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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: Executive Secretariat, NSC
Country File

Archivist: mjd

OA/Box:
File Folder: Japan (2/22/81 – 3/4/81)

FOIA ID: F00-037 (1539), Oberdorfer
Date: 01/12/2004

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Memo	Donald Gregg to Richard Allen re Your Meeting with Okita, 1p <i>R 7/24/06 F00-037/1 #31</i>	2/25/81	<i>B1</i>
2. Memo	Jim Lilley to Allen re Your Meeting with Okita, 1p <i>R " " #32</i>	2/24/81	<i>R1</i>
3. Memo	Lilley to Allen re Your Talk with Okita, 1p <i>R " " #33</i>	2/24/81	<i>B1</i>
4. Cable	200857Z FEB 81, 1p <i>R " " #34</i>	2/20/81	<i>R1</i>
5. Memo	Gregg to Allen re Your Meeting with Okita, 1p <i>R " " #35</i>	2/24/81	<i>B1</i>
6. Briefing Paper	Re Meeting with Japanese Special Economic Affair Representative Saburo Okita, 2p <i>R " " #36</i>	Nd	<i>R1</i>
7. Talking Points	Re Okita Meeting, 3p <i>R " " #37</i>	Nd	<i>R1</i>
8. Cable	230746Z FEB 81, 2p <i>PART " " #38</i>	2/23/81	<i>B1</i>
9. Cable	241005Z FEB 81, 2p <i>R " " #39</i>	2/23/81	<i>R1</i>
10. Cable	251100Z FEB 81, 3p <i>R " " #40</i>	2/25/81	<i>R1</i>
11. Cable	280038Z FEB, 81, 3p <i>R " " #41</i>	2/28/81	<i>B1</i>
12. Cable	020518Z MAR 81, 3p <i>R " " #42</i>	3/2/81	<i>R1</i>
13. Cable	020526Z MAR 81, 2p <i>PART " " #43</i>	3/2/81	<i>B1</i>
14. Cable	020524Z MAR 81, 4p <i>R " " #44</i>	3/2/81	<i>R1</i>
15. Cable	020529Z MAR 81, 3p <i>R " " #45</i>	3/2/81	<i>R1</i>

RESTRICTIONS

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- B-7a Release could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings [(b)(7)(A) of the FOIA].
- B-7b Release would deprive an individual of the right to a fair trial or impartial adjudication [(b)(7)(B) of the FOIA].
- B-7c Release could reasonably be expected to cause unwarranted invasion or privacy [(b)(7)(C) of the FOIA].
- B-7d Release could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source [(b)(7)(D) of the FOIA].
- B-7e Release would disclose techniques or procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions or would disclose guidelines which could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law [(b)(7)(E) of the FOIA].
- B-7f Release could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual [(b)(7)(F) of the FOIA].
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: Executive Secretariat, NSC
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OA/Box:
File Folder: Japan (2/22/81 – 3/4/81)

FOIA ID: F00-037 (1539), Oberdorfer
Date: 01/12/2004

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
16. NSC/S Profile Sheet	Casefile 8100917, 1p <i>R 7/24/06 F00-037/1 #46</i>	3/4/81	B1
17. Memo	Gregg to Allen re Japan, 1p <i>R " " #47</i>	3/3/81	B1
18. Cable	4p <i>D " " #48</i>	2/26/81	B1, <i>63</i>
19. Cable	040019Z MAR 81, 1p <i>R " " #49</i>	3/4/81	B1

RESTRICTIONS

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
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PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

LOJ 7/19/2007

File Folder JAPAN (2/22/81-3/4/81)

FOIA

F00-037 (F1539)

Box Number

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	
12	CABLE	020518Z MAR 81 (F00-037/1#42)	3	3/2/1981	MVH 5/21/08
13	CABLE	020526Z MAR 81 (F00-037/1#43)	2	3/2/1981	MVH 5/21/08
14	CABLE	020524Z MAR 81 (F00-037/1#44)	4	3/2/1981	MVH 5/21/08
15	CABLE	020529Z MAR 81 (F00-037/1#45)	3	3/2/1981	MVH 5/21/08

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 23 FEB 81 09

TO ALLEN

FROM BREMER

DOCDATE 22 FEB 81

nsn
11/9/64

KEYWORDS: JAPAN

IMPORT CONTROLS

OKITA, SABURO

ENERGY

AA

SUBJECT: TALKERS FOR ALLEN 25 FEB MTG W/ OKITA

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR ALLEN

DUE: 23 FEB 81 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

GREGG

LILLEY

DEAL

TYSON

COMMENTS

REF# 8105473

LOG 8100429

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ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

February 25, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: DONALD GREGG *DG*

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Okita --
Soft Loans to Jamaica

State called this morning to say that the Japanese Ministry of Finance is dragging its feet with regard to aid for Jamaica. The embassy urges that high-level Japanese visitors be pushed on this point.

Accordingly, I suggest you stress to Okita our strong interest in having Japan give all possible aid to the Jamaicans who are struggling to establish a new pattern for progressive change in the Caribbean. The Jamaicans' greatest need is for soft loans, and you might specifically ask Okita to throw his weight behind aid of this sort.

DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED
NLS FOO-037/1 #31
BY LAT, NARA, DATE 7/24/06

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

February 24, 1981

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: RICHARD V. ALLEN
FROM: JIM LILLEY *jl*
SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Okita on 25 February (U)

I have one additional item for your meeting with Okita tomorrow under the topic of Energy.

I suggest that you ask Okita for his views on Japan's policy towards off-shore oil exploration in the East China Sea. I suggest that you not advance any U.S. position as it would be premature to do so, but it would not be inappropriate for you to express an interest in what the Japanese intend to do. (U)

The background of it is this:

The East China Sea structures indicate a considerable potential for oil in that area. There are jurisdictional differences between China and Japan on where the territorial boundaries are, but the Chinese at the highest level have indicated several times that they are willing to put the jurisdictional issue aside in order to press forward on joint seismic surveys and exploration with the Japanese. (U)

As recently as October 1980 the head of the Chinese State Planning Commission suggested informally in Japan that China and Japan start working together on this problem in view of their acute energy needs. He suggested that American oil technology and management be part of the deal. We have seen no Japanese response to this constructive suggestion from the Chinese. (U)

cc: Don Gregg

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on
Feb. 24, 1987

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F00-037/1-#32
BY LOT NARA DATE 7/24/06

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

February 24, 1981

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~INFORMATION~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: RICHARD V. ALLEN
FROM: JIM LILLEY *[Signature]*
SUBJECT: Your Talk with Okita on February 25 ~~(U)~~

This telegram just arrived and I think you should read it before your meeting with Okita. It provides additional arguments for Japan and China to start moving on searching for new oil. ~~(U)~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on
Feb. 24, 1987

DECLASSIFIED
NLS FOO-037/1 #33
BY LOI, NARA, DATE 7/24/06

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ *PRC*
Department of State

CHINA 110
**INCOMING
TELEGRAM**
0094

PAGE 01
ACTION EA-12

BEIJIN 01749 220015Z

INFO	OCT-01	ADS-00	AID-07	INR-10	SS-15	CIAE-00	EB-08
	ICA-11	DODE-00	H-01	<u>NSC-05</u>	NSAE-00	COME-00	L-03
	DOE-10	TRSE-00	PM-07	INT-05	CEA-01	OMB-01	STR-10
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FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0390
INFO AMCONSUL SHANGHAI
AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
AMEMBASSY TOKYO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BEIJING 1749

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 2/20/91 (ROY, J. STAPLETON) OR-M
TAGS: ETRD CH JP
SUBJECT: CHINA'S OIL DELIVERIES TO JAPAN IN 1981

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AS REPORTED IN A SEPARATE TELEGRAM, CHINESE VICE PREMIER GU MU TOLD FORMER JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER OKITA DURING HIS VISIT TO BEIJING LAST WEEK THAT CHINA'S OIL PRODUCTION COULD VERY WELL FALL SIGNIFICANTLY IN THE NEXT FEW YEARS. FAR FROM RISING TO AN ANNUAL LEVEL OF 200 MILLION TONS BY 1985, WHICH WAS THE TARGET WHEN THE SINO-JAPANESE LONG-TERM TRADE AGREEMENT (LTTA) WAS SIGNED, IT COULD BE 10 TO 20 MILLION TONS BELOW 1980 PRODUCTION (106 MILLION TONS). GU MU TOLD OKITA THAT HE WAS SORRY, BUT CHINA WOULD BE UNABLE TO DELIVER 8.3 MILLION TONS OF CRUDE OIL TO JAPAN IN 1981, AS CALLED FOR BY THE REVISED LTTA. THE TARGET, REDUCED FROM THE ORIGINAL LTTA LEVEL OF 9.5 MILLION TONS, WILL AGAIN HAVE TO BE REVISED DOWNWARD, AND JAPANESE EMBASSY SOURCES SAY THAT NEGOTIATIONS WILL BEGIN SHORTLY.
ROY

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F00-0371#34
BY 121 NARA, DATE 7/24/06

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0681

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 24, 1981

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: RICHARD V. ALLEN
FROM: DONALD GREGG *Dg*
SUBJECT: Your meeting with Saburo Okita

Attached at TAB A are talking points prepared for your meeting with Okita tomorrow at 1:45 P.M. The State talkers cover the ground, but I find them rather mushy. I would specifically suggest that you not use the bracketed point on page 2--this would be establishing a kind of linkage between Defense and Trade, something which the talkers deny the Reagan Administration will do. (C)

On the SRC-II coal liquefaction project, you should note that the Energy Department has proposed consultation to be held among the U.S., Germany and Japan in mid-March. We are awaiting Japan's reply to this suggestion. (C)

To sum up, Okita knows that automobiles and defense spending are very much on our minds. He will be alert to any signals you may wish to send him with regard to how these topics will be dealt with when Mr. Suzuki comes. (C)

A final note, Okita is coming here from a visit to Ottawa where he undertook economic summit planning. If you are interested, you might ask him how that visit went. (C)

Attachments

TAB A - State Talking Points

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review in February 2001

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F00-037/1#35

BY LOJ NARA DATE 7/24/06

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



8105473
NSC-0681

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

February 22, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. RICHARD V. ALLEN
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Your Meeting with Saburo Okita, Japanese Special
Economic Representative, February 25, 1981

Transmitted herewith is a memorandum containing
suggested talking points for your meeting with Saburo Okita
on February 25.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read "L. Paul Bremer, III".

L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

a/s

TALKING POINTS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER

Suggested Points for Meeting With Japanese
Special Economic Affairs Representative
Saburo Okita, February 25, 1981

1. Autos

Although Okita is undoubtedly aware of the delicate nature of the auto trade issue in this setting, he will probably feel bound anyway to inquire about the new Administration's position.

-- The Administration would like to avoid import restraints since they are inflationary and likely to set off a round of protectionism in the industrial world.

-- But there is undeniably political pressure linking the deterioration of the domestic auto industry with Japanese imports. Imagination will continue to be needed to avoid serious bilateral difficulties arising from this situation.

-- Japanese exporters should exercise prudence in their shipments and should speed up their consideration of investment possibilities here as a means of alleviating political difficulties.

2. Defense

Because of the Reagan Administration's concern with security issues, Japan is worried that we might apply even greater pressure than before for increases in its defense spending. Since Japanese leaders realize that an acceleration of defense spending at a rate significantly higher than overall budget increases may prove infeasible, they fear that defense spending will continue to cause bilateral friction, with linkages to trade issues a real possibility. Okita and others have argued that Japan's efforts should be judged within the scope of a "comprehensive security" policy embracing not only defense, but a wider set of political and economic measures. We are currently examining how this concept can be developed to our mutual benefit.

-- The US will do more to increase its defense capabilities to meet the Soviet challenge and we naturally expect more from all of our allies. But we will not press for specific figures and will try to avoid a public debate on this issue.

KEY
POINT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
NLS FOO-037/1#36
BY LOI NARA DATE 7/24/86

RDS-1 2001 (Armstrong, Michael)

-- We are interested in Japan's idea of a comprehensive security approach as a means of promoting our mutual security objectives and sharing the growing burden more equitably.

WAGUE [-- Japan could probably do more in sharing the cost of maintaining US bases, accepting a division of defense roles and missions, taking a more flexible approach to foreign assistance that would assure greater political and strategic impact, and continue present admirable levels of diplomatic support.]

-- The administration will not seek to link defense spending to trade issues. However, the linkage has a superficial political appeal among certain domestic sectors and we may have to contend with it.

OMTI [-- The defense spending issue might be defused by implementing a more positive and concrete comprehensive security package and, perhaps, bold new trade initiatives.]

3. North/South Issues

Okita will be curious about the emphasis we intend to place on North/South versus East/West issues and especially about the reduction of the foreign aid package. The GOJ has also indicated it is inclined to attend a North/South summit in Mexico in June and Okita will want to know our position on this meeting.

-- Brief on the aid budget and our evolving change in emphasis to use it as instrument to bolster our global security efforts.

4. Energy

Having been pressed hard by the previous administration to get involved in the SRC-II coal liquefaction project, Okita will want to know what its future will be should it be transferred to the Synfuels Corporation as proposed by the Administration. He will also want to know about the development of a new policy toward nuclear issues, and how the Administration oil policies will affect Japan.

-- We will cooperate fully with Japan to assure that the SRC-II project preserves the substance of our initial understanding.

-- Our nuclear policy as it affects Tokai-Mura and other issues is being intensively reviewed and we hope to have a commitment to a more productive program with Japan by the time Prime Minister Suzuki visits here.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The following talking points are provided for reference in Mr. Allen's meeting at 1:45 today with Dr. Okita of Japan. Embassy Tokyo has just alerted us that impressing these points on Dr. Okita will be critical to our efforts to get Japan to provide a government-to-government credit to Jamaica.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS FOO-037/1#37

BY LDI DATE 7/24/06

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Japanese Aid to Jamaica

Background: The IMF estimates that Jamaica urgently needs \$450 million in balance of payment support in 1981. \$400 million must be in quick-disbursing concessional loans to bridge Jamaica over its current crisis. The Japanese Foreign Ministry had indicated that a high-level demarche to Dr. Okita on aid to Jamaica would be helpful in overcoming opposition from the Ministry of Finance, which continues to argue that Jamaica is irrelevant to Japanese interests. Finance reportedly is proposing to limit the Japanese response to export credits on rather hard terms.

Talking Points

-- I want to underscore the points Secretary Haig made in his recent letter to Foreign Minister Ito concerning the importance this administration attaches to the efforts of the US and its senior allies to help the new Jamaican administration rebuild the country's economy.

-- A clear demonstration that the industrial democracies are concerned about the success of the Seaga government will serve our common security purposes in an area vulnerable to Cuban and Soviet adventurism.

-- I understand the Jamaican government approached Japan with its request for aid on February 18 and has invited your government to the March 11 donors meeting in Kingston.

-- We believe the Government of Japan could be most supportive of the recovery effort by providing a concessional government-to-government, non-project loan of \$10 million, and by expanding its export credit line by at least \$10 million. Concessional balance of payments support is the more urgent need in view of the complete depletion

DECLASSIFIED

NLS FOO-0371 #37a

BY LAJ NARS DATE 7/24/86

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

Jamaica's foreign exchange reserves.

-- The US is committing \$62 million this fiscal year and we hope your government will be as forthcoming as possible.

Drafted: EAIJ:MDewit:avrs

Cleared: EAIJ:WClark

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*****S E C R E T*****

DATE 03/02/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 001

WHSR COMMENT:

FILE
EOBIEA, ASIMET

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

DE RUEHKO #3056 0540746
O 230746Z FEB 81 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6433

S E C R E T TOKYO 03056

NODIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-4 02/23/2011 (SHERMAN, W.C.) OR-M

TAGS: UNUC, MARR, AS, US, JA

SUBJECT: (A) U.S.-GOA B-52 TRANSIT AGREEMENT

REF: (A) STATE 044905, (B) 044822, (C) TOKYO 00387 (TS)

FOIA(b) (1)

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. EMBASSY FULLY CONCURS WITH APPROACH AND LANGUAGE OF AMENDED TEXT SUGGESTED REPTELS A AND B. FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW, CHANGES IN AMENDED TEXT MAKE FOR TIGHTER AND CLEANER AGREEMENT WHICH JAPANESE AND OTHERS SHOULD FULLY SUPPORT.

3. WE DO HAVE TWO MINOR POINTS TO NOTE:

(A) RE PARA 3(A) REF A, IT IS TRUE THAT OUR AGREEMENTS WITH JAPAN DO NOT DEAL WITH FREQUENCY OF OPERATIONS,

(B) ASSUME DELETED LANGUAGE (PARA 3(D) REF A CONCERNING PROPOSED GOA DEFMIN'S RESPONSE TO ARMAMENT QUERY) REFERS TO LANGUAGE OF PARA 3(E) OF STATE 024278 RATHER THAN CANBERRA 0800 AS CITED.

4. OUR APPRECIATION TO THOSE WHO PREPARED AMENDED TEXT. THEY HAVE DONE MASTERFUL JOB OF PROTECTING OUR OPERATING RIGHTS AND GOJ. POLITICAL SENSITIVITIES.
SHERMAN

*****S E C R E T*****

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLS 100-03711 #38

BY 125 NARA, DATE 7/24/06

*****~~S E C R E T~~*****

DATE 03/02/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 002

END OF MESSAGE FOOTER

PSN: 013290

TOR: 054/10127Z

DTG: 230740Z FEB 81

*****~~S E C R E T~~*****

538

*****S E C R E T*****

DATE 03/02/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 001

WHSR COMMENT:

EOBIECON, EURE

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

DE RUEHKO #3192 055100Z

P 241000Z FEB 81 ZFF-4

FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6491

~~S E C R E T~~ TOKYO 03192

NODIS

EO 120651 RDS-1 2/24/01 (SHERMAN, W.C.) OR-M

TAGS: NATO, PL, JA

SUBJECT: (C) POLAND: CONSULTATIONS WITH NON-NATO NATIONS

REF: (A) STATE 39684 (B) STATE 35763 (C) TOKYO 2762

1. ~~(A)~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. MOFA EUROPEAN BUREAU DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL DONOWAKI EXPLAINED TO POL COUNSELOR FEB 23 THAT MOFA HAD JUST INSTRUCTED ITS EMBASSIES IN WASHINGTON AND BRUSSELS TO CONVEY OFFICIALLY TO DEPARTMENT AND USNATO GOJ'S RELUCTANCE TO HOLD CONSULTATIONS ON POLAND IN A NATO CONTEXT. DONOWAKI SAID THAT GOJ WAS AWARE OF NATO PERM REPS' CONSIDERATION OF SYSTEM WHEREBY US, UK, CANADA AND PORTUGAL WOULD CONTACT JAPANESE, AUSTRALIAN, NEW ZEALAND, AND SPANISH EMBASSIES IN BRUSSELS AND THAT AMB BENNETT HAD IN FACT ASKED JAPANESE AMBASSADOR LAST WEEK IF HE WISHED TO BE BRIEFED PERIODICALLY ON NATO CONTINGENCY PLANNING.

3. DONOWAKI SAID THAT ANY LINK BETWEEN NATO AND JAPAN, NO MATTER HOW INDIRECT, WAS "NOT IN CONFORMITY" WITH JAPANESE BASIC APPROACH TO CONSULTATIONS. HE EMPHASIZED THAT GOJ WAS FULLY AWARE OF NEED FOR COORDINATION OF INDUSTRIALIZED DEMOCRACIES' PLANNING ON POLAND AND IN FACT REGARDED PARTICIPATION IN THESE CONSULTATIONS AS IMPERATIVE IN ORDER TO ENSURE LATER JAPANESE COOPERATION WITH ANY PROGRAM OF ECONOMIC COUNTERMEASURES. GOJ,

*****S E C R E T*****

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F00-037/1#39

BY WJ NARA DATE 7/24/06

*****S E C R E T*****

DATE 03/02/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 002

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

HOWEVER, PREFERRED TO ENGAGE IN BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS WITH THE US IN EITHER WASHINGTON OR TOKYO BUT NOT IN BRUSSELS AND, ON ASSUMPTION THEY WOULD LIMIT THEMSELVES TO ECONOMIC MEASURES, WOULD INITIATE CONSULTATIONS WITH EC AND INDIVIDUAL EUROPEAN NATIONS WHEN IT JUDGED THAT THE POLISH SITUATION HAD DETERIORATED TO A POINT MAKING SUCH APPROACHES ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY.

4. WHEN POL COUNSELOR INTERJECTED THAT AMB BENNETT'S APPROACH WAS MOST PROBABLY INSPIRED BY USG'S CONCERN THAT JAPAN BE FULLY BRIEFED ON WHAT WAS TRANSPIRING IN NATO PLANNING SESSIONS ON POLAND RATHER THAN BY A DESIRE TO HOLD CONSULTATIONS IN BRUSSELS ON WHAT SPECIFIC MEASURES JAPAN MIGHT ADOPT, DONOWAKI MERELY REPEATED THAT JAPAN DID NOT WANT TO HAVE ANY LINK WITH NATO WHEN DISCUSSING POLAND.

5. ACKNOWLEDGING THAT MOFA WAS CONDUCTING ONGOING THOROUGH EXAMINATION OF WHAT MEASURES GOJ MIGHT ACTUALLY TAKE IF SOVIETS INTERVENED IN POLAND, BASED ON LIST WE FURNISHED IN DECEMBER, DONOWAKI CAUTIONED THAT JAPANESE MEASURES, LIKE THOSE OF NATO MEMBERS, WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY HAVE TO BE TAILORED TO EXACT NATURE OF SOVIET ACTION. IN ANY CASE, JAPANESE WOULD HAVE GREATEST DIFFICULTY IN IMPLEMENTING ANY PROPOSAL TO SUSPEND EITHER FISHERIES OR CIVIL AIR AGREEMENTS WITH SOVIET UNION BECAUSE THEY WERE SEEN HERE AS INTERNATIONAL TREATY OBLIGATIONS. HALTING SHIPPING SERVICES WOULD ALSO BE VERY DIFFICULT. FEARING LEAKS, MOFA HAS NOT DISCUSSED THESE POSSIBILITIES WITH ANY OTHER MINISTRY.

6. COMMENT. WE UNDERSTAND THAT FONMIN ITO PERSONALLY ORDERED DRAFTING OF INSTRUCTION REFERRED TO ABOVE ON BASIS OF HIS CONCERN THAT IF OPPOSITION PARTIES AND MEDIA WERE TO GET WIND OF ANY CONNECTION, NO MATTER HOW TENUOUS, BETWEEN JAPAN AND NATO, GOJ'S EFFORTS TO ASSOCIATE ITSELF WITH COUNTERMEASURES IN CASE OF SOVIET ATTACK WOULD BE COMPLICATED ENORMOUSLY. MANSFIELD

PSN: 014790

TOR: 055/111242

RTG: 241005Z FEB 81

*****S E C R E T*****

*****C O N F I D E N T I A L*****

DATE 02/25/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 001

WHSR COMMENT:

RA NAN COL VP
EOBIECON,EA,ARA

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHKO #3272 0561102
O 251100Z FEB 81
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0534

INFO USINT HAVANA 0044
AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR 0036
AMEMBASSY MEXICO 0011
AMEMBASSY PANAMA 0227
AMEMBASSY MANAGUA 0046
AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE 0042
BT~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ TOKYO 03272
E.O. 120651 GDS 02/25/87 (IMMERMAN, R.M.) OR-P
TAGS: DEPR, JA, ES
SUBJECT: (A) EL SALVADOR: JAPANESE VIEWS
REF: (A) TOKYO 3009, (B) TOKYO 3193

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. EMBOFF DELIVERED EL SALVADOR WHITE PAPER TO MOFA SECOND LATIN AMERICA DIVISION DIRECTOR TANAKA AFTERNOON FEBRUARY 24. TANAKA SAID HE WAS FAMILIAR WITH U.S. POSITION REGARDING EL SALVADOR BECAUSE OF BRIEFING THAT HAD BEEN GIVEN TO AMBASSADOR OKAWARA. HE SAID THAT MOFA HAD NOT YET COMPLETED ITS OWN ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION IN EL SALVADOR. HE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT REPORTS FROM JAPANESE EMBASSIES IN CENTRAL AMERICA, ALBEIT LESS DETAILED THAN THOSE U.S. HAD, GENERALLY TENDED TO CONFIRM CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN EL SALVADOR. IN CONTRAST TO HIS REMARKS FEBRUARY 19 (REF A, PARA 4) TANAKA COMMENTED THAT REPORTS FROM JAPANESE EMBASSIES IN EUROPE ON REACTIONS TO EL SALVADOR, BASED ON CONVERSATIONS WITH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, INDICATED THAT

*****C O N F I D E N T I A L*****

DECLASSIFIED

NLS

FOO-037/1*40

BY LOI NARA, DATE 7/24/86

DATE 02/25/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 002

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THEY WERE NOT CONCERNED THAT AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN CENTRAL AMERICA WAS EXCESSIVE, THOUGH THE EUROPEAN PRESS CONTINUED TO STRESS THIS ISSUE.

3. EMBOFF INQUIRED ABOUT REPORTED REMARKS TO PRESS BY "HIGH RANKING MOFA OFFICIAL" EXPRESSING CONCERN OVER MOUNTING TENSION IN EL SALVADOR STEMMING FROM ALLEGED MILITARY SUPPLIES FROM COMMUNIST COUNTRIES TO GUERRILLAS, NOTING GOJ WAS FOLLOWING EL SALVADOR SITUATION, DENYING THAT U.S. HAD ASKED JAPAN TO TAKE MEASURES AGAINST CUBA OVER ARMS SUPPLY TO EL SALVADOR GUERRILLAS AND CONFIRMING HAIG BRIEFING OF AMBASSADOR OKAWARA AND OTHERS. TANAKA CONFIRMED THAT FOREIGN MINISTER ITO AND VICE MINISTER TAKASHIMA HAD MET WITH PRESS EVENING OF FEBRUARY 23, AND PRESS ACCOUNTS OF TAKASHIMA'S REMARKS AS OUTLINED ABOVE WERE ACCURATE.

4. TANAKA SAID THAT GOJ INTENDED TO SHOW SYMPATHETIC UNDERSTANDING TOWARDS THE U.S. POLICY IN EL SALVADOR. THERE WERE, HOWEVER, QUESTIONS WHICH MOFA WOULD LIKE CLARIFIED. FOR EXAMPLE, HOW THE U.S. INTENDED TO INTER-DICT WEAPONS SUPPLIES FROM CUBA. WOULD SHIPPING FROM CUBA BE CHECKED BY U.S. MILITARY VESSELS? ADDITIONALLY, HE NOTED THAT IF JAPAN OR OTHER FRIENDLY NATIONS WERE LIKELY TO BE ASKED TO TAKE COOPERATIVE MEASURES IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT THAT THEY BE TOLD IN ADVANCE WHAT MIGHT BE EXPECTED OF THEM.

5. TANAKA SAID THAT JAPANESE PRESS APPEARED TO BE AMBI-VALENT ON THE EL SALVADOR ISSUE, BUT HE WAS CONCERNED THAT ULTIMATELY TENDENCY OF PRESS TO CRITICIZE GOVERNMENT IN JAPAN WOULD LEAD THEM TO TAKE UNHELPFUL POSITION ON EL SALVADOR ISSUE WHICH MIGHT ADVERSELY AFFECT JAPANESE PUBLIC OPINION. HE NOTED TOKYO SHINBUN ARTICLE WHICH SAID THAT WHILE IT UNDERSTOOD THE U.S. POSITION, THE U.S. APPEARED TO BE GOING TOO FAR IN EL SALVADOR. (SEVERAL ARTICLES HAVE APPEARED IN JAPANESE VERNACULAR PRESS RECENTLY CONFIRMING GROWING PRESS INTEREST IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN. PRINCIPAL THRUST OF THESE ARTICLES HAS BEEN TO EXPRESS CONCERN ABOUT CONFRONTATION IN THE REGION AND SPECULATE ABOUT ECONOMIC ROLE JAPAN MIGHT BE EXPECTED TO PLAY TO SUPPORT U.S. EFFORTS.) TANAKA SAID THAT MAIN THRUST OF GOJ CONCERN REGARDING PRESS ATTENTION TO EL SALVADOR THUS FAR WAS APPARENT MISTAKEN JAPANESE PRESS IMPRESSION THAT EL SALVADORAN GOVERNMENT WAS A MILITARY GOVERNMENT. UNFORTUNATELY, THIS

~~*** CONFIDENTIAL ***~~

DATE 02/25/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 003

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

IMPRESSION WAS ENCOURAGED BY U.S. WIRE SERVICE STORIES
CHARACTERIZING THE GOVERNMENT AS A JUNTA.
MANSFIELD

SN: 016187

TOP: 050/11:10Z

FTG: 251100Z FEB 81

~~*****CONFIDENTIAL*****~~

572

~~*****S E C R E T*****~~

DATE 03/02/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 001

WHHR COMMENT:

EOBIEA

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

DE RUEHC #1392 0500123
O R 280038Z FEB 81 ZFFG
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO CINCPAC HONOLULU HAWAII IMMEDIATE 2527

INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO 3271
AMEMBASSY SEOUL 5167
COMUSJAPAN/LTGEN GINN
COMUSK/GENERAL WICKHAM
BT

~~S E C R E T~~ STATE 051392

MODIS
FROM BURT AND HOLDRIDGE FOR ADMIRAL LONG
INFO 120651 RDS-1 2/27/81 (BURT, RICHARD)
AGS: MPOL, JA, KS

SUBJECT: JAPAN-ROK MILITARY COOPERATION
MILITARY ADDRESSEE HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
REF: CINCPAC 212300Z FEB 81

(S - ENTIRE TEXT)

WE FULLY SHARE YOUR FEELING THAT MILITARY COOPERATION
BETWEEN OUR TWO ALLIES IN NORTHEAST ASIA CAN AND SHOULD BE
INCREASED. BEYOND THE NEED TO START WITH LOW VISIBILITY
INITIATIVES, THE POLITICAL FEASIBILITY OF EXPANDED DEFENSE
COOPERATION WOULD ALSO BE ENHANCED IF SUCH STEPS WERE
INITIALLY BENEFICIAL AND ORIENTED INITIALLY TOWARDS IMPROVING

THE AIR AND MARITIME DEFENSE CAPABILITIES OF BOTH
COUNTRIES.

~~*****S E C R E T*****~~

DECLASSIFIED
NLS FOO-037/1-#41
BY KAT NARA, DATE 7/24/86

~~*****S E C R E T*****~~

DATE 03/02/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 002

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

3. WE ALSO SHARE YOUR APPRECIATION OF THE NEED TO MOVE CAUTIOUSLY INTO THIS POLITICALLY SENSITIVE FIELD. BECAUSE OF THE LINGERING MUTUAL MISTRUST THAT CHARACTERIZES JAPAN-ROK RELATIONS AND THE POLITICAL SENSITIVITY WITHIN JAPAN TO AN EXPANSION OF ITS REGIONAL SECURITY ROLE, THE US MUST NOT APPEAR TO BE PUSHING PUBLICLY FOR THE CONTACTS MENTIONED AND LEAVE THE INITIATIVES OSTENSIBLY TO JAPAN AND KOREA.

DESPITE THESE OBSTACLES, WE BELIEVE THAT THE RECENT IMPROVEMENT IN S-ROK AND JAPAN-ROK RELATIONS HAS ENHANCED THE PROSPECTS FOR MAKING SMALL, BUT IMPORTANT, ADVANCES IN THIS AREA. MOREOVER, WE ARE NOT INCLINED TO LET CAUTION ALONE DISSUADE US FROM TAKING SOME LOW-KEY STEPS TO ENCOURAGE GREATER JAPANESE-KOREAN DEFENSE COOPERATION.

4. WE FIND MANY OF YOUR PROPOSALS ATTRACTIVE, IN PARTICULAR THE VISIT OF THE ROK NAVAL TRAINING SQUADRON, ROK AND JAPANESE PARTICIPATION IN THE CINCPAC SEMINAR, AND RECIPROCAL INVITATIONS TO OBSERVE COMBINED EXERCISES. EMBASSIES TOKYO AND SEOUL SHOULD NATURALLY HAVE A MAJOR SAY ON THE POLITICAL FEASIBILITY OF THE STEPS YOU OUTLINE IN PARAS 2 THROUGH 4 OF THE REFTTEL. LIKEWISE, WE WOULD DEFER TO OUR MILITARY COLLEAGUES ON THE SPECIFIC MILITARY-TO-MILITARY STEPS YOU IDENTIFY AS POSSIBILITIES, BUT WOULD APPRECIATE NOTIFICATION TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT PRIOR TO IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE MEASURES AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL.

5. WE DO, HOWEVER, BELIEVE THAT THE SUGGESTION (2-B) CONCERNING SECRET, OVER-THE-HORIZON THREE-NATION NAVAL EXERCISES SEEMS TO PRESENT A HIGH RISK, EVEN IF THEY WERE HELD SOUTH OF THE TSUSHIMA STRAIT IN THE EAST CHINA SEA. THE SOVIETS WOULD LIKELY DETECT SUCH EXERCISES, OR THEY WOULD BE LEAKED TO THE WATCHFUL JAPANESE PRESS. IN EITHER CASE, MAINTAINING A LOW POLITICAL PROFILE FOR THESE EXERCISES IS PROBABLY INFEASIBLE.

6. IN GENERAL, WE FIND THAT THOSE ACTIVITIES IN WHICH THE US IS A CO-PARTICIPANT WITH ONE OF THE PARTIES, OR SEPARATELY WITH BOTH, PROVIDE US AN EXCELLENT FOOTING FOR BRINGING OUR PARTNERS CLOSER TOGETHER. THIS IS THE CASE WITH YOUR SUGGESTION THAT THE JSDF BE INVITED TO

~~*****S E C R E T*****~~

~~***** S E C R E T *****~~

DATE 03/02/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 003

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

SEND OBSERVERS TO US-ROK EXERCISES LIKE ULCHI FOCUS LENS AND THAT ROK FORCES BE INVITED TO OBSERVE US-JAPAN EXERCISES LIKE COPE NORTH. AS YOU KNOW, OUR INVITING ROK OBSERVERS (AS WELL AS THE JAPANESE) TO FORTRESS GALE IN OKINAWA LAST YEAR WAS AN UNQUALIFIED SUCCESS. THERE MIGHT BE SEVERAL WAYS IN WHICH WE COULD EXPAND OUR HOST NATION UMBRELLA. ONE WOULD BE TO INVITE THE ROK NAVY TO PARTICIPATE IN RIMPAC 782. ANOTHER WOULD BE FOR US TO PROPOSE THAT BILATERAL US-ROK OR US-JAPAN NAVAL AND AIR EXERCISES ROUTINELY INCLUDE OBSERVERS FROM THE THIRD COUNTRY. YOU MIGHT FIND THAT THE ABOVE IDEAS MAKE USEFUL ADDITIONS TO THE LOW-KEY STEPS YOU SUGGEST IN PARAS 2 AND 3.

7. AS YOU NOTE, MORE FAR-REACHING PROPOSALS FOR ENHANCED JAPAN-ROK COOPERATION WOULD, OF COURSE, HAVE TO BE HELD OFF UNTIL WE HAVE THE RESULTS OF THESE INITIAL SOUNDINGS AND EXPERIMENTS.
HAIG

020904

TOR 059/12134Z

FTG 280038Z FEB 81

~~***** S E C R E T *****~~

SIT169 R

*****~~S E C R E T~~*****

DATE 03/17/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT:
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MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHKO #3479 0610521
O 020518Z MAR 81
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0636

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 2593

NODIS
CORRECTED COPY (LINE OMITTED IN PARA 5)
FOR PM DIRECTOR DIRECTOR BURT AND EA-AMBASSADOR HOLDRIDGE
FROM AMBASSADOR MANSFIELD
E.O. 120651 RDS-1,3 03/02/11 (MANSFIELD, M) OR-M
TAGS: MPOL, JA, MARR, KS
SUBJECT: (C) JAPAN-ROK MILITARY COOPERATION
REF: STATE 51392 (DTG 280038Z FEB 81)

1. (~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE, WHICH DISCUSSES SAME ISSUES
AS REFTEL, MAY HAVE INADVERTENTLY OMITTED DEPARTMENT
AS ADDRESSEE WHEN SENT AS TOKYO 2593 (DTG 140258Z FEB
81) AND IS THEREFORE REPEATED BELOW.

QUOTE ~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 2593
NOFORN

TO 120651 RDS-1,3 2/14/11 (MANSFIELD, M.) OR-M
TAGS: MPOL, JA, MARR, KS
SUBJECT: (C) JAPAN-ROK MILITARY COOPERATION

3. (~~SECRET/NOFORN~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.)

I WANTED YOU TO BE AWARE OF THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE
WHICH I SENT THROUGH OTHER CHANNELS TO ADM LONG,
EN WICKHAM, AND LTG GINN.

TOKYO 3479

DTG: 020518Z MAR 81 58N: 035625
TOR: 070/1820Z

*****~~S E C R E T~~*****

DECLASSIFIED

NLS 100-237/1-442

BY 107
DATE 7/24/06

*****S E C R E T*****

DATE 03/17/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

BEGIN TEXT.

SECRET EYES ONLY

FM AMBASSADOR MANSFIELD, AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO ADMIRAL LONG, CINCPAC

INFO LTGEN GINN, COMUSJAPAN

GENERAL WICKHAM, COMUSKOREA

SECRET EYES ONLY

JAPAN-ROK MILITARY COOPERATION (S)

A. CINCPAC 112142Z FEB 81

B. CINCPAC 112220Z FEB 81 (REPEATING AF880 5AF 260922Z

C. CINCPAC 112215Z FEB 81 (REPEATING 880 KOREA 300400Z

1. (~~SECRET~~/NOFORN - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. ALTHOUGH I WILL SEE YOU VERY SHORTLY, I WANTED TO EXPRESS MY APPRECIATION FOR REPEATING TO ME ALONG WITH YOUR OWN COMMENTS THE EXCHANGE ON JAPAN-ROK MILITARY COOPERATION. I ALSO THOUGHT THERE WOULD BE SOME ADVANTAGE IN MY JOTTING DOWN SOME PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS AND REACTIONS AS A POSSIBLE BASIS FOR DISCUSSION IN HAWAII.

3. I FULLY SHARE WHAT I TAKE TO BE THE CONSENSUS VIEW-POINT: THAT A CLOSER JAPAN-KOREA MILITARY CONNECTION IS IN THE U.S. INTEREST AND THAT THE U.S. SHOULD ACCORDINGLY SEEK TO ACT AS A CATALYST, IDEALLY AN INVISIBLE ONE, TO BRING THIS ABOUT. UP TO A POINT I AGREE THAT THE MOMENT IS MORE OPPORTUNE NOW THAN IT HAS BEEN OWING TO THE COMMUTATION OF KIM DAE JUNG'S DEATH SENTENCE AND THE TERMINATION OF MARTIAL LAW IN THE ROK. AND I ENDORSE IN PRINCIPLE THE TYPES OF EXCEEDINGLY LOW-KEY ACTIONS SPECIFIED BY BILL GINN AND GEN. WICKHAM TO NUDGE THE JAPANESE AND THE KOREANS A PACE OR TWO FORWARD.

4. HAVING SAID THIS, I WOULD STRESS THAT WHILE ATMOSPHERICS BETWEEN JAPAN AND KOREA HAVE IMPROVED AS A CONSEQUENCE OF PRESIDENT CHUN'S DECISIONS ON KIM AND MARTIAL LAW, IT IS HIGHLY PREMATURE TO THINK--AND TO PLAN--IN TERMS OF QUALITATIVE CHANGES IN THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. FOR JAPAN, KIM DAE JUNG REMAINS AN ISSUE AND A POTENTIAL DOMESTIC POLITICAL PROBLEM OF THE FIRST MAGNITUDE SO LONG AS HE IS INCARCERATED. LOOKING BEYOND THE IMMEDIATE QUESTION OF KIM AND HIS FATE, THE JAPANESE REMAIN EXTREMELY LEERY OF ANY DEFENSE/SECURITY LINKS WITH THE KOREANS, WHETHER THESE BE DIRECT BI-

TOKYO 3479

DTG:020518Z MAR 81 SSN: 035025
TOR: 070/1820Z

*****S E C R E T*****

~~*****S E C R E T*****~~

DATE 03/17/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

LATERAL MILITARY TIES OR INDIRECT TIES INVOLVING, FOR EXAMPLE, TOO OVERT PARTICIPATION OF JAPAN-BASED U.S. MILITARY ASSETS IN EXERCISES GEARED TO KOREAN CONTINGENCIES.

5. THE PERSPECTIVE FROM JAPAN STRIKES ME AS SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT FROM GEN WICKHAM'S CHARACTERIZATION, WHICH I ACCEPT, OF THE VIEWPOINT IN KOREA: "KOREANS WOULD PROBABLY ACCEPT BROADENING ROK-JAPANESE MILITARY CONTACTS PROVIDING SENSITIVITIES ARE OVERCOME GRADUALLY. THE PACE SHOULD BE MEASURED, INITIALLY LIMITED IN SCOPE AND COMBINED WITH SOLID ASSURANCES OF CONTINUED U.S. PRESENCE IN KOREA, JAPAN AND THE WESTERN PACIFIC." ONE RECENT CONVERSATION WITH A KEY MOFA OFFICIAL RESPONSIBLE FOR SECURITY QUESTIONS IS ILLUSTRATIVE. UNPRODDED AND OUT OF CONTEXT OF THE DISCUSSION, THE OFFICIAL VENTURED THAT PRESS LEAKS IN JAPAN OF BOB KOMER'S REMARKS LAST AUTUMN TO VISITING JAPANESE DIET MEMBERS HAD BEEN "MOST UN-FORTUNATE." ELABORATING ON THIS, HE SAID THAT KOMER'S APPARENT ADVOCACY OF GOJ FINANCIAL SUPPORT OF THE ROK'S MILITARY POSTURE WAS ANATHEMA TO MOST JAPANESE. "FORTUNATELY," THE OFFICIAL CONTINUED, THE LEAK HAD OMITTED THE MOST SENSITIVE SUGGESTION MADE BY KOMER: THAT JAPAN CONSIDER WORKING DIRECTLY WITH KOREA IN

TOKYO 3479

DTG:020518Z MAR 81 BSN: 035625
TOR: 070/1820Z

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*****S E C R E T*****

DATE 03/17/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT:
FOR:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHKG #3479 061052Z
O 020526Z MAR 81
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0637

~~S E C R E T~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 TOKYO 2593

NOODIS

FOR PM DIRECTOR DIRECTOR BURT AND EA-AMBASSADOR HOLDRIDGE
FROM AMBASSADOR MANSFIELD

WASHINGTON AT VARIOUS POINTS DURING THE PAST FOUR YEARS,
THE OFFICIAL LAMENTED THAT JAPANESE SENSITIVITIES WERE
SO LITTLE UNDERSTOOD IN WASHINGTON THAT THIS CONCEPT
COULD CONTINUE TO BUBBLE FORTH.

6. OTHER ASPECTS OF THE JAPAN-KOREA RELATIONSHIP REMAIN
EXTRAORDINARILY DELICATE FROM THE JAPANESE POINT OF
VIEW. THE DIET IS CURRENTLY INVOLVED IN AN IMBROGLIO
OVER WHETHER GOJ POLICY PROHIBITING ANY ARMS SALES HAD
BEEN VIOLATED IN THE CASE OF ARMOR PLATING AND SEMI-
FINISHED WEAPONS PARTS SHIPPED TO KOREA.

7. I NOTE THAT GEN WICKHAM SUGGESTS THE POSSIBILITY OF
CONVERTING COPE NORTH AND COPE JADE INTO COMBINED
US/ROK/JAPAN EXERCISES. WHILE THE LOGIC OF THIS IS
IMPECCABLE, I WOULD POINT OUT THAT THE JAPANESE STILL
INSIST ON THE FIG LEAF OF JAPAN-BASED U.S. AIRCRAFT
BEDDING DOWN IN KOREA BEFORE PARTICIPATING IN THESE
AND OTHER (E.G., TEAM SPIRIT) EXERCISES. "DIRECT
PARTICIPATION" REMAINS A TABOO; MOFA OFFICIALS WHO ARE
KNOWLEDGEABLE AND PREPARED TO BACK SUCH PARTICIPATION,
UNDERSTANDING ITS OBJECTIVES AND ITS RELEVANCE TO
JAPANESE SECURITY, TELL US THAT THEY WOULD HAVE GREAT

TOKYO 3479

DTG:020526Z MAR 81 ESN: 035626
TOR: 070/1822Z

*****S E C R E T*****

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLS 700-037/1#43
By 105, NARA, Date 7/24/06

*****~~S E C R E T~~*****

DATE 03/17/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

PROBLEMS DEFENDING SUCH PARTICIPATION IN THE DIET.

8.

FOIA(b) (1)

IN
TERMS OF BRIEFING MOFA, DEVELOPING A STRATEGY FOR
WINNING POLITICAL SUPPORT, AND PREPARING GUIDANCE TO
RESPOND TO POSSIBLE LEAKS. WE SHOULD AT MINIMUM BE
PREPARED TO ADDRESS THE POSSIBILITY THAT SUCH ACTIVITIES
AS EXCHANGE OF OBSERVERS OR INTELLIGENCE EXCHANGES WILL
BECOME PUBLIC, WILL BE READ AS THE PRELUDE TO A QUASI-
ALLIANCE SPONSORED BY THE U.S., AND WILL RAISE OBSTACLES
TO EFFECTIVE PHASE TWO U.S.-JAPAN BILATERAL PLANNING.

9. LEST ALL OF THIS SEEM EXCESSIVELY NEGATIVE, LET ME
REITERATE THAT I SUPPORT THE BROAD CONCEPT SPELLED OUT
BY BILL GINN, GEN WICKHAM, AND YOU. AS NOTED BY ALL,
THE WATCHWORDS SHOULD BE QUIET ENCOURAGEMENT, LOW-KEY
INITIATIVES, AND CAREFUL LAYING OF THE GROUNDWORK. FOR
US, THIS MEANS BRINGING THE GOJ FULLY ABOARD ON WHAT WE
ARE TRYING TO ACHIEVE. I WOULD PARTICULARLY EMPHASIZE
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CAVEAT NOTED BY GEN WICKHAM: THAT
OUR ENCOURAGEMENT BE COUPLED WITH "SOLID ASSURANCES
OF THE CONTINUED U.S. PRESENCE IN KOREA, JAPAN AND THE
WESTERN PACIFIC." OUR INTEREST ASSUREDLY WOULD NOT BE
SERVED BY FOSTERING THE SUSPICION THAT WE LACK THE
DESIRE OR THE CAPABILITY TO FULFILL OUR COMMITMENTS IN
THE AREA.

10. I LOOK FORWARD TO DISCUSSING THESE MATTERS WITH YOU
IN A FEW DAYS.

11. WITH BEST PERSONAL REGARDS, MIKE MANSFIELD.
END TEXT.
MANSFIELD

TOKYO 3479

DTG: 020526Z MAR 81 ESN: 035626
TOR: 070/1822Z

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-2 MAR 81 06 45

Department of State

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**INCOMING
TELEGRAM**

~~SECRET~~

NOD685

PAGE 01 TOKYO 02593 01 OF 02 020524Z
ACTION NODS-00

COPY 14 OF 20 COPIES

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 /001 W

-----234141 020529Z /22

O 020518Z MAR 81
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6636 ?

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 2593

NODIS

FOR PM DIRECTOR DIRECTOR BURT AND EA-AMBASSADOR HOLDRIDGE
FROM AMBASSADOR MANSFIELD

E.O. 12065: RDS-1,3 03/02/11 (MANSFIELD, M) OR-M
TAGS: MPOL, JA, MARR, KS
SUBJECT: (C) JAPAN-ROK MILITARY COOPERATION

REF: STATE 51392 (DTG 280038Z FEB 81)

1. (~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE, WHICH DISCUSSES SAME ISSUES
AS REFTEL, MAY HAVE INADVERTENTLY OMITTED DEPARTMENT
AS ADDRESSEE WHEN SENT AS TOKYO 2593 (DTG 140258Z FEB
81) AND IS THEREFORE REPEATED BELOW.

QUOTE ~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 2593

NOFORN

EO 12065: RDS-1,3 2/14/11 (MANSFIELD, M.) OR-M
TAGS: MPOL, JA, MARR, KS
SUBJECT: (C) JAPAN-ROK MILITARY COOPERATION

1. (~~SECRET~~/NOFORN - ENTIRE TEXT.)

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLS FOO-037/1#44

BY 105 NARA, DATE 7/24/06

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Department of State

**INCOMING
TELEGRAM**

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02

TOKYO 02593 01 OF 02 020524Z

2. I WANTED YOU TO BE AWARE OF THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE WHICH I SENT THROUGH OTHER CHANNELS TO ADM LONG, GEN WICKHAM, AND LTG GINN.

BEGIN TEXT.

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

FM AMBASSADOR MANSFIELD, AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO ADMIRAL LONG, CINCPAC
INFO LTGEN GINN, COMUSJAPAN
GENERAL WICKHAM, COMUSKOREA

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

JAPAN-ROK MILITARY COOPERATION (S)

A. CINCPAC 112142Z FEB 81

B. CINCPAC 112200Z FEB 81 (REPEATING AFSSO 5AF 260922Z

C. CINCPAC 112215Z FEB 81 (REPEATING SSO KOREA 300400Z

1. (~~SECRET/NOFORN~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. ALTHOUGH I WILL SEE YOU VERY SHORTLY, I WANTED TO EXPRESS MY APPRECIATION FOR REPEATING TO ME ALONG WITH YOUR OWN COMMENTS THE EXCHANGE ON JAPAN-ROK MILITARY COOPERATION. I ALSO THOUGHT THERE WOULD BE SOME ADVANTAGE IN MY JOTTING DOWN SOME PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS AND REACTIONS AS A POSSIBLE BASIS FOR DISCUSSION IN HAWAII.

~~SECRET~~

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NODIS

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*Department of State***INCOMING
TELEGRAM**~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03

TOKYO 02593 01 OF 02 020524Z

3. I FULLY SHARE WHAT I TAKE TO BE THE CONSENSUS VIEW-POINT: THAT A CLOSER JAPAN-KOREA MILITARY CONNECTION IS IN THE U.S. INTEREST AND THAT THE U.S. SHOULD ACCORDINGLY SEEK TO ACT AS A CATALYST, IDEALLY AN INVISIBLE ONE, TO BRING THIS ABOUT. UP TO A POINT I AGREE THAT THE MOMENT IS MORE OPPORTUNE NOW THAN IT HAS BEEN OWING TO THE COMMUTATION OF KIM DAE JUNG'S DEATH SENTENCE AND THE TERMINATION OF MARTIAL LAW IN THE ROK. AND I ENDORSE IN PRINCIPLE THE TYPES OF EXCEEDINGLY LOW-KEY ACTIONS SPECIFIED BY BILL GINN AND GEN WICKHAM TO NUDGE THE JAPANESE AND THE KOREANS A PACE OR TWO FORWARD.

4. HAVING SAID THIS, I WOULD STRESS THAT WHILE ATMOSPHERICS BETWEEN JAPAN AND KOREA HAVE IMPROVED AS A CONSEQUENCE OF PRESIDENT CHUN'S DECISIONS ON KIM AND MARTIAL LAW, IT IS HIGHLY PREMATURE TO THINK--AND TO PLAN--IN TERMS OF QUALITATIVE CHANGES IN THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. FOR JAPAN, KIM DAE JUNG REMAINS AN ISSUE AND A POTENTIAL DOMESTIC POLITICAL PROBLEM OF THE FIRST MAGNITUDE SO LONG AS HE IS INCARCERATED. LOOKING BEYOND THE IMMEDIATE QUESTION OF KIM AND HIS FATE, THE JAPANESE REMAIN EXTREMELY LEERY OF ANY DEFENSE/SECURITY LINKS WITH THE KOREANS, WHETHER THESE BE DIRECT BILATERAL MILITARY TIES OR INDIRECT TIES INVOLVING, FOR EXAMPLE, TOO OVERT PARTICIPATION OF JAPAN-BASED U.S. MILITARY ASSETS IN EXERCISES GEARED TO KOREAN CONTINGENCIES.

5. THE PERSPECTIVE FROM JAPAN STRIKES ME AS SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT FROM GEN WICKHAM'S CHARACTERIZATION, WHICH I ACCEPT, OF THE VIEWPOINT IN KOREA: "KOREANS WOULD PROBABLY ACCEPT BROADENING ROK-JAPANESE MILITARY CONTACTS PROVIDING SENSITIVITIES ARE OVERCOME GRADUALLY. THE PACE SHOULD BE MEASURED, INITIALLY LIMITED IN SCOPE AND COMBINED WITH SOLID ASSURANCES OF CONTINUED U.S. PRESENCE IN KOREA, JAPAN AND THE WESTERN PACIFIC." ONE RECENT

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CONVERSATION WITH A KEY MOFA OFFICIAL RESPONSIBLE FOR SECURITY QUESTIONS IS ILLUSTRATIVE. UNPRODDED AND OUT OF CONTEXT OF THE DISCUSSION, THE OFFICIAL VENTURED THAT PRESS LEAKS IN JAPAN OF BOB KOMER'S REMARKS LAST AUTUMN TO VISITING JAPANESE DIET MEMBERS HAD BEEN "MOST UN-FORTUNATE." ELABORATING ON THIS, HE SAID THAT KOMER'S APPARENT ADVOCACY OF GOJ FINANCIAL SUPPORT OF THE ROK'S "FORTUNATELY," THE OFFICIAL CONTINUED, THE LEAK HAD OMITTED THE MOST SENSITIVE SUGGESTION MADE BY KOMER: THAT JAPAN CONSIDER WORKING DIRECTLY WITH KOREA IN

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FOR PM DIRECTOR DIRECTOR BURT AND EA-AMBASSADOR HOLDRIDGE
FROM AMBASSADOR MANSFIELD

WASHINGTON AT VARIOUS POINTS DURING THE PAST FOUR YEARS,
THE OFFICIAL LAMENTED THAT JAPANESE SENSITIVITIES WERE
SO LITTLE UNDERSTOOD IN WASHINGTON THAT THIS CONCEPT
COULD CONTINUE TO BUBBLE FORTH.

6. OTHER ASPECTS OF THE JAPAN-KOREA RELATIONSHIP REMAIN
EXTRAORDINARILY DELICATE FROM THE JAPANESE POINT OF
VIEW. THE DIET IS CURRENTLY INVOLVED IN AN IMBROGLIO
OVER WHETHER GOJ POLICY PROHIBITING ANY ARMS SALES HAD
BEEN VIOLATED IN THE CASE OF ARMOR PLATING AND SEMI-
FINISHED WEAPONS PARTS SHIPPED TO KOREA.

7. I NOTE THAT GEN WICKHAM SUGGESTS THE POSSIBILITY OF
CONVERTING COPE NORTH AND COPE JADE INTO COMBINED
US/KOK/JAPAN EXERCISES. WHILE THE LOGIC OF THIS IS
IMPECCABLE, I WOULD POINT OUT THAT THE JAPANESE STILL
INSIST ON THE FIG LEAF OF JAPAN-BASED U.S. AIRCRAFT
BEDDING DOWN IN KOREA BEFORE PARTICIPATING IN THESE
AND OTHER (E.G., TEAM SPIRIT) EXERCISES. "DIRECT
PARTICIPATION" REMAINS A TABOO; MOFA OFFICIALS WHO ARE
KNOWLEDGEABLE AND PREPARED TO BACK SUCH PARTICIPATION,
UNDERSTANDING ITS OBJECTIVES AND ITS RELEVANCE TO

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PAGE 02

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JAPANESE SECURITY, TELL US THAT THEY WOULD HAVE GREAT PROBLEMS DEFENDING SUCH PARTICIPATION IN THE DIET.

8. WE SHOULD ALSO CONSIDER HOW OUR ACTIONS AS CATALYST TO A CLOSER JAPAN-ROK SECURITY RELATIONSHIP MIGHT IMPACT ON PHASE TWO OF U.S.-JAPAN BILATERAL MILITARY PLANNING. WE HAVE NOT YET COME TO GRIPS WITH HOW TO MANAGE THE POLITICALLY MOST SENSITIVE ASPECT OF THIS--JAPANESE SUPPORT FOR U.S. FORCES IN A KOREAN CONTINGENCY--IN TERMS OF BRIEFING MOFA, DEVELOPING A STRATEGY FOR WINNING POLITICAL SUPPORT, AND PREPARING GUIDANCE TO RESPOND TO POSSIBLE LEAKS. WE SHOULD AT MINIMUM BE PREPARED TO ADDRESS THE POSSIBILITY THAT SUCH ACTIVITIES AS EXCHANGE OF OBSERVERS OR INTELLIGENCE EXCHANGES WILL BECOME PUBLIC, WILL BE READ AS THE PRELUDE TO A QUASI-ALLIANCE SPONSORED BY THE U.S., AND WILL RAISE OBSTACLES TO EFFECTIVE PHASE TWO U.S.-JAPAN BILATERAL PLANNING.

9. LEST ALL OF THIS SEEM EXCESSIVELY NEGATIVE, LET ME REITERATE THAT I SUPPORT THE BROAD CONCEPT SPELLED OUT BY BILL GINN, GEN WICKHAM, AND YOU. AS NOTED BY ALL, THE WATCHWORDS SHOULD BE QUIET ENCOURAGEMENT, LOW-KEY INITIATIVES, AND CAREFUL LAYING OF THE GROUNDWORK. FOR US, THIS MEANS BRINGING THE GOJ FULLY ABOARD ON WHAT WE ARE TRYING TO ACHIEVE. I WOULD PARTICULARLY EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CAVEAT NOTED BY GEN WICKHAM: THAT OUR ENCOURAGEMENT BE COUPLED WITH "SOLID ASSURANCES OF THE CONTINUED U.S. PRESENCE IN KOREA, JAPAN AND THE WESTERN PACIFIC." OUR INTEREST ASSUREDLY WOULD NOT BE SERVED BY FOSTERING THE SUSPICION THAT WE LACK THE DESIRE OR THE CAPABILITY TO FULFILL OUR COMMITMENTS IN THE AREA.

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10. I LOOK FORWARD TO DISCUSSING THESE MATTERS WITH YOU
IN A FEW DAYS.

11. WITH BEST PERSONAL REGARDS, MIKE MANSFIELD.

END TEXT.

MANSFIELD

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TO ALLEN

FROM GREGG

DOC DATE 03 MAR 81

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KEYWORDS: JAPAN

IMPORT CONTROLS

AMAYA, NAOHIRO

SUBJECT: AMAYA RPT TO SUZUKI ON US - JAPAN AUTOMOBILE ISSUE

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL WITH
SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

March 3, 1981

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: RICHARD V. ALLEN
FROM: DONALD GREGG *DG*
SUBJECT: US-Japan Automobile Issue (U)

Attached (Tab A) is a good CIA report showing that Amaya of MITI took back with him a clear view of the difficulty of the automobile issue and of the need for Japan to take some action. Suzuki's cautious reaction, in which he cites declining Japanese auto profits, seems typical of the man's approach. (U)

Amaya plans to return to the US in mid-March with a Japanese plan to take the pressure off the US auto industry. As of now the outlines of this plan look very obscure. (U)

attachment

*for
The Japanese think they
are going to the woodshed.
John
3/5*

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SECRET ATTACHMENT~~
Review March 3, 1987

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DATE 03/11/81

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PAGE 01

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FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 0718
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA NIACT IMMEDIATE 4286
BT

~~S E C R E T~~ TOKYO 03882

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TAGS: MNUC, MARR, AS, US, JA
SUBJECT: (S) U.S.-GOA 8-52 AGREEMENT
REF: (A) STATE 52140, (S) STATE 44822

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. EMBASSY CONCURS IN REVISED FRASER STATEMENT (REF A)
FOR USE IN CONJUNCTION WITH AGREEMENT (REF B).
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