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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D C. 20506

4626

C.F.
462194
CO119
PROD 7
FG006-12

June 16, 1986

SECRET

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: SHIRIN TAHIR-KHELI *SK*

SUBJECT: Yaqub Call on the President and Meeting with Yourself

The only available time for the Pakistani Foreign Minister for a five-minute call on the President next week is during your morning briefing on Thursday, June 19. Frank Lavin suggests that this could be done either at 9:30 or 9:40.

Yaqub is here to talk specifically about the Geneva talks on Afghanistan. The Afghan Alliance leaders' visit on June 16 will have heightened Pak sensitivities, providing us with a perfect opening to discuss a role for the resistance in Pak strategy. It is important that the GOP hear White House concerns and have considered them before the Junejo visit mid-July.

You have agreed to see Yaqub for a 30-minute meeting which could follow Yaqub's meeting with the President.

Peter Rodman, Paul Thompson, Frank Lavin and Steve Sestanovich concur.

SK for.

RECOMMENDATION

1. That you agree to using five minutes of your morning time with the President for Yaqub's call on June 19.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

SECRET

Declassify on: OADR

NSC 8604626

close - OBE

RECEIVED 16 JUN 86 11

TO POINDEXTER

FROM TAHIR-KHELI

DOCDATE 16 JUN 86

KEYWORDS: PAKISTAN

AJP

KHAN, YAQUB

AP

SUBJECT: FOMIN YAQUB CALL W/ PRES & MTG W/ POINDEXTER 19 JUN

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 16 JUN 86 STATUS S FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

POINDEXTER

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (LF *DE*)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

C *1/28* *DBE per WWD*

DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C) *1*

**WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET**

10119
8639219

- O - OUTGOING
- H - INTERNAL
- I - INCOMING
Date Correspondence Received (YY/MM/DD) 86/ 12 / 22

Name of Correspondents DR. ABRAHAM, MRS. CHANDERSEKARAN, DR. SHAH

MI Mail Report User Codes: (A) _____ (B) _____ (C) _____

Subject: APPEAL FROM INDIAN AMERICAN COMMUNITY FOR PRESIDENT TO
DESIST FROM SUPPLYING AWACS TO PAKISTAN, WHICH COULD BE
USED AGAINST INDIA.

ROUTE TO:	ACTION	DISPOSITION
Office/Agency (Staff Name)	Action Code	Tracking Date YY/MM/DD Type of Response Code Completion Date YY/MM/DD
<u>OPL - Beserra</u>	<u>ORIGINATOR</u>	<u>86/12/22 NAN C 86/12/22</u>
<u>CO Anne Higgins</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>86/12/23 [Stamp] C 87/01/29 AB</u>
<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>R</u>	<u>86/12/29 [Stamp] A 87/01/29 AB</u>
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____

- ACTION CODES:**
A - Appropriate Action I - Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary
C - Comment/Recommendation R - Direct Reply w/Copy
D - Draft Response S - For Signature
F - Furnish Fact Sheet X - Interim Reply
to be used as Enclosure
- DISPOSITION CODES:**
A - Answered C - Completed
B - Non-Special Referral S - Suspended
- FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:**
Type of Response = Initials of Signer
Code = "A"
Completion Date = Date of Outgoing

Comments: Linus Kojelis and Rudy Beserra met with Mrs. Chandersekar
today, December 22, at which time this letter was delivered
to them.

Keep this worksheet attached to the original incoming letter. 456-7414
Send all routing updates to Central Reference (Room 75, OEOb).
Always return completed correspondence record to Central Files.
Refer questions about the correspondence tracking system to Central Reference, ext. 2590.

UNCLASSIFIED

(CLASSIFICATION)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
TRANSMITTAL FORM

S/S 8639219

DATE January 28, 1987

FOR: MR. FRANK C. CARLUCCI
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
THE WHITE HOUSE

REFERENCE:

TO: President Reagan FROM: Dr. Thomas Abraham

DATE: No date SUBJECT: Letter concerning an
appeal from Indian American community for President to desist
supplying AWACS to Pakistan, which could be used against India

REFERRAL DATED: December 30, 1986 ID# 467703
(IF ANY)

 THE ATTACHED ITEM WAS SENT DIRECTLY TO THE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION TAKEN:

- A DRAFT REPLY IS ATTACHED.
- A DRAFT REPLY WILL BE FORWARDED.
- A TRANSLATION IS ATTACHED.
- x AN INFORMATION COPY OF A DIRECT REPLY IS ATTACHED.
- WE BELIEVE NO RESPONSE IS NECESSARY FOR THE REASON
CITED BELOW.
- THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE HAS NO OBJECTION TO THE
PROPOSED TRAVEL.
- OTHER (SEE REMARKS).

REMARKS:

Lisa Kubishe
for
NICHOLAS PLATT
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

UNCLASSIFIED

(CLASSIFICATION)



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

January 27, 1987

Dear Dr. Abraham:

On behalf of the President, I am replying to the letter from you and your associates, Mrs. Chandrasekaran and Dr. Shah, regarding Pakistan's desire for U.S. assistance to improve its early warning capabilities against intruding aircraft attacks from Afghanistan.

Security assistance to Pakistan is governed by bilateral agreements going back to the 1950's, which specify that the assistance is intended to help the Government of Pakistan preserve "its national independence and integrity." The principal threat to Pakistan at this time is from Afghanistan. Since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, there has been a rising number of cross-border attacks by Soviet and Afghan aircraft on Pakistan (757 in 1986, resulting in 45 Pakistanis killed and 77 wounded). The long-term solution is the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan and the peaceful return of the Afghan refugees to their own country. In the meantime, however, Pakistan seeks to improve its ability to detect aircraft attacking from across the Afghanistan border. For this purpose, the U.S. and Pakistan have discussed several systems, but no decisions have as yet been made about a sale.

We are familiar with India's concerns regarding the AWACS system in particular and will take them into account when we make our final decision. India, of course, continues to have substantial military superiority over Pakistan, and any decision we might make would not change the military balance in the region. We will be guided also by our wish to promote rather than impede Indo-Pakistan normalization, which is the key to greater political stability in South Asia.

Regarding Pakistan's nuclear program, the President certified in October 1986 that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device and that our assistance to Pakistan reduces significantly the risk that Pakistan will possess such a device. We also have encouraged India and Pakistan to engage in a direct dialogue aimed at removing the risk of nuclear proliferation in South Asia. In our view, this could lead, ideally, to the signing of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty by both India and Pakistan (or other comprehensive non-proliferation measure).

While we continue to hope that both India and Pakistan will sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and also address nuclear nonproliferation issues bilaterally, we have made clear to the highest levels of the Pakistan government the serious consequences for our relationship should Pakistan fail to exercise restraint in its nuclear program. The Pakistanis fully understand that, under U.S. law, possession of a nuclear explosive device would preclude further U.S. assistance. Our assistance enables Pakistan to undertake a limited modernization of its conventional forces; this gives the Pakistanis not only greater confidence in their conventional capabilities but also helps them stand up to Soviet intimidation. This limited modernization thus serves to enhance Pakistan's general sense of security and contributes to the political stability of the region as a whole.

Sincerely yours,



Herbert G. Hagerty
Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary
Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

Dr. Thomas Abraham
President, National Federation of Asian Indian
Organizations in America
Room 310, 1819 "H" Street, NW
Washington, DC 20006

8639219

T H E W H I T E H O U S E O F F I C E

REFERRAL

DECEMBER 30, 1986

TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION REQUESTED:
DIRECT REPLY, FURNISH INFO COPY

DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:

ID: 467703
MEDIA: LETTER,
TO: PRESIDENT REAGAN
FROM: DR. THOMAS ABRAHAM
PRESIDENT
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF ASIAN
INDIAN ORGANIZATIONS IN AMERICA

XX 00000

SUBJECT: APPEAL FROM INDIAN AMERICAN COMMUNITY FOR
PRESIDENT TO DESIST FROM SUPPLYING AWACS TO
PAKISTAN, WHICH COULD BE USED AGAINST INDIA

✓ PROMPT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL -- IF REQUIRED ACTION HAS NOT BEEN
TAKEN WITHIN 9 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT, PLEASE TELEPHONE THE
UNDERSIGNED AT 456-7486.

RETURN CORRESPONDENCE, WORKSHEET AND COPY OF RESPONSE
(OR DRAFT) TO:
AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 91, THE WHITE HOUSE, 20500

SALLY KELLEY
DIRECTOR OF AGENCY LIAISON
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

46,703

AN APPEAL FROM THE INDIAN AMERICAN COMMUNITY
TO PRESIDENT RONALD REAGAN

Dear Mr. President:

The recent reports regarding the supply of airborne early warning systems (AWACs) by your administration to Pakistan are very disturbing; all the more so because of the widely published press reports and other mounting evidence that Pakistan does possess nuclear capabilities.

The AWACs will represent a new escalation in military technology and upset the military balance in South Asia. These systems will also have a "force multiplier effect" in terms of Pakistan's military striking power. The introduction of highly sophisticated weapons and war machinery in the South Asia region coupled with Pakistan's nuclear capability will pose a major threat to peace in that region, besides having a ripple effect throughout the world. In addition, it may force the Government of India to buy military hardware which means diverting its resources now being used for the development of the country and taking India closer to Russia. This letter is to let you know that we, the Americans of Indian origin as well as the rest of the Indian community in the U.S., are highly incensed and concerned about your administration's probable move in this matter.

The history of the past thirty-five years attests that Pakistan has freely used its U.S. supplied military equipments against India. There is nothing to stop Pakistan from doing the same now. Consequently, Pakistan's nuclear program with its military implications and the new technologies inherent in the airborne warning systems will cause a setback to the process of normalization of relations between India and Pakistan.

We, the representatives of the three national Indian American organizations, strongly urge you not to supply the sophisticated weapons to Pakistan, but instead, take steps to help strengthen the fragile peace now existing between India and Pakistan.

Sincerely,

Thomas Abraham Achamma Chandrasekaran Hj Ganardana
AC (Acting)

Dr. Thomas Abraham President National Federation of Asian Indian Organizations in America	Achamma Chandrasekaran President Indian American Forum for Political Education	Dr. Jitendra Shan President Association of Indians in America
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U.S. National Archives & Records Administration

Current Status Details for CTRH RECID: 473333 MAIN SUBCODE: CO121

Current Status	None
User Name	dbarrie
Status Date	2010-07-14
Case Number	
Notes	Transferred to CO119

Review Status History

No.	Status	Date	User	Case Number	Notes
1	None	2010-07-14	dbarrie		Transferred to CO119

8709169

ID # 473333

C0121

WHITE HOUSE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

O - OUTGOING

H - INTERNAL

INCOMING

Date Correspondence Received (YY/MM/DD)

87103116

Name of Correspondent: Achamma Chandrasekaran

MI Mail Report

User Codes: (A) _____ (B) _____ (C) _____

Subject: Pakistan's nuclear proliferation

ROUTE TO:

ACTION

DISPOSITION

Office/Agency (Staff Name)	Action Code	Tracking Date YY/MM/DD	Type of Response	Completion Date YY/MM/DD
<u>CSBARI</u>	ORIGINATOR	<u>87103125</u>		<u>C 87103125</u>
<u>DCARL</u>	A	<u>87103127</u>		<u>C 87103120</u>
<u>DOS</u>	R	<u>87104101</u>		<u>A 87104108</u>
		<u>1 1</u>		<u>1 1</u>
		<u>1 1</u>		<u>1 1</u>

ACTION CODES:

- A - Appropriate Action
- C - Comment/Recommendation
- D - Draft Response
- F - Furnish Fact Sheet to be used as Enclosure

- I - Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary
- R - Direct Reply w/Copy
- S - For Signature
- X - Interim Reply

DISPOSITION CODES:

- A - Answered
- B - Non-Special Referral
- C - Completed
- S - Suspended

FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:

- Type of Response = Initials of Signer
- Code = "A"
- Completion Date = Date of Outgoing

Comments: State

Keep this worksheet attached to the original incoming letter.
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 Always return completed correspondence record to Central Files.
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UNCLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
TRANSMITTAL FORM

S/S 8709169

Date April 9, 1987

FOR: Mr. Frank C. Carlucci
National Security Council
The White House

REFERENCE:

To: Howard Baker

From: Mr. Achamma Chandrasekaran

Date: March 12, 1987

Subject: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation letter

WH Referral Dated: April 1, 1987

NSC ID# (if any): 473333

The attached item was sent directly to the
Department of State.

ACTION TAKEN:

A draft reply is attached.

A draft reply will be forwarded.

A translation is attached.


An information copy of a direct reply is attached.

We believe no response is necessary for the reason
cited below.

The Department has no objection to the proposed
travel.

Other (see remarks).

REMARKS:


Melvyn Levitsky
Executive Secretary

UNCLASSIFIED



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

April 8, 1987

Mr. Achamma Chandrasekaran
Indian American Forum for
Political Education
Suite 310, Federal Bar Building
1819 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

Dear Mr. Chandrasekaran:

I am writing on behalf of Howard Baker to thank you for your March 12 letter and the enclosed material regarding Pakistan's nuclear program.

This Administration regards the prevention of the further spread of nuclear weapons as a leading national security and foreign policy priority. We share your concerns about the threat of nuclear proliferation in South Asia and have repeatedly raised this issue with the leaders of governments of the region. The Pakistan Government has assured us that its program for developing nuclear energy is peaceful in intent, and we welcome these assurances. However, we also remain concerned about the overall thrust of the Pakistan nuclear program and have made certain that Pakistan is well aware of our views. The government of Pakistan understands that our ability to continue our long-term assistance program presumes restraint in their nuclear program.


We believe that over the longer term, India also must play an active role if the threat of a nuclear arms race, and its underlying causes, are to be permanently removed from the region. As you know, Pakistan has offered to sign the NPT and accepts full scope safeguards if India will do likewise. We have welcomed Pakistan's proposals to India for mutual measures to address this objective and will continue to urge India to respond to these proposals or to offer suggestions of its own.

We believe it important to maintain our economic and security assistance programs aimed at helping Pakistan stand up to Soviet intimidation. We believe that our assistance to modernize Pakistan's conventional forces will serve to dissuade Pakistan from acquiring a nuclear explosive device. By helping

Pakistan address its substantial and legitimate economic and security needs, we reduce incentives and create disincentives for Pakistani acquisition of nuclear explosives.

I hope this information is helpful.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Robert A. Peck".

Robert A. Peck
Deputy Assistant Secretary
Bureau of Near East and
South Asian Affairs

8709169

T H E W H I T E H O U S E O F F I C E

REFERRAL

APRIL 1, 1987

TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION REQUESTED:

DIRECT REPLY, FURNISH INFO COPY

DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:

ID: 473333

MEDIA: LETTER, DATED MARCH 12, 1987

TO: HOWARD BAKER


FROM: MR. ACHAMMA CHANDERSEKARAN
INDIAN AMERICAN FORUM FOR
POLITICAL EDUCATION
SUITE 310, FEDERAL BAR BUILDING
1819 H STREET, NW
WASHINGTON DC 20006

SUBJECT: PAKISTAN NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

PROMPT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL -- IF REQUIRED ACTION HAS NOT BEEN
TAKEN WITHIN 9 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT, PLEASE TELEPHONE THE
UNDERSIGNED AT 456-7486.

RETURN CORRESPONDENCE, WORKSHEET AND COPY OF RESPONSE
(OR DRAFT) TO:
AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 91, THE WHITE HOUSE, 20500

SALLY KELLEY
DIRECTOR OF AGENCY LIAISON
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE



PRESIDENT

Mrs. Achamma Chandерsekarан
8911 Tuckerman Lane
Potomac, MD 20854
(301) 983-3476
(301) 983-2587

PRESIDENT-ELECT

Dr. Gopal K. Basisht
1751 Lake Berry Dr.
Winter Park, FL 32789
(305) 628-2771

SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT

Dr. Shailendra Kumar
3726 Rhode Island Ave.
Brentwood, MD 20722
(301) 864-6556

VICE PRESIDENT

Dr. Biswamay Ray
403 Suffolk Lane
Oak Brook, IL 60521
(312) 343-3122
(312) 655-3269

SECRETARY

J. John (Sunny) Wycliffe
2109 Van Buren Street
Hyattsville, MD 20782
(301) 422-8050
(301) 474-4004

ASSISTANT SECRETARY

Promod K. Bhatnagar
5027 Morris Street
Las Vegas, NV 89122
(702) 458-8414

TREASURER

Krishna Srinivasa
3020 Atlanta Street
Atlanta, GA 30080
(404) 432-3833

ASSISTANT TREASURER

Hari Keshav Puranik
Planning & Engineering Dept.
Virgin Island Tele Corp.
P.O. Box 6100
St. Thomas, U.S. VI 00801
(809) 775-7818 — (O)
(919) 872-3081 — (H)

PAST PRESIDENT

Dr. Joy Cherian
13316 Foxhall Dr.
Wheaton, MD 20906
(301) 933-1494

473333

March 12, 1987

The Honorable Howard Baker
Chief of Staff
The White House

Dear Mr. Baker:

It was an honor to meet you last Sunday. You are doing a great service to this country, setting aside personal ambitions, and we applaud you for that.

During my conversation with the President, I had promised to send him some material on Pakistan's nuclear capability. I am enclosing the material with this letter. You can see that most Americans see this capability as a grave matter with the possibility of dire consequences that we may not even want to think about now.

Knowing what you do about that area as a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, I am sure you understand the seriousness of the matter.

Thank you for your help in getting the information to the President.

sincerely,

Achamma Chandерsekarан

Achamma Chandерsekarан

The Washington Post

March 10-1987

Pakistan and Nuclear Weapons

FOR YEARS the United States has been trying to get Pakistan off its effort to develop a nuclear explosive, using persuasion, offers of patronage, conventional weaponry and nuclear power, and the leverage of aid. As Indians and Soviets have voiced their increasing and increasingly menacing concern over Pakistan's progress, American officials have told them to back off and leave it to Washington. But Islamabad has pressed on. Last fall, American authorities leaked word of Pakistan's latest progress. Pakistan ignored the warning. Last month the American ambassador publicly warned of an aid cutoff as required by American nonproliferation law. Pakistan responded by boasting of its bomb program's success.

Few American undertakings abroad have fared as poorly as the effort of successive administrations to deflect the Pakistanis from this pursuit. Warnings haven't worked, strategic dialogue hasn't worked, suppliers' cooperation hasn't worked, superpower collaboration hasn't worked, carrots haven't worked, sticks haven't worked. Why? Washington has always wanted to enjoy cooperation with Pakistan in other policy areas. In the early 1970s there was the China opening; at the end of the '70s there was replacement of intelligence facilities lost in Iran, and in the '80s there has been the support of the Afghan resistance. The United States has never made nonproliferation its first priority. The Pakis-

tanis have always made proliferation their first priority. They have thought they could have American patronage and the bomb too—and so far they have been right.

A desperate American government beseeches Pakistan to sign the nuclear nonproliferation treaty unilaterally—without a signature by its archrival India. India has a nuclear capability—it has developed an explosive—but not a nuclear arsenal. A Pakistani signature would give the president and Congress the kind of good-faith demonstration that American nonproliferation law requires, and would help keep American aid flowing to Pakistan. But Pakistan knows that an aid cutoff would adversely affect not only its own security but also the Afghan resistance, an American favorite. It is calling the American nonproliferation bluff.

An extremely difficult decision faces President Reagan. But the United States cannot yield without a devastating loss of credibility on this issue and elsewhere. Sen. John Glenn's suggestion of an aid suspension pending a policy review is useful—so long as the administration is prepared to hang tough. Nonproliferation is not some frivolous, idealistic cause that rightly yields in the pinch to other, more basic concerns. It bears directly on the first imperative of American foreign policy—to reduce the risks of nuclear war. It overwhelms any other American interests in Pakistan.

The Washington Times

Feb. 17-1987

Page 3

Envoy faults Pakistan N-program

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan — U.S. Ambassador Deane Hinton yesterday said there were indications Pakistan's nuclear program might be geared to produce weapons. The ambassador, ending more than three years on assignment to Pakistan, made the remark in a speech to the government-sponsored Institute of Strategic Studies here, according to a text released by the United States Information Service office.

"While Pakistan has publicly demonstrated a commitment to regional non-proliferation (of nuclear weapons), I must add in all candor that there are developments in Pakistan's nuclear program which we see as inconsistent with a purely peaceful program," he said. Pakistan has repeatedly said its nuclear program is meant to meet its future energy needs rather than for military weapons production.

The Washington Post
Editorial:—

March 1-1987

6

Pakistan and the Bomb ^{W. Post} _{March 1, 87}

PAKISTAN'S PURSUIT of nuclear weapons grows increasingly dangerous to itself and to the world. In Islamabad two weeks ago the American ambassador, Deane R. Hinton, urged Pakistan in its own interest to abandon this quest. In Washington Congress has now begun hearings on foreign aid to Pakistan. The connection between the two is the American law that would cut off all aid, both economic and military, if Pakistan built a nuclear bomb.

It's difficult to say with precision how close the Pakistanis have come to actual production of weapons. But Leonard S. Spector of the Carnegie Endowment, in a survey published a few days ago, reports a consensus that they have arrived "at the nuclear-weapons threshold." He also notes, incidentally, that within the past year India has gone to extraordinary lengths to develop a supply of plutonium beyond the reach of international inspection or control. With a history of hostility between them, each of these countries, in its own progress toward a nuclear armory, goads the other into greater exertions.

American law prohibits foreign aid to any country that imports nuclear technology, as Pakistan has done, without agreeing to international safeguards. After the Russian invasion of Afghanistan, Congress

passed a waiver for Pakistan to bolster its defenses and open a supply route to the Afghan rebels. But the waiver expires this year, and Congress now must decide whether to renew it. Even under the waiver, aid will continue only as long as President Reagan annually certifies that Pakistan has not built nuclear weapons. Ambassador Hinton warned his Pakistani audience that "it is open to question whether the president could so certify were he to conclude that Pakistan had in hand, but not assembled, all the needed components for a nuclear explosive device."

But above all Mr. Hinton pressed Pakistan to consider the meaning of nuclear weapons for its own security. India set off a nuclear explosion in 1974, but does not yet have deployable weapons. If Pakistan were to push India to make them, Mr. Hinton observed, it would have to reckon with India's far larger nuclear potential. As both countries began to arm, the temptation to try a first strike would rise on both sides.

There are several places in the world—southern Africa and the Middle East are the others—where a real risk has arisen that nuclear weapons might be used in a regional war. But the risk will remain greatest in South Asia as long as the competition between these two rivals continues.

Pakistan has the A-bomb

PAKISTAN has an atom bomb, the country's leading nuclear scientist, *the Observer* in an exclusive interview.

EXCLUSIVE

Dr Abdel Qader Khan, hailed in Pakistan as the new Einstein, said weapons-grade uranium was being produced at the Kahuta laboratories near Islamabad. They would not need to test the bomb, he added. The country's scientists had also mastered plutonium reprocessing and were now way ahead of their rivals in India.

His announcement follows reports from Washington at the end of last year that Pakistan had succeeded in enriching uranium to 93.5 per cent and had tested a triggering device for a nuclear weapon last September.

Confirmation of these reports is a big setback for global non-proliferation efforts. The United States has invested considerable effort in trying to persuade Pakistan not to take up the nuclear weapons option and a \$4.2 billion aid proposal before Congress depends on Pakistan not possessing the Bomb.

Khan's announcement will have a significant impact on public opinion in India, which tested a bomb in 1974. Pro-Bomb lobbyists have argued that India needs a nuclear strike force to enhance its status as a regional super-power. In his interview Khan

says he hopes India and Pakistan will agree not to use nuclear weapons against each other.

There will be concern also in Israel because of Arab funding, estimated at \$5 billion, for Pakistani nuclear research. Libyan leader Colonel Qadhafi is believed to have sent suitcases stuffed with money for Pakistani nuclear projects.

The Arab link has prompted Israel to approach India with plans for a joint strike against Pakistani nuclear installations. The last approach was made last year when an Israeli minister spoke to an Indian diplomat in Paris. The Indians refused to co-operate.

Since the interview took place, the Pakistan Government has passed on to *The Observer* a message purportedly from Dr Khan in which he denies that Pakistan possesses a nuclear weapon.

In 1984, Dr Khan admitted that Pakistan had the 'capability' to produce the Bomb and 'would not disappoint the country.'

The Observer's interview was conducted by Kuldip Nayar, a former editor of *The Statesman* in New Delhi and a highly regarded political journalist with extensive contacts in Pakistan.

In Washington, Mr Leonard Specter, an expert on nuclear proliferation at the Congress, said independently from Administration sources that Pakistan appeared to have the components for its first nuclear weapon. 'It's an enormous setback for global non-proliferation efforts.'

Under American law, economic aid is blocked unless President Reagan certifies that the country does not possess nuclear explosives. Reagan gave Congress such a certificate last October.

A Senate foreign relations expert in Washington said: 'It will have a major impact on how the US looks at the assistance programme to Islamabad. A cut-off in aid means that not one screw, not one bit of software, not even a rubber tyre can be sold to Pakistan.'

Dr Khan's interview has created dismay in New Delhi, but an Indian Government spokesman said he would prefer to study the full text before commenting. The latest black humour offering in India is that Dr Khan is really interested only in peaceful nuclear explosives, except that he has chosen New Delhi as the site for the first test.

India's defence spending is set to rise by 24 per cent, Premier Rajiv Gandhi told Parliament in Delhi yesterday. Interview, page 13.

We have the A-bomb, says Pakistan's 'Dr Strangelove'

PAKISTAN has the Bomb. Dr Abdel Qader Khan, father of the 'Islamic bomb', said in his first interview with a foreign journalist: 'America knows it. What the CIA has been saying about our possessing the bomb is correct and so is the speculation of some foreign newspapers.'

The 51-year-old nuclear scientist and metallurgist, educated in the Netherlands, West Germany and Belgium, is acclaimed as a hero by his fellow-countrymen, who refer to him affectionately as their own Einstein.

For outsiders, he is a mystery figure, a Dr Strangelove of Pakistan, obsessed with nuclear technology.

In confirming that his country has gained entry to the exclusive world nuclear club that includes the Big Powers, India, Israel and probably South Africa, he declared:

'They told us that Pakistan could never produce the bomb and they doubted my capabilities, but they now know we have done it.'

Khan heads top-secret uranium laboratories at Kahuta, a few miles from the country's capital of Islamabad, which the Pakistan Government has named the Khan Laboratories in his honour.

For the first time, he said, these labs are producing highly enriched or weapons-grade uranium. 'We have upgraded it (the uranium) to 90 per cent to achieve the desired results,' he revealed.

Asked if Pakistan had tested the bomb, he replied: 'Is it necessary? America has threatened to cut off all its aid. The testing does not have to be on the ground. It can be done in a laboratory, through a

KULDIP NAYAR, in Islamabad, comes face to face with mystery man Abdel Qader Khan, father of the 'Islamic Bomb' and a national hero.

simulator. Plans are often filed after testing that simulator.

During the hour-long interview, Khan made a point of referring to an observation by a former Indian atomic energy chairman that Pakistan lacked the technical ability and manpower to make its own nuclear bomb.

'Indeed it was difficult, particularly when America and other Western countries had stopped selling anything which could be used in manufacturing the bomb,' he said. 'Embargoes were put on such small things as magnets and maraging steel (a very tough steel used for constrictors), but we purchased whatever we wanted before Western countries got wind of it.'

Khan boasted that Pakistan had taken only seven years to assemble the bomb, whereas an Indian team—which carried out a nuclear test in 1974—took 12 years. The Indians have carried on with their nuclear weapons research, he claimed, and they may have a much bigger bomb. They had not tested it on the ground, he added, but they have tested its other capabilities.

His poured scorn on India's claim that it had carried out only a peaceful test in 1974. 'The test "peaceful" associated with nuclear programme is a bomb. There is no "peaceful" bomb.'

'How do you know how to use nuclear power, how to produce electricity and to process it—this is what Pakistan has mastered as well as

become a father of a nuclear weapon.'

It is difficult to reach Islamabad. Because of the sensitive nature of his job, he is better protected than President Zia. The grounds of his two-bungalow home are patrolled by guards with dogs.

He and his Dutch wife, Henny, live a quiet life with their two daughters in the suburbs of the capital. Mrs Khan, who has learned parts of the Koran by heart, is aware her husband is a controversial figure.

He came to public attention in 1979 when *The Observer* exposed the Netherlands' failure to inform its atomic partners that a non-Nato national, Khan, had been given access to a range of classified documents and blueprints not directly connected with his own work.

Four years earlier, he had returned to Pakistan to help establish the country's own uranium enrichment facility at Kahuta, a replica of the Dutch plant in which he had been working.

Khan spoke with obvious pride of the Kahuta plant, almost as if it were his third child, and described it as a mechanical miracle. It took three years to complete, he said, and became fully operational at the beginning of 1979. The procedure involved a sequence of ideas, decision-making, feasibility report, basic research, construction of a table model, of a pilot plant, and then of the facility.

The technology at Kahuta has been mastered only by highly industrialised countries, and Khan

said Pakistan deserved credit for accomplishing a herculean task that required expertise in metallurgy, engineering, electronics and nuclear physics.

'We took a very bold step and started to do all the work simultaneously while preliminary work was being done at Harvard and procurement was being done for the most essential and sophisticated equipment and materials, we were manufacturing the first prototypes.'

Scientists at Kahuta started by enriching uranium to between 3.0 and 3.5 per cent—the 'pile' level—for commercial purposes. Now, at 90 per cent, the uranium is weapons grade.

When I reminded Khan that a Dutch court had sentenced him for trying to gather secret information—a sentence later overturned on appeal—he claimed he never had a chance of presenting his side of the case to the public prosecutor who tried him in absentia.

The Dutch Minister of Justice told the country's Parliament last year that fresh charges would not be filed against Khan. But he will not be welcome if he should return to Holland.

'I never received any answer to my letters,' Khan said, 'but was prosecuted without my knowledge.'

The information I had asked for (from former colleagues) was ordinary technical information. I submitted certificates from six world-renowned professors, from Holland, Belgium, Britain and Germany, that the information requested by me was not classified.'

At the same time, in an extraordinarily frank aside, Khan made clear that Pakistan would be prepared to beg, borrow or steal whatever was required for its nuclear programme.



Nuclear power: The first picture of Dr Khan.

'Having said that, I can tell you that the Western world never talks about its own hectic and persistent efforts to sell everything to us. When we bought inverters from Emerson, England, we found them to be less efficient than we wanted them to be. We asked Emerson to improve upon the parameters and suggested the method.'

'At that period, we received many letters and telexes, and people chased us with figures and details of equipment they had sold to Almelo, Capenhurst, etc. They literally begged us to buy their equipment.'

Khan is aware of India's interest in Kahuta. A military attaché at the Indian embassy in Islamabad tried

unsuccessfully to recruit 'two of our boys,' he claims. 'Indira Mahere what price it would have to pay for attacking Kahuta. In any case, the plant is well protected and we have not put our eggs in one basket.'

'Nobody can undo Pakistan or take us for granted. We are here to stay and let it be clear that we shall use the bomb if our existence is threatened.'

Khan's fervent hope is that Pakistan and India will hold back from using nuclear weapons against each other. 'I personally think that the only way to stop nuclear warfare between us is to come to an agreement. Whatever arrangement India suggests, we are willing to accept, provided it is equally applicable to both.'

Pakistani A-Bomb Seen Likely U.S. Is Unwilling To Risk Aid Program To Block Weapon

By David B. Ottaway
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Reagan administration apparently has decided it cannot head off Pakistan's acquisition of nuclear weapons and is unwilling to sacrifice the big American aid program to that strategically located nation to try to force Pakistan not to build a bomb, according to administration officials.

The United States will continue to object publicly to the Pakistani nuclear program, officials said in recent interviews, but will give priority to assisting increased Soviet pressure on Pakistan and safeguarding the flow of U.S. aid to the resistance in Soviet-occupied Afghanistan.

Despite mounting evidence that Pakistan has reached the nuclear threshold, the Administration is pressing Congress to grant another six-year waiver to a provision that otherwise would cut off U.S. aid to a nation that refuses to open its nuclear facilities to international inspection. The administration is asking Congress to approve with no restrictions a new six-year, \$4.02 billion aid program for Pakistan.

Administration officials acknowledge there is little chance any more that President Reagan can provide Congress with "reliable assurance" that Pakistan is not moving toward building a nuclear bomb. Under a 1985 congressional requirement, the president has to certify annually that Pakistan does not have a nuclear device and that U.S. aid will reduce the risk of it obtaining one.

The White House last gave that certification to Congress in October, despite intelligence it had that Pakistan was developing weapons-grade enriched uranium. President Mohammad Zia ul-Haq and his prime minister, Mohammad Khan Junejo, reportedly have denied this

cont. on next page

Pakistan's Nuclear Intentions Called Into Doubt

State Department Says U.S. Lacks Reliable Assurances That Arms Production Isn't Planned

By David E. Gibney
Washington Post Staff Writer

A senior administration official said yesterday the United States can no longer obtain "reliable assurances" from Pakistan that it is not producing material for nuclear weapons. But the official appealed to Congress to avoid "public confrontations" or "legislative ultimatums" that would impair U.S. aid to the strategically located nation, which is under increasing Soviet pressure.

Robert Peck, deputy assistant secretary of state, was responding to a letter from Sen. John Glenn (D-Ohio) to President Reagan calling for a suspension of U.S. military aid to Pakistan. Peck said there is "not a very high probability" that Reagan could obtain the "reliable assurance" Glenn seeks from Pakistani authorities regarding their nuclear intentions.

Peck's comments, before the House Foreign Affairs Asia subcommittee, served to underscore the dilemma Congress and the administration face this year in attempting to use a six-year, \$4 billion aid program proposed for Pakistan to pressure that country to halt efforts to build a nuclear bomb.

The administration has asked Congress to grant a new six-year waiver to Pakistan from the Symington amendment, which prohibits U.S. aid to any country involved in producing enriched uranium without proper safeguards. Furthermore, in order for U.S. aid to go forward, the president must certify to Congress annually that Pakistan does not have a nuclear explosive device.

Peck's comments seem to raise doubts about whether the president can continue to sign the necessary certifications in the face of growing evidence that Pakistan has reached the nuclear threshold and is producing weapons-grade enriched uranium.

Pakistan's top nuclear scientist, Abdul Qadeer Khan, asserted in an interview with the London Observer last Sunday that Pakistan has the bomb and is producing its own enriched uranium. Although Khan later denied having made such statements, the article has added fuel to the reappraisal under way in Congress over U.S. relations with a country whose support is crucial to U.S.-backed rebels fighting to oust Soviet troops from neighboring Afghanistan.

Glenn, citing the Khan interview in his letter to Reagan, urged the president to suspend military aid to

Pakistan until a reexamination of U.S. information about the Pakistani nuclear program is completed.

"I also urge that such assistance not be restarted until you have received reliable assurances from the Pakistanis that they have ceased producing nuclear explosive materials," he said.

Asked by Rep. Stephen J. Solarz (D-N.Y.), chairman of the House Asia subcommittee, whether he thinks that Reagan could extract such assurances from the Pakistanis, Peck said: "I doubt the president could, certainly not under the present circumstances."

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AVEN SIMON

Pakistan, under Zia (left), reportedly may now be able to build nuclear arms. This news, along with domestic pressures and US plans to sell surveillance planes to Pakistan, is forcing India's Gandhi (right) to reassess his nuclear arms option.



India faces rising pressure for arms race with Pakistan

By Vyvyan Torp
Special to The Christian Science Monitor

New Delhi

India is feeling increased pressure to get into a nuclear arms race with Pakistan, according to analysts here. Three factors lie behind this:


- Recent reports of possible new evidence that Pakistan is close to, or has already achieved, nuclear weapons capability.
- The United States' proposed sale of sophisticated military equipment to Pakistan.
- Domestic pressure on Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to reassess India's nuclear option.

The latest reports of Pakistan's possible nuclear capability came in two Western newspapers. Last fall the Washington Post reported that Pakistan had conducted a test explosion to perfect a nuclear weapons trigger package. More recently, a March 1 report in the Observer of London referred to statements by Pakistan's top nuclear scientist as virtual admissions that Pakistan had already manufactured a nuclear bomb.

Neither India nor Pakistan has signed the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Although India exploded a nuclear device in 1974, it claims that its nuclear program is purely for energy-related purposes. But in the last two years, Mr. Gandhi has indicated that Pakistani nuclear efforts under President Mohammed Zia ul-Haq are forcing him to rethink his policy. And several reports say India has already begun designing nuclear weapons.

Relations between the two have been tense since Pakistan's inception in 1947; they have fought three wars. Adding to the strain is Operation Brass Tacks, a massive Indian military exercise taking place less than 120 miles from the border. The operation's final stage, which began Thursday, involves 150,000 troops and tests some of India's most advanced military technology. Pakistan calls the operation a provocation.

Meanwhile, the Reagan administration is asking Congress to approve a \$4.02 billion, six-year economic and military aid package for



SHIRLEY HORN - STAFF

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Pakistan. As part of the package, Pakistan is seeking radar and early-warning systems such as AWACS (airborne warning and control system) to help stem border attacks from Soviet-occupied Afghanistan.

India has told US congressional leaders that if Congress approves the AWACS sale, India will be forced to develop nuclear weapons, a well-placed academic source says.

Prime Minister Gandhi has been quoted by a French newspaper as saying, "If we decided to become a nuclear power, it would take a few weeks or a few months." He said the decision has not been taken, but "we have already worked on it."

If it is confirmed that Pakistan has detonated an atomic bomb, one defense analyst says, "there will be such an outcry in India that it will be very difficult for Rajiv Gandhi, or for any other prime minister, not to respond in a similar fashion."

Quoting classified US intelligence reports, the Washington Post said that Pakistan had conducted a high-explosive test to perfect a nuclear weapons trig-

ger package and that Pakistan has enriched uranium to 93.5 percent at its atomic plant at Kahuta. (Ninety-percent enrichment is needed to make a bomb.)

The Indian public reacted strongly. "In the absence of denial by the US administration in regard to the authenticity of the intelligence [report], it would be dangerous to rely on any assumption other than that Pakistan already is a nuclear weapons power," says Commodore Jasjit Singh of the government-sponsored Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses.

The Observer article provoked further controversy. The report said that Pakistan's top nuclear scientist, Abdul Qadir Khan, confirmed in an interview Western reports about Pakistan's nuclear arms program.

"Indeed, it was difficult - particularly when America and other Western countries had stopped selling anything which could be used in manufacturing the bomb," Mr. Khan reportedly said. "But we purchased whatever we wanted before Western countries got wind of it."

Khan later denied that he had given such an interview.

Nevertheless, the Indian government reacted strongly, say-

ing the report "was yet another confirmation that Pakistan's nuclear program was a weapons-oriented one."

The Observer story also renewed public pressures on the government, mostly from members of Parliament belonging to both the ruling and opposition parties, to reassess the country's defense strategies.

In Parliament, Gandhi responded by indirectly accusing the US of helping Pakistan launch an ambitious armaments program without safeguards against nuclear proliferation.

The US ambassador to Pakistan, Deane Hinton, warned Pakistan of the dangers of its nuclear efforts and urged Pakistan either to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty or adopt full-scale safeguards. In the strongest statements yet by a US official on the issue, he said that continued US aid to Pakistan would depend on Pakistani restraint. US senators last week called for making the AWACS sale conditional on further restrictions of Pakistan's nuclear program.

In India, however, there is a widespread belief that the US is not ready to curtail aid to Pakistan if it means losing the US's one ally in the region. In-

1981, the US waived the Symington amendment, which prohibits US aid to countries possessing unsafeguarded nuclear equipment and technology, to allow aid to Pakistan after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The Reagan administration is seeking to extend the waiver. [Pakistan pledged yesterday to continue its nuclear program, even if it meant losing foreign aid, Reuters reported.]

According to a defense analyst, India has three options: Do nothing; get into a strategic ambiguity similar to Pakistan's; or announce that it will start a nuclear testing program and advance its deployment capability.

The majority in India's government appears to favor a moderate approach. Gandhi has said he does not want to build the bomb, but he is holding the option open.

"He won't cross the barrier unless he's absolutely convinced that Pakistan has the bomb," says Maj. Gen. K. D. Palit, referring to the prime minister.

Says another analyst: If that is confirmed, "there will be such an outcry . . . that it will be very difficult for Rajiv Gandhi, or for any other prime minister, not to respond in a similar fashion."

India's nuclear potential is greater than Pakistan's. India has an ambitious program of building nuclear reactors and reprocessing plants capable of producing large amounts of unsafeguarded plutonium that could be used for nuclear arms.

Despite India's claims to the contrary, a number of reports have said that the country has already begun work on nuclear weapons designs. According to Leonard Spector, a fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, India has gone to great lengths to obtain a supply of plutonium that could not have been used for any other purpose than to develop nuclear arms.

"American officials now estimate that India has enough for between one and four atomic weapons comparable to that dropped on Nagasaki," Mr. Spector concludes.

Both India and Pakistan have aircraft delivery systems that can be used for nuclear arms. India has Soviet MIGs, French Mirages, and the British-French Jaguar. Pakistan has 40 US F-16s. In addition, Indian defense analysts say, India is looking in the long-term at developing a costly intermediate-range ballistic-missile capability.

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Pakistan Reported Near Atom Arms Production

Acquisition of Weapon Could Halt U.S. Aid

By Bob Woodward

Washington Post Staff Writer

President Reagan certified to Congress last week that Pakistan currently "does not possess a nuclear explosive device," although according to intelligence reports considered reliable inside the administration, the country has recently made dramatic progress toward production of a nuclear weapon.

Presidential certification is required by Congress as a condition of continued U.S. aid to Pakistan, which receives approximately \$600 million a year in military and economic assistance. Pakistan has cooperated with clandestine U.S. aid to Afghan guerrillas fighting the Soviet occupation of their country, and has provided facilities for U.S. intelligence-gathering near the Soviet Union.

According to a classified Defense Intelligence Agency report, Pakistan detonated a high explosive device between Sept. 18 and Sept. 21 as part of its continuing efforts to build an implosion-type nuclear weapon, sources said.

It was Pakistan's second such test this year, according to the sources, who said the Pakistanis have been conducting the tests for years in trying to perfect a nuclear weapons triggering package.

Intelligence reports also show that Pakistan has enriched uranium to 93.5 percent at its atomic plant at Kahuta, according to authoritative sources. A 90-percent level is normally needed to make a bomb. President Reagan in late 1984 told Pakistani President Mohammed Zia ul-Haq in a top-secret letter that 5 percent would be the highest enrichment level acceptable to the United States.

In July, the White House warned Pakistani Prime Minister Mohammed Khan Junejo during his visit here that acquiring a nuclear weapon would result in the end of U.S. economic and military assistance.

Pakistan has repeatedly denied that it is developing nuclear weapons. But a Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) completed earlier this year by U.S. intelligence agencies cited numerous activities totally inconsistent with those assurances, according to sources. The SNIE concluded that Pakistan would have a small nuclear weapon at a future, unspecified date.

Charles E. Redman, the State Department spokesman, said yesterday that Reagan signed the

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Pakistani Atom Weapon Reported Near

NUCLEAR, From A1

Pakistani certification Oct. 27. He added, however, that the Reagan administration still has "serious concerns" about the future and said the current certification should "not be interpreted as implying any U.S. approval of the Pakistani nuclear program."

He declined to comment on any intelligence reports.

There is disagreement among intelligence and nuclear nonproliferation experts about the exact status of the Pakistani program. One senior Reagan administration official confirmed that the program is advancing aggressively, but said that a new, multibillion-dollar U.S. assistance proposal would provide leverage to deter actual construction of a bomb.

Another official said Pakistan could assemble a bomb within two weeks. Another well-informed source said it could be done in a shorter time and, in practical terms, Pakistan is only "two screwdriver turns" from having a fully assembled bomb.

Despite this evidence, sources said, keeping Pakistan from obtaining a bomb is a low priority on the list of administration foreign policy goals. Said one senior official directly involved in monitoring the program, "This administration wouldn't come down on Pakistan if we found a bomb in Zia's basement."

The reason, the sources said, is Pakistan's willingness to help the administration by acting as the pipeline for the hundreds of millions of dollars in CIA covert assistance that is provided the Afghanistan rebels—a top priority for Reagan and his administration. At the time of Junejo's visit last summer to Washington, Reagan said that Pakistan was a "front line" against "the brutal Soviet occupation of Afghanistan."

Pakistan also cooperates with U.S. intelligence agencies in high-priority electronic intelligence gathering near the Soviet Union and in Southeast Asia, the sources said.

On June 21 the Soviets issued a strongly worded, unusual warning to Zia charging that Pakistan had achieved the capability to build nuclear weapons, which Moscow said

it would not tolerate, according to sources.

Within two days, the Reagan administration replied with its own protest, in effect telling Moscow to keep "hands off" Pakistan. This in effect made the administration a protector of the Pakistani program, and two sources said that the Pakistanis may have interpreted the administration's remarks as approval.

A senior administration official disputed this interpretation, however, saying the White House made clear last summer to Junejo that a single bomb would result in termination of all U.S. aid.

The intelligence report that uranium has been enriched at levels in excess of 90 percent has alarmed nuclear weapons experts most. Leonard S. Spector, a nuclear proliferation expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said yesterday that, if true, "it would be the last important step in the Pakistani program. It was the one outstanding gap in their program and could be a terrible setback to worldwide efforts to curtail the spread of nuclear weapons."

To Philadelphia Inquirer

March 9-1987

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Pakistan refuses to halt its nuclear program

United Press International

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan — Pakistan will not be "browbeaten or cajoled" into abandoning its nuclear program, even at the cost of a proposed \$4 billion U.S. aid program, a senior official said yesterday.

"As Allah is my witness, I promise the people of Pakistan, on behalf of the government, that no power on earth can deter us from pursuing our peaceful nuclear program because our conscience is clear and our aim is peaceful," Deputy Foreign Minister Zain Noorani told the parliament.

The Washington Post reported yesterday that the Reagan administration apparently has decided it cannot head off Pakistan's acquisition of nuclear weapons. But it does not want to sacrifice the aid program, which is designed to bolster Pakistan in the face of the Soviet presence in neighboring Afghanistan, the Post said.

Pakistan stands to lose a proposed six-year, \$4.02 billion aid package if Congress refuses to grant a six-year waiver to a provision cutting off U.S. aid to any country that refuses to allow international inspection of its nuclear facilities to ensure they are being used only for peaceful purposes.

Pakistan repeatedly has denied it is developing nuclear weapons, but U.S. intelligence indicates that it has produced weapons-grade enriched uranium. Last week, the Observer of London quoted Pakistan's chief nuclear scientist as saying a bomb is being built.

The Pakistani government has said the scientist now denies making that statement, which set off a storm of protest in Pakistan, but two journalists have insisted he did.

"Pakistan's peaceful nuclear program shall go on, no matter what difficulties we may have to face and what sacrifices we may have to undergo," Noorani said. "We shall not be browbeaten or cajoled."

Noorani was speaking against a motion for a foreign policy review by more than a dozen legislators, who were reacting to a Feb. 16 warning speech by the U.S. ambassador to Pakistan.

In the speech, Ambassador Deane Hinton said Pakistan risked losing the U.S. aid if it used its nuclear program to develop the capability to build nuclear weapons. He urged Pakistan to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

"The United States has not asked Pakistan to stop its nuclear program, and no threat has been held out to cut off aid to Pakistan," Noorani said yesterday.

"The United States is free to formulate any law," he said. "It can propose any conditions it chooses, but we have to decide as to whether we shall or shall not accept all or any of the conditions."

Opposition members did not press their motion after Noorani's speech.

USA Today March 9-1987

Pakistan firm on N-program despite warning

Special for USA TODAY

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan — Vowing not to bow to foreign pressure, Pakistan said Sunday it will continue peaceful development of nuclear energy.

"We will not be browbeaten

or cajoled out of pursuing our peaceful nuclear program," said Zain Noorani, minister of state for foreign affairs.

His statement followed the March 1 publication of comments attributed to a Pakistani scientist who said Pakistan is

close to a nuclear bomb.

U.S. Ambassador Deane Hinton warned Pakistan on Feb. 16 not to build such weapons, saying Congress might block \$4.02 billion in military and economic aid planned for the next six years. But the

White House wants to waive a provision that Pakistan not build nuclear arms in order to get the aid, *The Washington Post* reported Sunday.

Pakistan says its nuclear program is designed to meet an electricity shortage.

Pakistan's Bomb Could Kill Us All

By Joseph S. Nye Jr.

WHILE RONALD REAGAN and Mikhail Gorbachev were at Reykjavik talking about abolishing nuclear weapons, intelligence reports indicate that President Zia ul-Haq of Pakistan was making dramatic progress toward acquiring them.

Pakistan is deadly serious about getting the bomb. And its seemingly unstoppable weapons program poses, for the rest of the world, a deadly threat of nuclear war. Most specialists believe that nuclear weapons will be used, not in a war between the two superpowers, but by a Third World country such as India or Pakistan.

The Pakistan situation is doubly dangerous for the United States because it represents a chronic failure of American policy. We have tried unsuccessfully for more than a decade to restrain the Pakistani nuclear program. We have failed, in part, because other policy concerns have predominated. Pakistan provides us with intelligence-gathering opportunities to monitor strategic programs in the Soviet Union; it also allows us to pass supplies through its territory to the resistance movement in Afghanistan.

Joseph S. Nye Jr. is a professor of government at Harvard and author of "Nuclear Ethics." From 1977 to 1979 he was a deputy undersecretary of state and chaired the National Security Council ad hoc committee on non-proliferation.

President Zia knows that he has us over a barrel. After losing Iran in the late 1970s, the United States can't afford to lose Pakistan.

Yet by failing to stop Pakistan's nuclear program, the administration risks seeing a crucial ally involved in a dangerous conflict on the Indian subcontinent. After rumors of a preemptive Indian strike against Pakistan's nuclear facilities in 1984, and again after a recent Soviet statement that it would not tolerate a Pakistani bomb, the United States assured those countries that we were dealing with the situation.

Those assurances look increasingly hollow now, following disclosure in *The Washington Post* this week of U.S. intelligence reports that Pakistan has made dramatic progress this year in its nuclear-weapon program, including tests of non-nuclear ex-

plosives (that can be used in triggering a nuclear bomb) on Sept. 18 and Sept. 21.

The danger is that the Indians will do by military force what the United States has failed to do by diplomacy—stop the Pakistani nuclear program. A preemptive strike at the Pakistani nuclear enrichment plant at Kahuta by a frustrated India, possibly backed by the Soviet Union, could embroil us in an enormously dangerous situation. Why have we failed to halt this growing danger?

The story begins in the early 1970s. In 1974, India became the first Third World country to carry out a nuclear explosion and the first new entrant in the nuclear club since China exploded its bomb a decade earlier. India had been working on its nuclear program since the 1940s, with significant

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⑦

Jack Anderson and Dale Van Atta

Trade-Off With Pakistan

W. Post - March 1, 87

President Reagan could be forgiven if he wishes the whole southwestern end of the Asian continent would sink out of sight. The scandal over his arms deal with Iran has been trouble enough; now he faces a confrontation with Congress over a country suffused with its own brand of Moslem pride: Pakistan.

The problem with the Pakistani regime of Gen. Mohammed Zia ul-Haq has nothing to do with American hostages. What bothers Congress is that Zia is suspected, with good reason, of trying to build a nuclear device—the so-called Islamic bomb. In the long run, this could be a more serious disruption of U.S. foreign-policy goals than the seizure of American hostages.

But Zia is considered a determined anti-communist and a trusted ally of the United States. Also, Pakistan is absolutely crucial to our "covert" support of the anti-Soviet guerrilla forces in Afghanistan next door.

The Reagan administration has decided that Pakistan deserves U.S. economic aid, even though Zia has refused to sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty that would presumably keep him from developing a nuclear bomb. The White House has asked Congress for more than \$600 million in aid to Pakistan.

Unfortunately for the president and his policy strategists, the law prohibits U.S. economic aid to any country that won't agree to give up

development of nuclear weapons. The president must "certify" that Pakistan has promised this—which Reagan did last October to keep aid to Pakistan alive.

But Congress is now controlled by the Democrats, and there's a strong sentiment—particularly in the Senate—for threatening to cut off aid to Pakistan, or stopping it outright.

A 1981 amendment to the law that forbids U.S. aid to countries developing a nuclear potential allowed the president to waive the restriction for Pakistan. In addition, a 1985 amendment required the president to certify that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device before aid can be approved.

Now the president's Senate critics—Claiborne Pell (D-R.I.), chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, John Glenn (D-Ohio), of the Governmental Affairs Committee, and Alan Cranston (D-Calif.)—are trying to make aid to Pakistan more difficult. One possible way is to require the president to certify not just that Pakistan doesn't have a nuclear bomb, but that it doesn't have the enriched uranium and other materials necessary to make one.

This could be tough to do. Pakistan, through various means including theft of high technology, already has both the uranium and the know-how to manufacture an atomic bomb within a matter of weeks.

For their part, the Pakistanis aren't about to

give up their quest for membership in the nuclear club. This is because their blood enemy, India, is known to have nuclear weapons and has likewise refused to sign the non-proliferation treaty.

Faced with this Pakistani determination, the United States has tried to adopt a tough line on aid. In a recent speech to the Pakistan Institute of Strategic Studies, outgoing U.S. Ambassador Deane Hinton delivered a blunt warning: it is "open to question," he said, whether President Reagan could certify Pakistan for further aid "were he to conclude that Pakistan had in hand, but not assembled . . . the needed components [for a bomb]."

But why hasn't the administration been tougher? A congressional source summed it up for our associate Lucette Lagnado this way: "It's a trade-off between Afghanistan and non-proliferation."

Pakistan has endeared itself to the White House by providing shelter to thousands of Afghan refugees, and by allowing the covert U.S. supply of weapons to the anti-Soviet rebels to be delivered through Pakistan. In addition, Pakistan has played the anti-Soviet tune to justify its development of a nuclear bomb; the Soviets presumably will think twice about expanding their aggression in the area beyond Afghanistan if they think Pakistan has a nuclear capability.

But Senate proponents of a hard line against Zia's nuclear ambitions say the Reagan administration is being suckered by the Pakistanis. In their view, the Soviet menace on Pakistan's border is far more dangerous for Zia than for the United States; therefore, they argue, no concessions are necessary to get Pakistan to act in its own self-interest.

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Report of Pakistani A-Bomb Causes a Stir in the Region

By STEVEN R. WEISMAN
Special to The New York Times

NEW DELHI, March 1 — A report by an Indian journalist quoting the director of Pakistan's nuclear program as saying Pakistan possessed a nuclear bomb created a stir today in India and Pakistan.

Pakistan has consistently rejected Indian assertions that it would try to develop a nuclear weapon and has charged that American news reports of such development were also false. Islamabad asserts that its nuclear research program is peaceful and geared to producing atomic energy.

The report by the Indian, published today in a weekly New Delhi newspaper, quoted Abdul Qadeer Khan, head of Pakistan's nuclear research program, as saying in the interview: "They told us Pakistan could never produce the bomb, and they doubted my capabilities, but they know we have done it."

'Is It Necessary?'

Asked by the journalist why Pakistan had not announced that it had a bomb, Dr. Khan was quoted as saying: "Is it necessary? America has threatened to cut off all its aid."

[Dr. Khan issued a statement that said the comments attributed to him were "false and concocted."

["Furthermore, some of my remarks have been taken out of context to mislead the world into believing that Pakistan possesses a nuclear weapon and that we have enriched uranium to 90 percent or more," he said. "As I so often publicly stated, Pakistan's enrichment research is solely aimed at the development of fuel-grade uranium for our future power reactors. The Government of Pakistan has made it abundantly clear that it has no desire to produce nuclear weapons."]

The interview was said to have been conducted at Dr. Khan's house in Islamabad by Kuldip Nayar, a well-known columnist and journalist who has visited Pakistan many times. Mr. Nayar wrote that Dr. Khan "would not allow me to tape-record the interview."

The interview also appeared in *The Observer*, a British weekly.

Indian officials expressed serious concern about the report.

If Pakistan proved to have a nuclear bomb, it could drastically alter the political and military situation in South Asia, produce a nuclear arms race with India and jeopardize American aid to Pakistan.

Congress has approved an aid program for Pakistan on the condition that President Reagan certify that it did not

possess a nuclear weapon. The President certified this in October and recently requested \$4.02 billion in aid for Pakistan over the next six years.

Aid to Pakistan was cut off by President Carter in 1979 because of its refusal to permit international inspection of its nuclear installations. But Mr. Reagan waived the American law barring such aid in 1981 so as to channel military assistance after tens of thousands of Soviet troops swept into neighboring Afghanistan.

India, which exploded a "peaceful nuclear device" in 1974, maintains that it is not producing weapons, but Indian officials suggest that it would have to do so if Pakistan started. Specialists fear that a nuclear arms race in South Asia would quickly get out of hand.

Two years ago there were fears in Pakistan that India might bomb its nuclear research center. At the end of 1985 President Mohammad Zia ul-Haq of Pakistan and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi of India gave an oral pledge not to attack each other's installations, but the agreement has not been put into writing.

An Indian official said that although Mr. Nayar's interview was of great

The bomb could transform the region's situation

concern, it provided only "another confirmation of what has already been known because of news reports in the United States."

He cited a report in 1985 in *The New York Times* that Pakistani nationals were caught trying to smuggle advanced electronic switches out of the United States, and a report in *The Washington Post* last year that Pakistan had all the components of a bomb and needed only to assemble them.

Dr. Khan, the subject of the interview, has been a controversial figure in the nuclear program. He has been quoted widely in the past as saying Pakistan could produce a nuclear weapon if it wanted to.

A German-trained metallurgist, he studied at a classified nuclear enrichment plant in the Netherlands in the early 1970's. According to "Going Nuclear," a new book by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Dr. Khan left the Netherlands suddenly in 1975 and was later accused by the Dutch of trying to smuggle out "essential gas centrifuge know-how" to make a bomb in Pakistan. Dr. Khan denied that he had done anything illegal.

In the interview, he was quoted as saying it was difficult to obtain materials to produce a bomb. "Indeed, it was difficult, particularly when America and other Western countries had stopped selling anything which could be used in manufacturing the bomb," he was quoted as saying. "But we purchased whatever we wanted to before the Western countries got the wind of it."

Asked if the bomb had been tested, he was quoted as saying: "The testing does not have to be on the ground. It can be done in a laboratory, through a simulator. Gases are flown after testing their capability in simulators."

Dr. Khan made "no pretense that Pakistan's nuclear program was for peaceful purposes," Mr. Nayar wrote. He quoted him as saying:

"The word 'peaceful' associated with a nuclear program is humbug. There is no peaceful bomb. After all, there is only a weak, transparent screen between the two. Once you know how to make reactors, how to produce plutonium — all that Pakistan has mastered as well — it becomes rather easy to produce nuclear weapons."



Abdul Qadeer Khan

Agence France-Press

The Washington Times

March 3-1987

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Nuclear bomb report sparks furor in India

NEW DELHI (Agence France-
Presse) — The Indian government
expressed serious concern yester-
day with reports that Pakistan has a
nuclear bomb.

The new controversy over nuclear
arms erupted just as military forces
of the two countries began pulling
back troops from forward positions
on the forbidding mountainous border.
Senior officials of the two coun-
tries signed an agreement in Is-
lamabad yesterday to withdraw to
peacetime positions.

A foreign office spokesman here
virtually rejected a denial by Paki-
stan of claims attributed to a leading
nuclear scientist that it has assem-

bled a bomb and would not hesitate
to use it if its existence were
threatened.

The spokesman said India was
"keeping a watch" on the security
implications of the claims attributed
by the London Observer to Abdel
Qadar Khan, described here as the
"father" of Pakistan's nuclear pro-
gram.

"The report is yet another confir-
mation that Pakistan's nuclear pro-
gram has a weapons orientation," the
spokesman told a news conference.

In a denial issued in Islamabad
after the interview was published,
Mr. Khan said his words had been
used out of context. The newspaper

said Pakistan had tried to stop publi-
cation of the interview.

The interview with Mr. Khan was
conducted by Indian journalist Kul-
dip Nayyar. He told Reuters that Mr.
Khan had agreed to the interview
but would not allow him to tape it.


India exploded a nuclear device in
1974 in the desert of Rajasthan but
has insisted its nuclear development
program was for peaceful purposes
only. Mr. Khan was quoted as saying
in the interview, "It is you who have
forced us to go nuclear."

The Indian spokesman objected to
a Pakistani journalist who wanted to
know when India would unveil its
own bomb, saying: "I resent the in-
sinnuation, I do not take it as a joke. I
take it seriously."

The spokesman rejected as "mis-
chievous, false and baseless" an alle-
gation in the British newspaper in-
terview that India had a nuclear
weapon.

The Washington Post
March 6-1987

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BY REMATO ROTOLO FOR THE WASHINGTON POST

Indian citizens protest U.S. military aid to Pakistan outside House office building.

"I believe this would create serious problems in our relationship, undermine our relationship with Pakistan and put at risk a variety of larger interests in regard to Pakistan, including the influence which we have over Pakistan nuclear decision-making," he said. "We should avoid public confrontations and legislative ultimatums of standards Pakistan must meet."

Peck said the Pakistani government repeatedly has said it has "neither the means nor the intentions" of acquiring nuclear weapons.

Asked what the administration regards as "reliable" assurances,

Peck said the best solution would be for Pakistan to put all its nuclear facilities under international safeguards.

Peck also rejected the idea of reducing the waiver period of the Symington amendment or postponing a decision until September as a means of keeping the pressure on Pakistan. "This is the worst possible time for uncertainty," he said.

Pakistan is involved in talks in Geneva on a possible Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, and last week suffered heavy air bombardments from Afghan warplanes that killed more than 100 people.

The New York Times
March 6-1989

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Pakistan's Nuclear Effort Worries U.S.

By JOHN H. CUSHMAN Jr.

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 5 — Senator John Glenn asked President Reagan today to suspend military aid to Pakistan until it offers convincing proof that it is not seeking to make nuclear weapons.

Senator Glenn, an Ohio Democrat who is chairman of the Governmental Affairs Committee and a leading opponent of the spread of nuclear weapons, told Mr. Reagan in a letter that evidence "points to the conclusion that all the components and the means for assembling a working nuclear explosive device are in Pakistan's possession."

Military aid to Pakistan, which the Administration is planning to raise to \$4 billion over six years, is conditioned on certification that Pakistan does not possess nuclear weapons.

Congressional committees examining the aid request are considering tightening the requirement. At a hearing today before a House Foreign Affairs subcommittee, Representative Stephen J. Solarz, the subcommittee chairman, said the sale of early-warning radar planes sought by Pakistan might be made conditional on further restrictions of its nuclear program.

Scientist's Remark Recalled

The program drew renewed attention when a Pakistani scientist, Abdul Qadeer Khan, was quoted in published interviews as having said that Pakistan had developed a nuclear bomb. He later denied having made the remark. Pakistan has been assuring the United States that its nuclear research is not geared to military purposes.

The question facing lawmakers and Government officials is what to do if Pakistan achieves every technical step needed to produce nuclear weapons without actually making them.

Under questioning by members of Senator Glenn's Governmental Affairs Committee, Richard N. Perle, an Assistant Secretary of Defense, said today that it might be counterproductive to cut off military aid since a cutoff might induce Pakistan to pursue its weapons program even more vigorously to protect itself from its perceived adversary, India, which has the ability to make nuclear weapons.

But he said Pakistan could not insure continued aid by forgoing the actual assembly of weapons from stockpiled components.

At the House committee hearing, experts said decisive action was needed to prevent Pakistan from building a nuclear arsenal.

One expert, Leonard S. Spector of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said he was convinced that Pakistan last year "effectively crossed the nuclear weapons threshold for the first time in the limited sense of being

able to fabricate all of the key components for a nuclear device."

The most important development, he said, is that Pakistan is now able to enrich uranium to the high level needed for weapon use.

The United States Ambassador to Pakistan, Deane R. Hinton, said recently that the United States was losing patience with Pakistan over what were described as its continuing efforts to develop nuclear weapons.

Nuclear furor rattles Pakistan

Bomb report could sway U.S. aid

By Sheila Tefft
Special to the Tribune

NEW DELHI—A controversial reported disclosure that Pakistan has developed a nuclear bomb has embarrassed the government of President Zia ul-Haq as the U.S. Congress considers new aid for its south Asian ally.

The reported admission by Pakistan's top nuclear scientist, Abdul Qadeer Khan, is expected to trigger new American concerns and amplify India's protests against the \$4 billion defense and economic aid package.

But the bitter war in Afghanistan and Pakistan's importance as a key Moslem friend could override worries about a spreading nuclear arms race on the subcontinent.

"This was the worst possible time for Khan to make these remarks," says Gini Deshingkar, an analyst at the Center for the Study of Developing Societies, a New Delhi think tank. "But I don't think he told American decisionmakers anything they didn't know."

The disclosure report caps months of mounting suspicion that Pakistan is close to producing nuclear weapons.

Zia has repeatedly reassured the U.S. that his country's nuclear program is peaceful. President Reagan is required to certify to Congress that Pakistan does not have a nuclear device as a condition for continued American aid to the Asian country.

However, last fall, leaked American intelligence reports contended that Pakistan had detonated a nuclear device and enriched uranium to a weapons-grade level.

Last month, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, in its annual report on the spread of nuclear weapons, warned that Pakistan is on the threshold of possessing an atomic weapon.

In the strongest U.S. statement to date, Deane Hinton, the outgoing American ambassador to Islamabad, recently said "there are developments in Pakistan's nuclear program which we see as inconsistent with a purely peaceful program."

Khan's statements, made in an interview to an Indian journalist and published in a British newspaper, created a furor in Pakistan.

The scientist was quoted as confirming that American intelligence reports "about our possessing the bomb is correct and so is speculation of some foreign news-

papers." In recent months, Khan had publicly boasted of Pakistan's nuclear capability.

"They told the U.S. that Pakistan could never produce the bomb and they now know we have done it," he reportedly said in the interview.

In India, which for years has accused Pakistan of secretly developing a nuclear weapon, there was speculation that the Zia government intended to deliver a message to the Americans that his nuclear program would continue despite U.S. warnings.

However, since the interview was published, Pakistan officials disavowed the statements. Khan denied that he granted an interview, but then later said he agreed to meet the journalist, Kuldip Nayar, for an informal, off-the-record chat. A prominent Pakistani newspaper editor who had accompanied the Indian journalist was fired from his job.

"When the interview was given, there was a deliberate message he wanted to give," said Nayar, a senior New Delhi journalist and former editor. "But I don't think he anticipated such a wild reaction."

In New Delhi, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi issued a restrained call for India to take a new look at the Pakistan nuclear program. Officials said Gandhi was waiting to see the impact of the Pakistan scientist's remarks in Washington.

In recent weeks, India and Pakistan, which have fought three wars, defused a potential confrontation after yearly military exercises mushroomed into a massing of troops along the border.

India-Pakistan relations have deteriorated considerably since late 1985 when Zia and Gandhi agreed in principle not to attack each other's nuclear facilities. India exploded a nuclear device in 1974.

With tensions between the two countries still running high, there were renewed calls for India to reactivate a nuclear weapons program amid an increasing belief that the country already is developing a delivery system.

"There is no more time to lose. This country has no options left," said K. Subrahmanyam, the hawkish director of the Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis.

While some observers expect Indian opposition to the Pakistan aid package to gain a more sympathetic hearing in Washington, they do not foresee a serious setback for Pakistan.

THE NEXT NUCLEAR POWER?

Pakistan's nuclear program is fast approaching a dangerous stage; soon a weapon may be more reality than dream.

HAROLD FREEMAN

PAKISTAN'S ENTRY INTO the nuclear age was modest. But those early beginnings are now taking on a more ominous cast. In a few years, possibly a few months, Pakistan may well be the possessor of an unsophisticated, but effective, nuclear device. All of the technology is already in place. For the United States and other western countries, this presents a dilemma: how to indicate their concern over Islamabad's aggressive nuclear program while supporting that country in its exposed strategic position. The answers are far from clear.

It has been more than twenty years since President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto contracted with Canadian General Electric for the building of a nuclear reactor that would provide electric power to metropolitan Karachi, with its population of five million. Fuel for the reactor—lightly improved natural uranium—was also to be supplied by Canada. The project, known as KANUPP, was financed by a Canadian loan of \$47 million. To ensure that the reactor was dedicated only to peaceful uses, Pakistan was required to permit the United Nations' International Atomic Energy Agency to monitor the reactor and fuel. The safeguards were established, and the KANUPP reactor came on line in 1972.

Soon afterward, during 1974-75, Pakistan contracted with Saint-Gobain Techniques Nouvelles (SGN) to build a large reprocessing plant in Chashma, in the north-central region of the country. It was to be capable of extracting plutonium from 100 metric tons of spent uranium fuel each year. SGN is a world leader in the technology of reprocessing, an area pioneered by the French. These negotiations were conducted with the approval of the French government; in fact, by 1977 it had become the major owner of SGN. After a further year of negotiation, a safeguarding agreement was reached between Pakistan, France, and the IAEA. Construction began in 1977, with an estimated cost of \$60 million.

Such a large reprocessing plant was hardly needed to meet Pakistan's energy requirements. Then and now, the country has no commercial-size breeder reactors that can burn plutonium for fuel. Moreover, the amount of spent fuel from KANUPP each year only totals 20 tons. With little fuel to reprocess and no need for using the extracted plutonium in generating electric power, why did Pakistan build such a large

reprocessing plant? The answer: Pakistan was looking ahead, and in a different direction. Reprocessing spent uranium fuel to extract plutonium remains a preferred route to the nuclear bomb.

While the building of the Chashma reprocessing plant was proceeding, Pakistan was also developing a facility at Kahuta, 20 miles southeast of Islamabad, for high-level enrichment of uranium. But Pakistan had no reactors that used highly enriched uranium for fuel, nor were any such reactors planned. Once again, Pakistan had a different use in mind. Highly enriched uranium—an alternative to plutonium—serves admirably as the explosive ingredient in a nuclear bomb. And although enrichment may be the most difficult and expensive road to the bomb, Pakistan was not deterred. (Pakistan claims that the enrichment plant will provide fuel for future power reactors. It is difficult to take this explanation seriously.)

Beginning in 1972, one Abdul Qadir Khan—described as a family man, a good neighbor, and a dangerous street volleyball player—was employed by a major Dutch subsidiary of the URENCO uranium-enrichment plant, located at Almelo in the Netherlands. This super-secret operation was jointly owned by Great Britain, West Germany, and the Netherlands. For the next three years, Khan was able to tour URENCO, notebook in hand. In late 1975, Khan left URENCO with something more than handshakes. He took with him a set of enrichment plans, along with an invaluable detailed shopping list for components. In due time, he turned up at Kahuta, in charge.

Pakistan had already been refused in its attempts to buy an enrichment plant from the French. Once Khan arrived in Kahuta, he initiated an effort to accelerate Pakistan's own enrichment program. Using the shopping list drawn up at URENCO, along with Pakistan's network of dummy fronts and unidentifiable purchasing agents, Khan proceeded to buy the necessary components. Switzerland supplied the high-vacuum valves and a huge gasification and solidification unit (which filled three large transport planes); West Germany sold vacuum pumps, gas purifying equipment, and 10,000 aluminum parts; Britain provided critically important high-frequency inverters. Despite the protests of French officials, companies in that country sold 10,000 centrifuge bellows, while one of Khan's agents bought radiation-resistant thermometers from the United States. In the Netherlands, purchases were made of 6500 hardened steel tubes and a fluoridation plant. Some suppliers said that they felt free to sell

Harold Freeman is professor emeritus of statistics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

... Pakistan's potential capability for developing nuclear weapons as well as by India's 1974 underground detonation of a Hiroshima-size nuclear device, approximately 13 kilotons. In 1976, Washington offered to supply conventional arms to Pakistan if construction on the reprocessing facility at Chashma was halted. This, it was hoped, would abort the rapidly developing South Asian nuclear arms race. But Bhutto declined the offer; in response, the United States cut off all economic and military aid to Pakistan in 1977.

In its efforts to stem nuclear proliferation in South Asia, the United States next took aim at France. It pressured Paris to require even stronger IAEA safeguards at Chashma, and then to get out of Chashma altogether. In June 1978, France officially withdrew, and U.S. aid to Pakistan was promptly restored. But the French thoughtfully left behind blueprints covering 95 percent of the proposed plant, as well as a substantial cadre of French nuclear technicians. French firms, including SGN, remained willing to provide technical advice and materials for cash into early 1980. Moreover, the withdrawal of official French participation relieved Pakistan of the need to submit to any IAEA safeguards.

Under these circumstances, the Pakistanis set out to finish the reprocessing plant themselves. They have probably already succeeded. If sufficient spent fuel can be found to allow the plant to operate near the level planned by the French, Pakistan should be able to produce 135 kilograms of plutonium per year—enough for an annual output of twenty 22-kiloton nuclear bombs, the same size as that dropped at Hiroshima.

Pakistan was also striking out on its own at KANUPP. After less than four years, the Canadians concluded that Pakistan's nuclear program was intended to serve other than peaceful purposes; in 1975, Canada discontinued shipments of uranium fuel and spare parts. But Pakistan soon found a better source of fuel—Niger. Between 1978–80, Libya bought 250–450 tons of uranium ore from Niger, and most of this tonnage was transhipped to Pakistan. Pakistan also bought 60–100 tons directly from Niger. It also received some supplies from its own mines.

By no later than the end of 1980, this unsafeguarded raw fuel, along with earlier Canadian instruction and equipment purchased in the open and black markets of Europe and America, allowed Pakistan to fabricate small amounts of its own uranium fuel. The fuel was short-burned in the KANUPP reactor, and, once irradiated, shipped to Chashma for eventual extraction of plutonium. In early 1981, the IAEA acknowledged that its inability to monitor the unsafeguarded fuel made it impossible to determine exactly what was going on at KANUPP. A year later, the IAEA received permission from Pakistan to upgrade to a higher level of surveillance, but it was two years too late. Should KANUPP continue to circumvent IAEA safeguards—or worse, withdraw from them—the uncertain volume of reprocessed spent fuel from the facility could supply the production of five to ten nuclear bombs per year.

Meanwhile, the enrichment plant at Kahuta continues to do well. With significant shipments of

equipment, along with some slightly enriched uranium possibly coming from mainland China and raw uranium from Niger, Libya, the black market, and Pakistan's own mines, the unsafeguarded Kahuta facility may deliver substantial amounts of bomb-grade uranium by 1987. In fact, according to Bob Woodward, writing in the *Washington Post* in November, the Kahuta percentage figure for uranium 235 is now 93.5, well above minimum bomb-grade level.

In 1984, Senator Alan Cranston (D.-California) estimated that the 1000 centrifuge units then at Kahuta could produce 33 pounds of bomb-grade uranium each year, enough for one or two nuclear weapons to be produced. By the 21st century—14 years from now—it has been estimated that high enrichment should be able to provide enough material for three to six devices each year. Pakistan has probably also begun to research laser isotope separation, a simpler and cheaper path to enrichment.

ONCE PAKISTAN HAS a large-scale spent-fuel reprocessing plant at Chashma and a large-scale uranium enrichment plant at Kahuta, only one link in the chain will be missing: a large-scale nuclear reactor that could produce significant amounts of unsafeguarded material. This could provide electric power for the back country as well as enough spent fuel to be reprocessed to secure an adequate supply of plutonium for nuclear warheads. Pakistan has decided to acquire exactly such a reactor. Initially, a 600–900 megawatt nuclear power plant was to be built at Chashma, and beginning in 1980, it would be followed by another reactor every two years.

Nothing quite that ambitious appears possible now, but the project is underway. The first reactor will produce 900 megawatts, more than six times that of KANUPP. The bill may run as high as \$1 billion, most of which is expected to be paid by Saudi Arabia. Although basic site construction got underway in 1982, no tenders have yet been received to build the reactor itself.

One possible contractor is France, with whom Pakistan has been having serious government-level negotiations since 1983. A second possible contractor is Westinghouse. Forbidden by American law to participate in unsafeguarded foreign nuclear projects, that company may be able to operate legally through its Spanish affiliates, none of them subject to U.S. statutes. The bids are likely to come from Equipos Nucleares SA; design and software by Nuclear Espanola; and reactor construction by SENER, an architectural-engineering firm with whom Pakistan has maintained close nuclear ties. Asked for an opinion of such an arrangement, the Department of State, the Department of Energy, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission had nothing to say. Unless safeguarding becomes a condition imposed by bidders, the completed plant is likely to be outside the jurisdiction of the IAEA.

There may be problems in financing the reactor and there may be pressure by major governments on contractors to refrain from bidding. But it is safe to expect that the reactor will be built. The 900-

megawatt reactor will be built adjacent to the unguarded reprocessing plant in Chashma. The transfer of spent fuel rods from the reactor to the reprocessing plant will be quietly accomplished, and bomb-grade plutonium will be quietly extracted.

In April 1979, as the probable purpose of Pakistan's uranium enrichment plant at Kahuta became clear, President Carter again cut off all economic and military aid, scheduled to be about \$85 million during 1979-1980. But the fall of the shah of Iran, followed by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan later that same year, renewed U.S. interest in rebuilding its friendship with Pakistan. In 1980, the Carter administration offered to restore aid, sharply increasing the two-year package to \$400 million and including advanced General Dynamics F-16 fighter planes. The offer was declined by President Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq.

One year later, Zia got a much better deal from President Reagan: a "loan" of \$3.2 billion, spread over the six-year period 1982-1987. In March 1986, the United States proposed a six-year (1988-1993), \$4-billion extension: \$2.3 billion in economic assistance (\$1.8 billion in grants and \$500 million in loans) and \$1.7 billion to be used as a credit for military purchases. The current agreement may be terminated if Pakistan explodes a nuclear device.

The agreement provides for the purchase of 40 F-16 fighters for about \$1.1 billion; some part of this bill will be covered, almost certainly, by Saudi Arabia. F-16s, with a combat radius of 575-700 miles, are classified as conventional weaponry, but they can carry nuclear warheads. Twelve had been delivered by July 1984, and by late 1985, almost all had been received.

FEW NATIONS ARE as surrounded by hostile neighbors as is Pakistan. To the west lies Afghanistan, with a long history of severe border disputes with Pakistan. The Soviet occupation has worsened the situation, putting Pakistan on the front lines between the U.S.S.R. and the attractive warm waters of the Arabian Sea. To the east is India, a people and government who have never been reconciled to the notion of a permanent, Islamic Pakistan. New Delhi retains its control over Muslim Kashmir while suspecting Pakistan of arming the militant Sikhs, some of whom have been waging a violent campaign for independence. Three times—in 1947, 1965, and 1971—India confronted and defeated the military forces of Pakistan. In 1971, Indian forces entered East Pakistan in support of the rebels, forced the surrender of 90,000 Pakistani troops, and replaced East Pakistan by independent Bangladesh. That same year, India also signed a mutual defense treaty with the Soviet Union.

Given this history of rivalry, Pakistan lives in perpetual fear of the Indian nuclear bomb. Unless Pakistan finishes Chashma and Kahuta successfully in the near future, India may take a page out of Israel's 1981 book on Iraq, and destroy the two major Pakistani nuclear facilities. President Bhutto wrote, "Our problem, in its essence, is how to obtain such a weapon in time before the crisis begins." If it is attacked by India

or the Soviet Union, Pakistan has little confidence that its friends—even those of the Arab bloc—will come to its aid. This lack of confidence is not without foundation; in the 1971 war with India, Pakistan received vocal support from the United States, China, and the Arab states, but little more.

To President Zia and the leadership in Islamabad, the bomb could change everything. India, perhaps even the Soviet Union, would think twice before initiating a conventional or nuclear war. Three 40-kiloton nuclear bombs, each only twice the size of the one dropped on Nagasaki, could wipe out Calcutta, Delhi, or Bombay, with immediate death to two million and slower death to millions more. The bomb would also bring some fringe benefits; prestige in the Muslim world, and perhaps even a bargaining chip for the return of Kashmir.

The bomb may not belong solely to Pakistan. As Bhutto remarked when he began the project: "There is a Hindu bomb, a Jewish bomb, and a Christian bomb. There must be an Islamic bomb." (Despite the hostility between the Bhutto and Zia factions, both have supported Pakistan's nuclear ambitions.) The project has been financed in large part by Islamic oil money. Though it has never been visible in Islamabad's published budgets, Saudi Arabia has poured hundreds of millions of dollars into Pakistan's economy, most going directly into military projects. Over the period 1973-75, Iran contributed close to \$1 billion. Pakistani International Airways carried trunks of U.S. dollars from Qaddafi in oil-rich Libya to Bhutto in Pakistan—\$1 billion over the period 1973-1976. The contributions continued at reduced levels after Zia replaced Bhutto in 1977. Much, perhaps all, of this Libyan money went directly to support Pakistan's nuclear enterprises. Qaddafi has said: "The monopoly of the atom will be broken.... When that day comes, Libya will not be absent."

As Americans, we tend to focus on the superpowers, each of whom have 25,000 nuclear warheads. And well we should. But we should not overlook Pakistan, an impoverished nation moving systematically toward the bomb, with modern scientists in charge and modern equipment in place. As yet there are probably no assembled nuclear weapons, but that will be probably only a matter of time.

The prospect of another nuclear-armed country in such a volatile area of the world is not comforting. But in large part we asked for it. We chose to believe ten years of Pakistani denials and we may pay for that. Western nations made millions in profit, selling every needed nuclear component to Pakistan, and we may pay for that. We poured billions of dollars of conventional arms into this "buffer state," only to discover that the recipient was more interested in the ultimate weapons, nuclear arms; we may pay for that. However few and unpromising current South Asian nuclear options may be, we had better examine them—now. The first is undramatic but essential: talk. There should be an immediate conference among six nations: Pakistan, India, Israel, the Soviet Union, China, and the United States. It is only a small beginning, but it is the first step in helping millions of South Asian Muslims, Hindus, Christians, and Jews survive. □

The Washington Times
March 9, 1987

page 12

Pakistan continuing its nuclear programs

FROM COMBINED DISPATCHES

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan — Pakistan has not been asked by the United States to halt its nuclear program, Zain Noorani, minister of state for foreign affairs, told Parliament yesterday, and Pakistan is not open to persuasion on the issue, he added.

"No threats have been held out to us," he said.

"We will not be browbeaten or cajoled out of pursuing our peaceful nuclear program," Mr. Noorani said in a policy statement in the National Assembly.

"The government will not compromise the national sovereignty, and it will go on with its peaceful nuclear program, in spite of any difficulties which we may have to face or sacrifices which may have to be made," he said.

His statement followed the March 1 publication, in Pakistan and abroad, of comments attributed to Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdel Qader Khan. He was quoted in an interview in the London Observer as saying Pakistan "has the atomic bomb," is enriching uranium 90 percent, and does not need to test the bomb because tests can be simulated.

Mr. Khan later denied the statements.

Pakistan dismissed the report as a fabrication that had been timed maliciously to coincide with an aid package coming up before congressional hearings in Washington.

The Pakistani government maintains its nuclear program is designed to meet a chronic shortage of electricity.

In a Feb. 16 speech, U.S. Ambassador Deane R. Hinton advised Pakistan not to develop nuclear weapons, saying Congress and the Reagan administration might block \$4.02 billion in military and economic aid planned for the next six years.

Mr. Noorani's statement replied to several members of the National Assembly, including opposition leader Syed Fakhre Iman, who said Mr. Hinton's statement amounted to a threat.

"No power on earth can deter us from pursuing our peaceful nuclear program because our conscience is clear and our aim is peaceful," he said. "We will prefer to go without foreign aid instead of abandoning our nuclear program."

Mr. Noorani said the United States had suspended aid twice during the 1960s and 1970s, but could not force Pakistan to change its policies.

President Johnson stopped military aid to Pakistan when it was at war with India in 1965, and President Carter stopped all economic aid to Islamabad in 1979 over the nuclear issue.

The Washington Post yesterday quoted officials as saying the United States had decided it could not head off Pakistani nuclear weapons, and considered it more important to continue to give aid to Pakistan to help it resist Soviet pressure.

The officials were quoted as saying the U.S. government would ask Congress to approve without any strings a \$4.02 billion aid package to Pakistan over the next six years.

In 1985, Congress asked the president to certify annually Pakistan did not possess nuclear weapons and that U.S. aid would lessen the chances of it acquiring them. The most recent certification was in October.

The Washington Post
8-3-87

U.S. Shifts Priorities In Pakistan

Aid to Afghan Rebels Gains Precedence Over Nuclear Threat

By David B. Ottawa
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Reagan administration apparently has decided it cannot head off Pakistan's acquisition of nuclear weapons and that it is unwilling to sacrifice the big American aid program to that strategically located nation to try to force Pakistan not to build a bomb, according to administration officials.

The United States will continue to object publicly to the Pakistani nuclear program, officials said in recent interviews, but will give priority to resisting increased Soviet pressure on Pakistan and safeguarding the flow of U.S. aid to the resistance in Soviet-occupied Afghanistan.

Despite mounting evidence that Pakistan has reached the nuclear threshold, the administration is pressing Congress to grant another six-year waiver to a provision that otherwise would cut off U.S. aid to a nation that refuses to open its nuclear facilities to international inspection. The administration is asking Congress to approve with no restrictions a new six-year, \$4.02 billion aid program for Pakistan.

Administration officials acknowledge there is little chance any more that President Reagan can provide Congress with "reliable assurance" that Pakistan is not moving toward building a nuclear bomb. Under a 1985 congressional requirement, the president has to certify annually that Pakistan does not have a nuclear device and that U.S. aid will reduce the risk of it obtaining one.

The White House last gave that certification to Congress in October, despite intelligence it had that Pakistan was producing weapons-grade enriched uranium. President Mohammed Zia ul-Haq and his prime minister, Mohammed Khan Junejo, repeatedly have denied this

See PAKISTAN, A28, Col. 1

The Christian Science Monitor Page 4
Sept. 12-1986

Thinking the 'unthinkable' - Indo-US security ties

By Raja G. C. Thomas

UNTIL recently the prospect of security ties between the United States and India seemed unthinkable.

Since 1972, US policy has sought to offset the growth of Soviet military power, first by seeking closer ties with its communist rival, China, and after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan by beefing up the defense and economy of Pakistan. China and Pakistan are both traditional adversaries of India.

As in earlier decades, the military buildup in Pakistan and China increased Indian military dependence on the Soviet Union. More than two-thirds of India's military hardware is now imported from the Soviets or co-produced with their assistance. According to traditional American "cold warriors," notably those in the Department of Defense, Indian protests of US military assistance to Pakistan and China were best ignored, given India's political and military quasi-alliance with the Soviet Union.

This approach ignores a basic problem, however. The arming of Pakistan or China increases Indian military dependence on the Soviet Union and invites a greater Soviet presence in South Asia. The policy is self-defeating. The subcontinent cannot be defended against great-power threats without India's cooperation.

The visit last month by a US Department of Defense delegation led by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger to China, India, and Pakistan suggests a new effort to co-opt India into the American regional security framework. For the first time since the aborted efforts following the 1962 Sino-Indian war, the US has

indicated it is willing to negotiate the transfer of arms and military-related technology to India.

Two major items on the agenda following the memorandum of understanding for the transfer of technology signed between President Reagan and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1986 are the sale of supercomputers to India and the co-production in India of a new generation of light combat aircraft based on an advanced General Electric engine.

If closer Indo-US security ties are to come about, Washington must not attempt to co-opt India into its cold-war politics.

These negotiations with India are accompanied, however, by continuing efforts to provide Pakistan with about \$1.75 billion in arms, including the possible transfer of Boeing's airborne warning and control system aircraft. All this takes place at a time when Indo-Pakistani relations have deteriorated over Indian criticisms of Pakistani assistance to Sikh extremists and of Pakistani assistance in the handling of the Pan Am hijacking in Karachi. Can the US please both regional rivals with their defense requests when such efforts have failed in the past? Can there be Indo-US military collaboration when India is still getting Soviet military aid?

Any suggestion that India has security ties with either of the great powers will be hotly denied in New Delhi. India claims to be a nonaligned state. It seeks military assistance from all viable sources while also refusing military bases and other collaboration that may suggest an alliance relationship. Although there may be differences in the interpretation and execution of India's nonalignment policy,

this doctrine continues to be an article of faith no matter which government or leader is in power. As such, this Indian posture is not likely to change soon.

Therefore, the basic change of attitude and approach will have to come from the US. This may seem like succumbing to Indian pressures to obtain military assistance from the US in exchange for nothing. The major objection within the Pentagon is not only that India offers nothing in return, but that the transfer of such ad-

vanced technology could fall into Soviet hands, given the large number of Soviet technicians assisting India in the production of MIG-21s and T-72 tanks.

such technological cooperation? Note that Indo-Soviet military collaboration did not result in a formal alliance relationship. The 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty may be considered a quasi-alliance now rarely mentioned. India has, however, produced political support for the Soviets on various international issues, such as the Afghanistan and Cambodian crises.

In the earlier cases of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, regional security interests in common with those of the US produced military alliance relationships and, later, close economic and political ties. Close economic and technological ties between India and the US may in the long run produce common perceptions of mutual security interests in southwestern and central Asia.

During the last decade the US was India's leading trade partner; it provided the largest number of new joint ventures in India annually. Indo-American military and technological collaboration must be seen as part of this trend rather than as part of a direct offset of Soviet military power and influence.

Such an approach will advance security and stability in the region as a whole, since all the states of South Asia as well as China look to the US and the West as the primary source of capital and technology. Transfers of military technology to India buried within such North-South technological transfers are less likely to aggravate the antagonisms of Pakistan and China than the direct sale of military equipment.

Raja G. C. Thomas is professor of political science at Marquette University and the author of "Indian Security Policy," Princeton University Press.

Needless Offense To India


By Selig S. Harrison

JUST ON THE eve of Mikhail S. Gorbachev's visit to New Delhi, the Reagan Administration has provoked intense anti-American bitterness in India by offering to sell Pakistan advanced Awacs planes with an electronic reach extending hundreds of miles into Indian territory.

Unless this misconceived plan is abandoned or significantly modified, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi will face growing pressures to shift from his pursuit of closer military and economic ties with America to the Soviet-oriented brand of nonalignment identified with his late mother, Indira Gandhi.

The Administration says that Pakistan needs some form of early-warning capability to combat Soviet-directed Afghan Air Force incursions into Pakistan. But Islamabad makes no secret of the fact that it wants the Airborne Warning and Control System planes primarily to improve its military balance with India.

Gen. Zia ul-Haq's regime has rejected American proposals dating back to 1980 for ground-based radar or balloon systems designed for installation on the Afghan border alone. Pakistan has been content to do without any early-warning system until it can get an airborne system capable of covering India, such as the Sentry (used by Saudi Arabia), with a range of 400 miles, or the Hawkeye, with a 300-mile range. Both have now been offered to Islamabad.



To be safe from Soviet attack, Awacs planes would not patrol near the Afghan border but over central Pakistan, where they could "see" India, Afghan — and some Soviet central Asian — airspace and monitor ground-based radar and electronic signals across the Indian border.

Indian strategists argue that both the Sentry and Hawkeye systems could serve offensive as well as defensive purposes, enabling the Pakistani Air Force to launch a first strike with more precise targeting as well as more effective command and control than India now possesses.

Publicly, the Pentagon depicts a large-scale Soviet threat to bolster its case for the Awacs sale. Yet an unpublished defense intelligence study shows that Afghan Air Force border incursions, while frequent, have gen-

Selig S. Harrison, a senior associate of The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, is author of five books on United States relations with Asia.

Must They All Go Nuclear?

Nations Hovering Near the Bomb Need Help on a Safe Future

By ROGER MOLANDER

Pakistan's prime minister was in Washington a few weeks ago—and I would bet that somebody met his plane with a copy of the Washington Post's front-page story headlined "Pakistan A-Project Upsets Superpowers." He probably was the only person in Washington who knew just how upset the superpowers—and India—should be. Just what are Pakistan's plans for the bomb?

There are people in Washington who want to believe that Pakistan is not building nuclear weapons. When Congress considers foreign aid for Pakistan this fall, the President by law must certify Pakistan's nuclear purity. We must cut the Pakistanis off without a dime if they "possess" nuclear weapons; we can continue to help them if they don't. A lot turns on the word *possess*.

America's foreign aid has not always depended on hair-splitting word definitions. In 1978 the British uncovered a worldwide Pakistani network of dummy companies that were secretly buying the nuclear equipment critical to the production of nuclear-bomb material. In April, 1978, we cut off aid to Pakistan, as required by U.S. law, because the Pakistanis had received certain sensitive nuclear equipment from abroad. We were sure then that the Pakistanis were in hot pursuit of the

bomb, and we hoped to dissuade them.

But when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan later that year, we reconsidered our stance toward neighboring Pakistan—and immediately opened negotiations with the Pakistanis on a new aid program. The deal (a six-year, \$3.2-billion program) was completed early in the Reagan Administration, and reports say that Pakistan began funneling more U.S. aid to the Afghan rebels.

But what about the bomb?

At the time the six-year aid package was signed, President Zia ul-Haq reportedly assured U.S. officials that Pakistan did not intend to build a bomb. But now something has provoked the Soviets and the Indians. Is it evidence of a new and major Pakistani step toward nuclear-weapons capability? Are they losing patience with U.S. timidity in exercising leverage on an ever-advancing Pakistani bomb program? Are the Pakistanis holding to Zia's promise or not? And what does possession of the bomb mean, anyway?

Whatever definition the United States and Pakistan agree on, the Soviet Union and India must deal with the reality of Pakistan's nuclear capability. If all the components that are necessary for building bombs stand ready and assembly is all that's left, does a country possess the

bomb or not? What if a country has gone nine of the 10 steps to the bomb and then goes to a nuclear holding pattern, knowing that the last step can be taken quickly if need be?

A look at the friendship and enmities in the region shows why Pakistani progress toward the bomb is so disconcerting. India and Pakistan have gone to war three times since 1947. In the last war Pakistan lost all of East Pakistan—now Bangladesh.

India exploded a nuclear device in 1974, and could produce at least a handful of bombs in a relatively short time. The Soviet Union is India's ally; the United States and China side with Pakistan. What if there is another Pakistan-India war—or even a bloody border skirmish? Will one side or the other brandish its nuclear capability—or even use it? What will its allies do then?

These are not idle questions in a world that's as dangerous as this one. The United States cannot look the other way on nuclear proliferation because of competing foreign-policy concerns and expect other nations to do nothing. Right or wrong, the Indians and the Soviets are rethinking their options on dealing with Pakistan and the United States ought to think about the choices that these countries are considering.

The first is probably "do nothing"—always the easiest, and sometimes the best, choice for governments. But the consequence of that choice is that Pakistan gets the bomb—or hovers just shy of a sprint toward final assembly. Threats are always possible options, and so are military assaults that are designed simply to remove the problem—at least temporarily—with an all-out conventional weapons attack on an enemy's nuclear facilities (the route that Israel took in bombing an Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981). How could the United States respond if India (or, worse yet, the Soviet Union) chose this option and attacked Pakistani nuclear facilities? This inherent potential for superpower conflict in the spread of the bomb to troubled regions of the world must give us pause.

The United States, the Soviet Union and China must not go on seeing only their own short-term national interest, or they will all contribute to a situation in which war may come again to South Asia—maybe this time nuclear war. Better that these three nuclear powers work together (it will be hard work) to help India and Pakistan negotiate a safe nuclear future—perhaps one that does not include nuclear arsenals. If that could happen in South Asia, maybe it could spread to other hot spots where the nuclear specter also has appeared—like the Middle East, where a similar drama may play out all too soon. The alternative is a future of repeated threats and counter-threats by regional enemies, backed by the bomb and all too often involving the superpowers as well.

The United States cannot by itself move the world toward a safer path into the Nuclear Age. But it can lead, and it could rethink its policy toward Pakistan. It could decide that averting a full-scale nuclear-arms race in South Asia is its overriding aim in that region, and that competing aims—even the wish to make the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan more costly—must be subordinate. If it did so, it might be able to talk both the Soviet Union and China—and eventually the other nuclear powers—into a similar ordering of priorities.

The nuclear powers are running out of time in which they could make a difference in how the world works. By the year 2000, 50 countries will have the choice of whether or not to build the bomb. The policies that present nuclear powers adopt now will help to determine how many of those 50 countries choose to go nuclear. There is a need for leadership. Why not this country, now, on the matter of Pakistan? If not us, who? If not now, when?

Roger Molander is the president of the Roosevelt Center for American Policy Studies and the director of the center's education project, "Wildfire: Stopping the Spread of Nuclear Weapons."

ENDS.

y been limited ones of two to six
as in disputed border regions and
e usually not involved bombing or
afing. An adequate response to this
gree of threat would be a mixture
ground-based radar, balloons and a
modified version of existing airborne
systems that would have a limited
range suited to surveillance of the Af-
ghan frontier.

In the event of deeper air strikes
into Pakistan, especially strikes by
Soviet aircraft, Islamabad would be
compelled to seek United States inter-
vention even if it had Awacs planes.

India's relations with America
have been slowly but steadily improv-
ing since Mr. Gandhi took office in
1984. Washington has cautiously
liberalized exports of militarily re-
lated high technology to India, and
New Delhi has gradually been reduc-
ing its tilt toward Moscow.

If the Awacs program is approved,
however, the resulting climate of dis-
trust could force Mr. Gandhi to limit
the further expansion of high-tech
joint ventures with America while in-
creasing Indian dependence on Mos-
cow. In such a climate, even if New

Delhi continued to seek certain Amer-
ican technology not available else-
where, America would no longer liber-
alize export policies.

Mr. Gorbachev, who arrives in New
Delhi today, is reportedly prepared to
offer India the Soviet Mainstay early-
warning system, together with more
MIG-27 and MIG-29 aircraft and up-
graded air-defense missiles.

Indian alarm over the impending
decision on Awacs has been intensi-
fied by recent disclosures that the
United States, for the first time since
1968, is monitoring Soviet missile
tests with ground-based electronic in-
telligence facilities in Pakistan.

In New Delhi's eyes, this means
that Islamabad will have increasing
leverage in military-aid dealings with
Washington and will be free to ignore
American warnings against a nuclear
weapons program.

While the electronic monitoring fa-
cilities are situated in northern
Pakistan, close to Soviet testing sites
in central Asia, New Delhi fears
that Washington could use them for
surveillance of India, passing on mili-

tary information to Islamabad.
Looking ahead, the overriding
American security interest in South
Asia lies in compatible relations with
New Delhi, which is rapidly building a
powerful military-industrial complex
and expanding its naval reach in the
Indian Ocean.

Whatever the short-term intelli-
gence benefits derived from the Isla-
mabad connection, they must be bal-
anced against the incalculable dam-
age to long-term American security
interests that would result from the
growth of xenophobic anti-American-
ism in India.

So far, New Delhi has carefully
stopped short of military collabora-
tion with Moscow. But it would be
reckless to assume that such re-
straint will continue to govern Indian
policy regardless of the nature
of United States policy toward Paki-
stan.

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Pakistan-India Feuds Upset U.S. Strategy

Washington's Balancing Act Threatened

By Richard M. Weintraub
Washington Post Foreign Service

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan, Nov. 5 —As it moves to reassert a U.S. role in South Asian regional politics, the Reagan administration suddenly is finding the effort complicated by new recriminations between Pakistan and India over U.S. military and nuclear policy in the region.

In a careful balancing act, the administration is trying to widen its relations with India while maintaining the United States' close strategic ties to its neighbor and bitter rival, Pakistan.

But no sooner had Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger completed what is viewed in New Delhi as a generally successful visit there last month than he came to Pakistan and started talking about supplying this country with U.S. early warning radar aircraft—a theme that has set political alarm bells ringing both here and in the Indian capital.

A further round of fingerpointing began with a report in yesterday's Washington Post about Pakistan's nuclear program.

Both India and Pakistan are accusing each other of playing dangerous political games, and language difficulties are sharpening the problem.

While administration officials have spoken only about the possibility of supplying an airborne early warning system to Pakistan, this suggestion quickly was translated into a much more solid proposal in the often imprecise press of the two capitals.

After the Post cited U.S. intelligence reports as saying Pakistan had enriched uranium to 90 percent—a critical step in building a nuclear bomb—Indian nuclear officials quickly warned that India, too, could and would enrich uranium for weapons.

While admitting today that the reports could cause problems when

Pakistan's new \$4 billion aid package comes before Congress, Pakistani officials wondered aloud why India was not being held to the same standards when they publicly threaten to use a capability Pakistan does not even admit having.

In this region, the language of weaponry is often imprecise.

Following press reports earlier this year that the United States might funnel advanced Stinger anti-aircraft missiles through Pakistan to Afghan rebels, people here began speaking of almost any shoulder-fired anti-aircraft weapons as "Stingers." Now, any airborne early warning system has come to be called "AWACS."

In the case of early warning systems, the general terminology is potentially confusing because it fails to distinguish between top-of-the-line and less sophisticated systems and the different threats they would pose to India.

U.S. diplomats in New Delhi have scrambled to allay Indian fears that any deal on an early warning capability for Pakistan has been struck. They also have pointed out that no decision has been made on any type of system, much less the state-of-the-art AWACS. Nevertheless, India's ambassador to Washington has warned that a sale could jeopardize newly warming ties between the United States and India.

In Islamabad, President Mohammed Zia ul-Haq, sensing domestic and international implications in a U.S. operational role in Pakistan, quickly called in reporters to tell them that he is interested in an early warning capability, but he "categorically denied that Pakistan would offer a base on its soil to any other country and clarified that AWACS planes would be manned by Pakistani personnel," according to the newspaper Dawn.

Pakistani officials also moved quickly today to deflect the nuclear issue.

"This isn't the first time these
See RELATIONS, A24, Col. 1

NEWS ANALYSIS

E10

Pakistan-India Feuds Threaten U.S. Balancing

RELATIONS, From A21

reports have come to our attention. The U.S. comes to us at least once a year with anxious inquiries based on some intelligence report or another," said a highly placed Pakistani official. "I am sure the U.S. government has waited and watched and found the reports invalid.

"It is a constant struggle to make sure relations between the two countries are not undercut by reports of a questionable nature. Now the U.S. government has a problem (when it has to go before Congress). The government of Pakistan is well aware of U.S. law. Any violation will lead to discontinuation of the aid relationship and Pakistan is doing nothing that will jeopardize that relationship."

With the United States embarked on a new long-range policy, underscored by

Weinberger's recent visit, to reestablish a closer relationship with India, such visible reminders of U.S. ties to Pakistan as the early warning system or a big planned naval visit to Karachi underscore the difficulty of the task. A naval task force, led by the nuclear carrier Enterprise, was scheduled to arrive in Karachi Thursday but the visit was postponed at the last minute because of rioting there.

The Reagan administration's balancing act in South Asia is complicated at home by the legal requirement that the United States not give aid to countries possessing or developing a nuclear weapons capability.

The United States has an important stake in strategic cooperation with Pakistan, partly because of this country's role as a base for U.S. policy in Afghanistan, and partly because of Pakistani links with the Middle East. As a result, Washington is now Pak-

istan's major arms supplier, including some of the most sophisticated weapons in the U.S. arsenal.

At the same time, the United States also has recognized that it has left an open field for the Soviet Union in India, Pakistan's neighbor, its foe in four wars and builder of the world's fourth largest military machine.

U.S. planners who look beyond images of poverty and backwardness see an Indian military that is effectively trained, equipped with increasingly modern weaponry and determined to be self-reliant.

While New Delhi still buys modern weapons from the Soviet Union and the West, it has embarked on a program of developing its own tanks, ships, missiles and aircraft. The United States sees India's desire to build its own sophisticated military hardware as a vehicle for expanding American influence as a counter to the Soviets'.

Act in Region

The U.S. argument is simple: over time, if there is no counterweight, a predominant Soviet influence could develop in India even though Indian planners genuinely want to maintain a neutral stance in world politics.

It is primarily the United States that can supply the super-computers, the advanced avionics, the graphite composites for airframes, the missile-tracking equipment and the other high-technology items the Indians eagerly seek.

The problem, according to close observers of the situation, is that short-range strategists, especially at the Pentagon, sometimes do not mesh closer and longer-range goals, leaving a policy that ends up arguing with itself.

This, they say, is what seems to have happened with the Weinberger visit to India and Pakistan.

In New Delhi, by all accounts, Weinberger had good sessions with Indian officials,

clearing away some mutual misconceptions. Indian officials described what they wanted and, while the U.S. side made it clear that not all the Indian requests could be met, there was ample negotiating room.

Within hours of his arrival in Pakistan, Weinberger was speaking publicly about a possible offer of early warning systems, to fill what he and other Pentagon officials say is a clear need to counter Soviet and Afghan government pressures on Pakistan from across the Afghan border.

Indian military planners see it another way.

Writing in a major Indian daily newspaper, Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, deputy director of India's Institute for Strategic Studies, has argued that Pakistani targets are so close to the Afghan border, and the terrain so mountainous there, that no early warning system is likely to help meet the threat from Afghanistan. Indian defenses,

See RELATIONS, A25, Col. 1

U.S. Tries to Reassert Role in South Asia

RELATIONS, From A24

on the other hand, would be severely compromised, Singh wrote.

This region is the meeting point for the Middle East and Asia, and is a little bit of both, a problem with which policymakers have wrestled long before Washington started trying its hand. To try to isolate policy issues of the Middle East from those of Asia, or vice-versa, can be a difficult, if not impossible, task.

"Regardless of the professed justifications, the real effective role of the AWACS [U.S. or Pakistani] in Pakistan would be directed against Indian and Soviet airspace," Singh added, noting that "during peacetime, AWACS in Pakistan would be able to monitor the flight profile of virtually

every single aircraft of the Indian Air Force since the range covers almost the entire spectrum of IAF deployments."

"This would help build up a complete picture of the flying effort, training patterns and operational tactics of the Indian Air Force within a short span of time unless a major redeployment deep inside Indian territory is arranged in time," Singh wrote.

During wartime, observers point out, the capabilities of the airborne early warning radar systems would multiply the effect of Pakistan's much smaller air force against India—a fact that also has not been lost on Indian planners.

With Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev scheduled to visit India this month, U.S. officials here now can only hunker down in anticipation of an expected flood of Moscow-related activity and then prepare for congressional questions about the nuclear programs of both Pakistan and India, hoping that in the interim they can continue their balancing act.

The New York Times
Mar 09 - 1987

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Pakistan Atom Work Goes On

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan, March 8 (AP) — Pakistan declared today that it would continue peaceful development of nuclear energy and would not bow to pressure from foreigners who fear it may be building atomic bombs.

"We will not be browbeaten or cajoled out of pursuing our peaceful nuclear program," Zain Noorani, the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, said in a speech to the National Assembly.

"The Government will not compromise the national sovereignty," Mr. Noorani said, "and it will go on with its peaceful nuclear program, in spite of any difficulties which we may have to face or sacrifices which may have to be made."

The statement followed the publication on March 1, in Pakistan and abroad, of comments attributed to a Pakistani nuclear scientist, Abdul Qa-

deer Khan. Mr. Khan was quoted as saying Pakistan had progressed significantly toward construction of a nuclear weapon. He later disavowed the comments.

The Pakistani Government maintains that its nuclear program is designed to meet a chronic shortage of electricity.

In a Feb. 16 speech, the American Ambassador, Deane R. Hinton, advised Pakistan not to develop nuclear weapons, saying Congress and the Reagan Administration might block \$4.02 billion in military and economic assistance planned for the next six years. The aid package is now the subject of Congressional hearings.

Mr. Noorani's statement came in reply to several members of the National Assembly who said Mr. Hinton's statement amounted to a threat.

ASIA

Pak Nuke, Carnegie Study

From Our Correspondent
WASHINGTON: President Ronald Reagan's assurance that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear bomb is deceptive, the Carnegie Endowment's Nuclear Specialist Leonard S. Spector, said last week.

"I think what it may boil down (to) is a judgment of whether possession of components for nuclear weapons is equivalent to the possession of a nuclear weapon," Spector told a senate committee on nuclear proliferation.

The possession of components to make a bomb, even if they were stored in different aults, amounted to the creation of a bomb and to certify otherwise would be "disingenuous," Spector said.

Spector said he expected Pakistan and other nuclear weapon proliferators to follow the Israeli model, namely to have the components ready so that a bomb can be assembled in days.



President Reagan

He said since tests were essential only for hydrogen bombs or more sophisticated nuclear weapons, these nations could build up nuclear weapon capabilities and perhaps even arsenals and not announce them.

Chinese aid to Pakistan had, perhaps made testing unnecessary in any case, he said. "I have not been able to confirm it but I have received reports that private nuclear commerce between China and Pakistan had started.

U.S. Shifts Priorities in Pakistan

PAKISTAN (From A1)

to the U.S. government. But U.S. officials said the only outstanding questions are how much enriched uranium the Pakistanis have and whether they have assembled the various parts of a bomb.

"A State Department official said Friday, "We think they have the capability of producing one [nuclear bomb] now, but we're convinced they don't have one yet."

Last Sunday The Observer of London quoted Pakistan's chief nuclear scientist, Abdel Qader Khan, as saying in an interview that his country has succeeded in producing weapons-grade uranium and making a nuclear bomb. He said a test of the Pakistani bomb might not be necessary because "it can be done in a laboratory, through a simulator."

The Pakistani government has since said Khan denies he gave the interview, but two newspapers—one in India and one in Pakistan—insist he did.

Mounting evidence that Pakistan is about to join the nuclear club has created both Congress and the administration with what Rep. Stephen J. Solarz (D-N.Y.) called a dilemma of "Rubik's Cube" proportions: how to fit together the U.S. commitment to nuclear nonproliferation with its equally firm commitment to aiding anticommunist rebels dependent on Pakistan in their war to oust the Soviet Union from neighboring Afghanistan.

Proponents, in and out of Congress, of a strong nonproliferation policy want to use the leverage of the big new U.S. aid program in a final bid to extract promises from Pakistan that it will go no further toward assembling a bomb.


Administration officials argue that this would jeopardize the more immediate goal of supporting Pakistan against Soviet pressure and helping the anti-Soviet Afghan rebels.

Administration officials also said they still are pressing Pakistan to consider carefully the implications of assembling a bomb—a step they are warning the Pakistanis would be certain to touch off a nuclear arms race with India that Pakistan would be unlikely to win. India tested a nuclear device in 1974 but then halted further development of nuclear weapons until recently.

At a hearing last week, Sen. John Glenn (D-Ohio), chairman of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, criticized "the growing



SEN. JOHN GLENN
A State Department official said...



REP. STEPHEN SOLARZ
...the U.S. is caught in a dilemma...

signs of disarray within the administration over its whole nuclear-proliferation policy.

"Serious differences seem to exist within the administration over our fundamental policy for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons," Glenn said. The senator charged that the State Department refuses to share critical intelligence information with the Pentagon, which he said has a stronger antinuclear proliferation policy.

The Ohio senator has written a letter to Reagan calling for a review of U.S. information about the Pakistani nuclear program and a suspension of military assistance to Pakistan until it is completed and until "reliable assurances" are provided that the Pakistanis have ceased producing nuclear-grade uranium. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Robert Peck told Solarz's House Asia subcommittee bluntly last week that such assurances are impossible to obtain.

Leonard S. Spector, a nuclear nonproliferation specialist at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said in testimony before the subcommittee that Pakistan last year "effectively crossed the nuclear-weapons threshold" and could now fabricate "all of the key components" for a nuclear device.

Spector estimated that Pakistan would be able to produce enough weapons-grade uranium at its Kahuta plant for "several Hiroshima-size weapons annually."

There also is evidence that India

is producing itself to produce nuclear weapons, Spector said. It has obtained the materials to do so from newly built nuclear facilities, not subject to international control, that have the capacity to produce nuclear-grade uranium for 10 to 15 weapons annually, he said.

State Department officials insist they still are trying to persuade Pakistan not to go forward with the development of nuclear weapons.

The U.S. ambassador to Pakistan, Deane R. Hinton, gave a speech in Islamabad Feb. 16 warning of the dangerous road Pakistan would be taking in assembling a nuclear bomb and saying even possession of all the components for a nuclear explosive device might be enough to end U.S. aid.

A State Department official said the Hinton speech has been "a big catalyst" in causing "a lot of ferment" within the Pakistan government over the implications of its nuclear program and led to the recall to Islamabad of Pakistan's ambassador here, Jamsheed Marker, for consultations.

Marker, who returned here early last week, met with Under Secretary Michael H. Armacost Thursday to discuss further the implications of the Hinton speech for U.S.-Pakistani relations, the official said.

"This means the Pakistanis are seriously considering our views," the State Department official added. "We're not convinced they have made any decision yet to go ahead."