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FOIA ID: F00-037 (1539), Oberdorfer

Date: 02/02/2004

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NO. 8. TYPE		THE PERSON NAMED IN	
1. Note	Bud to Judge re PM Nakasone's Defense Initiatives, 1p.	7/7/83	BL
2. Memo	R 7/24/66 F00-037/1 #51Z Philip Dur, et al to Clark re Nakasone's Defense Initiatives, 2p R 11 #513	6/30/83	BL
3. Memo	Clark to George Shultz, et al re Presidential Reply, 2p	nd	BI
. Memo	Norman Bailey to Clark re Trip Report – Japan, 3p	7/7/83	81
. Report	US-Japan Working Group Experts Meeting, 6p	nd	B1
6. Memo	Sigur/Tyson to Clark re Briefing for Former President Carter, 1p R 7/24/06 F00-037/1 # 517	7/14/83	BI
7. Talking Points	Briefing for Carter, 2p	nd	BI
3. Cable	3000851Z JUL 83, 1p	7/30/83	B1

RESTRICTIONS

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].

B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].

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B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].

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B-7c Release could reasonably be expected to cause unwarranted invasion or privacy [(b)(7)(C) of the FOIA]. B-7d Release could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source [(b)(7)(D) of the FOIA].

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File Folder

JAPAN (06/30/1983-07/30/1983)

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1 NOTE	BUD TO JUDGE RE PM NAKASONE'S	1	- 7/7/1983 -	MVH	5/21/02
2 MEMO	DEFENSE INITIATIVES (F00-037/1#512) DUR ET AL TO CLARK RE NAKASON'ES DEFENSE INITIATIVES (F00-037/1#513)		-6/30/1983 -	. WAN	5/21/08

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THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

7/7/83

Judge

I think it is sensible. It may suffer what we are experiencing in other regions; that is, rejection because it was "not invented here (at State)".

To get around that, I would think it would be wise for Don Forteir and perhaps Gaston to have a lunch with Paul Wolfowitz where the idea could be seeded at the working level. They might inlude Rich Armitage who ought to have some good ideas for how our DOD ENLY WOLF WOULD WOULD WOULD UP.

Bud

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BY 185 NARA, DATE 7/24/06

MEMORANDUM



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET

June 30, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM:

PHILIP A. DUR

GASTON J. SIGUR

DONALD R. FORTIER

SUBJECT:

Responding to Prime Minister Nakasone's Defense

Initiatives

The President's forthcoming trip to Japan will afford the opportunity to respond in a helpful and reassuring way to Prime Minister Nakasone's initiatives first announced during his visit here last February. Heretofore, our dialogue with Japan on defense has consisted of repeated exhortations to do more, and all-too public criticisms when they failed to hit the mark we have set for them.

The criticism is well-founded and we need to keep pressing the Japanese to fund the defense programs which both countries agree are needed. At the same time, however, we can help Nakasone to press his own reluctant ministers—and especially the more liberal wing of his party—by providing him with concrete expressions of the security benefits Japan can derive from increased cooperation with the U.S. and from higher levels of investment in defense.

President Reagan's response to Nakasone's bold initiatives (e.g., mining the Sea of Japan Straits, helping with the Soviet Backfire Threat, etc.) would be to recognize the initiatives publicly and to respond privately with complimentary initiatives of our own. Some of the things which come to mind are measures which greatly increase the interoperability of U.S. and Japanese forces, especially tactical air force (U.S. AWACs--Japanese E-2C; U.S. and Japanese F-15s) and naval forces (U.S. and Japanese ASW forces).

Another category of initiatives might be described as improved bilateral force cooperation or even modest force integration. For example, we could draw on the NATO Standing Naval Force Atlantic (a multinational force with ships provided by all the Atlantic powers) precedent and propose the establishment of a similar U.S.-Japanese force for the northwest Pacific/Sea of Japan. Such a force, very modest in size, could specialize in ASW and be exercised in a way that the Japanese Government could point to the benefits of cooperation with us. As for naval missions, the concept could also be extended to mining and mine countermeasures.

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Another illustrative example is the Japanese air defense system. Both we and the Japanese have fighter aircraft based on the main islands and (in our case) on Okinawa. Indeed, with the recognition of the Soviet air threat, we have recently agreed to deploy a wing of USAF F-16 aircraft to Hokkaido. It seems to us that both governments could derive considerable benefit were we to somehow integrate our assets in Japan and institutionalize the cooperation between our tactical air forces.

We are not talking about the trappings of an alliance with Japan, but we are suggesting a much closer military relationship than we have. If accepted, the initiatives we have in mind will gradually lead to pressures for a change in the strategic relationship, and induce Japan to accept a more significant role in the defense of our common interests.

We might also profit from means to better coordinate our foreign assistance with the Japanese. Since the Nakasone government appears interested in exploring how we might coordinate and plan better, we believe there may be utility in the President's formally proposing such a mechanism during his visit. RECOMMENDATION

If you agree that the President might respond to Prime Minister Nakasone's initiatives in the manner suggested, we recommend you sign out the tasker at Tab I to get State and Defense thinking Disapprove _ along these lines.

Approve

Attachment

Tab I - Clark Memo to Shultz and Weinberger





WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE \ HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ

The Secretary of State

THE HONORABLE CASPAR W. WEINBERGER

The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT:

A Presidential Reply to Prime Minister Nakasone's Defense Initiatives (X)

As we prepare for the President's forthcoming visit to Japan, it seems that one subject which warrants careful consideration is the state of U.S.-Japanese defense cooperation. More specifically, I would appreciate your thoughts on how the President could respond to the Prime Minister's bold initiatives in the defense and foreign assistance fields. (%)

We will no doubt want to maintain steady pressure for a greater level of effort from the Japanese to develop the capabilities and meet the missions prescribed for the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF). Having said that, it seems that we might be able to help the Prime Minister overcome some domestic criticism and the negative inertia within his government and party by offering tangible evidence that we welcome the Nakasone pronouncements and that we are prepared to acknowledge in a tangible way his offers of closer cooperation with the U.S.

To this end, would you undertake a review of how the President might respond and what we could offer Japan by way of closer cooperation. I would be particularly interested in your thoughts about prospects for an "on-call" or even a "standing" bilateral naval force in the northwestern Pacific drawing on the NATO models. Another illustrative example of what might be feasible is an integrated air defense system for Japanese air-space and the contiguous areas which could be threatened from the Soviet Far East. These examples are by no means exclusive but merely representative of some of my thoughts.

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The Japanese have also indicated a willingness to be more supportive in the area of foreign assistance policy. Given our own resource constraints and the magnitude of our existing commitments, we need to think of ways to improve and systematize our foreign assistance cooperation with the Japanese. We should aim first, perhaps, at a mechanism for greater coordination and planning, rather than trying to secure a commitment for large new resources. This too would be a way of responding positively to what the Japanese have already done, and yet would provide a more formal means for inducing the Japanese to do more over time. Perhaps, the establishment of such a mechanism could be announced by the President during the time of his visit. Your thoughts on this subject would also be appreciated.

William P Clark





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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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July 7, 1983

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INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM:

NORMAN A. BAILEY

SUBJECT:

Trip Report -- Japan

While in Tokyo from June 28 to July 6, I saw the following people and groups:

Chief Cabinet Secretary Gotoda (to whom I gave your letter).

Minister of Foreign Affairs Abe

Minister of Finance Takeshita (at Don Regan's request)

Minister of International Trade and Industry Uno

The Deputy and Vice Ministers of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and Industry

The Chairman of the Diet Committees on International Affairs and Energy as well as other LDP officials

The Chairman and other board members of the Japan National Oil Company

Former Minister of Finance Watanabe

The President and board members of the Industrial Bank of Japan

Many businessmen, including the President of SODECO (Sakhalin project), utility, oil company, steel company, trading company executives and others

Ambassador Mansfield and other Embassy officials

Retired executive and close friend of Prime Minister Nakasone, Sejima

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BY ______ NARA, DATE 7/24/00

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I addressed the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in Japan.

At all of these meetings (except Takeshita, which was on the subject of Japanese domestic economic policy and response to the debt crisis), I stressed the following themes:

- 1. The vital importance of U.S.-Japanese relations.
- 2. The shift of economic power to the Pacific Basin.
- 3. The complementarity of the U.S. and Japanese economies.
- 4. The dedication of the President to the Pacific Basin concept.
- 5. The necessity to counteract negative tendencies and put U.S.-Japanese relations firmly on the right track.
- 6. The necessity of doing this before and during the President's November trip since after both countries will be in electoral periods.
- 7. The contribution that can be made to all this by energy cooperation.

As to the meetings themselves, the Experts Meeting went well and the report is attached (Tab I). All the language we wanted is in it, especially concerning the necessity of long-term purchase contracts if costs are to be brought down and the stress on Alaskan gas and coal. Bill Martin did yeoman work here.

The plenary of the U.S.-Japan Energy Working Group resulted in a press release (Tab II) that is excellent from our point of view, hitting on all the essential points. We drafted it and the relevant passages are marked.

I prenegotiated the Japanese final position: (1) encouragement of private negotiations, (2) joint study of bringing down metallurgical coal costs, funded by MITI, (3) promise of concrete action on utility conversion (from oil to gas and coal) program, metcoal supply pledges and negotiations on all fuels before the President's visit. Some negotiations are already taking place (Tab III).

Further information promised by our side will be furnished by the end of August, and they will complete their 1990's projections by September, after which the Experts Group will meet again, perhaps in Alaska. There may or may not be another meeting of the U.S.-Japan Energy Working Group before the President's visit.

There is progress and the Pacific Basin concept is moving ahead. The Japanese bureaucracy is moving with what for them





is blinding speed. The vital nature of the President's visit is well understood. Incidentally, the Japanese would be pleased if the President would stay at the State Guest House and not at the Ambassador's residence. Among other things, security is easier.

Other observations:

- 1. The Japanese have the serious intention and plan to stimulate their domestic economy through fiscal and monetary measures. This will help the trade balance somewhat but may further weaken the yen.
- 2. If we will back down from our all or nothing attitude towards beef, citrus and tobacco exports to Japan, the quotas can be substantially lifted.
- 3. American business has not moved aggressively to test the liberalization measures already taken by the Nakasone government.

Attachments

Tab I Report of Experts Meeting

Tab II Press Release

Tab III Letter to Murofushi

cc: Martin
Sigur
Robinson
Tyson
McMinn

The sure of the su

The Report of the Japan-US Energy Working Group Experts Meeting

In preparation for the second meeting of the Japan-U.S. Energy Working Group, experts from both Japan and the U.S. met in Tokyo on 28 and 29 June, 1983 to discuss global energy supply and demand and review Japan-U.S. relations in coal, natural gas and oil on a sector-by-sector basis. They agreed to submit the present report for consideration by the Working Group on 4 and 5 July, 1983.

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PRESS RELEASE

The Japan-United States Energy Working Group, formed by Prime Minister Nakasone and President Reagan to promote a cooperative relationship in energy, held its second meeting in Tokyo July 4 and 5, 1983 at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The U.S. delegation was chaired by Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Allen Wallis with Special Assistant to the President Norman Bailey serving as Vice Chairman. The Japanese delegation was co-chaired by Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs Moriyuki Motono and Vice-Minister of International Trade and Industry Kunio Komatsu.

Drawing upon technical work done by experts, the Working Group discussed the global energy outlook and the situations in the U.S. and Japan with respect to energy, and examined how greater cooperation can be achieved by governments and private enterprises in oil, coal and natural gas.

The two delegations acknowledged that sound expansion in Japan-U.S. energy trade would help further develop the close economic relations between the two countries.

The Working Group noted that the current relative stability in energy markets is not likely to continue through the 1990's and agreed that both countries should continue their efforts to diversify their sources of supply. The two delegations recognized the importance of long-term U.S.-Japan energy cooperation, the central role of the private sectors and the need for a balance between energy security and economic cost.

The U.S. pointed to the abundant energy resources of oil, coal and gas in the United States, its reliability as a supplier and the need for long-term supply contracts for some fuels to encourage the necessary investment. The Japanese delegation stressed that in revising its long-term energy plans on the basis of reduced expectations of economic growth, of changes in industrial structure and of the effects of energy conservation, the reduction of energy costs is a national priority.

The Working Group agreed to continue its efforts to explore areas of cooperation in coal, oil and gas, taking into account economic and commercial viability. In particular

the two sides agreed to examine the impact of coal transportation factors and long-term contracts on the delivered price in Japan of U.S. coal as well as possible means to reduce this price. The two sides also agreed to discuss further the liquefied natural gas demand and supply situation in both countries, including the possibility for joint development of Alaskan LNG.

A list of the delegations is attached.

JAPAN-U.S. ENERGY WORKING GROUP

July 4 and 5, 1983

Japanese Delegation

Moriyuki Motono

Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Foreign

Affairs

Kunio Komatsu

Vice Minister for International Affairs, Ministry of International

Trade and Industry

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Minoru Endo

Deputy Director-General of the Economic Affairs Bureau

Shunji Maruyama

Director of the First Resources Division, Economic Affairs Bureau

Kiyohiko Nanao

Director of the Second North America Division, North American

Affairs Bureau

Tadanori Inomata

Deputy Director of the First Resources Division, Economic

Affairs Bureau

Shin'ichi Kitajima

Deputy Director of the Second North America Division, North

American Affairs Bureau

Ministry of Finance

Masayoshi Hasegawa

Special Officer for Research and Planning, Minister's Secretariat

Ministry of International Trade and Industry

Hiroshi Kawasaki Deputy Director-General of

the Agency of Natural Resources

and Energy

Takashi Okabe Director of the International

Division, Director-General's Secretariat, Agency of Natural

Resources and Energy

Mitsuo Watanabe Director of the Electric Power

Development Division, Public Utilities Department, Agency of Natural Resources and Energy

Tsuneo Osumi Director of the Development

Division, Petroleum Department, Agency of Natural Resources and

Energy

Toshihiko Nakamura Director for Coal Import Policy

Planning, Agency of Natural Resources and Energy, MITI

Shigeo Shimada Director for Petroleum Policy

Planning, Petroleum Department, Agency of Natural Resources and

Energy

Nobuyori Kodaira Deputy Director of the American-

Oceania Division, International

Trade Policy Bureau

Ministry of Transport

Takemasa Sakata Senior Officer for International

Shipping, Bureau of Shipping

Satoshi Iwamura Driector of the Energy Policy

Division, Secretariat to the

Minister

Economic Planning Agency

Takeomi Satoda Director of the Industrial

Economic Affairs Division,

Coordination Bureau

JAPAN-U.S. ENERGY WORKING GROUP

July 4 and 5, 1983

U.S. Delegation

Chairman

W. Allen Wallis

Under Secretary for Economic Affairs, State Department

Vice-Chairman

Norman Bailey

Special Assistant to the President, Executive Office of the President

State Department

Richard T. Mccormack

Assistant Secretary of State for

Economic and Business Affairs

Anthony C. Albrecht

Deputy Assistant Secretary,

Bureau of East Asian and

Pacific Affairs

E. Allan Wendt

Deputy Assistant Secretary,

Bureau of Economic and

Business Affairs

Marshall Casse

Executive Assistant to the Under

Secretary for Economic Affairs

Michael Michalak

Economic Officer, Office of Japanese Affairs, Bureau of

East Asian and Pacific Affairs

Karen Weaver

Special Assistant to the Under

Secretary for Economic Affairs

National Security Council

William Martin

Director, International Economic

Affairs

Department of Energy

William J. Silvey

Associate Director, Planning and Analysis

Denise Dwyer

International Economist,

Office of International Affairs

Department of Interior

Alexander H. Good

Deputy Solicitor

United States Trade Representative

William Triplett

Director, East West Trade Policy

Department of Commerce

Paul T. O'day

Acting Assistant Secretary

for Trade Development, International

Trade Administration

Joseph J. Yancik

Director, Coal Staff

Department of Treasury

Charles Schotta

Deputy Assistant Secretary

for Commodities and Natural Resources

U.S. Embassy

William Piez

Minister-Counsellor for Economic

Affairs

Charles E. Angevine

Counsellor for Economic Affairs

William P. Rapp

Counsellor for Commercial Affairs

Marc A. Baas

First Secretary

July 1, 1983

Mr. M. Murofushi General Manager New Business Planning & Development Department C. Itoh & Co., Ltd. 5-1, Kita-Aoyama 2-Chome. Minato-Ku, Tokyo JAPAN

Dear Mr. Murofushi:

I appreciated talking with you yesterday and having Messrs. Ohkawa, Ishii and Nakaguchi in Anchorage this week to discuss with us the possibility for developing an LNG or urea project in the Cook Inlet area. I believe the discussions and field examination were productive.

I agree with you that C. Itoh should continue to pursue the preliminary feasibility and market study of a possible LNG or urea project in the Cook Inlet area for exportation to Japan as you informed us you are pursuing. If your study results show that the market exists for either project so that the economics and wellhead price for the gas justify pursuing the project, we would be prepared to negotiate a joint pursuit with you.

As we discussed in our telephone conversation, CIRI will be meeting with ARCO, Texaco and Chevron officials over the next several months to discuss their potential interest in jointly pursuing a Cook Inlet LNG project. Once the results of your preliminary study are reviewed, a joint meeting among all of us would be in order.

We also will be attempting to set up a meeting for you with Governor Sheffield of Alaska between July 18 and July 22 to also discuss the potential projects.

We appreciate your interest and look forward to your study results.

Sincerely,

COOK INLET REGION, INC.

George Y. Kriste/ Executive Vice President

GVK/p

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MEMORANDUM

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CONFIDENTIAL

July 14, 1983

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

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FROM:

GASTON J. SIGUR

CHARLES P. TYSON

SUBJECT:

Telephone Briefing of Former President Jimmy Carter

on Japan, July 13, 3:05-3:20 p.m.

On your instructions we briefed by telephone President Carter on Japan. He leaves for Tokyo tomorrow.

The former president told us that he planned to spend time in Japan with political leaders, including Prime Minister Nakasone, academicians, business leaders and the media, as well as with Ambassador Mansfield.

The briefing went along the lines of the talking points attached to this memorandum (Tab A).

President Carter had a number of comments to make and questions to ask which are of interest:

- 1) He did not know that President Reagan was going to Asia in November. We gave him a run-down on the President's planned itinerary.
- 2) He asked about the visit of the New Jersey to Japan and possible adverse Japanese reaction. We answered that we anticipate no major problem.
- 3) He asked about Japanese views on U.S.-China relations. We responded that the Japanese have made it clear that they want good U.S.-China ties and are pleased that things are warming up between us and China. He expressed his agreement with this.
- 4) He wanted to know if we were going to officially express our concern over the inadequate increase in Japanese projected defense expeditures for next year's budget. We said that the budget process is still going on and won't be finally concluded until December, and that we would make our views known to the Japanese government through normal, regular channels.

After we finished the substantive discussion, Mr. Carter thanked us for calling and expressed his appreciation.

Attachment:

Tab A Talking points

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TALKING POINTS PREPARED BY GASTON SIGUR FOR TELEPHONE CALL TO FORMER PRESIDENT CARTER JULY 13, 1983

Briefing of President Carter prior to his trip to Japan.

- -- Recent election for Japan's Upper House has given strength to Nakasone. Increased prestige and power within LDP. Tanaka sentencing on October 12 can be a problem for Nakasone because of their close ties.
- -- US-Japan relations central to our policies in Asia and the Pacific and the relations are strong.
- -- President Reagan and Prime Minister Nakasone have good and close personal rapport.
- -- Prime Minister wants to do everything possible to sustain, broaden and deepen our relationship and, of course, so do we.
- -- We are committed to working together with Japan, not only to promote peace and stability in Asia and the Pacific, but throughout the world.
- -- On the President's coming visit to Japan, we will emphasize the positive nature of our ties with Japan and the necessity for U.S.- Japanese cooperation. After all, we are the two greatest industrial nations in the Free World.
- -- There are some problems in our relationship, as you well know, dealing with trade matters and defense.
- -- On defense, we are disappointed in the 6.9% increase for next year that Cabinet is seeking. Hope this can be improved upon before final decision in December - Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) is planned to increase by 11.4%. This is good.
- -- On trade, Nakasone government has moved quite a distance on legislation affecting certification and in taking other steps, e.g., with tobacco to ease Japanese restrictions on imports. But more must be done.
- -- Have a problem with agricultural products. Have taken this to GATT and hope for a solution prior to President Reagan's trip in November.
- -- On limitations of number of Japanese autos to come to U.S., we have hopes that a new agreement can be struck to take the place of the old agreement which lapses next year.

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- -- Industrial policy and targetting. Discussions with Japanese going on. Hearings in Congress on 24th of July.
- -- We hope that President Reagan's trip to Japan will give both us and the Japanese the impetus needed to reconcile a number of the problems in our relationship.
- -- We want to move on to spending our time on working out ways that we can cooperate more in economic terms -- not only regionally but also globally -- and in defense.

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National Security Council The White House

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