be publicized by Voice of America. A signed letter from the President to Mr. Tsvetkov is attached.

Robert M. Kimmitt Executive Secretary

Attachment

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Sec.3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2006
BY NARA
, DATE 12, 21 (1)

#### THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 3, 1983

Dear Mr. Tsvetkov:

Your letter eloquently addresses one of the most urgent and complex issues of our time -- how to avoid a nuclear war. Let me assure you that the United States is sincerely and actively pursuing an arms control policy designed to achieve genuine and significant progress on this issue.

The policy of my country clearly recognizes the immense importance to international security of efforts to reduce, and eventually eliminate, nuclear weapons. This is why we are presently engaged in no less than five major negotiations dealing with arms control.

In fact, the U.S. is now embarked on one of the most ambitious and comprehensive programs for arms control ever. In the START negotiations we seek deep reductions in strategic nuclear arsenals to much lower and equal levels. In INF we have sought to eliminate an entire class of weapons, and now seek an interim solution to reduce the weapons to equal numbers and the lowest possible levels. In other negotiations, we have made proposals for measures to reduce the risk of nuclear war by accident or miscalculation, for substantial, verifiable reductions in conventional forces in Central Europe, and for the complete elimination of chemical weapons.

We will continue to pursue arms control negotiations vigorously, for I am determined to strive for equitable and verifiable agreements that will provide for substantial reductions and greatly enhanced security. We realize, of course, that significant and lasting agreements, which truly enhance international security and

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reduce the threat of war, will not come easily. But the United States will continue to do everything in its power to achieve this goal. Soviet Union shows similar goodwill and determination and exercises restraint in its international behavior, then the prospects for international peace and security will be truly good.

However, I do believe that so far the Soviet leaders have not demonstrated enough willingness to compromise to reach a genuine arms control agreement. It is my firm belief that if such an agreement is to advance the cause of peace, it must result in equal and reduced levels of nuclear capability. The agreement must also be verifiable. Although Soviet leaders have always proclaimed their interest in arms control and disarmament, their actual behavior has been quite different throughout the 1970s and 80s. The USSR has engaged in an unprecedented military buildup and what seems to us to be a dangerous global pattern of committing acts of aggression and inciting its allies to do likewise. For example, Soviet troops are in Afghanistan, Vietnamese forces are in Kampuchea, and Cuban proxies are in Africa and Central America. It is my hope that the current Soviet leadership will have the courage and vision to reverse this fateful course. I firmly believe that if a flexible and balanced approach is adopted, a genuine arms control breakthrough would ensue.

I hope, Mr. Tsvetkov, that this letter will allay the fears you or your countrymen may have about peace. Let me once again assure you that I have no higher goal, no more urgent task, than to reduce the threat of nuclear war to all the world's people. I join you as "an adherent to peace who desires understanding between peoples and happiness for future generations."

Sincerely,

Mr. D. Tsvetkov c/o American Embassy Sofia

# CONFIDENTIAL

#### THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

August 3, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SIGNED

FROM:

WILLIAM P. CLARK W

SUBJECT:

Presidential Response to Letter from Mr. D. Tsvetkov

of Bulgaria

Mr. D. Tsvetkov, a 90-year old Bulgarian, sent you a letter (Tab B) which is critical of your alleged desire to wage nuclear war and calls for an end to the U.S.-Soviet arms race. State proposes, and I agree, that this letter, authentic or not, provides us with an opportunity to counter Soviet disinformation in Eastern Europe concerning U.S. intentions in arms control. In particular, the exchange of letters could be publicized by Voice of America. At Tab A is a suggested draft response which points out your recognition of the horrors of nuclear war, your proposals for deep arms reductions, and Soviet unwillingness to compromise. Speechwriters have cleared the text.

#### RECOMMENDATION

OK No

That you sign the letter at Tab A, and that the exchange of letters be publicized by Voice of America.

Prepared by: Paula Dobriansky

Attachments:

Tab A Proposed response to Mr. Tsvetkov

Tab B Incoming letter

CONFIDENTIAL Declassify on: OADR

Sec.3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
Whith House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2006
BY NARA P. DATE 12 21 11

cc Vice President
Ed Meese
Jim Baker
Mike Deaver
Bob Sims



#### NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CONFIDENTIAL

July 28, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

SIGNED

FROM:

PAULA DOBRIANSKY

SUBJECT:

Presidential Response to letter from Mr. D. Tsvetkov

of Bulgaria

At Tab II is a State memorandum to you forwarding a letter to the President from Mr. D. Tsvetkov, a 90-year old Bulgarian (Tab B). His letter is critical of the President's alleged desire to wage nuclear war and calls for an end to the U.S.-Soviet arms race. State believes, and I agree, that this letter, authentic or not, provides us with an opportunity to counter Soviet disinformation in Eastern Europe concerning U.S. intentions in arms control. State's amended draft reply (Tab A) points out the President's recognition of the horrors of nuclear war, his proposals for deep arms reductions and the fact that so far, Soviet leaders have not demonstrated a willingness to compromise. At Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President forwarding the suggested response; at Tab III is a memorandum from Bob Kimmitt to State concurring with the reply as amended. Speechwriters have cleared Also, State approved the amended reply. the text.

Kraemer, Matlock and Raymond concur.

#### RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum at Tab I to the President.

Approve	Disapprove
T T	11

#### Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Amended proposed reply to Mr. Tsvetkov

Tab B Text of incoming letter from Mr. Tsvetkov

Tab II State's memorandum, July 25, 1983

Tab III Proposed Memorandum from Kimmitt to Hill

Declassify on: OADR

Sec.3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2008 BY NARA D. DATE





Washington, D.C. 20520

July 25, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject:

Proposed Presidential Response to Letter from 90-year-old Bulgarian

Our Embassy in Sofia received a letter from one D. Tsvetkov, a 90-year-old Bulgarian, addressed to President Reagan (Tab 2). The letter, while critical of the President's alleged desire to wage nuclear war, is unusually eloquent.

More importantly, however, this letter, authentic or not, provides us with an excellent opportunity to counter the Soviet disinformation in Eastern Europe concerning U.S. intentions in the area of arms control. We believe the President should reply to the letter, emphasizing his recognition of the horrors of nuclear war and his proposals for deep reductions. The exchange of letters could then be publicized by Voice of America and have a substantial impact on Eastern European perceptions of U.S. sincerity and determination to achieve effective arms control agreements with the Soviet Union.

A proposed reply is attached (Tab 1). We plan to send the letter to our Embassy in Sofia, which, in turn, will place the signed letter in the local Bulgarian post for delivery to Mr. Tsvetkov.

#### Attachments:

- 1. Tab 1 Proposed reply to Mr. Tsvetkov.
- 2. Tab 2 A copy of Mr. Tsvetkov's letter to President Reagan.

Charles Hi Executive Secretary

DECL: 7-23-87

DECLASSIFIED Dept. of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997 NARA, DATE 12/21

CONFIDENTIAL

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### Proposed Reply to Mr. D. Tsvetkov

Dear Mr. Tsvetkov:

Your letter eloquently addresses one of the most urgent and complex issues of our time -- the issue of how to avoid a nuclear war. Let me assure you that the United States is sincerely and actively pursuing an arms control policy designed to achieve genuine and significant progress on this issue.

The policy of my country clearly recognizes the immense importance to international security of efforts to reduce, and eventually eliminate, nuclear weapons. This is why we are presently engaged in no less than five major negotiations dealing with arms control.

In fact, the U.S. is now embarked on one of the most ambitious and comprehensive programs for arms control ever. In the START negotiations we seeking deep reductions in strategic nuclear arsenals to much lower and equal levels. In INF we have sought to eliminate an entire class of weapons, and now seek an interim solution to reduce the weapons to equal numbers and the lowest possible levels. In other negotiations, we have made proposals for measures to reduce the risk of nuclear war by accident or miscalculation, for substantial, verifiable reductions in conventional forces in Central Europe, and for the complete elimination of chemical weapons.

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BY FW NARADATE 12/21/16

DECLASSIFIED
Sec.3.4(b), E.O. 12958, es amended
White House Cuidelines, Sept. 11, 2006
BY NARA
, DATE

We will continue to pursue arms control negotiations vigorously, For I am determined to strive for equitable and verifiable agreements that will provide for substantial reductions and greatly enhanced security. Significant and lasting agreements, which truly enhance international security and reduce the threat of war, will not come easily. But the United States will continue to do everything in its power to achieve this goal. If the Soviet Union shows similar goodwill and determination and exercises restraint in its international behavior, then the prospects for international peace and security will be truly good.

However, I do not believe that so far the Soviet leaders have not demonstrated a willingness to compromise which is necessary for a genuine arms control agreement. It is my firm belief that if an arms control agreement is to advance the cause of peace, it must result in equal and reduced levels of nuclear capability. The agreement must also be verifiable. Although Soviet leaders have always proclaimed their interest in arms control and disarmament, their actual behavior has been quite different throughout the 1970s and 80s. The USSR has engaged in an unprecedented nuclear buildup which has not served the cause of peace. It is my hope that the current Soviet leadership will have the courage and vision to reverse this fateful course. I firmly believe that if a flexible and balanced approach is adopted, a genuine arms control breakthrough would ensue.

I hope, Mr. Tsvetkov, that this letter will allay fears you or your countrymen may have about peace. Let me once again assure you that I have no higher goal, no more urgent task, than to reduce the threat of nuclear war to the people of this world. I join you as "an adherent to peace who desires understanding between peoples and happiness for future generations."

Sincerely,

CONFIDENTIAL

#### Proposed Reply

Dear Mr. Tsvetkov:

your letter eloquently addresses one of the most urgent and complex issues of our time - the issue of how to avoid a nuclear war. Let me assure you that the United States is sincerely and actively pursuing an arms control policy designed to achieve genuine and significant progress on this issue.

The policy of my country clearly recognizes the immense importance to international security of efforts to reduce, and eventually eliminate, nuclear weapons. This is why we are presently engaged in no less than five major negotiations dealing with arms control.

In fact, the U.S. is now embarked on one of the most ambitious and comprehensive programs for arms control ever. In the START negotiations we are seeking deep reductions in strategic nuclear arsenals to much lower and equal levels. In INF we have sought to eliminate an entire class of weapons, and now seek an interim solution to reduce the weapons to equal numbers and the lowest possible levels. In other negotiations, we have made proposals for measures to reduce the risk of nuclear war by accident or miscalculation, for substantial, verifiable reductions in conventional forces in Central Europe, and for the complete elimination of chemical weapons.

We will continue to pursue arms control negotiations vigorously. For I am determined to strive for equitable and verifiable agreements that will provide for substantial reductions and greatly enhanced security. Significant and lasting agreements, which truly enhance international security and reduce the threat of war, will not come easily. But the

CONFIDENTIAL



U.S. will continue to do everything in its power to achieve this goal. If the Soviet Union shows similar goodwill and determination and exercises restraint in its international behavior, then the prospects for international peace and security will be truly good.

I hope, Mr. Tsvetkov, that this letter will allay fears you or your countrymen may have about peace. Let me once again assure you that I have no higher goal, no more urgent task, than to reduce the threat of nuclear war to the people of this world. I join you as "an adherent to peace who desires understanding between peoples and happiness for future generations."

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

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E.O. 12356: N/A TAGS: PREL PROP INF START MB FR BU US' SUBJECT: LETTER FROM 98- YEAR-OLD BULGARIAN TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

- 1. COU) ACTION REQUESTED: A TO- YEAR-OLD BULGARIAN CITIZEN, IN A LETTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN VIA US EMBASSY IN SOFIA, ASKS FOR END TO SOVIET-US ARMS RACE. RECOMMEND WHITE HOUSE USING OPPORTUNITY TO RESTATE ADMINISTRATION POSITICE ON NEGOTIATED ARMS REDUCTION.
- 2. COU) FOLLOWING IS TRANSLATION OF A LETTER FROM D. TSVETKOL, A 98-YEAR-OLD BULGARIAN MAN, WHO WROTE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN VIA THE US EMBASSY IN SOFIA.
- 3. A.OU) WE THINK THE LETTER IS UNUSUALLY ELOQUENT AND DESERVES A WHITE HOUSE REPLY, WHICH CAN BE USED TO RESTATE THE ADMINISTRATION POSITION ON MEGOTIATED ARMS REDUCTIONS AND THE MEED TO PREVENT MUCLEAR WAR. THE EXCHANGE OF LETTERS COULD BE USEFULLY PUBLICIZED ON VOA.
- 4. 40) LETTER TRANSLATION:

A. THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES WASHINGTON

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

YOU RECEIVE LETTERS FROM PEOPLE FROM VARIOUS COUNTRIES WITH VARIOUS BELIEFS, WITH VARIOUS REQUESTS, AND MOST OF THOSE LETTERS ARE IN CONNECTION WITH THE FEAR OF THOSE PEOPLE FROM A NUCLEAR WAR. I ALSO AN LIVING IN DISTURBANCE WITH THE THOUGHT THAT SOMETHING TERRIBLE IS COMING FOR THE FUTURE OF MANKIND. THAT IS EXACTLY WHY I, A 98 YEAR OLD CITIZEN OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUELIC OF BULGARIA, AM TAKING THE LIBERTY TO SEND THIS LETTER WITH A WISH TO DRAW YOUR ATTENTION TO THE FATAL AFTER-EFFECTS OF SUCH AN EVENTUAL DISASTER. MY DEEP CONVICTION IS THAT YOU ARE PREPARING SUCH A DEADLY NUCLEAR WAR.

B. I CAME TO THIS CONCLUSION AFTER READING THE FOREIGN AND THE BULGARIAN PRESS. PTHERWISE I CANNOT EXPLAIN TO MYSELF THE CAUSE FOR YOUR ORDER FOR THE URGENT AND COLOSSAL CREATION OF NEW AND NEW ARMS, EVEN AFTER THE READINESS WHICH THE USSR LEADER YURI ANDROPOV HAS STATED SEVERAL TIMES TO NEGOTIATE WITH YOU ON REACHING AN UNDERSTANDING, FOR STOPPING THE ARMS RACE, FOR A DISARMAMENT AND FOR SETTLING DOWN OF ALL QUESTIONS IN DISPUTE.

C. IS IT NOT IN THE INTEREST OF ALL PEOPLES, INCLUDING ALSO YOUR PEOPLE, THAT RESOLUTE, SINCERE AND HONEST

D. TSVETKOV

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D. I AM SINCERELY AND DEEPLY CONVINCED THAT (DESPITE) THE REALISTIC STATEMENTS, ADVICE AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF EMINENT AMERICAN PUBLIC FIGURES, SCHOLARS, DIPLOMATS AND PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS, YOU HAVE DECIDED TO DECLARE A CRUADE WAR AGAINST REAL SOCIALISM. READING ABOUT THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE AGAINST NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT IN THE WESTERN COUNTRIES AND IN THE UNITED STATES, WHICH IS GROWING WITH A GREAT SPEED AND WITH AN ENORMOUS FORCE, I UNDERSTAND THAT COMING IS THE DAY WHE THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES WILL IMPOSE THEIR WILL. PEACE AND DISARMAMENT MUST BE TRIUMPHANT. AND THIS IS WHERE MY FEAR COMES FROM. I AM AFRAID THAT THE PEOPLE AROUND YOU, HAVING TAKEN RECKLESS DECISIONS AFTER UNDERSTANDING THAT THEY ARE NOT IN A POSITION TO CONTROL THE SITUATION ANYMORE, AND THINKING THAT THEY WILL WIN A VICTORY THROUGH A RESTRICTED WAR. MAY PUSH THE DEADLY BUTTON AND THOUSAND OF NUCLEAR MISSILES WILL SPEED ON THEIR WAY FROM THE WEST TO THE EAST. BUT MODERN TECHNOLOGY IS SUCH THAT ONLY SECONDS AFTER THE WESTERN MISSILES START ON THEIR WAY TO THE EAST, THE EAST ON ITS TURN. IN ORDER TO DEFEND ITSELF, WILL PUSH ITS SUTTON AND THE EASTERN ENSSILES WILL BE LAUNCHED AGAINST WESTERN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA. THE MISSILES OF THE WEST AND OF THE EAST WILL PASS EACH OTHER SOME PLACE UP IN THE ATMOSPHERE AND WILL HIT THEIR PREDETERMINED TARGETS. THIS WILL BE THE END OF CIVILIZATION.

E. DENSE, BLACK, DEADLY, RADIOACTIVE CLOUDS WILL COVER THE ENTIRE GLOBE- EUROPE, ASIA, AND NORTH AMERICA-AND THAT WILL BE THE END OF LIFE. AND JUST REMINDING MYSELF THAT EACH MODERN NUCLEAR MISSILE HAS HUNDRED OF TIMES GREATER DESTRUCTIVE AND DEADLY FORCE THAN THE ATOM BOMB THROWN BY THE US OVER HIROSHIMA, ONE CAN IMAGINE WHAT KIND OF A DESTRUCTION WILL BE CAUSED BY THE THOUSANDS OF NUCLEAR MISSILES AND A FUTURE WAR. AS A MATTER OF FACT THERE WILL BE NO WAR. ALL LAND AND NAVY ARMIES OF THE WEST AND THE EAST WILL STAY IN THEIR POSITIONS. THEY WILL BE DEAD OR AT LEAST HALF-DEAD, EXHAUSTED. AND ON THE STRENGTH OF PHYSICS, ATMOSPHERIC AND EARTH LAWS THESE DENSE DEADLY NUCLEAR CLOUDS WILL DISPERSE AND WILL COVER THE ENTIRE SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE- AFRICA, SOUTH ASIA, SOUTH AMERICA AND AUSTRALIA AND THE TWO OCEANS, TO PUT AN END FOR THE ENTIRE WORLD. WHEN I THINK ABOUT THAT, I SHIVER: I AM NOT SCARED ABOUT US, THE OLD PEOPLE, WE ARE READY FOR THE GRAVE, ANYHOW, BUT I AMSCARED ABOUT THE YOUNG PEOPLE, THE KIDS, ABOUT THIS ENTIRE MODERN CIVILIZATION- BORN BY THE HUMAN MIND AND HAVING BEEN CREATED IN THE RUN OF THE CENTURIES. THIS IS WHY I TAKE THE LIBERTY TO DRAW

F. I WOULD LIKE TO ADD THAT AT THE LEVEL OF THIS MODERN TECHNOLOGY NOBODY COULD SURPRISE ITS RIVAL SO THAT, THE OTHER WOULD ALWAYS BE IN ERROR IF HE THINKS THAT HE COULD DO SOMETHING WITHOUT THE OTHER KNOWING IT. AT THE END I WOULD LIKE TO ASK IS IT NOT POSSIBLE THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN YOU AND THE USSR LEADER FOR SETTLING THE FIRST RATE QUESTION, THE QUESTION OF MANKIND'S SURVIVAL, START IMMEDIATELY? THE TWO OF YOU, THE LEADERS OF THE USSR AND THE USA HAVE AN UNRESTRICTED, RESOLUTE FORCE AND POSSIBILITIES TO PUT IN ORDER ALL DISPUTES BETWEEN THE EAST AND THE WEST AND IF YOU PERSONALLY, MR. PRESIDENT, WISH IT, THEY SHOULD START URGENTLY, BE CONDUCTED IN A SINCERE AND HONEST WAY, SO THAT THESE REGOTIATIONS WILL BRING WELLBEING TO ALL PEOPLES ON OUR PLANET. I HOPE THAT MY REQUEST WILL GIVE A RESULT. RESPECTFULLY YOURS: SIGNED

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YOUR ATTENTION ON THE EVENTUAL CONSEQUENCES WHICH

WILL FOLLOW IF A NUCLEAR WAR SHOULD BE STARTED.

N. P. S. I AM NOT A COMMUNIST, BUT I AM AN ADHERENT OF PEACE WYO WISHES AN UNDERSTANDING AMONG THE PEOPLE AND NAPPINESS FOR THE FUTURE GENERATIONS. THE ABOVE WAS WRITTEN BY MY OWN WILL AND CONVICTION (INITIALED)

Paula Dobriansky

from Boto Sim

Editorial 0-0671

August 19, 1983

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### TAKE A LETTER TO SOFIA (00224)

Anner:

Next, a VOA Editorial, reflecting the views of the U.S. Government. Voice:

Last month, President Reagan received a letter from Mr. D. Tsvetkov, who is

— as he described himself — a ninety-year old citizen of Bulgaria. Mr. Tsvetkov

expressed his fears about nuclear confrontation, asking, "Is it not in the interest of
all peoples that resolute, sincere, and honest negotiations be conducted, aiming at
the avoidance of a deadly nuclear war?"

Yes, it is — and because the issue is so important, President Reagan responded personally to Mr. Tsvetkov's letter. We thought others would like to hear some of what the President wrote:

"The policy of my country," wrote President Reagan, "clearly recognizes the immense importance to international security of efforts to reduce, and eventually eliminate, nuclear weapons. This is why we are engaged in no less than five major negotiations dealing with arms control."

"In the strategic arms reduction talks, we seek deep reductions in strategic nuclear arsenals to much lower and equal levels. In the intermediate nuclear force talks, we have sought to eliminate an entire class of weapons, and seek an interim solution to reduce the weapons to equal numbers and the lowest possible levels. In other negotiations, we have made proposals for measures to reduce the risk of nuclear war by accident or miscalculation; for substantial, verifiable reductions in conventional forces in central Europe; and for the complete elimination of chemical weapons."

(0-0671) Page 2

"I am determined to strive for equitable and verifiable agreements that will provide for substantial reductions and greatly enhanced security," wrote President Reagan. "If the Soviet Union shows similar goodwill and determination, and exercises restraint in its international behavior, then the prospects for world peace and security will be truly good."

"However," added the President, "I do believe that so far the Soviet leaders have not demonstrated enough willingness to compromise to reach a genuine arms control agreement. The USSR has engaged in an unprecedented military build-up and what seems to us to be a dangerous global pattern of committing acts of aggression and inciting its allies to do likewise. For example, Soviet troops are in Afganistan, Vietnamese forces are in Kampuchea, and Cuban proxies are in Africa and Central America."

"It is my hope," President Reagan wrote, "that the current Soviet leadership will have the courage and vision to reverse this fateful course."

Annor:

That was a VOA Editorial, reflecting the views of the U.S. Government.