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ID Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions	
186127 NOTE	RE. AMBASSADOR LEVITSKY	1	ND	B6	
186125 REPORT	RE. BULGARIA: HIGH-TECH LEADER OF THE BALKANS?	4	10/7/1983	B1	B3
186126 PAPER	RE. BULGARIA	1	12/16/1983	B1	
186128 REPORT	RE. BULGARIA: LEADERSHIP RESHUFFLE	6	2/8/1984	B1	B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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ID	Document Type	No of pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
	Document Description			
186125	REPORT	4	10/7/1983	B1
	RE. BULGARIA: HIGH-TECH LEADER OF THE BALKANS?			B3

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D. Dobriansky
S

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 28, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE *RMK*
SUBJECT: International Fishery Agreement with Bulgaria

Issue: Transmittal of Governing International Fishery Agreement with Bulgaria.

Facts: Attached for your signature at Tab A are letters to the House of Representatives and Senate, respectively, transmitting the 5-year Governing International Fishery Agreement between the United States and Bulgaria signed in Washington on September 22, 1983. This agreement has been renegotiated in accordance with the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act. It replaces the existing agreement negotiated in 1977. Specifically, "it sets out the principles that will govern fishing by residents and vessels of Bulgaria for fisheries over which the U.S. exercises exclusive authority and enables Bulgaria to fish an allocation of that portion of the allowable catch of a specific fishery that will not be harvested by U.S. fishing vessels."

Discussion: Your transmittal letters recommend that the Congress give favorable consideration to the agreement at an early date. State and Commerce concur.

RECOMMENDATION

Yes No That you sign the letters to Congress at Tabs A1 and A2.

SIGNED

NOV 1 8 1983

Attachments:

Tab A 1. and 2. Letters to the Congress for signature.

Prepared by: Paula Dobriansky

cc Vice President

6

TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:

In accordance with the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 (Public Law 94-265; 16 USC 1801), I transmit herewith a governing international fishery agreement between the United States and the People's Republic of Bulgaria, signed at Washington on September 22, 1983.

This agreement is one of a series to be renegotiated in accordance with that legislation. I urge that the Congress give favorable consideration to this agreement at an early date.

THE WHITE HOUSE,

7

AGREEMENT BETWEEN
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA
CONCERNING FISHERIES OFF THE COASTS
OF THE UNITED STATES

The Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria,

Considering their common concern for the rational
management, conservation and achievement of optimum yield
of fish stocks off the coasts of the United States;

Recognizing that the United States has established by
Presidential Proclamation of March 10, 1983 an exclusive
economic zone within 200 nautical miles of its coasts within
which the United States has sovereign rights to explore,
exploit, conserve and manage all fish and that the United
States also has such rights over the living resources of the
continental shelf appertaining to the United States and to
anadromous species of fish of United States origin;

Considering the past experience and cooperation between
the two Parties under the Agreement between the Government
of the United States of America and the Government of the
People's Republic of Bulgaria Concerning Fisheries Off the
Coasts of the United States, signed December 17, 1976, and
in anticipation of continued and improved cooperation in
the field of fisheries; and

Desirous of establishing reasonable terms and conditions
pertaining to fisheries of mutual concern over which the United
States has sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve and
manage;

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

The purpose of this Agreement is to promote effective conservation, rational management and the achievement of optimum yield in the fisheries of mutual interest off the coasts of the United States, to facilitate the rapid and full development of the United States fishing industry and to establish a common understanding of the principles and procedures under which fishing may be conducted by nationals and vessels of the People's Republic of Bulgaria for the living resources over which the United States has sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve and manage.

ARTICLE II

As used in this Agreement, the term

1. "living resources over which the United States has sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve and manage" means all fish within the exclusive economic zone of the United States (except highly migratory species of tuna), all anadromous species of fish that spawn in the fresh or estuarine waters of the United States and migrate to ocean waters while

present in the United States exclusive economic zone and in areas beyond national fisheries jurisdictions recognized by the United States and all living resources of the continental shelf appertaining to the United States;

2. "fish" means all finfish, molluscs, crustaceans, and other forms of marine animal and plant life, other than marine mammals, birds and highly migratory species;

3. "fishery" means

a. one or more stocks of fish that can be treated as a unit for purposes of conservation and management and that are identified on the basis of geographical, scientific, technical, recreational and economic characteristics; and

b. any fishing for such stocks;

4. "exclusive economic zone" means a zone contiguous to the territorial sea of the United States, the seaward boundary of which is a line drawn in such a manner that each point on it is 200 nautical miles from the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea of the United States is measured;

- 4 -

5. "fishing" means

- a. the catching, taking or harvesting of fish;
- b. the attempted catching, taking or harvesting of fish;
- c. any other activity that can reasonably be expected to result in the catching, taking or harvesting of fish;
- d. any operations at sea, including processing, directly in support of, or in preparation for, any activity described in subparagraphs a. through c. above, provided that such term does not include other legitimate uses of the high seas, including any scientific research activity;

6. "fishing vessel" means any vessel, boat, ship, or other craft that is used for, equipped to be used for, or of a type that is normally used for

- a. fishing; or
- b. aiding or assisting one or more vessels at sea in the performance of any activity relating to fishing, including preparation, supply, storage, refrigeration, transportation or processing;

7. "highly migratory species" means species of tuna which in the course of their life cycle, spawn and migrate over great distances in waters of the ocean; and

8. "marine mammal" means any mammal that is morphologically adapted to the marine environment, including sea otters and members of the orders Sirenia, Pinnipedia, and Cetacea, or primarily inhabits the marine environment such as polar bears.

ARTICLE III

1. The Government of the United States of America is willing to allow access for foreign fishing vessels including fishing vessels of the People's Republic of Bulgaria to harvest, in accordance with terms and conditions to be established in permits issued under Article VII, that portion of the total allowable catch for a specific fishery that will not be harvested by United States fishing vessels and is determined to be available to foreign fishing vessels in accordance with United States law.

2. The Government of the United States of America shall determine each year, subject to such adjustments as may be necessitated by unforeseen circumstances affecting the stocks, and in accordance with United States law:

- 6 -

- a. the total allowable catch for each fishery based on optimum yield, taking into account the best available scientific evidence, and social, economic and other relevant factors;
- b. the harvesting capacity of United States fishing vessels in respect of each fishery;
- c. the portion of the total allowable catch for a specific fishery to which access will be provided, on a periodic basis each year, to foreign fishing vessels; and
- d. the allocation of such portion that may be made available to permitted fishing vessels of the People's Republic of Bulgaria.

3. In the implementation of paragraph 2 of this Article, the United States shall determine each year the measures necessary to prevent overfishing while achieving, on a continuing basis, the optimum yield from each fishery in accordance with United States law. Such measures may include, inter alia:

- 7 -

- a. designated areas where, and periods when, fishing shall be permitted, limited, or conducted only by specified types of fishing vessels or with specified types and quantities of fishing gear;
- b. limitations on the catch of fish based on area, species, size, number, weight, sex, incidental catch, total biomass or other factors;
- c. limitations on the number and types of fishing vessels that may engage in fishing and/or on the number of days each vessel of the total fleet may engage in a designated area for a specified fishery;
- d. requirements as to the types of gear that may, or may not, be employed; and
- e. requirements designed to facilitate enforcement of such conditions and restrictions, including the maintenance of appropriate position-fixing and identification equipment.

4. The Government of the United States of America shall notify the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria of the determinations provided for by this Article on a timely basis.

ARTICLE IV

In determining the portion of the surplus that may be made available to vessels of each country, including the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Government of the United States of America will decide on the basis of the factors identified in United States law including:

1. whether, and to what extent, such nations impose tariff barriers or nontariff barriers on the importation, or otherwise restrict the market access, of United States fish or fishery products;
2. whether, and to what extent such nations are cooperating with the United States in the advancement of existing and new opportunities for fisheries trade, particularly through the purchase of fish or fishery products from United States processors or from United States fishermen;
3. whether, and to what extent, such nations and the fishing fleets of such nations have cooperated with the United States in the enforcement of United States fishing regulations;
4. whether, and to what extent, such nations require the fish harvested from the exclusive economic zone for their domestic consumption;
5. whether, and to what extent, such nations otherwise contribute to, or foster the growth of, a sound and economic United States fishing industry, including minimizing gear

conflicts with fishing operations of United States fishermen, and transferring harvesting or processing technology which will benefit the United States fishing industry;

6. whether, and to what extent, the fishing vessels of such nations have traditionally engaged in fishing in such fishery;

7. whether, and to what extent, such nations are cooperating with the United States in, and making substantial contributions to, fishery research and the identification of fishery resources; and

8. such other matters as the United States deems appropriate.

ARTICLE V

The Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria shall cooperate with and assist the United States in the development of the United States fishing industry and the increase of United States fishery exports by taking such measures as reducing or removing impediments to the importation and sale of United States fishery products, providing information concerning technical and administrative requirements for access of United States fishery products into the People's Republic of Bulgaria, providing economic data, sharing

expertise, facilitating the transfer of harvesting or processing technology to the United States fishing industry, facilitating appropriate joint venture and other arrangements, informing its industry of trade and joint venture opportunities with the United States, and taking other actions as may be appropriate.

ARTICLE VI

The Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria shall take all necessary measures to ensure:

1. that nationals and vessels of the People's Republic of Bulgaria refrain from fishing for living resources over which the United States has sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve and manage except as authorized pursuant to this Agreement;
2. that all such vessels so authorized comply with the provisions of permits issued pursuant to this Agreement and applicable laws of the United States and the People's Republic of Bulgaria; and
3. that the total allocation referred to in Article III, paragraph 2.d. of this Agreement is not exceeded for any fishery.

ARTICLE VII

The Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria may submit an application to the Government of the United States of America for a permit for each fishing vessel of the People's Republic of Bulgaria that wishes to engage in fishing in the exclusive economic

zone pursuant to this Agreement. Such application shall be prepared and processed in accordance with Annex I, which constitutes an integral part of this Agreement. The Government of the United States of America may require the payment of fees for such permits and for fishing in the United States exclusive economic zone. The Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria undertakes to keep the number of applications to the minimum required, in order to aid in the efficient administration of the permit program.

ARTICLE VIII

The Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria shall ensure that nationals and vessels of the People's Republic of Bulgaria refrain from harassing, hunting, capturing or killing, or attempting to harass, hunt, capture or kill, any marine mammal within the United States exclusive economic zone, except as may be otherwise provided by an international agreement respecting marine mammals to which the United States is a party, or in accordance with specific authorization for and controls on incidental taking of marine mammals established by the Government of the United States of America.

ARTICLE IX

The Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria shall ensure that in the conduct of the fisheries under this Agreement:

1. the authorizing permit for each vessel of the People's Republic of Bulgaria is prominently displayed in the wheelhouse of such vessel;

2. appropriate position-fixing and identification equipment, as determined by the Government of the United States of America, is installed and maintained in working order on each vessel;

3. designated United States observers are permitted to board, upon request, any such fishing vessel, and shall be accorded the courtesies and accommodations provided to ship's officers while aboard such vessel, and owners, operators and crews of such vessel shall cooperate with observers in the conduct of their official duties, and, further, the Government of the United States of America shall be reimbursed for the costs incurred in the utilization of observers;

4. agents are appointed and maintained within the United States possessing the authority to receive and respond to any legal process issued in the United States with respect to an owner or operator of a vessel of the People's Republic of Bulgaria for any cause arising out of the conduct of fishing activities for the living resources over which the United States has sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve and manage; and

5. all necessary measures are taken to minimize fishing gear conflicts and to ensure the prompt and adequate compensation of United States citizens for any loss of, or damage to, their fishing vessels, fishing gear or catch, and resultant

economic loss, that is caused by any fishing vessel of the People's Republic of Bulgaria as determined by applicable United States procedures.

ARTICLE X

The Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria shall take all appropriate measures to assist the United States in the enforcement of its laws pertaining to fishing in the exclusive economic zone and to ensure that each vessel of the People's Republic of Bulgaria that engages in fishing for living resources over which the United States has sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve and manage shall allow and assist the boarding and inspection of such vessel by any duly authorized enforcement officer of the United States and shall cooperate in such enforcement action as may be undertaken pursuant to the laws of the United States.

ARTICLE XI

1. The Government of the United States of America will impose appropriate penalties, in accordance with the laws of the United States, on vessels of the People's Republic of Bulgaria or their owners, operators or crews, that violate the requirements of this Agreement or of any permit issued hereunder.

- 14 -

2. Arrested vessels and their crews shall be promptly released, subject to such reasonable bond or other security as may be determined by the court.

3. In any case arising out of fishing activities under this Agreement, the penalty for violation of fishery regulations shall not include imprisonment or any other form of corporal punishment except in the case of enforcement related offenses such as assault on an enforcement officer or refusal to permit boarding and inspection.

4. In cases of seizure and arrest of a vessel of the People's Republic of Bulgaria by the authorities of the Government of the United States of America, notification shall be given promptly through diplomatic channels informing the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria of the action taken and of any penalties subsequently imposed.

ARTICLE XII

1. The Governments of the United States of America and the People's Republic of Bulgaria shall cooperate in the conduct of scientific research required for the purpose of managing and conserving living resources over which the United States has sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve and manage, including the compilation of the best available scientific information for management and conservation of stocks of mutual interest.

2. The competent agencies of the two Governments shall cooperate in the development of a periodic research plan on stocks of mutual concern through correspondence or meetings as appropriate, and may modify it from time to time by agreement. The agreed research plans may include, but are not limited to, the exchange of information and scientists, regularly scheduled meetings between scientists to prepare research plans and review progress, and jointly conducted research projects.

3. The conduct of agreed research during regular commercial fishing operations on board a fishing vessel of the People's Republic of Bulgaria in the United States exclusive economic zone shall not be deemed to change the character of the vessel's activities from fishing to scientific research. Therefore, it will still be necessary to obtain a permit for the vessel in accordance with Article VII.

4. The Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria shall cooperate with the Government of the United States of America in the implementation of procedures for collecting and reporting biostatistical information and fisheries data, including catch and effort statistics, in accordance with procedures which will be stipulated by the United States.

- 16 -

ARTICLE XIII

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria shall carry out periodic bilateral consultations regarding the implementation of this Agreement and the development of further cooperation in the field of fisheries of mutual concern, including the establishment of appropriate multilateral organizations for the collection and analysis of scientific data respecting such fisheries.

ARTICLE XIV

The Government of the United States of America undertakes to authorize fisheries research vessels and fishing vessels of the People's Republic of Bulgaria allowed to fish pursuant to this Agreement to enter designated ports in accordance with United States laws and regulations referred to in Annex II, which constitutes an integral part of this Agreement.

ARTICLE XV

Should the Government of the United States of America indicate to the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria that nationals and vessels of the United States wish to engage in fishing in the fishery conservation zone of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, or its equivalent, the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria will allow such fishing on the basis of reciprocity and on terms not more restrictive than those established in accordance with this Agreement.

ARTICLE XVI

Nothing contained in the present Agreement shall prejudice the views of either Government with respect to the existing territorial or other jurisdiction of the coastal State for all purposes other than the conservation and management of fisheries.

ARTICLE XVII


1. This Agreement shall enter into force on a date to be agreed upon by exchange of notes, following the completion of internal procedures of both Governments, and remain in force until July 1, 1988, unless extended by an exchange of notes between the Parties. Notwithstanding the foregoing, either Party may terminate this Agreement after giving written notice of such termination to the other Party 12 months in advance.

2. At the request of either Party, this Agreement shall be subject to review by the two Governments two years after its entry into force.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized for this purpose, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Washington, September 22, 1983, in the English and Bulgarian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:



FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA:



ANNEX I

Application and Permit Procedures

The following procedures shall govern the application for and issuance of annual permits authorizing vessels of the People's Republic of Bulgaria to engage in fishing for living resources over which the United States has sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve and manage:

1. The Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria may submit an application to the competent authorities of the United States for each fishing vessel of the People's Republic of Bulgaria that wishes to engage in fishing pursuant to this Agreement. Such application shall be made on forms provided by the Government of the United States for that purpose.

2. Any such application shall specify

- a. the name and official number or other identification of each fishing vessel for which a permit is sought, together with the name and address of the owner and operator thereof;
- b. the tonnage, capacity, speed, processing equipment, type and quantity of fishing gear, and such other information relating to the fishing characteristics of the vessel as may be requested;

- 2 -

- c. a specification of each fishery in which each vessel wishes to fish;
- d. the amount of fish or tonnage of catch by species contemplated for each vessel during the time such permit is in force;
- e. the ocean area in which, and the season or period during which, such fishing would be conducted; and
- f. such other relevant information as may be requested, including desired transshipping areas.

3. The Government of the United States of America shall review each application, shall determine what conditions and restrictions may be needed, and what fee will be required, and shall inform the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria of such determinations. The Government of the United States of America reserves the right not to approve applications.

4. The Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria shall thereupon notify the Government of the United States of America of its acceptance or rejection of such conditions and restrictions and, in the case of a rejection, of its objections thereto.

5. Upon acceptance of the conditions and restrictions by the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the payment of any fees, the Government of the United States of America shall approve the application and issue a permit for

each Bulgarian fishing vessel, which fishing vessel shall thereupon be authorized to fish in accordance with this Agreement and the terms and conditions set forth in the permit. Such permits shall be issued for a specific vessel and shall not be transferred.

6. In the event the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria notifies the Government of the United States of America of its objections to specific conditions and restrictions, the two sides may consult with respect thereto and the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria may thereupon submit a revised application.

7. The procedures in this Annex may be amended by agreement through an exchange of notes between the two Governments.

ANNEX II

Procedures Relating to United States Port Calls

Article XIV of the Agreement provides for the entry of certain vessels of the People's Republic of Bulgaria into designated ports of the United States in accordance with United States law for certain purposes. Annex II designates the ports and purposes authorized and describes procedures which govern such port entries.

1. The following types of vessels are authorized to enter the ports specified following a notice received at least four working days in advance of the entry:

Fisheries research vessels, fishing vessels participating in joint ventures involving over-the-side purchases of fish from United States fishing vessels, and other fishing vessels (including support vessels) of the People's Republic of Bulgaria which have been issued permits pursuant to the Agreement are authorized to enter the ports of Astoria, Oregon; Baltimore, Maryland; Boston, Massachusetts; Coos Bay, Oregon; Eureka, California; New York, New York; and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

2. Vessels referred to in paragraph 1 above may enter the ports referred to for a period not exceeding seven calendar days for the purposes of coordinating scientific activities

- 2 -

to exchange scientific data, equipment, and personnel, and to replenish ships' stores or fresh water, obtain bunkers, provide rest for or make changes in the vessels' personnel by charter flights subject to the civil aviation and other laws and regulations of the United States, obtain repairs, or obtain other services normally provided in such ports, and, as necessary, to receive permits. In exceptional cases involving force majeure vessels may remain in port for longer periods required to effect repairs necessary for seaworthiness and operational reliability without which the voyage could not be continued. All such entries into port shall be in accordance with applicable rules and regulations of the United States and of state and local authorities in the areas wherein they have jurisdiction.

3. The notice referred to in paragraph 1 shall be made by an agent for the vessel to the United States Coast Guard (GWPE) in accordance with standard procedures using telex (892427), teletype communication "TWX" (710-822-1959), or (Western Union). With respect to vessels desiring to enter United States ports under this Agreement, the United States reserves the right to require such vessels to submit to inspection by authorized personnel of the United States Coast Guard or other appropriate Federal agencies.

- 3 -

4. The Government of the United States of America at the consular sections of its diplomatic missions will accept crew lists in application for visas valid for a period of 12 months for multiple entry into the specified United States ports. Such a crew list shall be submitted at least 14 days prior to the first entry of a vessel into a port of the United States. Submission of an amended (supplemental) crew list subsequent to departure of a vessel from a port of the People's Republic of Bulgaria will also be subject to the provisions of this paragraph, provided that visas thereunder shall be valid for 12 months from the date of issuance of the original crew list visa. Notification of entry shall specify if shore leave is requested under such multiple entry visa.

5. In cases where a crewmember of a vessel of the People's Republic of Bulgaria is evacuated from his vessel to the United States for the purpose of emergency medical treatment, authorities of the People's Republic of Bulgaria shall ensure that the crewmember departs from the United States within 14 days after his release from the hospital. During the period that the crewmember is in the United States, representatives of the People's Republic of Bulgaria will be responsible for him.

6. The exchange of crews of vessels of the People's Republic of Bulgaria in the specified ports shall be permitted

- 4 -

subject to submission to the consular section of United States diplomatic missions of applications for individual transit visas and crewman visas for replacement crewmen. Applications shall be submitted 14 days in advance of the date of the arrival of the crewmen in the United States and shall indicate the names, dates and places of birth, the purpose of the visit, the vessel to which assigned, and the modes and dates of arrival of all replacement crewmen. Individual passports or crewmember's documents shall accompany each application. Subject to United States laws and regulations, the United States mission will affix transit and crewmen visas to each passport or seaman's document before it is returned. In addition to the requirements above, the name of the vessel and date of its expected arrival, a list of names, dates and places of birth for those crewmen who shall be admitted to the United States under the responsibility of the People's Republic of Bulgaria representatives for repatriation to the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the dates and manner of their departure from the United States shall be submitted to the Department of State 14 days in advance of arrival.

7. The provisions of Annex II may be amended by agreement through an exchange of notes between the two Governments.

AGREED MINUTE

With respect to Article V, the representative of the Government of the United States of America stated that the economic data likely to be sought would be economic data related to various aspects of fisheries and trade in fishery products.

The representative of the Government of the United States of America further stated that Article V illustrates the kinds of cooperation and assistance that might be sought, and that such cooperation and assistance in his view would result in benefits to both Parties. The representative of the Government of the United States of America also stated that, consistent with United States law, the Government of the United States of America would provide to the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria available information and would otherwise appropriately assist the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria in promoting cooperation in the fisheries area.



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

7624

32

October 21, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Transmission to the Congress of the
Governing International Fishery
Agreement with the People's Republic
of Bulgaria

Attached for signature by the President are letters to the House of Representatives and the Senate, respectively, transmitting the governing international fishery agreement between the United States and the People's Republic of Bulgaria, signed at Washington on September 22, 1983.


This governing international fishery agreement is one of a series to be renegotiated since the passage of legislation creating a 200-mile fishery conservation zone for the United States, beginning March 1, 1977, and in all material respects is in accordance with the legislation. It replaces an existing agreement negotiated in 1977. It sets out the principles that will govern fishing by residents and vessels of the People's Republic of Bulgaria for fisheries over which the United States exercises exclusive authority; and it provides that the People's Republic of Bulgaria may apply for permits to fish an allocation of that portion of the allowable catch of a specific fishery that will not be harvested by United States fishing vessels.

Section 203(a) of the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 (P.L. 94-265; 16 USC 1801) provides as follows with respect to transmission to the Congress:

(a) IN GENERAL--No governing international fishery agreement shall become effective with respect to the

United States before the close of the first 60 calendar days of continuous session of the Congress after the date on which the President transmits to the House of Representatives and to the Senate a document setting forth the text of such governing international fishery agreement. A copy of the document shall be delivered to each House of Congress on the same day and shall be delivered to the Clerk of the House of Representatives, if the House is not in session, and to the Secretary of the Senate, if the Senate is not in session.

We urge the transmittal of this document to the House and to the Senate as soon as possible to allow its rapid entry into force.



Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

Letters for signature by
the President with copies
of the Agreement.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

October 27, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY *PD*

SUBJECT: International Fishery Agreement with Bulgaria

State has forwarded for the President's signature letters to the Congress (Tabs A1 and A2), respectively, transmitting the 5-year Governing International Fishery Agreement between the United States and Bulgaria signed in Washington on September 22, 1983. State's memorandum (Tab II) notes that the agreement is one of a series renegotiated in accordance with the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act and replaces an existing agreement negotiated in 1977. Specifically, "it sets out the principles that will govern fishing by residents and vessels of Bulgaria for fisheries over which the U.S. exercises exclusive authority and enables Bulgaria to fish an allocation of that portion of the allowable catch of a specific fishery that will not be harvested by U.S. fishing vessels."

At Tab I is a self-explanatory memorandum from you to the President forwarding the two transmittal letters. Phil Dur, Richard Levine and Paul Thompson concur. *(not available)*

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum to the President at Tab I (with attachments) for his signature.

Approve RMK

Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I	Memorandum to the President
Tab A	1. and 2. Letters to the Congress for signature.
Tab II	State's memorandum, October 21, 1983

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BU CONFIDENTIAL

JL
PD
✓

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

35

SITUATION ROOM NOTE

December 9, 1983

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Soviet Missiles for Bulgaria

Embassy Moscow reports that the stationing of Soviet missiles in Bulgaria was a major issue at the Sofia meeting of Warsaw Pact defense ministers and during Ustinov's visit to Bulgaria yesterday, according to local sources. One, an experienced Western European journalist learned that the Sofia meeting was contentious. The Soviets pressed for increased defense spending and for Bulgaria to base Soviet nuclear missiles, but Pact members resisted and Bulgaria argued that accepting the Soviet missiles would be inconsistent with its proposal for a Balkan nuclear-free zone.

- o Nevertheless, Soviet TV coverage of the Sofia meeting showed the defense ministers signing some document, giving the impression that some agreement had been reached. The communique of the meeting, however, says the meeting took place "in a businesslike conditions," implying that there was less than a full meeting of minds.
- o A TASS report of Ustinov's meeting yesterday with the Bulgarian defense minister supports the idea that there was not full agreement. The report says there was an "exchange of opinions," suggesting that the opinions were different.

Our embassy comments that if the Soviets and Bulgarians do reach agreement on stationing nuclear missiles in Bulgaria, they will be taking a more serious step than their other countermeasures. The Soviets will be introducing nuclear weapons and into a country as well as a region where neither existed before. (C)

Moscow 5391, PSN 72618

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BY RW NARA DATE 12/21/16

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ID	Document Type	No of pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
	Document Description			
186126	PAPER RE. BULGARIA	1	12/16/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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ID	Document Type	No of pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
	Document Description			
186127	NOTE RE. AMBASSADOR LEVITSKY	1	ND	B6

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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Melvyn Levitsky
Ambassador of the United States
to Bulgaria

Melvyn Levitsky was appointed a career member of the Senior Foreign Service, class of counselor, in 1981. He joined the Service in 1963, then took German-language training at the Foreign Service Institute. Following his studies, he was posted to Frankfurt. From 1965 to 1967 he was consular and political officer in Belem, Brazil. He was political officer, Brasilia, 1967-68.

Mr. Levitsky returned to Washington in 1968 to become political officer for Brazil in the Department. He then drew assignments as staff officer, Executive Secretariat, 1969-71; on detail to the Foreign Service Institute, to take Russian-language training, 1971-72, publication procurement officer, 1972-73, and then political officer, both in Moscow, 1973-75. He returned to Washington in 1975 to become officer in charge of U.S.-Soviet bilateral relations, serving until 1978.

In recent years Mr. Levitsky has been deputy director, 1978-80, then director, Office of UN Political Affairs, 1980-82; deputy assistant secretary, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, 1982-83; on detail to USIA as deputy director of the Voice of America, since 1983.

Mr. Levitsky was born in Sioux City, Iowa, on March 19, 1938. He received a bachelor's from the University of Michigan in 1960; attended the University of Chicago Law School, 1960-61; and obtained a master's from State University of Iowa in 1963. He is fluent in German, Portuguese and Russian. Mr. Levitsky won the Department's Meritorious Honor Award in 1960, and its Superior Honor Award in 1975. He is a member of the American Foreign Service Association. He is married to Joan Daskovsky Levitsky.

They have three children, Adam, Ross and Josh.

FORM CD-14	U.S. DEPT. OF COMM.	DATE
(2-76)		1-5-84
Prescr. by		
DAO 214-2		
TRANSMITTAL SLIP		
TO:	Bill Waney	REF. NO. OR ROOM, BLDG.
FROM:	Susanne Lofardi	REF. NO. OR ROOM, BLDG.
ACTION		
<input type="checkbox"/>	NOTE AND FILE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/>	NOTE AND RETURN TO ME	<input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/>	RETURN WITH MORE DETAILS	<input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/>	NOTE AND SEE ME ABOUT THIS	<input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/>	PLEASE ANSWER	<input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/>	PREPARE REPLY FOR MY SIGNATURE	<input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/>	TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION	<input type="checkbox"/>
		PER OUR CONVERSATION
		PER YOUR REQUEST
		FOR YOUR APPROVAL
		FOR YOUR INFORMATION
		FOR YOUR COMMENTS
		SIGNATURE
		INVESTIGATE AND REPORT

COMMENTS:

1/5/84

38

FORMAT OF THE ROUNDTABLE

The Bulgarians have proposed that the Roundtable be held from May 14-16 in Sofia. The importance they attach to it is indicated by their intention to have Deputy Prime Minister Lukanov and Deputy Minister Pirinski participate. An overview of the Bulgarian economy and industrial development plans would be presented in the first day's plenary session. Following the opening session, working group meetings and business appointments tailored to the needs and interests of individual firms will take place. The Bulgarians have developed a list of approximately 50 U.S. companies which they plan to invite and the Bulgarian Commercial Office intends to send out letters of invitation by the end of January.

COMMERCE/IEP INVOLVEMENT

We think the Bulgarian initiative is a very positive development and we propose to support it in the following ways:

- advice to the Bulgarian Commercial Office regarding format of the Roundtable and letter of invitation to U.S. firms; ✓
- follow-up with U.S. firms by telephone and letter to Bulgarian letter of invitation; ✓
- notification of the Roundtable through telex to Commerce Department District Offices and follow-up; ✓
- publication of article on the Roundtable in Business America; and ✓
- attendance at the Roundtable by one or two IEP staffpersons. ✓

The U.S. Chamber of Commerce will also support the Roundtable by contacting interested U.S. firms.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve IEP's support for the Business Roundtable as outlined above.

APPROVE _____

DISAPPROVE _____

RW 12/21/16



BUREAU OF
INTELLIGENCE
AND RESEARCH

ASSESSMENTS
AND
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FILE
BULGARIA

39

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INTELLIGENCE

(U) BULGARIA-YUGOSLAVIA: THE MACEDONIAN
QUESTION REMAINS UNANSWERED

(C) Summary

Longstanding Bulgarian-Yugoslav tensions over the ethnic and national identity of inhabitants of the historic region known as Macedonia peaked in fall 1983 when Bulgaria ostentatiously celebrated the anniversary of the 1903 Ilinden-Preobrazhenie Uprising. Associated events led to a round of polemics, especially heated in the Yugoslav press. Although neither country aspires to change territorial boundaries, the prestige, machismo, and domestic problems involved in even identifying these Macedonians/Bulgarians keep the issue a thorn in the Belgrade-Sofia relationship.

* * * * *

Macedonia in History: The Roots of the Question

(U) The people who first called themselves Macedonians are known to have inhabited the area at the intersection of the modern states of Greece, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia from about 700 BC onward. While Athens controlled the coastal regions to the south, these Macedonians concentrated on unifying the uplands and plains. They gained international renown from the exploits of two of their rulers, Philip II and Alexander III (the Great), who carried Macedonian arms to the Nile and Indus Rivers in the 300s BC. By 146 BC, the Roman Empire had absorbed the largely Hellenized Macedonians. When this Empire too dissolved, Macedonia became part of the Byzantine Empire (395 AD).

(U) Waves of Slavic invasions during the sixth and seventh centuries weakened the Byzantine Empire, and forced relocations of populations

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Report 754-AR
January 10, 1984

followed. By the end of the ninth century, an army of Bulgars (Volga Turks) had established an empire which included virtually all of the Macedonian area except Thessaloniki. This regime in turn was toppled by rebellion and foreign intrigue. It was followed by an empire under a local rebel, Samuilo, with a capital at Ohrid, which managed to unite the disparate ethnic groups of the region who had been suppressed under the Bulgars. Byzantium reasserted its presence, however, and by 1261 had regained complete control of Macedonia, only to lose it to the Turks by 1394 after a century of battling and family fights.

(U) Rebellion against Ottoman rule began in Macedonia in the 1560s. Even more significant rebellions took place as the Turks concentrated increasingly on challenging the Hapsburg domain. The area was briefly designated part of the Greater Bulgaria established by the Peace of San Stefano in 1878 following the Russo-Turkish wars; but after British and Austrian intervention, the Congress of Berlin revised the terms of San Stefano, and Macedonia was returned to Turkey. Macedonia finally was freed from the Turks in 1912 when Serbian, Bulgarian, Greek, and Montenegrin forces defeated a Turkey preoccupied with war against Italy and an uprising in Albania. But the victors could not decide on a division of the spoils and were soon warring among themselves, with Bulgaria the main loser, including the loss of its claim to Macedonia. This then caused the emergence of the "Macedonian Questions"--to whom did the territory belong, and who were the people?

(C) The territorial question seems to have been settled by World War II and international recognition of international boundaries. But the thornier question of the ethnic and national identity of the inhabitants has not been, and probably never will be, solved. Centuries of shifting political, ethnic, and religious dominations and loyalties make it difficult to assign labels. Large segments of the Macedo-Slav population of the area lacked any clear national consciousness in 1900, 1912, or even 1945. Many simply regarded themselves as Macedonians, as Slavs in origin, as Christians, and as residents of a particular community, plain, valley, or mountain.

(U) Language, often helpful in determining ethnic origins, further confuses the matter in this case. Scholars have long disagreed over the linguistic origins of the Macedonians. It is unclear if Macedonian was an independent language or a Greek dialect into which non-Hellenic vocabulary and grammar were introduced. There was apparently a class distinction in language use; as early as the fifth century BC, Greek was the language of public administration and education. Contemporary Yugoslav Macedonian is more akin to Bulgarian than to the Serbo-Croatian of Yugoslavia.

(C) Having lost most of the Macedonian territory, the Bulgarians choose to portray the Macedonians not as a separate ethnic group, but as fellow ethnic Bulgarians. Considerable political prestige and ethnocentrism are arrayed behind this claim. On the other hand, Yugoslavia demands recognition for the Macedonians as a separate nationality and contends that the Bulgarian approach is an implicit territorial claim. Belgrade must also consider the delicate ethnic balance of its at-times precarious multinational state. Thus, the two states have staked out their claims and last fall entered the fray once more in a new battle of bombast.

(C) Celebrating the Ilinden Uprising

The initial spark in this most recent flareup was the blatantly chauvinistic Bulgarian celebration of the 80th anniversary of the Ilinden-Preobrazhenie Uprising. On Saint Eli's Day, August 2, 1903, a Macedonian revolutionary group called the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) started an uprising which lasted two months. It was hopeless from the start as the Turks sent some 300,000 troops against the 30,000 rebels, but the rebels did succeed in briefly (some 12 days) establishing a socialist republic in Krusevo, now in the Yugoslav Macedonian Republic. Bulgarians celebrate this ill-fated rebellion as a followup to their 1876 April Revolution in the "continuation of the process of the national liberation revolution of the Bulgarians." The Yugoslavs mark it as a nationalist battle against an outside power.

This year's Bulgarian celebration featured weeks of local media coverage, capped by ceremonies in Blagoevgrad (the center of Bulgaria's Pirin Macedonia region) and Sofia, attended by no less a personality than Prime Minister Grisha Filipov.

The immediate festivities and earlier academic conferences on the subject carefully managed to avoid mentioning that the center of the rebellion, and indeed most of the action, took place on territory now part of Yugoslavia. Instead, the Bulgarians stuck with their past adoption of the rebellion and identification of its heroes as Bulgarians. Sofia and the Bulgarian Communist Party further blessed the rebellion as "progressive" and incorporated it into their own national (i.e., Bulgarian) liberation movement pantheon. The Bulgarian media even characterized as "Bulgarians" foreign attendees at the celebration who had come from Yugoslavia's Macedonian Republic.

(C) Polemics and Later Events

The Yugoslavs not unexpectedly bridled at the Ilinden celebrations. Yugoslav President Spiljak noted in his speech marking the rebellion, "It is a historical fact that the Ilinden uprising

was a deed of the Macedonian people.... This should be known by all those who, by appropriating the Macedonian people's history, want to deny the Macedonians their national identity." Borba called the Bulgarian celebration "an act of extreme nationalism and chauvinism" which was against the spirit of the Helsinki Act. Tanjug belittled Bulgarian attempts "to present to the world that the Macedonian nation appeared after World War II as a product of new Yugoslavia" and claimed that Bulgaria's "dreams of annexation did not vanish with the collapse of the Bulgarian kingdom in 1944."

A brief repeat of the exchange of vitriol occurred in the fall over the writer Venko Markovski, a pro-Soviet Yugoslav emigré of Macedonian extraction who has lived in Bulgaria since 1948. First, the Bulgarians displayed his works in their September exhibit at the Moscow International Book Fair, then removed them following Yugoslav press criticism and protests until the final day of the fair. Later the Soviets printed some of Markovski's verse in Pravda, setting off a spate of Belgrade press complaints over the "provocative" and "insulting" act.

Then Bulgarian Defense Minister Dobri Dzhurov in early November traveled to Pirin Macedonia to dedicate a monument to Gotse Delchev, a founder of IMRO and a hero of the Ilinden uprising. Dzhurov's remarks featured repeated reference to Delchev as a great Bulgarian, not Macedonian. He toed the standard Bulgarian line recognizing the geographic, but not ethnic, identity of Macedonia and Macedonians by calling Delchev "the first figure of the national liberation movement of the Bulgarian population of Macedonia."

The response from Yugoslavia was especially hostile in the Macedonian Republic press, but Tanjug also joined in with the threat:

"As long as the leading party and state officials of neighboring Bulgaria persist in their claims to the national identity of the Macedonian people and deny the existence of Macedonian national minority in their country, it will be illusory to expect a quicker promotion of relations and more fruitful cooperation between the two countries."

Skopje's Nova Makedonija railed against "continuous Bulgarian appropriation of the past historical events and great personalities of the Macedonian people." Later, it charged Sofia with "provocations and falsifications"; one commentator ominously noted that "there is only one step from negating a people who are an equal and constituent part of the Yugoslav Federation to making territorial claims to a part of Yugoslavia."

As if to back up their words with actions, the Yugoslavs undertook major military maneuvers--"Unity-83"--in the Macedonian Republic in early September. Again, in late November, a two-day

exercise, "All in Defense and Protection (SVOZ) '83," was held near Skopje to practice detecting and destroying "infiltrated diversionist-terrorist groups." The Bulgarian press replayed Albanian criticism of the Unity maneuvers, but sent an observer.

(C) Will There Ever Be an Answer?

It would appear that both Sofia and Belgrade have invested too much political capital and have too many domestic problems with nationalism and minority issues to permit them to consider a solution to the Macedonian question in the foreseeable future. At the same time, however, there is little chance that the controversy will go beyond polemics and posturing.

The Yugoslavs are extremely sensitive to their delicate multi-ethnic balance. A failure to defend Macedonian ethnic identity would threaten all the other southern Slavs by imperiling their own identity. Rivalries among and between the nations of Yugoslavia over political and economic questions have constantly shaken its balance. By presenting Bulgaria as the threat, Belgrade can transform some of this internal hostility into international wariness, thus distracting public attention from other domestic problems.

Yugoslavia's sensitivity on the issue is compounded by its perception of a Soviet hand in Bulgaria's actions. Sofia is only the immediate focus of Belgrade's suspicions and vitriol; Belgrade is much more concerned that Moscow may be manipulating the issue to weaken and distract Yugoslavia.

For Bulgaria, the existence of ethnic minorities on its territory presents an obstacle to its own recent indulgence in nationalism. Acceptance of other ethnic groups and their accomplishments detracts from the glorification of Bulgaria's past. These minority groups also present an irritant in relations with their country of origin (witness the problems over Macedonians with Yugoslavia and Turks with Turkey) and a weak spot for outside penetration into Bulgaria. Furthermore, Sofia has insisted for so long that the residents of Pirin Macedonia are Bulgarians that retraction would severely undermine the authority of other such unilateral pronouncements and beliefs.

So the question is likely to remain unresolved. A Bulgarian commentator noted on Yugoslav national day, "It is true that certain difficulties exist in our bilateral relations." Significantly, however, neither side seems to feel that such difficulties are insurmountable. The formal Yugoslav complaints over Ilinden and Delchev also included hopes for better relations. The Yugoslav national day editorial stated, "Our mutual interests give us all opportunities to raise Bulgarian-Yugoslav cooperation to a higher, new level."

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- 6 -

44

Both Yugoslavia and Bulgaria have domestic reasons for their respective answers to the Macedonian question, and both sides have reasons for periodically laying it aside to pursue mutually beneficial cooperation. The main function of the question in this era is simply to be there so it can be asked--again and again.

Prepared by J. L. M. Floyd
632-9198

Approved by M. Mautner
632-9536

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186128	REPORT RE. BULGARIA: LEADERSHIP RESHUFFLE	6	2/8/1984	B1 B3

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 9, 1984

3650

FILE
Bulgaria

Hobmansley:

51

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JAMES C. MURR
Assistant Director for
Legislative Reference

FROM:

Paul S. Thompson for
ROBERT M. KIMMITT

SUBJECT:

Justice Testimony on Bulgarian Involvement in
Narcotics Trafficking

We have reviewed and have no objection to the Justice testimony on the above subject as set forth in your Legislative Referral Memorandum of May 4, 1984.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

52

May 7, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY ²⁷SUBJECT: Justice Testimony on Bulgarian Involvement in
Narcotic Tafficking

I concur with the thrust of the Justice Department testimony forwarded by OMB. Attached at Tab I is memorandum to Mr. Murr indicating that we have no objection.

Phil Dur and Chris Lehman concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum at Tab I to Mr. Murr.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Proposed memorandum to Mr. Murr, responding to his
Legislative Referral Memorandum, dated May 4, 1984

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

53

May 7, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY

SUBJECT: Justice Testimony on Bulgarian Involvement in
Narcotic Tafficking

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Phil Dur and Chris Lehman concur.

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That you forward the memorandum at Tab I to Mr. Murr.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Proposed memorandum to Mr. Murr, responding to his
Legislative Referral Memorandum, dated May 4, 1984



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

3650

54

May 4, 1984

SPECIAL

LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL MEMORANDUM

TO: Legislative Liaison Officer

Department of State
National Security Council

SUBJECT: Justice testimony on Bulgarian involvement in
narcotic trafficking

The Office of Management and Budget requests the views of your agency on the above subject before advising on its relationship to the program of the President, in accordance with OMB Circular A-19.

Please provide us with your views no later than

May 8, 1984

Direct your questions to Gregory Jones (395-3856), of this office.


James C. Murr for
Assistant Director for
Legislative Reference

Enclosures

cc: A. Curtis
R. Williams

DRAFT

STATEMENT
OF
JOHN C. LAWN
ACTING DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR
OF THE
DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION
ON
BULGARIAN INVOLVEMENT IN NARCOTIC TRAFFICKING
BEFORE
THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE
TASK FORCE ON INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MAY 3, 1984

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Task Force, I am pleased to appear before a committee of the United States Congress to give testimony on the Bulgarian Government involvement in drug trafficking. It is a subject deserving of both national and international attention.

Information accumulated by the Drug Enforcement Administration and its predecessor agencies over the past 14 years indicates that the Government of Bulgaria has established a policy of encouraging and facilitating the trafficking of narcotics through the corporate veil of Kintex. Kintex is the official import/export agency of Bulgaria, overseeing the international trade of such legitimate commodities as arms, textiles, appliances and cigarettes.

Since 1970, and continuing to date, the DEA has received statements from several different sources delineating Bulgaria's involvement in illicit trafficking activities. Information about the involvement of government officials, government agencies, and the descriptions of selected arms and narcotics traffickers, have remained consistent over the years.

The reliability of this information coupled with disappointing responses from the Government of Bulgaria when confronted with these allegations led the United States, in the fall of 1981, to

DRAFT

suspend working relations with the Government of Bulgaria in the area of law enforcement.

Public exposure of Bulgaria's involvement in illicit activities began through press coverage in the early 1970's. In 1973, the Long Island newspaper, Newsday, published an in-depth investigative report citing Bulgaria's use of Kintex to smuggle arms and drugs. The article disclosed that arrangements were made by Kintex with selected Turkish traffickers, which allowed morphine base to move unmolested through Bulgaria in exchange for the transportation and delivery of guns and ammunition to left-wing terrorist groups in Turkey.

Recently, articles have appeared in Time magazine and Reader's Digest in which the authors make clear their belief in the existence of a complex and well-calculated Warsaw Pact conspiracy which is planned and directed to undermine Western societies.

In Nathan Adam's article "Drugs for Guns: the Bulgarian Connection" appearing in the Reader's Digest last fall, an ex-Bulgarian State Security Officer divulged a strategy purportedly formulated in Moscow and Sofia between 1967 to 1970 in which Kintex was allegedly chosen as the vehicle to 'destabilize' Western society, through, among other things, the narcotic trade.

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Although the DEA has no information by which to corroborate the existence of Warsaw Pact Meetings with destabilization directives being issued, one of our sources corroborates the fact that the formation of Kintex occurred during this time. Interestingly, at this same time the amount of available intelligence about the Bulgarian involvement in drug trafficking began to increase. Our information indicates that Kintex was formed in 1968 brought about by the merging of three commercial import/export firms. The directors of Kintex were top ranking members of the Bulgarian Intelligence Service. As a source of income, the Bulgarians, through Kintex, became active in assisting the flow of illicit arms and ammunitions throughout Europe to the Middle East. In 1970 they began to sell heroin and morphine base to European traffickers which had been seized by Bulgarian authorities.

Intelligence sources further indicated a plan by the directors of Kintex during this time to licitly import large amounts of opium into Bulgaria for conversion into morphine base and heroin through selected Turkish traffickers in Sofia.

It is noteworthy that, in December 1969, West German authorities seized 200 kilograms of morphine base at Frankfurt. Chemical analysis performed by German chemists reportedly disclosed that the morphine base was produced in Sofia, Bulgaria. This location was identified because of the presence of chemicals found in the base which were only used in the Sofia area. A Turkish national

DRAFT

and two Syrians were arrested at the time of the seizure and subsequent investigation confirmed the source of supply to be a Turkish national based in Sofia.

From 1971 through 1981, the Government of Bulgaria expressed a willingness to cooperate only in the area of border enforcement. Any proposal for the expanded cooperation in the area of internal narcotics control was strongly resisted. The Government of Bulgaria continually voiced a desire for a mutual exchange of information and publically lamented the fact that there was not a greater exchange of intelligence. Yet, when the DEA passed information to the Bulgarians for follow-up action over this 10-year period, the results were not responsive. On at least 5 separate occasions, information was provided on scores of Turkish, Syrian and Jordanian traffickers based in Sofia. The Bulgarian side promised a full and prompt investigation. In these cases the Bulgarians either did not respond or only provided the DEA with on a list of recent narcotics seizures made by their Customs Service. While an ultimate goal of using drugs as a political weapon to destabilize Western societies may be inferred, a more immediate motivation for Bulgaria's encouragement and support of both narcotics and arms smuggling activities can be identified as follows:-

1. An attempt by the Bulgarian Government to obtain hard Western currency which is in short supply in Bulgaria;

DRAFT

2. An attempt to supply and support several dissident groups in the Middle East with Western arms and ammunition, in support of communist revolutionary aims. Payment for arms at times are made by these revolutionary groups with narcotics, which then are smuggled to Western democracies and sold at a considerable profit; and

3. Intelligence gathering requirements which the Bulgarians are able to levy on the various traffickers in both the Middle East and in Western Europe by allowing and controlling such traffic.

In virtually every report available to the DEA since 1970 about narcotics trafficking in and through Bulgaria, the state trading organization of Kintex is mentioned as a facilitator of transactions. In turn, knowledgeable sources consistently tell us that top-ranking members of Bulgarian Ministries comprise the directorate of Kintex.

Certain smugglers are permitted to conduct their activities within and through Bulgaria. In effect, Bulgarian officials, through Kintex, designate 'representatives' to operate as brokers who establish exclusive arrangements with smugglers for bartered contraband for a fee. These representatives and smugglers are non-Bulgarians, primarily composed of Turkish Nationals of Kurdish background, a majority of which are known as the 'Turkish

DRAFT

Mafia'. However, selected smugglers also include Syrian, Iranian, Jordanian, Lebanese and European Nationals. Kintex has in the past denied any knowledge of or association with these representatives. Bulgarian officials, in defense of trafficking allegations, claim the presence of foreign nationals on their soil constitutes no crime. They further emphasize the fact that no Bulgarian Nationals have been implicated in large-scale drug smuggling activities either inside or outside Bulgarian Territory..

Incidental to drug-related investigations overseas, a limited amount of terrorist-related activity has been known to the DEA. In its quest for hard currency, Kintex assists the flow of illicit arms and ammunition primarily to left-wing insurgency groups in Turkey and Lebanon. Although Kintex has been known to deal with terrorist groups regardless of political affiliation, no direct association between Kintex and the PLO or 'Gray Wolves' has been established, according to our information.

On June 30, 1983, a DEA representative for Austria met with a high-level Bulgarian Customs official in Sofia. This official responded to a question on Bulgarian arms smuggling by stating that the United States was 'also' a major supplier of arms. By inference, we recognize this was an admission that Bulgaria deals in arms.

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While contraband transiting Bulgaria at times is transported via vessel to customers in Western Europe or the Middle East, most of it is carried overland by truck. As early as 1972, information available to the DEA disclosed the use of Iranian, Turkish and Bulgarian TIR trucks to smuggle illicit goods through Bulgaria. A number of Turkish patrons of Kintex are known owners of TIR trucks and the complicity of Bulgarian Customs officials in selective border enforcement is no longer secret.

The Customs Convention on the International Transport of Goods under the auspices of the United Nations serves as a cover for the TIR (Transport International Routier). This instrument provides for a customs transit system to facilitate the international transportation of goods by eliminating, to the extent possible, the necessity for customs examination of road vehicles and containers after the customs formalities at the beginning of the journey have been satisfied -- thus shipments are exempt from customs inspections until the end of the journey.

The United States, all major European countries including Bulgaria, and the Southwest Asian countries of Afghanistan, Iran, and Turkey are participants in this international agreement. It is estimated that at least 50,000 trucks per year transit Bulgaria and Yugoslavia either to or from the Middle East and Europe. Approximately half of these trucks are TIR trucks.

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Although the reporting of Bulgarian involvement in narcotics trafficking continues, the amount of heroin and morphine base transiting Bulgaria is not as great as in the past. You will remember that during the 'French Connection' era, several traffickers operating from Bulgaria were identified as the key suppliers of morphine base for laboratories in France and Italy. Bulgarian trafficking has been overshadowed in the past few years by the enormous availability of processed heroin trafficked directly from Southwest Asian countries to consumer markets in Western Europe and the United States.

In light of the increased reporting of heroin laboratory activity in Eastern Turkey, (which had remained dormant during Turkish military rule from 1980 to 1983), the trafficking activity through Bulgaria may escalate.

Our DEA office in Vienna, Austria, continues to have responsibility for the reporting and dissemination of information about narcotics-related activities in Bulgaria. The office also handles limited liaison duties with Bulgarian officials through the American Embassy in Sofia. The Drug Enforcement Administration has been instrumental in the development of demarches presented to the Government of Bulgaria by our State Department. In March of this year, the United States again formally voiced its concerns to the Bulgarian Government, citing Bulgaria's continued toleration and facilitation of the activities of known

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drug and arms smugglers through Kintex. Efforts are underway to enlist the cooperation and support of other concerned nations in the area of law enforcement and narcotic control through paralleled demarches to the Government of Bulgaria.

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before this committee. I would be glad to address any questions.

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(U) BULGARIAN CULTURAL LIFE: DECLINE AND
DECADENCE AFTER LYUDMILA ZHIVKOVA

BUREAU OF
INTELLIGENCE
AND RESEARCH

ASSESSMENTS
AND
RESEARCH

Summary

Following the sudden death in 1981 of Bulgarian cultural doyenne Lyudmila Zhivkova, culture and the arts in Bulgaria went into a rapid decline in terms of both innovation and taste. The celebrations surrounding the 1300th Anniversary of Bulgarian Culture in 1981 were the high point of the nationalist revival Zhivkova had engineered. Now, without her power, access, and ideas, the local cultural scene has deteriorated, but not so severely as to erase all of her accomplishments.

* * * * *

Zhivkova's Accomplishments

As Zhivkov's daughter and holder of a state office, Lyudmila combined unparalleled power with a willingness to experiment and foster innovation that allowed Bulgarian culture to flourish during her six-year reign as chairman of the Committee for Culture. She is remembered for encouraging artistic innovation and openness to Western ideas while initiating general cultural reform and espousing Bulgarian nationalism and cultural development.

Zhivkova's influence at the top echelon of the leadership helped the committee secure disproportionate levels of funding. At a time of otherwise tight money and chronic shortages in such areas as housing construction, it received huge sums to construct a Cultural Palace in Sofia (subsequently renamed in honor of Zhivkova), as well as to finance an entire series of events around the 1300th Anniversary of Bulgarian Culture. It also obtained funds to arrange such international meetings and

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conferences as the Banner of Peace Assemblies, to facilitate exchange programs, and to assist Bulgarian museums.

With Zhivkova at its head, the Committee for Culture allowed Bulgarian artists and intellectuals creative license with less deference to socialist realism than ever before. Although still controlled by the communist party, guidelines in cultural fields became more general and pluralistic, especially compared with the USSR or other Warsaw Pact states. The cultural intelligentsia was allowed to travel abroad in unprecedented numbers to spread Bulgarian culture as well as to be exposed to developments elsewhere. Zhivkova's own dalliance with non-standard philosophies, such as mysticism, astrology, "suggestology," and transcendental meditation, served as an example to the cultural elite of just how experimental they too could be.

Zhivkova's stewardship saw a marked increase in the number and range of Western books translated into Bulgarian; in showings of Western films, plays, and TV programs; in Western cultural weeks, film weeks, and international artists' congresses for writers, poets, etc. At the same time, Zhivkova organized cultural events to highlight the uniqueness and importance of Bulgarian culture. She mounted a major display of "The Thracian and Medieval Heritage," personally opening the exhibit in various Western countries (while letting deputies handle that task in socialist states). The celebration of the 1300th Anniversary contained so many nationalist overtones that it was said to have angered the Soviets. The anniversary celebrations live on in a permanent Sofia exhibit of "A Panorama of Bulgarian Culture."

Deterioration After Lyudmila

Unfortunately, Zhivkova's financial and ideological influence was never institutionalized; soon after her death it declined. Her successor as cultural chairman, Georgi Yordanov, has had neither her pull in securing funds nor her effectiveness in fighting orthodoxy (if he ever had such aspirations). Cultural life, while not totally abandoning Zhivkova or her enthusiasm for Bulgarian cultural nationalism, seems to be suffering from a lack of taste, openness, initiative, and money.

Taste. Bulgaria's occasional bias toward tackiness has long been satirized by the city of Gabrovo, which not only hosts a yearly joke festival but also has a Humor Museum. As an example of the decline in local taste, the current exhibit at the museum is a display of kitsch art. In addition to plastic souvenirs, knickknacks, children's toys, and garish paintings, the exhibit features a bottle-opener commemorating the 11th Party Congress and cheap models of Misha, the 1980 Moscow Olympic mascot. The display conveys a political message--art is returning to the

service of the party--as Bulgaria moves into a major economic reform campaign stressing the need for quality in production.

Even Zhivkova's international congresses, including her favorite Banner of Peace Assembly for exceptional children from around the world, face the threat of becoming more propagandized. One Sofia paper this June indicated that the 1985 assembly may be attended by Samantha Smith, the young American who made such a hit in the Soviet Union when Andropov invited her to visit.

Openness. Bulgarian reaction to the recent space shuttle exhibit at the US Embassy in Sofia provides evidence of a clamp-down on openness to the West. To prevent access to the popular exhibit, Bulgarian officials went to the extreme of blocking off the entire street in front of the embassy. After protests and the institution of procedures reducing contacts between viewers and the embassy, the barricades finally came down so the public could look at the exhibit.

Prior to this episode, Western countries, including the US, had been experiencing difficulties in implementing exchange agreements worked out during the Zhivkova era.

Initiative. The creativity encouraged by Zhivkova has given way to imitation. Rather than develop new or specifically Bulgarian approaches, those in the cultural field now tend to copy Western, especially American, ways. Bulgaria's premier rock band, FSB, plays only to carefully controlled audiences; and its repertoire, possibly by direction, includes no Western music per se. Nonetheless it assiduously imitates Western styles of the last five or so years, down to the light show and stage fog. Its fans wear T-shirts with Western logos and pride themselves on knowing Western slang.

The authorities are obviously unable to stem access to the West. Odd imitations result but, worse still, the slavish copying detracts from development of viable Bulgarian national alternatives.

Money. Zhivkova's remarkable ability to procure huge sums for her projects in the face of economic stringencies has fallen by the wayside under her less influential successors. Subsidies for existing programs continue, but funds for capital improvements are unavailable.

Representative of this lack of financial support for the arts is the state of the Bulgarian National Opera Company. Financial cutbacks have resulted in a shortage of orchestra and technical personnel, dilapidated workshops and storage facilities, and poor-quality scenery and costumes (so bad, in fact, that the stage

settings were booed during a 1982 Paris tour). Money has also played a role in the decline of the opera from another angle. In order to earn hard currency, the best performers, some of world renown, perform more often abroad than at home. Combined with a return to a more orthodox repertoire, this decline in operatic quality has led to a decline in opera attendance--only 30 percent of capacity during the 1981-82 season, despite traditionally low ticket prices.

Culture Without Lyudmila

The Bulgarian cultural world was obviously shocked and hurt by Zhivkova's sudden death in July 1981. It has not recovered under the pedantic guidance of her party hack successor, Yordanov. With no patron of Zhivkova's quality and influence, cultural workers have had to return to their more traditional socialist role as political tools. The intellectual elites thus are less independent, less creative, and less well supported.

It must be remembered, however, that disappointments seen today are shortcomings only in terms of the halcyon days of Zhivkova. The new Cultural Palace is an impressive, well-used, surprisingly accessible monument to Zhivkova and Bulgarian culture. The Zhivkova Foundation has the potential to protect and support some of the innovations Zhivkova introduced, especially contacts with Western influences. National celebrations, such as Cyril and Methodius Day and this fall's 40th Anniversary of Socialist Bulgaria, are symbols of the renewed national pride engendered by Zhivkova's policies.

Under Zhivkova, culture took two giant steps forward; it has now had to take one step back. Despite current problems, it is still well ahead of the dark days of socialist realism, lockstep shadowing of Soviet culture, and the primacy of Slavic brotherhood and shared Slavic culture.

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Turks Closer to Linking Pope's Assailant With

By DAVID IGNATIUS

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
WASHINGTON—A Turkish prosecutor's report provides additional evidence linking Mehmet Ali Agca, the man who shot the pope, with a Bulgarian-based ring of Turkish smugglers.

The Turkish report focuses on Mr. Agca's first known major crime, the 1979 murder of a Turkish journalist, Abdi Ipekci, rather than his 1981 attempt to kill Pope John Paul II. But it corroborates important details of an Italian investigation into Mr. Agca's "Bulgarian connection."

The Turkish prosecutor concludes that Mr. Agca acted in the 1979 killing of Mr. Ipekci as part of a conspiracy headed by a Turkish underworld boss, Abuzer Ugurlu, who operated largely out of Bulgaria. The Turkish report also alleges that Mr. Ugurlu gave "financial assistance to Mr. Agca when he was in Bulgaria."

The report's significance lies mainly in that it adds the official stamp of the Turkish military prosecutor to one element of the complex case prepared by Italians investigating the attempt on the pope's life—the link between Mr. Agca and the Turkish mafia boss, Mr. Ugurlu. The Turkish findings about Mr. Agca's early activities parallel those of the Italian investigation and those of independent researchers such as Claire Sterling and Paul Henze.

Bulgarians Not Discussed

The Turkish report is a public legal document but it has received little attention outside Turkey. The report, translated by The Wall Street Journal, provides the clearest picture yet of Mr. Agca's beginnings as a paid assassin. It draws a picture of him as a tough, cynical man without fanatical political views who became an operative in an underworld ring drawn largely from his home area of Malatya in central Turkey.

The Agca of the Turkish report cheated on his university entrance exams, took sole responsibility for the 1979 killing and confidently stonewalled Turkish officials about the role of others in that murder when he

was in prison in 1979, and received money from unknown sources in a network of bank accounts opened in his name.

The Turkish report doesn't discuss Mr. Agca's alleged links with the Bulgarian secret service or the relationship, if any, of the Kremlin to the alleged conspiracy to kill the pope. A report by Italian prosecutor Antonio Albano that is expected to be issued formally this month, charges that three Bulgarian intelligence operatives in Rome met with Mr. Agca and plotted a Bulgarian-sponsored attack on the pope.

The Turkish prosecutor's report was filed in Istanbul Jan. 16 by Col. Hanefi Ongul, a senior judge of the Martial Law Prosecutor's office, and his assistant, Tefik Tunc Onat. The Turkish authorities in December 1982 had asked Col. Ongul to reinvestigate the 1979 Ipekci case, following Mr. Agca's confessions to Italian investigators about his links to Mr. Ugurlu and the Bulgarians.

The Turkish case against Mr. Ugurlu and other members of the alleged conspiracy to kill journalist Ipekci went to trial in March. Some of the report's allegations have been disclosed in testimony; the trial is continuing. According to the Turkish Embassy in Washington, Mr. Ugurlu is being held in a Turkish prison and is also a defendant in several other criminal cases besides the Ipekci murder.

Mr. Ugurlu has denied knowing Mr. Agca or participating in a conspiracy to kill Mr. Ipekci. But he has admitted to Turkish prosecutors that he gave money in 1980 to a man named Metin in Bulgaria; the prosecutor charges that "Metin" was Mr. Agca.

Mr. Ugurlu's role in the Agca case is important because of his links to the Bulgarians, who allegedly aided his drug and weapons-smuggling operations.

Relationship Summarized

A summary of this relationship is provided by Paul Henze, who closely followed Turkish affairs as an official of the high-level National Security Council during the Carter administration. Mr. Henze told a House of Representatives panel this year: "Bulgaria started early to offer protection to Turkish drug smugglers. With Bulgarian help, what came to be called the Turkish mafia set up elaborate networks, lodged in part among Turkish workers in Europe, for moving opium products westward. . . . Fugitives from justice in their

own country, these Turkish mafia figures were permitted to buy villas in Bulgaria and were given passports and eased through Bulgarian border and customs controls."

Mr. Henze adds in an interview: "Ugurlu has been known to be involved with the Bulgarians since the 1960s. It is inconceivable that a widely known criminal operative such as Ugurlu could have lived and worked in Bulgaria without the approval of the Bulgarian intelligence service and the rest of the Bulgarian Communist Party hierarchy."

The Turkish prosecutor's report suggests that Mr. Agca was drawn into Mr.

. . . a tough and cynical young man, without fanatical political views . . .

Ugurlu's network in Istanbul and was involved in petty smuggling operations. In early 1979, the report says, Mr. Ugurlu "proposed the idea of killing Abdi Ipekci," apparently to prevent the publication of stories about Mr. Ugurlu's smuggling activities.

The report quotes Turkish witnesses who say that at the time he was killed Mr. Ipekci was planning to publish an investigation of smuggling in the newspaper he edited, Milliyet.

Escape From Prison

The Turkish report also alleges that Mr. Ugurlu helped Mr. Agca escape from prison in Istanbul in November 1979, after Mr. Agca was arrested and charged with killing Mr. Ipekci, "by providing the money that was given as a bribe to the prison officials."

According to the report, Mr. Ugurlu also provided Mr. Agca with money when the prison fugitive arrived in Bulgaria in July 1980; the money was delivered by Omer Mersan, the report says. Mr. Mersan is believed to have been an associate of Mr. Ugurlu involved in European drug smuggling.

The Turkish report also outlines Mr. Agca's close involvement with Oral Celik, a Turk from Mr. Agca's home town of Malatya, who Italian investigators allege helped plan the attempted assassination of



Bulgaria

the pope and was present in St. Peter's Square on May 13, 1981, when Mr. Agca fired his gun.

Evidence gathered by the Turkish prosecutors indicates that Mr. Celik helped Mr. Agca plan the February 1979 killing of Mr. Ipekci, visited him in prison in Istanbul after he was arrested in June 1979, helped plan his escape in November 1979, took him by car to Ankara, the Turkish capital, after the escape, sent him to Nevsehir in central Turkey to obtain a false passport, and traveled with him in early 1980 to Erzurum, near the Iranian border in eastern Turkey, and helped him escape into Iran.

One of the Turkish report's interesting aspects is that it undercuts the picture of Mr. Agca, formed by investigators shortly after the attack on the pope, as an ideologically motivated member of the right-wing Turkish Gray Wolves organization. He did have extensive contact with members of the group, such as Mr. Celik. But the earlier view that he killed Mr. Ipekci in a right-wing plot against a liberal newspaper editor now appears to be wrong.

A Hired Gun

Instead, Mr. Agca emerges in the Turkish report as a petty criminal who evolved into a hired gun. The report claims that he forged a pass to the Istanbul University entrance exams in 1978 and had someone else take the exam for him; that he was involved in petty smuggling in Istanbul; that he robbed a jewelry store in March 1979 and a warehouse the next month; and that in February 1980 he helped murder a Turk who he believed had informed Turkish police of his role in the Ipekci killing.

Adding to this picture of Mr. Agca as a paid assassin is evidence gathered by the Turkish prosecutors about his bank accounts. The Turkish report claims that prior to the killing of Mr. Ipekci, a total of 180,000 Turkish lira, at that time about \$10,000, was deposited in his name in four Istanbul bank accounts. Mr. Agca claimed to Turkish investigators that he obtained the money through smuggling.

The Italian investigation of Mr. Agca continues the story from the point the Turkish report leaves off, after Mr. Agca's flight to Bulgaria. The two reports, taken together, suggest that after becoming a paid gunman for the Bulgarian-based Turkish mafia, and after threatening on his own to kill the pope in November 1979, Mr. Agca was taken up by operatives of the Bulgarian intelligence service.

Neither report sheds light on speculation that the Soviet Union may have cooperated with Bulgarian intelligence services in the papal shooting. Given the difficulty of obtaining evidence about Soviet intelligence operations, that question may never be settled. But the investigations of Mr. Agca have sharply altered the early picture of him as simply a deranged, right-wing assassin acting on his own.

Document 170

*Statement by the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) Before the House Task Force on International Narcotics Control, July 24, 1984*³²

U.S.-Bulgarian Relations

Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittees, I thank you for the opportunity to appear before you to discuss our policy toward Bulgaria. Mr. Lawn and Commissioner von Raab will discuss the particular questions involving international narcotics network and possible abuse of the TIR system.

As the most loyal member of the Warsaw Pact, Bulgaria evidences the least amount of differentiation from the Soviet Union in its political, ideological, and economic policies.

For years the Bulgarian leadership evoked an almost symbiotic relationship with the Soviet Union. They seemed to fall over themselves to defer to the Soviets, to echo their propaganda, and to support them in every single issue of international importance. Bulgarian devotion to the Moscow line seemed to go far beyond their obligations under existing political realities, surpassing that of their partners in the Warsaw Pact.

One looked hard for even small signs of diversity. Under those conditions, there were few grounds for dialog. In fact, during the decade of the 1950's, we did not even maintain diplomatic relations.

Relations were reestablished in 1960, but little has happened. Our relations with Bulgaria remain at a low level. Unlike some of the other countries in Eastern Europe with whom our relations began to expand in keeping with our policy of differentiation, we have not exchanged high-level political visits nor do we have official bilateral commissions on economic and trade development.

³² Source: *Bulgarian-Turkish Narcotics Connection: United States-Bulgarian Relations and International Drug Trafficking: Hearings and Markup Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Its Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, House of Representatives, Ninety-eighth Congress, Second Session (Washington, 1984)*, pp. 79-82. The Chairman of the Task Force was Representative Edward Feighan.

As Bulgaria has not fulfilled the requirements of the Trade Act of 1974,³³ we do not extend most-favored-nation tariff treatment to Bulgaria. Nor is Bulgaria eligible for U.S. Government trade credits or guarantees.

By the end of the 1970's, Bulgaria began paying greater attention to developing its economic and commercial ties to Western Europe and the United States. In order to do so, its leaders accepted a broadened political and cultural dialog with us on matters of importance to us.

In this dialog, we pressed for improved Bulgarian adherence to the CSCE principles—greater contacts, reunification of divided families, and human rights generally.

We pressed the Bulgarians to stop jamming our Bulgarian-language VOA broadcasts. We pressed them on persistent allegations and reports of official Bulgarian involvement in the illegal drug trade and in illegal arms sales to terrorist groups in the Third World and the Middle East.

The results of our efforts have been, on balance, disappointing. In the area of the Helsinki principles and human rights, they have resolved nearly all of the longstanding family reunification cases for which we had been seeking solutions, in some cases as much as 15 years.

They have also taken steps to facilitate the operation of our Embassy in Sofia and improve their access to Bulgarian officials. Last fall they received at the very highest level, President Zhivkov, an important delegation from this House led by Congressman Gibbons.

But on the very serious issues of Bulgarian involvement in the illegal narcotics and illicit arms trade, our representations have produced few results. Our drug enforcement cooperation efforts with Bulgaria have been turned into propaganda exercises to demonstrate apparent rather than real cooperation in eliminating drug trafficking from Bulgaria.

Repeated requests by Turkey for extradition of known Turkish narcotics smugglers have been refused. Information passed by our Drug Enforcement Agency people about known narcotics smugglers in Bulgaria have been largely ignored, and

³³ P.L. 93-618. (88 Stat. 2056)

instead we have been given statistics about the number of seizures at the border. Little has been done to crack down on those within the country that were moving drugs and illicit arms in international trade.

After several years of frustrating cooperation that produced few real improvements in drug enforcement, we suspended customs cooperation with Bulgaria in 1981. We reluctantly came to the conclusion that the relationship was largely fruitless and was being misused for propaganda purposes.

Last February I visited Bulgaria, along with two other countries in Eastern Europe, to provide that close ally of the Soviet Union our position on security and arms control and, in particular, INF, in the context of Soviet counterdeployments in Eastern Europe.

I also used that opportunity to make unmistakably clear our continuing interest and concern over Bulgaria's official dealings in or toleration of the international narcotics trade, their involvement in the illicit arms trade, and over allegations of support for terrorist groups.

I stressed that there could be no marked improvement in our relations until these concerns could be satisfied.

In addition to my trip, I note that representatives of DEA also have been in Sofia recently to press the Bulgarians and will be continuing such contacts.

I understand that there are recent reports of improved Bulgarian enforcement action along their borders, and significant drug seizures have been announced. I hope these reports are correct.

However, there has been insufficient movement on elimination of the drug rings that operate out of Bulgaria, moving drugs and guns between the Middle East and Europe. Those are the operators that we have to get at: Those are the connections that must be broken.

We must and will continue to press the Bulgarians on these concerns. We have also discussed our concerns with key West European governments, urging them to approach the Bulgarians directly on the subject. We will continue to work to enlist the support of other governments.

Mr. Chairman, with regard to the two resolutions concerning Bulgaria that are currently before your subcommittee, let me say that there should be no mistake as to the gravity with which we view the attempt on the life of Pope John Paul II. We regard the cowardly attack on the Pope as one of the most terrible and despicable of all possible crimes.

As you know, the crime occurred on Vatican soil, and it is the Italian judicial system which has the jurisdiction to investigate the charges. All along, we have been extremely impressed with the thorough and dispassionate manner in which the Italian authorities have pursued their investigation. Their courageous, painstaking, exhaustive and impartial approach has been most laudatory. We continue to have complete faith in the integrity of the Italian investigation, and we have offered the fullest possible assistance to the Italian investigation and we will continue to do so.

Since the Italian judicial process has not yet been completed, we must maintain both the appearance and the reality of nonintervention in this case.

I might add here that senior Italian political authorities in recent days have asked us to maintain this appearance and reality of nonintervention in this case.

This is the position that the Secretary of State stressed in his testimony on June 13 before the full Foreign Affairs Committee.⁸⁴

Mr. Chairman, in considering these pieces of legislation, H.R. 5980, and House Concurrent Resolution 337,⁸⁵ let

me assure you that we share the concerns of members of this subcommittee about the very grave charges of Bulgarian complicity in the attempted assassination of the Pope.

We support the conduct of a comprehensive review of U.S. policy toward Bulgaria to examine all facets of our relationship.

I would strongly recommend, however, that the study be delayed until such time as the Italians have completed their investigation and the outcome of an eventual trial is known. By awaiting those results, we will not have interfered in the Italian judicial process.

We will also avoid playing into Soviet and Bulgarian hands by introducing the appearance of external pressure that could discredit the impartiality of the investigation and an eventual trial.

In conclusion, let me assure you once again of the seriousness with which the Department of State regards the charges and evidence of Bulgarian involvement and toleration of illicit narcotics and arms trafficking and support to terrorist groups. We will continue to devote close attention to the concerns raised by you and members of your committees.

Thank you.