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EMERGENCY MOBILIZATION PREPAREDNESS BOARD FG 378

Washington, D.C. 20472

June 14, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR BOARD MEMBERS

FROM:

ROBERT C. MCFARLANEZCH

SUBJECT:

Economic and Fiscal Mobilization Discussion at

the Next Board Meeting

In response to Fred Ikle's request at the last Board meeting, the subject of the next meeting, tentatively scheduled for July 11, will be economic and fiscal mobilization.

I have asked C. Warren Carter, of Treasury, the Acting Chairman of the Economic Stabilization and Public Finance Working Group, to present a 15-minute briefing covering the results of the Group's work under the National Plan of Action. Copies of these materials will be distributed to each of you in the near future.

The Federal Reserve System and the Council of Economic Advisers are being invited to participate.

As was evidenced by the discussion and the resolution of the free market issue during development of the National Policy Statement (NSDD-47) and the National Plan of Action on Emergency Mobilization Preparedness, this is a subject of great importance to the Nation's preparedness.

12

D# 254454

WHITE HOUSE COUNSELLOR'S OFFICE TRACKING WORKSHEET

F-EUDY

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F - Furnish Fact Sheet to be used as Enclosure	X - Interim Reply		FOR OUTGOING CORR	ESPONDENCE:
			Type of Response = Code =	Initials of Signer
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Comments:				

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Office of the Director

Federal Emergency Management Agency

Washington, D.C. 20472

August 29, 1984

254454

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Edwin Meese III

Counsellor to the President

FROM:

Louis O. Giuffrida

Director

SUBJECT:

Emergency Authorities Computerized Retrieval System

Working through the Government Operations Working Group of the Emergency Mobilization Preparedness Board, FEMA coordinated an effort to: (1) develop a comprehensive list of all Federal emergency authorities (covering all types of emergencies from natural disasters to nuclear war); (2) produce an easy to understand "English language" synopsis of each authority; and (3) develop a computerized retrieval system which is useable by Federal officials throughout the country.

The resulting Emergency Authorities Computerized Retrieval System (the system) is designed to provide attorneys and program personnel within the Federal Government with a means of quick access to all Federal authorities pertaining to both peacetime and national emergencies. Its purpose is to reduce response time to questions of legal authority, thereby enhancing the ability of the Federal Government to respond to emergency situations. Accordingly, the system is designed to encompass the full array of Federal Government functions and will be made available governmentwide. The system serves as an educational tool and a means of identifying areas within the Federal domain requiring additional legislation or regulation. In summary, the combined effect of the system is to enhance emergency preparedness of the Federal Government.

For the purposes of this system, an emergency authority is broadly defined as any Federal legal authority, exclusive of case law, which impacts during either a peace-time or national security emergency. Emergency would include national disasters, catastrophes, national emergencies, and war, as well as any other exigent circumstances.

Compilations of Federal emergency authorities contain:

statutes; Executive orders; regulations; treaties; and delegations of authority.

Case law has been excluded from the data base because of problems associated with both the accuracy of digesting such law and the manageability of updating such information. Users of the system are expected to consult case law as a second stage inquiry in order to complete their understanding of the scope of any particular authority.

26856APD FE007 FG331

Paper entitled

National Decisionmaking Structures during the High End of the Crisis Spectrum

Premise: Once a President has become comfortable with a management structure he is unlikely to turn to an entirely new structure as a national security emergency evolves. For example, those groups that have been advising him on fundamental economic and tax policy will most likely continue to advise him on these matters.

Problem: During the high end of the crisis spectrum, the pace and magnitude of decisionmaking will stress structures which have functioned solely during the lower end of the crisis spectrum.

Conclusion: As the crisis intensifies, it is likely that change in the structures will be required but the changes should be evolutionary:

- o Existing structures would be expanded through the addition of new members, the creation of special subgroups to staff issues and the formation of new organizations to implement new policies (e.g., an Economic Stabilization Agency).
- o Issues will be prioritized and some issues will be delegated to the special subgroups (to perhaps only a single agency).

In neither of these cases will the basic decisionmaking structure be dramatically changed. Where decisions are delegated, guidance will be provided by the top of the existing management structure.

Recommendation: FEMA should use its expertise and experience in thinking about emergency actions to enable the existing structure to function efficiently and expeditiously as a crisis intensifies. The structure used by the current Administration consists of the National Security Council (NSC) and six Cabinet Councils focused on civil issues: Commerce and Trade, Economic Affairs, Food and Agriculture, Natural Resources and the Environment, Human Resources and Legal Policy (see attached). In addition, a sub-structure of more focused "Interagency Groups" has been established to address more specific policy areas.

These groups are supported by executive secretaries and very modest staff resources. However, they tend not to consider many aspects of the agenda associated with the high end of a crisis spectrum and are used to an extended policy development and deliberation process.

FEMA has considerable leadership and staff experience in focusing interagency discussions on key emergency issues. This experience should be cultivated and institutionalized such that it could be available in an effective manner to the President:

- o The Director of FEMA should seek a role as a statutory advisor to the NSC and as an observer on all existing Cabinet Councils and relevant Interagency Groups on the grounds that FEMA can provide valuable input when national security emergencies arise provided it is familiar with the agenda and working procedures of the councils.
- o In cooperation with the emergency planners of the civil and defense agencies, FEMA should continue to refine emergency action inputs to the existing Cabinet Councils in time of crisis (e.g., analysis of emergency actions, PEADs, draft legislation, etc.).
- o In support of the management structure of the Administration, FEMA should think about how its staffing structure could support that organization considering the emergency resources available from the other agencies and the committments required of its own line functions.
- o FEMA should specify how its line functions (especially resource ajudication and civil preparedness) will function in the context of the management structure of the current Administration.
- o The Cabinet Councils (using surrogate Secretaries) should be exercised in REX-86 ALPHA.

Note: None of the above is normative for the design of the transitional management structures for use following a nuclear attack and before reestablishment of a "cabinet" government.

Comments on the Acceptability of an Independent Management Structure (FPC-6)

Once the President has become comfortable with a structure, he is unlikely to suddenly turn to an entirely new structure as a national security emergency evolves. No matter what is prescribed on paper, the only real trigger mechanism for change will be the perception of the President that a change is needed.

It is difficult to imagine the conditions under which a President will wish to have a "Czar" between himself and the departments and agencies coordinating virtually all timely major issues in the civil sector. Even during World War II, Roosevelt created many Boards and Agencies with fairly narrowly defined responsibilities in what appears to have been a conscious effort to ensure that he and his immediate staff remained the essential integration point for policy an decisionmaking.

Because of the negative reaction of the other departments and agencies, attempts by FEMA to establish new, FEMA chaired, entities appears to be detrimental to FEMA's widely recognized and accepted role in coordination and ajudication.

If a permanent, independent structure is established, it should recognize and allow for the almost unavoidable bifurcation of FEMA during times of extreme national security emergency. During normal conditions it is very convenient to house emergency resource adjudication authorities and core emergency programs in one organization. However, under conditions when civil preparedness and population protection programs become significant claimants for scarce resources, the resulting conflict of interest would be unacceptible.

If FEMA is to play a real role in emergency management and decisionmaking during a national security crisis, it must tie into the real structure and not push for the establishment of an independent, but unconnected, structure.

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- Chair

** NOTE: Executive Secretaries are in the White House Office of Policy Development which is directed by John A. Svahn.



WHITE HOUSE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

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that low power testing nuclear plant does no	act swift] g at the S t go forwa	y to assure Shoreham		
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- to be used as Enclosure
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- C Completed S - Suspended

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Completion Date = **Date of Outgoing**

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n - 3 - Mrs. Ronald Reagan

CBn - Presidential & First Lady's Correspondence n - 1 - Ronald Reagan - Nancy Reagan n - 2 - Ron - Nancy

X - Miscellaneous Y - Study

Dear Tom:

on the President's behalf, I would like to thank you for advising us of your serious concerns with respect to the issuance of a low power license for the Shoreham nuclear power plant.

Please know that your comments have been conveyed to the President and to his energy advisers. Let me assure you that the points which you raised will be carefully reviewed and your recommendations taken into consideration. You should be hearing again as soon as additional information is available.

with best wishes,

Sincerely,

M. B. Oglesby, Jr. Assistant to the President

The Honorable Thomas J. Downey nouse of Representatives mashington, D.C. 20515

MBO/KRJ/TJR/tjr

Dept of Energy - for DIRECT response w/copy of inc to Randy Davis - FYI

ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP March 19, 1985 TO: (Name, office symbol, room number, building, Agency/Post) Initials Date Sally Kelley Director of Agency Liaison The White House Rm 91 0E0B Note and Return Action For Clearance Per Conversation Approval For Correction Prepare Reply As Requested Circulate For Your Information See Me Comment Investigate Signature

REMARKS

Coordination

Attached for your information and records is a copy of the Department of Energy's response from James Vaughan to Honorable Thomas Downey regarding the Emergency Evacuation Plan for the Shoreham Nuclear Powerplant; letter is dated 3/19/85.

Justify

Your original correspondence is returned also for your records and should complete your control No. 269395.

If you have any questions regarding this correspondence, please do not hesitate to call me on 252-9586.

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Frances Hooks	Room No.—Bldg.
Office of Executive Secretariat Department of Energy	Phone No. 252-9586

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OPTIONAL FORM 41 (Rev. 7-76) Prescribed by GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.206

★ U.S.G.P.O.: 1984-421-529/412

THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

REFERRAL

NOVEMBER 21, 1984

TO: DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY ATTN: ROB ODLE

ACTION REQUESTED:

DIRECT REPLY, FURNISH INFO COPY

DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:

ID:

269395

MEDIA: LETTER, DATED OCTOBER 29, 1984

TO:

PRESIDENT REAGAN

FROM:

THE HONORABLE THOMAS DOWNEY U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

WASHINGTON DC 20515

SUBJECT: STATES THAT YOUR LETTER INDICATING THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SHOULD NOT IMPOSE AN EMERGENCY EVACUATION PLAN OVER THE OBJECTIONS OF A STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT WAS GREATLY APPRECIATED BY THE PEOPLE OF EASTERN LONG ISLAND. ASKS YOU TO ACT SWIFTLY TO ASSURE THAT LOW POWER TESTING AT THE SHOREHAM NUCLEAR PLANT DOES NOT GO FORWARD UNTIL THE EMERGENCY PLANNING ISSUE IS SUCCESSFULLY

RESOLVED.

PROMPT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL -- IF REQUIRED ACTION HAS NOT BEEN TAKEN WITHIN 9 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT, PLEASE TELEPHONE THE UNDERSIGNED AT 456-7486.

RETURN CORRESPONDENCE, WORKSHEET AND COPY OF RESPONSE (OR DRAFT) TO:

AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 91, THE WHITE HOUSE

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THOMAS J. DOWNEY SHO DISTRICT, NEW YORK

303 CANNON HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING

DISTRICT OFFICE:

4 UDALL ROAD
WEST IDLIP, NEW YORK 11795
TELEPHONE: (516) 661-8777

Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, D.C. 20515

October 29, 1984

COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRADE
COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET
SELECT COMMITTEE ON AGING

Honorable Ronald Reagan President of the United States The White House Washington, D.C. 20500

209395

Dear Mr. President:

Your October 11, 1984 letter to Congressman William Carney summarizing your view that the Federal government should not impose an emergency evacuation plan over the objections of a State and local government was greatly appreciated by the people of Eastern Long Island.

However, serious questions remain, and I hope and expect that you will offer your personal assurance that the licensing of the Shoreham nuclear power plant will be handled prudently and in full compliance with the law. My concern is especially timely since the Nuclear Regulatory Commission plans to vote soon on whether to issue a low power license for the Shoreham nuclear power plant.

The central issue is that the NRC may allow low power operation of this facility prior to resolving the emergency planning issue that you have recognized may be insurmountable. Although this issue would not normally be addressed until the issuance of a full power license, if it is not resolved, full power operation will be impossible. Let me point out that the County government and the state governments in this case oppose the issuance of this low power operating license largely for this reason. Quite simply, low power testing and operation would irretrievably contaminate this nuclear reactor. As a matter of public policy—regardless of any loopholes that may exist in the NRC's regulations—it is unwise to take on the added economic burden and safety risk of radioactive decommissioning if this plant may never operate commercially.

I hope that you will act swiftly to assure that low power testing at Shoreham does not go forward until such time as the emergency planning issue is successfully resolved.

Sincerely,

THOMAS J. DOWNEY

Member of Congress

THOMAS J. DOWNEY 2ND INSTRICT, NEW YORK

303 CANNON HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING TELEPHONE: (202) 225-3335

DISTRICT OFFICE: A LIDALL ROAD WEST IBLIP, NEW YORK 11795 TELEPHONE: (516) 661-8777

Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington. D.C. 20515

October 29, 1984

COMMITTEE ON SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRADE COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET SELECT COMMITTEE ON AGING

209395

Honorable Ronald Reagan President of the United States The White House Washington, D.C. 20500

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Sincerely,


THOMAS J. DOWNEY

Member of Congress

RO/

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON February 1, 1985



MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN SVAHN, ROGER PORTER

FROM:

RALPH BLEDSOE Raff Blelsoe

SUBJECT:

Emergency Preparedness Study

This memo outlines the steps taken to comply with Ed Meese's request to have Col. Murl D. Munger perform a study of FEMA and the White House emergency response system.

Lou Hays first contacted me last October about an emergency preparedness working group study that was discussed in a Meese management meeting. A memo proposing a CCMA working group was written and sent to Ed on October 30. Within a week or so, Lou related that Ed wanted Col. Munger "brought on board" to do the study, instead of a CCMA working group. No details were given to Lou or me on the precise purpose or scope of the study.

I reached Col. Munger at the Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. We discussed the project, though he did not know what Ed had in mind either. Since he was with Ed in New York the following day, they talked about what should be done. The next week, Col Munger came to the EOB where we discussed the results of his conversation with Ed. We went over logistics of how the project might be done, given his commitments at the War College.

My understanding was that he could be made available by the War College, but that we would have to cover his costs. It was felt that GPD and the War College might be able to divide the costs. It also appeared that the best arrangement was to have Col. Munger do the work in Washington, where he could more readily interview and have access to the people important to the study. We explored alternative travel arrangements, and he concluded it was best to obtain an apartment in Washington for the 90-day period he estimated the project would take, beginning 12/1/84.

The War College did not want to cover travel costs, (but they indicated that his salary had been budgeted and could be handled.) I felt we might be able to obtain travel funds from another source, such as Army or FEMA, and could cover his salary costs. Now, however, this does not appear feasible.

To handle the formal detail, I sent a letter to Army Secretary John Marsh, requesting Col. Munger's assignment. It was forwarded to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, where it was approved. The agreement was that "Arrangements for reimbursement of costs can be made between this office (OPD) and the Army War College."

On December 5, 1984, we (Svahn, Bledsoe, Munger) met with Meese to discuss expected project results, at which time we told Ed we could cover the funding. A lot of questions were cleared up about the scope of the study. I accept the blame for not pinning down the details of the funding, but in order to complete the project in time for Ed to be able to use the results I felt it necessary to have Col. Munger begin when he did, 12/1/84.

As to the project, an interim report was issued on 1/17/85 and you received a copy. It is estimated that the final report will be ready in mid to late February. March 1 should be a date by which the project will be totally complete, unless Ed directs some type of follow-on.

I hope the above clearly portrays the background and status of this effort. While the funding arrangments have been confusing, it is my recommendation that OPD cover the salary costs (about \$12K) and the travel costs (about \$7K), in order to say that we fully paid for this policy study. My assessment is that the study will produce sound recommendations that will support any decisions Ed may wish to make about FEMA and the White House crisis management response process.

To prevent future misunderstandings on use of OPD budgeted funds, we probably need an internal "memorandum of understanding" system which precisely allocates S&E and travel funds required for this and other kinds of "special projects."

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
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CPn - Presidential Correspondence	B - Box/package	
n - 0 - Unknown n - 1 - Ronald Wilson Reagan	C - Copy	
n - 2 - Ronald Reagan	D - Official documer	it
n - 3 - Ron	G - Message H - Handcarried	
n - 4 - Dutch	L - Letter	
n - 5 - Ron Reagan n - 6 - Ronald	M- Mailgram	
n - 7 - Ronnie	O - Memo	
	P - Photo	
CLn - First Lady's Correspondence	R - Report	
n - 0 - Unknown	S - Sealed T - Telegram	
n - 1 - Nancy Reagan	V - Telephone	
n - 2 - Nancy n - 3 - Mrs. Ronald Reagan	X - Miscellaneous	
ii - 6 - Mis. Nollaiu neagan	Y - Study	

CBn - Presidential & First Lady's Correspondence n - 1 - Ronald Reagan - Nancy Reagan n - 2 - Ron - Nancy



DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY WASHINGTON



FEB 6 1987

Dear Jack:

As you may be aware, Senators John Heinz and Alan Dixon plan to introduce legislation to amend the International Emergency Economic Powers Act ("IEEPA").

Our conversations with congressional staff indicate that they are considering amendments that would conform the language of IEEPA to that of the Export Administration Act with respect to export restrictions. Such amendments would receive support, we understand, from the National Association of Manufacturers and the Emergency Committee on American Trade. Consideration is also being given to amendments that would severely restrict the President's authority to impose assets freezes for foreign policy reasons.

The Treasury Department strongly opposes amendments that would reduce the scope of the President's existing discretion under IEEPA. Treasury believes the President must be able to use the full range of IEEPA powers, at his discretion, when the national interest so requires.

As a related matter, these amendments directly implicate concerns Robert B. Zoellick raised in his letter to you of January 30, which laid out Treasury's objection to freezing the assets of Jean Claude Duvalier. Imposing a freeze on Duvalier's assets would add support to the notion that IEEPA controls currently are used too broadly and too guickly in instances when no emergency exists. Treasury believes that the United States' national interest is best served without these amendments to IEEPA and without an assets freeze under the Special Foreign Assistance Act.

Sincerely,

Robert M. Kimmitt

John H. Carley, Esq. General Counsel Office of Management and Budget Old Executive Office Building Washington, D.C. 20503 cc: The Honorable Peter Wallison Counsel to the President The White House Washington, D.C. 20500

> Judge Abraham D. Sofaer Legal Adviser Department of State Washington, D.C. 20520

Paul S. Stevens, Esq. Legal Adviser National Security Council Room 368, Old Executive Office Bldg. Washington, D.C. 20506

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Deputy Associate Attorney General
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

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April 24, 1987

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Executive Summary

PY FEODT

PROPOSED NATIONAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE STRUCTURE

BACKGROUND

In accordance with Domestic Policy Council guidance, the Working Group on Management and Administration (WGMA) has developed the National Emergency Response Structure (NERS) as a proposed basis for replacement of current incident-specific interagency response plans. The NERS provides a generic interagency structure whereby the Federal response to major emergencies can be efficiently and effectively coordinated.

On March 2, 1987, the NERS concept paper was provided to the Executive Branch departments and agencies for review and comment. Thirty-eight Federal entities responded; of these, 6 raised major issues. In addition, via the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the States were asked to comment. Forty-four States responded; of these, 4 non-concurred and 6 raised major issues.

Every comment and issue raised by the respondents was carefully reviewed. In general, they could be categorized as follows:

- o Those that could be accommodated by a change in the concept paper itself. In such cases, line-in/line-out changes were made and presented to the WGMA at its April 10 meeting.
- o Those that would need to be considered as additional documentation is developed (e.g., planning guidance).
- o Those that were inconsistent with the basic features of the concept and, therefore, could not be accommodated (e.g., retention of the current incident-specific planning activities). There were relatively few such cases.

At its April 10 meeting, the WGMA approved the proposed concept for presentation to the DPC (copy of revised concept paper attached).

KEY FEATURES

- Consistent with functional structure adopted for national security emergencies.
- o States and localities are the first level of response; the Federal government assists through the regions, as needed.
- o A single "on-scene" official, the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO), serves as the President's representative and is responsible for coordinating all aspects of the Federal response.
- o A single national level official, the National Coordinating Official (NCO), coordinates the provision of support to the regional emergency response.

- o A predesignated "Cognizant Federal Agency" (CFA) is responsible for overall coordination of the Federal response to specified emergencies. Proposed CFAs are listed on page 11 of the concept paper.
- o An Interagency Working Group provides a forum for senior level coordination of cross-cutting policy issues.
- o Interagency functional groups coordinate department and agency operations; organic responsibilities assigned by statute or other authority are not disturbed. Primary and support agencies are designated for each functional group. Proposed functional groups are listed on page 10 of the concept paper.
- o Organization support is provided for such activities as public affairs, congressional relations, other external liaison, and situation assessment.
- o Coordination with States and localities is provided for and encouraged.

WHY THE NERS IS NEEDED

Federal planning for and response to major civil domestic emergencies should be based on a single set of principles and procedures, in order to assure timely, effective, and predictable action. The NERS concept provides for this.

In catastrophic or extraordinary situations, a broad spectrum of Federal assistance may be required from around the Nation quickly to support State and local emergency response operations. The NERS provides a coordinative structure whereby such assistance is facilitated.

Few emergency responsibilities are exclusively within the purview of a single Federal department or agency; most are shared. Thus, effective coordination is necessary to ensure maximum payoff, particularly during an emergency when lives are at stake. The primary function of NERS is coordination.

RECOMMENDATION

It is recommended that the DPC approve the NERS concept and direct Executive Branch departments and agencies to implement it, including preparation of the necessary plans and operational documents, on a specified schedule. It is further recommended that such schedule be developed by DPC staff in conjunction with NSC staff, in order to assure consistency with schedules already established for national security emergency plan development.

PROPOSAL: NATIONAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE STRUCTURE

PURPOSE

The objective of the proposed National Emergency Response Structure (NERS) is to establish a consistent set of organizational principles and procedures for the Federal departments and agencies in planning for and responding to major civil domestic emergencies. The principles and procedures would also be consistent with principles and procedures utilized in national security emergencies.

BASIC PRINCIPLES

- o Although the Federal Government has significant capabilities to assist
 States in any emergency, the principal responsibility for protecting public
 health and safety remains with the States. That is, State and local governments are the first level of response for emergencies affecting the population
 and most elements of the economy and infrastructure. The Federal Government
 normally will play a major role in response to a civil domestic emergency
 only when the States require assistance. However, in some situations (e.g.,
 a nuclear power plant accident), a Federal response will occur because a
 Federal department or agency has a statutory responsibility to respond.
- o Regional offices or subordinate field elements such as disaster field offices are the primary Federal responders. Liaison with State and local governments usually will be accomplished at the regional and field levels. However, some agencies have indicated that this will be accomplished from a location other than at the region, or through the use of special teams. The headquarters role is to support the regions, provide policy and program guidance, and prioritize critical resources.


- o For catastrophic or extraordinary situations, a broad spectrum of Federal assistance may be required from around the Nation quickly to support State and local emergency response operations.
- o Federal emergency response consists of the provision of financial and other support to State and local governments for use in life saving and life protecting operations. In some circumstances assistance is provided directly to local governments. However, such assistance would be provided either under the direction of or in coordination with the State government.
- o Few emergency responsibilities are exclusively within the purview of a single Federal department or agency. Most responsibilities are shared among two or more departments. For example, the Departments of Defense and Health and Human Services, and the Veterans Administration all have major medical responsibilities and resources that will be affected by a health-related emergency. Other agencies like the Department of Commerce and the General Services Administration also have roles. There is no single health agency at the Federal level; thus, effective coordination is necessary to ensure maximum payoff, particularly during an emergency when lives are at stake.
- o The primary function of NERS is coordination. Unless specifically authorized to the contrary by legislation or Executive order, "direction" of resources is done by the department or agency with the authority to do so.

DESCRIPTION

o The NERS is a structure through which the Federal departments and agencies can coordinate their efforts during a civil domestic emergency. It is also consistent with the structure that the Federal government would use in a national security emergency.

- o It is a generic structure designed for all extraordinary civil domestic emergencies in which a Federal response is necessary and provides common organizing principles and concept of operations for Federal response at the regional levels and for coordinating headquarters support to the regions. The structure does not apply to "routine" disasters for which existing response mechanisms suffice.
- o The NERS is "authority neutral" in the sense that the structure would facilitate both coordination and management. That is, it could be used in Disaster Relief Act situations when a Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) is designated pursuant to the law as the President's representative to manage the disaster and in other situations where the FCO has no directive authority and must rely exclusively on coordination.
- o The structure is flexible its elements are activated only as necessary to facilitate coordination. For example, in a health emergency only the health-related parts of the structure may need to be activated; other government business would be conducted through normal processes.

KEY FEATURES



1. Single "on scene" official - Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO). The single FCO serves as the President's representative on scene and is responsible for managing and/or coordinating all aspects of the Federal emergency response. The authorities of the FCO will include mission assignment in situations when the President declared a major disaster. In the absence of a declaration, the FCO will be responsible only for coordinating Federal emergency response activities.

For declared disasters, the FCO is a senior official appointed as the President's representative under the authorities of P.L. 93-288 and current delegations of authority to FEMA. In other situations, the FCO would be a senior representative of the department or agency that is recognized as "cognizant", i.e., that has the greatest proprietary interest in the emergency, that is expected to play the most substantial role in the response, or that is designated by the President. In any emergency, the Cabinet may make recommendations to the President as to who should be designated as the FCO.

The FCO reports on the emergency response to the National Coordinating Official unless the President has decided that such reporting should be directly to the White House.

2. Single national level official - National Coordinating Official (NCO) - to coordinate the provision of support to the regional emergency response. A single headquarters official will be responsible for coordinating the provision of support to the FCO and to the Federal regional emergency response. The NCO normally would be a senior official designated by the head of the cognizant agency; generally, the NCO would be from the same agency as the FCO. In declared disaster situations the NCO is a senior FEMA official. This does not, however, preclude the President from naming a senior member of the White House staff, a Cabinet member, or any other person as the NCO.

For national-level incidents such as the COSMOS 1402 satellite failure, the cognizant Federal agency would designate an NCO to initiate preparations and monitor developments. The NCO could activate any necessary elements of the NERS to coordinate preparations and would determine when an FCO should be designated to manage and coordinate operations "on scene".

In the absence of P.L. 93-288 authority, or unless the NCO has Cabinet or White House authority, disputes that cannot be resolved at the FCO or NCO levels will be referred to the Executive Office of the President, the Cabinet or the President for resolution.

- 3. Designated agencies for the overall response. Federal agencies would be designated "cognizant Federal agencies" in advance as being responsible for the overall coordination of the Federal response to specified emergencies. These designations by the Domestic Policy Council would be based on existing statutory assignments, executive order or interagency agreement. The Federal Emergency Management Agency would serve as the "standby" cognizant Federal agency in emergencies for which there has been no prior designation until such time as the Cabinet designates a cognizant Federal agency. Cognizant Federal agencies would have overall responsibility for assessing the adequacy of the Federal planning pertinent to their area of cognizance.
- 4. Interagency Working Group. The Interagency Working Group is a forum for senior interagency coordination of cross-cutting policy issues. The Interagency Working Group is the primary national-level mechanism for coordination of emergency support. The group advises on operational policy, coordinates national policy recommendations to the Cabinet, resolves interagency conflicts and provides cross-cutting information exchange.

The Interagency Working Group would be chaired by the NCO and would be composed of Assistant Secretary-level representatives from each department and agency with a role in the emergency.

A Regional Interagency Working Group performs similar functions for the FCO. The FCO or deputy chairs the Interagency Regional Response Group which has as members the senior regional officials of the primary agency from each functional group.

5. Functional groups to coordinate department and agency operations. Many Federal departments and agencies have responsibilities in domestic emergencies. Federal emergency responsibilities are shared by multiple agencies. Thus, agencies cannot effectively carry out their emergency responsibilities without substantial coordination with departments and agencies with related programs.

Interagency groups of departments and agencies with related programs or responsibilities provide forums for the detailed coordination necessary for timely and effective Federal action. These interagency groups are being organized for each of the basic emergency functions at both the regional and headquarters levels. The functional groups assess the problems presented by the emergency; assess discretionary resources; develop a comrehensive strategy for employment of resources; provide guidance to operational personnel; and coordinate and facilitate resolution of operational issues among the agencies.

Primary and support departments and agencies are assigned for each functional group, in accordance with the responsibilities in the draft Executive Order, "Responsibilities of the Federal Departments and Agencies for National Security Emergency Preparedness." The primary agency is designated on the basis of having a recognized leadership role (e.g., in an Executive order or interagency agreement) and/or having the most resources, inherent authorities or expertise relative to the accomplishment of the emergency response. Primary agencies are responsible for overall planning for and coordination of the actual delivery of Federal emergency response. Primary agencies will coordinate the development of support agency emergency plans as required by the functional area.

Support agencies assist the primary agency with available resources, capabilities and expertise in support of the basic emergency function. Support agencies work through the primary agencies and FCO to provide assistance to the States(s).

6. Organization Support. Staff support and logistics support to the NCO, the Interagency Working Group and the FCO would be necessary for the smooth functioning of the structure and to facilitate coordination across functional groups. For organizational convenience, such support tasks are assigned to a functional group called "organization support" which can be operated as another functional group or as a staff element attached to the NCO and FCO.

The cognizant Federal agency would be responsible for arranging for the personnel and other resources for these functions. The cognizant Federal agency would be responsible for planning for the provision of these staff support functions during the emergency. FEMA personnel would also be available as a support core when the lead is with another agency.

Organization support includes such functions as public affairs, congressional relations, and communications and logistics. It also encompasses damage and situation assessment and resources support to the States and local governments that is not coordinated through other functional groups.

FEDERAL, STATE AND LOCAL COORDINATION

The FCO is the on-scene official responsibility for direct coordination and/or management of Federal support to the affected State(s). The Governor of a State requesting assistance would be requested to appoint a State Coordinating Officer (SCO) to coordinate State and local response efforts with those of the Federal government. The FCO and SCO work closely together to ensure that the priorities and requirements of the State are met. Liaison with local government agencies is ordinarily conducted by the SCO.

The primary Federal agency for each functional group that is activated serves as the primary coordination point for corresponding State agencies. State governments would be encouraged to designate primary agencies as counterparts for the primary Federal agencies and to plan for coordinating with the Federal government through the functional groups.

ACTIVATION

The NERS will be activated by the President, his designee, or the cognizant Federal agency. In cases where a cognizant Federal agency has not been predesignated, or where the choice of an appropriate cognizant Federal agency is not obvious, the Director of FEMA will consult with the heads of those departments and agencies likely to be involved in the emergency response and will prepare options and a recommendation to the President concerning what agency should be designated as the cognizant Federal agency.

Activation could take place in advance of a disaster declaration to facilitate preparations for an impending emergency. Advance activation would ordinarily consist of designating an NCO and activating the appropriate functional groups at the headquarters and/or regional levels. For example, warnings of an impending national transportation strike may warrant designation of a senior Department of Transportation official as NCO and activation of the transportation functional group. Reliable seismological warnings of an imminent earthquake could cause the activation of several national and regional functional groups.

Once an emergency has occurred, the FCO and NCO determine which elements should be activated (if this has not already happened). Different components of the NERS may be activated at the regional and national levels, depending upon the nature of the emergency. For example, in a COSMOS 1402 or overseas nuclear accident like Chernobyl, only certain headquarters elements would be activated; regional elements would not be activated until a State required assistance in responding to the effects of the radiation or satellite crash.

FUNCTIONAL GROUPS

Functional groups are chaired by pre-designated primary agencies that are responsible for coordinating emergency response activities of member agencies and for arranging the necessary logistics support and planning for the groups.

In domestic emergencies, the planning envisions that the first level functional groups would be activated. These groups are organized more narrowly around specific functional areas and facilitate more intensive coordination of subject-specific emergency responses.

The purpose of second level functional groups is to enable the NCO or FCO to reduce "span-of-control" during a major emergency requiring the activation of many or all of the first level functional groups. In such a situation it would be extremely difficult for the NCO or FCO to interact directly with up to 20 functional group heads or representatives. Thus, in the Human Services, Economic Services, and Organizational Support areas, a second level is available to simplify the coordination task of the NCO and FCO.

In general, second level functional groups would not replace the first level groups; however, it is possible to envision circumstances in which it is not necessary or not possible to constitute all of the first level groups. In such circumstances, the second level group would provide for any of the first level functions that are needed, to the extent of its capability.

FIRST LEVEL

SECOND LEVEL

HEALTH AND MEDICAL
MASS CARE
FOOD DISTRIBUTION
SEARCH AND RESCUE
FIRE SUPPRESSION
CONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT
ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS

HUMAN SERVICES

TRANSPORTATION

TRANSPORTATION

COMMUNICATIONS

COMMUNICATIONS

FINANCE PRODUCTION LABOR FORCE

ECONOMIC SERVICES

ENERGY

ENERGY

LEGAL AND
LAW ENFORCEMENT

LEGAL AND

LAW ENFORCEMENT

EMERGENCY COORDINATION
PUBLIC AFFAIRS
EDUCATION
CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS
SITUATION ASSESSMENT
SUPPORT STAFF

ORGANIZATION SUPPORT

ASSIGNMENTS FOR COGNIZANT FEDERAL AGENCIES

Cognizant Federal agencies would be responsible for: (1) conducting risk assessments in their areas of cognizance to identify and prioritize contingencies for which emergency plans need to be made; (2) reviewing the functional group plans to determine if they are adequate for the specific emergency assigned to the cognizant Federal agency; (3) coordinating the additional increment of planning needed to make functional group plans adequate for the specific emergency; (4) developing their internal agency emergency plans; (5) planning for organizational support; and (6) exercising Federal emergency response structures and plans for the specific emergency. Proposed designations of cognizant Federal agencies are:

NATURAL DISASTERS	FEMA
HEALTH OR MEDICAL	DHHS
TERRORISM (LESS AIRCRAFT HIJACKING)	DOJ
ENERGY	DOE
NUCLEAR WEAPON ACCIDENT	DOE or DOD ("OWNER")
NUCLEAR POWER PLANT ACCIDENT	NRC
ENVIRONMENTAL	EPA .
TRANSPORTATION	DOT
ECONOMIC DISRUPTION	TREAS
TELECOMMUNICATIONS	OSTP/NCS
STANDBY	FEMA

ASSIGNMENTS - FIRST LEVEL FUNCTIONAL GROUPS

FUNCTIONAL GROUP	PRIMARY AGENCY	SUPPORT AGENCIES
HEALTH AND MEDICAL	DHHS	DOD, DOT, ARC, USACE, VA, DOJ, GSA, DOC, FEMA
MASS CARE	ARC (RED CROSS)	USDA, DOC, DOD, DHHS, DHUD, DOI, DOT, USPS, VA, GSA
FOOD	USDA	DOD, DHHS, DOT, ARC, DOI, DOS, GSA, DOC, EPA
SEARCH AND RESCUE	DOD	USDA, DHHS, DOI, DOL, DOT, USACE, GSA, VA
FIRE SUPPRESSION	USDA	DOC, DOD, DOI, DOT, USACE, EPA, FEMA, GSA
CONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT	USACE	USDA, DOD, DOE, DOI, DOT, EPA, GSA, DOC, TREAS, HUD, DOL
ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS	EPA	USDA, DOC, DOD, DOE, DOS, DOT, FEMA, NRC, DHHS, DOI, DOJ, DOL, FEMA, USCG, NASA
TRANSPORTATION	DOT	USDA, DOD, DOI, USACE, GSA, USPS, DOE, ICC, DOL, EPA
COMMUNICATIONS	OSTP/NCS	NCS Member Agencies: USDA, DOD, DOI, DOT, GSA, FCC, DOC, NASA, USIA, DOS, DOE, DOJ, TREAS, CIA, FEMA, FRS, NRC, NSA, NTIA, OJCS, USPS, VA
FINANCE	TREAS	FRB, DOC, OMB, FDIC, NCUA, OCC
PRODUCTION	DOC	DOD, DOI, DOE, DOT, USDA, EPA, FEMA, DOL, DOS, GSA, TREAS
LABOR FORCE	DOL	DOC, DOD, DOE, OPM, DOEd, SSS, NSF
ENERGY	DOE	NRC, DOT, DOD, DOI, GSA, TVA, EPA, DOJ, USDA
LEGAL AND LAW ENFORCEMENT	DOJ	TREAS, DOI, USDA, DOD, DOE, GSA, DOT, USPS
EMERGENCY COORDINATION PUBLIC AFFAIRS EDUCATION CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS SITUATION ASSESSMENT SUPPORT STAFF	COGNIZANT FEDERAL AGENCY	FEMA AND OTHERS TO BE DETERMINED COGNIZANT FEDERAL AGENCY

ASSIGNMENTS - SECOND LEVEL FUNCTIONAL GROUPS


FUNCTIONAL GROUP	PRIMARY AGENCY	SUPPORT AGENCIES
HUMAN SERVICES	DH HS	USDA, DOD, GSA, VA, DOC, HUD, DOT, ARC, DOI, USPS, USACE, DOJ, FEMA, DOS, EPA, DOL, DOE, TREAS, NRC, USCG, NASA
TRANSPORTATION	DOT	USDA, DOD, DOI, USACE, GSA, USPS, DOE, ICC, DOL, EPA
COMMUNICATIONS	OSTP/NCS	NCS Member Agencies: USDA, DOD, DOI, DOT, GSA, FCC, DOC, NASA, USIA, DOS, DOE, DOJ, TREAS, CIA, FEMA, FRS, NRC, NSA, NTIA, OJCS, USPS, VA
ECONOMIC SERVICES	TREAS	DOC, DOD, OMB, FRB, DOE, DOT, EPA, USDA, DOS, DOL, DOI, HUD, FDIC, NCUA, OCC, FEMA, GSA
ENERGY	DOE	NRC, DOT, DOD, DOI, GSA, TVA, EPA, DOJ, USDA
LEGAL AND LAW ENFORCEMENT	DOJ	TREAS, DOI, USDA, DOD, DOE, GSA, DOT, USPS
ORGANIZATION SUPPORT	COGNIZANT FEDERAL AGENCY	FEMA AND OTHERS TO BE DETERMINED BY COGNIZANT FEDERAL AGENCY

NATIONAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE STRUCTURE


NATIONAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE STRUCTURE

- STATES AND LOCALITIES ARE FIRST LEVEL OF RESPONSE; FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ASSISTS THROUGH REGIONS, WHEN NEEDED
- SINGLE "ON-SCENE" OFFICIAL THE FEDERAL COORDINATING OFFICIAL (FCO)
- SINGLE NATIONAL LEVEL OFFICIAL THE NATIONAL COORDINATING OFFICIAL (NCO)
- FORUM FOR SENIOR INTERAGENCY COORDINATION OF CROSS-CUTTING POLICY ISSUES
- FUNCTIONAL GROUPS TO COORDINATE DEPARTMENT AND AGENCY RESPONSE OPERATIONS
- STAFF SUPPORT

GENERIC STRUCTURE



FEDERAL - STATE COORDINATION



IMPLICATIONS OF PROPOSED NATIONAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE STRUCTURE

- FEDERAL AGENCIES DEVELOP AND MAINTAIN OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY AT HEADQUARTERS AND REGIONS
- COGNIZANT DEPARTMENT/AGENCY RESPONSIBLE FOR COORDINATING/MANAGING FEDERAL RESPONSE
- PRIMARY AGENCY RESPONSIBLE FOR DEVELOPMENT OF FUNCTIONAL GROUP ACTIVITIES
- COGNIZANT AND PRIMARY AGENCIES IDENTIFIED IN PLAN

RECOMMENDED DESIGNATIONS OF COGNIZANT FEDERAL AGENCIES

EMERGENCY

COGNIZANT FEDERAL AGENCY

NATURAL DISASTER FEMA
MEDICAL/PUBLIC HEALTH DHHS
TERRORISM DOJ

ENERGY

NUCLEAR WEAPON ACCIDENT DOD OR DOE

NUCLEAR POWER
PLANT INCIDENT
NRC

ENVIRONMENTAL EPA
TRANSPORTATION DOT

ECONOMIC DISRUPTION TREAS

TELECOMMUNICATIONS OSTP/NCS

"STANDBY" FEMA

FUNCTIONAL GROUPS

FIRST LEVEL

SECOND LEVEL

HEALTH AND MEDICAL

MASS CARE

FOOD DISTRIBUTION

SEARCH AND RESCUE

FIRE SUPPRESSION

CONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT

ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS

TRANSPORTATION

COMMUNICATIONS

FINANCE

PRODUCTION

LABOR FORCE

ENERGY

LEGAL AND LAW ENFORCEMENT

EMERGENCY COORDINATION

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

EDUCATION

CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS

SITUATION ASSESSMENT

SUPPORT STAFF

HUMAN SERVICES

TRANSPORTATION

COMMUNICATIONS

ECONOMIC SERVICES

ENERGY

LAW ENFORCEMENT

ORGANIZATIONAL SUPPORT

MAJOR CONCERNS

- COVERAGE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT DIRECTION
 - FLEXIBILITY FOR USE OF SPECIAL TEAMS
- IMPLEMENTATION IN LIGHT CURRENT RESPONSIBILITIES AND RELATIONSHIPS
- **HHS** DESCRIPTION OF FUNCTIONAL GROUPS
- RELATIONSHIP TO NATIONAL AND REGIONAL RESPONSE TEAMS
 - EMERGENCIES OTHER THAN HAZARDOUS MATERIALS
- NRC IMPACT ON FRERP
 - STATE PLANS
- TREASURY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NERS AND NSEP
 - COVERAGE OF NON-93-288 NATURAL DISASTERS

STATE CONCERNS

- SOME ENDORSE INCIDENT-SPECIFIC PLANNING
- NEED SINGLE POINT OF CONTACT WITH STATES

NATIONAL PLANS FOR DOMESTIC EMERGENCIES*

CATASTROPHIC EARTHQUAKE PLAN 1987

FEDERAL RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY 1985
RESPONSE PLAN 1985

NATIONAL CONTINGENCY PLAN 1985

(HAZARDOUS MATERIALS)

^{*}The NSC Is Currently Revising Federal Plans for National Security Emergencies; Close Coordination Between These Efforts Is Essential

FEDERAL RESPONSE TO EMERGENCIES

CHERNOBYL

- WHITE HOUSE SELECTS LEE THOMAS TO COORDINATE NATIONAL RESPONSE [NATIONAL COORDINATING OFFICIAL (NCO)]
- IF SERIOUS REGIONAL EFFECTS IN THIS COUNTRY, FEDERAL COORDINATING OFFICERS (FCOs) PROBABLY WOULD HAVE BEEN NEEDED

NERS

- BASED ON THE SAME STRUCTURE
- COGNIZANT FEDERAL AGENCY, NCO AND FCO PRE-SELECTED

NATIONAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE STRUCTURE (NERS)

NEXT STEPS

- DOMESTIC POLICY COUNCIL APPROVAL OF THE CONCEPT
- PREPARATION OF WHITE HOUSE IMPLEMENTATION DIRECTIVE
- OVERSIGHT OF EXECUTIVE BRANCH PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION EFFORT BY THE WORKING GROUP ON MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION