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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** Dobriansky, Paula: Files

**Withdrawer**

CAS 11/12/2010

**File Folder** CSCE 1985-1986 (4/28/1986-5/30/1986)

**FOIA**

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MIYAWAKI

16

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
100215	FAX COVER SHEET		1	4/25/1986	B1
100216	PAPER	RE CSCE	6	4/22/1986	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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CSCE



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

UNCLASSIFIED WITH CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT  
MEMORANDUM

April 28, 1986

TO: CSCE Working Group

FROM: EUR/RPM - Michael Klosson *MK*

SUBJECT: April 29 CSCE Working Group Meeting:  
Issues To Be Considered

I would like to use tomorrow's working group meeting to exchange ideas on the appropriate U.S. approach to Basket III issues at the Vienna CSCE Follow-up Meeting. I would also like to consider our Allies probable approach to the meeting, and its effect on our CSCE policy.

As background for our discussions, I have attached a paper prepared by the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe as well as an EC-12 paper on the Community's approach to Vienna.

Attachments:

1. April 28 Memorandum from the CSCE Commission to the CSCE Working Group
2. EC paper on Vienna distributed at NATO (Confidential).

PMP/794

*Mr. Dobriansky*

*TO Paula*

UNCLASSIFIED WITH CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

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COMMISSION ON  
SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE  
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES  
WASHINGTON, DC 20515

April 28, 1986

MEMORANDUM

TO: The Interagency Working Group on CSCE  
FR: CSCE Commission  
RE: Objectives for the Vienna CSCE Review Meeting

We find the objectives set forth in State Department cable 106326 of April 5 to constitute an excellent preliminary statement for the Vienna meeting. We agree with the general thrust and content of the U.S. approach as outlined in the cable and wish to offer the following observations and recommendations:

Observations

-- Vienna will be seen as a watershed for CSCE by the press and public. Even those who over the past decade have argued in support of the process now question whether CSCE is producing diminishing returns for human rights.

-- From the beginning, the U.S. has struggled to preserve balance in CSCE among all its aspects, but particularly between its security and humanitarian aspects. The United States has worked to counter Eastern efforts to turn the process into a one-dimensional security platform for Soviet peace propaganda. CSCE's utility, when considered at all by the U.S. press and public, is measured in terms of its effectiveness as a human rights tool. In contrast, the security aspects of CSCE tend to be given more emphasis in Europe. The challenge both to maintain real balance and to achieve progress will be even greater in Vienna, should Stockholm end with a document and the Soviets refuse to make comparable progress in other areas.

-- Progress in CSCE has been defined largely in terms of a balanced array of post-review subsidiary meetings and in new commitments. But, neither balance nor new commitments have produced improved implementation in the human rights area - in fact it can be argued that the reverse has occurred. Without a marked improvement in human rights implementation, the credibility of the entire CSCE process is in dire jeopardy, at least in the United States. Implementation is the key to the viability of the process.

## Recommendations

-- At Vienna, if we are to maintain U.S. public support for CSCE, a comprehensive implementation review should be our paramount objective. According to past practice, the U.S. Delegation should cite illustrative cases, naming names when appropriate. The U.S. Delegation should make it clear from the outset that it will speak forthrightly about Eastern deficiencies in performance in the post-Madrid years. Speaking factually about continuing Eastern violations is not at all inconsistent with a non-polemical approach to Vienna. Patterns of East Bloc repression will not have altered significantly, despite the resolution of cause celebre cases or a possible upturn in emigration from the USSR in connection with a summit. If no gestures are forthcoming prior to the opening of the Vienna Meeting, the East can be expected to dangle the possibility of such gestures in an attempt to mute Western criticism. The United States should do its utmost to resist such efforts.

-- As the agenda, working programme and modalities of the main Madrid Meeting are to be applied mutatis mutandis to the main Vienna Meeting unless other decisions on these questions are taken by consensus at the Vienna Preparatory Meeting the West must ensure that no procedural ground is lost and Madrid precedents preserved, particularly with respect to openness and to amount of time devoted at the Main Meeting to implementation review.

-- Producing a lengthy concluding document of Madrid proportions at Vienna will not be a sufficient result. We agree that it is not more words but compliance that is required. The carefully balanced words in negotiated documents have not led to balanced progress in deeds. For alliance management, we should join with our partners in a good faith effort to negotiate a document. We should not, however, settle for a document that contains new agreements in the military security area but merely offers a reiteration of Helsinki and Madrid language on human rights issues, or even marginal new language that in all probability will not be implemented.

-- In drafting substantive proposals for Vienna, the West should draw heavily on documents NATO jointly tabled at Ottawa (OME. 47), Budapest (BCF. 116) and Bern in an effort to enlarge significantly the area of Eastern accountability.

-- With respect to Follow-up, we should insist on the fourth major review meeting within 2 to 2 1/2 years after the conclusion of the Vienna Meeting. Also, the West should propose that the Vienna Meeting agree to a categorical commitment in the future to hold review meetings 2 to 2 1/2 years following the conclusion of every major review meeting.

-- The Commission agrees that subsidiary or experts meetings between major reviews are helpful in keeping the process alive and public attention focussed on issues of concern. However, we also have seen some drawbacks to the experts meeting arrangement. Subsidiary meetings having one-dimensional subject matter provide little leverage with which to pressure for implementation or for actual negotiation.

Agreement to an array of post-Vienna meetings absent any explicit linkage among them risks fracturing CSCE into its component parts and upsetting CSCE's delicate balance. Therefore, the United States should insist that the mandates for proposed experts meetings always refer to linkage, emphasizing the need for constant, tangible and balanced progress in all Final Act fields.

-- The United States should insure that any CDE agreement reached contains language linking security-related principles to other Helsinki Final Act principles concerning human rights and fundamental freedoms.

-- The United States should defer a CDE agreement in Stockholm for further consideration at the Vienna Meeting so that such an agreement can be balanced against agreements in other areas of CSCE, particularly its human rights dimension.

-- A form of linkage between CDE and human rights/human contacts implementation would be the truest measure of balance. At Vienna, we should consider not giving consensus to continuation of the CDE talks until we see concrete progress in the implementation of human rights and human contacts commitments.

-- Another way in which balance can be preserved and linkage established through follow-up mechanisms is to propose subsidiary meetings with combined subject matter. For example, a post-Vienna forum on the connection between peace and human rights or the link between scientific, cultural and educational exchange and the freer flow of people and information could be proposed. Another approach reinforcing the concept of linkage would be to task subsidiary meetings to focus on key Final Act principles that tend to be addressed in tandem in CSCE, say the connection between Principle VI (Non-intervention/Terrorism) and Principle VII (Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms) or between Principle XI (Co-operation among States, including the role of governments, institutions, organizations and persons) and Principle X (Fulfillment of Obligations under International Law).

-- It might be useful to hold a less-controversial, more informal post-Vienna "seminar" of experts on social issues of topical concern, i.e. child care, health care, scientific ventures such as biotechnology, etc...



-- Inclusion of cultural figures on delegations to Budapest drew greater public attention to the Cultural Forum and to the Helsinki process as a whole. The Commission would recommend mandating at Vienna an Information Forum. Delegations would include media figures. The participation of media representatives would ensure that journalists become better informed about CSCE and could generate more understanding of and interest in the process in the future. The West can make important points about freedom of the press, "the right to know", the free flow of information and jamming. Yet, such a forum would not be without appeal to the East, which seeks to use the openness of the Western media and new satellite technology to bring its peace propaganda to Western audiences.

Exchanges of views in the field of information have been fairly frequent. For example, U.S. delegations from the New England Society of Newspaper Editors and the American Society of Newspaper Editors have had a series of exchanges with Soviet counterparts. Also, the Committee of California Print and Broadcast Journalists and the U.S.S.R. State Committee for Television and Radio issued in 1984 a cooperatively prepared report on "Soviet-American Media Exchange."

-- Public support for the negotiating effort in Vienna will be greatly enhanced by the inclusion of Public Members on the U.S. Delegation, as was the case at the Belgrade and Madrid Meetings. The Commission strongly recommends that a minimum of twelve Public Member slots be allotted on the U.S. Delegation. These positions should be filled (on a rotating basis for a minimum of two-weeks per Public Member) throughout the negotiation, particularly during those parts of the meeting in which they are especially interested or knowledgeable. The Public Members should be chosen to ensure broad representation of domestic constituencies and to enhance the resources of the delegation. The Public Members would not represent the U.S. at the conference tables (or in NATO caucuses because they will lack the necessary clearance) but would be allowed to be present in the plenaries and working groups and take part in U.S. delegation staff/strategy sessions. During and after the meeting, these Public Members would serve as advocates for CSCE and for the U.S. Delegation's efforts at Vienna.

-- Setting a date for the conclusion of the Vienna Meeting is wise so long as it is only a target date in the sense of such dates set for Belgrade and Madrid. It can be argued that protraction of the Madrid Meeting in response to external events, such as the crackdown in Poland, served Western, not Eastern, interests. We agree, however, that barring unforeseen international developments, a protracted meeting would convey the impression of impotence.

--In light of the experience in Budapest, in which the United States and other Western countries had reason to protest irregularities in the performance of the Hungarian Executive Secretariat and of the host-government's treatment of non-governmental visitors, the U.S. should exact a high price and/or clear commitments for agreement to any post-Vienna meetings in Warsaw Pact locations.

-- Well in advance of the Vienna Conference, the U.S. Government should begin to educate the press and public about its significance. The Commission will be pleased to cooperate with the Department to this end. Joining in a pre-Vienna briefing trip to key U.S. cities is an excellent idea.

As noted at the beginning of this memo and as restated repeatedly above, public credibility of the Helsinki process is at stake in Vienna. In planning for the Vienna Meeting, development and conduct of an intensive, well-coordinated public diplomacy effort is essential. This effort must include an effective and continuing public information/education campaign directed at U.S. public opinion.

Accordingly, equal emphasis should be given to planning for, allocating resources in support of, and implementation of the public diplomacy/information effort as is given to the substantive aspects of the meeting. While this conceptual approach is at variance to the usual approach to preparing for and conducting international negotiations, both the unique nature of the CSCE process and its current situational context argue strongly in favor of this difference in emphasis.

Specifically, the strongest efforts should be made at the outset to locate and assign personnel to the Vienna Meeting who will conduct an energetic and successful public affairs campaign such as was mounted in Madrid. In coordination with the development of the substantive goals and the agenda and modalities for the Vienna Meeting, the public diplomacy/information plan must also be developed. It would be appropriate to involve cognizant senior-level National Security Council staff in the public diplomacy planning at the earliest possible stage. The Commission is eager to see the timely and effective development of the U.S. public diplomacy/information effort and is willing to provide any assistance it can to this effort.

--Early indications are that many hundreds of NGOs (the Latvians alone plan to bring in several hundred people from communities all over the world) will come to Vienna during its initial weeks. The NGO presence will lessen, but can be expected to remain substantial, throughout the time allotted for implementation review. An efficient and effective delegation liaison operation therefore is a must. The U.S. should vigorously insist -- and be seen to insist -- at the preparatory meeting on maximum openness at Vienna, at least comparable to the number and nature of sessions designated as open at Madrid.

-- Finally, with respect to planning for Vienna, there should be early and frequent coordination meetings within NATO in order to minimize the possibilities of being presented with faits accompli by the EC-12.

I N D E X

Tuesday, May 27, 1986

*SS*  
*WR*  
*JM*  
*Paula D*  
*CSCE*

BRIEFER: Charles Redman

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #93

TUESDAY, MAY 27, 1986, . 12:35 P.M.  
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. REDMAN: Ladies and gentlemen, good afternoon: Let me begin with one rather lengthy statement on the Bern Conference and the resolution of 38 U.S.-Soviet divided family cases.

The CSCE meeting of Human Contacts Experts in Bern, Switzerland, which began on April 15, concluded on May 27. The participants discussed development of contacts among persons, institutions, and organizations. The U.S. believes that the meeting represented a highly useful opportunity to examine the record of implementation of human contacts commitments made in Helsinki and Madrid.

The participants in Bern had a wide-ranging, frank, and useful discussion of the development of contacts among persons, institutions and organizations, on the basis of the provisions relating to human contacts in the Helsinki Final Act and the Madrid concluding document. They discussed in particular measures to be taken for the improvement of such contacts.

During the discussion, different and at times contradictory opinions were expressed. A number of proposals on human contacts were presented and discussed during the meeting. Unfortunately, no consensus was reached on the range of proposals discussed at the conference, and it proved impossible to reach agreement on a final document. The U.S. believes, however, that many of the proposals discussed at Bern have merit, and notes the possibility for delegations of the participating states to present them for further discussion at the Vienna follow-up meeting in November. We look forward to and hope to further develop this important dialogue prior to and during the next CSCE review meeting in Vienna.

On May 26, in the closing hours of the Bern Conference, the Soviet Government informed us of the names of

Q You said the 117 were not named. Can you tell us about the two that were?

A I don't have the names on those. As a general rule, we don't comment on the specific cases because of Privacy Act restrictions.

Q Are you informing the family members in this country? We went through this agony at the time of those nine cases where we began calling up everybody we know who has a divided spouse, and eventually, the State Department did put out the list.

A The best I can tell you right now is that we are attempting to contact the U.S. relatives. The Soviet Government has told us that it is informing the Soviet citizens involved, although we are not yet able to confirm this.

Q If I could just make a pitch, my impression on all this is that we do more of a service by putting out the names as soon as you can, because all the people who are not affected begin to get very nervous and wonder, as well.

A I'll take a look at that.

Q What is the status of the Shcharansky relatives, the mother and, I think, another relative, that the State Department said would be coming out after he came out? And as far as we've heard, they never have.

A I don't have anything specifically on that question. Let me take another look at that. I believe we may have posted something in response to a previous question a week or so ago.

Q It's a little different now, though.

A In any case, let me just, if you will, refer to the 33 cases that we talked about after the Geneva Summit, that the Soviets had promised to resolve. In 24 of the 33 cases, the Soviet family members have left the Soviet Union.

The Soviets told us May 26 that one of the nine remaining cases will be resolved in the near future. At Bern last week, they told us that four others would be permitted to emigrate after they had renounced their Soviet citizenship. We have officially questioned this requirement in one

A Yes.

Q Some of the Europeans are saying that the reason that it was impossible was that the U.S. switched its position at the last moment on some key issues. Do you have any response to that?

A Well, as I understand it, for the past six weeks, these experts have been hard at work at Bern trying to promote practical results, trying to promote movement in specific individual cases and improvement in the general conditions for cross-border human contacts.

At the end of the conference, the neutral and nonaligned countries presented a draft concluding document. We regret that after careful review, we could not give consent to this draft. Given the record of Eastern adherence to CSCE commitments, we knew that a document in Bern would have to meet very high standards to dispel public disillusionment with the Helsinki process.

In our judgment, the language in the draft document that the negotiations produced would not have improved the prospects for future compliance, but I could note a number of positive aspects, of which I've already noted some, of this particular meeting. Among them, that it provided a much-needed platform for us to examine the record of compliance with Helsinki and Madrid commitments. The debate was spirited and candid. The discussions highlighted the importance of fulfilling existing commitments on cross border human contacts, such as the right of emigration. But the debate also reflected the wide gap between promises undertaken in documents and reality.

We strongly support the Helsinki process and the documents that enshrine it, but these documents fulfill their purpose only if they are complied with. Our goal at Bern was not more words; we sought to promote steps that would improve the lives of individuals in all the CSCE states. We measured the proposals offered at Bern according to their ability to improve Eastern compliance with existing CSCE commitments.

Several of the proposals offered in the neutral, nonaligned concluding documents would not only have failed to improve compliance; they would have deluded the clear and comprehensive contacts provisions of the Helsinki Final Act and the Madrid concluding document.

A I'll have to look into that, but as I recall --

Q What did Teddy Kennedy get? He got a whole list, a separate --

A As I recall, there were a number of lists that developed at the time of Geneva.

Q Is this the Kennedy thing?

A We'll look into that and see if we can get something that clarifies that.

Q Are the 36 today comparable to the 33 at the Summit? In other words, is this a promise of the type that was made at the Summit, or is this comparable to the 24 in terms of their getting out?

A At this stage, it's a promise --

Q I don't know if it is --

A -- but in the case of the 33, 24 of those have been resolved, and people have left.

Q It's a promise, but you've been given, the U.S. has been given names, has it not, of the 36 cases?

I mean it's a promise, but you've been given specific names of 36 cases --

A Yes, we do have the names.

Q -- and you're going about notifying them?

A Yes. You'll see that in the statement. We do have the names of the 36 divided family cases.

Q So it's not a general promise of some 36 case --

A No, that's right; definitely not.

Q -- it's a very specific --

A There are names involved.

Q Can you categorize the 36? Are they people who



the next summit meeting?

A I have nothing by way of general reaction other than what I used at the end of the statement.

Q Have you heard anything from the Soviets on the Shevardnadze meeting?

A Nothing to advance that question.

Let me give you one other thing. People are interested in knowing how long this is going to take before people are actually allowed to leave. The answer is, the time involved often varies. These Soviet citizens must still go through several bureaucratic procedures before they are actually given the exit permit and foreign passport. Typically, this can take several weeks.

When the Soviet citizen has exit permission, we are able to issue an immigrant visa quickly.

Q Any thoughts on why they did this now? Apart from the Bern Conference was there any other rationale for it?

A No, I don't have any other rationale.

-- MORE --

A No. Only to say that the practices as they are being applied have not been totally consistent. So that's why I say I would leave it that we're looking into the situation carefully to see exactly what it is we're dealing with and how to respond to it.

Q Is this consistent for different Western nationalities -- different practices for different -- what do you mean?

A I can't give you any further details on consistency in that context.

Q (Inaudible)...Some people get through on their red cards I mean.

A I think you've seen a lot of reporting already in the press on those kind of questions.

Q Aside from being in contact with the story --

Q Can we take it as accurate -- whatever is reported in the press we can take as accurate? Is that your answer?

A I hope most of it is accurate, but I'm not commenting on the case.

Q No, can't we take it all as accurate?

A Since I haven't seen all of it, I can't answer your question.

Q Well, we haven't seen anything on what's happened to U.S. officials this morning.

A I don't have anything more on that.

Ralph?

Q You said that the allies have taken up the issue with the Soviet Embassy in East Berlin. Has a protest been lodged with the Soviet Government either there or through some other channel?

A I said it's been taken up with them. That's all.

Q And the second question: Do you have any comment on Mr. Rabin's refusal of the request by Mrs. Thatcher to work on improving the quality of life for Palestinians under occupation? Mr. Rabin refused her request.

A Only to reiterate what you heard us say before -- which, in a more general way, we have long said, that we would welcome an increase in Arab control and a reduction in Israeli control over the day-to-day life of Palestinians in both the West Bank and Gaza, and that as a practical matter any new arrangements, to be successful, would require acceptance by all the concerned parties.

Q If I might go back to your answer to my first question about this small town? You say that you continue to believe that building more settlements will be an impediment to peace -- but it looks like the plans are -- you know, they are waiting, according to the story in The Washington Post -- waiting for the bulldozers to go in and raze the town. Do you know whether the United States has any measures -- or steps to be taken -- in addition to what you just said, that will stop depriving 150 Palestinians of their homes and lands immediately -- sort of an injunction somehow?

A No, I don't have anything else to offer you right now.

Q The Syrian Foreign Minister on Sunday said that Syria would like an equal and positive dialogue with the United States. Do you have any comment on that?

A No, not really.

Q Chuck, on the meeting with the U.S. Spanish Council this afternoon, is this the meeting that was supposed to meet in the first half of '86 to discuss the level of American troops in Spain?

A There will be, of course, a communique --

Q Yes.

A -- which will come out at the end of that. But I believe this Council meeting has its own life, if you will, and this is the second of what I think to be annual meetings of this Council.

A In terms of further steps, I don't have anything to offer you. Concerning the expulsion of our attache, we believe the action is unjustified.

Q Unjustified -- why? In view of what the U.S. did. Can you elaborate?

A There was a very clear and evident reason for our action --

Q Can you elaborate?

A -- which we explained at the time.

Q O.K. Can I ask one more about one other part, switching areas? Prime Minister Hawke's statement about the importance of American bases, talking to Mrs. Aquino. Does the U.S. have any comment to make? Are you appreciative of his statements?

A No, I haven't seen that statement.

Q Do you want to take it?

Q Are further steps still under consideration in response to the raids last week, or has the U.S. now done all that it's going to do?

A I don't really have any way to help you on that question as to whether anything may be done in the future or not.

Q Anything on King Hussein's visit to Damascus on the weekend in his current trip to Baghdad?

A No.

Q Do you have any comment on the timing of the recent deterioration in the security situation in Lebanon, and especially the series of booby-trapped cars that exploded in residential areas in Beirut?

A No, nothing in specific -- other than if you look at the position we've consistently taken on the question of violence, it's something that we deplore. And we've said that the solution to the problems of Lebanon is in the political arena and not through such acts as that.

Q Did anything happen in the meeting of the presidents of Central America -- named Esquipulas -- last weekend?

A The question concerns the Central American Summit at Esquipulas.

The Summit demonstrated that there are real and profound differences between the democracies and the Nicaraguan Government. The differences extend even in the language of the final communique to the "Concept of Life and the Structure of Power in a Pluralistic Democracy." This contradicts the Sandinista's argument that their only quarrel is with the United States.

The Summit made clear the view of the democracies that democratization is fundamental to peace in Central America. Commitments on security issues alone are not sufficient to bring peace.

Third, the Summit reflects a growing desire of the Central Americans to take charge of their own affairs. We welcome this development.

Q Did that answer encompass the answer to the question of Ortega's latest arms proposal?

A No.

Q Do you have any comment on his latest arms proposal? I'm referring to the phrase, "Commitments to security alone are not enough to do", something or other.

A Concerning the arms reduction proposals of Daniel Ortega, reduction of armaments and troop levels are important elements being considered now in regional negotiations. The real test of the Nicaraguan proposal is if it is acceptable to the other Central American countries.

Placing preconditions on negotiations dealing with these important military issues would have the effect of preempting the negotiating process.

The United States has stated repeatedly its view that the Nicaraguan arms buildup and the size of its armed forces of approximately 120,000 regular troops and trained reserves create a serious military imbalance in Central America.

Q Do you have anything on SALT II compliance -- the Administration's position on dismantling the two submarines?

A Nothing other than stay tuned to another channel. (Laughter.)

(The briefing concluded at 1:03 p.m.)

*just when  
ours started!*

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 28, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY<sup>(1)</sup>

SUBJECT: CSCE: 20th Semiannual Report

I have reviewed and concur in the text submitted by the Department of State under memorandum of May 27, 1986 (Tab III), of the 20th Semiannual Report on the implementation of the Helsinki Final Act to the CSCE Commission. As required by Public Law 94-304, attached at Tab II is a memorandum to Secretary Shultz authorizing the transmission of the Report to the Commission on behalf of the President. Your authorization is needed by noon on Saturday, May 31.

At Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President which summarizes the highlights of the Report. There is no need to forward the Report at Tab III to the President.

Jack Matlock, Ty Cobb<sup>N/A</sup>, Peter Sommer<sup>PS</sup>, Don Mahley<sup>How</sup> and Sven Kraemer<sup>SK</sup> concur.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- 1. That you forward the summary memorandum at Tab I to the President.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

- 2. That you sign and forward the memorandum at Tab II to Secretary of State Shultz.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

- Tab I Summary Memo to Pres
- Tab II Memo to SecState
- Tab III CSCE 20th Semiannual Rpt (Oct 1, 1985 - Apr 1, 1986)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

4191

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JOHN M. POINDEXTER

SUBJECT: Summary: CSCE 20th Semiannual Report

The State Department has forwarded the 20th Semiannual Report of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). It surveys significant developments in the implementation of the Helsinki Final Act during the period October 1, 1985 - April 1, 1986. Key highlights of the report include:

1. The Soviet/East European record of compliance with CSCE commitments continued to be seriously flawed.
2. Soviet persecution of dissidents, refuseniks and religious activists continued unabated, as did suppression of national minorities and harassment of political prisoners and their families. Andrei Sakharov remained in isolation, still confined to Gorky; Anatoliy Shcharansky was released, but several dozen other Helsinki monitors remain imprisoned; also, Soviet abuses of psychiatry for political purposes persisted.
3. Despite Helsinki Final Act commitments to facilitate family reunification, the rate of emigration from the Soviet Union remained low. During this period, only 554 Jews were granted exit visas. Travel outside the USSR also continued to be restricted, with only 688 Soviet citizens permitted to make private visits to the US.
4. Some positive developments in Eastern Europe's implementation of the Final Act included: Bulgaria's commitment to resolve 8 of 12 family reunification cases; Romania's release of 3 "activist" Baptist pastors; and Hungary's modified passport and exit permission guidelines which promote freer travel regardless of one's political orientation.
5. However, this period continued to be plagued by strict governmental control in each East European country. The number of political prisoners and fundamental human rights violations totalled more than 240 in Poland; Hungarian officials refused to permit the International Helsinki Federation to hold a seminar in a hotel during the CSCE Budapest Cultural Forum; an upsurge in reports of persecution of religious activists, particularly Catholics, occurred in Czechoslovakia; and the Bulgarian government continued to force the assimilation of its ethnic Turkish minority.

Prepared by:  
Paula Dobriansky



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

4191

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ  
The Secretary of State

SUBJECT: Twentieth Semiannual Report by the President  
to the Commission on Security and Cooperation  
in Europe on the Implementation of the Helsinki  
Final Act: October 1, 1985 - April 1, 1986  
(SS8616223)

The text submitted by the Department of State for review under memorandum of May 27, 1986, has been reviewed and approved for transmission over your signature to the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT**

TIME STAMP

SYSTEM LOG NUMBER: 4191

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ACTION OFFICER: DOBRIANSKY DUE: 29 MAY

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CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS\* PHONE\* to action officer at ext. 3912

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- INFORMATION  McDaniel  Pearson  Secretariat
- Rodman  Lehman  \_\_\_\_\_
- Poindexter (advance)  Fortier (advance)

COMMENTS

*Return to Secretariat*



8616223  
United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520 #4191

May 27, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR VADM. JOHN M. POINDEXTER  
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Twentieth Semiannual Report to the CSCE Commission

Public Law 94-304 requires the President to submit a report on implementation of the Helsinki Final Act to the CSCE Commission semiannually. The attached draft report, which covers the period October 1, 1985 to April 1, 1986, is due to the Commission on June 3. The report provides a factual survey of developments in the areas covered by the Helsinki Final Act and the Madrid Concluding Document: human rights and humanitarian concerns; security; economic, scientific, and technological cooperation; and educational and cultural exchanges. It concentrates on compliance with the Final Act and the Concluding Document, focusing particularly on events in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

The Department recommends that the Secretary of State be authorized to transmit the report to the Commission on behalf of the President in accordance with the existing practice for this report.

*Nicholas Platt*  
Nicholas Platt  
Executive Secretary

TWENTIETH SEMIANNUAL REPORT  
IMPLEMENTATION OF HELSINKI FINAL ACT  
OCTOBER 1, 1985 - APRIL 1, 1986

## CHAPTER ONE

### GENERAL ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT AND MADRID CONCLUDING DOCUMENT

#### OVERVIEW

The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) represents a framework for the 35 participating states to work to resolve the humanitarian, economic, political, and military issues that divide Europe. The Final Act underscores that each area is of equal importance to genuine security and cooperation in Europe. The Western objective has been to preserve and strengthen this process by a thorough review of implementation of the Final Act and the Madrid Concluding Document and agreement on balanced and constructive steps forward.

The Final Act recognizes that follow-up meetings are essential for maintaining the Helsinki framework as a vigorous means of addressing problems in Europe. The Madrid Follow-up Meeting, the second such CSCE review conference, began on November 11, 1980, and came to a close on September 9, 1983. The Madrid Concluding Document confirmed and expanded upon the original Helsinki Final Act of 1975. It includes significant new provisions in the area of human rights, trade union freedoms, human contacts, free flow of information, access to diplomatic and consular missions, and measures against terrorism.

It also mandated seven follow-on "experts" meetings leading up to the next review conference, which will begin on November 4, 1986, in Vienna. The United States is participating actively and fully in these meetings, both as a means of assessing existing problems in implementation and seeking balanced progress in the CSCE.

This is the 20th semiannual report submitted by the President to the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe under the provisions of Public Law 94-304 of June 3, 1976. It surveys significant developments in the implementation of the Helsinki Final Act and the Madrid Concluding Document during the period October 1, 1985 through April 1, 1986. The purpose of the report is to assist the Commission in its task of monitoring and encouraging compliance with the Helsinki Accords and the Madrid Concluding Document. These reports are themselves an important element of the U.S. Government's effort to assess the progress and shortcomings in achieving the CSCE goals of strengthening security, expanding cooperation, building mutual confidence, and promoting human rights.

## Review of Implementation

For most of the CSCE participating states, the status of implementation over the current reporting period did not change significantly from earlier periods. The overall record of compliance of the Warsaw Pact nations of Eastern Europe with their CSCE undertakings remained seriously flawed, although limited encouragement could be taken from a few positive developments. In Romania there has been less apparent harassment of the activities of "unauthorized" religious denominations; an increased number of seminarians for some of the allowed religions; and a slightly less confrontational stance by the government on construction and renovation of churches. Recently the government permitted the rapid emigration of 3 of Romania's best-known "activist" Baptist pastors, though their departure itself is a commentary on the state of religious freedom there. In Poland, the authorities implemented a limited release of political prisoners in November and December that resulted in the freeing of 218 prisoners and detainees, most of whom were first-time political offenders. The Hungarian Government lifted the one outstanding police surveillance order imposed against a political dissident. In addition, passports and exit permission became available for most Hungarians regardless of their political orientation. The current rate of emigration allowed by the G.D.R. is twice the 1980-83 norm, although the numbers are still well below those during the "emigration wave" of 1984. The emigration rate seems to have increased again since the beginning of 1986, though it is too early to tell whether this upswing will continue throughout the year. In Czechoslovakia, criminal charges, stemming from organization of informal youth groups, were dropped against Jan Keller, a former minister of the Czech Brethren Evangelical Church, though he remains barred from returning to his clergyman's practice. During this period, on March 24, the Bulgarian Government promised to permit reunification in 8 of 12 cases on the latest representation list and stated that some of the 4 remaining cases might also be resolved. The government also pledged that it would resolve favorably 2 of 6 visitation cases on the Embassy representation list and hoped for prompt favorable resolution of several more. These relative bright spots must be viewed, however, in the context of strict governmental control and limitations on political and religious expression as well as violations of basic human rights in many of these states.

And there were continuing negative developments. In Romania during this period the government promulgated new rules extending restrictions on contacts by Romanians with foreigners, and increasing the penalties for infraction. Though its past record on emigration has been the best in Eastern Europe, over the past year the rate of passport approvals for the United States has not maintained its earlier

high levels. In Poland, such well-known political prisoners as Bogdan Lis, Adam Michnik, and Wladyslaw Frasyuniuk, as well as several other leading Solidarity activists and advisers, remained among the more than 200 imprisoned at the turn of the year. By mid-March, the number of political prisoners had reportedly passed the 240 mark. The Government of Hungary refused to allow the International Helsinki Federation to hold a seminar in a hotel during the CSCE Budapest Cultural Forum (the seminar took place in private homes). In addition, 2 political gatherings held in February and March of 1986 were broken up by policemen wielding nightsticks and mace-like spray. Throughout the reporting period, the G.D.R. has continued a policy of dissuading its citizens from contacts with Western embassies, using techniques which include persuasion, threat of arrest and prosecution (inter alia, under a law requiring state permission to visit foreign missions), and inspecting identification cards of people exiting our Embassy. In Czechoslovakia, there has been an upsurge in reports of persecution of religious activists, especially Catholics. In addition, the authorities have continued to use numerous measures -- including threats, interrogations, short-term arrests, job dismissals, denial of passports and educational opportunities -- to stifle political, religious or cultural activities that have not been organized by the Communist Party or affiliated institutions. The Government of Bulgaria has continued to force the assimilation of its ethnic Turkish minority. There are credible reports about arrests and detention of ethnic Turks at the Belene Island prison camp and other facilities. Signs in public establishments forbidding the speaking of Turkish have been seen by travelers, and the Turkish language is also forbidden in schools.

Once again, the continued unsatisfactory Soviet implementation of the Helsinki and Madrid commitments during the 6 month review period gave cause for concern. In the international arena, continued Soviet prosecution of the war against the Afghan people was in flagrant violation of the basic principles guiding relations between states. The Soviet Union also has undermined these key principles by continuing to support the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia and Vietnam's war against the Cambodian resistance.

Persecution by the Soviet authorities of Soviet citizens who attempted to express themselves freely continued at an unabated rate during the 6 months under review. Religious believers, proponents of greater cultural and political rights for ethnic minorities, human rights monitors, and peace activists alike were subjected to harassment and often to arrest and imprisonment. Assertion of religious and cultural identity brought arrests to Jews, Ukrainians, Pentecostal Christians, Baptists, and others. An independent peace group was subjected to harassment, arrests, confinement to psychiatric hospitals and expulsions.

Andrey Sakharov remained in isolation, still confined to the closed city of Gor'kiy, although authorities permitted Yelena Bonner, his wife, to travel to the West for medical treatment on the condition that she not speak with reporters abroad. Anatoliy Shcharanskiy was released to the West after nearly 9 years in prison, but several dozen other Helsinki monitors remained in prison or internal exile. One of them, Yuriy Orlov, remained isolated in a remote village in the region of Yakutia. Dr. Anatoliy Koryagin, formerly active in monitoring abuses of psychiatric institutions, was reportedly given 2 more years in prison for resisting force-feeding to break his hunger strike.

Political prisoners often endured strict or solitary confinement and were often denied letters, packages or visits from their families. Soviet abuse of psychiatry for political purposes continued unabated as did inhumane conditions in labor camps and beatings.

Despite commitments under the Helsinki Final Act to facilitate family reunification, the rate of emigration from the Soviet Union remained low. 554 Jews left the Soviet Union from October 1, 1985 to March 31, 1986; 283 ethnic Germans left during the same period. A number of cases of divided spouses and families were resolved in conjunction with the November Reagan-Gorbachev meeting, but many more such cases remained unresolved.

The Soviet authorities continued to exercise tight control on travel outside the country, with only 788 Soviet citizens allowed to make private visits to the United States during the period October 1, 1985 through March 28, 1986. One hundred twenty-nine Soviet citizens received exit permission for permanent residence in the United States during this 6-month period. All were either spouses or immediate relatives of American citizens or permanent residents.

The Soviet authorities maintained their traditional strict control of information media, essentially denying Soviet citizens access to filmed, printed, and broadcast information which might call into question the tenets of Marxism-Leninism or the official line of the communist party. Jamming of Voice of America and Radio Liberty broadcasts in languages native to the Soviet Union continued.

#### The Stockholm CDE Continues

The Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) mandated by the Madrid CSCE review meeting opened in Stockholm on January 17, 1984. The Conference is scheduled to adjourn on September 19, 1986. The Madrid mandate calls for CDE to negotiate measures which



are militarily significant, politically binding, verifiable, and applicable to the whole of Europe- including the European portion of the Soviet Union. Ambassador Robert L. Barry is head of the U.S. delegation.

The NATO Approach. During the period under review, the NATO countries have continued to focus discussion on the package of concrete confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) they introduced 2 weeks after the conference opened. This package is designed to foster greater transparency in European military activities and to increase the political cost for using military force for political intimidation. The NATO package fulfills the requirements of the mandate and builds upon the confidence-building measures (CBMs) adopted as part of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975. It provides for the following CSBMs:

- o Mutual exchanges of information about the organization and location of the significant military units of all participating states;

- o Exchanges of annual forecasts of planned military activities;

- o Mandatory notification 45 days in advance of out-of-garrison military activities involving 6,000 or more personnel (in the Final Act, notification is required 21 days in advance only for major military maneuvers involving 25,000 or more troops);

- o Mandatory invitation of observers of all participating states to all activities requiring notification (in the Final Act, invitation of observers is voluntary);

- o On-site inspection to verify compliance with these CSBMs; and

- o Improvement of the communications facilities among the 35 participating states.

The Eastern Response. The East has not formally withdrawn its long list of declaratory measures introduced in 1984. But in recent months, the only declaratory proposal it has chosen to pursue has been its proposed treaty on non-use of force. Moreover, during recent rounds Soviet efforts have focused on the confidence and security-building proposals introduced by the East in 1985 and early 1986. While adoption of Eastern proposals would not represent a substantial improvement over the confidence building measures in the Helsinki Final Act and in some cases would harm Western security interests, the East's move away from empty declaratory measures and toward confidence-building proposals represents a positive change in the Eastern posture toward CDE.

And in recent rounds the East has begun to consider more seriously the proposals introduced by the West as well as the neutral and non-aligned states. In Paris on October 3, Gorbachev stated that the Soviets were prepared to accept "mutual exchanges of annual plans of military activities subject to notification." While this was far short of accepting the Western approach to CDE, it did signal a more serious approach to the CSBMs proposed by the West and the NNA.

Rounds Seven, Eight, and Nine. The seventh round was already in session at the beginning of the reporting period; it concluded on October 18. Although there were few substantive achievements during the round, the participating states did agree on October 14 to move to a more informal working structure to prepare for drafting. This structure was based on the working groups created in 1985 and preserved the integrity of all of the Western proposals. And late in round eight, on December 13, the Conference agreed to the appointment of NNA coordinators to head these groups, setting the stage to begin drafting in round nine.

On November 15, 1985, the long-awaited detailed NNA proposal was tabled. Even though the NNA proposal features an unbalanced constraint measure which is unacceptable to the West and has inadequate verification features, it has served to keep the focus on concrete CSBMs and away from hortatory declaratory proposals.

Also in round eight, the Conference was given a boost by the Geneva Summit where the President and General Secretary Gorbachev declared:

"Attaching great importance to the Stockholm Conference. . . and noting the progress made there, the two sides stated their intention to facilitate an early and successful completion of the work of the conference. To this end, they reaffirmed the need for a document which would include mutually acceptable (CSBMs) and give concrete expression and effect to the principle of nonuse of force."

Round nine was disappointing. It began with General Secretary Gorbachev's January 15 statement on arms control. And although the statement offered to defer inclusion of independent naval activities to a later stage of CDE, the Soviets insisted that this deferral be "registered" in Stockholm. Because these activities are outside the Madrid mandate for CDE and only a review conference can change that mandate, the West has rejected this condition. The January 15 statement also insisted that independent air activities be included in the notification regime negotiated in Stockholm, even though the U.S. has made clear this is not acceptable.

And while round nine witnessed the beginning of drafting, that process was slow and halting. By the end of the round, only anodyne language, mostly drawn directly from the Helsinki Final Act and Madrid Concluding Document, had been provisionally agreed. As the round closed, it was clear that Soviet intransigence was limiting progress on drafting in Stockholm. The U.S. and its NATO allies were prepared to make substantial progress on the confidence and security-building measures at the heart of the Stockholm Conference, but the Soviets continued to hold back, in an apparent attempt to build pressures for the endgame.

With Stockholm scheduled to adjourn on September 19, at the end of the reporting period there were only a few months left to draft a concluding document before CDE had to report to the Vienna CSCE Follow-up Meeting. While hope remained that compromises could be made and a substantive, verifiable concluding document could be crafted before CDE adjourned, there was little time left.

#### The Budapest Cultural Forum

Delegates from the 35 CSCE participating states met in Budapest on October 15 to November 25, as mandated by the Madrid Concluding Document, to "discuss interrelated problems concerning creation, dissemination and co-operation, including the promotion and expansion of contacts and exchanges in the different fields of culture." This was the first CSCE experts' meeting devoted to the cultural content of the Helsinki Final Act and the first to be held in a Warsaw Pact state. Delegations included prominent personalities in the field of culture.

The U.S. delegation, led by Ambassador Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., sought at Budapest to ensure attention to all three themes of the mandate, to focus attention on specific problems and on possible solutions, and to promote productive discussions among the cultural figures. The U.S. delegation, in close coordination with our friends and allies, engaged in an extensive, serious review of the Soviet and East European implementation records, raising such issues as: censorship, jamming, cultural repression, and the rights of national minorities and religious groups to preserve and develop their cultures. We reinforced our public stance in private bilateral meetings with the Soviet, Polish and Romanian delegations. The U.S. Delegation also took occasions to meet with and thereby show support for dissident cultural figures in Hungary. The U.S. Delegation also received representatives from a number of non-governmental organizations who travelled to Budapest in connection with the Forum.

Western delegates at the Forum chafed under formal CSCE procedures that regulated discussion through use of a set

speakers' list. Although the West pressed for more flexible procedures to promote free debate among the cultural figures, the East rigidly refused, except on two brief occasions. Nonetheless, cultural personalities from 35 countries met, conversed, exchanged ideas and opened new horizons for each other -- demonstrating the value of direct contact among people. They made many unofficial proposals for improving and expanding East-West cultural relations.

Due to Eastern intransigence, the participating States were unable to reach consensus on a concluding document. None was mandated, although the demand and efforts for a written result ran high among most delegations. The lack of consensus represents the reality of the gap between East and West on matters concerning human rights and fundamental freedoms, pertaining in this instance to the conditions for unhindered cultural activity within and among states.

The United States received enthusiastic support from our NATO allies for proposals intended to strengthen observance of cultural rights and freedoms. Common Western cultural values and a joint determination that the Cultural Forum produce meaningful conclusions are reflected in the draft final document (BCF. 116) that the West tabled when negotiations with the East stalemated. This document identified Western goals for Budapest and the future.

The Eastern approach to the Cultural Forum involved procedural inflexibility, a preference for long speeches listing cultural accomplishments, emphasis on the "historic responsibility" of artists for peace, opposition to Western defense policy, and avoidance of the numerous aspects of the Forum's mandate where Eastern performance fell short. The Soviets and some of their allies sought to drive wedges in the Western position by referring to a European cultural unity, implicitly excluding North America. This theme found little support from Western or neutral delegations.

One event outside the Forum had an impact on those within. The U.S. delegation strongly protested publicly and privately, the Hungarian Government's decision to prevent the International Helsinki Federation from conducting a public, by-invitation-only cultural symposium at a Budapest hotel during the first week of the Forum. This decision violated Hungary's commitment as host to follow the precedent of the Madrid Meeting concerning treatment of non-governmental organizations. The Federation eventually conducted the symposium at a private location, without further interference or harassment from Hungarian authorities, and with Western media representatives in attendance.

Although the Forum could have accomplished much more, overall it was worthwhile and served Western interests in a

number of important ways:

-- The cultural figures from the 35 participating states built bridges among themselves that promote mutual understanding across borders;

-- Soviet and Eastern European delegations had no choice but to hear about their shortcomings in the cultural field from exceptionally articulate private citizens from the West, whose opinion carried irrefutable moral authority;

-- Western attention to the problems and cases of cultural repression and insistence on compliance with the provisions of the Final Act give sustenance to the victims of such repression and others in the East who want their governments to uphold Helsinki commitments; and

-- Although no consensus document was reached (because a good one was not possible), the West has an agreed text that can serve our common interests at the Vienna CSCE Follow-up Conference.

The issues discussed in Budapest and the Western proposals advanced on cultural issues will be returned to when the Vienna CSCE followup meeting convenes in November 1986.

his rights and freedoms; ensure individual freedom to practice and profess religion; consult with religious organizations; favorably consider applications for registration by religious communities; ensure respect for the rights of workers freely to establish and join trade unions and the right of trade unions freely to pursue their activities and other rights.

#### IMPLEMENTATION OF PRINCIPLE SEVEN

Although the Eastern countries gave considerable publicity to their signing of the Final Act and to the Madrid Concluding Document, the Eastern record of compliance with the Helsinki principles has deteriorated in important respects, especially in the Soviet Union. The United States remains dissatisfied with the implementation record of the Eastern countries so far, particularly with regard to Principle Seven. This principle calls on the participating states to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of thought, conscience, religion, or belief as well as the right to "know and act upon" ones rights.

The following section provides a detailed survey of implementation of the Helsinki principles and related provisions of the Madrid Concluding Document. It treats specific cases in an illustrative rather than comprehensive fashion. Lack of information detailing abuses in a given country may not indicate their absence.

Soviet Union The Soviet Union has continued to violate both the letter and spirit of principles guiding relations between states as set forth in the Helsinki Final Act. The Soviet Union persists in its occupation of Afghanistan and in its efforts to eradicate national opposition. In conducting its ruthless war against Afghanistan, the Soviet Union has used chemical weapons, bombed civilian targets, used ground and air forces to destroy villages and crops, and employed weapons intended to cripple or maim noncombatants. The Soviet Union also supports the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia and Vietnam's war against the Cambodian resistance. These actions are in direct and willful violation of the general principles set forth in the Helsinki Final Act, including respect for the inviolability of frontiers, territorial integrity of states, and self-determination of peoples.

Soviet performance in the field of human rights (principle seven) continued to be poor during this 6-month review period. Soviet propaganda continued to allege human rights abuses in the West in an apparent effort to divert attention from the government's own policies. Meanwhile, Soviet persecution of dissidents, refuseniks, and religious activists continued unabated, as did suppression of national minorities and harassment of political prisoners and their families. Article 188-3 of the Soviet Criminal Code, enacted October 1983, makes

infractions of prison camp rules criminal offenses. This law effectively permits indefinite extensions of sentences. It continued to be used regularly against human rights prisoners during this review period. For example, Sergei Khodorovich, administrator of the Russian Social Fund to Aid Political Prisoners and their Families, was re-arrested in camp in March for supposedly violating this article.

Nobel prize laureate Andrey Sakharov apparently remained in exile in the closed city of Gor'kiy during the review period. The Soviet authorities released Yelena Bonner, his wife, in December for medical treatment in the West on condition that she not talk to reporters while abroad. Little current information was available about Dr. Sakharov, who evidently remained under close guard with very few visitors permitted. According to rumor, his health improved somewhat after his wife received permission to obtain Western medical care.

Anatoliy Shcharanskiy, a founding member of the Moscow Helsinki Monitoring Group, was released at the Glienicke Bridge between the G.D.R. and Berlin on February 11, after spending over 9 years in prison on a fabricated charge of espionage. Other Helsinki monitors were less fortunate. Yuriy Orlov continued serving a 5-year term of exile in the Siberian region of Yakutia. He can receive visits from his wife but otherwise is very isolated. His small house has poor heating and no running water. Appeals on his behalf continue to go unheeded by Soviet authorities.

Another member of the Moscow Helsinki Group, Naum Meiman, continued to encounter obdurate resistance as he persistently sought permission for his wife to travel abroad for medical treatment not available in the USSR. Soviet doctors have told Inna Meiman, who suffers from cancer and whose condition was deteriorating during the review period, that they cannot operate again. Although Western hospitals have offered radiotherapy, the Soviet authorities prevented Mrs. Meiman from receiving it.

Helsinki monitor Anatoliy Marchenko was transferred in October from labor camp to prison for a 3 year term, apparently for breaking camp rules. Dr. Anatoliy Koryagin, once a leading force in the Working Commission to Investigate the Use of Psychiatry for Political Purposes, was reportedly sentenced during 1985 to a further 2-year term for resisting force-feeding during a hunger strike.

Some political trials took place in late September 1985, too late for mention in the previous report. Vladimir Albrecht, former member of the Soviet Chapter of Amnesty International, already serving a camp term for "anti-Soviet slander," was tried September 29 and sentenced to an additional 3 1/2 years for malicious hooliganism. Aleksandr Chukayev,

member of a small social democratic group, was sentenced September 27 to at least 5 years in labor camp and 5 more in internal exile for anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda. Lev Timofeyev, a dissident economist, was sentenced September 30 to 6 years in labor camp and 5 in internal exile under the same charge.

While Georgian Helsinki monitor Tengiz Gudava awaited trial for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda", his brother Eduard was arrested November 15 after placing posters in his apartment window calling on the authorities to release Tengiz and cease harassing the family. Eduard Gudava was sentenced January 20 to 4 years for malicious hooliganism, although a police officer told him the day of his arrest that placing signs in his window was not illegal. Two other Helsinki monitors from Tbilisi, Isai and Grigoriy Goldshteyn, emigrated in late March, after a 15 year struggle.

Vladimir Balakhonov, already serving a 12 year camp term for treason upon returning voluntarily to the USSR after defecting while working for the United Nations in Geneva, received an additional 3 years in a strict regime labor camp for "anti-Soviet slander" on December 26. Ukrainian nationalist Petr Ruban was sentenced December 27 to 9 years in labor camp plus 5 years in internal exile for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda." Russian Orthodox dissident Kirill Popov spent the review period awaiting trial.

Information about these political prisoners is scanty because authorities permit very little communication between them and the outside world. Rigid rules severely restrict family visits and the receipt of letters and packages. These privileges are withdrawn at the slightest infraction of camp or prison rules, such as praying or failing to remove one's cap at the approach of a camp official. Even those whose sentences are finished live under restrictions. A new regulation prevents them from entering in Moscow, which cuts them off from friends, relatively comfortable housing, consumer goods, and travel via Moscow. The third violation of this rule is reportedly punishable by imprisonment.

Members of the Group to Establish Trust between the USSR and USA, often referred to as the "unofficial peace committee", were also subject to official harassment. The Group to Establish Trust is an independent group of concerned Soviet citizens whose nonpartisan, nonpolemical approach to the discussion of arms control and confidence-building issues stands in sharp contrast to the statements of the officially-sanctioned Soviet peace committee. Police prevented two peaceful meetings in February by the Group to Establish Trust by placing members under house arrest or taking them into custody. On these occasions, at least four members of the group were taken by the authorities to psychiatric hospitals,



and reportedly were administered drugs causing great discomfort but of no known therapeutic value. Several members were repeatedly warned by the authorities to stop their activities, especially meetings with visiting foreign peace activists, or were harassed by having their telephones cut off. After an extended period of such harassment, Aleksey and Olga Lusnikov were suddenly deported from the Soviet Union.

Tactics such as house arrest were used on December 10, International Human Rights Day, to prevent the traditional demonstration at the Pushkin Monument in central Moscow. Dissidents who were suspected of intending to participate were prevented by plainclothesmen from leaving home or work, or were arrested as they approached the monument. About a dozen persons managed to remove their hats quietly near the statue but were immediately arrested. A woman who began distributing leaflets was taken by police to a psychiatric hospital.

Independent labor unions are not accepted by the Soviet authorities. Existing "unions" are officially described as ideological schools for workers, and are completely controlled by the state-party apparatus. Strikes are not permitted. Labor discipline is enforced in part by the official "unions." The effective suppression of past attempts to organize independent labor unions helps explain the lack of reports of such activity during the current review period.

The Soviet authorities continued to abuse psychiatric facilities during the review period to control and suppress political dissent. Political "patients" were often kept under guard, and were clearly treated differently from ordinary psychiatric patients. In some cases, medical personnel reportedly have said openly that a "patient's" problems would cease if he would stop associating with political dissidents.

Despite commitments under the Helsinki Final Act to facilitate family reunification, the Soviet Union continued to deny exit permission to thousands of its citizens who wish to join relatives living abroad. Jewish emigration continued at a very low level compared to the peak year of 1979, when over 50,000 left the country. The Soviet authorities continued to maintain, in the face of abundant evidence to the contrary, that the vast majority of Jews who wanted to leave the country have already left and that the rate of emigration is declining naturally as fewer and fewer families remain to be reunited. The authorities have also stated that family reunification refers only to those families divided by World War II.

Official public denunciation of Jewish emigration is often accompanied by hostile "anti-Zionist" rhetoric. Soviet propaganda maintained that Israeli and Western intelligence agencies encouraged emigration in order to obtain state secrets from Soviet citizens. It has alleged that "Zionists"

collaborated with fascists during World War II to send many innocent Jews to their death. These "Zionist" elements, so the argument goes, now comprise the ruling circles of Israel, which have inherited Hitler's fascist mantle. The "anti-Zionist Committee of the Soviet Public," an officially sanctioned group, continued to lead the propaganda attack against Jewish refuseniks and "Zionists." Jews living in the Soviet Union have emphasized that the official propaganda makes no meaningful distinction between "Zionists" and Jews in general.

The current review period was marked by a continued crackdown on Jewish (primarily refusenik) cultural activists and teachers of Hebrew. (A refusenik is a Jew who who has been denied permission to emigrate.) Gor'kiy Hebrew teacher Leonid Volvovskiy received a term of 3 years in labor camp for "anti-Soviet slander," a charge based in part on his possession of the novel Exodus. Vladimir Lifshits of Leningrad was arrested January 8, tried March 19 for "anti-Soviet slander," and sentenced to 3 years in a labor camp. Moscow Hebrew teacher Aleksey Magarik was arrested at Tbilisi Airport March 15 after officials claimed they found six grams of hashish in his luggage while he was not present. Jewish refusenik Betsalel Shalolashvili was arrested in Tbilisi March 19 on charges of draft evasion. Other Jewish activists faced occasional KGB questioning, surveillance, disconnected telephones, and other harassment. Leningrad refusenik Albert Burshteyn was jailed for 15 days in November for threatening a work strike to protest the authorities' refusal to allow him to emigrate. Such harassment took place in an atmosphere affected by the continuing official Soviet "anti-Zionist" campaign, which many Soviet Jews believe is understood by both the authorities and the public as anti-semitic in meaning.

Hebrew teacher Yuliy Edelshteyn, serving a term in labor camp for alleged possession of drugs, was denied treatment in a normal hospital despite severe internal injuries suffered in a fall of 13 feet. Hebrew teacher Iosif Begun continued serving his sentence in Chistopol Prison. News about his condition was scanty.

As noted above, Jews faced arrest for actively pursuing their own religious and cultural traditions. Many other religious groups were persecuted as well. Soviet law requires any religious group to register with the authorities and forbids religious indoctrination of children outside the home. Believers of any faith, therefore, face a choice between participating in a group controlled and closely monitored by the authorities and breaking the law by joining an underground religious group. Many Baptists -- both registered and unregistered -- were arrested, including Vsevolod Pozhko of Rovno, Ukraine, sentenced to 8 years on October 25, in part for alleged hard-currency dealings; Yakov Kreker of the Kuibyshev region; and Ivan Plett, arrested a third time in October and

released after a month. Reported arrests of Baptists in October and November include six captured in Moldavia with an underground printing press; former prisoner Aleksey Kozorezov, detained during a church service and warned not to violate a ban on his attending prayer meetings; Vladimir Felippov and Stanislav Chudakov of Leningrad, arrested in November; Leonhard Gotman and Mikhail Pugachev of the Bashkir Assr; and Mikhail Pshenibyn of Moscow Oblast, sentenced to 3 years in strict regime labor camp. Pavel Rytikov, also a Baptist, was arrested January 30 after two official warnings that he had violated administrative surveillance following previous prison terms totalling 10 years.

Many Pentecostal Christians also refused to register and suffered as a result. Pentecostal Bishop Vasily Boyechko of L'vov, arrested in the previous review period, apparently continued to await trial. In December a meeting of Pentecostal leaders from various cities was broken up by the authorities. Ten men from the small Pentecostal community of Chuguyevka, in the Soviet Far East, remained in labor camps. Pentecostals endured official harassment in Vilnius, Moscow, L'vov, and other cities. Two articles in Moscow newspapers harshly attacked Pavel Timonin, a Pentecostalist, calling him lazy and self-centered and criticizing his desire to emigrate.

Even tiny religious groups were not immune to severe pressure. Authorities arrested followers of the Hare Krishna movement in over a dozen different locations, including Moscow, Leningrad, Armenia, and Georgia. Among those convicted or awaiting trial were Vladimir Kustrya, Yuriy Fedchenko, Sergei Priborov, Valentina Samoilova, and Aleksey Baida. The authorities used confinement in psychiatric institutions against the Hare Krishna movement. Jehovah's Witnesses also continued to encounter serious obstacles to the free exercise of their religion.

Russian Orthodox believers whose activities were beyond official supervision also felt the weight of persecution. Boris Razveyev was sentenced to 3 years in labor camp for "anti-Soviet propaganda," while another Orthodox activist, Mikhail Bombin, was taken by police to a psychiatric hospital. Even the closely supervised official Orthodox church was not free of harassment. Police and plainclothesmen continued to restrict access to the few remaining open churches on holidays such as Easter, and young people in particular faced pressure to stay away from church.

Russian Orthodox activist and writer Feliks Svetov was sentenced January 8 to 5 years in internal exile, reduced to 2 years because of his year spent in pre-trial detention. In an unusual step, the authorities permitted Svetov to join his wife, Zoya Krakhmalnikova, already serving a sentence of one year in labor camp and 5 years of internal exile. Russian

Orthodox activist Aleksandr Ogorodnikov, sentenced in 1979 to 6 years in labor camp plus 5 years in internal exile, was not sent to exile in September as scheduled. He was instead sentenced to an additional 2 years in labor camp for violating camp rules, under Article 188-3 of the Soviet Penal Code.

The authorities also published newspaper articles which reveal strong displeasure with the Uniate (Eastern rite) Catholic church of Ukraine. An article published in October in Uzhgorod, in the western Ukraine, stated that "there is no such church here," despite claims by Uniate Catholics of millions of followers. The official press charged past church leaders with treason and described Iosip Terelya, a Catholic leader imprisoned throughout the review period, as a social parasite whose importance was concocted by Western propaganda media. The samizdat "Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Ukraine", which had not been published for several months, reappeared in January 1986 with a special edition devoted to Ukrainian Catholic activist Vasily Kobrin's trial.

The Soviet authorities maintained unabated their attempts to "russify" the Ukraine. Like other non-Russians, Ukrainians are expected to learn the Russian language. Ukrainian cultural and historical objects have been neglected, and according to unconfirmed reports, Uniate churches in the past have been burned. Western visitors to Kiev have commented on how little Ukrainian is actually spoken there. Those who inquire why this is so are frequently told that spoken Ukrainian is regarded by local officials as a manifestation of "bourgeois nationalism" and strongly discouraged. In contrast to the previous review period, there were no reports received in the current period of deaths of Ukrainian prisoners, although Irina Ratushinskaya, a dissident poet of Polish descent from Kiev, has reportedly developed chronic kidney disease owing to harsh conditions of imprisonment and was reported to have had systolic blood pressure reaching as high as 150 in March. The difficult circumstances of Ukrainian human rights activists are reflected in the fact that although Ukrainians account for only 20% of the Soviet population, they account for 40% of all Soviet political prisoners.

The authorities in Lithuania arrested Stanislovas Murauskas and others for operating a secret printing press to make Catholic holy pictures, calendars, and prayer books. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, whose forced annexation by the Soviet Union in 1944 has never been recognized by the United States, have long been characterized by resistance to Russification and culture. According to unconfirmed reports, civil disturbances in Tartu, Estonia, in early October led to the introduction of police reinforcements to halt fighting between Estonians and Russians, and to arrests of several Estonians, including two brothers who raised the flag of independent Estonia over a theater. Despite the influx of Russian settlers and the

subordination of traditional cultures and local languages, the Baltic peoples continued to defend their unique cultures from Russian encroachments.

The Soviet authorities continued to exert steady pressure to encourage Muslim inhabitants of Central Asia and Azerbaijan to abandon their religion, calling it backward and subject to manipulation by foreign enemies. Very few mosques were open for use, and there were few officially recognized clergymen. Muslim clergy not sanctioned by the authorities were attacked in the official press as shiftless vagabonds. A venerated gravesite in Samarkand was destroyed, ostensibly for archeological purposes, in a likely attempt to disrupt religious observances there.

Crimean Tatars, evicted from their homeland at the end of World War II, continued to insist on their right to return there. The authorities reportedly searched Tatar apartments in Central Asia, confiscating documents on the subject of national identity. There have been persistent reports of Tatar families who have tried to return to the Crimea to live and establish farms, but who have been sent away again, often despite the sympathy of their non-Tatar neighbors.

Romania The Government of Romania continues to comply with the first six Helsinki principles and repeatedly advocates them in policy statements, bilateral discussions and international forums. Romania placed on the agenda of the 40th UN General Assembly session an appeal for peaceful settlements of disputes and for non-interference in the domestic affairs of others.

Romania's observance of basic human rights (principle seven) continues to be poor. The Romanian Constitution contains guarantees of human rights and fundamental freedoms. The same document, and Romanian law, in many cases either explicitly limit these guarantees, or set a standard of state control so vague as to make the guarantees meaningless. The Constitution names the Romanian Communist Party as the guiding authority in the country. Under this mandate the Party, the Government of Romania, and its internal security apparatus tolerate no significant opposition. All forms of mass media are tightly controlled. Freedom of conscience is seriously limited in a society where behavior is conditioned on the widespread belief that one out of four of one's neighbors is a police informant, and that almost every conversation might be monitored. Freedoms of association and assembly are limited by these same fears and by government policies which allow meetings and assembly only for officially-approved purposes. During the reporting period, a new, unpublished decree was promulgated tightening existing laws requiring prior approval for many types of contacts with foreigners, and requiring unauthorized contacts to be reported to the police. However, as of the end of the reporting period, implementing regulations

apparently had not been decided upon.

In discussing human rights, Romanian officials often assert that economic, "quality-of-life" benefits are the most significant human right. They say that first and foremost, citizens have a right to the essentials of life: food, shelter, employment, economic security. By implication, lesser standards of performance should be tolerated in the area of human freedoms, in order to achieve rapid progress toward the primary goal. Romanian performance in the area of economic rights, mentioned in paragraph two of principle seven, is poor by any European standard. Once a primary agricultural supplier and a country whose living standard compared favorably with Bulgaria's and the Soviet Union's, since 1980 Romania has become a country where even basic foodstuff are rationed, and often simply unavailable. Its living standard is Europe's lowest, save Albania's.

For the second year in row, the winter of 1985-86 left many residents of the nation's capital with little or no heat, no hot water, and electricity only a few hours each day. One Western visitor called Bucharest the "darkest and coldest capital city in Europe." Similar electricity shortages were reported throughout the country although electrical outages continued to occur regularly in residential areas, business and the center of Bucharest were less affected, largely due to extensive government efforts to redirect available power. Since coal was generally unavailable homeowners turned to wood. Private cars and taxis were banned from the streets for a month in Bucharest and public transportation was unable to cope. Because the winter weather was considerably milder this year than last, the degree of hardship was less by comparison. Some basic food items continued to be rationed and others were unavailable. A balanced diet was difficult for most Romanians to maintain, and one foreign doctor reported cases of malnutrition, especially among old people and children.

Despite constitutional guarantees, the practice of religion in Romania continues to be circumscribed by the government. Officially-tolerated religious activity is restricted to the 14 denominations officially recognized by the government. Attempts to gather for worship by members of officially-unrecognized faiths are treated as "illegal assemblies," with participants sometimes arrested and fined. Among the denominations refused recognition by the government of Romania are the Church of the Latter Day Saints (Mormons), Jehovah's Witnesses and the Nazarenes. The Uniate, or Eastern-rite Catholic Church was forcibly absorbed into the Romanian Orthodox Church in 1948. The press campaign against religion in general has continued, but without repetition of earlier attacks on specific denominations.

Romania's fourteen officially-recognized religions are

administratively supervised by the government's Department of Religious Affairs, which subsidizes salaries of the country's clergy (although Baptists do not accept official subventions), and approves building permits, seminary admissions and printing of religious material. The degree of authority exercised by the Department of Religious Affairs varies among the religious groups. Government policy tends to restrict the Evangelistic "neo Protestant" faiths more than the Romanian Orthodox Church (to which a large majority of Romanians belong), or other long-established faiths such as the Roman Catholic, Lutheran, Jewish, Islamic, or Hungarian Reformed Church.

The growth of officially recognized "neo-Protestant" faiths -- Pentecostals, Seventh Day Adventists, Evangelical Brethren, and Baptists -- during the last 15 years has led to continued friction with the government. Official attempts to discourage these groups are stimulated by their insistence on the primacy of religious belief over state authority in matters of conscience and by a stated government policy that as the "historic" church of the vast majority of Romanians the Romanian Orthodox church has a special position in society.

During this period there was no major improvement in the government's performance on repair of existing churches and construction of new ones, although it's approach was slightly less confrontational. During this period two churches were ordered to dismantle allegedly illegal add-on construction but, as of April 1, the authorities had taken no arbitrary action in either case. Another congregation recently won a postponement of a court-ordered repossession of their church building. In October a Baptist church under construction in Blaj was demolished because authorities claimed the building permit given to the church was defective. Other churches previously destroyed by authorities on similar grounds have made no progress in re-erecting their buildings. One Baptist pastor facing prosecution on what appears a false charge is free while awaiting trial. Three others (Bunian and Benjamin Cocar, and Ioan Stef) have emigrated after a long history of government harassment. Many others continue to be kept under scrutiny by state security officials.

Romania's minority populations of Hungarians, Gypsies, Germans and others live in a country infused with Romanian nationalism. School texts, history books, and mass media purvey a Romanian version of history which often ignores or belittles the role these minorities have played in Romanian history. There is a mounting body of evidence suggesting that, despite its public pronouncement, the Romanian Government systematically seeks to integrate and absorb these other cultures within its image of a society peopled by the "new socialist (Romanian) man." Although some basic schooling is available in minority languages, recent administrative measures make it increasingly difficult for minorities to get higher

education in their own language and to enjoy more sophisticated forms of their ethnic culture, generating discontent among Hungarians and Germans. There is little evidence of any economic discrimination -- minorities have suffered along with the Romanian majority. Prominent non-official members of ethnic minorities are targetted for special surveillance.

The Government of Romania officially condemns terrorism and seeks to prevent its territory from being used for the operation, organization, or commission of terrorist activities. It does, however, recognize a number of "national liberation movements," all of which espouse terrorism, although it insists that it has used dialogue with these organizations in an effort to moderate their tactics. The PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization), SWAPO (South West Africa People's Organization), and the ANC (African National Congress) have diplomatic or quasi-diplomatic missions in Bucharest. The Romanian government has expressed interest in cooperation to suppress terrorism.

Domestically, a large number of Middle Eastern students among the estimated 20,000 to 30,000 foreign students, present a potential terrorist problem for Romania. Among these students are thought to be represented almost all of the radical Middle Eastern terrorist factions. Following the March Gulf of Sidra incident, extraordinary new Romanian security measures around the U.S. Embassy showed the GOR's keen awareness of this problem. There are apparently only relatively few Libyan students in Romania. Some 100 Iranian students hastily departed Bucharest for Tehran in March. Following the assassination of a senior Jordanian diplomat in Bucharest in December 1984, security measures aimed at this student community increased and continued during this reporting period. Authorities performing a routine search of student dormitories reportedly found explosives.

Labor Unions are integrated with and controlled by the party and state. There are continuing unconfirmed reports of instances of labor unrest. In the last reporting period Romania refused to appear before an International Labor Organization commission investigating charges, stemming from the suppression in 1979 of a fledgling independent labor union, that Romania denies freedom of association to its workers. This situation remains unchanged.

Poland The Polish Government has shown sensitivity to Western statements on the human rights situation in Poland and has firmly rebuffed them as infringements on Polish sovereignty. The Polish Government has continued to condemn certain Western broadcasts, including those by VOA and RFE, as interference in Poland's internal affairs.

During the past 6 months, Poland was not involved in any



situation which could entail the threat or use of force. In general terms, Polish policy in this regard is identical to that of the Soviet Union. Poland was not involved in any frontier violation disputes. It has maintained peaceful, unviolated frontiers with all neighbors. Poland and the USSR negotiated and signed a new maritime boundary treaty during the reporting period.

Official Polish sensitivity regarding the permanence of the postwar borders of Europe, "as established at the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences," remains acute. The Polish Government and official media regularly and stridently accuse certain political forces, especially in the Federal Republic of Germany, of "revanchism," or harboring a desire to recover formerly German territories lost to Poland at the end of World War II. Polish leaders particularly stressed this theme during West German SPD leader Brandt's visit to Warsaw in December. Polish statements supporting the peaceful settlement of disputes and deploring the use of force are similar to Soviet foreign policy positions.

During the reporting period, Polish officials frequently expressed concern over what they considered to be regular interference in Polish internal affairs by Western governments in general and the United States in particular. The Polish Government criticized the formation by leading U.S. political figures of the Solidarity Endowment in November 1985 as "a blatant interference" in Polish internal politics that would fund domestic political groups hostile to the Polish state. The government accuses many political opposition groups of being the beneficiaries of major foreign financial support and has prosecuted activists on treason charges for maintaining trade union and other contacts abroad. Additionally, Polish officials regularly criticize the Polish language broadcasting of VOA, RFE and other Western stations as further interference, and regularly jam these shortwave broadcasts. Medium-wave frequencies are unjammed. Polish authorities frequently prevent Western diplomats and journalists from observing political demonstrations and trials, citing this as a legitimate defense against foreign interference in internal Polish affairs.

Despite claims of normalization, Polish authorities continued to restrict severely most forms of independent political and trade union activity. Concern over the number and treatment of political prisoners mounted as a round of pre-election arrests swelled the ranks of political prisoners by the end of October to 368 by officials statements. (Some independent sources set the number above 400.) In contrast, the number of political prisoners one year previously stood at fewer than 40. Polish leaders in September and October began hinting to Western reporters that an amnesty might be declared for political prisoners as a sign of normalization if there

were a successful outcome in the SEJM elections. Domestic political protest over the issue grew steadily throughout autumn and culminated in the observance of "political prisoners week", November 3-11. Human rights activists organized masses and exhibits in churches throughout Poland and circulated petitions demanding the prisoners' release. According to the activists, the petitions attracted 35,000 signatories by year's end. Advocates of a complete amnesty were disappointed, however, with the announcement on November 9 that in response to a "humanitarian initiative" from the Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth (PRON), the government had ordered a review of all cases of persons held for "non-criminal offenses." Prisoners who had benefited from general amnesties in 1983 and 1984, or who were considered to be "socially dangerous", would not be eligible for release. Although by year's end this "initiative" resulted in the release of 218 political prisoners, or little more than half the total, such well-known prisoners as Adam Michnik, Bogdan Lis, Wladyslaw Frasnyniuk, Tadeusz Jedynek, Czeslaw Bielecki and others remained behind bars. By March, the number of prisoners again increased to as many as 260, according to some knowledgeable sources.

Reports of police mistreatment and abuse of prisoners and detainees further exacerbated the political prisoner issue. The most dramatic allegations of police brutality arose from the November 2 death of 19-year old Gdansk University student Marcin Antonowicz, which resulted from injuries sustained after being taken into police custody in Olsztyn on October 18 (ironically, the first anniversary of the kidnap/murder of Father Jerzy Popieluszko). An official inquiry reported that the boy's injuries resulted from his fall from a moving police van during an escape attempt. Though the government exonerated police of any wrongdoing, widespread speculation persisted that Antonowicz's injuries may have resulted from a blow from a policeman's club. Throughout the reporting period, human rights activists regularly charged official complicity in the beating and torture of prisoners and detainees in jails and police stations as well as in the harassment, beatings and, in some cases, even the deaths of local-level Solidarity activists. The Polish Government flatly rejected such charges, and defended its human rights record.

Political trials in Poland continued to attract attention during the reporting period. In the most widely-publicized case, Gdansk prosecutors indicted Solidarity leader Lech Walesa on charges of slandering local election officials through statements questioning the accuracy of the results of the SEJM elections. Despite appeals, including that of the U.S. Government, Walesa went on trial in Gdansk on February 11, with selected Western journalists admitted to the courtroom. The case was promptly dismissed. The outcome of the Walesa case did not foreshadow any greater official leniency for independent political activity, however. On February 21, the

Supreme Court ruled that it would not overturn the convictions of Solidarity activists Michnik, Lis and Frasnyniuk, whose defense lawyers in an appeal had charged wide-ranging deviations from proper legal procedure in the defendants' May 1985 trial. The court reduced the sentences of Lis and Michnik by 6 months, reasoning that the two were not "recidivists." The sentence of previously-convicted Frasnyniuk remained fixed at 3 1/2 years and he is reportedly being mistreated in prison.

After nearly a year of imprisonment, five activists of the Confederation for an Independent Poland (KPN) led by Leszek Moczulski went on trial on March 3 in Warsaw Provincial Court for engaging in "anti-state activity." KPN is best known for publishing an anti-Communist, anti-Soviet underground journal and for organizing symposia on Polish national independence. Court authorities throughout the trial adamantly refused admission to all Western observers, despite a number of vacant seats inside the courtroom. Moczulski and his associate face prison sentences of up to 10 years for their political activism.

In a show of support for peace activist Marek Adamkiewicz, 30 Polish Army draftees from Gdansk, Krakow, Warsaw, and Wroclaw in September and October turned in their draft cards to the Ministry of National Defense. Adamkiewicz had earlier been convicted on charges of refusing upon his induction into the Army to take the Polish Army oath because it pledges loyalty to the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact Allies. He is now serving a 2 1/2 year prison sentence. In trials around the country in December and January, the draftees were ordered to pay fines of 30,000 to 50,999 zloties (2-3 months' wages for an average Pole) or to serve 3-month prison terms. All refused to pay the fines, and some have already begun serving their sentences. One of the Gdansk draftees, 21-year old Wojciech Jankowski, refused military service for reasons of conscience but offered to perform social work for an equivalent duration. The military court in Gdansk instead convicted him and sentenced him to 3 1/2 years in prison.

The Polish authorities have continued their selective crackdown on Poland's underground opposition movement. Bogdan Borusewicz, underground Solidarity's second-in-command, was arrested in January by Gdansk police during a surprise raid on an underground printing operation. Police have arrested a number of lesser-known activists during the reporting period under similar circumstances. To the evident frustration of police, underground Solidarity's leader Zbigniew Bujak remains active in hiding. Authorities have moved quickly to use newly-adopted court procedures (passed by the SEJM in May 1985) to convict and imprison political offenders within 48 hours of arrest. However, regulations against underground activity are not enforced with uniform severity, and many of those apprehended in underground publishing or broadcasting operations have recently been let off with fines or suspended

sentences.

Despite the clamp-down on independent political activity, the government still generally permits wide-ranging debates on non-political issues and makes an active effort to educate the populace at large about rights and entitlements they may enjoy within the political and ideological boundaries of the system. The government regularly and strongly encourages public participation in state- and party-sanctioned consultations on a variety of issues and decisions, occasionally producing lively results.

The Polish Government allows a high degree of religious freedom, although it has maintained its long-term policy of restricting religious influence. Churches are free to preach and proselytize and, to a lesser extent, to build and publish. The Roman Catholic Church continues to broadcast Sunday Mass on state-run radio; the smaller Protestant denominations do so on a rotating basis. The government continues to allow religious gatherings, such as pilgrimages and conventions, without significant interference. Nevertheless, the government makes it clear that it expects the gatherings to maintain a purely religious nature. Activist clergy who openly support Solidarity and the intellectual opposition are targets of harassment. Although the vast majority of the populace are religious adherents, persons who openly profess religious belief usually find it difficult to rise to leading positions in government and industry. Recently, for example, the party and government have stressed the secular nature of Polish schools and have begun "verifications" of teachers' religious orientations.

The Roman Catholic Church is the predominant religious force and the single largest independent social institution. A substantial majority of all ages and social groups participates regularly in Catholic religious services. The next largest community is the Orthodox Church which claims approximately 800,000 adherents. Approximately a dozen other religious denominations exist in Poland, and the Government of Poland allows them to practice their faiths freely as long as they avoid activities the government considers political.

The government bans labor union pluralism and the officially sanctioned National Trade Union Alliance (OPZZ) continues to be the only legally-recognized labor organization in Poland. Authorities often fire, arrest, and imprison activists of the "de-legalized" Solidarity trade union. However, independent union activity enjoys broad worker allegiance. Solidarity supporters have remained active on many worker self-management councils, where they have achieved some noticeable successes in defending the rights of workers.

On October 21, the OPZZ took over 21.5 billion zloties

(approximately \$125 million) worth of assets the government had confiscated from Solidarity upon the imposition of martial law. Despite this new financial strength, the appointment of OPZZ Chief Alfred Miodowicz to the Council of State, and newly-won consultative rights on many issues in the workplace, the membership in the official unions continued to languish around the 5.5 million mark. At its peak, Solidarity claimed 10 million members.

Despite its official imprimatur, the OPZZ has shown some opposition to the government's economic and housing policies, particularly in response to government decisions on pricing and working hours. Workers are strongly encouraged by the regime to join the new unions. The OPZZ belongs to the World Federation of Trade Unions, and it has regular contacts with the trade union organizations of other Communist countries. Poland does not participate in the ILO.

The Polish Government officially subscribes to the principle of equality for all citizens, regardless of ethnic or religious background, age or sex, and generally adheres to this in practice. There is no officially-sanctioned or institutionalized discrimination against any social group. Though generally ethnically homogenous, Poland has some ethnic and linguistic minorities, most prominently Byelorussians and Ukrainians. Many of these two groups are of the Orthodox faith. There are a number of small Protestant communities, as well as a very small group of Muslims and a few thousand Jews. The Polish Government says that there is no German ethnic minority in Poland, a claim disputed by the F.R.G.

Though women have equal rights under the law in both theory and practice, traditional social views of women as wives, mothers, and homemakers have somewhat retarded their advancement to high positions in Polish society. However, a large majority of working-age women are employed in Poland, and equal opportunity in education and the professions have enabled many women to reach positions of responsibility in a number of spheres.

Poland engages in many bilateral and multilateral cultural, scientific, economic, consular, military, educational, labor and recreational agreements which involve exchanges, participation in conferences, and fulfillment of obligations. Poland is a member of the United Nations and related organizations, the Warsaw Pact, and the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance. The Polish Government adopts a carefully legalistic approach to the question of international obligations.

In its public statements, the Polish Government generally condemns all forms of terrorism, but often accompanies these condemnations with expressions of understanding of the

political conditions which gave rise to terrorism. In working to prevent terrorism, the Polish Government has recently stepped up security patrols at Warsaw's international airport. Poland is not known to maintain facilities for the training of terrorists, nor has it been known to be the base of any terrorist attacks.

Hungary Although some disturbing developments took place during the reporting period, Hungary improved its already relatively good human rights record. During this period, authorities lifted the one outstanding police surveillance order (a form of limited house arrest) which was imposed for political reasons against Gyorgy Krasso, a dissident economist, 1956 activist, and former political prisoner. Also in October, the state released some minor figures including rock band members who had been incarcerated for singing anti-state songs. It also granted amnesty to a theater director who ran afoul of the anti-pornography regulations.

In another positive development, dissidents who had failed for years to secure a passport but had kept their applications current finally obtained them. Even Transylvanian-born Gaspar Miklos Tamas received permission to travel to the West for the first time in his life. (In previous years, Ministry of the Interior officials had informed Tamas that he could only travel to the West if he agreed not to return to Hungary.) None of the dissidents who have left the country have experienced any problems returning. A few have taken more than one trip abroad since they received passports and exit permission last year.

One of the setbacks during this reporting period took place during the opening days of the CSCE Budapest Cultural Forum. When organizers of the Vienna-based International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights (IHF) attempted to hold a private seminar for writers, including a number of Hungarian and other dissidents, the Government of Hungary refused to grant IHF permission to meet in a downtown hotel. In place of the hotel, the 3-day program was conducted in private homes without further government interference. The authorities did not and have not to date interfered with the seminar's Hungarian organizers.

On February 8, the Hungarian environmental group called the "Duna Circle" planned an "environmental walk" from Batthany Squire in Buda to Margit Island in a display of opposition to Budapest's participation in a joint Hungarian-Czechoslovakian dam complex on the Danube. West German Greens and Austrian environmentalists were invited. In response to police pressure, the circle called off the walk several days before it was scheduled to take place. Nevertheless, a group of about 80, primarily Austrians, decided to march anyway. As they proceeded towards Margit Island, they were charged by baton swinging police who, according to eyewitness accounts beat

several participants and used a mace-like gas on at least one Austrian video camera operator as he was being detained.

A second incident this year involving the police and street crowds occurred on March 15, the anniversary of the ill-fated Hungarian revolt against the Hapsburgs. This year, demonstrators became angry after a young woman was arrested for soliciting funds for a dissident. According to reports, police handling of the crowd was fairly restrained during the morning and afternoon encounters with demonstrators. In the evening, however, the authorities changed their tactics, trapped hundreds of demonstrators on one of the Danube bridges, beat some of them with batons, and confiscated or damaged identity documents.

On January 16 and March 13, the police conducted house searches of young dissident writer and samizdat distributor Jenó Nagy who works for the independent AB Press. Nagy was subjected to other forms of harassment between the two house searches primarily relating to his samizdat distribution activities. Nagy received some stiff fines for violating press regulations. During the same period, Samizdat writer György Gado also had his house searched and, like Nagy, was also fined. As noted in previous implementation reports, the imposition of stiff fines for violations of press regulations are not new. Notwithstanding what happened to Nagy and Gado, other Samizdat publications such as Beszelo, Hirmondo, Duna Circle and the Hungarian Press of Transylvania continued functioning as usual.

The settled relations between the churches and the state continued during the reporting period. The Catholic Church and the State Office for Church Affairs signed an agreement in late 1985 permitting laymen to engage in some pastoral work in Hungarian churches. This agreement gives laymen selected by the Church and approved by the state permission to teach catechism in church buildings and to assist priests in parish work. Roman Catholic and other conscientious objectors to military service continue to be tried and sentenced. We believe there are at least 10-15 currently serving prison terms of from 1-3 years. Some Western sources claim there may be upwards of 150 Catholics currently serving in Hungarian prisons as conscientious objectors to military service. We know that Roman Catholics are not offered the possibility of alternative service as are Nazarenes, Adventists, and other small religious groups.

Hungary's record of cooperation with overseas organizations interested in affairs affecting the tiny Jewish community (less than one percent of the population) continued during the reporting period. Trade prospects and tourism with Israel continued to improve, as signified by Israel's recent decision to waive visa requirements for Hungarian passport holders.

The Hungarian Government has taken some positive actions in response to terrorism during the reporting period. Following the airport slayings in Vienna, the Government of Hungary cooperated with Austrian authorities to trace the movements of the terrorists who transited Hungary. In addition, they instituted a requirement that all Arabs who wish to visit Hungary must first obtain visas at consulates and embassies abroad instead of at the airport or border crossing points. The Hungarians have also shown a willingness to cooperate with other countries in efforts to confront the terrorist threat.

German Democratic Republic During this reporting period, the G.D.R. stopped allowing many, though not all, third-world nationals from transiting the G.D.R. without proper visas for their final destinations, i.e., Denmark, Sweden, and the F.R.G. However, the G.D.R. has so far refused to cut off the flow of these third-world transients, so-called asylum seekers, to West Berlin. The G.D.R. specifically excluded West Berlin from the unilateral pledge it made February 1, 1986 to stop this practice in regard to the F.R.G.

There have been no changes in G.D.R. practices regarding the remaining five of the first six principles. The G.D.R. has not used or threatened force; it has respected territorial integrity of states; not settled disputes by other than peaceful means; and there is no clear proof of G.D.R. intervention into the internal affairs of other countries. The G.D.R. continued its strong support for so-called national liberation movements in developing countries.

The G.D.R. continues to restrict the fundamental freedoms of thought, conscience, religion, and belief among its people. The activities of the Ministry of State Security's secret police are pervasive. Without judicial controls, the police may install listening devices, open private mail, or interrogate whomever they choose.

With the exception of church-sponsored events held on church grounds, groups are not allowed to organize events without official approval. Participants in some meetings on church grounds have encountered difficulties with G.D.R. authorities.

Reported examples of G.D.R. violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms during this reporting period include the following:

- o The well-known G.D.R. economist Hermann von Berg, formerly advisor to G.D.R. Premier Willi Stoph, was dismissed from his position as Professor at Humboldt University because he permitted the unauthorized publication in the F.R.G. of his recent book on the European Economic Community.



o A former G.D.R. political prisoner stated, after being released to the F.R.G., that he was imprisoned for 16 months for no other crime than singing the West German national anthem in public.

There were also some positive developments to note. As mentioned in chapter one, emigration figures are moderately encouraging. The G.D.R. also seems to be experimenting with some travel relaxation. On rare occasions spouses are now allowed to travel to the West together for family visits, whereas this was unheard of in previous years.

In addition, there is a continuing trend toward more extensive and positive treatment of G.D.R. churches in the official press. The election of a new leadership of the Protestant Church Federation evoked a widely publicized letter of congratulations from state and party Chief Honecker, which was complimentary in its assessment of the role of Christians in G.D.R. society. G.D.R. Protestant Church participation in an international church meeting on human contacts also received positive media treatment. During this reporting period, too, the leadership of the Catholic Church in the G.D.R. announced publicly that it has received G.D.R. Government sanction for a general convention of East German Catholics in July 1987. Nevertheless, Christian Scientists and Jehovah's Witnesses remain under court orders restricting their freedom of religion.

In November 1985 the G.D.R. released from detention without prosecution a number of conscientious objectors who had refused all military service whatsoever. The Protestant Church was active in promoting the cause of these young men. In addition, the G.D.R. has not so far moved against four G.D.R. human rights activists who sent a letter to the G.D.R. Head of State demanding greater human rights.

Self-determination by means of democratic elections is unknown in the G.D.R. Every 5 years G.D.R. citizens are presented with a list of candidates, most unopposed, for the "People's Chamber" (Volkskammer) and various local assemblies (Volksvertretungen). Though a 1976 election law states that voting is secret, it is not in fact always so. East Germans who refuse to vote or who reject entire ballots may suffer reprisals.

Foreign diplomats in the G.D.R. are effectively protected by G.D.R. security forces. However, the G.D.R. reportedly provides military training to members of groups which have been associated with terrorism in the past.

Only government-controlled unions are allowed. Strikes are not permitted in the G.D.R., and union assemblies are strictly controlled by the State. G.D.R. unions are a captive political

arm of the Government and are used to transmit and carry out official government and party policy.

Czechoslovakia Czechoslovak performance in respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms (Principle VII) remains unsatisfactory and has not improved over the past 6 months.

Inside Czechoslovakia, implementation of the Final Act is monitored by a small group of private citizens who are signatories of "Charter 77." An associated group, "The Committee for the Defense of the Unjustly Persecuted" (VONS) gathers and publicizes information concerning individual cases of human rights abuses. The Charter has existed for 9 years, and VONS for 8, despite official attempts to dismantle them. In the past couple of years, Chartists have reported some abatement in official persecution. Although they and their families continue to suffer discrimination in employment and education, there have been fewer arrests and trials, and some lessening in the intensity of other forms of harassment, e.g., house searches, interrogations, short-term detentions and intrusive surveillance. At present, four Chartists are serving prison terms ranging from 7 months to 12 years (Petr Cibulka: 7 months for "insulting the nation"; Walter Kania: 2 years for "harming the interest of the republic abroad"; Frantisek Veis: 12 years for "espionage"; and Jiri Wolf" 6 years for "subversion").

Four other Charter signatories, who previously served prison terms, are subject to "protective supervision" (Ladislav Lis, Jiri Guntorad, Frantisek Starek, and Ivan Jirous). The conditions they must abide by differ in each case, but they include travel restrictions, curfews, and the necessity to report frequently to the police -- in Mr. Lis's cases, for instance, more than seven times a week. The imposition of such a regime -- intended for habitual violent offenders -- against persons who have never committed a violent crime is an infringement of fundamental freedoms.

Freedom of conscience remains severely restricted and there has been an upsurge in reports of persecution of religious activists during the past 6 months. The government bans certain proselytizing groups outright (e.g., Jehovah's Witnesses) and intervenes arbitrarily in the operation of all other religious bodies. Religious education of children and intending clergy is strictly controlled, and unofficial gatherings such as privately celebrated masses, prayer meetings, or educational sessions are forbidden. Male religious orders have been banned since 1950, and women's orders are barred from accepting new members. All clergymen require state licenses and all promotions must be approved by the authorities. Only a small number of new candidates are granted licenses, and these licenses can be revoked at any time, without explanation. Clergymen who continue to follow

their calling after losing their licenses are subject to criminal sanctions. The supply of religious literature is inadequate, and efforts to supplement it by "underground" printing or unauthorized imports are punished harshly.

Specific cases of persecution of religious activists that have come to light over the past 6 months include:

- o House searches, interrogations and/or detentions of at least 40 people in the Brno-Gottwaldov area in November 1985 on suspicion of printing and distributing religious literature. As of April 1, three persons remain in police custody with no trial in sight (Pavel Dudr, Jaromir Nemeč and Augustin Navratil), and a number of others have criminal charges pending against them.

- o Withdrawal of clergymen's licenses from three Catholic priests (Matej Nemeth, Rudolf Chudy and Anton Srholec) reportedly in connection with their participation in last summer's Velehrad pilgrimage.

- o Interrogations and judicial harassment of Bystrik Janik, an unlicensed Catholic priest believed to be active in the banned Franciscan order, and Viktor Trstensky, and unlicensed priest who was imprisoned in the past.

- o Arrest of two Slovak Protestants in August on charges of illegal transport of religious literature (Jan Vecan and Marek Rohacek); and trial of three Slovak Protestants on similar charges in October (Jan Juhascik Sr., Jan Juhascik Jr., and Rudolf Sobanos).

The only positive development during the reporting period was the dropping of criminal charges against Jan Keller, a former minister of the Czech Brethren Evangelical Church, whose clergyman's license was revoked in 1984. Criminal charges stemming from informal youth groups Keller had organized, were finally withdrawn in February 1986, after 2000 people signed a petition in his defense, and an unprecedented number of church officials spoke out on his behalf. However Reverend Keller remains barred from returning to his clergyman's practice.

Independent organizations are not permitted in Czechoslovakia. Membership in the state trade union, the "Revolutionary Workers' Movement" (ROH), is virtually compulsory, and the ROH is controlled from the top, not the bottom. Independent trade unions are forbidden, as are strikes, and other forms of independent labor activities. Intellectuals such as artists, writers, and others are organized in professional associations which are under strict party control.

The government's unwillingness to tolerate independent

initiatives on the part of these organizations continued to be evident during the reporting period in the saga of the Jazz Section of the Czech Musicians Union. The Jazz Section was a legally-constituted association of 6000 jazz fans throughout Czechoslovakia. It organized jazz festivals and sponsored publications on music and the arts for its members. In March 1985, the Jazz Section was dissolved under a 1968 statute banning "counterrevolutionary activity." Leaders of the section protested, and addressed a series of letters and petitions to the authorities. The result was surveillance, interrogations, loss of their jobs, and other forms of harassment. In December criminal charges were filed against the Jazz Section's chairman Karel Srp, and in January his passport was confiscated. But despite the pressure from the authorities, the Jazz Section, thus far, continues to function.

Individual initiatives in the ecological area have been treated even more harshly during the reporting period. In November 1985, two young ecologists, Pavel Krivka and Pavel Skoda, were sentenced to prison terms of 3 years and 20 months respectively for "subversion" and "incitement". Their "crime" involved a letter to a West German friend, and a map detailing the ecologically threatened areas of Czechoslovakia. Diplomatic observers and friends were denied access to their "open" trial in Hradec Kralove and their appeal hearing in Prague.

Czechoslovakia publicly maintains its opposition to all forms of international terrorism. To what extent official internal policy and actions mirror this public stance is impossible to say. The Western press has reported that there are terrorist training camps located in Czechoslovakia, and that Czechoslovak territory has been used by terrorists for transit and other purposes.

Bulgaria For the most part, the Government of Bulgaria carried out its obligations contained in Principles One through Six and Principles Nine and Ten. During this period, as in the past, Bulgarian Government policies violated Principles Seven and Eight: respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and self-determination. The authorities have continued the repression of the ethnic Turkish minority, maintained their pressure against religion and against those who attempted to expand human rights and fundamental freedoms.

The Government of Bulgaria's campaign to forcibly change the names of ethnic Turkish citizens has ended; the preliminary results of the 1985 census make no mention of nationalities in Bulgaria other than Bulgarians. There are, however, credible reports of resistance by ethnic Turks to assimilation and of the continued arrest and imprisonment of resisters. For the most part, ethnic Turkish villages are now pacified and curfews in some have been lifted. However, members of the "Red Beret"

paramilitary organization still patrol in some areas. Although there have been reports of ethnic Turks being sent to prison camps in Belene Island and Sliven, there were no reports of any killings by the security forces during the reporting period, nor was there any evidence of cases in which the regular military forces have been called out, as in the past, to assist civilian security authorities. The regime still restricts the movements of ethnic Turks with a series of road checkpoints. Ethnic Turks complain that fines are still imposed on those who attempt to speak Turkish or wear Turkish dress and signs in public establishments forbidding the speaking of Turkish have been seen by travelers. The Turkish language is also forbidden in schools. In many villages, the only Bulgarian is the school teacher who has been assigned to ensure that students learn Bulgarian and to indoctrinate them in communism. Turkish men fulfilling their military obligations are still inducted into construction battalions in the Army -- they do not serve in regular armed units.

Although Bulgaria is a communist country, many ethnic Turks have title to real property that has been in their families for generations. Others have more recently purchased property; as Bulgarian citizens, they are allowed to own their place of residence. There have been reports that the militia is forcing ethnic Turks in some locations to surrender their title documents and that Bulgarians have been told not to sell any property to ethnic Turks. This practice may be the precursor to the transfer of ethnic Turks to other regions where they will be broken into in smaller groups and more easily assimilated.

The Government of Bulgaria has continued to suppress religion. The most visible target has been the Muslim religion, as the authorities have coupled the suppression of Islam with the campaign to assimilate ethnic Turks. Authorities have closed some mosques and limited activities at others only to Fridays. Muslim rites such as circumcision, weddings and funerals are forbidden. One source reported a recent trial in Kurdzhali where an ethnic Turkish father was sentenced to one year in prison for having his son circumcised. The Koran is not freely available in Bulgaria, since the Government of Bulgaria does not permit it to be printed locally or imported from abroad. The Bulgarian Government has also not permitted Bulgarian Muslims to participate in the pilgrimage to Mecca.

The Bulgarian Orthodox Church, on the other hand, enjoys privileged status, and in return loyally supports the regime's domestic and foreign policies. Even so, the regime keeps a close watch on the Church's activities. Armenian Christian, Jewish, Roman Catholic and Protestant congregations also function in Bulgaria. While the Armenians and Jews claim no conflicts with authorities, Bulgarian Government relations with

Catholics and certain Protestant groups range from tense to hostile. As with the Koran, the importation of Bibles is forbidden. The last Bulgarian-printed Bible dates from 1982, when it was printed only in small numbers.

Bulgarian Government repressions of dissidents and human rights advocates continues. During the period, for example, one man who was sentenced to 5 months' imprisonment and 2 years' restriction to a particular town for violating the terms of an administrative order limiting his movements. According to a dissident formerly confined at the Debelt forced labor camp, the guards there delegate the beating of prisoners to muscular inmates. Political offenders are subject to forced labor. Prisoners at the Devnia camp are assigned the most hazardous jobs at the Devnia chemical plant. Occasionally, arrestees are charged with having committed a "crime" such as visiting a foreign embassy. The contents of private telephone conversations between one well-known dissident and Embassy officers featured prominently in the court indictment against him, which alleged that he had "slandered" the Bulgarian state.

After what appeared to be a significant relaxation in Bulgarian practices towards access to embassies earlier in the year, access was suddenly cut off with the erection of barricades around our Embassy in Sofia late in 1985. The Bulgarian Government placed the barricades around the Embassy claiming a "terrorist threat," but was unwilling to provide any credible information regarding the alleged threat. The "threat" evolved just as an increased number of Bulgarians were starting to visit the Embassy's Press and Culture section daily.

The barricades have successfully cut off access to the Embassy for most Bulgarians. Even consular clients are often told they first must obtain permission from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs before they may enter the Embassy. Foreign diplomats and American citizens also have been denied access by over-zealous militiamen assigned to check documents in front of the Embassy. Other Western diplomats have noticed an increase in similar "security" measures around their embassies.

During the period, the Bulgarian Government made significant improvements in controls at Sofia airport to prevent terrorism or air-piracy through the installation of new X-ray machines at departure holding areas. Authorities have also stepped up tarmac patrols, as well as stationing "Red Beret" paramilitary forces in the terminals and in armored cars just outside. Despite these positive measures, the Bulgarian Government has been generally reluctant to cooperate with Western governments in sharing information about known or suspected terrorists.

DOCUMENT ON CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES AND CERTAIN ASPECTS OF SECURITY AND DISARMAMENT

The signatories to the Helsinki Final Act are required by the Act's Document on Confidence-Building Measures and Certain Aspects of Security and Disarmament to give prior notification of "major military maneuvers exceeding a total of 25,000 troops, independently or combined with possible air or naval components." Notification is required for maneuvers that take place on the territory, in Europe, of any participating State, and must be made 21 days or more in advance of the start of the maneuver. The notification "will contain information on the designation, if any, the general purpose of and the States involved in the maneuver, and the type or types and numerical strength of the forces engaged, and the area and estimated time-frame of its conduct. Participating States will also, if possible, provide additional relevant information, particularly that related to the components of the forces engaged and the period of involvement of these forces."

In addition, signatories are encouraged to engage in other confidence-building measures (CBMs) on a voluntary basis. These voluntary CBMs include the invitation of observers to maneuvers and prior notification of major military movements and of exercises involving fewer than 25,000 troops.

Implementation

The United States and its NATO Allies continued their excellent record of implementation of these CBMs. The United States and the Federal Republic of Germany notified the major military maneuver "Certain Sentinel," which took place from January 20-30, 1986 on the territory of the Federal Republic. Approximately 73,000 troops from the U.S., the FRG, Canada, and France participated in this corps level training exercise. Norway also provided discretionary notification of the field training exercise "Anchor Express" which was held in Northern Norway from March 6-12, 1986, and involved about 20,000 troops from Norway, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Observers were invited to attend both maneuvers.

During the reporting period, the Soviet Union provided notifications of two major military maneuvers under the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act. The USSR notified the military exercise "Zapad '86," which took place in the Soviet Baltic Military District from February 10-17, 1986 and involved approximately 50,000 Soviet troops. The USSR also notified the military exercise "Kavkaz '86," which was held in the Southern USSR from February 17-21, 1986 and involved about 25,000 Soviet troops. Observers were not invited to attend either maneuver.

The Soviet notifications provided the bare minimum of

information required under the CSCE provisions. This is consistent with the East's practice of maintaining a very restrictive interpretation of its obligations and in general disregarding the spirit (if not the letter) of the Helsinki Final Act. Also, unlike the practice of the U.S. and its NATO Allies, Soviet implementation of voluntary confidence-building measures has been the exception rather than the rule. Since 1980, the USSR has invited observers from selected Western countries to only two military maneuvers -- Kavkaz '85 and Dnestr '83. The latter, which involved less than 25,000 Soviet troops, was also the only exercise notified by the USSR on a voluntary basis. In the current reporting period, Warsaw Pact forces participated in at least two smaller scale maneuvers which could have been notified on a discretionary basis: the Duna '86 exercise in Hungary and an unnamed field training exercise in the G.D.R.



## CHAPTER THREE

### IMPLEMENTATION OF BASKET II: COOPERATION IN THE FIELDS OF ECONOMICS, OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, AND OF THE ENVIRONMENT

The implementation of Basket II provisions by the Soviet Union and East European countries showed no real improvements during the reporting period and remains generally unsatisfactory. While the East European countries continue to solicit Western business activity, balance of payments and other economic difficulties, as well as an unwillingness to change policies, have prevented any progress in the Basket II area.

Several businesses have closed their offices in Bulgaria because of highly inflated rental rates, and Romania has lost at least one large potential sale due to new rules limiting the access by foreigners to industrial and production facilities. U.S. firms finally regained access to direct telephone links to the West a year after the Soviet government promised to reestablish them. The only major U.S. company to open offices in the Soviet Union was Pan American Airways.

The quality and quantity of economic and commercial information, which deteriorated drastically during the previous reporting period, showed no signs of improvement. Nonetheless, some progress occurred in the area of economic and commercial cooperation arrangements. Several East European countries have promulgated laws making it easier to establish joint ventures, and there appears to be more willingness to entertain such ventures as hard currency earnings remain low. We continue to see positive attitudes toward improving the environment reported during the last period. Of the states under review, the German Democratic Republic remains the most interested in dealing with the problems of pollution.

The annual session of the Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) offered one bright spot in this otherwise gloomy assessment. Taking place in early December, just after the Geneva summit, the meeting was the least contentious in years. The Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies toned down their rhetoric on Western "obstacles to trade." The session agreed to concentrate the 1986 work program on a symposium on East-West trade for representatives of government and business to be held in Greece in September. It remains to be seen, however, if positive actions on the part of the East will result.

#### SOVIET UNION

General Assessment. Soviet implementation of Basket II provisions continued to be poor. General business conditions remained largely unchanged during the reporting period, with

contacts with Soviet officials in the agricultural area complicated by a major reorganization of the government apparatus in that sector. U.S. firms reported they had regained access to direct telephone lines to the West (cut in 1982) a year after the Soviet government promised to reestablish such links.

Business Working Conditions. U.S. business representatives are generally able to obtain appointments with Soviet trade officials and have few complaints of interference by UPRK (Soviet Diplomatic Services Bureau), Customs, or the Ministry of Finance in their business activities. Firms often have to wait up to 6 months, however, for UPRK to identify replacement office workers. Also, access to Soviet end-users has never been good in some industries and did not improve. As noted above, the reorganization in agriculture has made it difficult for businessmen to maintain contacts and develop new working relationships with Soviet agricultural officials. U.S. firms generally report fewer problems than before in obtaining inquiries from Soviet foreign trade organizations (FTOs) partly as a result of the May 1985 meeting of the joint U.S.-Soviet Commercial Commission and also due to the higher visibility afforded U.S.-Soviet trade in the post-Geneva period.

At the end of the review period there were 27 U.S. firms with accredited offices in Moscow, up by 2 -- Pan American Airlines and US-USSR Marine Resources -- from the last reporting period. Marine Resources continued to maintain an office in Nakhoda.

High rents at the Sovincenter International Trade complex continue to create serious difficulties for many small firms which have established non-accredited offices in that center's residential wing. In the absence of other office options, these firms have to suffer the high rents. As in the past, most non-accredited firms continue to experience problems in meeting their requirements for office equipment, vehicles, and clerical support.

Hotel and housing conditions for businessmen did not change. Visiting businessmen generally were able to obtain suitable hotel accommodations. As a rule, housing remains satisfactory, although there are occasional complaints about the lack of adequate provision for fire escapes in the buildings made available to business representatives.

Travel and visa restrictions were essentially unchanged from the previous report. Business representatives lodged few complaints about travel and visa restrictions. The Nakhoda-based representative of Marine Resources, however, must use the Khabarovsk Airport -- about 8 hours away by train -- instead of the much closer one at Vladivostok.

Accredited representatives of U.S. firms, whether actually resident in Moscow or not, have occasional difficulties in renewing their individual accreditations. While no specific cases arose during the reporting period, past denials tended to reflect official opposition to individual representatives' intended marriage to Soviet citizens or to the emigration of the latter.

In the area of international communications, those U.S. firms which sought new telephone lines for direct dialing out of the USSR received such service, as did most of the Western firms seeking such lines. Many continue to experience delays up to 4 hours on incoming calls, however, and have raised this problem with Soviet officials. The question remains whether companies with offices in Moscow should be liable for Soviet income taxes on incomes derived from services provided by subsidiaries and affiliated companies without offices in the Soviet Union.

Availability of Economic and Commercial Information. The availability of economic and commercial information remained poor during the reporting period. There was a sharp reduction in the published monthly economic performance data in September, but subsequent monthly reports resumed in the customary format. The availability of information on the economy remained limited and the quality of the data was often poor.

Access to Soviet officials for discussion of current economic developments remained restricted. Press conferences by Soviet economic officials became more frequent during the reporting period, largely as a result of the CPSU Party Congress and a high-level CEMA meeting, but failed to broaden appreciably information available in Soviet journals and newspapers.

Policies Concerning Economic and Commercial Cooperation Arrangements. Soviet policy toward cooperation arrangements has not changed. Soviet officials encourage such cooperation whenever it is in their interest although lingering skepticism prevails about long-term relationships with U.S. firms. The Embassy is not aware of any new complications for existing cooperation arrangements with U.S. firms. With the recent drop in oil export earnings, there have been more hints about Soviet interest in industrial cooperation, apparently as a vehicle to push Soviet exports.

Official Visits. There was one Cabinet-level visit during the reporting period related to economic questions. In December, Secretary of Commerce Baldrige attended the annual meeting of the U.S.-Soviet Trade and Economic Council (USTEC), an organization of U.S. businessmen and representatives from Soviet foreign trade-related organizations, and met with senior

Soviet officials, including General Secretary Gorbachev.

Policies Toward Countertrade Arrangements. The trend toward a diminution of the requirement for Western firms to link sales and purchases continues. For single transactions, the Soviet emphasis appears to be on obtaining evidence of general purchasing activity by Western firms.

Policies Affecting Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises. Policies affecting small and medium-sized enterprises remain no different from those affecting other companies.

## ROMANIA

General Assessment. Romanian foreign trade policy continues to be based on enlarging its trade surplus to build up foreign exchange reserves and retire foreign debt. Trade officials remain under instructions to limit hard-currency imports and generally to require that Western firms concluding sales contracts with Romania accept payment in counter-purchase of Romanian goods. The 1985 foreign trade turnover totalled 340.7 billion lei, a decrease of 48.2 billion lei or 1.6% over 1984. The 1985 trade surplus amounted to \$2.5 billion.

The government of Romania, during the last 6 month period, has continued to stress the need for expanded efforts to obtain advanced technology from abroad. While this has led to greater emphasis on scientific and technological exchange, it has been at the expense of exchange in other areas, primarily the humanities. However, our Embassy knows of no cooperative efforts by Romania in the field of environmental protection.

Business Working Conditions. Our Embassy officers continue to have access to government officials concerned with U.S.-Romanian trade and economic relations. Visiting U.S. government officials and businessmen obtain appointments with their Romanian counterparts in most instances. Senior-level U.S. officials and business leaders are often received at the highest official level of the Romanian government. Businessmen have adequate access to directors of foreign trade organizations (FTOs) and their staffs. But due to recurring personnel changes at FTOs and the Ministry of Foreign Trade, businessmen have difficulty pinpointing responsible decisionmakers for negotiations.

However, in January 1986, the government started tightening considerably access of businessmen to plants and projects. Access to protocol rooms of such facilities is easily obtainable, but production lines can be visited only with the express approval of respective ministries or FTOs. So far, experience since the new regulations were promulgated (apparently in December) indicates this permission is typically denied. Romania has already lost one potential sale of its