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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

November 30, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY (P)

SUBJECT: 17th Semiannual Report

I have reviewed and concur in the text submitted by the Department of State under memorandum of November 28, 1984 (Tab II), of the 17th Semiannual Report on the implementation of the Helsinki Final Act to the CSCE Commission. As required by Public Law 94-304, attached at Tab I is a memorandum to Secretary Shultz authorizing the transmission of the Report to the Commission on behalf of the President. Your authorization is needed by COB today, since the report is due at the Commission on Monday, December 3, 1984.

At Tab III is a memorandum from you to the President which summarizes the highlights of the Report. There is no need to forward the Report at Tab III to the President.

mk AW PS SK
Matlock, Wigg, Sommer, Kraemer and Steiner concur.

RECOMMENDATION

- 1. That you sign and forward the memorandum at Tab I to Secretary of State Shultz.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

- 2. That you forward the summary memorandum at Tab II to the President.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

- Tab I Memorandum to Secretary Shultz
- Tab II Summary memorandum to the President
- Tab III 17th Semiannual Report to the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe on the Implementation of the Helsinki Final Act: April 1, 1984 - October 1, 1984.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
The Secretary of State

SUBJECT: Seventeenth Semiannual Report by the President to
the Commission on Security and Cooperation in
Europe on the Implementation of the Helsinki Final
Act: April 1, 1984 - October 1, 1984

The text submitted by the Department of State for review under
memorandum of November 28, 1984, has been reviewed and approved
for transmission over your signature to the Commission on Security
and Cooperation in Europe.

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Robert C. McFarlane

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTONINFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. McFARLANE

SUBJECT: Summary: CSCE 17th Semiannual Report

The 17th Semiannual Report of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) has been completed. It surveys significant developments in the implementation of the Helsinki Final Act during the period April 1, 1984 - October 1, 1984. This is the second Semiannual Report to stress compliance with the provisions agreed upon at the Madrid follow-up meeting. Key highlights of the Report include:

1. During the review period, the USSR and Eastern Europe record of compliance with the Helsinki Final Act principles remained seriously flawed.
2. Continued deterioration of the Soviet Union's already poor record of compliance was still the greatest cause for concern. Soviet authorities amended the legal code to outlaw independent forms of expression and severed contacts between Soviets and foreigners. Also, the abysmal level of Jewish emigration continued and was accompanied by an alarming increase in anti-Semitic propaganda.
3. There were some positive developments in East European implementation of the Final Act: Bulgaria reversed its decision to jam VOA broadcasts; in Czechoslovakia, a Rabbi was ordained (the first since 1970); Father Calciu, the renowned Romanian human rights activist, was released from prison; and Hungary and Romania continued to implement Basket II (economic) provisions satisfactorily. However, these improvements were offset by continued repression and stricter controls in each country.

Prepared by:
Paula Dobriansky

cc: The Vice President



S/S 8432501
United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

November 28, 1984

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT McFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: CSCE - Seventeenth Semiannual Report by the President

Public Law 94-304 requires the President to submit a report on implementation of the Helsinki Final Act to the CSCE Commission semiannually. The attached draft report, which covers the period April 1, 1984 - October 1, 1984, is due on December 3, 1984. The report provides a factual survey of developments in the areas covered by the Final Act: human rights and humanitarian concerns; security; economic, scientific and technological cooperation; and educational and cultural exchanges. It concentrates on compliance with the Final Act and focuses particularly on events in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

The Department recommends that the Secretary of State be authorized to transmit the report to the Commission on behalf of the President in accordance with the existing practice for this report.

The report has been cleared as appropriate by the Departments of Defense and Commerce, the U.S. Information Agency, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It has been reviewed thoroughly within the Department of State and incorporates working level CSCE Commission comments.

Charles Hill

Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

UNCLASSIFIED

SEVENTEENTH SEMIANNUAL REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT
TO THE COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT
APRIL 1, 1984 - OCTOBER 1, 1984

SEVENTEENTH SEMIANNUAL REPORT

TABLE OF CONTENTS

- Chapter One - General Assessment of the Implementation of the Helsinki Final Act and Madrid Concluding Document
- Chapter Two - Implementation of Basket I: Questions Relating to Security in Europe
- Chapter Three - Implementation of Basket II: Cooperation in the Fields of Economics, of Science and Technology, and of the Environment
- Chapter Four - Implementation of Basket III: Cooperation in Humanitarian and Other Fields

CHAPTER ONE

OVERVIEW

The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) represents a framework for the 35 participating states to work to resolve the humanitarian, economic, political, and military issues that divide Europe. The Final Act underscores that each area is of equal importance to genuine security and cooperation in Europe. The Western objective has been to preserve and strengthen this process by a thorough review of implementation of the Final Act and agreement on balanced and constructive steps forward.

The Final Act recognizes that followup meetings are essential for maintaining the Helsinki framework as a vigorous means of addressing problems in Europe. The Madrid followup meeting, the second such CSCE review conference, began on November 11, 1980, and came to a close on September 9, 1983. The Madrid Concluding Document confirmed and expanded upon the original Helsinki Final Act of 1975. It includes significant new provisions in the areas of human rights, trade union freedoms, human contacts, free flow of information, access to diplomatic and consular missions, and measures against terrorism.

It also mandated seven follow-on "experts" meetings leading up to the next review conference to be held in Vienna beginning in November, 1986. The U.S. is participating actively and fully in these meetings, both as a means of assessing existing problems in implementation and seeking balanced progress in the CSCE.

This is the seventeenth semiannual report submitted by the President to the CSCE Commission under the provisions of Public Law 94-304 of June 3, 1976. It surveys significant developments in the implementation of the Helsinki Final Act and the Madrid Concluding Document during the period April 1, 1984 through October 1, 1984. This is the second semiannual report to assess compliance with the provisions agreed upon at the Madrid followup meeting. The purpose of the report is to assist the CSCE Commission in its task of monitoring and encouraging compliance with the Helsinki Accords. These reports are themselves an important element of the U.S. Government's effort to assess the progress and shortcomings in achieving the CSCE goals to strengthen security, expand cooperation, build mutual confidence, and promote human rights.

Review of Implementation

For most of the CSCE participating states, the status of implementation over the current reporting period did not change significantly from earlier periods. The overall record of compliance by the Warsaw Pact nations of Eastern Europe with their CSCE undertakings remained seriously flawed, although encouragement could be taken from some specific positive developments. The Bulgarian government, for example, reversed its decision to jam Voice of America radio broadcasts, and favorably resolved several family reunification cases. In Czechoslovakia, a Rabbi was ordained, giving the country its first resident Rabbi since 1970, and an increase in the number of Catholic seminary students was permitted. The German Democratic Republic has adhered to its October 1983 law providing for resolution of binational marriage cases within six months of the application. Hungary maintained its relatively liberal humanitarian, cultural, and economic policies. In Poland, an extensive amnesty was promoted by the regime as a significant step toward national reconciliation. In Romania, leading dissident Priest Father Calciu-Dumitreasa was released from prison, and the government made other welcome promises to religious groups. These relatively bright spots must be seen, however, in the wider context of strict government control and limitations on political and religious expression.

There were however, a number of negative developments. There was a marked increase in the number of requests for asylum at Western embassies in Sofia, indicating a continuation of the Bulgarian pattern of human rights abuses. The Czechoslovak government has made increased use of "protective supervision" -- a form of house arrest -- against political prisoners who have completed their prison terms. Other invidious efforts were made by the Czechoslovak government to intimidate those citizens who wished to exercise the fundamental rights and freedoms contained in the Helsinki Accords. In the German Democratic Republic, the surge in exit visas granted during the previous report period ended abruptly, and the government continued to limit sharply access to Western diplomatic missions. In Hungary, a dissident intellectual was refused permission to study in New York unless he agreed not to return home following study abroad. In Poland, the possibility of a genuine national reconciliation was set back by failure to include 22 persons in the amnesty, by rearrest of two released Solidarity leaders, and by the government's rejection of a return to trade union pluralism. The Romanian government maintained its tight control over the population.

Once again the continuing deterioration of the Soviet Union's already poor record of compliance gave the greatest cause of concern. The Soviet authorities continued to amend the legal code to outlaw independent forms of expression and to sever contacts between Soviets and foreigners.

In the international arena, the Soviet Union has continued to violate basic principles guiding relations among states by waging war against Afghanistan, supporting the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia, and defending the September 1983 downing of a civilian Korean airliner that accidentally strayed into Soviet airspace. Domestically, the Soviet authorities continued to introduce new amendments to the legal code to strengthen their hand against independent forms of expression and lend a certain fictitious legality to their campaign to sever contacts between Soviets and foreigners. In this respect, a new decree establishing fines for Soviet citizens who provide broadly defined material support to foreigners represents a continuation of the effort to tighten legal restrictions that were begun under the previous review period.

Persecution of individuals who attempted to express themselves outside the framework of state-controlled organs continued at an alarming rate in the six months under review. Human rights monitors, religious believers, proponents of greater cultural and political rights for ethnic minorities, and peace activists were all subject to arrest and imprisonment. Renowned human rights activist Yelena Bonner was sentenced by a Gorkiy court to five years of internal exile while her husband, Andrey Sakharov, who began a hunger strike on her behalf in May, was forcibly separated from her and placed incommunicado in a medical facility. Anatoliy Shcharanskiy was placed on a strict regimen in the prison where he is being held, and Yuriy Orlov remained isolated in his remote place of exile in the Far East. Dissident activist Yuriy Shikhanovich was sentenced to a term in a labor camp for compiling information on the status of political prisoners, and Yelena Sannikova and Lina Tumanova awaited trial on similar charges. Soviet persecution of religious activists took on an ominous hue with the arrests of Hebrew teachers Aleksandr Kholmianskiy and Yuliy Edelstein, the arrest of Odessa refusenik Yakov Levin, and the sentencing of Riga refusenik Zakhar Zunshaine to labor camp. These arrests were part of what appears to be an intensified crackdown on Jewish cultural activists. Psychiatric abuse has also not abated, as witnessed by the recent sentencing of Catholic activist Aleksandr Riga to indefinite treatment in a special psychiatric hospital and the death of Alexey Nikitin in a psychiatric hospital.

Despite commitments under the Helsinki Final Act to facilitate family reunification, the rate of emigration from the Soviet Union continued to decline below the disappointing figures of early 1984 and has come to a virtual standstill. Some 423 Jews left the Soviet Union from April 1-August 30. 356 ethnic Germans left in the same period, and 46 Armenians from April 1-September 30. The abysmal level of Jewish emigration was accompanied by an alarming increase in the level of official anti-semitic propaganda.

The Soviet authorities continued to exercise tight control on travel outside the country, allowing only 786 Soviet citizens to make private visits to the United States during the past six months. Only 93 Soviet citizens received exit permission to join relatives in the United States.

The Soviet authorities maintained their traditional strict control of information media, denying Soviet citizens access to all filmed, printed, and broadcast information which might call into question the tenets of Marxism-Leninism or the official line of the Communist party. Jamming of Voice of America and Radio Liberty native language broadcasts continued.

Failure by the Soviet Union and the Eastern European nations to improve their generally poor record of compliance with the provisions of the Helsinki and Madrid Accords was especially regrettable in view of the commitments they made in Madrid in September 1983. The United States, our allies, and other CSCE participating states have responded with private diplomatic efforts and public diplomacy aimed at increasing Eastern adherence to the Helsinki principles. In the CSCE follow-on meetings such as the Athens meeting on Peaceful Settlements, the Venice Seminar on Cooperation in the Mediterranean, and the Stockholm CDE, the United States raised compliance issues related to the subject matter under the discussion. The U.S. has also reaffirmed on these and other occasions its firm commitment to the principle of balanced progress in the security and humanitarian dimensions of the CSCE process.

The Helsinki and Madrid Accords are not juridically binding documents, and there are no enforcement mechanisms to ensure compliance. The United States will continue to exert political and moral pressure for improved performance, and will call to account those who fail to live up to their commitments in the Helsinki process.

CSCE Meeting Schedule

The final Madrid document provides for another followup meeting in Vienna beginning in November 1986. A series of supplementary meetings will also be held between those in Madrid and Vienna. The United States will use these meetings to keep the Helsinki issues alive and before the public, in an effort to strengthen the Helsinki process. The meetings are:

- o The first stage of a Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) which commenced in Stockholm on January 17, 1984, and was preceded by a 3-week preparatory meeting in Helsinki;
- o An experts' meeting on the peaceful settlement of disputes in Athens which commenced March 21 and ended April 30, 1984;
- o A seminar on Mediterranean cooperation in Venice, October 16-26, 1984;
- o A Cultural Forum in Budapest, commencing October 15, 1985 and preceded by a preparatory conference in November 1984;
- o An experts' meeting on human rights in Ottawa, starting May 7, 1985, preceded by a preparatory meeting in April 1985;
- o A commemorative meeting in Helsinki in 1985 marking the 10th anniversary of the signing of the Final Act;
- o An experts' meeting on human contacts in Bern, Switzerland, commencing April 16, 1986, after a preparatory meeting beginning April 12; and
- o The third followup meeting of the CSCE in Vienna starting November 4, 1986.

The Stockholm CDE Continues

The Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, mandated by the Madrid CSCE review meeting, opened in Stockholm January 17, 1984. The mandate calls for it to negotiate measures which are militarily significant, politically binding, verifiable and apply to all of the CSCE area, including the entire European portion of the Soviet Union. Ambassador James E. Goodby is Head of the U.S Delegation.

The NATO Approach

During the period under review, the NATO countries have continued to focus discussion on the package of concrete measures they introduced in the first round. It is designed to increase mutual understanding and reduce the risk of surprise attack. It fulfills the requirements of the mandate and builds upon the confidence-building measures adopted as part of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975. It provides for:

- o mutual exchanges of information about the organization and location of the significant military units of all participating states;

- o exchanges of annual forecasts of planned military exchanges;

- o mandatory notification 45 days in advance of out-of-garrison military activities involving 6,000 or more personnel (in the Final Act, only major military maneuvers involving 25,000 or more troops must be notified, no more than 21 days in advance);

- o mandatory invitation of observers of all participating states to all notifiable activities (in the Final Act, invitation of observers is voluntary);

- o specific arrangements to monitor and verify compliance with these CSBMs; and

- o improvement of the facilities for communication among the 35 participant states.

The Eastern Response

At the beginning, the East sought to use the conference as a forum for denouncing NATO INF deployments. At the beginning of the second round, the Soviet Union tabled a set of proposals, some of which fall outside the mandate for the CDE. It features:

- o a non-use of force treaty;

- o a no-first-use of nuclear weapons pledge;

- o a ban on chemical weapons use in Europe;

- o regional nuclear weapons free zones in Europe, including the Balkans and the Baltic;

- o reductions in military spending; and

- o unspecified improvements in the confidence-building measures agreed upon in the Helsinki Final Act.

Presidential Statement

In response to the Soviet interest in a non-use of force agreement, President Reagan stated on June 4 in Dublin:

We must translate the idea into actions which build effective barriers against the use of force in Europe. If the Soviet Union will agree to such concrete actions, which other countries in the Stockholm Conference seem prepared to accept, this would be an important step forward in creating a more peaceful world. If discussions on reaffirming the principle not to use force, a principle in which we believe so deeply, will bring the Soviet Union to negotiate agreements which will give concrete new meaning to that principle, we will gladly enter into such discussions.

Rounds Two and Three

The second round opened May 8 and ended July 6. Much of this round focused on attempts to reach agreement on procedures for establishment of working groups in the conference. Near the end of the round the United States and its Allies agreed to a compromise put forward by Sweden and other neutral and non-aligned states which would have resolved the procedural issue. The Soviets refused to join the consensus, although they stated that the Swedish compromise should form the basis for additional procedural negotiations.

The third round began September 11 and was scheduled to end October 12. The West sought to raise the debate above procedural questions and to initiate a genuine dialogue on substantive issues. The Soviet Union had not yet responded to the President's Dublin speech in a concrete fashion, and did not engage in a detailed discussion of the NATO package of confidence-building measures.

Bilateral Contacts

Ambassador Goodby visited Moscow April 29-30 at the invitation of his Soviet counterpart, Ambassador Oleg Grinevsky, for consultations between the first and second

rounds. After the second round, Ambassador Grinevsky visited Washington August 21-22 at Ambassador Goodby's invitation for further bilateral consultations. Ambassador Goodby described the discussions in both instances as cordial, substantive and useful.

Ambassador Goodby has actively pursued additional bilateral consultations. Prior to the third round, he visited Romania, Yugoslavia, East Germany and Hungary for discussions with officials in those countries. He has also visited a number of Western countries, including France, Norway, Finland and the Federal Republic of Germany.

Prospects for the Future

The West hopes that serious negotiations in Stockholm will lead to an agreement which will make a significant contribution to European security. The fourth round was scheduled to be held between November 6 and December 14.

Athens Conference on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes

Delegates from the 35 CSCE participating states met in Athens March 21-April 30 to try to develop a framework for the peaceful settlement of international disputes under a mandate from the Madrid review conference. An earlier meeting on this subject was held in Montreux, Switzerland in 1978.

The goal of the United States, the West Europeans and most of the neutral and non-aligned states was an agreement containing a political undertaking by all 35 states committing them to go to a conciliation commission if a quarrel with another country could not be settled in direct talks. The Soviet Union and its allies at first refused to consider anything but direct negotiations. They conceded the principle of third party involvement only in the final week of the conference and then added conditions that the West found unacceptable.

The Eastern position was that international disputes should be settled by direct negotiations -- a system they call "consultation." The neutral countries, especially Switzerland and Austria, argued that small countries forced into negotiations with the Soviet Union could be bullied, and they insisted instead on some system in accordance with which quarreling states would be obliged to go to a conciliation commission that would give all concerned a fair hearing and a fair judgment. The U.S. proposed a detailed document providing

for several levels of third party conciliation and mediation.

After six weeks the conference agreed on a brief report stating that discussions were held and that there was particular emphasis on how to include a third party element. It was left to the next CSCE review conference, scheduled to take place in Vienna in 1986, to decide whether this subject should receive further treatment within the CSCE process.

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CHAPTER TWO

IMPLEMENTATION OF BASKET I:
QUESTIONS RELATING TO SECURITY IN EUROPE

The first section or "basket" of the Final Act has two main parts. The first part is a declaration of ten principles guiding relations among states. It sets forth generally accepted precepts of international behavior which the CSCE participating states agree to observe in their relations with one another, as well as with other states. The second part of Basket I is devoted to security issues. Here the participating states endorse certain confidence-building measures that are designed to remove some of the secrecy surrounding military activities; they also make certain more general pledges with respect to the importance of arms control and disarmament.

DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES GUIDING RELATIONS AMONG STATES

There are ten principles in the declaration of principles guiding relations among states in the Final Act:

Principle One. Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty;

Principle Two. Refraining from the threat or use of force;

Principle Three. Inviolability of frontiers;

Principle Four. Territorial integrity of states;

Principle Five. Peaceful settlement of disputes;

Principle Six. Nonintervention in internal affairs;

Principle Seven. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion, or belief;

Principle Eight. Equal rights and self-determination of peoples;

Principle Nine. Cooperation among states;

Principle Ten. Fulfillment in good faith of obligations under international law.

The Madrid Concluding Document contains complementary principles which strengthen and extend the Final Act. These include pledges to: take effective measures against terrorism; prevent territories from being used for terrorist activities; assure constant, tangible progress in the exercise of human rights; ensure the right of the individual to know and act upon his rights and freedoms; ensure individual freedom to practice and profess religion; consult with religious organizations; favorably consider applications for registration by religious communities; ensure respect for the rights of national minorities; ensure the right of workers freely to establish and join trade unions, and the right of trade unions freely to pursue their activities and other rights.

Implementation of Principles

Although the Eastern countries gave considerable publicity to their signing of the Final Act and more recently the Madrid document, the Eastern record of compliance with the Helsinki principles has deteriorated in important respects, especially in the Soviet Union. The United States remains dissatisfied with the implementation record of the Eastern countries so far, particularly with regard to Principle Seven. This principle calls on the participating states to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of thought, conscience, religion, or belief.

The following section provides a detailed survey of implementation of the Helsinki principles and related provisions of the Madrid document. It treats specific cases in an illustrative rather than comprehensive fashion. Lack of information detailing abuses in a given country may not indicate their absence.

Bulgaria

In general, there has been little improvement in Bulgarian compliance with the Helsinki Final Act and the Madrid Concluding Document during the past six months. As stated in the previous report, the government of Bulgaria continues to comply with Principles one through five. They also complied generally with Principle six: there has not been an identifiable incident involving Bulgarian intervention in the internal affairs of another state during the reporting period under review.

The Bulgarian record on respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms continues to be abysmal. Bulgaria simply

neither respects nor encourages"...the effective exercise of civil, political, economic, social, cultural, and other rights and freedoms...." Allegations of Bulgarian involvement in the attempt to assassinate the Pope have contributed to the deterioration in U.S.-Bulgarian relations.

Bulgaria has no organized political opposition. An elaborate system of informers directed by the party and security apparatus monitors Bulgarian society in search of signs of dissidence or other unacceptable behavior. Those who speak or take action against the party are subject to arrest and detention, and are dealt with swiftly.

This period witnessed a significant increase in asylum seekers. Most of these asylum seekers stated that the Bulgarian government would take unspecified harmful action against them if the Embassy were to turn them back onto the street. In one case involving an East German citizen, the militia came out in force to apprehend him when he was persuaded to leave a western Embassy.

The Bulgarian government continued to persecute dissidents. During the period, the U.S. Embassy received subtle threats from the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the father of Valodya Nakov could possibly "accost an Embassy officer on the street" if the Embassy did not stop dealing with Valodya. The issue became moot, however, when, according to his wife, Valodya Nakov began a four-year prison sentence in early September.

In the area of religious freedom, the state limits the activity of all of Bulgaria's religions. Orthodoxy, Islam, and Judaism are the only "recognized" religions, but several Protestant sects are allowed to operate in Bulgaria well. As the country's historically and culturally dominant religion, Bulgarian Orthodoxy enjoys the most favored position of all the religions.

The Muslims are divided among the Turkish minority, the Pomaks (ethnic Bulgarians whose ancestors adopted Islam during the period of Turkish rule), and gypsies. Bulgaria's large Turkish minority accounts for most of the country's 800,000 or more nominal Muslims. The Turkish minority is mistrusted and discriminated against by the government. Access to higher education is restricted, the group is under-represented in responsible government and party positions, and over-represented in labor details in the armed forces. The Pomaks are subject to periodic government campaigns to persuade

them to give up their Muslim names, religion, and way of life. Because the birthrate of Bulgaria's Muslims is much higher than that of its Slavic population, the Muslim proportion of the population is rising. Following heavy post-war emigration, only about 5,000 Jews, mostly elderly, remain.

During this period there were no evident signs of Bulgarian efforts to promote greater freedom for religious or ethnic minorities. To the contrary, Muslims, particularly Turkish ones, have experienced an even greater downturn in their ability to practice their religion. There was an apparent increase in the confiscations of religious texts. There was also an increase in the forced changing of Turkish names to Bulgarian ones. Some Turks who live in the Kurdzhali area near Bulgaria's border with Turkey moved to the Ruse area in Northern Bulgaria to escape discrimination and threats by Bulgarian officials in Kurdzhali.

Although the major religions remains heavily controlled and regulated, a religious underground exists among Protestants and receives religious texts from the outside. There was a slight increase in contacts between the Vatican and the Bulgarian government but these contacts were probably the product of the Bulgarian government's desire for better press following allegations of Bulgarian involvement in the Papal assassination attempt.

Bulgarian workers are still not free to establish their own trade unions. Trade unions remain under the complete control of the party and government.

The government of Bulgaria does little to promote cooperation among states (principle nine) and does not, in our view fulfill a number of its obligations under international law (principle ten). Rather than seek cooperation among peoples, the Bulgarian government continuously spreads virulent propaganda blaming the West for all the world's ills.

Czechoslovakia

Czechoslovakian implementation of the Helsinki and Madrid principles remains fundamentally flawed, particularly on Principle Seven human rights issues. There has been no observable change in Czechoslovak performance regarding Principles One through Six, Nine, and Ten. Czechoslovakia's compliance with Principle VII, concerning respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms including freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, remains fundamentally flawed,

and has shown no improvement during the last six months.

The government's implementation of the Helsinki Final Act continues to be monitored by a small group of private Czechoslovak citizens who are signatories of "Charter 77" and members of the Committee for the Defense of the Unjustly Persecuted (VONS). The regime's attitude towards its citizens' efforts to monitor CSCE compliance was graphically demonstrated in May 1984, when a charge of "incitement" (paragraph 100 of the Czechoslovak criminal code) was registered against Jan Pukalik, because "the accused is directly linked to the signatories of Charter '77." Documents published by Vons and Charter '77 have shown that the Czechoslovak regime remains one of the most repressive in Eastern Europe.

The previous report noted that in March 1984, the Czechoslovak government had for the first time imposed a regime of "protective supervision" against two individuals (Ladislav Lis and Jan Litomisky) who had served prison terms for political dissidence. Under this regime, both men were obliged to report daily at a specified time, seven days a week, to the police station in their place of residence. Tardiness of more than five minutes is punished, and a third violation of "protective supervision" may lead to an additional sentence of two-to-five years in prison. In addition, the men must provide information on all employment and salaries, allow their homes to be searched at any time the police choose (including all persons found in the homes), observe very tight curfews, and obtain prior permission to travel outside their places of residence. The imposition of such a regime (intended for habitual violent offenders) against persons who have never committed a violent crime, is clearly a form of harassment, and an infringement of fundamental freedoms.

On May 29, Ladislav Lis was sentenced to a three month jail term for violating the terms of his "protective supervision,". On August 10 he was returned to "liberty". But he remains under "protective supervision" and will be liable to an additional two-to-five year jail sentence for any further infraction.

Two other political prisoners, Frantisek Starek (who was released in May after serving almost two years) and Jiri Gruntorad (who received an additional 14-month jail sentence in June 1984) were also sentenced to terms of "protective supervision" of two years and three years, respectively. As noted in our previous report, Mr. Gruntorad, who had been serving a four-year prison term imposed in July 1981 (on

paragraph 98 of the criminal code, "subversion") was charged last spring with "false testimony" (para 174/1) for having accused prison guards of severely beating him. On June 4 he was sentenced to 14 months additional imprisonment" under the strictest regime on this new charge, despite conflicting evidence from the prison guards present at the incident.

Another trial, which took place in May 1984, concerned Drahomira Fajtlova, a Charter '77 signatory, who had been arrested a year earlier and charged with "incitement" (para 100/1) for possessing "anti-state" literature. The case was first suspended, but the charges were raised again, for no apparent reason, and Mrs. Fajtlova was sentenced to a twelve-month suspended sentence in May 1984. Such seemingly arbitrary suspension and reopening of cases is clearly intended to intimidate those who insist on exercising the human rights embodied in CSCE Principle Seven.

Another insidious form of intimidation has been the denial of the opportunity for higher education to the children of individuals who engage in political or religious activity which the state opposes. During the past six months, the children of several prominent charter signatories, including Jiri Dienstbier, Vaclav Benda, and Jiri Hajek, have all faced obstacles in seeking to pursue secondary and higher education in Czechoslovakia or abroad, despite excellent academic records. After repeated refusals, Mr. Dienstbier's daughter Monika was finally permitted to accept a university scholarship in Austria, but only under the condition that she renounce her Czechoslovak citizenship.

Czechoslovak compliance with Principles VII and VIII was further diminished during the reporting period by the arrest and continued detention of Miklos Duray, a leading human rights activist for the Hungarian minority in Slovakia. Mr. Duray, who was campaigning to ensure the maintenance of the educational rights of the Hungarian minority, was arrested on May 10 and charged under paragraph 112 ("harming the interests of the republic abroad)". No trial date has been set.

There remain serious shortcomings in the Czechoslovak government's observance of Principle VII and its commitment under the Madrid Concluding Document, to recognize and respect the freedom of individuals to profess or practice their religious beliefs. On the positive side, the reporting period saw the investiture of Rabbi Daniel Mayer, Czechoslovakia's first resident Rabbi since 1970. In addition, there was some increase in the number of first-year students permitted to

enroll in the Roman Catholic seminary in Bratislava in 1984 (from 30 last year to 43 this year), although many candidates were reportedly rejected for political reasons.

As noted in our previous report, however, the Czechoslovak government continues to make considerable efforts to discourage religious practice, particularly among the young. The government's nervousness about unsanctioned religious activity was evident from the reported instances of detention and harassment, directed against individuals organizing and/or signing petitions inviting the Pope to visit Czechoslovakia in 1985.

Although the Czechoslovak constitution states that there is freedom of religious practices, in reality this right is strictly limited by a variety of regulations. A recent example of state interference in religious activities came in August, when the editorial staff of Cesky Bratr, the official publication of the Evangelical Church of the Czech Brethren, was dismissed for refusing to suspend publication of one issue of the magazine. The printing and distribution of unauthorized religious materials is treated even more harshly, and those apprehended are liable to criminal prosecution.

An additional restriction on religious liberty is the requirement that priests and ministers must be licensed by the state, and the licenses may be withdrawn at any time. In August 1984, for instance, the license of Adam Rucki of Trinec was revoked, without any official explanation. Priests and ministers who continue to follow their calling, despite revocation of their licenses, are liable to criminal prosecution.

Religious education of children and intending clergy remains strictly controlled, and unofficial gatherings such as privately celebrated masses, prayer meetings, or educational sessions are forbidden. In at least one recent instance, a priest (Father Joseph Kajnek) was prosecuted under paragraph 178 ("obstructing state supervision over churches and religious societies") for showing slides and other educational materials to children in the church sacristy. Father Kajnek was sentenced to a year's suspended sentence and had his priest's license revoked.

Virtually all workers in Czechoslovakia are enrolled in the officially-sponsored trade union movement, the revolutionary workers' movement (ROH). Intellectuals such as artists, writers, and others are organized in professional associations

which are under the control of the Communist Party. No organizations which are not approved by the state are allowed to exist in Czechoslovakia; unauthorized trade unions are also not permitted. Therefore, workers are not allowed "freely to establish" unions, nor are they allowed freely not to be members of the regime-sponsored workers' organization. Rights of unions--such as the right to strike-- do not exist, but on occasion workers' organizations within industries or factories have been able to gain some improvements in working conditions through negotiation with management.

Czechoslovakia publicly maintains its opposition to all forms of international terrorism. To what extent official policy and actions mirror this public stance is impossible to say. Occasionally, Western press reports carry stories alleging that there are terrorist training camps on Czechoslovak territory. Such stories surfaced in Italy in 1981, for example, and were debated in the Italian parliament. Others, like author Claire Sterling, have made similar allegations. The secrecy surrounding alleged terrorist training activities in this country is virtually impenetrable.

German Democratic Republic

There have been no changes in German Democratic Republic (GDR) practices regarding the first six principles. The GDR has respected the rights inherent in sovereignty; not used or threatened force; not violated frontiers; respected territorial integrity of states; not settled disputes by other than peaceful means; and there is not clear proof of GDR intervention in internal affairs of other countries, although the government continues its active support of Soviet activities in developing countries.

The government's emigration policy continued to be a major focus of interest during this reporting period. Approximately 16,000 East Germans received exit visas between April 1 and October 1, 1984. The vast majority of these emigrants were beneficiaries of the surge in exit permits which occurred in the first four months of 1984 (see the sixteenth semi-annual report). However, since July only about 600-1,000 GDR exit visas have been granted monthly, a figure consistent with the average monthly rate of past years.

GDR leader Erich Honecker announced on October 5, 1983, that the GDR would remove automatic shooting devices from the GDR-FRG border, and the GDR has proceeded to remove some of these devices during this reporting period. However, a

significant portion of the border area is still equipped with these devices. It is not known how many people attempting flight from the GDR have been killed or wounded by these devices, which fire ballbearings and shrapnel over a 25 meter area when triggered by trip wires.

The government has continued to restrict the fundamental freedoms of thought, conscience, religion, and belief among its people. (Principle Seven) The activities of the Ministry of State Security's secret police are pervasive. Without judicial controls, the police do not hesitate to install listening devices, open private mail, or interrogate whomever they choose. With the exception of church-sponsored events held on church grounds, individuals are not allowed to organize events without official approval, and even groups meeting on church grounds have encountered difficulties with GDR authorities. The West German based International Society for Human Rights (IGFM) estimates that there are 6,000 political prisoners in the GDR, while the 13th of August working group, a West Berlin human rights group, puts this figure at 9,500.

Self determination by means of democratic elections remains impossible in the GDR. Every five years GDR citizens are presented with a list of candidates, most unopposed, for the "People's Chamber" (Volkskammer) and various local assemblies (Volksvertretungen). Though a 1976 election law states that voting will be secret, it is not in fact always so, and East Germans who refuse to vote or who reject entire ballots may suffer reprisals.

There were numerous examples of GDR violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms during this reporting period, including the following:

-- Fifteen bus drivers were arrested in Jena after they demonstrated for exit visas.

-- Four members of an independent church-connected peace group in Gera were sentenced to prison terms under paragraph 218 of the criminal code. This paragraph prohibits "organizing to pursue illegal aims."

-- Songwriter Karlheinz Bomberg, arrested in February 1984 after passing the texts of some of his songs to Westerners, was given a 30 month suspended sentence for violation of paragraph 219 of the criminal code. This paragraph prohibits transmitting materials of a derogatory nature to the GDR to a foreigner.

-- Four members of a church-connected discussion group, the Weimar Montagskreise, were given prison terms of up to 32 months for "prejudicing state and social activity" and "illegal association."

-- A July 1 decree provided for the levying of a 500 mark fine for "disturbances of the socialist community life." Liable to prosecution under this law are those who "organize, support, or in some other way participate in a gathering which is likely to flout society's interests or to adversely affect the public order and security," and those who "evinced or encourage in a demonstrative way a disrespect for laws and other legal regulations, or national or social interest," or "make use of themes, symbols, or other signs in a way which goes against governmental or social interests." Though the effect and degree of enforcement of this law have not yet been seen, it is obvious that this decree can be used against those who participate in unofficial peace groups or display the banned "swords into plowshares" emblem.

Open and active adherence to religious beliefs often resulted in effective disqualification for preferred job and educational opportunities. The state monitored statements and writings by church figures and regulated the printing and distribution of religious materials. The GDR continued to prohibit Jehovah's Witnesses and Christian Scientists from practicing their faith.

-- Foreign diplomats in the GDR are effectively protected by GDR security forces. However, the GDR reportedly continued to provide military training to members of groups which have been associated with terrorism in the past. The GDR continued to limit sharply access to Western missions. The presence of security forces around some of these missions served to intimidate and, at times, to prevent visitors. The West German-based International Society for Human Rights (IGFM) reported in August that since January 1, 1984, more than 400 East Germans had been arrested after visiting the FRG mission and that the majority of those arrested were still in prison. The Embassy recently received information that four East Germans were arrested after visiting the U.S. Embassy. One of the four was expelled to the West after being imprisoned for seven months. To our knowledge, the other three are still in prison.

-- Non-government controlled unions are prohibited, and strikes are not permitted in the GDR. Union assemblies are

rigidly controlled by the state. GDR unions are a controlled political arm of the government and are used to carry out official and party policy.

Hungary

Hungary's record of compliance with the provisions of the Final Act, compared to other Soviet Bloc states, remained generally better during the reporting period. At the Stockholm CDE conference and on a number of other occasions Hungarian officials expressed continued support for the CSCE process as well as for improved ties with Western countries. A consensus policy of economic reform remains the key to the country's relatively tolerant and relaxed domestic policies and cultural atmosphere. The party understands that Western perceptions that Hungary is a country trying to improve its Final Act implementation record in all fields encourages Western governments to assist Hungarian economic efforts. Although Hungary continues to have a relatively tolerant record in human rights and related social policies, there are limits on the extent to which fundamental freedoms can be exercised, and continued instances of government harassment of dissidents.

During this reporting period, Hungary continued to seize opportunities to improve its ties with Western countries and to encourage other Warsaw Pact countries to pursue a similar course. The most notable issue among the smaller Warsaw Pact countries was the question of whether or not GDR leader Honecker would travel to the Federal Republic of Germany. While the trip was within the purview of international commentary, articles in the Hungarian press sided with Honecker making the trip, often invoking the spirit of the Helsinki Final Act. The highlight of bilateral political activity with the U.S. was the successful visit to Washington by Janos Nagy, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs. Other visits included travel by the Hungarian National Bank's First Deputy President Fekete, EXIM Bank President Draper, and a high-level team from the Secretary's Policy Planning Staff which held first-ever discussions with a range of Hungarian officials.

In one instance the Ministry of Interior refused to allow dissident intellectual Gaspar Miklos Tamas to study in New York unless he agreed to accept emigration papers which would prohibit his return following study abroad. Other prominent dissidents, such as Tamas' fellow Samizdat writer Miklos Haraszti went to and returned from New York without incident.

Several dissidents were detained or imprisoned during this period. On May 23 the members of the CRG rock group, all unskilled workers, received prison terms of up to two years on the basis of the lyrics of some of their songs. The charges were that the lyrics were "incitement against the constitutional order of the Hungarian People's Republic and against its international alliances...rooted in nihilism and anarchism or in other words in the desire to create hatred. Also, on June 8 dissident economist Gyorgy Krasso was detained for nine hours in connection with an interview he gave to a Samizdat publication in December 1983. Even Gabor Demszky, who had a nasty scuffle with the police last year which resulted in his being sent to the hospital and later being convicted of assaulting a policeman, continued his dissident activities, including his small "AB Press" operation, and was not interfered with by the authorities.

In the arena of press freedom, the Samizdat publication called Beszelo finally reappeared in July. The delay in its reappearance was due to police confiscation of a duplicating machine and some material for the December edition. Subsequent to the dissemination of Beszelo no. 8 in July, editions no. 9 and 10 were published, as well as editions 6-7 of a new journal Hirmondo. The only case of overt censorship during the reporting period took place in August and pertained to literary monthly review Mozgo Vilag. Despite the fact that the authorities fired the editorial board in toto last year on the grounds that it was taking on anti-marxist tones, the August (no. 8) issue was ordered destroyed because it contained some reprints of material written by Leon Trotsky. An August issue, without Trotsky, appeared in the middle of September.

A specialized form of dissent continued in the Catholic Church. It centers around the "basic community" movement, which has charged that the Church hierarchy is "collaborationist." The hierarchy continues to receive support from the Vatican. Cardinal Casaroli has sent several communications calling upon "basic community" members to obey the hierarchy. This has made it easier for the Hungarian government to take no action against church members of the "basic community" movement. Nevertheless, tension increased because of the pacifist activity of several priests and their lay supporters. During the summer of 1984 at least four more persons were sentenced to prison for refusing induction into the military on religious grounds. Approximately a dozen young people are believed to be serving jail sentences ranging up to 3 years for refusing military service. We are aware of no new

instances of clashes between the dissenting "basic community" movement and either the Church hierarchy or state during the reporting period.

The highlight of church-state relations occurred when the World Lutheran Federation met in Budapest in late July and elected Hungarian presiding Bishop Zoltan Kaldy as President of the Lutheran World Federation. The general impression the church delegates had of Hungarian society was positive, although some of them charged that the Lutheran church hierarchy is basically "collaborationist" in nature.

A second positive development in church-state arena was the number of conferences held in Budapest this summer addressing the holocaust and issues of interest to the Jewish community. Last May, the Hungarian authorities quietly liberalized their administrative procedures concerning Hungarians who wish to travel to Israel and for Israelis wishing to come to Hungary. The Hungarian authorities now treat Israeli visa applicants in the same manner in which they handle Americans wishing to visit Hungary. (Following the June 1967 war and the subsequent rupture in diplomatic relations, Hungary only allowed Israelis in the country if they were visiting relatives, and applied the same condition on Hungarians wishing to travel to Israel.) Under the new policy, any Israeli citizen is free to visit Hungary. In addition, two Hungarian delegations officially representing the local Jewish community paid visits to Israel this year.

There are reports that Hungarian authorities at border-crossings have noticeably increased effective measures to prevent Hungary from being used for the purpose of perpetrating terrorist activities.

Poland

During the spring and summer of 1984 the Polish government sought to demonstrate that the martial law period had become history. On the international scene this was manifested in General Jaruzelski's May visit to Moscow and in a series of visits to Warsaw by leaders of socialist countries (Ceausescu of Romania, Zhivkov of Bulgaria, Chan Si of the Heng Samrin Regime in Cambodia, Kim il Sung of North Korea, and Dos Santos of Angola), who emphasized respect for Poland's leadership and a generally shared world-view. The celebration in July of the fortieth anniversary of the founding of the Polish People's Republic served a similar function, attracting a host of Warsaw

Pact notables, most prominently Soviet Premier Tikhonov (but no party chairmen or heads of state). The official Polish media gave prominent play to these events and also stressed Poland's active multilateral undertakings, especially its participation in the Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe. Scheduled visits by various Western leaders as well as a government agreement on debt rescheduling with its commercial bank creditors round out a picture of gradual international "normalization."

Domestically, the Polish government continued to proclaim its desire for national reconciliation while insisting on the need to maintain law and order, and continuing to deny certain fundamental human rights and freedoms. A number of disturbing incidents of threats, attacks and kidnappings perpetrated against Solidarity supporters occurred during the reporting period.

The government's highly publicized consultations with broad elements of society and the related activities of the Pron, the Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth, generally failed to capture the popular imagination. The first elections of the postmartial law period were held in June, for local-level deliberative bodies, the People's Councils. The elections were preceded by a round of public appearances and media presentations of various candidates. Controversy remains over the percentage of eligible voters who actually participated (the Solidarity underground called for a boycott). It appears that a majority of eligible voters did cast a ballot, but the turnout was well below previous levels in such elections, despite vigorous government efforts to persuade citizens to participate.

The average Pole realizes that his or her government permits debate within certain parameters. Thus, one can - as the media often do - complain about a wide range of subjects, from the difficulties of daily life and the arbitrariness or inefficiency of clerks and minor bureaucrats to significant issues of public policy which do not touch upon the leading role of the Communist Party or upon Poland's relationships with its allies.

During much of this reporting period, the government maintained strong pressure on political activists and civil rights lawyers who sought to defend them. The officially admitted number of politically-motivated persons jailed grew from 427 in March to 652 in July, with arrests based on charges

ranging from illegal publication activities to treason. A judicial decision in early July, absolving police officials from responsibility in the beating death of Grzegorz Przemysk, son of a noted political activist, was widely considered a "whitewash" and significantly undermined public confidence in the stated commitment of the Jaruzelski government to the rule of law. Soon thereafter the trial began of the four long-detained leaders of KOR, the Workers Defense Committee.

At this point the Polish government, in conjunction with the earlier-mentioned fortieth anniversary celebration, enacted an extensive conditional amnesty covering most offenses against the criminal statutes and against martial law regulations. The amnesty decree was welcomed by virtually all elements in Polish society as a significant step forward. Under the amnesty the seven imprisoned senior Solidarity leaders and the four leaders of KOR were released. While the government appears to have implemented the letter of the amnesty decree, the results caused some disappointment. The government announced on August 24, at the end of the central phase of the amnesty, that 630 of 652 politically-motivated persons in jail had been freed. The government explained that two--Bogdan Lis and Piotr Mierzejewski - were still detained for investigation of charges of treason, an offense not covered by the amnesty. According to the government, the remaining twenty, who were not named, were still in prison because of convictions for non-political offenses, or for investigation of such offenses. Their political acts had, however, been amnestied. The release of Lis and Mierzejewski is considered by some elements in Polish society as the needed capstone to the amnesty before the government can be seen to have created conditions warranting positive gestures from outside.

Activists released under the amnesty were cautioned against further political activity; several were formally and even publicly admonished for their subsequent actions, and two, Wladyslaw Frasnyniuk and Jozef Pinor, were sentenced to two months in jail on misdemeanor charges of disturbing the public order during peaceful demonstrations in Wroclaw marking the fourth anniversary of the Gdansk Accords. The government continues to issue strong warnings against "recidivism."

In the wake of the amnesty decree, the Council of Chairmen of the official trade unions called for an "amnesty in the workplace," covering persons fined or dismissed for infractions of enterprise regulations. The actual results of the campaign, which received strong government endorsement, are as yet unclear, especially as it might affect political activists.

As of early September 1984 the government claimed that the new unions have attracted 4.5 million members, grouped into 115 national federations and over 20,000 enterprise unions. This represents about 45 per cent of the peak membership of Solidarity, although an estimated third of the members of the new unions are pensioners. Apparently many have joined the unions because they control dispensation of such fringe benefits as subsidized vacations.

Official trade unions recently called for an amnesty for people who had received administrative punishment for breaking rules at their places of work. The government seemed to endorse this idea, which would entail primarily cancellation of fines and revocation of suspensions. However, most people fired from work for Solidarity activities have not yet been rehired in their former positions. Fragmentary information suggests that many such persons have found other employment.

The new official unions have been more active than their pre-Solidarity predecessors in expressing workers' concerns on such issues as wages and working conditions. The unions' participation in consultations over the 1985 economic plan has been highly publicized. Still, the unions' self-proclaimed independence continues to be regarded with deep skepticism or outright disbelief by the majority of the labor force, including many of the new unions' own members.

A commission of inquiry of the International Labor Organization (ILO) reported in June that several Polish government actions since the imposition of martial law have conflicted with Poland's obligations under ILO conventions, particularly the convention on freedom of association and the convention on the right to organize and collective bargaining. Poland is a party to these international conventions. The report describes direct repression of Solidarity leaders and members and decries the government's decision to dissolve Solidarity in October 1982 as a violation of the principle established in ILO conventions that only the members of a union may dissolve it. At present, Polish workers are still denied the legal right to join or form unions of their choice, and are limited to membership in the official unions permitted under the October 1982 legislation.

Officially, the government subscribes to the principle of equality for all citizens, regardless of ethnic, religious, or national background, age or sex. Byelorussians and Ukrainans

religious force in Poland. A substantial majority of Poles of all ages and social groups participate regularly in Catholic religious services. The Orthodox church is the second largest denomination, with about 500,000 members. Approximately a dozen other denominations exist in Poland, and the government allows them to practice their faith freely as long as they avoid activities construed by the government as political.

Church-state relations have improved over the last six months. There have been no major church-state disputes since the compromise settlement of the last round of the "war of the crosses," which involved attempts by some local officials, over the protest of students, to remove crosses from public schools. While areas of tension remain, particularly regarding alleged political activities by some priests, progress has been made on many issues, particularly the Church aid plan for private agriculture. Contacts between government and church representatives are frequent and have involved such topics as politically active priests, the agriculture fund, political prisoners, and building permits. No apparent progress has been made during the last six months on proposed draft legislation concerning the legal status of the Church in Poland.

In the area of trade union freedoms, Solidarity and all other unions were delegalized with the passage of a new trade union law on October 8, 1982. Under this law Polish workers are allowed to join only newly established official unions. Each workplace employing thirty or more people is entitled to form such a union (but membership must reach fifty within a specified period of time, and remain at least at that level.) Enterprise unions from factories performing similar kinds of work are allowed to join together into national federations. The 1982 law calls for the setting up of a central council of federations in 1985, and steps in that direction are already being taken.

As presently constituted the official unions are not an effective substitute for Solidarity. During the fifteen months of Solidarity's legal existence, Poles were free to join the union of their choice and were able to associate into local union councils, national federations, and, of course, into Solidarity itself. The government has recently begun a large-scale media campaign to discredit the leadership of Solidarity and to divide them from rank-and-file solidarity members, who the government claims were misled by the union's "anti-socialist leaders." The government has also rejected appeals for a return to union pluralism, claiming that these appeals are merely a front for the creation of another anti-socialist political organization.

This initiative was the first in a series of steps in the post-amnesty period by the official trade unions, seeking to bolster their credibility as a spokesman for the workers. The union chairmen also criticized aspects of the 1985 economic plan, and they undertook to study and consult their membership on the creation of a more formal unified, nationwide trade union structure. Meanwhile, the leaders of Solidarity and the Church called upon the government to permit trade union pluralism and a true dialogue on matters of urgent social and economic concern.

Through this reporting period a strained dialogue between the government and the Roman Catholic church in Poland continued. In April a compromise on the question of crucifixes in schools and other public buildings was worked out, ending the "battle of the crosses." Church and government also discussed such key themes as the Church fund for private agriculture, the legal status of the Church, diplomatic relations between Poland and the Vatican, the status and condition of political prisoners and government allegations of political activities by some members of the clergy. Outspoken pro-Solidarity priests were the targets of threats and attacks in the official press.

Following is a more specific assessment of Polish implementation of the Final Act principles and related provisions of the Madrid concluding document.

In general, Poland's implementation of the first six principles has been satisfactory, although its interpretation of these principles was often distorted. For example, the government is critical of what it calls encroachment on its sovereignty (Principle One) and intervention in its internal affairs (Principle Six). Poland has invoked these principles when subjects such as union membership, church-state disputes, and political prisoners are presented in Western media as reflecting unfavorably on Polish human rights. In view of Polish commitments to abide by agreed principles in the Final Act and Madrid document, this position is unjustified.

Polish government statements supporting the peaceful settlement of disputes and deploring the use of force are in line with Soviet foreign policy positions. Thus, for example, Poland criticizes U.S. involvement in Central America, but not Soviet use of force in Afghanistan.

The major development in the field of human rights in

Poland over the last six months was the announcement on July 22, in conjunction with the 40th anniversary of communist Poland, of a broad but conditional amnesty including individuals who had been imprisoned for politically-motivated crimes. The July 22nd amnesty was a significant step forward in Poland's internal life. All this notwithstanding, the Polish government has institutionalized certain ways of circumscribing opposition activities in the post-martial law period. Some of these provisions, such as the parasite law, have not yet been used against the opposition. Possibly as a warning of the limits of the government's tolerance, two Solidarity leaders released under the amnesty, Wladyslaw Fraszyniuk and Jozef Piniur, were rearrested and sentenced to two-month jail terms on the misdemeanor charge of attempting to disturb the peace in Wroclaw on August 31 the anniversary of the 1980 Gdansk accords.

Two major political trials took place in Poland before the amnesty. After a government-imposed delay, a trial was held in the case of the beating death of a young Warsaw student, Grzegorz Przemek (Przemek's mother, Barbara Sadowska, is a political activist of long standing). In a decision most Poles consider to be a travesty of justice, the court absolved the two policemen accused of beating Przemek and attributed all of the guilt to two ambulance attendants also charged in the case. Even the two convicted attendants were covered by the amnesty which went into effect shortly thereafter. Thus, no one will serve a prison term for the murder.

Second, after a two-and-a-half year wait, four leading activists of the Workers' Defense Committee (KOR) were tried on charges of attempting to overthrow the state. Proceedings were suspended because of the amnesty, which resulted in the release of the four defendants.

The Polish government allows significant religious freedom. Churches are free to preach, to publish and to proselytize, and the Catholic Church is allowed to broadcast Sunday mass over the state radio (as are Protestant faiths on a rotational basis). Before 1980, government permits for church construction were extremely difficult to obtain. Since 1980, approximately 1000 new churches have been built or are under construction. Despite this relative liberalism, persons who openly profess their religious beliefs often find it difficult to rise to leading positions in government or industry.

The Roman Catholic Church is the overwhelmingly predominant

differ linguistically from the majority, and many are members of the Orthodox or Uniate churches. While they have somewhat greater difficulty building churches, training clergy, and maintaining their languages, there is no legal discrimination against them. Whatever prejudice they may encounter appears to occur in the context of their small numbers and the region's history. There are small Protestant communities in Poland, as well as a very small group of Muslims. At present only a few thousand Jews, mostly elderly, remain in the country.

Women have equal rights under the law, and there is no evidence that discrimination based on sex is a serious problem. Traditional views of women as wives, mothers, and homemakers remain strong. A large majority of working age Polish women, including almost all those who live in rural areas, are employed. Many women have reached positions of responsibility in their professions but relatively few have high government or party posts.

The Polish government adopts a narrow and carefully legalistic approach to the question of international obligations, and in that context generally fulfills the letter of the obligations it assumes--as it understands those obligations. However, as noted above, certain Polish government actions have been found to be in conflict with ILO conventions. In public statements the government condemns terrorism. However, its pronouncements on this issue, as on territorial integrity, tend to be selective.

Romania

The government of Romania (GOR) complies with the first six Helsinki principles, and advocates them in international fora. In contrast, Romanian observance of basic human rights (Principle Seven) continued to be generally poor. Human rights and fundamental freedoms, many of which are guaranteed by the Romanian constitution and laws, are in fact severely limited by the government. The government and the ruling Communist Party tolerate no opposition. All forms of mass media are tightly controlled. Freedom of speech is restricted. Romanian citizens must obtain official permission to organize or assemble. This permission is granted only when the activity is determined to be in the interest of the government. Because Romania does not recognize the right of its citizens to emigrate, many of those that seek to leave face official harassment, confiscatory sale of property, loss of employment, eviction from their homes and other abuses. Those allowed to leave are often deprived of their Romanian citizenship,

becoming stateless persons. However, annual emigration of more than 18,000 to Israel, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the U.S. does take place.

Although it recognizes, supports and closely controls the activities of the 14 separate church organizations, the expression of religious belief is carefully monitored and discouraged by the Romanian government. Communist Party members -- virtually all persons with positions of responsibility are members of the party -- cannot practice a religious faith. Religious practitioners who go beyond the narrow limits defined by the government are sometimes sharply and brutally rebuffed.

During the reporting period, a significant and positive move was made by the Romanian government; Father Gheorghe Calciu-Dumitreasa, a Roman Orthodox priest imprisoned since 1979, and probably Romania's most celebrated current human rights case, was released August 20. At the same time, several denominations including Baptists were promised additional seminary matriculations, though the number remains far below levels of need. Similarly, the government promised construction of thirteen new Baptist churches throughout the country in the next two years. While these promises are hopeful signs, demolition orders due to rezoning and similar tactics continued to be used by the Romanian government to reestablish control over uncooperative congregations or to punish fractious religious groups or leaders. Harassment of religious leaders, especially some of the more activist pastors, also continues.

Self-determination of peoples is a point given much emphasis in official government pronouncements. In fact the government, faced with a Hungarian-speaking population which is the largest minority group in Eastern Europe outside of the U.S.S.R., as well as substantial German and numerous other smaller minority groups, has adopted measures the effect of which is clearly to discourage cultural and ethnic differentiation. Although the Romanian government theoretically supports "cultural autonomy", through the centralized school system, the state-owned mass media, and its official version of history the government in fact, ignores or belittles the significant contributions made by these minorities throughout Romanian history.

Despite Romania's active role at the Madrid review conference and its statements of support for the conference's concluding document, observance of the provisions of that

document has been at best mixed.

The security-conscious government has had little or no problem with acts of terrorism on its territory, but by its own admission the government does lend material support to a number of "national liberation" groups (the PLO, SWAPO, the ANC), some of which have diplomatic status in Bucharest and some of which use terrorism as an accepted means of furthering their aspirations.

The Madrid Concluding Document states that the participating states "will favorably consider applications by religious communities of believers practicing or prepared to practice their faith within the constitutional framework of their states, to be granted the status provided for in their respective countries for religious faiths, institutions, and organizations." Soon after Romania agreed to implement the provisions of the Madrid Concluding Document, Romania rejected attempts by the Church of the Latter-Day Saints to gain official recognition because "Romania already has enough churches." The Eastern-Rite Catholic, or Uniate church, banned in 1948, remains illegal. Church leaders petitioned the Madrid conference for reinstatement by the government of Romania, but there has been no discernible progress toward recognition.

Through a number of state and party structures, Romania maintains tight control over the nation's labor force. As in other socialist bloc states, trade unions are merely an extension of the party and the state. The last attempt to organize a free trade union here was brutally suppressed in 1978. Despite continued reports of labor unrest, the government security apparatus appears to be successful in stifling further attempts to organize similar new movements.

Soviet Union

The Soviet Union has continued to violate both the letter and the spirit of principles guiding relations between states as set forth in the Helsinki Final Act. Defying worldwide condemnation, the U.S.S.R. persists in its military occupation of Afghanistan and in its efforts to eradicate Afghan resistance by the brutal force of arms; and it continues to lend full support to the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea. These actions represent willful violations of the general principles outlined in the Final Act, including respect for the inviolability of frontiers, territorial integrity of states, and self-determination of peoples. In addition, the Soviet Union marked the first anniversary of its downing of a Korean

civilian airliner without warning on September 1, 1983, which resulted in the death of 269 people, by disclaiming its own responsibility for the tragedy. In doing so, the Soviet authorities continue to assert a right to destroy civilian aircraft which accidentally cross Soviet borders, if they so choose, without regard for loss of human lives. This position contravenes moral principles, as well as obligations under the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act, to make every effort to settle international problems by peaceful means.

Soviet performance in the field of human rights (Principle Seven) continued a deplorable decline throughout the six-month review period, despite the renewed commitment to respect "the universal significance of human rights and fundamental freedoms" undertaken one year ago in the Concluding Document of the Madrid CSCE Conference. The Madrid agreement stipulates that the 35 participating states "stress their determination to develop their laws and regulations in the field of civil, political, economic, social, cultural and other human rights and fundamental freedoms." Despite this undertaking, the Soviet authorities introduced in the months succeeding the conclusion of the Madrid agreement a series of new statutes that enable them to pursue more readily their continuing repression of dissidence, and of the free flow of information and ideas. These new statutes were documented in the previous (sixteenth) report on CSCE implementation.

During the current review period, the Soviet authorities further restricted fundamental freedoms by promulgating a decree effective July 1 that makes Soviet citizens liable to fines of up to 100 rubles for violating so-called "rules for stay in the U.S.S.R. by foreign citizens or stateless persons." This new rule specifies that Soviet citizens who render material assistance to foreigners in the form of "housing or means of transportation or...other services in violation of the established regulations" can be administratively fined. The new decree is part of a continuing campaign by Soviet authorities to put an end to contacts between Soviet citizens and foreigners if these have not been sanctioned by the authorities. This action seriously affects dissidents and human rights activists who desperately depend on foreign support. It is patently inconsistent with the CSCE principles and the human contacts provisions of the Helsinki and Madrid agreements.

This new Soviet decree on aiding foreigners coincided with an unprecedented campaign of harassment, primarily on the part of Leningrad authorities, aimed at discouraging contacts

between local citizens and foreigners. Numerous American tourists were subjected to searches, expulsions, physical abuse, and detention by the militia simply for having met with Soviet citizens. Jewish refuseniks in Leningrad who met with Americans were denounced in the local press. These crude attempts to discourage fundamental freedoms of expression and contacts with foreigners eventually forced the Department of State to issue a travel advisory for Leningrad, warning tourists of potential dangers they may face when visiting that city.

A further component of this attempt to isolate Soviet citizens from foreign contact was seen in the decision of the Soviet freight forwarding company, Vneshposyltorg, to cease forwarding packages from abroad to Soviet recipients as of October 1, 1983. This change made it impossible for persons sending parcels from outside the U.S.S.R to prepay the (often sizeable) customs duties. These fees can reach prohibitive levels for the Soviet recipient in the U.S.S.R. This new regulation will particularly affect such disadvantaged segments of the Soviet population as refuseniks and religious believers.

Perhaps the most telling example of the severity of the continuing Soviet offensive against human rights during the past six months was the arrest and trial of Yelena Bonner, a founding member of the Moscow Helsinki Group and wife of dissident activist and Nobel peace prize laureate Andrey Sakharov. Accused of conspiring with U.S. diplomats to seek asylum in the U.S. Embassy, from where she would allegedly spread anti-Soviet propaganda while her husband went on a hunger strike in support of her demand for medical treatment abroad, Yelena Bonner was arrested at the place of her husband's exile, Gorkiy, on May 2 as she was attempting to board a plane to visit friends in Moscow. Charged with anti-Soviet slander (Article 190-1 of the Russian criminal code), Bonner was confined to Gorkiy for the duration of the pretrial investigation. Andrey Sakharov immediately undertook a hunger strike in support of his wife's demand for medical treatment abroad, but after five days he was forcibly separated from her and placed under medical care. Subsequent reports that he was being force-fed and administered "mind-altering" drugs were countered by official and quasi-official assurances that he is "well," including one film clip of him eating while being handed a July edition of a Western journal. The August publication of a scientific article by Sakharov in a Soviet journal, and reports that he was again living at home with his wife in their Gorkiy apartment, did little to relieve friends who have been unable to establish direct contact with the pair

since early May.

In early August friends of Yelena Bonner received two letters from her. In the letters Bonner confirmed that she had not seen Sakharov since May 7 and that she was to be tried soon for anti-Soviet slander. Shortly thereafter Bonner's friends learned that in a one-day trial on August 17 she was convicted of anti-Soviet slander and sentenced to five years of internal exile. Despite numerous expressions of concern around the world about the plight of Sakharov and Bonner, the Soviet authorities have permitted no independent contact with them since May 6, 1984. Indeed, the last personal friend to visit with Sakharov and Bonner in Gorkiy on May 6 was subsequently kept under house arrest in her Moscow apartment for more than four months. The world still awaits reliable assurances that Andrey Sakharov is alive and well.

Many Soviet citizens have sought to focus attention on the general problem of abuse of human rights in the Soviet Union. Such people, who are often also involved in religious activities or in defense of minority rights, have suffered persecution as a consequence. Within this category two figures remain paramount alongside Andrey Sakharov and Yelena Bonner: Anatoliy Shcharanskiy and Yuriy Orlov.

Anatoliy Shcharanskiy is a founding member of the Helsinki Monitoring Group which was organized in 1975 by concerned private citizens including Bonner and Orlov to monitor Soviet compliance with the Helsinki accords. He is currently serving a 13-year sentence in Chistopol prison on the patently false charge of spying, and has continued to suffer relentless persecution by Soviet authorities. In July 1984, Shcharanskiy was placed on a strict regimen for allegedly failing to meet his work quota -- a quota he has not been physically able to meet since ending a 110-day hunger strike in January 1983. The strict regimen means that Shcharanskiy's family can visit him only once instead of twice per year and that his calorie ration, exercise time, and correspondence (presently one letter every two months) have been sharply cut. He was initially slated for transfer to labor camp in 1981, but the authorities decided at that time to keep him in prison for another three years. Ida Milgrom, Shcharanskiy's mother, has expressed concern that her son now might not be transferred from prison to a labor camp on October 26, 1984 as scheduled.

Yuriy Orlov, the founder of the Moscow Helsinki Monitoring Group completed a seven-year term in a strict regime labor camp in February 1984 and is now serving the first year of a

five-year sentence of internal exile. Exiled in the remote province of Yakutia, with its severe climate, Orlov has been visited by his wife and has not been compelled to work since his sixtieth birthday in August when he qualified as a pensioner. Repeated appeals for his release continue to go unanswered by Soviet authorities. Other imprisoned Helsinki monitors have suffered similar deprivations.

Two leading Ukrainian human and national rights activists, Oleksiy Tykhy and Yuriy Lytvyn, died in the same special regimen labor camp in Perm. Tykhy, a co-founder of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, died in camp on May 5 from a long-untreated ulcer condition. Lytvyn died, reportedly by suicide, in early September. In a press statement October 17, the Department of State asserted, "These deaths can be attributed to the brutal conditions in Soviet labor camps which fail to meet minimal standards of human decency."

Another former member of the Helsinki Monitoring Group, Naum Meiman, encountered obdurate resistance when he, like Sakharov, sought medical treatment for his wife abroad. Inna Meiman, who underwent several extremely serious operations during 1983-84, was repeatedly denied Soviet exit permission for medical treatment.

Soviet defenders of human rights believe it essential to work for a freer flow of information within Soviet society. To this end activists have produced for many years Samizdat manuscripts covering literary, ethnic, religious, social, economic and political topics. Soviet persecution of individuals allegedly affiliated with such Samizdat production has increased markedly during the review period. On September 6, long-time dissident and human rights activist Yuri Shikhanovich was convicted in Moscow of "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda" for collecting and disseminating information about the status of political prisoners in the U.S.S.R. He was sentenced to five years deprivation of freedom and five years of internal exile. On July 4, human rights activist Lina Tumanova was arrested while meeting with U.S. diplomats in Moscow. Tumanova, known for signing a number of appeals on behalf of political prisoners, has also been charged with "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda" because of her alleged work on Samizdat. Tumanova has also reportedly assisted with the work of the Solzhenitsyn Fund for Aid to Political Prisoners, whose administrator, Sergey Khodorovich, was imprisoned last year. Another activist, Yelena Sannikova, who was arrested in January, continues to languish in prison awaiting her trial on charges of Anti-Soviet Agitation and

Propaganda. Police in a number of cities have conducted searches of numerous apartments in connection with the investigation of her case.

Many other groups have been the target of Soviet efforts to eliminate any vestiges of independent expression from society. Religious believers, Jewish cultural activists, independent peace activists, proponents of greater regional autonomy, and those who simply wish to emigrate from the Soviet Union continued to suffer persecution by the authorities during the six-month review period.

Members of all religious denominations fell prey to such persecution. Russian orthodox activist Sergey Markus was sentenced on August 18 to three years in a labor camp for allegedly circulating religious materials and including too many religious references in his privately-organized lectures on Russian culture. Russian orthodox priest Nikolay Temirbayev was sentenced in June to two years deprivation of freedom on charges of hooliganism for allegedly beating his wife and trying to strangle one of his parishioners. Also in June, Evangelical Lutheran preacher Jakob Rein was sentenced in Kazakhstan to five years at hard labor for allegedly holding non-registered worship services.

Baptists were not spared a similar fate. On June 30 police in Kazakhstan stopped the car in which Baptists Eduard Ewert, Ivan Tkachenko and Nikolay Loeven (a minister) were traveling, and confiscated religious literature from them. Two weeks later all three were arrested. On May 22 popular youth Evangelist Peter Peters was sentenced to three years in a strict regime labor camp for not being officially employed. And in a May 16 trial in the Ukrainian city of Cherkassy, Baptists Nikolay Shepel, Anatoliy Ivashchenko and Aleksandr Pavlenko were sentenced to several years in labor camps. Vladimir Zinchenko, another Baptist who gained notoriety when his wife unfurled a banner (drawing attention to religious persecution) in Moscow's Baptist church during the visit of 266 members of the U.S. National Council of Churches in June, was sentenced on May 31 to three years in a strict regime labor camp.

Soviet Pentecostals found no easing of official repression of their religious practices, and faced unresponsiveness to their attempts to emigrate. Ivan Luchko, a Pentecostal from Rovno, was sentenced during the summer of 1984 to two years deprivation of freedom and three years probation despite the fact that he has eleven children to provide for. Luchko has

reportedly faced a history of harassment due to his religious convictions. Moscow Pentecostals Il'ya and Lydia Staskevich and family conducted a fourteen-day hunger strike in May protesting their inability to renounce their Soviet citizenship and worship freely. Similarly, in the far east village of Chuguyevka a group of fifty-five (primarily ethnic German) Pentecostals began a month-long hunger strike on September 15 to press their demand for Soviet exit permission, a demand which Soviet authorities told them would be met when in January 1984 they last undertook a hunger strike. Finally, a Moscow Pentecostal deacon who led a small congregation of parishioners was sentenced in September to five years deprivation of freedom for leading unauthorized worship services.

Defenders of Jewish culture faced a particularly difficult six months as Soviet persecution of Jewish cultural activists intensified. Moscow Hebrew teachers Aleksandr Kholmianskiy and Yuliy Edelstein were arrested during the summer, respectively, for hooliganism and possession of drugs. Police reportedly located a pistol in Kholmianskiy's room at his parents' apartment and drugs in Edelstein's apartment. Close relatives assert that the items were in both cases planted by the police. Yakov Levin, a Jewish activist from Odessa, was also arrested during the summer and is facing charges of anti-Soviet slander for circulating religious materials. The review period also witnessed the trial of Jewish activist Zakhar Zunshaine of Riga. Zunshaine was sentenced on June 29 to three years in a labor camp for allegedly little more than writing letters on behalf of his own family's emigration efforts. His friend, Yakov Gorodetskiy, who wanted to serve as Zunshaine's defense lawyer, was himself sentenced to corrective labor for two months for reportedly not telling the authorities where he was employed.

Even Jewish refuseniks who sought only their own emigration came under increasing harassment by the Soviet authorities during the review period. The sentencing of Aleksandr Yakir to two years in a labor camp for alleged draft evasion was indicative of the deteriorating situation of Soviet Jewry. Accused of evading the draft since 1977, Yakir was arrested only after he had passed his 28th birthday and was no longer eligible to be inducted into the army.

Imprisoned Jewish dissident Iosif Begun, who was sentenced in 1983 to seven years in a labor camp and five years of internal exile, has continued to feel the wrath of the authorities in the labor camp where he has been serving his sentence. In May, Begun was placed in special confinement for

infringement of camp rules. Scheduled to remain there for six months, Begun reportedly undertook a hunger strike and was hospitalized in June.

The Group to Establish Trust Between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. is an independent group of concerned Soviet citizens whose non-partisan, non-polemical approach to the discussion of arms control and confidence-building stands in sharp contrast to the statements of the officially sanctioned Soviet Peace Committee. Members of this group continued to be subjected to harassment and persecution during the six months under review. Group members were arrested, detained, and beaten. Nikolay Khramov and Aleksandr Rubchenko were each jailed twice for fifteen day periods during the summer on charges ranging from hooliganism to disobeying Soviet authorities. Their troubles began after they attempted to obtain signatures on the street for a petition calling for a U.S.-Soviet summit meeting to reduce international tension. Group members Marina Chertakova and Vladimir Brodskiy were also incarcerated for ten and fifteen day periods respectively for similar reasons. Brodskiy was reportedly physically beaten and then hospitalized by his captors. During the review period group members were repeatedly detained at police stations or in their homes for varying periods of time on evenings when the group was scheduled to meet. On one occasion some fifty persons were reportedly prevented by authorities from attending a meeting.

The Baltic Republics of Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia have traditionally formed a center of national and religious opposition to the Soviet regime. Forcibly incorporated into the Soviet Union during World War II, the Baltic peoples had never developed firm cultural ties with the Slavs despite having once been part of the Russian empire. The Soviet authorities have over the years undertaken a deliberate effort to "Russianize" the population, moving numerous ethnic Russians into the Baltic states and forcibly evicting many ethnic Balts. Knowledge of Russian language is becoming ever more necessary for educational and professional success in the Baltic republics.

It is often difficult to distinguish readily among forms of dissent in the Baltic Republics. The Soviet regime is, however, equally sensitive to any form of independent expression. The review period was particularly difficult for dissidents in Estonia. On April 19, Estonian dissident Enn Tarto was sentenced to the maximum ten years in a labor camp and five years in internal exile for anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda. In May, Estonian Baptist Pavel Vezikov was

sentenced by the Estonian supreme court to two years in a labor camp for allegedly circulating religious manuscripts. In Lithuania Catholic priests Leonas Kalinauskas and Vincas Velavicius have received several warnings to cease their activities on behalf of the Catholic Committee for the Defense of Believers' Rights and to stop production of "slanderous anti-Soviet" documents. In reaction to such persecution, which resulted in 1983 in ten-year sentences for committee members Alfonsas Svarinskas and Sigitas Tamkevicius, an anonymous group has reportedly been formed to carry on the work of the committee, which until now had always functioned openly.

Incarceration in psychiatric hospitals is frequently utilized by the Soviet authorities as a punitive measure against individuals whose activities are considered to run counter to the interests of the party and government. The Soviet Union has, in fact, amassed such a deplorable record of abuses of psychiatry that it withdrew from the World Psychiatric Association in 1983 rather than face near certain censure or expulsion. Far from chastened by the experience, the Soviet authorities continued this inhumane practice during the current review period. Around September 1 the Catholic activist Aleksandr Riga was sentenced by a Moscow court to indefinite treatment in a special psychiatric hospital for allegedly promoting religious practices among friends and disseminating religious material. Special psychiatric hospitals, as compared with ordinary psychiatric hospitals, are used for the incarceration of particularly dangerous criminals, often including murderers and rapists. Valeriy Tyurichev, who wrote a manuscript on socialist economics in 1979 and, having failed to get it published, applied to emigrate in 1980, has spent three years in psychiatric hospitals. In mid-September he was transferred to the particularly notorious special psychiatric hospital in Dnepropetrovsk. Other cases of Soviet psychiatric abuse continue, such as that of Fyodor Parasenkov, who has been in Chernyakhovsk special psychiatric hospital since 1974 for apparently advocating the introduction of private enterprise; and Nikolay Baranov, who refuses to give up his demand to emigrate, and was recently transferred to Leningrad's special psychiatric hospital.

Nadezhda Fradkova, a friend and active supporter of Zakhar Zunshaine, was admitted to a Leningrad psychiatric hospital on July 19. Psychiatric abuse reached its zenith with the death in the spring of 1984 of Alexey Nikitin, the renowned Donetsk mining engineer who was forcibly imprisoned in psychiatric hospitals after introducing two American correspondents to Soviet coalminers in 1980 in order to demonstrate the

conditions of life they endure.

Despite its commitments under the Helsinki Final Act, the Soviet Union continued to deny exit permission to thousands of its citizens who wish to join relatives living abroad. Jewish emigration continued its dramatic decline since the peak year of 1979, when over 50,000 left the country. In the period March 1-August 30, 423 Jews left the Soviet Union. This compares with approximately 473 Jews who left the U.S.S.R. in the previous six-month period. The Soviet authorities continued to maintain, despite abundant evidence to the contrary, that the vast majority of Jews who wanted to leave the country have already left and the rate of emigration is declining naturally as fewer and fewer families remain to be reunited. The authorities have also stated that family reunification refers only to those families divided by World War II.

The current review period has also witnessed increased levels of anti-semitic rhetoric thinly veiled as "anti-Zionism." Soviet propaganda maintains that Israeli and western intelligence encourages emigration in order to obtain state secrets from Soviet citizens. It further alleges that "Zionists" collaborated with fascists during World War II to send many innocent Jews to their death. These Zionist elements, so the argument goes, now comprise the ruling circles of Israel, which has inherited Hitler's fascist mantle. Crude Soviet propaganda posters often depict images of Hitler together with Israeli officials who in turn are often depicted poisoning Arab drinking water.

Individual Jewish "refuseniks" (Jews who have been refused when they apply to emigrate) have responded in various ways to official intransigence on emigration. Some have reacted with despair and, for the time being, have stopped applying to leave, while others apply as frequently as possible -- once every six months.

Ethnic German emigration from the Soviet Union remained at low levels throughout the reporting period. From March 1 through August 30, 356 left the Soviet Union. This compares with 585 during the previous six months. Armenian emigration to the United States continued at its abysmal level with only 49 leaving, compared with 44 in the previous review period.

Principle Eight: Equal Rights and Self-Determination of Peoples

Principle Eight reaffirms the right of all peoples to

determine freely their own political status and to pursue their political, social, and cultural development without outside interference. Preferences of ordinary citizens are, of course, difficult to ascertain in countries which allow no political opposition and restrict the right of free expression. In connection with Principle Eight, the United States continues not to recognize the forcible and unlawful incorporation of Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia into the Soviet Union. Expressions of nationalism in the Baltic republics, as detailed elsewhere in this report, and in other non-Russian republics, are severely repressed by the Soviet Government.

The United States has also made clear that, in accordance with Principle Eight, the resolution of Poland's problems by the Poles themselves can best be achieved in an atmosphere of calm and moderation free of all outside interference. However, the Soviet Union continues to exert pressure on Poland's political process.

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union's four-year occupation of Afghanistan continues to strike at the heart of the Final Act principles related to the rights of sovereign countries, refraining from the threat or use of force, the right to self-determination, and the acceptance of rules of international conduct. With a permanent military presence of over 100,000 troops, Soviet armed forces have directed a calculated terror campaign, including destruction of villages, killing of women and children, poisoning water supplies, burning crops, and, most recently in the Panjsher Valley, indiscriminate high-altitude bombings against civilian targets in an effort to demoralize the resistance. In Southeast Asia, the Soviets continue to provide the Vietnamese with the support necessary to maintain Hanoi's efforts to subjugate and colonize neighboring Cambodia.

In addition, the Soviet Union continues to justify the wanton destruction of the civilian Korean airliner that accidentally strayed into Soviet airspace in September, 1983. The Soviet Union also refused to cooperate with the ICAO investigation of the tragedy.

Document on Confidence Building Measures

The signatories to the Helsinki Final Act are required by the Act's Documents on Confidence-Building Measures and Certain Aspects of Security and Disarmament to give prior notification of "major military maneuvers exceeding a total of 25,000 troops, independently or combined with possible air or naval

components." In addition, signatories are encouraged to engage in other confidence-building measures (CBMs) on a voluntary basis. These voluntary CBMs include the invitation of observers to maneuvers and prior notification of major military movements and exercises involving fewer than 25,000 troops.

Implementation

The United States and its NATO Allies continue their excellent record of implementation of this CBM. The United States and the F.R.G. notified the major maneuver, Certain Fury; in addition, the F.R.G. notified the major maneuvers Flinker Igel and Lion Heart (which was also notified by the United Kingdom), while Denmark notified its major maneuver, Bold Gannet. Observers were invited to all but the last of these exercises; although, for the first time since 1981, the Soviet Union declined German invitations to send observers to the maneuvers taking place in the F.R.G. A voluntary notification was also made by France on the small scale maneuver, Doubs 84.

The Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact Allies, on the other hand, have provided the bare minimum of information and in general disregarded the spirit (if not the letter) of the provisions for confidence-building contained in the Helsinki Final Act. During this reporting period, the Soviet Union notified one major military maneuver which took place between June 28 and July 7, involving some 60,000 Soviet troops in the G.D.R., Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Baltic Sea. Formal notification of the unnamed maneuver (referred to as "Zapad 84" in the West) was made 21 days in advance and specified the number of troops participating, as well as the areas in which the exercise was to take place. No Western observers, however, were invited to attend. The Soviet Union did not provide discretionary notification of the small-scale maneuver, Danubex 84, which involved some 16,000 Soviet, Hungarian and Czechoslovak troops between June 26 and July 2, and did not invite observers.

This minimalist performance contrasts unfavorably with the slight improvement in the U.S.S.R.'s record for the last half of 1983 which included the first-ever Soviet discretionary notification of an exercise involving less than 25,000 troops and the invitation of observers from three NATO countries and several neutral and nonaligned countries to that exercise. It does not represent, however, a return to past unacceptable Soviet practice as in its failure in 1981 to live up to its Helsinki obligations, when it did not specify the number of

participants in the major maneuver Zapad 81 as required under the Final Act.

Czechoslovakia on August 14 notified the major maneuver, Shield 84, which involved some 60,000 Warsaw Pact troops and took place between September 9-14 on Czech territory. The notification, while provided the requisite 21 days in advance, was minimal in other respects. It indicated the timeframe for the maneuver only as "early September" and omitted details on the nationality of the forces participating in the exercise, on the types and levels of forces of each national contingent, as well as on the precise location of the exercise. No Western observers were invited to attend.

No other Warsaw Pact members made any notifications during this reporting period. It does not appear that any of the exercises which they held involved more than 25,000 men.

CHAPTER THREE
IMPLEMENTATION OF BASKET II:
COOPERATION IN THE FIELDS OF ECONOMICS,
OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, AND OF THE ENVIRONMENT

There have been few improvements in the implementation of Basket II provisions by the Soviet Union and the East European countries during the review period.

While the levels of implementation by individual countries have generally been maintained, there have been no major actions by these governments to further the principles set out in the Helsinki Final Act and reiterated in the Madrid concluding document regarding cooperation in the fields of economics, science and technology, and the environment. Business facilitation in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe remains far below Western standards, although there are significant differences among the countries. Countertrade demands on Western suppliers continue to impede business with the region. The performance of the Soviet Union and the East Europeans on publication and dissemination of economic and trade statistics remains unsatisfactory and frequent deliberate distortions in official statistics are deplorable.

The following country-by-country survey specifies the extent to which Soviet Union and East European countries have implemented the Basket II provisions of the Helsinki Accords.

Bulgaria

General Assessment

The overall business climate in Bulgaria has not changed noticeably since the last report although the Bulgarians continue to profess strong interest in Western goods, particularly high technology items. In particular, operating conditions for Western businessmen have not improved. There has been an increase in countertrade demands by the Bulgarians with regard to a few West European countries. One bright spot was the Bulgarian sponsorship in May of a roundtable conference in Sofia for U.S. firms which was attended by 80 American business representatives.

Business Working Conditions

Although there has been no perceptible improvement over the last reporting period in business working conditions, Western

businessmen are still welcomed. In fact, the Bulgarians say they attracted a substantially increased number of Western business representatives to the Plovdiv fair. During the period the Bulgarian Chamber of Commerce and Ministry of Foreign Trade co-sponsored a highly successful businessmen's roundtable which was held in Sofia. In this unprecedented move by the Bulgarians, American businessmen were invited to discuss commercial contacts with Bulgarian government officials, all with an eye towards the promotion of trade. The roundtable discussions showed the Bulgarian desire to normalize business relations and led to specific business negotiations.

The traditional role of Foreign Trade Organizations (FTOs) as mediators between Western businessmen and Bulgarian end-users continues to lessen, as Western business representatives have more frequent contact with end-users. Nonetheless, FTO's still play at least a formal mediating role in some cases and a primary role in others.

The number of Western business offices in Bulgaria did not change during the period. Rental costs are expected to be high in a new international trade center, which will be run by the Bulgarian agency in charge of local business representation.

Western business representatives are encouraged to stay only in expensive hotels, where rooms are normally available. Adequate housing is more difficult to obtain due to the chronic shortage.

Business representatives are almost always required to obtain a telexed invitation from the Bulgarian concern they will visit in order to get a visa. This is usually forthcoming and Bulgarian Embassy visa offices are cooperative. There are no known travel restrictions on Western business representatives.

Availability of Economic and Commercial Information

Bulgaria continues to lag far behind its East European neighbors in publishing trade and economic statistics. Virtually no information is released on Bulgaria's external financial situation. Published trade information reports only the value of the trade, calculated in valuta leva, omitting the volume. Exchange rates for valuta leva are not published and may not be the same as officially published exchange rates. Much published data on the economic progress of the country is erroneous and misleading. Information is withheld under an official secrets act. Only tourism statistics have become more

widely available.

Policies on Economic and Commercial Cooperation

The Bulgarians continue to emphasize cooperation with Western companies, including joint ventures. One U.S. firm signed a joint venture agreement with Bulgaria in the reporting period, and another proceeded to implement a previously signed agreement. There was no significant new legislation during the period regarding cooperation or joint ventures.

Official Visits

In conjunction with the May 14-17 Businessmen's Roundtable, Commerce Deputy Assistant Secretary Alexander Good visited Sofia and met with a number of Bulgarian officials, including Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade Georgi Pirinski and Andrei Loukanov, Vice Chairman of the Council of Ministers.

Policies toward Countertrade Arrangements

Western companies face increasing pressures to accept countertrade arrangements as a condition for signing sales contracts.

Policies Affecting Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise (SME's)

Bulgaria seeks to establish business relations with SME's. Several SME's participated at the May Business Roundtable. Nonetheless, SME's still face the problems of countertrade demands and financing obstacles.

Czechoslovakia

General Assessment

There have been no significant changes in Czechoslovakia's attitude or policy regarding economic/commercial cooperation during these six months. Czechoslovakia's success in achieving a positive trade balance with non-socialist countries enables it to reduce or maintain its low level of foreign indebtedness. Although there is no evidence of any distinct changes in the policy of limiting imports and taking on foreign debt, many exhibitors at the September 1984 and Brno Engineering fair reported moderately better success than during the commercially depressed years of 1982 and 1983. Restrictions on contacts of Czechoslovak citizens with foreigners remain rather severe but foreign businessmen seem to

some extent able to meet end-users and appropriate officials.

Business Working Conditions

Business working conditions and access to business contacts and commercial officials did not improve during the reporting period. Western business representatives do have less difficulty in making contacts than Western diplomats, who are viewed with particular suspicion. Nevertheless, Western business representatives continue to have difficulty making contact with end-users from enterprises and industrial research institutions, placing them at a disadvantage in the market.

No new American business offices were established in Prague during the reporting period. Establishment is strictly controlled, and official policy requires that in most cases permission to establish be granted only when there is some indication that the firm will buy from as well as sell to Czechoslovakia. For firms that do establish offices in Prague, office space, once acquired, is generally satisfactory.

Although hotel accommodations in Prague are often quite difficult to obtain, most other cities have a reasonably adequate supply. Very little new investment in this sector has been made in Prague in recent years, but construction of at least one new first class hotel is expected to begin next year. Foreigners continue to pay significantly higher rates than Czechoslovak citizens. U.S. firms with offices in Prague appear to be adequately housed, although it is likely that new applicants for offices would face considerable delay in obtaining suitable office and housing space.

There were no instances during the reporting period of undue delays in obtaining visas or of restrictions on business travel because of visa denial.

Czechoslovakia has maintained a policy of balanced bilateral trade with Western partners. U.S. firms are often looked upon as "suppliers of last resort," in part because of economic and marketing factors, but also, evidence suggests, for non-economic reasons. In these cases, Czechoslovak discrimination appears to be in retaliation for U.S. trade policy measures such as non-extension of MFN to Czechoslovakia and Czechoslovakia's ineligibility for official credits and guarantees.

Availability of Economic and Commercial Information

Economic/commercial information continues to be made available, generally with considerable delay and in inadequate detail for many analysts. Figures on foreign debt, for example, are not provided, although some instances of Czechoslovak official acknowledgement of the accuracy of foreign estimates have been reported during this period. Certain figures on imports and exports are missing from the data which have been published, and it is therefore difficult to have a complete and timely picture of Czechoslovak foreign trade. Figures on cost of living and inflation are especially limited and late in public dissemination. There is also reason to doubt their accuracy.

Policies on Economic and Commercial Cooperation

During the past six months several license agreements in the petrochemical area have been concluded. Under these agreements, U.S. firms make available technology for the design, construction, and operation of petrochemical facilities in Czechoslovakia.

Czechoslovakia continues to avoid joint venture involvement or other types of foreign investment in its economy. It does, however, maintain a number of Czechoslovak-owned firms abroad. These are primarily trading firms, but also include a bank and at least one production facility.

Official Visit

There have been no high-level official U.S. visitors in the economic/commercial area during the past six months. Several major U.S. business officials, including the chairman of one of the ten largest U.S. banks and a Fortune "500" industrial producer, visited Czechoslovakia in the period. On the Czechoslovak side, visitors to the U.S. included a delegation of the chairman and members of the executive committee of the U.S. Czechoslovak Economic Council, and included talks with U.S. government officials in Washington.

Policies toward Countertrade Arrangements

Czechoslovak policies in this area appear to show little change from the previous period. There are no reports of greater demands for countertrade purchases.