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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: Records
Country File

Archivist: mjd

File Folder: Germany, FRG Vol. I (1/20/81-6/30/81) (3)
Box 91325 14

Date: 12/17/98

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. cable	271718Z FEB 81, 4p P 7/28/00 NLSF97-030 #98	2/27/81	P1/F1
2. cable	241617Z FEB 81, 4p R 7/28/00 NLSF97-030 #99	2/24/81	P1/F1
2a. cable	201957 FEB 81, 2p D 7/28/00 NLSF97-030 #100	2/20/81	P1/F1
3. cable	201923Z FEB 81, 5p P 7/28/00 NLSF97-030 #101	2/20/81	P1/F1
4. cable	201459Z FEB 81, 2p R 7/28/00 NLSF97-030 #102	2/20/81	P1/F1
5. cable	192028Z FEB 81, 6p D " " #103	2/19/81	P1/F1
6. cable	200654Z JUN 81, 11p R 7/28/00 NLSF97-030 #104	6/20/81	P1/F1
7. cable	211029Z FEB 81, 8p [includes 211033Z & 211022Z] R 7/28/00 NLSF97-030 #105	2/21/81	P1/F1
7a. cable	021234Z Feb 81, 1p R 7/28/00 NLSF97-030 #106	2/21/81	P1/F1
8. cable	032315Z AUG 81, 2p R 7/28/00 NLSF97-030 #107	8/3/81	P1/F1
9. cable	080231Z JUN 81, 2p P 7/28/00 NLSF97-030 #108	6/8/81	P1/F1
10. cable	051408Z JUN 81, 1p D 7/28/00 NLSF97-030 #109	6/5/81	P1/F1
11. cable	280039Z MAY 81, 2p D 7/28/00 NLSF97-030 #110	5/28/81	P1/F1
12. cable	230257Z APR 81, 2p R 7/28/00 NLSF97-030 #111	4/23/81	P1/F1
13. cable	221656Z APR 81, 3p R 7/28/00 NLSF97-030 #112	4/22/81	P1/F1
14. cable	221656Z APR 81, 2p R 7/28/00 NLSF97-030 #113	4/22/81	P1/F1
15. cable	191542Z APR 81, 3p R 7/28/00 NLSF97-030 #114	4/19/81	P1/F1
16. cable	180204Z APR 81, 2p R 7/28/00 NLSF97-030 #115	4/18/81	P1/F1
17. cable	280234Z MAR 81, 2p R 7/28/00 NLSF97-030 #116	3/28/81	P1/F1
18. cable	240143Z MAR 81, 2p R 7/28/00 NLSF97-030 #117	3/24/81	P1/F1

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: Records
Country File

Archivist: mjd

File Folder: Germany, FRG Vol. I (1/20/81-6/30/81) (3)
Box 91325

Date: 12/17/98

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
19. cable	200107Z MAR 81, 2p R 7/28/00 NLSF97-030#118	3/20/81	P1/F1
20. cable	122137Z MAR 81, 12p R 7/28/00 NLSF97-030#119	3/12/81	P1/F1

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

DATE 03/02/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 001

WHSR COMMENT:

RA NAN COL VP
EOBIEURE,EEUR,WEUR

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHOL #4103/01 0681719
O 271718Z FEB 81
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6109

INFO USICA WASHDC
USMISSION USBERLIN 3334
AMEMBASSY BERLIN 4532
AMCONSUL FRANKFURT 1215
AMCONSUL MUNICH 5511
AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF POUCH
AMCONSUL HAMBURG POUCH
AMCONSUL STUTTGART POUCH
BT~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 BONN 04103
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 2/27/01 (YORK, CHARLES T.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, 8DPN, GW, US
SUBJ: GENSCHEER VISIT: CONSULTATION AND STRATEGY "CONCEPTS"
REF: BONN 28221. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. BACKGROUND

- THE GERMANS CONTINUE TO EMPHASIZE THEIR CONCERN FOR EFFECTIVE CONSULTATIONS AND FOR DEVELOPING AN AGREED WESTERN STRATEGY. THEY WILL LOOK TO THE U.S. FOR LEADERSHIP. THE SPD/FDP COALITION HAS ITS BROAD CONCEPT OF HOW THE SUPERPOWERS SHOULD CONDUCT THEIR RELATIONSHIP. IT NATURALLY FITS THE FRG SCHEME OF INTERESTS, AND BONN WOULD LIKE TO SEE US FOLLOW IT.*****~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~*****

DECLASSIFIED BY 6032

F97-030 #98

LOI

8/30/00

DATE 03/02/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 1002

MESSAGE (CONTINUED) 1

4. SUGGESTED U.S. POSITION

IN AN IDEAL WORLD, OUR BEST APPROACH MIGHT BE TO FORMULATE EARLY A BROAD, CONCEPTUAL APPROACH TO ADVANCE WESTERN POLICY INTERESTS VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIETS AND THE THIRD WORLD, DISCUSS IT WITH OUR MAJOR ALLIANCE PARTNERS, AND GET THE GERMANS AND OTHERS TO SIGN ON THE NEXT FOUR YEARS TO THE CONSENSUS THAT MIGHT EMERGE. SUCH A "GESAMPT-KONZEPT" APPROACH WOULD BE PARTICULARLY APPEALING TO THE GERMANS. IN THE REAL WORLD, WE WILL DOUBTLESS HAVE TO OPERATE ON A PRAGMATIC, AD HOC BASIS TAILORED TO THE ISSUES OF THE DAY. THIS WILL PLACE A PREMIUM ON MECHANISMS FOR RAPID CONSULTATIONS BOTH BILATERALLY WITH THE GERMANS AND MULTILATERALLY THROUGH NATO AND OTHER FORUMS.

5. REGARDLESS WHAT SYSTEMS ARE DEvised AND WHAT POLICIES WE PURSUE, TO MINIMIZE PROBLEMS WITH THE GERMANS, WE SHOULD TRY TO ADHERE TO THESE PRINCIPLES:
-- CLEAR EXPLANATION OF OUR GOALS, AND HOW WE EXPECT TO ACHIEVE THEM,
-- ENCOURAGEMENT OF A LARGER FRG ROLE WHERE APPROPRIATE,
-- CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN OUR SEEKING ADVICE AND OUR INFORMING BONN OF NECESSARY DECISIONS TAKEN OR ACTIONS PLANNED. (MISUNDERSTANDING OF THESE DISTINCTIONS HAS LED TO UNNECESSARY RESENTMENT IN THE PAST),
-- ADVANCE NOTIFICATION TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE AND APPROPRIATE.

*****CONFIDENTIAL*****

DATE 03/02/81

(WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM)

PAGE 008

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

[REDACTED] E.G., THE IRAN RESCUE ATTEMPT. WE
MUST JUDGE ACCORDING TO OUR INTERESTS.)
-- CONSISTENCY. THIS CAVEAT MIGHT NOT NEED MENTION
BUT BONN'S CONFIDENCE HAS BEEN SHAKEN BY WHAT GERMANS
REGARD AS TOO MANY SHARP AND SUDDEN CHANGES.

6. WE SHOULD TRY TO AVOID SUCH SHIFTS AND, WHEN
WE MUST MAKE THEM, WE SHOULD FOLLOW THE OTHER RULES

PSN: 019675

TOR: 068/17141Z

RTG: 271718Z FEB 81

*****~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~*****

0

DATE 03/02/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

DE RUFHOL #4103/02 0681721

O 271718Z FEB 81

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0200

INFO USICA WASHDC

USMISSION USBERLIN 3335

AMEMBASSY BERLIN 4633

AMCONSUL FRANKFURT 1216

AMCONSUL MUNICH 6612

AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF POUCH

AMCONSUL HAMBURG POUCH

AMCONSUL STUTTGART POUCH

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 BONN 04103
ABOVE SO AS MINIMIZE ANNOYANCE AND MISUNDERSTANDING.
(DOING SO, WE SHOULD REMEMBER THAT CONVINCING THE
GOVERNMENT IS ONE THING AND CONVINCING THE PRESS IS
SOMETHING ELSE.

AT THE SAME TIME, WE SHOULD INSIST ON
RECIPROCITY WITH BONN.

PSNI 019676

TOR: 068/17141Z

RTG: 271718Z FEB 81

*****S E C R E T*****

DATE 02/25/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 001

WHSR COMMENT:

RA NAN COL VP
EOBIARA, ASIMET, EZUR, WEUR

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUPHOL #3754 0551617
O 241617Z FEB 81
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0009

~~S E C R E T~~ BONN 03754

EXDIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM CHARGE

E.O. 12065; RDS-3 2/24/11 (WOBESSNER, WILLIAM M) OR-M

TAGS: DEPR, ES, GW

SUBJECT: GENSCHER'S STATEMENT ON ARMS FLOW TO EL SALVADOR

REF: BONN 3598

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. DURING RECEPTION GIVEN TODAY BY THE COSTA RICAN AMBASSADOR IN HONOR OF FOREIGN MINISTER NIEHAUS, I TOOK GENSCHER ASIDE AND ASKED HIM WHY HE HAD NOT YET ISSUED THE STATEMENT CONDEMNING SOVIET/CUBAN ARMS FLOW TO SALVADORAN REBELS THAT HE HAD PROMISED AMBASSADOR EAGLEBURGER HE WOULD MAKE FEBRUARY 21 (REFTEL).

3. GENSCHER REPLIED THAT THE INTERVIEW HE PLANNED TO USE PROVED IN THE EVENT TO BE AN UNSUITABLE VEHICLE. HE NOW HOPED THAT LANGUAGE CONDEMNING THE ARMS FLOW COULD BE INCORPORATED INTO THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE THAT HE AND NIEHAUS PLANNED TO ISSUE AT THE CONCLUSION OF NIEHAUS' VISIT HERE. FAILING THAT GENSCHER SAID THAT HE WOULD ISSUE A STATEMENT OF HIS OWN WITHIN THE NEXT DAY OR TWO.

4. GENSCHER ALSO VOICED CONCERN REGARDING IMPACT ON EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION OF BREZHNEV TNF MORATORIUM PROPOSAL. HE EXPRESSED HOPE THAT USG WOULD PROMPTLY ISSUE REJOINDER LABELING THIS FOR THE PROPAGANDA PLOY IT IS. THIS SAME VIEW WAS ECHOED BY STATE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS 697-030 #99BY LOJ, NARA, DATE 8/29/00

*****S E C R E T*****

*****~~SECRET~~*****

DATE 02/25/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 002

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

VAN WELL AT QUADRIPARTITE AMBASSADORIAL LUNCH IMMEDIATELY
AFTER COSTA RICAN RECEPTION. WOESSNER

PSNI 015357

TORI 055/19148Z

RTGI 241617Z FEB 81

*****~~SECRET~~*****

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 7a LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

~~*****SECRET*****~~

DATE 02/26/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 001

WHSR COMMENT:

RA, NAN, COL, VP
EOB:ARA, EUR, WEUR

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

DE RUFHOL #3597/01 0511925

O 201923Z FEB 81

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 0022

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 BONN 03597

EXDIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR EAGLEBURGER

E.O. 120651 RDS-1 2/20/11 (WOESSNER, WILLIAM M.) OR-M

TAGS: PEPR, GW, ES

SUBJ: EUROPEAN TRIP ON EL SALVADOR: OVERVIEW

1. ~~SECRET~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. I HAVE JUST COMPLETED MY MEETING WITH GENSCHER WHICH WILL BE REPORTED SEPTEL. LET ME NOW SUMMARIZE MY IMPRESSIONS AFTER FIVE DAYS OF PEREGRINATIONS.

3. FIRST, THE PLUSES:

- A) WE HAVE, I BELIEVE, CONVINCED EVERYONE WITH WHOM WE SPOKE OF THE COMPLICITY OF THE SOVIET BLOC IN THE CLANDESTINE SUPPLY OF ARMS TO THE SALVADORAN INSURGENTS.

- B) WE HAVE ALSO CONVINCED THEM THAT THE ISSUE MUST BE LOOKED AT IN AN EAST-WEST CONTEXT, AND IN THE LIGHT OF WHAT TRANSPIRED IN ANGOLA AND ETHIOPIA.

- C) THEY UNDERSTAND THAT WE INTEND TO TAKE STEPS TO BRING AN END TO THE CLANDESTINE SUPPLYING OF ARMS. EQUALLY, THEY ARE IN NO DOUBT THAT WE WILL DEAL IN SOME WAY WITH CUBA, NERVOUS AS THAT NEWS MAY HAVE MADE THEM.

- D) OUR ALLIES ARE ALL PLEASED WITH THE EARLY AND DETAILED CONSULTATIONS, EVEN THOUGH THEY WISH IT

~~*****SECRET*****~~

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

F97-030#101
LoT 8/30/00

*****~~SECRET~~*****

DATE 02/25/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 002

MESSAGE (CONTINUED)

WERE ON A SUBJECT OTHER THAN EL SALVADOR.

- E) WE HAVE, FOR THE MOMENT AT LEAST, PUT A HALT TO THE EC COMMISSION'S ATTEMPT TO SUPPLY HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE IN WAYS THAT WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY HAVE AIDED THE INSURGENTS. I SUSPECT, IN FACT, THAT THERE ARE NOW MANY IN THE COMMISSION AND STAFF WHO WISH THEY HAD NEVER BEGUN THE EFFORT IN THE FIRST PLACE.

- F) WE HAVE GOTTEN A GOOD STATEMENT OUT OF THE BELGIANS CONDEMNING THE CLANDESTINE ARMS SUPPLY EFFORT (YOU MIGHT SEND NOTHOMB A SHORT THANK YOU NOTE), AND WILL GET SOMETHING FROM GENSCHER TOMORROW. I AM FAIRLY CERTAIN FRANCOIS-PONCET WILL GIVE YOU A GOOD PUBLIC STATEMENT DURING HIS VISIT, AND AM SANGUINE THAT SOMETHING CAN BE PRIED OUT OF THATCHER WHEN SHE IS IN WASHINGTON.

- G) WE MAY -- IN OFFICIAL CIRCLES -- HAVE MADE SOME SMALL DENT IN THE WIDESPREAD CONVICTION HERE THAT THE GOES IS THE DEVIL INCARNATE. SOME SEEM TO HAVE BEEN AT LEAST marginally IMPRESSED WITH OUR ARGUMENTS THAT THE DUARTE REGIME HAS CARRIED OUT REFORMS AND WANTS TO DO MORE. FURTHER, MANY NOW ACCEPT THE POINT THAT THE USG INTENDS TO ENCOURAGE THE GOES TO CONTINUE WITH THE PROCESS OF REFORM. THEY ALSO, HOWEVER, UNDERSTAND THAT THE CHARACTER AND QUALITY OF THE SALVADORAN REGIME WILL NOT AFFECT OUR DETERMINATION TO BRING THE CLANDESTINE SUPPLY OF ARMS TO THE INSURGENTS TO A HALT.

4. NOW, THE MINUSES:



- B) THERE IS STILL A WIDESPREAD BELIEF THAT THE

*****~~SECRET~~*****

~~*****S E C R E T*****~~

DATE 02/25/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 003

MESSAGE (CONTINUED) :

USG IS SO CONCERNED ABOUT SOVIET AND CUBAN INVOLVE-
MENT IN EL SALVADOR THAT IT WILL IGNORE THE NEED
FOR REFORM, FAIL TO PUSH DUARTE TO BROADEN HIS
POLITICAL BASE, AND SEARCH FOR A MILITARY SITUATION
RATHER THAN WORK TO BRING THE "DEMOCRATIC" LEFT
BACK INTO THE GOVERNMENT. MOST HERE IN WESTERN

PSN: 010684

TOR: 051/21141Z

RTG: 201923Z FEB 81

~~*****S E C R E T*****~~

~~*****S E C R E T*****~~

DATE 02/25/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 00

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

DE RUFHOL #3597/02 0511927

O 201923Z FEB 81

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 5023

~~S E C R E T~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 BONN 03597

EXDIS

EUROPE BELIEVE, OR PRETEND TO BELIEVE, THAT A POLITICAL SOLUTION IS POSSIBLE IF THE USG WILL ONLY ENGINEER IT.

C) WE ARE WAY BEHIND IN THE PROPAGANDA WAR. THE MONTH'S LONG MEDIA CAMPAIGN, IN GREAT MEASURE, I SUSPECT FINANCED AND MASTER-MINDED FROM THE EAST, HAS SUCCEEDED IN PERSUADING MANY THAT THE GOES IS VICIOUS, MURDEROUS, AND CORRUPT. THIS, OF COURSE, HAS STRENGTHENED THE LEFT, AND FRIGHTENED MODERATES AND RIGHTISTS EITHER INTO NEUTRALITY OR EVEN HOSTILITY TOWARD OUR OWN POSITION. THIS TRIP, WITH THE EVIDENCE WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO PRESENT (PLUS, OF COURSE, MY OWN PERSUASIVE ELOQUENCE), HAS MADE SOME IMPACT ON GOVERNMENTS, AND PERHAPS EVEN A SMALL DIFFERENCE IN PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS. BUT WE ARE STILL BEHIND AND WILL HAVE TO WORK HARD IF WE ARE TO BEGIN TO DRAW EVEN. ALSO, WE MUST NOW EXPECT, AND SOON, A MAJOR COUNTERATTACK. IT WILL COME IN THE PRESS, FROM THE LEFT POLITICAL PARTIES, IN THE SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL, IN WESTERN PARLIAMENTS, AND FROM THE EAST. IF WE DON'T GET OUR STORY OUT, AND THEN KEEP REPEATING IT EVERY CHANCE AND EVERY PLACE WE CAN, WE WILL SOON LOSE THE LITTLE GROUND WE HAVE GAINED.

5. THERE ARE SOME UNSETTLED QUESTIONS THAT WILL NEED TO BE ADDRESSED AS OUR DELIBERATIONS ON HOW TO MOVE ON THE EL SALVADOR QUESTION PROCEED. I HAVE LEFT BEHIND ME SOME RATHER SPECIFIC AND SOME LESS SPECIFIC PROMISES OF CONSULTATION IN ADVANCE OF DECISIONS. I VERY MUCH HOPE THEY CAN BE HONORED, NOT ONLY IN PARIS, BONN, AND LONDON, BUT ALSO IN THE NATO COUNCIL. I RECOGNIZE THAT THERE SHOULD BE DIFFERENT LEVELS OF SPECIFICITY AND FRANKNESS, BUT WE HAVE MADE A GOOD BEGINNING AT REBUILDING

~~*****S E C R E T*****~~

~~*****S E C R E T*****~~

DATE 02/25/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 001

MESSAGE (CONTINUED)

CONFIDENCE IN OUR LEADERSHIP AND COMMITMENT TO CONSULTATION. THE MORE WE TALK, THE MORE WE AVOID SURPRISES, THE MORE OUR ALLIES ARE LIKELY TO STAY WITH US.

6. I WILL HAVE SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR YOU ON THIS ISSUE WHEN I RETURN TO WASHINGTON.

7. FINALLY, AND VERY MUCH RELATED TO THE FOREGOING, WE NEED TO THINK HARD ABOUT OUR STRATEGY FOR HANDLING A "POLITICAL ACTION" CAMPAIGN IN EUROPE OVER THE COMING WEEKS.

8. SUCH A CAMPAIGN NEEDS TO INTEGRATE THE FOLLOWING:
-- CONSULTATIONS WITH ALLIES;
-- PROPAGANDA IN WESTERN EUROPE;
-- CONTACTS WITH POLITICAL PARTIES AND LEADERS OUTSIDE GOVERNMENT;
-- WHETHER AND HOW TO USE WEST EUROPEAN POLITICAL CONTACTS (PARTICULARLY BETWEEN THE VARIOUS CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC AND SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTIES);
-- WHAT MEASURES OF A POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND MILITARY NATURE WE MIGHT ASK OUR ALLIES TO TAKE AS WE DECIDE HOW WE OURSELVES WILL ACT VIS-A-VIS EL SALVADOR, CUBA, AND THE SOVIET BLOC.

9. ON THIS, TOO, I WILL HAVE SOME THOUGHTS FOR YOU AFTER I RETURN. IN THE MEANTIME, I WANT TO THANK YOU FOR THIS OPPORTUNITY TO TOUR EUROPE AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE WHILE MARLENE HANDLES THE MOVE INTO OUR NEW QUARTERS. WOESSNER

PSN: 010686

TOR: 051/21142Z

RTG: 201923Z FEB 81

~~*****S E C R E T*****~~

*****S E C R E T*****

DATE 02/25/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 001

WHSR COMMENT:

RA NAN COL VP
EOBIARA,EEUR,WEUR

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFUOL #3524 0511500
O 201400Z FEB 81
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4990

~~SECRET~~ BONN 03524EXDIS
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR EAGLEBURGER
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 2/20/11 (WOESSNER, WILLIAM M.) OR-P
TAGS: PEPR, GW, NU, ES, CR
SUBJ: CONVERSATION WITH FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER:
COSTA RICA AND NICARAGUA

1. SECRET ENTIRE TEXT.

2. IN COURSE OF CONVERSATION WITH GENSCHER FEBRUARY 20
HE RAISED WITH ME VISIT TO BONN OF COSTA RICAN FOREIGN
MINISTER NEXT WEEK. GENSCHER ASKED ME WHETHER THERE
WAS ANY USEFUL MESSAGE HE COULD CONVEY TO COSTA RICA
ON SALVADORAN SITUATION. I SAID THAT, WHILE COSTA
RICA IS CLEARLY SUPPORTIVE OF OUR POSITION ON EL
SALVADOR, I WOULD SEEK GUIDANCE SOONEST TO PERMIT
EMBASSY BONN TO REPLY TO GENSCHER SHOULD DEPARTMENT
WISH GERMANS TO CONVEY ANY SPECIAL MESSAGE.3. GENSCHER ALSO SAID THAT GERMANY HAD BEEN APPROACHED
BY NICARAGUAN FSLN DIRECTORATE MEMBER ARCE WHO
INQUIRED ABOUT POSSIBILITY OF VISIT TO BONN.
GENSCHER ASKED FOR USG OPINION ON WHETHER ARCE
VISIT WOULD BE USEFUL OR WHETHER USG WOULD PREFER
THAT VISIT NOT TAKE PLACE. GENSCHER STATED THAT
AN ARCE VISIT CONCEIVABLY MIGHT OFFER OPPORTUNITY
TO CONVEY USEFUL MESSAGE TO NICARAGUA. HE SAID,
HOWEVER, THAT, IF USG CONSIDERED VISIT OBJECTIONABLE,
HE WOULD BE GUIDED BY OUR WISHES. I PROMISED

*****S E C R E T*****

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F97-030 #102BY LOS, NARA, DATE 8/29/00

*****~~S E C R E T~~*****

DATE 02/25/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 002

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

GENSCHER THAT EMBASSY BONN WOULD BE BACK WITH HIM
AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO PROVIDE DEPARTMENT VIEWS ON
THIS MATTER.

4. COMMENT: MY OWN INCLINATION IS TO URGE GERMANS
TO CONDITION ARCE VISIT ON FSLN COMMITMENT TO CUT
OFF ARMS FLOW TO EL SALVADOR. REGARDING COSTA
RICAN, WE PRESUME THAT GERMANS WILL BE SEEKING
THEMSELVES TO REPAIR DAMAGE TO THEIR RELATIONS WITH
COSTA RICAN PLN CAUSED BY BRANDT'S HIGHLY PARTISAN
STATEMENTS IN SUPPORT OF SALVADORAN LEFT. END COMMENT

5. ACTION REQUESTED: PROMPT GUIDANCE FOR RESPONSE
TO GENSCHER. WOESSNER.

PSNI 010389

TOR: 051/18120Z

BTGI 201450Z FEB 81

*****~~S E C R E T~~*****

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 5 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

*****U N C L A S S I F I E D*****

DATE 02/04/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 001

WHSR COMMENT:

RA,XX
EOBIWEUR

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFJGX #0022 0211040
O R 211035Z JAN 81
FM AMCONSUL STRASBOURG

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1730

INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS 1500
BT

UNCLAS STRASBOURG 022

FOR 8/8

E.O. 12065: N/A

TAGS: PDIP, PFOR, COE.

SUBJECT: MESSAGE FOR PRESIDENT REAGAN.

THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN WAS SENT BY FRANZ
KARASEK, SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE, STRASBOURG,
FRANCE, ON JANUARY 20, 1981.

QUOTE

ON THE OCCASION OF YOUR INAUGURATION AS PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA I EXPRESS TO YOU MY WARMEST CONGRATULATIONS AND
WISHES FOR SUCCESS AND HAPPINESS.WE LOOK FORWARD TO MAINTAINING AND STRENGTHENING THE GOOD RELATIONS
THAT EXIST BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE COUNCIL OF
EUROPE.

FRANZ KARASEK, SECRETARY GENERAL, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, STRASBOURG.

ENDQUOTE

KURZE

PSN: 027728

TOR: 021/09159Z

RTG: 211035Z JAN 81

*****U N C L A S S I F I E D*****

MUNICH

SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 07/10/81//191

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

PLS F97-030#104

MESSAGE:

BY LOS, NARA, DATE 8/29/00

HCE113
STU1773
OO RUEHC RUEHSD
DE RUFHMM #2814/01 1710703 SVCD FOR MCN PROCESS
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 200654Z JUN 81
FM AMCONSUL MUNICH
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 04 MUNICH 02814

EXDIS DEPTD 028
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 6/19/81 (WOESSNER, WILLIAM M.)
TAGS: OVIP (CLARK, WILLIAM P.) XJ, GE
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER
GENSCHER, JUNE 18.

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
 2. SUMMARY. DEPUTY SECRETARY CLARK BRIEFED FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER ON HIS RECENT TALKS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. HE STRESSED THAT THE U.S. STILL REGARDED UN RESOLUTION 435 AS THE BASIS FOR A SETTLEMENT, ALTHOUGH MODIFICATIONS MIGHT BE REQUIRED. HE HAD MADE CLEAR TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEADERSHIP THAT THE U.S. WOULD NOT BE PARTY TO A CHARADE OR DELIBERATE DELAY ON THEIR PART. ONCE HE HAD CONVEYED SOUTH AFRICA'S PROPOSALS TO THE SECRETARY AND THE PRESIDENT, TOGETHER WITH HIS OWN EVALUATION AND PROPOSALS, CLARK PROMISED THE USG WOULD SHARE HIS FINDINGS WITH THE CONTACT GROUP.
 3. GENSCHER EXPRESSED HIS STRONG BELIEF THAT THE TIDE IN THE THIRD WORLD, ESPECIALLY SINCE THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN, WAS RUNNING IN FAVOR OF THE WEST. HE WAS CONCERNED THAT THE ISRAELI RAID ON TUWAITHA WOULD DIVERT ARAB ATTENTION AWAY FROM THE SOVIET THREAT. IT WAS DOUBLY IMPORTANT, THEREFORE, THAT THE WEST NOT DISAPPOINT THE AFRICANS ON NAMIBIA. SUCH A DEVELOPMENT COULD CAUSE THE THIRD WORLD TO REDEFINE ITS POSITION AND GIVE THE USSR A "HISTORIC BREATHING SPACE."
 4. GENSCHER ADVISED THE U.S. TO DO MORE TO PUBLICIZE BOTH THE THREAT POSED BY SS-20'S AND THE TALKS IT WAS HAVING WITH THE SOVIETS REGARDING TNF. HE ALSO EXPRESSED ANXIETY ABOUT POLAND IN THE PERIOD LEADING UP TO THE PZPR CONGRESS AND ADVISED KEEPING THE CSCE IN SESSION PAST THEN AS AT LEAST A MARGINAL INCENTIVE TO THE SOVIETS NOT TO INVADE. ACTION REQUESTED: SEE PARAGRAPH 22.
- END SUMMARY.

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MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

5. DEPUTY SECRETARY CLARK MET WITH FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER FOR NINETY MINUTES JUNE 18. THEIR MEETING, ARRANGED AT GENSCHER'S INVITATION, WAS HELD IN GENSCHER'S PRIVATE HOME. ALSO PRESENT WERE ASSISTANT SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER, CHARGE WOESSNER, STATE SECRETARY VON STADEN AND OFFICE DIRECTOR SCHENK.

6. DEPUTY SECRETARY CLARK BRIEFED FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER ON HIS RECENT TRIP TO SOUTHERN AFRICA. HE SAID THAT IN EXTENSIVE TALKS WITH THE SOUTH AFRICAN MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER, WITH VARIOUS PARTIES AND INFLUENTIAL GROUPS IN NAMIBIA, AND WITH MUGABE IN ZIMBABWE, HE HAD MADE CLEAR THAT THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION WAS STARTING FROM UN RESOLUTION 435. IT RECOGNIZED THE NEED TO MOVE THE NEGOTIATIONS OFF DEAD CENTER, BUT IT HAD NO SEPARATE PLAN. NEITHER WOULD IT BE PARTY TO A CHARADE OR DELIBERATE DELAY BY SOUTH AFRICA. ASSISTANT SECRETARIES CROCKER AND ABRAMS WERE NOW AT WORK EVALUATING THESE TALKS AND DRAWING UP POSITIONS WHICH CLARK WOULD PRESENT TO THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY HAIG NEXT WEEK. A JUDGMENT WOULD HAVE TO BE REACHED ON THE SINCERITY OF THE SOUTH AFRICANS IN WANTING TO REACH A SETTLEMENT. THEREAFTER AND BEFORE THE END OF JUNE, THE U.S. WOULD DISCUSS ITS IMPRESSIONS WITH THE CONTACT GROUP.

7. REGARDING THIS SESSION WITH MUGABE, CLARK NOTED THAT HE HAD RAISED CUBA THREE TIMES AND ONLY ON THE THIRD OCCASION DID MUGABE AGREE THAT HE WOULD NOT OBJECT IF THE CUBANS IN ANGOLA WENT HOME. CLARK TOLD MUGABE THAT HE COULD DO A LOT TO EXPEDITE THEIR DEPARTURE. THEIR CONTINUED PRESENCE IN ANGOLA WAS FOR THE U.S. A MAJOR STUMBLING BLOCK TO A NAMIBIAN SETTLEMENT. MUGABE TOLD CLARK HE WANTED TO CONTINUE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE SETTLEMENT PROCESS, BUT WOULD NOT WELCOME MODIFICATIONS TO 435. CLARK RESPONDED THAT WHILE 435 REMAINED THE BASIS FOR A SETTLEMENT, TWO YEARS HAD ELAPSED SINCE IT HAD BEEN PASSED, AND MODIFICATIONS OR EXTENSIONS MIGHT BE NEEDED.

8. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION FROM GENSCHER ABOUT SOUTH AFRICAN INTENTIONS, CLARK EXPLAINED THAT BOTHA HAD GIVEN HIM FIVE POINTS BUT THAT HE REALLY FELT OBLIGED TO PRESENT THESE FIRST TO THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY HAIG BEFORE SHARING THEM WITH THE CONTACT GROUP. GENSCHER EXPRESSED FULL UNDERSTANDING.

9. WHEN GENSCHER ASKED WHETHER THE SOUTH AFRICANS SAW THE REALITIES, CLARK RESPONDED THAT THEY ARE NOW MINDFUL OF
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SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 07/10/81//191

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE114
STU1770
DD RUEHC
DE RUFHMU #2814/02 1710711
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 200654Z JUN 81
FM AMCONSUL MUNICH
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5188
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 04 MUNICH 02814

EXDIS - DEPTD 028

AT LEAST SOME OF THE REALITIES OF THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION. THE STATEMENTS OF SOME SENATORS NOTWITHSTANDING, THE U.S. WAS NOT GOING TO GO ITS SEPARATE WAY. CLARK RELATED TO GENSCHER HOW THE SOUTH AFRICANS HAD BECOME QUITE EMOTIONAL WHEN HE REFUSED TO DON THE BUSH CLOTHES THEY HAD PROVIDED AND FLY ON THEIR HELICOPTERS TO INSPECT THE BORDER WITH MOZAMBIQUE. HE POINTED OUT THAT BY DOING SO, HE WOULD HAVE RISKED LOSING HIS CREDIBILITY WITH THE FRONT LINE STATES. THEY ACCUSED HIM OF BEING AS INSENSITIVE TO THEIR SITUATION AS THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION HAD BEEN. BUT WHEN HE THREATENED TO CUT SHORT HIS VISIT, THEY CALMED DOWN. CLARK EXPLAINED THAT THE U.S. SHARED SOUTH AFRICA'S CONCERN THAT NAMIBIA MIGHT BECOME A SPRINGBOARD FOR THE SOVIETS AS WELL AS ITS CONCERN ABOUT SOVIET HARDWARE POURING INTO ANGOLA, BUT THAT THE U.S. ALSO HAD BROADER RESPONSIBILITIES TO CONSIDER.

10. GENSCHER THEN LAUNCHED INTO A LENGTHY DISCOURSE ON AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST. THE SOVIETS HAD IN THE PAST YEAR SUFFERED SETBACKS IN BOTH AREAS. THERE WAS SIGNIFICANT TRUST AMONG AFRICANS IN THE WESTERN GROUP OF FIVE. MUGABE'S ASSUMPTION OF POWER IN ZIMBABWE WAS AN ENCOURAGING EXAMPLE. MUGABE EXERTED A POSITIVE INFLUENCE ON MACHEL. ANGOLA WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE CUBANS LEAVE. HOW COULD THE WEST PROMOTE THIS? THREE TO FOUR YEARS AGO THE SOUTH AFRICANS WERE SAYING THE SAME THING ABOUT MUGABE THAT THEY'RE SAYING TODAY ABOUT SWAPO. NUJOMA IS NO MUGABE. HE DOESN'T HAVE THE SAME INTELLIGENCE OR INTERNAL STRENGTH OF CHARACTER, BUT HE HAS GROWN IN HIS SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY. MUGABE'S INFLUENCE ON HIM IS CONSIDERABLE. IT WAS GOOD THAT CLARK WENT TO SALISBURY. HIGH-LEVEL U.S. INFLUENCE ON MUGABE WAS IMPORTANT.

11. THE SOVIETS, GENSCHEE CONTINUED, COULD NOT WISH

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MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

FOR ANYTHING BETTER THAN THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEADERSHIP. THE SOVIETS WANT A RACIAL WAR. IN NOVEMBER 1979, GROMYKO CAME TO BONN TO COMPLAIN ABOUT THE IMPENDING NATO DECISION ON TNF. HE WAS EVEN MORE NERVOUS, HOWEVER, ABOUT CARRINGTON'S PROGRESS AT THE LANCASTER HOUSE TALKS. THE SOVIETS WERE AFRAID, AND RIGHTLY SO, THAT THEY WOULD LOSE INFLUENCE. FOR THE SAME REASON, THEY WOULD LOVE TO SEE THE GROUP OF FIVE INITIATIVE FAIL. IT WAS THEREFORE GENSCHER'S FIRM CONVICTION THAT 435 HAD TO BE FIRMLY AND VIGOROUSLY IMPLEMENTED. THE FIVE HAD TO STICK TOGETHER AND PUSH THEIR INITIATIVE THROUGH. THE SOUTH AFRICANS HAD BEEN HOPING THAT CHANGES IN GOVERNMENT -- IN CANADA, IN THE FRG, NOW IN THE U.S. -- WOULD END THE PRESSURE ON THEM. WHAT THE U.S. DID ON THIS, HE ASSERTED, WOULD AFFECT ITS IMAGE THROUGHOUT AFRICA.

12. GENSCHER THEN DIGRESSED INTO A DESCRIPTION OF THE GDR CONSTITUTION TO MAKE THE POINT THAT THE REALITY OF FREEDOMS BORE NO NECESSARY RELATION TO THEIR LEGAL DOCUMENTATION. HE HAD TOLD NUJOMA THAT IF HE TOOK THE SAME COURSE AS MUGABE, IF HE PROMOTED GENUINE COOPERATION BETWEEN BLACKS AND WHITES, THEN THE FRG WAS PREPARED TO HELP MAKE NAMIBIA PROPEROUS. IT WAS THE WEST'S STRENGTH THAT IT COULD ASSIST WITH ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. THIS WAS BETTER THAN ARTIFICIALLY CONSTRUCTED CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES.

13. GENSCHER ASKED THE U.S. TO VIEW THE DECISION IT MADE REGARDING SOUTHERN AFRICA IN CONNECTION WITH WHAT WAS HAPPENING IN THE MIDDLE EAST. HE WAS DEEPLY DISTURBED OVER THE ISRAELI ATTACK ON TUWAITHA. HE HAD RECEIVED A REPORT THAT MORNING FROM THE FRG EMBASSY IN CAIRO INDICATING SEVERE UNHAPPINESS IN THE EGYPTIAN ARMY. THE RAID HAD BEEN A TERRIBLE BLOW TO SADAT, ESPECIALLY AS IT OCCURRED SO SOON AFTER HIS MEETING WITH BEGIN. IT HAD ALSO BEEN A BLOW TO RAPPROCHEMENT WITH MODERATE ARABS. THE IRAQIS TOO WERE INTERESTED IN RAPPROCHEMENT WITH THE WEST, INCLUDING THE UNITED STATES. NOW THE ENTIRE ATTENTION OF THE ARAB WORLD WOULD BE DIVERTED FROM AFGHANISTAN AND THE SOVIET THREAT. THE SOVIET POSITION HAD IMPROVED WITHOUT THEIR HAVING HAD TO LIFT A FINGER.

14. SUMMING UP, GENSCHER WARNED THAT IF THESE TWO GREAT GROUPS, THE AFRICANS AND THE ARABS, WERE DISAPPOINTED IN THE WEST, THE THIRD WORLD COULD RE-DEFINE ITS POSITION, SETTING BACK THE POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS OF THE PAST FEW YEARS. WE SHOULD NOT GIVE THE SOVIETS THIS HISTORIC BREATHING SPACE. THE WEST HAD BETTER CARDS TO PLAY THAN THE USSR. THEREFORE, 435 HAD TO BE IMPLEMENTED. THE FRONT

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SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNUNCIATION:

LINE STATES WERE FED UP WITH NAMIBIA. THEY WOULD BE WILL-
ING TO PRESSURE SWAPO IF THE FIVE PUSHED THROUGH THEIR
INITIATIVE. NAMIBIA WOULD BE A GOOD NEIGHBOR TO SOUTH

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SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE115
STU1775
DD RUEHC
DE RUFHMU #2814/03 1710719
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 200654Z JUN 81
FM AMCONSUL MUNICH
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5189
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 04 MUNICH 02814

EXDIS - DEPTD 028

AFRICA, GIVING IT TIME TO STRAIGHTEN OUT ITS INTERNAL PROBLEMS. AS A MODEL, GENSCHER CITED A PLEDGE MUGABE HAD GIVEN HIM THAT HE WOULD NOT ALLOW TERRORISTS TO USE ZIMBABWE FOR RAIDS INTO SOUTH AFRICA. ZIMBABWE AND NAMIBIA, IN MUGABE'S VIEW, WERE COLONIAL PROBLEMS THAT NEEDED TO BE SOLVED. SOUTH AFRICA WAS DIFFERENT; ZIMBABWE WOULD NOT INTERFERE.

15. CLARK THANKED GENSCHER FOR HIS COMMENTS WHICH HE SAID WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL TO HIM IN PREPARING HIS REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT. HE EXPRESSED SYMPATHY FOR MUCH OF WHAT GENSCHER HAD SAID. IF THE SOVIETS DID NOT HAVE SOUTHERN AFRICA, THEY WOULD HAVE TO INVENT IT. THEIR IDEOLOGY HAD FAILED IN AFRICA. THE TWO MEN THEN EXCHANGED IMPRESSIONS ABOUT THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEADERS, AGREEING THAT THEY ARE INDEED VERY TOUGH NEGOTIATORS. CLARK OBSERVED THAT THEIR BACKS WERE TO THE WALL AND THAT IT MIGHT BE NECESSARY FOR THE WEST TO DO SOMETHING TO HELP THEM SAVE FACE. IN CONTRAST TO THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM, WHICH PEOPLE HAD BEEN TRYING TO SOLVE FOR MORE THAN THIRTY YEARS, CLARK THOUGHT THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN QUESTION COULD BE SOLVED. HE PROMISED THAT IT WOULD HAVE HIS HIGHEST PRIORITY AFTER HIS RETURN TO WASHINGTON. HE WAS INTERESTED IN FINDING A SOLUTION BOTH ON LEGAL AND MORAL GROUNDS. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS FROM PRIME MINISTER BOTHA, CLARK HAD PROMISED HIM THAT WHATEVER PRIVATE THOUGHTS HE MIGHT HAVE ON SOUTH AFRICA'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS, HE WOULD NOT BERATE THE SOUTH AFRICANS PUBLICLY. BOTHA, HE NOTED, HAD PROBLEMS WITH HIS RIGHT WING. GENSCHER REJOINED THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT WAS UNDER PRESSURE FROM BOTH THE RIGHT AND THE LEFT AND THAT, IN HIS VIEW, TIME WAS RUNNING OUT.

16. TURNING TO TNF, GENSCHER SAID THAT HE HAD HEARD WITH SATISFACTION AMBASSADOR RUTH'S REPORTS ON THE RECENTLY CONCLUDED SCG. HE ASKED WHETHER SECRETARY HAIG WANTED TO

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SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

HOLD THE TRADITIONAL MEETING OF FOUR FOREIGN MINISTERS AT THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY BEFORE OR AFTER HIS MEETING WITH GROMYKO. GENSCHER THOUGHT THAT A MEETING OF THE FOUR AFTERWARDS WOULD BE MOST USEFUL. THE WEST, HE SAID, HAD TO EXPECT A CONTINUATION OF THE SOVIET OFFENSIVE AGAINST THE NATO TWO-TRACK DECISION. THE WEST SHOULD USE EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO CRITICIZE THE SOVIETS PUBLICLY AND TO STRESS THE THREAT THEIR SS-20'S POSED TO WESTERN EUROPE. HE NOTED THAT THE SOVIETS HAD BACKTRACKED ON THEIR CBM OFFER AT THE CSCE AND THEN, IN FACE OF THE WEST'S CRITICISM, HAD APPEARED AT LEAST TO RESTORE SOME OF THEIR ORIGINAL OFFER. GENSCHER REPORTED THAT SOVIET AMBASSADOR SEMYONOV HAD BEEN IN TO SEE HIM TWO DAYS EARLIER TO DISCUSS BREZHNEV'S PROPOSAL FOR A SCIENTIFIC FORUM TO DISCUSS THE DANGERS OF NUCLEAR DISASTERS. GENSCHER RESPONDED THAT THE FRG WOULD HAVE TO CONSULT ITS PARTNERS ABOUT THAT, BUT THAT THE USSR WOULD NOT NEED U.S. OR FRG APPROVAL TO INFORM THE WORLD OF THE DANGERS POSED BY SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS. WITH EVIDENT GLEE, HE SAID HE HAD NEVER SEEN SEMYONOV SO SPEECHLESS.

17. GENSCHER ALSO EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT POLAND. HE THOUGHT THE PERIOD LEADING UP TO THE PZPR CONGRESS WAS MOST DANGEROUS SINCE THE SOVIETS, ANTICIPATING AN OUTCOME NOT TO THEIR LIKING, MIGHT TRY TO OVERTHROW KANIA AND JARUZELSKI BEFORE THE CONGRESS EVER CONVENED. IT WAS ESSENTIAL, THEREFORE, THAT THE WEST MAINTAIN ITS THREE-PART POLICY OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, NON-INTERVENTION, AND CONTINUATION OF EAST-WEST DIALOGUE. ON THIS LAST POINT, IT WAS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT THAT THERE BE NO SUMMER BREAK AT CSCE BEFORE THE PZPR CONGRESS. EAGLEBURGER THOUGHT IT LIKELY THE CSCE WOULD CONTINUE INTO AUGUST.

18. GENSCHER THOUGHT THAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE HAD MADE A HISTORIC MISTAKE IN 1956. THEIR ATTACK ON SUEZ HAD GIVEN THE SOVIETS A FREE HAND IN HUNGARY. ALTHOUGH THE SITUATIONS WERE NOT EXACTLY PARALLEL, THE WEST MUST DO NOTHING NOW TO DIVERT WORLD ATTENTION FROM POLAND. IN A VERY RESPONSIBLE WAY, IT WAS NECESSARY TO KEEP THE POLISH SITUATION UNDER CONTROL.

19. NOTING THAT HE WOULD BE IN BULGARIA JULY 8-10 FOR LONG TALKS WITH ZHIVKOV, GENSCHER SAID HE WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING A U.S. ASSESSMENT OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS BEFORE THEN. TALKING TO ZHIVKOV, HE SAID, WAS THE SAME AS TALKING TO BREZHNEV. EAGLEBURGER PROMISED TO PROVIDE HIM WITH SUCH AN ASSESSMENT.

20. EAGLEBURGER NOTED THAT THE SOVIETS CONTINUED TO SAY THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS NOT SERIOUS ABOUT TNF TALKS.

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SITUATION: CHECK
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MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

THIS WAS SIMPLY NOT TRUE. HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH
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DATE 07/10/81//191

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE116
STU1779
OO RUEHC
DE RUFHMU #2814/04 1710728
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 200654Z JUN 81
FM AMCONSUL MUNICH
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5190
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 04 OF 04 MUNICH 02814

EXDIS - DEPT0028

BESSMERTNYKH WERE PROCEDURAL ONLY. THE SOVIETS ARE TRYING TO INSERT SUBSTANCE INTO THEM BUT THERE WOULD BE NO SUBSTANTIVE TALKS BEFORE HAIG MEETS WITH GROMYKO. GENSCHER ENCOURAGED EAGLEBURGER TO PERMIT MORE MEDIA COVERAGE OF HIS TALKS WITH BESSMERTNYKH. IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE MAN IN THE STREET ACTUALLY SEE, VIA PICTURES AND TELEVISION, THAT THESE DISCUSSIONS ARE ACTUALLY TAKING PLACE. CLARK THOUGHT THAT WAS GOOD ADVICE. EAGLEBURGER NOTED THAT MORE PUBLICITY WAS BEING GIVEN TO THE SCG MEETING. GENSCHER THOUGHT THAT WAS GOOD. THE SOVIETS, HE SAID, ARE THE BEST PROPAGANDISTS ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE THE WORST PRODUCT. THE WEST, ON THE OTHER HAND, HAD THE BEST PRODUCT BUT DID NOT KNOW HOW TO SELL IT.

21. CLARK ASKED GENSCHER FOR HIS IMPRESSIONS OF WHAT THE FRENCH WOULD DO IN THE GROUP OF FIVE. GENSCHER RESPONDED THAT HE HAD FOUND CHEYSSON'S COMMENTS VERY SATISFYING. HE CITED, FOR EXAMPLE, THE NEW FRENCH GOVERNMENT'S STRONG POSITIVE ENDORSEMENT OF TNF, AND ITS STRICT FIRM LINE WITH THE USSR. CHEYSSON COULD NOT HAVE BEEN MORE POSITIVE ABOUT THE UNITED STATES. REGARDING SOUTHERN AFRICA, THE FRENCH POSITION WOULD BE NO DIFFERENT FROM THE FRG'S. INTERNALLY, MITTERRAND HOPED TO BE ABLE TO GOVERN WITHOUT THE COMMUNISTS. THIS WAS IMPORTANT, GENSCHER THOUGHT, BECAUSE OF THE EFFECT ON ITALY. HE HAD NO DOUBTS ABOUT MITTERRAND'S ABILITY TO HANDLE THE COMMUNISTS, BUT THEY MUST NOT BE RENDERED MORE ACCEPTABLE ELSEWHERE IN EUROPE. VON STADEN PRAISED MITTERRAND'S IMMENSE TACTICAL SKILL IN STRENGTHENING THE SOCIALISTS AND WEAKENING THE COMMUNISTS DURING THE PAST DECADE. HE NOTED TOO THAT THE WEST WAS LUCKY TO HAVE IN PARIS A FOREIGN MINISTER WHO KNEW AND UNDERSTOOD AFRICA SO INTIMATELY.

22. ACTION REQUESTED: ASSISTANT SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER REQUESTS THAT EUR PREPARE AN EVALUATION OF EAST-WEST

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SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

RELATIONS THAT EMBASSY BUNN CAN TRANSMIT TO FOREIGN
MINISTER GENSCHER ON OR ABOUT JULY 6 FOR HIS USE IN TALKS
WITH ZHIVKOV. CLARK

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SENSITIVE

*****S E/C R E T*****

DATE 02/25/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 001

WHSR COMMENT:

RA, NAN, COL, VP
ROBIEEUR, WEUR, DEPOL

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F97-030 #105BY WOT, NARA, DATE 8/29/00IMMEDIATE
DE RUFH MU 00754/01 0521035
O 211029Z FEB 81
FM AMCONSUL MUNICHTO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 4666
SECDEF WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE
BT~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 3 MUNICH 00754EXDIS
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 (2-20-01) WOESSNER, WILLIAM) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, MIL, NATO, GW
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY CARLUCCI'S VISIT TO BONN
FOL REPEATED FOR YOUR ACTION QUOTE
O 202015Z FEB 81
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO AMCONSUL MUNICH NIACT IMMEDIATE 6473~~SECRET~~ BONN 03603EXDIS
PLEASE DELIVER UPON RECEIPT TO BRIGADIER GENERAL POWELL
AT WEHRKUNDE CONFERENCE FOR DEPUTY DEFENSE SECRETARY
CARLUCCI AND MR. BURT
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 (2-20-01) (WOESSNER, WILLIAM) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, MIL, NATO, GW
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETAR CARLUCCI'S VIS IT TO BONN1. ~~SECRET~~ ENTIRE TEXT2. SUMMARY: IN HIS FIRST OFFICIAL VISIT TO BONN
DEPSECDEF CARLUCCI SAW DEFENSE MINISTER APEL AS WELL
AS STATE SECRETARY LEISTER AND INSPECTOR GENERAL BRANDT.
THE DISCUSSIONS WERE FRIENDLY, OPEN AND RELAXED AND
COVERED A NUMBER OF ITEMS ON THE CURRENT US/FRG
DEFENSE AGENDA. DESPITE DOMESTIC POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES,
SPECIFICALLY THE TORNADO COST OVERRUN, APEL LOOKED
CONFIDENT AND SOUNDED UPBEAT. APEL SAID HE IS LOOKING

*****S E/C R E T*****

~~*****S E C R E T*****~~

DATE 02/25/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 002

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

FORWARD TO HIS WASHINGTON VISIT IN MARCH.

3. DEPSECDEF DESCRIBED THE BUDGET APPROACH OF THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION, POINTING OUT THAT DESPITE DEEP CUTS IN THE SOCIAL SECTOR, THERE WILL BE SUBSTANTIAL INCREASES FOR DEFENSE. HE DESCRIBED THE POLITICAL MOOD IN THE COUNTRY AS SUPPORTIVE OF THE EFFORT TO REEMPHASIZE AMERICAN STRENGTH AND HE NOTED THIS MOOD IS ALSO REFLECTED IN THE PRESENT CONGRESS. HE SAID THAT THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S DEFENSE PROPOSALS ARE MEANT TO BE A SIGNAL TO THE OTHER ALLIES ALSO TO DO MORE. DEPSECDEF ALSO TOUCHED ON A NUMBER OF SPECIFIC BUDGET ITEMS, INCLUDING CW AND SLCM AND ASSURED APEL ON ERW.

4. APEL IN RESPONSE EMPHASIZED FRG FIRMNESS ON LRTNF DEPLOYMENT. HE NOTED THAT PUBLIC OPINION IS CRITICAL BUT INDICATED THAT HE WAS OPTIMISTIC ON THIS SCORE. NEVERTHELESS HE PREDICTED THAT THE ISSUE WOULD STAY IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN AS TNF DEPLOYMENT DATE APPROACHED AND WOULD REQUIRE CONSTANT WATCHING. APEL REGISTERED UNHAPPINESS WITH THE WAY ERW HAD COME INTO THE PUBLIC DEBATE, NOTING THE NEGATIVE EFFECT ON TNF. HE INDICATED THAT BONN WILL PROVIDE HOST NATION SUPPORT. NOTING THAT FRG WAS MAKING HIGHLY RESPECTABLE DEFENSE CONTRIBUTION, HE SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE SMALLER EUROPEAN ALLIES CONTRIBUTE A FAIR SHARE TO THE ALLIANCE EFFORT AND NOT LEAVE THE UNITED STATES, FRG, AND UK TO CARRY THE WHOLE LOAD. END SUMMARY.

5. IN BRIEF VISIT TO BONN FEBRUARY 20, DEPSECDEF CARLUCCI, ACCOMPANIED BY STATE PM DIRECTOR BURT, MET WITH DEFENSE MINISTER APEL. THE MEETING WAS PRECEDED BY A LUNCHEON WITH STATE SECRETARY LEISTER. INSPECTOR GENERAL BRANDT WAS PRESENT THROUGHOUT. DESPITE THE WINTER WEATHER THE GERMANS PROVIDED A WARM RECEPTION AND THE DISCUSSION WAS FREE AND RELAXED. EVEN THOUGH APEL HAS BEEN IN CONSIDERABLE POLITICAL HOT WATER, MOST LATELY BECAUSE OF THE GROWING TORNADOCOST OVERRUN, HE LOOKED CONFIDENT, SOUNDED UPBEAT AND SEEMED TO MAKE LIGHT OF THE AFFAIR. HE SPOKE WITH AUTHORITY, UNDERLINING THAT THE FRG IS FIRMLY COMMITTED TO LRTNF.

6. DEPSECDEF OPENED BY STRESSING THE DESIRE OF THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION FOR CLOSE BILATERAL RELATIONS,

~~*****S E C R E T*****~~

~~*****S E C R E T*****~~

DATE 02/25/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 003

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

NOTING HE WOULD MAKE THIS POINT ALSO AT THE WEHRKUNDE MEETING IN MUNICH. HE REVIEWED THE BUDGET APPROACH OF THE NEW U.S. ADMINISTRATION, POINTING OUT THAT DESPITE DEEP CUTS IN THE SOCIAL SECTOR, THERE WOULD BE SUBSTANTIAL INCREASES IN THE DEFENSE BUDGET WHICH WOULD BE USED TO IMPROVE READINESS, MOBILITY AND MODERNIZATION. THIS APPROACH, HE SAID, WAS ALSO MEANT TO SEND A POSITIVE SIGNAL TO THE EUROPEAN ALLIES TO DO MORE. OBSERVING THAT THE ADMINISTRATION DISLIKED TO EXPRESS THE NECESSARY ADDITIONAL EFFORT IN PERCENTAGES, HE SAID THAT NEVERTHESS IT SHOULD BE REGARDED AS A STARTING POINT. HE EXPRESSED UNDERSTANDING FOR THE POLITICAL PROBLEMS FACED BY THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT AND UNDERLINED THE DESIRABILITY OF AN ONGOING PRIVATE DIALOGUE ON THIS SUBJECT WITH THE EUROPEANS. HE SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT TO SEE THE ADDITIONAL U.S. EFFORT AS DESIGNED TO IMPROVE DETERRENCE AND INDICATED THAT WE WOULD NOT USE AMERICAN MILITARY POWER IN A RECKLESS FASHION

PSNI 011915

TOR: 052/20110Z

FTG: 211020Z FEB 81

~~*****S E C R E T*****~~

~~*****S E C R E T*****~~

DATE 02/25/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 001

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

DE RUFHMMU #0754/02 0521050 (CCY MRN AD373446 STU9355)

O 211033Z FEB 81

FM AMCONSUL MUNICH

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 4658

SECDEF WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE

BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 3 MUNICH 00754

EXDIS

CORRECTED COPY (MRN 754 VICE 755)

7. FORECASTING A THEME IN HIS WEHRKUNDE ADDRESS, THE DEPUTY SECRETARY MENTIONED THE DESIRABILITY THAT NATO FOCUS ON WHAT THE ALLIANCE CAN DO OUTSIDE EUROPE. THE FIRST STEP, HE SAID, SHOULD BE AN EXPANDED DIALOGUE ON THESE ISSUES WITH A VIEW TO GENERATING A NEW UNDERSTANDING AND DEVELOPING A COMMON APPROACH.

8. DEPSECDEF ASSURED APEL THERE HAD BEEN NO CHANGE IN U.S. POLICY ON ERW. HE ALSO EXPLAINED THAT BUDGET ITEMS ON CW AND SLCM RELATED ONLY TO CERTAIN PRODUCTION DECISIONS AND DID NOT INDICATE ANY DEPARTURE FROM PREVIOUS U.S. POLICY.

9. APEL RESPONDED WITH BRIEF REMARKS OF HIS OWN AND THE ENSUING DISCUSSION COVERED THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

LRTNF

10. APEL STATED THAT THE FRG IS FIRMLY COMMITTED. HE SAID BOTH THE UK AND ITALIANS WERE SOLID TOO AND THIS WOULD ENABLE THE DEPLOYMENT PROGRAM TO GO FORWARD. HE ADDED THAT THE DUTCH AND BELGIANS WERE ALSO VERY IMPORTANT AND THAT FROM THE ALLIANCE POINT OF VIEW IT WAS BEST TO HAVE THE BROADEST POSSIBLE CONSENSUS. HE WAS SOMEWHAT MORE OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE PROSPECTS IN BELGIUM THAN HE WAS IN THE NETHERLANDS. APEL

~~*****S E C R E T*****~~

DATE 02/25/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 002

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

UNDERLINED THAT PUBLIC OPINION ON THIS ISSUE WAS CRITICAL. THERE WAS A GREAT DEAL OF PUBLIC MISUNDERSTANDING. THIS ALSO AFFECTED POLITICAL PARTIES IN EUROPE. HE WAS ESPECIALLY PLEASED, THEREFORE, THAT THE SPD PARLIAMENTARY PARTY HAD JUST AGAIN PUT ITS STAMP OF APPROVAL ON GOVERNMENT DEFENSE POLICY, BY AN OVERWHELMING VOTE OF 240 TO 0 WITH ONLY 11 ABSTENTIONS. APEL SAID THAT BOTH THE CHANCELLOR AND HE HIMSELF HAD THROWN THEIR FULL WEIGHT INTO THE DISCUSSION LEADING UP TO THE VOTE AND HE NOTED WITH SATISFACTION THAT THEY HAD WON HANDILY.

11. APEL CAUTIONED, HOWEVER, THAT THE PROBLEM WOULD NOT GO AWAY. HE ANTICIPATED IT WOULD GAIN IN DIMENSION AS THE DATE FOR DEPLOYMENT OF LRTNF APPROACHED. IT WAS THEREFORE OF THE UTMOST IMPORTANCE, HE SAID, THAT THE ALLIANCE BE SEEN TO TAKE ARMS CONTROL SERIOUSLY. DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIETS SHOULD THEREFORE BE UNDERWAY AS SOON AS THIS WAS POSSIBLE. SAYING THAT THIS WAS HIS PRIVATE OPINION, APEL SAID HE DID NOT ANTICIPATE SUCCESS IN ARMS CONTROL TALKS PRIOR TO THE 1983 DEPLOYMENT DATE. THE TIME WAS SIMPLY TOO SHORT. BUT HE SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT TO NEGOTIATE IN ORDER TO SHOW WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE. APEL SAID HE WAS THEREFORE HAPPY THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD CONTINUE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIETS.

12. APEL SAID HE HAD BEEN UNHAPPY THAT ERW HAD COME INTO THE PUBLIC DEBATE. THE WEAPON HAD SUFFERED A DREADFUL PUBLIC IMAGE FROM THE START AND THERE WAS LITTLE THAT COULD BE DONE TO CHANGE THIS NOW. FOR THE SAKE OF THE SUCCESS OF THE LRTNF PROGRAM, HE THOUGHT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO AVOID PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF ERW. DEPSECDEF ASSURED APEL THAT IT WAS ALSO WASHINGTON'S VIEW THAT ERW SHOULD NOT INTERFERE WITH LRTNF.

HOST NATION SUPPORT

13. APEL SAID THAT BONN WOULD COME THROUGH ON HOST NATION SUPPORT. THERE WOULD BE A MEETING NEXT WEEK TO NAIL DOWN THIS DECISION, WHICH WOULD CAP A YEAR OF MODELING AND PLANNING. SOME MINOR DETAILS STILL NEEDED TO BE STRAIGHTENED OUT BUT THE BASIC DECISION WOULD

~~*****S E C R E T*****~~

DATE 02/25/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 003

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

BE POSITIVE. DESECDEF TOLD APEL THIS WAS MOST HELPFUL. HE NOTED THAT GERMAN SUPPORT ON THIS ISSUE WOULD PROVIDE AN IMPORTANT ARGUMENT WITH THE CONGRESS AND SHOW WHAT OUR ALLIES ARE DOING. GENERAL BRANDT POINTED OUT THE IMPLICATION OF THE GERMAN DECISION, NOTING THE TREMENDOUS MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS WHICH WOULD BE INVOLVED FOR THE FRG IN WARTIME. BRANDT, HOWEVER, MADE CLEAR HE REGARDED THIS GERMAN BURDEN AS FULLY JUSTIFIED. BOTH SIDES BRIEFLY DISCUSSED POMCUS AND EXPRESSED SATISFACTION WITH CURRENT PROGRESS.

PSNI 011917

TORI 052/20112Z

HTOI 211033Z FEB 81

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~~*****S E C R E T*****~~

DATE 02/25/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 001

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

DE RUPHMU #0754/01 0521105

O 211102Z FEB 81

FM AMCONSUL MUNICH

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 4669

SECDEF WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE

BT

~~S E C R E T~~ SECTION 3 OF 3 MUNICH 00754

EXDIS

CW

14. APEL BRIEFLY TOUCHED ON CW NOTING THAT HE HAD NO PROBLEMS EXPLAINING TO THE BUNDESTAG THE IMPORTANCE OF MODERNIZATION OF ALLIANCE STOCKS, WHICH WERE NEEDED BOTH FOR DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE. HE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT ANY LARGE BUILDUP OF CW STOCKS IN EUROPE MIGHT BE TROUBLESOME SINCE IT WOULD INEVITABLY DRAW ATTENTION AND COULD BE SEEN AS HAVING A DECOUPLING EFFECT.

SOUTHWEST ASIA

15. APEL RECOGNIZED THAT THE GERMANS AND OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES ALSO HAD SUBSTANTIAL INTERESTS IN THE AREA, MENTIONING OIL IN PARTICULAR. CONSEQUENTLY, THE FRG FELT IT SHOULD BE INVOLVED. THE GERMAN CONSTITUTION, HOWEVER, EXCLUDED THE POSSIBILITY OF USING GERMAN ARMED FORCES OUTSIDE OF THE NATO AREA. FOR THAT REASON, APEL THOUGHT IT RIGHT THAT THERE BE A DIVISION OF LABOR. HE SAID HE LOOKED FORWARD TO A FURTHER DISCUSSION OF THIS SUBJECT WHEN WASHINGTON HAD PROGRESSED FURTHER WITH ITS THINKING AND HAD A CLEARER IDEA WHAT ALLIANCE CONTRIBUTIONS MIGHT BE REQUIRED.

SOVIET MILITARY BUILDUP

16. APEL NOTED THAT THE SOVIETS HAD BEEN ENGAGING IN A STEADY MILITARY BUILDUP. LEAVING SOVIET INTENTIONS ASIDE, HE SAID, THE FACTS SHOWED A SOVIET UNION WHICH WAS MILITARILY BECOMING STRONGER AND STRONGER. HE

~~*****S E C R E T*****~~

~~*****SECRET*****~~

DATE 02/25/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 002

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THOUGHT THE ALLIANCE SHOULD REACT IN COMMON, ADDING THAT HE WANTED TO REGISTER ANNOYANCE THAT SOME NATO MEMBERS THOUGHT THEY COULD REMAIN PASSIVE. THESE COUNTRIES WERE RICH, APEL SAID, AND IT WOULD DO NO GOOD FOR THE UNITED STATES, THE UK AND THE FRG TO BE THE ONLY COUNTRIES RESPONDING. IN THAT CASE THERE WOULD BE NO ALLIANCE. OTHERS SHOULD DO THEIR TASK TOO. THE FRG CONTRIBUTION HAD, HE THOUGHT, BEEN REMARKABLE. APEL REMPHASIZED THE THEME OF ALLIANCE UNITY AND NOTED WITH A TOUCH OF SARCASM THAT AT THE LATEST NPG SOME SMALL COUNTRIES HAD APPEARED TO TAKE AN ANTI-NUCLEAR POSITION. APEL SAID HE FELT STRONGLY THAT SUCH AN ATTITUDE UNDERCUT THE ALLIANCE DETERRENT ABILITY.

THE BUDGET PROCESS.

17. RESPONDING TO THE REMARKS OF DEPSECDEF ABOUT THE DEEP CUTS PLANNED BY THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION IN THE SOCIAL SECTOR, APEL SAID THAT SUCH CUTS WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE IN WESTERN EUROPE. HE EVEN ENTERTAINED SOME DOUBT THAT THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION WOULD BE ABLE TO ACHIEVE ITS OBJECTIVES. DEPSECDEF MENTIONED THE DIFFICULTIES OF A SIMILAR BUDGET PARING EFFORT IN 1974 BUT POINTED OUT THAT CONDITIONS NOW WERE VERY DIFFERENT. HE EXPRESSED THE CONVICTION THAT WITH THE CURRENT STRONG PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP AND A NEW PSYCHOLOGY, THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSALS WOULD HAVE A SUBSTANTIAL CHANCE OF SUCCESS.

18. APEL EXPRESSED APPRECIATION THAT DEPSECDEF HAD COME TO BONN, NOTING THE VISIT HAD BEEN HIGHLY USEFUL. HE SAID HE LOOKED FORWARD TO CONTINUING THE DISCUSSION DURING HIS FORTHCOMING VISIT TO WASHINGTON IN MARCH. WOESSNER UNQUOTE BROWN

PSN: 011910

TOR: 002/20:13Z

FTG: 211102Z FEB 81

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DATE 02/06/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 001

WHSR COMMENT:

EOB: THOMSON, EEUR, WEUR, DEPOL

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

PRIORITY

DE RUFHOL #2086 0031235

R 021234Z FEB 81 ZFF-4

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4511

~~SECRET~~ BONN 02086

NDDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 2/2/11 (WOESSNER, WILLIAM M.) OR-M

TAGS: PL

SUBJECT: POLAND: NATO CONSIDERATION OF PRESENT
DEVELOPMENTS

REF: STATE 24761

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. CONTENTS OF REPTEL GIVEN TO FOREIGN MINISTRY DUTY
OFFICER TO PASS TO BLECH 1130 (LOCAL) JANUARY 31.3. IN TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH BLECH, I STRESSED A
RESPONSE WAS NEEDED BY MONDAY AFTERNOON (WASHINGTON
TIME). WOESSNER

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F97-030 #106BY LOJ, NARA, DATE 8/29/00

PSNI 045603

TORI 035/05153Z

RTGI 021234Z FEB 81

*****~~SECRET~~*****

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SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 113

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/11/81//223

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

NLS F97-030 #107

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

BY LoI, NARA, DATE 8/29/00

MESSAGE:

HCE433

DD RUEHC RUFHOL RUTADR RUEHLD RUFHOLD RUFHFR RUEKJCS
RUSNAAA RUFHTA RUDKKR RUFHOC RUFHOK RUFHYC RUEHNR
RUTAMA RUQMDI RUEHCR RUEHRU RUFHPC RUEHCR RUFHLC
RUEHDS RUTADH RUDKBT RUEHCK RUEHCR RUTADU RUTAAK
RUEHEG RUFHVI RUEHDR RUEHCR RUFHYCB RUTABO RUEHCR
RUTADK RUEHSB RUTADE RUTAFN RUFHRS RUTAGN RUTABA
RUEHAB RUQMKR RUQMKM RUEHKI RUEHLK RUFHMC RUEHLG
RUQMDJ

DE RUEHC #4830 2152321

ZNY CCCCC ZZH

O 032315Z AUG 81 ZEX

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 9171

RUTADR/AMEMBASSY DAKAR IMMEDIATE 5789

RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 1418

RUFHOLD/AMCONSUL STUTTGART IMMEDIATE 6428

INFO OAU COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

RUFHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 7720

RUEKJCS/ SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3212

RUSNAAA/USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 204830

E.O. 12065: GDS 8/4/87 (SANDBERG, D. A.)

TAGS: PINR, PDIP

SUBJECT: GAMBIA COUP; SITREP NO. 11

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THE SITUATION IN BANJUL REMAINS UNCERTAIN. THE SENEGALESE NOW HAVE 1,410 TROOPS ON THE GROUND. THEY HAVE SECURED THE AIRPORT. MOVEMENT ALONG THE MAJOR ROAD IN BANJUL PROPER IS POSSIBLE WITHOUT ESCORT, WHILE ELSEWHERE IN THE CITY, ESCORT IS REQUIRED. SENEGALESE FORCES ARE LEAVING NEGOTIATIONS TO END THE FIGHTING AND OBTAIN RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES TO JAWARA AND ARE APPARENTLY IN A STANDFAST POSITION. THERE IS NO NEW INFORMATION ON THE STATUS OF THE HOSTAGES HELD BY THE DISSIDENTS AT THE FIELD FORCE HEADQUARTERS.

3. PRESIDENT JAWARA IS IN THE GAMBIA AND TODAY MADE A SPEECH CALLING FOR THEREBELS TO LAY DOWN THEIR ARMS AND

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

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DATE 08/11/81//223

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

NEGOTIATE WITH GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES TO END THE SHEDDING OF GAMBIA BLOOD. JAWARA RETURNED TO THE GAMBIA AUGUST 2. CONFUSION AMONG THE GAMBIA PUBLIC CONTINUES, HOWEVER, AS REBEL RADIO BROADCASTS CLAIM JAWARA IS NOT REALLY IN THE COUNTRY AND CANNOT RETURN. TO COUNTER THIS, JAWARA PLANS ANOTHER RADIO MESSAGE SHORTLY WHICH WILL INCLUDE STATEMENTS

FROM OTHER GOVERNMENT MEMBERS WHO ARE GENERALLY KNOWN NOT TO HAVE LEFT THE COUNTRY.

4. SENEGALES: PRESIDENT DIOUF IN A BRIEF ADDRESS TO THE SENEGALESE NATION MADE THE FIRST PUBLIC CLAIM TO FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT IN THE GAMBIA COUP ATTEMPT. EXPLAINING THAT HE HAD ORDERED TROOP INTERVENTION IN THE GAMBIA BECAUSE SENEGALESE SECURITY WAS AT STAKE, DIOUF ASSERTED THAT REBEL ELEMENTS IN THE GAMBIA HAD BEEN EQUIPPED AND TRAINED ABROAD. EMBASSY DAKAR REPORTS SENEGALESE PUBLIC REACTION TO THE INTERVENTION IN THE GAMBIA HAS NOT BEEN FAVORABLE. HAIG

BT

#4830

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DATE 06/16/01

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHHS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: RA,NAN,COL,VP,JP
EOB: KEMP,GREGG,PIPES,RENT,SCHWEITZER,GUHIN,TANTER,GUHIN,HUB
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

FLASH
DE RUEHC #8549 1090200
Z O 080231Z JUN 01 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BONN FLASH 0890
AMEMBASSY PARIS FLASH 4071
AMEMBASSY ROME FLASH 4127
AMEMBASSY LONDON FLASH 8018
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD FLASH 0272
AMEMBASSY CAIRO FLASH 0158
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT FLASH 7024
AMEMBASSY AMMAN FLASH 1632
USMISSION USNATO FLASH 2360
AMEMBASSY TOKYO FLASH 6509

INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 140549
NODIS
FOR AMB. HABIB AND DRAPER
E.O. 12005: RDS-1, 3 6/7/11 (HAIG. ALEXANDER)

TAGS: MUPS, MNUC, MILI, IS, IZ

SUBJECT: ISRAELI STRIKE AGAINST IRAQI NUC FACILITIES

1. (X - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. YOU SHOULD IMMEDIATELY CONTACT HOST GOVERNMENT AT
HIGHEST AVAILABLE LEVEL AND SECURE NATO TO REPORT THAT

SECSTATE WASHDC 8549

DTG:080231Z JUN 01 PSN: 030242
TOR: 10970535Z

*****~~SECRET~~*****

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

F97-030#108

LOT 8/30/00

*****~~SECRET~~*****

DATE 06/10/01

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL NOTIFIED US IN ISRAEL AFTERNOON
JUNE 7 THAT SEVERAL HOURS EARLIER ISRAELI AIRCRAFT HAD
ATTACKED IRAQI NUCLEAR FACILITY AT TUWAITHA.

3. YOU SHOULD SAY THAT WE HAVE NO FURTHER INFORMATION ON
THE INCIDENT, AND THAT WE ARE URGENTLY SEEKING CLARIFICA-
TION AND FURTHER DETAILS FROM ISRAELIS.

4. WE HAVE NO FIRST-HAND DETAILS OF THE ATTACK OR OF THE
OVERALL DAMAGE, INCLUDING CASUALTIES.



5. YOU SHOULD MAKE CLEAR WE HAD NO RPT NO ADVANCE
KNOWLEDGE OF ISRAELI ACTION AND SAY WE WILL BE IN FURTHER
TOUCH ONCE WE HAVE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.

HAIS

SECSTATE WASHDC 0049

DTG:080201Z JUN 01 PSN: 030242
TOR: 15970035Z

*****~~SECRET~~*****

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 10-11 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/01/81//152

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE711
DD RUEHC
DE RUEHC #4223 1421953
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O R 221902Z MAY 81 ZEX
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUFHDL/AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 0000
RUFHJA/USMISSION USBERLIN IMMEDIATE 0000
RUFHAM/AMCONSUL HAMBURG 0000
RUFHMU/AMCONSUL MUNICH 0000
RUFHSG/AMCONSUL STUTTGART 0000
RUFHDI/AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF 0000
RUFHFT/AMCONSUL FRANKFURT 0000
INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS
RUFHEB/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0000
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0000
BT
UNCLAS STATE 134223
E.O. 12065: N/A

TAGS: PEPR, GE

SUBJECT: VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES OF HELMUT SCHMIDT

1. FOLLOWING JOINT STATEMENT RELEASED IN WASHINGTON MAY 22 PROVIDED FOR POSTS: USE: "VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES OF HELMUT SCHMIDT, CHANCELLOR OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, MAY 20-23, 1981".

2. DURING THE OFFICIAL VISIT OF CHANCELLOR HELMUT SCHMIDT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY TO THE UNITED STATES FROM MAY 20-23, 1981, PRESIDENT REAGAN AND THE FEDERAL CHANCELLOR HELD DETAILED TALKS ON A WIDE RANGE OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC QUESTIONS. THEY NOTED WITH SATISFACTION THAT THEY SHARED A COMMON ASSESSMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE WESTERN ALLIANCE. THEY AGREED THAT THEIR TWO COUNTRIES HAVE A COMMON DESTINY FOUNDED ON JOINT SECURITY INTERESTS AND FIRMLY ROOTED IN THEIR SHARED VALUES OF LIBERTY, A DEMOCRATIC WAY OF LIFE, SELF-DETERMINATION AND BELIEF IN THE INALIENABLE RIGHTS OF MAN.

3. THEY REGARD THE RELIABLE AND PROVEN US-GERMAN PARTNERSHIP AS AN ESSENTIAL FACTOR IN INTERNATIONAL STABILITY AND

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SENSITIVE

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SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

WESTERN SECURITY BASED ON THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE.

THEY AGREED THAT SUBSTANTIVE AND EFFECTIVE CONSULTATIONS ARE A MAINSTAY OF THE RELATIONS BETWEEN WESTERN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES.

4. THE PRESIDENT AND THE FEDERAL CHANCELLOR WELCOMED AND REAFFIRMED THE RESULTS OF THE RECENT NATO MINISTERIAL MEETINGS IN ROME AND BRUSSELS AS RENEWED PROOF OF THE POLITICAL STRENGTH OF THE ALLIANCE AND THE CONTINUITY OF ALLIANCE POLICY. THEY STRESSED THE DETERMINATION OF ALLIANCE MEMBERS TO TAKE THE NECESSARY STEPS TO WORK WITH THEIR NATO PARTNERS TO STRENGTHEN THE WESTERN DEFENSE POSTURE AND TO ADDRESS ADVERSE TRENDS DUE TO THE SOVIET MILITARY BUILDUP. TOGETHER WITH DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ARE INTEGRAL PARTS OF ALLIANCE SECURITY POLICY.

5. THE PRESIDENT AND THE FEDERAL CHANCELLOR AFFIRMED IN THIS CONNECTION THEIR RESOLVE TO IMPLEMENT BOTH ELEMENTS OF THE NATO DECISION OF DECEMBER 1979 AND TO GIVE EQUAL WEIGHT TO BOTH ELEMENTS. THE FEDERAL CHANCELLOR WELCOMED THE US DECISION TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION ON THE LIMITATION OF THEATER NUCLEAR WEAPONS WITHIN THE SALT FRAMEWORK BY THE END OF THIS YEAR. HE ALSO WELCOMED THE FACT THAT THE U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE HAS INITIATED PREPARATORY DISCUSSIONS ON TNF WITH THE SOVIET UNION, LOOKING TOWARD AN AGREEMENT TO BEGIN FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS. THE PRESIDENT AND THE FEDERAL CHANCELLOR AGREED THAT TNF MODERNIZATION IS ESSENTIAL FOR ALLIANCE SECURITY AND AS A BASIS FOR PARALLEL NEGOTIATIONS LEADING TO CONCRETE RESULTS ON LIMITATIONS OF THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES. THEY FURTHER AGREED THAT THE PREPARATORY STUDIES CALLED FOR IN THE ROME COMMUNIQUE SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN AS MATTERS OF IMMEDIATE PRIORITY BY THE RELEVANT NATO BODIES.

6. THE PRESIDENT AND THE FEDERAL CHANCELLOR ASSESSED VERY FAVORABLY THE CLOSE COOPERATION BETWEEN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AND THE THREE POWERS IN MATTERS RELATING TO BERLIN AND GERMANY AS A WHOLE. THE FEDERAL CHANCELLOR THANKED THE PRESIDENT FOR HIS REAFFIRMATION OF THE PLEDGE THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL CONTINUE TO GUARANTEE THE SECURITY AND VIABILITY OF BERLIN. THEY AGREED THAT THE MAINTENANCE OF THE CALM SITUATION IN AND AROUND BERLIN IS OF CRUCIAL SIGNIFICANCE FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY

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SENSITIVE

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DATE 06/01/81//152

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

AND STABILITY.

7. THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY PLAYS AN IMPORTANT PART IN MAINTAINING INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STABILITY. THE US WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE PROCESS OF

EUROPEAN UNIFICATION.

8. BOTH SIDES NOTED THAT A SERIOUS INTERNATIONAL SITUATION HAS BEEN CREATED BY SOVIET EXPANSIONISM AND ARMAMENT EFFORTS. TO MEET THIS CHALLENGE AND TO SECURE PEACE, THEY ARE DETERMINED TO RESPOND WITH FIRMNESS AND TO MAINTAIN A DIALOGUE WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

9. THE PRESIDENT AND THE FEDERAL CHANCELLOR AGREED THAT IT IS IMPORTANT FOR THE STABILIZATION OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS THAT THE CURRENT CSCE REVIEW CONFERENCE IN MADRID AGREE ON A BALANCED SUBSTANTIVE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT WHICH INCLUDES ENHANCED RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, INCREASED HUMAN CONTACTS, A FREER FLOW OF INFORMATION, AND COOPERATION AMONG AND SECURITY FOR ALL OF THE PARTICIPANTS. IN THIS REGARD, AND AS PART OF SUCH A BALANCED RESULT, THE PRESIDENT AND THE CHANCELLOR FAVOR AGREEMENT ON A PRECISE MANDATE FOR A CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE, PROVIDING FOR THE APPLICATION OF MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT, BINDING AND VERIFIABLE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES COVERING ALL OF THE CONTINENT OF EUROPE FROM THE ATLANTIC TO THE URALS.

10. POLAND MUST BE ALLOWED TO SOLVE ITS PROBLEMS PEACEFULLY AND WITHOUT EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE. THE PRESIDENT AND THE FEDERAL CHANCELLOR REAFFIRMED UNEQUIVOCALLY THEIR VIEW THAT ANY EXTERNAL INTERVENTION WOULD HAVE THE GRAVEST CONSEQUENCES FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND WOULD FUNDAMENTALLY CHANGE THE ENTIRE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION.

11. GENUINE NONALIGNMENT OF THE STATES OF THE DEVELOPING WORLD IS AN IMPORTANT STABILIZING FACTOR IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. THE CHANCELLOR AND THE PRESIDENT SUPPORT THE INDEPENDENCE AND THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION OF THE STATES OF THE DEVELOPING WORLD. THEY WILL, IN CONCERT WITH THEIR ALLIES AND THE COUNTRIES AFFECTED, OPPOSE ANY ATTEMPTS, DIRECT OR INDIRECT, BY THE SOVIET UNION TO UNDERMINE THE INDEPENDENCE AND STABILITY OF THESE STATES. THEY CONFIRMED THEIR WILLINGNESS TO CONTINUE THEIR

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 253

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/01/81//152

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

COOPERATION WITH THESE STATES ON THE BASIS OF EQUAL PARTNERSHIP AND TO CONTINUE THEIR SUPPORT OF THEIR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.

12. THE PRESIDENT AND THE FEDERAL CHANCELLOR REAFFIRMED THEIR VIEW THAT THE SOVIET OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN IS UNACCEPTABLE. THEY DEMANDED THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS FROM AFGHANISTAN AND RESPECT FOR THAT COUNTRY'S

RIGHT TO RETURN TO INDEPENDENCE AND NONALIGNMENT. THE DESTABILIZING EFFECTS WHICH THE SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN HAS ON THE ENTIRE REGION MUST BE COUNTERED.

13. BOTH SIDES STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF BROAD-BASED COOPERATION WITH THE STATES OF THE GULF REGION.

14. THE PRESIDENT AND THE FEDERAL CHANCELLOR AGREED THAT THE UNITED STATES AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, THE LATTER WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF EUROPEAN POLITICAL COOPERATION, SHOULD CONTINUE THE SEARCH FOR A COMPREHENSIVE, JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THEIR EFFORTS SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE COMPLEMENTARY AND BUILD UPON WHAT HAS BEEN ACHIEVED SO FAR.

15. BOTH SIDES REAFFIRMED THE DETERMINATION TO STRENGTHEN FURTHER THE OPEN SYSTEM OF WORLD TRADE AND TO OPPOSE PRESSURE FOR PROTECTIONIST MEASURES.

16. THEY STRESSED THE VITAL IMPORTANCE FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STABILITY OF FURTHER ENERGY CONSERVATION AND DIVERSIFICATION MEASURES TO REDUCE THE HIGH DEGREE OF DEPENDENCE ON OIL. THE PRESSING ENERGY PROBLEMS CAN ONLY BE MASTERED ON THE BASIS OF WORLD-WIDE COOPERATIVE EFFORTS THAT STRENGTHEN WESTERN ENERGY SECURITY AND REDUCE THE VULNERABILITY OF THE WEST TO POTENTIAL SUPPLY CUTOFFS FROM ANY SOURCE. THE SUPPLY PROBLEMS OF THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES REQUIRE PARTICULAR ATTENTION.

17. THE PRESIDENT AND THE FEDERAL CHANCELLOR AGREED ON THE NEED IN FRAMING THEIR ECONOMIC POLICIES TO GIVE HIGH PRIORITY TO THE FIGHT AGAINST INFLATION AND TO THE CREATION OF IMPROVED CONDITIONS FOR RENEWED ECONOMIC GROWTH AND INCREASED PRODUCTIVITY. BOTH SIDES STRESSED THE NEED FOR CLOSE COORDINATION OF ECONOMIC POLICIES AMONG THE INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES.

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 254

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/01/81//152

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

18. BOTH SIDES STRESSED THE NEED FOR A CLOSE AND COMPREHENSIVE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE UN CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA WHILE THE US GOVERNMENT REVIEWS ITS POSITION.

19. THE PRESIDENT AND THE FEDERAL CHANCELLOR NOTED THAT THEIR TALKS ONCE MORE DEMONSTRATED THE FRIENDLY AND TRUSTING RELATIONSHIP THAT HAS LINKED THEIR TWO COUNTRIES FOR OVER 30 YEARS. THEY WELCOMED ALL EFFORTS WHICH SERVE TO BROADEN MUTUAL CONTACTS AND UNDERLINED THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE COMING GENERATION FOR MAINTAINING AND DEVELOPING GERMAN-AMERICAN FRIENDSHIP. HAIG

BT

#4223

NNNN

SENSITIVE

DATE 05/03/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: RA NAN COL VP

EOB:

WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F97-030 #111BY LOJ, NARA, DATE 8/29/00

IMMEDIATE

DE RUEHC #3838 1130309

O 230257Z APR 81 ZFF4

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0489

~~SECRET~~ STATE 103838

NODIS

STADIS////////////////////////////////////

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 (4/22/11) (HAIG, ALEXANDER M., JR.)

TAGS: ETRD, UR, US

SUBJECT: GRAIN EMBARGO

1. SECRETARY HAIG CALLED IN SOVIET AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN ON APRIL 21 TO ADVISE HIM OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S INTENTION TO ANNOUNCE THE LIFTING OF THE EMBARGO ON GRAIN SALES TO THE USSR. POINTING OUT THAT THIS IN NO WAY ALTERED OUR OPPOSITION TO THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN OR OUR CONCERN OVER THE POSSIBILITY OF A SOVIET INTERVENTION IN POLAND, SECRETARY HAIG SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS ACTING IN FULFILLMENT OF A COMMITMENT THAT HE HAD MADE TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE DURING THE CAMPAIGN. SHOULD THERE BE A SOVIET INTERVENTION IN POLAND, SECRETARY HAIG SAID THE CONSEQUENCES FOR EAST-WEST RELATIONS WOULD BE GRAVE AND LASTING AND WOULD AFFECT ALL ASPECTS OF U.S.-SOVIET TRADE INCLUDING THE GRAIN TRADE.

2. SECRETARY ASKED DOBRYNIN TO FIND OUT FROM HIS GOVERNMENT WHETHER THE USSR WISHED TO MAKE ADDITIONAL PURCHASES OF

SECSTATE WASHDC 3838

DTG:230257Z APR 81 PSN: 037445
TOR: 114/1439Z

*****~~SECRET~~*****

DATE 05/03/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

GRAIN FROM THE U.S. IN THIS CROP YEAR AND, IF SO, HOW MUCH. HE ALSO ASKED DOBRYNIN TO INQUIRE WHETHER THE SOVIET GOVT. WAS INTERESTED IN THE CONCLUSION OF A NEW LONGTERM GRAINS AGREEMENT ON THE EXPIRATION OF THIS ONE.

3. DOBRYNIN PROMISED TO CONVEY THESE REQUESTS TO HIS GOVERNMENT AND SECRETARY HAIG ASKED THAT HE OBTAIN A REPLY IF POSSIBLE BY FRIDAY.

4. THE ABOVE INFORMATION IS FYI ONLY AND NOT FOR USE WITH ALLIED EMBASSIES IN MOSCOW OR SOVIETS. HAIG

SECSTATE WASHDC 3838

DTG:230257Z APR 81 PSN: 037445
TOR: 114/1439Z

*****~~SECRET~~*****

DATE 05/03/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: RA NAN COL VP

EOB:

WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F97-030 #112BY LOJ, NARA, DATE 8/29/00

IMMEDIATE

DE RUEHC #3064 1121742

O 221656Z APR 81 ZFF4

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY PARIS NIACT IMMEDIATE 1499

~~SECRET~~ STATE 103064

NODIS

-STADIS

E.O. 12065: GDS 4/21/87 (EAGLEBURGER, LAWRENCE S.)

TAGS:ETRD, FR

SUBJECT: GRAIN EMBARGO

1. (8 - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. EMBASSY SHOULD DELIVER THE FOLLOWING LETTER FROM SECRETARY HAIG TO FOREIGN SECRETARY FRANCOIS-PONCET ASAP REQUESTING THAT THE LETTER BE KEPT CONFIDENTIAL UNTIL U.S. ANNOUNCEMENT IS MADE.

--

3. BEGIN TEXT DEAR JEAN: I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT THE PRESIDENT WILL ANNOUNCE, IN THE NEAR FUTURE, HIS DECISION TO LIFT THE PARTIAL GRAIN EMBARGO AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION. AS I KNOW YOU WILL UNDERSTAND, THIS DECISION HAS NOT COME EASILY TO THE PRESIDENT, WHO REALIZES FULL WELL ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR OUR CLOSEST ALLIES. HE HAS, THEREFORE, PERSONALLY ASKED ME TO SEE THAT YOU, AND THROUGH YOU PRESIDENT GISCARD, ARE THE FIRST TO BE INFORMED OF HIS DECISION AND THE REASONS FOR IT.

SECSTATE WASHDC 3064

DTG:221656Z APR 81 PSN: 037443

TGR: 114/1436Z

DATE 05/03/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THE PRESIDENT HAS LONG BEEN OPPOSED TO THE GRAIN EMBARGO, WHICH HE BELIEVES HAS IMPOSED UNEQUAL AND THEREFORE UNFAIR SACRIFICE ON ONE SECTOR OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMY. HE CAMPAIGNED AGAINST THE EMBARGO; HE MADE A FIRM COMMITMENT TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE TO REMOVE IT.

NEVERTHELESS, FOLLOWING HIS INAUGURATION THE PRESIDENT RECOGNIZED THE SUBSTANTIAL FOREIGN POLICY CONSIDERATIONS THAT MILITATED AGAINST LIFTING OF THE EMBARGO. HE HAS FIRMLY AND COURAGEOUSLY STOOD AGAINST THE POLITICAL FORCES WITHIN THIS COUNTRY THAT HAVE SOUGHT, FROM THE MOMENT HE TOOK OFFICE, A REVERSAL OF PRESIDENT CARTER'S EMBARGO DECISION.

IN ALL FRANKNESS, JEAN, THOSE FORCES HAVE NOW BECOME SO STRONG THAT THE PRESIDENT FEELS HE CAN NO LONGER SUSTAIN HIS POSITION. TO MAINTAIN THE EMBARGO NOW WOULD SERIOUSLY JEOPARDIZE AFFIRMATIVE CONGRESSIONAL ACTION ON HIS ECONOMIC PROGRAM IN GENERAL AND HIS FARM BILL IN PARTICULAR. THE PRICE, IN TERMS OF THE ABILITY OF THIS ADMINISTRATION TO REESTABLISH A HEALTHY AND PRODUCTIVE NATION, IS TOO MUCH TO PAY. THUS, ALBEIT RELUCTANTLY, THE PRESIDENT HAS DETERMINED THAT HE MUST ACT NOW IF HE IS TO CARRY FORWARD THE DOMESTIC REFORM PROGRAMS THAT ARE SO IMPORTANT TO US AND, IN THE LAST ANALYSIS, OUR ALLIES.

LET ME EMPHASIZE THAT THE LIFTING OF THE EMBARGO DOES NOT INDICATE ANY CHANGE IN U.S. POLICY VIS-A-VIS THE USSR, OR U.S. ACCEPTANCE OF THE STATUS QUO IN AFGHANISTAN. THE UNITED STATES REMAINS DETERMINED TO RESIST SOVIET AGGRESSION WHEREVER IT OCCURS. WE WILL CONTINUE TO WORK FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN WHICH INCLUDES THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS. WE WILL CONTINUE TO SCRUTINIZE ALL OUR COMMERCIAL TIES WITH THE SOVIET UNION CAREFULLY; WE OF COURSE URGE OUR ALLIES TO DO THE SAME. NOR DOES OUR ACTION ON THE GRAINS EMBARGO AFFECT OUR BELIEF THAT POLAND CONTINGENCY PLANNING IS VITAL TO ENABLE THE WEST TO TAKE CONCERTED ACTION IF THE SOVIETS SHOULD INTERVENE IN POLAND. IN THAT REGARD, LET ME ALSO ASSURE YOU THAT SHOULD THE SOVIETS INTERVENE MILITARILY IN POLAND WE WILL TAKE THE MOST STRINGENT MEASURES TO LIMIT ECONOMIC

SECSTATE WASHDC 3064

DTG:221056Z APR 81 PSN: 037443
TOR: 114/1436Z

*****~~SECRET~~*****

DATE 05/03/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE USSR;
THESE MEASURES WILL NOT BE RESTRICTED TO THE AGRI-
CULTURAL SECTOR ALONE.

THE PRESIDENT AND I HAVE GREATLY APPRECIATED THE
SUPPORT WE HAVE RECEIVED OVER THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS
FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF FRANCE; WE HAVE SOUGHT TO
RECIPROCATATE WHEN WE COULD. WE ASK NOW FOR UNDERSTANDING
FROM YOU AND YOUR PRESIDENT FOR THE REASONS THAT LED
PRESIDENT REAGAN TO THE DIFFICULT DECISION HE HAS TAKEN
SINCERELY, ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR. END TEXT HAIG

SECSTATE WASHDC 3064

DTG:221056Z APR 81 PSN: 037443
TOR: 114/1436Z

*****~~SECRET~~*****

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~~***** S E C R E T *****~~

DATE 04/27/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: RA NAN COL VP

EOB:

WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F97-030 #

BY LoJ, NARA, DATE 8/29/00

IMMEDIATE

DE RUEHC #3063 1121718

O 221656Z APR 81 ZFF4

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BONN NIACT IMMEDIATE 5026

~~S E C R E T~~ STATE 103063

NODIS

-BTADIS//////////

E.O. 120651 GDS 4/21/87 (EAGLEBURGER, LAWRENCE S.)

TAGS:ETRD, UK, UR

SUBJECT: GRAIN EMBARGO

1. ~~1~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. EMBASSY SHOULD DELIVER THE FOLLOWING LETTER FROM SECRETARY HAIG TO FOREIGN SECRETARY GENSCHER ASAP, REQUESTING THAT THE LETTER BE KEPT CONFIDENTIAL UNTIL U.S. ANNOUNCEMENT IS MADE.

3. BEGIN TEXT DEAR HANS-DIETRICH: I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT THE PRESIDENT WILL ANNOUNCE, IN THE NEAR FUTURE, HIS DECISION TO LIFT THE PARTIAL GRAIN EMBARGO AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION. AS I KNOW YOU WILL UNDERSTAND, THIS DECISION HAS NOT COME EASILY TO THE PRESIDENT, WHO REALIZES FULL WELL ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR OUR CLOSEST ALLIES. HE HAS, THEREFORE, PERSONALLY ASKED ME TO SEE THAT YOU, AND THROUGH YOU, THE CHANCELLOR, ARE THE FIRST TO BE INFORMED OF HIS DECISION

SECSTATE WASHDC 3063

DTG:221656Z APR 81 P8NI 037439
TOR: 114/1456Z

~~***** S E C R E T *****~~

*****~~SECRET~~*****

DATE 04/27/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

AND THE REASONS FOR IT.

THE PRESIDENT HAS LONG BEEN OPPOSED TO THE GRAIN EMBARGO, WHICH HE BELIEVES HAS IMPOSED UNEQUAL AND THEREFORE UNFAIR SACRIFICE ON ONE SECTOR OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMY. HE CAMPAIGNED AGAINST THE EMBARGO; HE MADE A FIRM COMMITMENT TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE TO REMOVE IT. NEVERTHELESS, FOLLOWING HIS INAUGURATION THE PRESIDENT RECOGNIZED THE SUBSTANTIAL FOREIGN POLICY CONSIDERATIONS THAT MILITATED AGAINST LIFTING OF THE EMBARGO. HE HAS FIRMLY AND COURAGEOUSLY STOOD AGAINST THE POLITICAL FORCES WITHIN THIS COUNTRY THAT HAVE SOUGHT, FROM THE MOMENT HE TOOK OFFICE, A REVERSAL OF PRESIDENT CARTER'S EMBARGO DECISION.

IN ALL FRANKNESS THOSE FORCES HAVE NOW BECOME SO STRONG THAT THE PRESIDENT FEELS HE CAN NO LONGER SUSTAIN HIS POSITION. TO MAINTAIN THE EMBARGO NOW WOULD SERIOUSLY JEOPARDIZE AFFIRMATIVE CONGRESSIONAL ACTION ON HIS ECONOMIC PROGRAM IN GENERAL AND HIS FARM BILL IN PARTICULAR. THE PRICE, IN TERMS OF THE ABILITY OF THIS ADMINISTRATION TO REESTABLISH A HEALTHY AND PRODUCTIVE NATION, IS TOO MUCH TO PAY. THUS, ALBEIT RELUCTANTLY, THE PRESIDENT HAS DETERMINED THAT HE MUST ACT NOW IF HE IS TO CARRY FORWARD THE DOMESTIC REFORM PROGRAMS THAT ARE SO IMPORTANT TO US AND, IN THE LAST ANALYSIS, OUR ALLIES.

LET ME EMPHASIZE THAT THE LIFTING OF THE EMBARGO DOES NOT INDICATE ANY CHANGE IN U.S. POLICY VIS-A-VIS THE USSR, OR U.S. ACCEPTANCE OF THE STATUS QUO IN AFGHANISTAN. THE UNITED STATES REMAINS DETERMINED TO RESIST SOVIET AGGRESSION WHEREVER IT OCCURS. WE WILL CONTINUE TO WORK FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN WHICH INCLUDES THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS. WE WILL CONTINUE TO SCRUTINIZE ALL OUR COMMERCIAL TIES WITH THE SOVIET UNION CAREFULLY; WE OF COURSE URGE OUR ALLIES TO DO THE SAME. NOR DOES OUR ACTION ON THE GRAINS EMBARGO AFFECT OUR BELIEF THAT POLAND CONTINGENCY PLANNING IS VITAL TO ENABLE THE WEST TO TAKE CONCERTED ACTION IF THE SOVIETS SHOULD INTERVENE IN POLAND. IN THAT REGARD, LET ME ALSO ASSURE YOU THAT SHOULD THE SOVIETS INTERVENE MILITARILY IN POLAND WE WILL TAKE THE MOST STRINGENT MEASURES TO LIMIT ECONOMIC

SECSTATE WASHDC 3063

DTG:221656Z APR 81 PSNI 037439
TOR: 114/1435Z

*****~~SECRET~~*****

~~*****S E C R E T*****~~

DATE 04/27/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE USSR;
THESE MEASURES WILL NOT BE RESTRICTED TO THE AGRIC-
CULTURAL SECTOR ALONE.

FINALLY YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT THE PRESIDENT
AND I HAVE APPRECIATED THE FIRM SUPPORT WE HAVE RE-
CEIVED FROM YOU AND THE CHANCELLOR ON THE ISSUE OF TRADE
WITH THE SOVIETS OVER THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS. YOU HAVE
OUR GRATITUDE; I HOPE WE HAVE YOUR UNDERSTANDING FOR
THE REASONS THAT LED THE PRESIDENT TO THIS DIFFICULT
DECISION. SINCERELY, ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR. END TEXT.
HAIG

SECSTATE WASHDC 3063

DTG: 221656Z APR 81 PSN: 037439
TOR: 114/1435Z

~~*****S E C R E T*****~~

SIT497 R

~~*****SECRET*****~~

DATE 04/27/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: RA NAN COL VP
EOP: EUR, WEUR
WHSR COMMENTS:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F97-030 #114

BY LoI, NARA, DATE 8/29/00

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #0570 1091559
Q O 191542Z APR 81 ZFFB
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BONN NIACT IMMEDIATE 4914
AMEMBASSY PARIS NIACT IMMEDIATE 1367
AMEMBASSY LONDON NIACT IMMEDIATE 6356
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA NIACT IMMEDIATE 1459
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA NIACT IMMEDIATE 8479

INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 6684
WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 6425
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 100570
NODIS
E.O. 12065:RDS-3 4/18/01 (HAIG, ALEXANDER M.)

TAGS:PEPR, US, XA, UK, XJ, GW, CA, PR

SUBJECT: MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY OF STATE ON PLAY IN
SOUTHERN AFRICAN ISSUE

REF: GABORONE 1556 NOTAL

1. (ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. REQUEST EMBASSY PASS FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER. TIMING MUST BE SUCH THAT MESSAGE HAS IMPACT BEFORE FIRST MEETING OF CONTACT GROUP IN LONDON SCHEDULED FOR MORNING APRIL 22.

SECSTATE WASHDC 0570

DTG: 191542Z APR 81 PSN: 030775
TOR: 109/10022

~~*****SECRET*****~~

~~***** S E C R E T *****~~

DATE 04/27/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

3. BEGIN MESSAGE: AS CHET CROCKER DRAWS NEAR THE END OF THIS CYCLE OF CONSULTATIONS WITH AFRICAN LEADERS ON THE ISSUES OF NAMIBIA AND ANGOLA, I WANTED TO SHARE WITH YOU MY UNDERSTANDING OF WHERE WE STAND, IN ADVANCE OF THE MEETING OF OUR REPRESENTATIVES IN LONDON APRIL 22 AND 23.

4. IT WAS CLEAR TO ME IN JANUARY, IN THE WAKE OF THE INCONCLUSIVE GENEVA CONFERENCE, THAT FURTHER FORWARD MOVEMENT TOWARD INDEPENDENCE FOR NAMIBIA WAS IMPOSSIBLE UNDER THE UN PLAN AS IT STOOD. IT WAS ALSO CLEAR TO ME THAT THE SITUATION IN ANGOLA, A RELATED ISSUE, WAS NOT GOING

TO EVOLVE FROM ITS PRESENT STATUS, WITH THE UNDESIRABLE CUBAN/SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE IN PLACE, WITHOUT A NEW INITIATIVE.

5. NEITHER OF THESE KNOTTY PROBLEMS IS GOING TO BE RESOLVED EASILY. THUS, CHET CROCKER'S MISSION HAS, PREDICTABLY, HIT CHOPPY WATER. SOME OF THE DIRECTLY INVOLVED PARTIES - SOUTH AFRICA AND SOME OF THE FRONT LINE AND OTHER AFRICAN STATES-HAVE RETREATED TO THEIR MAXIMUM BARGAINING POSITIONS. SOUTH AFRICA IS PROLIFERTING ITS CONDITIONS; THE AFRICANS ARE INSISTING ON A PURE "435" SOLUTION. AT THE SAME TIME, ONE UNQUESTIONABLE CONCLUSION THAT I AM DRAWING FROM CHET CROCKER'S REPORTS IS THAT ALL PARTIES REMAIN VERY INTERESTED IN SEEKING A SOLUTION TO THE NAMIBIA PROBLEM AND THAT SOME PARTIES RECOGNIZE, ALBEIT RELUCTANTLY, THAT THE STATUS QUO IN ANGOLA IS NOT HEALTHY FOR THAT COUNTRY, THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN REGION, OR FOR AFRICA IN GENERAL.

6. I WANT TO ASSURE YOU THAT OUR RESOLVE TWORK WITH YOU IN DEALING WITH THESE ISSUES IS FIRM. DEVELOPMENTS RELATING TO THESE ISSUES IN LUANDA, ALGIERS, AND NEW YORK INDICATE THAT OUR COOPERATION AND COOLNESS UNDER FIRE ARE ABOUT TO BE TESTED.

7. I ASK THAT YOUR REPRESENTATIVES GO TO

SECSTATE WASHDC 0570

DTG:191542Z APR 81 PSN: 030775
TOR: 109/1602Z

~~***** S E C R E T *****~~

~~*****SECRET*****~~

DATE 04/27/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

LONDON WITH THESE THOUGHTS IN MIND, PREPARED TO WORK WITH US TO RESOLVE THESE PROBLEMS. THE PROBLEMS THEMSELVES ARE COMPLICATED AND NOT SUSCEPTIBLE TO EASY RESOLUTION; AT THE SAME TIME, THEY INVOLVE OUR SHARED INTERESTS TO A DEGREE TO FULLY JUSTIFY THE SERIOUS UNDERTAKING TO RESOLVE THEM IN WHICH WE ARE NOW ENGAGED. END MESSAGE.

HAIG

SECSTATE WASHDC 0670

DTG:191542Z APR 81 PSN: 030775
TOR: 109/1602Z

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SIT007 R

*****~~SECRET~~*****

DATE 05/03/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: NAN COL VP
EOB: EUR, WEUR
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

ROUTINE
DE RUEHC #9998 1080217
R 180204Z APR 81 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BONN 4870

INFO WHITE HOUSE 6422
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 099998
NODIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 4/17/11 (EWING, RAYMOND C.)

TAGS: PEPR, GW

SUBJECT: LETTER TO THE SECRETARY FROM THE FOREIGN MINISTER
-- CHEMICAL WEAPONS

1. THE FOLLOWING LETTER DATED MARCH 31ST AND DELIVERED
APRIL 14TH IS PROVIDED FOR THE EMBASSY'S INFORMATION:

BEGIN TEXT: DEAR AL, THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER TRANSMITTED
TO ME ON 4 MARCH 1981 INFORMING ME ABOUT MEASURES WHICH
THE US GOVERNMENT INTENDS TO TAKE TO MODERNIZE THE COUN-
TRY'S CHEMICAL MUNITIONS AND FOR YOUR FURTHER BRIEFING ON
THE MATTER WHICH YOU GAVE ME DURING MY RECENT VISIT TO
WASHINGTON.

I AGREE WITH YOUR ASSESSMENT THAT THE WESTERN DEFENSIVE
ALLIANCE IS CONFRONTED WITH A QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE
SOVIET BUILD-UP OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. THIS IS ALL HAPPENING
AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF INTENSIFIED COMBAT TRAINING FOR

SECSTATE WASHDC 9998

DTG: 180204Z APR 81 PSN: 029422
TOR: 105/0218Z

*****~~SECRET~~*****

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F97-030 #115

BY LOI, NARA, DATE 8/29/00

*****~~SECRET~~*****

DATE 05/03/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

WARSAW PACT FORCES UNDER SIMULATED CHEMICAL WARFARE. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, WHICH AS IN THE PAST RULES OUT GERMAN CONTROL OVER CHEMICAL WEAPONS, WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS WHICH WILL COMPRISE A COMPREHENSIVE AND VERIFIABLE BAN ON THE DEVELOPMENT, MANUFACTURE AND STOCKPILING OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

I AM ALSO CONVINCED, HOWEVER, IN VIEW OF THE GROWING THREAT, THAT THE WESTERN DEFENSIVE ALLIANCE CANNOT FOREGO AN UP-TO-DATE CHEMICAL WEAPONS RETALIATORY CAPABILITY UNTIL SUCH TIME AS SUCH A BAN HAS BEEN AGREED. THE OBJECT OF SUCH A CAPABILITY IS TO HAVE AVAILABLE WEAPONS OF COMPARABLE QUALITY WHICH WILL DETER THE WARSAW PACT FROM USING CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN CONTRAVENTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. FOR THIS REASON THE MODERNIZATION OF US CHEMICAL WEAPON STOCKS, WHICH IS A DECISION OF YOUR GOVERNMENT ALONE, DESERVES THE SUPPORT OF THE ALLIES.

AS YOU YOURSELF INTIMATED IN YOUR LETTER, A PUBLIC DISCUSSION ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS AT THE PRESENT TIME MIGHT ALSO PROVE CONTROVERSIAL IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AND FURTHER COMPLICATE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF NATO'S TWO-TRACK DECISION OF 1979. IT THEREFORE SEEMS IMPORTANT TO ME THAT THIS QUESTION BE HANDLED WITH RESTRAINT, BUT IN PARTICULAR THAT THERE SHOULD BE CLOSE CONSULTATIONS WITH THE ALLIES IN THE FORM YOU HAVE SUGGESTED ABOUT ANY DECISION WHICH MAY HAVE TO BE TAKEN IN SEVERAL YEARS' TIME ON THE DEPLOYMENT OF MODERNIZED CHEMICAL WEAPONS. SINCERELY, (SGD.) HANS-DIETRICH GENSCHER.END TEXT.

2. THIS LETTER IS A REPLY TO STATE 53593 OF MARCH 3. HAIG

SECSTATE WASHDC 9998

DTG:180204Z APR 81 PSN: 029422
TOR: 108/0218Z

*****~~SECRET~~*****

DATE 04/22/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT:

EOB: EUR, WEUR

WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

DE RUEHC #9109 1071523

O 171511Z APR 81

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 4837

UNCLAS STATE 099109

E.O. 12065: N/A

TAGS: PDIP, GW

SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT FROM CDU
CHAIRMAN KOHL (S/S 8110303)

1. THE PRESIDENT HAS RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM
CDU CHAIRMAN KOHL. BEGIN TEXT: DEAR MR. PRESIDENT, IN
THOSE HOURS OF CONSTERNATION AND GRIEF CAUSED BY THE ABOMI-
NABLE ATTEMPT UPON YOUR LIFE WHICH DESERVES THE CONDEMN-
ATION OF THE ENTIRE CIVILIZED WORLD, MY THOUGHTS ARE IN
SOLIDARITY AND FRIENDSHIP WITH YOU AND YOUR COUNTRY. I FEEL
GREAT RELIEF THAT THE ATTEMPT FAILED.

OUR SYMPATHY IS ALSO WITH THE INJURED MEMBERS OF YOUR
STAFF.

PERSONALLY AND ON BEHALF OF THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC UNION
OF GERMANY, I WISH TO EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT YOU CAN TAKE
OFFICE AGAIN AFTER A SHORT BREAK IN FULL HEALTH AND WITH
FULL STRENGTH. YOUR COUNTRY AS WELL AS THE ENTIRE FREE
WORLD REQUIRE YOUR STRONG AND WISE LEADERSHIP WHICH WILL
BE A GUARANTEE FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE.

SECSTATE 99109//BON 9109

DTG:171511Z APR 81 P6N1 028733
TOR: 107/1520Z

DATE 04/22/81

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PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

PLEASE ACCEPT, MR. PRESIDENT, THE ASSURANCES OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION. DR. HELMUT KOHL, CHAIRMAN OF THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC UNION. END TEXT.

2. THE FOLLOWING RESPONSE FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN SHOULD BE DELIVERED TO CHAIRMAN KOHL. BEGIN TEXT: DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: NANCY AND I WERE DEEPLY TOUCHED BY YOUR KIND EXPRESSION OF CONCERN. WE VERY MUCH APPRECIATE KNOWING THAT YOU ARE THINKING OF US AND THAT I HAVE YOUR PRAYERS FOR A SPEEDY RECOVERY. DURING MY CONVALESCENCE MY ADMINISTRATION WILL CONTINUE TO ADVANCE THE POLICIES AND GOALS WHICH BOTH OF OUR COUNTRIES SHARE. PLEASE BE ASSURED OF THAT. THANK YOU FOR LETTING ME KNOW YOUR FEELINGS. SINCERELY, RONALD REAGAN. END TEXT.

3. NO RELEASE INTENDED, BUT NO OBJECTION IF RECIPIENT WISHES TO DO SO. HAIG

SECSTATE 99109//BON 9109

DTG:171511Z APR 81 PSN: 028733
TOR: 107/1526Z

DATE 04/22/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT:
EOB: EUR, WEUR
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #7719 1061548
O 161531Z APR 81
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 4777

UNCLAS STATE 097719
E.O. 120651 N/A

TAGS: PDIP, GW

SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT FROM SPD
CHAIRMAN BRANDT. (S/S 8110375)

REF: BONN 06575

1. THE FOLLOWING RESPONSE FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN SHOULD BE
DELIVERED TO CHAIRMAN BRANDT: BEGIN TEXT: DEAR MR.
CHAIRMAN: NANCY AND I WERE DEEPLY TOUCHED BY YOUR KIND
EXPRESSIONS OF CONCERN. WE VERY MUCH APPRECIATE KNOWING
THAT YOU WERE THINKING OF US AND THAT I HAVE YOUR PRAYERS
FOR A SPEEDY RECOVERY. DURING MY CONVALESCENCE MY ADMINI-
STRATION WILL CONTINUE TO ADVANCE THE POLICIES AND GOALS
WHICH BOTH OF OUR COUNTRIES SHARE. PLEASE BE ASSURED OF
THAT. THANK YOU FOR LETTING ME KNOW YOUR FEELINGS.
SINCERELY, RONALD REAGAN. END TEXT.

2. NO RELEASE INTENDED, BUT NO OBJECTION IF RECIPIENT
WISHES TO DO SO. HAIG

SECSTATE 97719/BONN 7719

DTG: 161531Z APR 81 PSN: 027310
TOR: 106/1600Z

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~~*****SECRET*****~~

DATE 03/30/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

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EOB: EURE, EUR, WEUR, DEPOL

WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F97-030 #116

IMMEDIATE

DE RUEHC #0408 087024Z

O P 280234Z MAR 81 ZFFG

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

BY LOT, NARA, DATE 8/29/00

TO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 3877

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 5139

AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 9985

USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0540

USMISSION USBERLIN PRIORITY 9609

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 9420

AMEMBASSY BERLIN 3730

AMEMBASSY WARSAW 8783

BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 079408

NPDIS

E.O. 12065:3/27/91 (EWING, R.C)

TAGS: BGG, PGOV, NATO, UR, PL

SUBJECT: BERLIN: BONN GROUP POLISH CONTINGENCY STUDY

REF: BONN 6211

1. ~~SECRET~~ (ENTIRE TEXT)

2. ALTHOUGH WE PREFERRED PREVIOUS FORMAT, WE CAN AGREE TO FRENCH REVISIONS OF PAPER IN INTEREST OF COMPLETING THIS EXERCISE. WE FIND CHANGES GENERALLY NON-SUBSTANTIVE IN NATURE.

SECSTATE WASHDC 9408

DTG:280234Z MAR 81 ZSN: 000910
TOR: 087/1226Z

~~*****SECRET*****~~

~~*****SECRET*****~~

DATE 03/30/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

3. DEPARTMENT IS REPEATING REFTEL TO INFO ADDRESSEES. HAIG

SECSTATE WASHDC 9408

DTG: 280234Z MAR 81 PSN: 000010
TOR: 087/1226Z

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DATE 03/30/81

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PAGE 01

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EOB: EURE,EEUR,WEUR,DEPOL
WHBR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #3734 0830153
O R 240143Z MAR 81 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 3647

INFO USMISSION USBERLIN 9580
AMEMBASSY BERLIN 3682
AMEMBASSY LONDON 4807
AMEMBASSY PARIS 9649
USMISSION USNATO 0404
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 9206
AMEMBASSY WARSAW 8675
WHITE HOUSE 6367
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 073734

NODIS
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 3/23/81 (EWING, RAYMOND C.)
TAGS: RGG NATO PGOV UR PL

SUBJECT: BERLIN: BONN GROUP POLISH CONTINGENCY STUDY

REF: BONN 5818

1. ENTIRE TEXT ~~SECRET~~.

2. DEPARTMENT'S SUGGESTIONS (STATE 71235) FOR REVISIONS
IN DRAFT PAPER DID NOT REFLECT SUBSTANTIVE POINTS OF
DISAGREEMENT BUT WERE AIMED AT MAKING PAPER MORE ACCURATE.
IF GERMANS FEEL STRONGLY, WHICH REPTEL INDICATES IS THE
CASE, THAT THE ORIGINAL LISTING OF POSSIBLE SOVIET/DDR

SECSTATE WASHDC 3734

DTG: 240143Z MAR 81 58N1 051600
TOR: 083/0104Z

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NLS F97-030 #117BY LOJ, NARA, DATE 8/29/00

~~*****S E C R E T*****~~

DATE 03/30/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

ACTIONS IS MORE OR LESS IN RANK ORDER OF SERIOUSNESS,
EMBASSY IS AUTHORIZED TO GO ALONG.

3. WE LOOK FORWARD TO FRENCH ANNEX ON CONTINGENCY
PLANNING. HAIG

SECSTATE WASHDC 17:54

DTG:240143Z MAR 81 PSN: 051650
TOR: 083/0151Z

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DATE 03/23/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT:
EOB: EFUR, WEUR, DEPOL
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #1235 0790206
O R 200107Z MAR 81 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 3511
USMISSION USBERLIN IMMEDIATE 9662

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON 4663
AMEMBASSY PARIS 9474
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 9103
AMEMBASSY WARSAW 8635
USMISSION USNATO 0347
AMEMBASSY BERLIN 3655
BT

~~S E C R E T~~ STATE 071235
NDDIS
E.O. 12065: RDS-4 3/19/01 (EAGLEBURGER, LAWRENCE S.)

TAGS: BQG NATO PGOV UR PL

SUBJECT: BERLIN: UK PROPOSAL FOR BONN GROUP POLISH
CONTINGENCY STUDY

REF: BONN 5441

1. ENTIRE TEXT ~~SECRET~~.

2. PAPER WHICH HAS EMERGED FROM BONN GROUP STUDY (REFTEL)
IS CLEARLY SOMEWHAT LESS USEFUL THAN WE HAD HOPED WOULD
BE THE CASE, DUE IN LARGE MEASURE TO REDUCTION IN SCOPE

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DTG:200107Z MAR 81 SSN: 047248
TOR: 079/0410Z

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NLS F97-030 #118

BY LOI, NARA, DATE 8/29/00

DATE 03/23/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

OF THE EXERCISE DESCRIBED PARA FIVE, REFTEL. WHILE WE REGRET ELIMINATION OF REFERENCE TO CONTINGENCY PLANNING, WE DO NOT BELIEVE IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO REOPEN THE ISSUE. ASSUMPTION THAT "PROBLEMS OVER BERLIN WOULD BE LIMITED ONES," WHILE REASSURING, STRIKES US AS SOMEWHAT OPTIMISTIC UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

3. AS FAR AS SUBSEQUENT USE OF BONN GROUP PAPER, WE WOULD SUGGEST THAT POLITICAL DIRECTORS DISCUSS SUBJECT AT NEXT MEETING BEFORE DECISION REACHED ON POSSIBLE USE OF PAPER IN THE NAC.

4. AS FAR AS TEXT ITSELF IS CONCERNED, WE HAVE FOLLOWING RATHER MINOR COMMENTS:

-- PARA 3 PURPORTS TO LIST THE POSSIBILITIES IN "ROUGHLY ASCENDING ORDER OF SERIOUSNESS." GIVEN THIS CRITERIA, WE QUESTION WHETHER ITEM "I" IS IN THE RIGHT PLACE AND WOULD SUGGEST THAT IT COULD BE PROPERLY INCLUDED BETWEEN ITEMS "C" AND "D."

-- ITEM 3.G COVERS POSSIBILITY OF "OPEN HARASSMENT OF FLAG TOURS IN EAST BERLIN AND OF MILITARY LIAISON MISSIONS IN THE GDR." IT HAS BEEN OUR IMPRESSION THAT MILITARY LIAISON MISSIONS IN THE GDR ARE SUBJECT TO MORE OR LESS CONTINUOUS "OPEN HARASSMENT" AND WE WOULD SUGGEST THAT SOME DISTINCTION BE DRAWN BETWEEN FLAG TOURS AND MLMS.

5. REFTEL HAS BEEN REPEATED TO OTHER INTERESTED ADDRESSEES. HAIG

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DTG:200107Z MAR 81 PSN: 047248
TOR: 079/0410Z

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DATE 03/17/81

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PAGE 01

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SIT: NAN GOL VP
EOB: EURE,EEUR,WEUR
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

MESSAGE:

NLS F97-030 #119

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #3158 071220Z
O R 122137Z MAR 81
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

BY LOT, NARA, DATE 8/29/00

TO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 0000

INFO USMISSION USBERLIN 0000
AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0000
AMEMBASSY LONDON 0000
AMEMBASSY PARIS 0000
USMISSION USNATO 0000
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0000
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 063158

EXDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 (3/9/11 (EAGLEBURGER, LAWRENCE S.))

TAGS: PEPR GW

SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER
GENSCHER -- MARCH 9, 1981

1. (C) SECRETARY'S MARCH 9 MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER
GENSCHER FOCUSSED AS EXPECTED ON QUESTIONS OF EAST-WEST
RELATIONS, WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON ARMS CONTROL
ISSUES. OTHER SUBJECTS DISCUSSED INCLUDED NORTH/SOUTH
ECONOMIC RELATIONS, EL SALVADOR, MIDDLE EAST, NAMIBIA,
INNER-GERMAN RELATIONS, POLAND, DEVELOPMENTS IN SPAIN,
TURKEY, PAKISTAN, AND OTTAWA ECONOMIC SUMMIT. MEETING
OPENED WITH ONE HOUR TETE-A-TETE FOLLOWED BY ONE AND A
HALF HOUR GROUP DISCUSSION IN WHICH OTHERS TAKING PART

SECSTATE WASHDC 3158

DTG:122137Z MAR 81 58N1 037578
TOR: 072/0039Z

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

WERE, ON THE US SIDE, UNDER SECRETARY STOESEL, UNDER SECRETARY RASHISH, ASSISTANT SECRETARY-DESIGNATE EAGLEBURGER AND EUR/CE DIRECTOR NILES, AND ON THE GERMAN SIDE, AMBASSADOR HERMES, POLITICAL DIRECTOR BLECH, ECONOMIC DIRECTOR FISCHER, BLECH'S SUCCESSOR PFEFFER, GENSCHER AIDES WALLOU AND PASCHKE AND INTERPRETER WEBER. FOLLOWING LUNCHEON, THE SECRETARY AND GENSCHER MET WITH THE PRESIDENT, AFTER WHICH THEY MET WITH THE PRESS AT THE WHITE HOUSE. GENSCHER HOSTED RETURN DINNER THAT NIGHT. END SUMMARY.

SUMMARY OF PRIVATE MEETING

2. (S) SECRETARY OPENED LARGER MEETING WITH BRIEF REVIEW OF HIS PRIVATE DISCUSSION WITH GENSCHER, STRESSING OVERRIDING IMPORTANCE OF US-FRG RELATIONS FOR THE WESTERN ALLIANCE. TURNING TO CURRENT PROBLEMS, HE CITED IMPORTANCE OF PROCEEDING WITH BOTH TRACKS OF THE DECEMBER 1979 LRINF DECISION AND ADVISED GENSCHER OF OUR INTENTION TO CALL AN EARLY MEETING OF THE SCG MARCH 31. HE REASSURED GENSCHER OF OUR CONFIDENCE IN THE FRG AS AN ALLY, ADDING THAT WE REGARDED INITIAL PRESS REPORTS OF CUTS IN FRG DEFENSE BUDGET AS "MISCHIEF MAKING BY THE PRESS." TURNING TO BREZHNEV'S LETTERS TO WESTERN HEADS OF GOVERNMENT, HE STRESSED THE NEED FOR EARLY CONSULTATIONS SO THE SUBSTANCE OF ALLIED RESPONSES WOULD BE THE SAME. ON QUESTION OF POSSIBLE US-SOVIET SUMMIT, SECRETARY NOTED OUR MEASURED AND CAUTIOUS APPROACH AND NEED FOR MANIFESTATION OF SOVIET MODERATION, NOT ONLY AS FAR AS POLAND AND AFGHANISTAN ARE CONCERNED BUT ALSO ON SO-CALLED "WARS OF NATIONAL LIBERATION" SUCH AS WE NOW SEE IN EL SALVADOR. HE NOTED US-FRG AGREEMENT ON PROPOSED MINI-SUMMIT AND ASSURED GENSCHER THAT WHILE HE COULD NOT AT THIS TIME ENDORSE ANY PARTICULAR BASING MODE, GERMANS COULD BE ASSURED THAT WE WOULD NOT ABANDON OUR LAND-BASED STRATEGIC DETERRENT. ON QUESTION OF ABM'S AND THE SALT I/II LIMITATIONS, HE REFERRED TO OUR STATEMENT LAST WEEK OF AFFIRMING ADHERENCE TO THE LIMITATIONS PROVIDED THE SOVIETS DO THE SAME. IN THIS CONTEXT, HE OBSERVED THAT ABM'S QUESTION WAS PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT FOR THE FRENCH (GENSCHER REFERRED TO IT AS "CRUCIAL" FOR FRANCE) AND SAID HE HAD DISCUSSED IT WITH FRANCOIS-PONCET. FINALLY, HE NOTED

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THAT HE AND GENSCHER HAD DISCUSSED POLAND, INCLUDING QUESTION OF FURTHER ASSISTANCE AND OUR THINKING ON FORTHCOMING VISIT BY DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER JAGIELSKI TO THE UNITED STATES.

3. (S) IN GENERAL COMMENT, GENSCHER STRESSED CENTRALITY OF US RELATIONSHIP FOR THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT. HE EXPRESSED GREAT APPRECIATION FOR SCG DECISION AND STRESSED NEED TO MOVE AHEAD WITH GENEVA TNF TALKS "WITHOUT DELAY" IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR MODERNIZATION. TURNING TO A FAVORITE THEME, HE NOTED NEED TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE BREZHNEV CONCESSION ON CDE ZONE OF APPLICABILITY, SUGGESTING THAT HAD THE UNITED STATES NOT JOINED ALLIED CONSENSUS ON CDE, BREZHNEV CONCESSION WOULD HAVE NEVER MATERIALIZED.

SECRETARY HAIG OBSERVED THAT WE WILL HAVE TO DETERMINE IN MADRID WHETHER THE ATLANTIC ENDS AT SAN FRANCISCO OR OMAHA. GENSCHER ALSO STATED HIS SATISFACTION WITH US POSITION ON PROPOSED US-SOVIET SUMMIT AND NORTH/SOUTH MINI-SUMMIT. REGARDING LATTER, HE ASKED WHEN WE PLANNED TO NOTIFY MEXICO AND WAS INFORMED THAT UNDER SECRETARY RASHID WOULD BE GOING TO MEXICO CITY MARCH 11 FOR THAT PURPOSE.

POLAND

4. (S) TURNING TO POLAND, GENSCHER SUGGESTED THAT THE SITUATION AGAIN IS IN HIGHLY UNCERTAIN PHASE AND SAID FRG WAS CONCERNED OVER IMPLICATIONS IN COMMUNIQUE ON SOVIET-POLISH MEETING THAT SOVIET CONFIDENCE IN POLISH LEADERSHIP WAS WANING. HE SUGGESTED THAT WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO PLAY ON BREZHNEV'S ASSUMED DESIRE TO AVOID, THROUGH INTERVENTION IN POLAND, DEMISE OF SOVIET COOPERATION WITH THE WEST WHICH HE FOSTERED. GENSCHER STRESSED THAT WE SHOULD MAKE CONSEQUENCES OF INTERVENTION CLEAR TO SOVIETS "AGAIN AND AGAIN" IN ORDER TO AVOID MISCALCULATION SUCH AS HAPPENED IN CASE OF AFGHANISTAN. SECRETARY AGREED THAT OUR PREVIOUS WARNINGS HAD BEEN INSTRUMENTAL IN PREVENTING INTERVENTION IN DECEMBER AND SAID WE SHARED GERMAN CONCERNS OVER BOTH EXERCISE PREPARATIONS AND INTERNAL MEASURES

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

DEVELOPED BY POLISH LEADERSHIP. GENSCHER REAFFIRMED THAT HE PLANNED TO PROCEED WITH MARCH 19-20 VISIT TO WARSAW UNLESS UNEXPECTED EVENTS INTERVENED.

EAST-WEST RELATIONS (C)

5. CS-E. THE SECRETARY NOTED OUR SUPPORT FOR FRENCH COE PROPOSAL, WHICH HE SAID HAD REAL AND PROPAGANDA ADVANTAGES FROM WESTERN POINT OF VIEW. GENSCHER AGREED THAT WE SHOULD USE THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT IN AN "OFFENSIVE" SENSE AGAINST THE SOVIETS BECAUSE THE WEST CAN IMPLEMENT ALL OF THE HELSINKI DOCUMENT WITHOUT DIFFICULTY WHILE IT POSES GRAVE PROBLEMS FOR THE EAST. HE URGED THAT ALLIES PUSH AHEAD IN MADRID ON BASIS OF BREZHNEV CONCESSION.

6. MBFR. ON MBFR, THE SECRETARY OBSERVED THAT NEGOTIATIONS HAVE SERVED A UNIFYING PURPOSE WITHIN NATO AND ADDED WE WOULD WISH TO CONTINUE TO UTILIZE THIS FORUM BOTH FOR ITS OWN SAKE AND AS A MODEL FOR ALLIED CONSULTATIONS. REFLECTING HIS TRADITIONAL

ATTITUDE, GENSCHER AGREED THAT MBFR WAS USEFUL IN PRESERVING WESTERN UNITY. HE POINTED OUT, HOWEVER, THAT SOVIETS SAW MBFR PRIMARILY AS MEANS TO IMPOSE LIMITS ON THE BUNDESWEHR, AND HE EXPRESSED PARTICULAR OPPOSITION TO PROPOSED 50 PERCENT RULE (ORIGINALLY SUGGESTED BY CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT) UNDER WHICH NO INDIVIDUALLY COULD HAVE MORE THAN 50 PERCENT OF THE REMAINING FORCES FOLLOWING A REDUCTION AGREEMENT. IF THIS WERE SO, GENSCHER SAID, IN EVENT OF WITHDRAWAL OF US FORCES, WHICH HE SAID COULD NOT BE EXCLUDED, THIS COULD FORCE REDUCTIONS IN THE BUNDESWEHR IN ORDER TO KEEP UNDER THE 50 PERCENT CEILING. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT WE WERE ALSO SKEPTICAL OF LIKELY OUTCOME IN MBFR BUT FELT THAT THE FORUM COULD BE USEFUL.

7. (C) ECONOMIC RELATIONS (PROPOSED GAS PIPELINE). THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT PROPOSED GAS PIPELINE WAS A SENSITIVE INTERNAL QUESTION IN THE FRG. WHILE WE DID

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

NOT INTEND TO BECOME INVOLVED, DESPITE EFFORTS BY SOME FRG OPPOSITION POLITICIANS, WE WERE CONCERNED ABOUT GREATER DEPENDENCE UPON SOVIET GAS SUPPLIES AS A RESULT OF THIS PROJECT. HE URGED THAT, AS LONG AS THE POLISH SITUATION REMAINS SO UNCERTAIN, THE GERMANS MOVE SLOWLY ON THIS PROJECT. IN REPLY, GENSCHER REITERATED FRG CONTENTION THAT DEPENDENCY QUESTION HAD BEEN CAREFULLY EXAMINED AND THAT SOVIET SHARE OF UP TO 30 PERCENT OF GAS SUPPLY WAS FOUND TO BE "ACCEPTABLE AND TOLERABLE." HE CLAIMED THE FRENCH AGREED WITH THIS CONCLUSION, AND ADDED THAT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE AT THIS POINT TO PREDICT HOW VERY COMPLICATED NEGOTIATIONS WOULD PROCEED. ECONOMICS MINISTER LAMBSDORFF, HE SAID, WOULD BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE PROJECT IN GREATER DETAIL WITH US OFFICIALS, BUT HE STRESSED AGAIN FACT THAT FRG AUTHORITIES HAD VERY CAREFULLY EVALUATED THIS PROJECT. HE ASKED THAT US HELP WESTERN EUROPEANS DIVERSIFY GAS SUPPLY BY PERSUADING NORWAY TO BE MORE FORTHCOMING. THE SECRETARY SUGGESTED THAT BOTH THE UK AND NORWAY COULD BE HELPFUL ON RESOURCES AND PRICING.

ALLIED MILITARY QUESTIONS

8. (C) THE SECRETARY ADVISED GENSCHER THAT HE HAD THREE MINOR POINTS INVOLVING US WEAPONS PROGRAMS WHICH WOULD BECOME PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE FROM THE NEW DEFENSE BUDGET AND WHICH COULD CAUSE PROBLEMS FOR THE

GERMANS IF THEY WERE NOT PREVIOUSLY INFORMED. HE CITED (A) SLCM DEVELOPMENT, WHICH HE CHARACTERIZED AS A CONVENTIONAL PROGRAM NOT OF IMMEDIATE CONCERN TO THE FRG; (B) DEVELOPMENT OF BINARY CHEMICAL WEAPONS, WHICH HE POINTED OUT WAS A FIVE YEAR LONG-TERM PROGRAM ON WHICH NO DEPLOYMENT DECISION HAD BEEN MADE. HE EXPLAINED THAT WE WERE UNDERTAKING THIS PROGRAM BECAUSE OF WHAT WE CONSIDERED TO BE INCREASING WESTERN VULNERABILITY, ADDING THAT IF WE DID NOT MODERNIZE IN THIS AREA THERE WOULD BE NO HOPE FOR NEGOTIATING RESTRAINTS WITH THE SOVIETS; AND (C) ERW, ON WHICH HE ADVISED GENSCHER THAT ALL US IS UNDERTAKING CURRENTLY IS PRODUCTION OF COMPONENTS. NO DEPLOYMENT DECISION HAD BEEN MADE, AND HE SAID WE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 06

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

WERE VERY WELL AWARE OF THE PROBLEMS ERW HAS CAUSED AND CAN CAUSE FOR OUR ALLIES. ON LATTER POINT, GENSCHER SAID HE WOULD NEVER FORGET HIS 1978 INVOLVEMENT IN THIS ISSUE.

9. (C) RDF COMMAND. REGARDING RDF, THE SECRETARY SAID HE BELIEVED THAT SACEUR SHOULD BE IN COMMAND NOT REPEAT NOT BECAUSE HIS TROOPS IN EUROPE WOULD BE DEPLOYED TO OTHER AREAS BUT BECAUSE SACEUR WAS UNIQUELY SITUATED GEOGRAPHICALLY AND IN TERMS OF HIS POLITICAL/MILITARY CONTACTS TO COMMAND THIS FORCE. IT WAS IMPORTANT, THE SECRETARY POINTED OUT, THAT THE COMMANDER OF THE RDF BE AWARE OF IMPLICATIONS OF RDF DEPLOYMENTS FOR SITUATION IN EUROPE. SACEUR WAS, CONSEQUENTLY, BEST ABLE TO EXERCISE THIS RESPONSIBILITY. GENSCHER SAID HE FOUND THIS ARGUMENTATION CONVINCING AND SAID HE THOUGHT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT US EXPLAIN DECISION ON THIS TO THE ALLIES IF SACEUR WERE DESIGNATED AS COMMANDER OF RDF.

10. (C) ON QUESTION OF POSSIBLE REDUCTION OF US FORCES IN EUROPE, THE SECRETARY SAID HE FULLY UNDERSTOOD THAT ANY REDUCTION WOULD HAVE AN ENORMOUS PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT IN EUROPE. GENSCHER SAID HE SHARED THIS VIEW ENTIRELY.

11. (C) FRG DEFENSE BUDGET. REFERRING TO DEFENSE MINISTER APEL'S ANNOUNCEMENT OF CHANGES IN WEAPONS PROCUREMENT SCHEDULES, GENSCHER SAID APEL WOULD EXPLAIN THESE DECISIONS HIMSELF DURING HIS MARCH 23-25 VISIT. HE ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT HE WANTED THE SECRETARY TO KNOW THAT THE FRG WOULD CARRY OUT ITS NATO PROGRAMS, CITING IN PARTICULAR "TORNADO" AND LEOPARD II. ACQUISITION OF SEVENTH

AND EIGHTH FRIGATES WOULD BE DELAYED AND "ROLAND" WOULD GO ONLY TO THE ARMY. HE CONFIRMED THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAD REACHED POSITIVE DECISION ON ALL EIGHT POINTS OF AMBASSADOR STOESEL'S NOVEMBER 4, 1980 HOST NATION SUPPORT DEMARCHE AND SAID APEL WOULD BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE DETAILS. THE

SECSTATE WASHDC 3158

DTG:122137Z MAR 81 ESN: 037578
TOR: 072/0039Z

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*****S E C R E T*****

DATE 03/17/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

SECRETARY SAID HE WELCOMED THIS EXPLANATION, ADDING THAT WE WERE NOT ALARMED BY PRESS REPORTS. HE SAID WE ARE PLEASED WITH DECISION ON HOST NATION SUPPORT IN VIEW OF URGENT NEEDS TO IMPROVE FORCE DEPLOYMENT AND LIVING CONDITIONS. ON GENERAL SUBJECT OF DEFENSE BURDEN, HE STRESSED NEED TO AVOID GIVING SKEPTICS IN OUR CONGRESS AMMUNITION ON ISSUE OF ALLIED BURDENSHARING. ALL NATO MEMBERS MUST DO MORE FOR COMMON DEFENSE, DESPITE DIFFICULT ECONOMIC SITUATIONS THROUGHOUT THE ALLIANCE, HE ADDED. THE THREE PERCENT DEFENSE SPENDING TARGET HAD LED TO UNNECESSARY DISPUTES BETWEEN THE US AND THE FRG AND REFLECTED A LACK OF UNDERSTANDING IN WASHINGTON OF HOW THE FRG PLANNING PROCESS WORKS.

INNER-GERMAN RELATIONS

12. (X) AT THE SECRETARY'S REQUEST, GENSCHER REVIEWED CURRENT STATE OF INNER-GERMAN RELATIONS, STRESSING IN PARTICULAR THAT THIS RELATIONSHIP COULD NOT BE ISOLATED FROM OVERALL EAST-WEST SITUATION. HE NOTED RELATIVELY HARSH GDR MOVES VIS-A-VIS FRG IN OCTOBER AND NOVEMBER OF LAST YEAR, WHICH HE ATTRIBUTED PRIMARILY TO GDR ASSUMPTION THAT WARSAW PACT INTERVENTION IN POLAND WAS LIKELY AND THAT EASTERN COUNTRIES SHOULD "PREPARE FOR IT." HE ADDED THAT EAST GERMANS ARE NOW MOVING IN A MORE POSITIVE DIRECTION, CITING HONECKER'S REMARKS TO BOELLING. THE FRG WOULD CONTINUE TO SEEK IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH THE GDR BUT GENSCHER ASSURED THE SECRETARY THAT BONN WAS QUITE WELL AWARE THAT GDR WOULD USE TACTIC OF OFFERING HUMANITARIAN CONCESSIONS IN EXCHANGE FOR FRG ABANDONMENT OF TNF. SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT WAS OUT OF THE QUESTION, HE SAID. TURNING TO THE SITUATION IN BERLIN, GENSCHER OBSERVED THAT CALM ATMOSPHERE HAD PERSISTED DESPITE DOWN-TURN IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS. HE URGED THAT GOVERNING MAYOR VOGEL AND MAYOR BRUNNER BE GIVEN HIGH-LEVEL TREATMENT WHEN THEY VISIT WASHINGTON IN ORDER TO DEMONSTRATE US SUPPORT FOR BERLIN. THE SECRETARY SAID HE SHARED GENSCHER'S GENERAL ASSESSMENT AND SAID THAT WE WOULD DO OUR BEST

TO ENSURE APPROPRIATE PROGRAM FOR VOGEL AND BRUNNER.

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

AS FAR AS US-GDR RELATIONS WERE CONCERNED, THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT WE ARE MOVING IN A MEASURED WAY AND WOULD BE GUIDED BY FRG CONCERNS. IN THIS CONNECTION, HE NOTED OUR UNHAPPINESS WITH GDR INVOLVEMENT IN SOME COUNTRIES OF THIS HEMISPHERE, TO WHICH GENSCHER ADDED THAT GDR INVOLVEMENT WAS BY NO MEANS RESTRICTED TO LATIN AMERICA.

TURKEY

13. (S) ON TURKEY, THE SECRETARY EXPRESSED THANKS FOR GENSCHER'S RECENT LETTER AND HIS ASSURANCES THAT FRG WOULD CONTINUE ACTIVE SUPPORT OF TURKEY, WHICH HE SAID REPRESENTED CONTINUATION OF LONG-TERM POSITIVE GERMAN ROLE IN THIS SITUATION. GENSCHER REPORTED THAT HE HAD MET ON MARCH 8 WITH FIVE-MEMBER BUNDESTAG DELEGATION WHICH HAD JUST VISITED TURKEY (ONE MEMBER WAS "RATHER LEFT"), AND HE SAID HE WAS PLEASED THEY FORMED AN "ALL-PARTY COALITION IN SUPPORT OF CONTINUED ASSISTANCE TO TURKEY." BUNDESTAG MEMBERS HAD MET WITH FORMER PRIME MINISTERS ECEVIT AND DEMIREL, AS WELL AS HEAD OF TRADE UNION FEDERATION, ALL OF WHOM HAD URGED THAT GERMANS NOT PUSH CURRENT GOVERNMENT TOO FAST ON END OF MILITARY RULE. ONLY NEGATIVE POINTS WHICH DID EMERGE FROM THIS VISIT WERE CONCERN OVER EXTENSION OF PERIOD DURING WHICH PERSON ARRESTED ON POSSIBLE SUSPICION OF TERRORISM COULD BE CONFINED WITHOUT ACCESS OF AN ATTORNEY FROM 15 TO 90 DAYS AND GENERAL FEELING THAT TOO MANY PEOPLE HAD BEEN ARRESTED AS SUSPECTED TERRORISTS. AMBASSADOR STOESEL RAISED QUESTION OF EFFORT TO EXCLUDE TURKEY FROM COUNCIL OF EUROPE, A MOVE WHICH GENSCHER SAID FRG WOULD RESIST SO LONG AS TURKEY IS REPRESENTED BY PERSONS APPOINTED BY PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT.

14. () THE SECRETARY ASKED GENSCHER WHETHER HE SAW ANY AREAS IN WHICH THE US COULD BE OF ASSISTANCE. GENSCHER SUGGESTED THAT WE RAISE ISSUE OF ACCESS TO LEGAL COUNSEL AND NEED FOR MOVE BY CURRENT GOVERNMENT ON CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM. GENSCHER ADDED THAT HE HAD TOLD TURKS THAT HE WOULD VISIT TURKEY AS SOON AS

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

NEW CONSTITUTIONAL LEGISLATION IS ADOPTED. THE SECRETARY MADE NO COMMITMENTS ON EITHER POINT.

SPAIN

15. (C) GENSCHER SAID FRG AND US SHOULD JOIN IN STEPS TO REASSURE SPANISH AFTER RECENT UNSUCCESSFUL COUP D'ETAT ATTEMPT. HE SUGGESTED POSITIVE STATEMENTS AS WELL AS PROMINENT VISITS WOULD BE USEFUL. GENSCHER AND THE SECRETARY AGREED THAT THE RECENT EVENTS HAD BEEN MORE SERIOUS THAN INDICATED IN THE PRESS, AND THE SECRETARY ADDED THAT WE SHOULD TAKE STEPS TO SUPPORT THE KING AND SPANISH DEMOCRACY AT THIS TIME.

NAMIBIA

16. (C) REFERRING TO HIS EARLIER CONVERSATIONS WITH CARRINGTON AND FRANCOIS-PONCET, THE SECRETARY SAID THAT OUR NAMIBIA POLICY WAS STILL UNDER REVIEW. HE NOTED THAT THIS WAS A DIFFICULT AND CONTRADICTION-LADEN SUBJECT. WE WANT AN INTERNATIONALLY-ACCEPTABLE SETTLEMENT, THE SECRETARY SAID, BUT ARE NOT PLEASED WITH THE PROCESS WHICH COULD INSTALL MARXIST-LENINIST GOVERNMENT IN NAMIBIA. AT THE SAME TIME, THERE IS A NEGOTIATING HISTORY WHICH CANNOT BE IGNORED AS WELL AS UN DECISIONS. HE NOTED THAT WE WERE ASKING THE FRONT LINE STATES AND OTHERS IN THE UN TO BE PATIENT AND ALLOW US TO CONDUCT THE NECESSARY POLICY REVIEW. IN REPLY, GENSCHER PRESENTED A GENERALLY OPTIMISTIC APPRAISAL OF DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA AND ADDED THAT THE SOVIETS SEE A CHANGE IN US POLICY AS A CHANCE FOR THEM TO GET BACK INTO THE GAME IN THAT PART OF THE WORLD. HE REFERRED TO HIS NOVEMBER 1979 BONN MEETING WITH GROMYKO, IN WHICH THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER HAD BEEN TOUGH ON TNF BUT EVEN TOUGHER ON ZIMBABWE, WHERE IT WAS CLEAR THE SOVIETS FEARED A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. GENSCHER CLAIMED SOUTH AFRICANS WERE UNCONSCIOUSLY HELPING THE SOVIETS WITH THEIR POLICY AND URGED STRONGLY THAT US AGREE TO CONTINUATION OF CONTACT GROUP INITIATIVE.

MIDDLE EAST

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

17. (S) THE SECRETARY SAID LORD CARRINGTON HAD RE-ASSURED HIM DURING THEIR RECENT TALKS THAT EC TEN WOULD NOT PLAN TO ACT IN A MANNER WHICH WOULD COMPLICATE THE PEACE PROCESS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, WHICH THE SECRETARY SAID MUST BE BASED ON UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338, THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS, AND THE AUTONOMY TALKS. REFERRING TO HIS

APRIL VISIT TO THE AREA, HE SAID HE WAS GOING WITHOUT PRECONCEPTIONS BUT IN THE HOPE OF KEEPING THE PROCESS GOING. IN GENERAL COMMENT ON THE MIDDLE EAST, THE SECRETARY URGED THAT EUROPEANS VIEW SITUATION IN ITS TOTALITY, AVOIDING PREOCCUPATION WITH ARAB/ISRAELI DISPUTE. THERE ARE OTHER, VERY IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS, INCLUDING MODERATING STANCE OF PREVIOUSLY RADICAL ARAB STATES, GROWING DISTRUST OF THE USSR, POSSIBLE IMPROVEMENT IN SAUDI/EGYPT RELATIONS, TRENDS TOWARD COOPERATION OF THE GULF STATES, AS WELL AS DEVELOPMENTS IN NEIGHBORING AFRICAN COUNTRIES. GENSCHER REITERATED FRG AND EC TEN DESIRE TO BE HELPFUL AND COMPLEMENTARY IN THEIR APPROACH TO THE MIDDLE EAST. HE AGREED WITH THE SECRETARY'S ASSESSMENT OF POSSIBLE IMPROVEMENT IN EGYPT/SAUDI RELATIONSHIP, BUT HE ADDED ISRAELIS SHOULD HELP BY SHOWING FLEXIBILITY ON ISSUE OF JERUSALEM, WHICH IS KEY FOR SAUDIS.

PAKISTAN

18. (S) REFERRING TO HIS RECENT VISIT THERE, GENSCHER STRESSED NEED FOR GREATER WESTERN ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN. WHILE HE ADMITTED THAT WE MIGHT WISH FOR SOMETHING BETTER THAN THE ZIA GOVERNMENT, PAKISTAN HAS ENORMOUS STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE IN THE WAKE OF AFGHANISTAN. HE SAID ZIA HAD STRESSED TO HIM THE NEED TO PUSH DEVELOPMENT OF BALUCHISTAN AND DESERVED INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT IN THIS EFFORT AS WELL AS IN COPING WITH THE 1.5 MILLION AFGHAN REFUGEES. ZIA ALSO NEEDS HELP IN DEVELOPING "MILITARY INFRASTRUCTURE" OF HIS COUNTRY TO ENABLE REDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES FROM PAKISTAN-INDIAN BORDER TO THE BORDER WITH AFGHANISTAN. HE SAID THE FRG PLANS TO INCREASE ITS ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE BUT DID NOT PLAN ARMS AID TO PAKISTAN. THE SECRETARY SAID WE SHARED THE FRG

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

ASSESSMENT OF THE NEED TO ASSIST PAKISTAN AND SAID HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT WHEN OUR CURRENT POLICY REVIEW WAS CONCLUDED, WE WOULD RECOMMEND TO THE PRESIDENT THAT HE APPROVE ADDITIONAL ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE. IN THIS CONTEXT, THE SECRETARY NOTED THE CONTROVERSY IN GERMANY REGARDING POSSIBLE TANK SALES TO SAUDI ARABIA AND EXPRESSED UNDERSTANDING OF THE PROBLEMS WHICH THIS POSED FOR THE FRG GOVERNMENT. IN GENERAL OBSERVATION, HE SUGGESTED THAT THE WESTERN ALLIES SHOULD COORDINATE THEIR ASSISTANCE TO COUNTRIES IN THAT AREA. GENSCHER REVIEWED STATUS OF DEBATE IN THE FRG OVER ARMS-TO-SAUDI-ARABIA ISSUE WITHOUT INDICATING HOW HE EXPECTED ISSUE TO BE RESOLVED.

CENTRAL AMERICA

19. (S) THE SECRETARY LAMENTED SITUATION IN WHICH THE MEDIA FOCUSED ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY ON MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO EL SALVADOR, DESPITE FACT THAT THIS WAS RELATIVELY MINOR PART OF OUR AID EFFORT. THE BASIC OBJECTIVE REMAINS, HE SAID, TO STOP OUTSIDE INTERVENTION BY COMMUNIST COUNTRIES AND ALLOW PEOPLE OF EL SALVADOR TO DECIDE THEIR FUTURE THEMSELVES. HE NOTED PROPOSALS BY SOME SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTIES THAT SOLUTION BE SOUGHT THROUGH RECONCILIATION BETWEEN PRESIDENT DUARTE AND SOCIALIST LEADER UNGO, A APPROACH WHICH HE SAID OFFERED NO SOLUTION SINCE UNGO WAS DISCREDITED IN EL SALVADOR. THE SOLUTION, HE SAID, WAS TO PUSH AHEAD FOR FREE AND OPEN ELECTIONS. HE ASSURED GENSCHER THAT WE ARE CONCERNED ABOUT EL SALVADOR NOT BECAUSE IT IS PART OF THE AMERICAN HEMISPHERE BUT BECAUSE IT IS SUCH A BLATANT EXAMPLE OF A SOVIET EFFORT TO DESTABILIZE A SITUATION TO ITS ADVANTAGE. GENSCHER URGED THAT WE STRESS REFORM EFFORT UNDERWAY IN EL SALVADOR AS MEANS TO ATTRACT GREATER PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR OUR POLICY IN WESTERN EUROPE. THE SECRETARY REVIEWED OUR EFFORTS TO PERSUADE THE NICARAGUANS TO CEASE THEIR PARTICIPATION IN THE CLANDESTINE ARMS SUPPLY EFFORT, IN WHICH HE SAID THE NICARAGUANS ADMITTED THEY HAD BEEN INVOLVED. WHILE WE HAD RECEIVED ASSURANCES FROM THE NICARAGUANS ON THESE POINTS, WE WERE WATCHING THE SITUATION VERY

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

CLOSELY TO SEE HOW THEY ACTUALLY PERFORMED.

SEVEN-NATION ECONOMIC SUMMIT AND AID LEVELS

20. (C) THE SECRETARY SAID HE WOULD WELCOME GENSCHER'S COMMENTS ON THE QUESTIONS TO BE CONSIDERED BY THE OTTAWA SUMMIT, TO WHICH GENSCHER LISTED COORDINATION OF ECONOMIC POLICIES, EAST-WEST RELATIONS, A GENERAL POLICY REVIEW AND STRATEGIES FOR THE NORTH/SOUTH MINI-SUMMIT. ON AID LEVELS, THE SECRETARY CALLED GENSCHER'S ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT DESPITE SERIOUS BUDGETARY PROBLEMS, WE WOULD MEET ALL OUR OBLIGATIONS TO THE IFI'S, INCLUDING IDA VI. HE NOTED THAT WHILE WE SEE UTILITY OF MULTILATERAL AID AND WOULD CONTINUE IT, WE BELIEVE THAT BILATERAL ASSISTANCE COULD ALSO HAVE A VERY USEFUL IMPACT. GENSCHER SAID THAT HE AGREED ENTIRELY WITH THE SECRETARY'S REMARKS AND STATE SECRETARY FISCHER POINTED OUT THAT FRG ASSISTANCE PROGRAM IS DIVIDED ROUGHLY 70-30 BETWEEN BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL

PROGRAMS. GENSCHER EXPRESSED GENERAL DISTASTE OVER SITUATION IN WHICH SOVIETS IN UN AGENCIES HAVE A SAY IN DISTRIBUTING FRG MONEY WHEN THEY DON'T GIVE ANY OF THEIR OWN. HAIG

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