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Collection: Executive Secretariat, NSC: Meeting Files
Folder Title: NSC0004 27 Feb 1981 [Poland,
Caribbean Basin, F-15, El Salvador] (3 of 4)

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: MEETING FILE

Withdrawer

CAS 12/12/2004

File Folder NSC 00004 2/27/81 [POLAND, CARIBBEAN BASIN, F-15, EL SALVADOR] (3/4)

FOIA

2000-002

Box Number 91282

SKINNER

5

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
848	MEMO	RICHARD ALLEN TO THE VICE PRESIDENT ET AL INCLUDING ATTACHED SUMMARY RE F-15 R 2/22/2008 F00-002 #852	3	2/28/1981	B1
849	SUMMARY	OF CONCLUSIONS (MINUTES OF MEETING) PP. 2- 6 PAR 11/16/2011 M109/1	5	ND	B1
852	SUMMARY	OF CONCLUSIONS RE F-15 (MINUTES OF MEETING)	3	ND	B1
858	MEMO	ROBERT KIMMITT TO ALLEN RE F-15 R 2/22/2008 F00-002	1	2/24/1981	B1
861	MEMO	ALLEN TO THE PRESIDENT RE F-15 R 2/22/2008 F00-002	1	ND	B1
863	MEMO	ALEXANDER HAIG TO RR RE MILITARY EQUIPMENT FOR SAUDI ARABIA R 6/6/2006	1	2/24/1981	B1
864	TALKING POINTS	RE MILITARY EQUIPMENT (ATTACHMENT TO ITEM #863) R 6/6/2006	5	ND	B1
867	TALKING POINTS	RE F-15	3	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
871	TALKING POINTS	RE F-15 ITEMS <i>R 6/6/2006</i>	4	ND	B1
873	TALKING POINTS	RE F-15 SUPPORT <i>R 6/6/2006</i>	2	ND	B1
876	TALKING POINTS	RE F-15 ITEMS <i>R 6/6/2006</i>	3	ND	B1
878	CABLE	010131Z <i>R 5/11/2010 M109/1</i>	3	3/1/1981	B1
909	CABLE	010132Z <i>R 5/11/2010 M109/1</i>	3	3/1/1981	B1

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RECEIVED 02 MAR 81 15

TO AGENCIES

FROM ALLEN

DOCDATE 28 FEB 81

White House G:

just 28, 1991

KEYWORDS: EL SALVADOR

NSC

SOC

SUBJECT: D/R 050 SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS OF 27 FEB NSC MTG

ACTION: ALLEN SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE: STATUS CD FILES IFM O

FOR ACTION

FOR-COMMENT

FOR INFO

FONTAINE

LENZ

COMMENTS

REF# LOG 3100731 3100768 NSC/FID NSC00004 (C / C)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C)

3/2/81

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Jeanne,

Please mail copies to
AG, US Rep to UN. I
will take care of VP,
~~and Schmitt~~ - OBM.
M/B and other copies
have been LDKed.

K

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: MEETING FILES: RECORDS

File Folder

NSC 0004 2/27/81 [POLAND, CARIBBEAN BASIN, F-15, EL
SALVADOR] (3/4)

Box Number

91282

Withdrawer

CAS 12/12/2004

FOIA

2000-002

SKINNER

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ID	Document Type Document Description	No of pages	Doc Date	Restric- tions
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~~SECRET~~

862

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

February 27, 1981

Time and Place: 4:30-5:20 PM, Cabinet Room, White House

Subject: El Salvador and Saudi F-15s (S)

Participants:

State

Secretary Alexander M. Haig, Jr.

OSD

Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger

Deputy Secretary Frank C. Carlucci

Justice

Attorney General William French Smith

OMB

William Schneider, Jr., Associate Director for National Security
and International Security Affairs

CIA

Director William J. Casey

John McMahon, Director for Operations

USUN

Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick

JCS

General David C. Jones

White House

Edwin Meese, III

James A. Baker, III

Richard V. Allen

Charles Tyson (El Salvador only)

NSC

Janet Colson

Roger Fontaine (El Salvador only)

Donald Gregg (El Salvador only)

Major Robert Kimmitt (Saudi Arabia only)

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Review 2/27/91

Extended by Richard Allen

Reason: NSC 1.13(g)

DECLASSIFIED
White House, August 28, 1997
By CS JARA, Date 11/2/14

~~SECRET~~

Summary of Conclusions

Mr. Allen reviewed the agenda mentioning El Salvador and F-15s for Saudi Arabia. He then introduced Secretary Haig and Director Casey to review their papers. (S)

Secretary Haig stressed the interdepartmental paper stresses short-term holding actions that will shore up the Salvadorean government while a long-term strategy would include the Cuban dimension. (S)

The Secretary said there had been differences of opinion, but they had been resolved. The agreement was to send in MTTs but there was a question of where they would be placed and whether they would be in uniform or not. (S)

He then presented the options and gave State's views. They were to move promptly because Duarte asked for them and the country team had agreed with the requests. (S)

Secretary Haig added that in the last two weeks the press has created a furor over it and it was his view that we should not back down under public pressure. The Secretary also said the MTTs will be restrained and their time in El Salvador is temporary. (S)

The President asked if the MTTs will remain in garrison or would they accompany the troops? (S)

Secretary Weinberger pointed out the specific restrictions on the MTTs. They would not go on patrol. They would not accompany on helicopter combat missions. They would use arms only in self-defense. They would not be stationed in areas where guerrillas are strong. (S)

The Secretary also said he now understands that San Salvador is no safer than other places. The attempt is to recognize risk without pretending risk can be eliminated completely. He then mentioned the War Powers Act. (S)

Secretary Haig observed that Congress be kept informed and Secretary Weinberger agreed and added, we are not seeking Congressional approval. But the Congress should be informed of the constraints on the MTT. (S)

Mr. Baker then asked if the MTT personnel would remain in uniform? Both General Jones and Secretary Weinberger believed they should be in uniform. (S)

The President then asked who in the Congress would be notified? (S)

Secretary Haig observed that there was some misunderstanding in the Congress. It must be made clear to them that we are there at the Duarte government's invitation. (S)

Ambassador Kirkpatrick stated that in a conversation with Ambassador White before some 60 Congressmen there was a sentiment against aiding the government. We have to make it clear Duarte wants the aid and we must confront this issue directly. (S)

Secretary Haig said that White had bottled up government requests -- that he rewrote cables. In talking to Duarte today, it is clear he wants these items badly. They need an early demonstration of our intentions. (S)

Director Casey



Secretary Haig expressed his enthusiasm for the Casey paper. He added there was a special working group on Cuba and all of this should be put together now for a senior review. He pointed out the need to have the overt blend with the covert. (S)

Director Casey expressed his reluctance to lose more time and hoped the process would get started. (S)

The Vice President expressed his concern in placing our MTT personnel -- especially one getting killed. (S)

Secretary Weinberger reviewed the constraints and reminded everyone that San Salvador is no safer than other training sites. (S)

The President observed that the two labor people were killed in the capital. The President meant to say that our men were in other places taking risks. But it was far better to do it in uniform in an open mission than trying to hide it. (S)

Mr. Meese said it was important to call them training personnel and not advisors. (S)

Secretary Haig emphasized the need to talk to the press on this. (S)

The Vice President asked where were our personnel currently deployed? (S)

General Jones said they are in San Salvador, but the naval MTTs will be on the coast. (S)

Secretary Weinberger expressed some concern regarding locating our men in Paraiso, but the area was fairly secure. (S)

Deputy Secretary Carlucci stated the greatest risk our people will face is an urban terrorist attack in San Salvador. (S)

Mr. Baker asked since we are losing the propaganda war, are we better off with them in uniform? (S)

Secretary Weinberger said that if they are caught without their uniforms, they could be executed. (S)

Secretary Haig emphatically supported them in uniform. Avoid the Laos approach. Don't sneak them in. (S)

Director Casey asked when this would begin to pay off? (S)

Secretary Weinberger said over a period of a few weeks, perhaps months. It was hard to say. (S)

Gheeral Jones then broke down the MTTs into their component parts and mentioned that OPAT would remain in San Salvador while the SUTs would be in two garrisons. (S)

Attorney General Smith asked if the men were volunteering. The answer was yes. (S)

Ambassador Kirkpatrick asked if helicopter maintenance and pilot training couldn't be done by civilians on contract. (S)

Secretary Weinberger said it could be done either way. (S)

Secretary Haig then outlined the funding options. One was \$5 million in reprogrammed aid. The second involved \$20 million under Section 506 which drew down on present stocks. Neither required Congressional action. (S)

The President asked what the \$20 million would be. (S)

Secretary Haig said most importantly four helicopters costing \$7 million. (S)

The Vice President asked if the MTTs could be given a time limit term of service. (S)

Secretary Haig said we cannot give a specific time, but emphasized they are temporary. (S)

General Jones observed that individual orders will be for six months. (S)

The Vice President observed that if we could put them in to do a job and then pull them out, it would be effective for our public position. (S)

~~SECRET~~

The President asked if other Central American countries could be involved? (S)

Deputy Secretary Carlucci said that one MTT for Honduras is being considered. (S)

General Jones recommended that a survey team go in at once. (S)

The President said this could be a part of a regional policy, but the countries will have to ask for it. (S)

Secretary Haig said the next item was improving interdiction and intelligence, especially to stop infiltration by water. That involves lookout posts along the coast. (S)

There was then discussion between Secretary Haig and Director Casey on blending the intelligence and training operations. (S)

Secretary Haig preferred to defer a decision on this until the Casey plan was integrated with the SIG paper. (S)

Secretary Weinberger hoped that it could be sorted out -- who was doing what -- by the next meeting. (S)

Mr. Allen suggested that the covert action plan be finished and blended in by Monday. Delay would result in a better product. (S)

Secretary Haig added that this would include Cuba. (S)

Director Casey agreed to this. (S)

Secretary Haig then reviewed the decisions agreed on: (1) MTTs, (2) the funding in two packages -- \$5 million and \$20 million, and (3) the survey team for Honduras. (S)

Mr. Allen asked when they would go in? (S)

General Jones said within several weeks with one officer going to Honduras to brief the government and our Ambassadors with survey team action. (S)

The President then asked about Guatemala? (S)

Mr. Allen said we are making some diplomatic overtures and we are working on the Belize issue. (S)

Secretary Haig said that Carrington expressed his fear we were pro-Guatemala, and in a sense we were. (S)

Mr. Meese then reviewed the three decisions once more. (S)

Mr. Baker asked about the War Powers Act. Would deploying the MTTs outside the capital involve the WPA. What was the legal opinion? (S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

8

Attorney General Smith believed Secretary Weinberger's language avoided the problem. (S)

The question then became who specifically in the Congress needs to be informed. This needs to be worked out. (S)

Mr. Meese's suggestion is that consulting be as routine as possible with ordinary channel contacts. (S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 28, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE VICE PRESIDENT
 THE SECRETARY OF STATE
 THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
 THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
 THE UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO
 THE UNITED NATIONS
 THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
 COUNSELLOR TO THE PRESIDENT
 CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
 THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of NSC Meeting,
 February 27, 1981

Following for your information is the Summary of Conclusions of the
 NSC meeting on El Salvador:

- Deploy a single five-man Operational Planning Assistance Team (OPAT) and three five-man Small Unit Training Teams (SUT), for a total of 20 additional personnel, as requested by the Government of El Salvador and approved by our Ambassador with support of his entire country team. (S)
- Teams may be deployed to garrisons outside of San Salvador as the Ambassador (Chief of Mission) may direct. (S)
- Reprogram \$5M in FY 81 FMS for El Salvador. (S)
- Provide \$20M in FY 81 under Section 506a, Foreign Assistance Act, for El Salvador. (S)
- Deploy a military survey team to Honduras to determine requirements. (S)
- Integrate the CIA and DOD plans and programs. (S)
- Consult informally with Congress; War Powers Resolution does not apply to present circumstances. (S)

cc: Wm Schneider

Richard V. Allen
 Richard V. Allen
 Assistant to the President for
 National Security Affairs

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Review on Feb. 28, 1987

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F00-002# 852 #848 RW 11-17-01

BY LOT, NARA, DATE 2/22/08

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

(El Salvador)

It was concluded that prompt action needed to be taken to shore up the GOES. It was also concluded that training personnel would be in uniform and would be deployed in garrisons outside San Salvador. The MTTs, however, would be there in a strictly training capacity and specific prohibitions against any combat advisory role were agreed on.

It was decided that Congress be consulted informally and on as routine a basis as possible.

It was also decided to continue work on a longer-term strategy which would carefully blend both covert and overt actions.

The short-term decisions were:

- sending the additional MTTs;
- funding additional military assistance from \$5 million of reprogrammed aid and \$20 million under Section 506;
- sending in a MTT survey team to Honduras.

Summary of Conclusions
(Saudi Arabia)

Saudi F-15 Enhancement

- The President gave final approval to the February 6, 1981 proposal of the Secretaries of State and Defense to provide selected F-15 enhancement items to Saudi Arabia and to provide additional security assistance to Israel.
- As reflected in the Secretaries' proposal, the USG will be supportive of Israeli sales of Kfir aircraft in the context of our more forthcoming arms sales policy. The Israelis still will have to compete for sales on an even basis with US aerospace companies.
- This favorable decision on the Saudi request for F-15 enhancement should form the basis for an improved dialogue with the Saudis on a broad range of security issues of mutual concern. The cables from the Secretaries of State and Defense to their Saudi counterparts should make this point.
- The National Security Council Staff will prepare and circulate a draft talking paper for use with key leaders of the American Jewish community. The paper will stress the President's commitment that the USG will take no action in this area that would be harmful to Israel's security interests.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

February 24, 1981

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: RICHARD V. ALLEN
FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT *Bob*
SUBJECT: Saudi F-15 Enhancement Items

After I forwarded talking points for tomorrow's NSC discussion of this issue (#0791), I received Secretary Haig's proposed talking points for the President's use with key Senators and Congressmen (Tab A).

Assuming a final decision has been made on this issue, Haig's talking points are well reasoned and appropriate. However, ~~before the President makes his call and before Haig briefs the SFRC and HFAC tomorrow in closed session, I believe there should be NSC discussion of some loose ends of the package. I have proposed talking points for the NSC meeting forwarded earlier, address these loose ends.~~

RECOMMENDATION:

- (1) That you sign the memorandum at Tab I to the President.
- (2) That you call Secretary Haig to ask him to schedule his SFRC and HFAC sessions after tomorrow's NSC.

Attachments

cc: Geoff Kemp
Gary Sick
Henry Nau
General Schweitzer

~~SECRET~~

Review February 24, 1987

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F00-002# 858BY WOT, NARA, DATE 2/22/08

PRESERVATION COPY

RECEIVED 24 FEB 81 13

TO PRES

FROM HAIG, A

DOCDATE 24 FEB 81

KIMMITT

24 FEB 81

White House Q:

just 28, 1997

KEYWORDS: SAUDI ARABIA

FMS

ISRAEL

SUBJECT: TALKER FOR 25 FEB NSC MEETING RE PRES CONGRESSIONAL CONSULTATIONS RE
SAUDI F-15 AIRCRAFT ENHANCEMENT ITEMS

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR ALLEN

DUE: 24 FEB 81 STATUS C FILES IFM O

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

KIMMITT

KEMP

COLSON

COMMENTS RESCHEDULED TO 27 FEB

REF# 8105586

LOG 8100768

3100791

NSCIFIED NSC00004

(L / C)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<u>Allen</u>	<u>X 2/24</u>	<u>for decision</u>		<u>KE, GS, HW, SC</u>
	<u>- 3/4</u>	<u>formed by 8100791</u>		
	<u>C 3/4</u>	<u>OBE per Colson</u>		<u>RE, KE, GS, HW, SC</u>

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE (C)

URGENT

ID 81C 1731

RECEIVED 24 FEB 81 13

TO

PRES

FROM HAIG, A

DOCDATE 24 FEB 81

DECLASSIFIED

White Ho

BY: CACDATE: 11/21/04

KEYWORDS: FMS

SAUDI ARABIA

ISRAEL

SUBJECT: TALKER FOR PRES CONGRESSIONAL CONSULTATIONS RE MILITARY EQUIPMENT

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR ALLEN

DUE: 24 FEB 81 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

KIMMITT

KEMP

COMMENTS PERHAPS FRIEDERSDORF SHOULD GET A CY OF YOUR PKG TO THE

PRES. THANKS L.

REF# 8105586

LOG 8100403

NSCIFID

NSC 4 (L /)

8100 7 9 1

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

RVA:

Bob Kimmitt has raised what he
thinks are some serious questions
regarding the [REDACTED]s

He feels that we may be putting the
President in the position of some
tough Congressional scrutiny and
questions for which he may not be
prepared.

Janet



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

0731
0791
3/2

NSC Luntanab

OBE's last issue
still remains
under discussion

J. A. M.

RVA has copies

Note 2 packages attached
0731 + 0791

~~SECRET~~

0731

MEMORANDUM.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN *ja*
SUBJECT: Saudi F-15 Enhancement Items

Secretary Haig has forwarded proposed talking points for your use in discussing the Saudi F-15 issue with key Senators and Congressmen (Tab A).

I believe Al's points are well reasoned and appropriate. However, before proceeding with congressional notification, I believe we should clear up a number of questions at Wednesday's NSC meeting:

-- Is the Israeli component of the package acceptable to the Israelis and their supporters?

- Has OMB cleared on the additional Foreign Military Sales credits in FY 83 and FY 84?

- How will US aerospace companies react to our more forthcoming attitude on Kfir sales?

-- Do we have firmly in mind what we will ask the Saudis to do in return for this favorable decision?

-- Are we prepared to coordinate Administration actions once congressional and press inquiries begin?

RECOMMENDATION:

That you authorize congressional notification, and use the talking points prepared by Secretary Haig, only after receiving satisfactory answers to the questions above.

~~SECRET~~

Review February 24, 1987

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FOO-002#861

BY MDI, AKA, DATE 2/22/08

~~SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

February 24, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From: Alexander M. Haig, Jr. *AMH*
Subject: Military Equipment for Saudi Arabia and
Israel: Congressional Consultations

Attached are suggested talking points for your consultations with the Congressional leadership concerning military equipment for Saudi Arabia and Israel.

In line with your previous decision I suggest that immediately following Shamir's departure you speak directly with Senators Baker and Byrd, Speaker O'Neill, and Congressmen Jim Wright and Bob Michel. Following your consultations, I plan to talk with Senators Percy and Pell, Congressmen Zablocki and Broomfield and then Senators Boschwitz and Jackson. At the same time Secretary Weinberger will talk with Senators Tower, Thurmond, and Stennis, and Congressmen Mel Price and Bill Dickenson. I also plan to brief the SFRC and HFAC in closed session this Wednesday, February 25.

Attachment:

Suggested Talking Points.

~~SECRET~~

GDS 2/23/87

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F00-002 #863
BY WAT NARA, DATE 6/6/06

~~SECRET~~

PRIMARY TALKING POINTS
MILITARY EQUIPMENT FOR SAUDI ARABIA AND ISRAEL

-- I WANT TO TALK WITH YOU ABOUT SAUDI ARABIA'S REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT FOR THEIR F-15S AND FOR AERIAL SURVEILLANCE AIRCRAFT.

-- I ALSO WANT YOU TO KNOW OF CERTAIN ACTIONS I INTEND TO TAKE TO STRENGTHEN ISRAEL'S DEFENSES AND DEFENSE INDUSTRY.

-- BOTH OF THESE WILL CONTRIBUTE TO OUR STRATEGY FOR DETERRING SOVIET ADVENTURISM IN THE REGION.

-- YOU'VE PROBABLY ALREADY SEEN PRESS REPORTS ABOUT THIS MATTER. THEY REPORTED SOME DETAILS, BUT NOT THE REASONING WITH WHICH I HAVE APPROACHED THE ISSUE.

-- I HAVE COME TO CERTAIN JUDGMENTS AFTER CAREFUL CONSIDERATION AND FROM DEEP CONCERN ABOUT THE THREAT POSED BY THE SOVIET UNION TO THE SECURITY IN THIS STRATEGIC PART OF THE WORLD.

-- I AM DETERMINED TO ARREST THIS TREND AND TO STRENGTHEN THE U.S. SECURITY POSITION IN THE MIDDLE EAST. AS PART OF THIS OVERALL STRATEGY, WE HAVE A SPECIAL CONCERN FOR THE SECURITY AND MILITARY CAPABILITY OF ISRAEL, AND FOR HELPING SAUDI ARABIA PROVIDE ADEQUATE DEFENSE FOR ITS STRATEGIC RESOURCES. ANY ARMS DECISIONS WE WILL TAKE MUST FIT INTO A BROADER STRATEGY DESIGNED TO DETER SOVIET PENETRATION INTO THIS VITAL REGION AND TO BLOCK SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO

NLS FOO-002 #864
BY LOT NARA DATE 6/6/06

SECRET

- 2 -

EXPLOIT THEIR MILITARY POSTURE IN THE REGION FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES.

-- I HAVE COME TO A FIRM CONCLUSION ABOUT THE DANGERS IN THE REGION AND WANT TO CONSULT WITH YOU ABOUT OUR POSITION AND SOME OF THE MILITARY SUPPLY IMPLICATIONS OF THIS SITUATION.

-- WE PROPOSE TO INFORM THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT, WHICH ATTACHES MAJOR IMPORTANCE TO OUR RESPONSE, THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO SUBMIT NOTIFICATION TO THE CONGRESS FOR SALE OF CONFORMAL FUEL TANKS FOR THE F-15S AND AIM 9L SIDEWINDER MISSILES.

-- WE ALSO PROPOSE TO TELL THEM THAT WE WILL AGREE TO PROVIDE AERIAL SURVEILLANCE AIRCRAFT SUBJECT TO FURTHER DETERMINATION OF THEIR REQUIREMENTS AND THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO BE FORTHCOMING ON PROVIDING A REFUELING CAPABILITY.

-- WE WILL BE TALKING WITH THE SAUDIS ABOUT THEIR AIR-TO-GROUND REQUIREMENTS FOR DEFENSE AGAINST INVASION IN RESPONSE TO THEIR EARLIER REQUEST FOR BOMB RACKS. (IF PRESSED: I DO NOT EXPECT TO TAKE A FINAL POSITION ON THIS ISSUE IN THE NEAR FUTURE.)

-- THESE ACTIONS ARE INTENDED TO SIGNAL TO THE SAUDIS THE SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH WE VIEW THE INCREASED THREAT TO THE REGION AS THE RESULT OF THE FALL OF THE SHAH AND THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN. ON THE BASIS OF THESE

~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

ACTIONS WE WILL BE WORKING MORE ACTIVELY WITH THE SAUDIS TO BROADEN THE SCOPE OF OUR DEFENSE COOPERATION AGAINST THREATS TO THE AREA.

-- BECAUSE THE SOVIET THREAT IS OF MAJOR CONCERN TO US, I AM GIVING PERSONAL ATTENTION TO DEVELOPING A CLOSER STRATEGIC DIALOGUE WITH ISRAEL AND WITH OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE AREA.

-- THEREFORE, I WANT TO BE ABSOLUTELY ASSURED OF THE ADEQUACY OF ISRAEL'S DEFENSES. WE ARE PREPARED TO PROVIDE ISRAEL WITH APPROPRIATE CREDIT ARRANGEMENTS NECESSARY FOR THE PURCHASE OF ADDITIONAL F-15S OR OTHER EQUIPMENT ISRAEL MAY PREFER. (I EXPECT TO PROPOSE TO THE CONGRESS AN ADDITIONAL \$300 MILLION IN SECURITY ASSISTANCE IN FY 1983 AND A SIMILAR AMOUNT IN FY 1984 FOR THIS PURPOSE.)

-- TAKEN AS A WHOLE, I BELIEVE THESE ACTIONS WILL INCREASE THE SECURITY OF BOTH COUNTRIES AND IMPROVE OUR OVERALL ABILITY TO DEAL WITH SOVIET AND OTHER THREATS.

-- AS YOU KNOW, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN ECONOMICALLY VIABLE DEFENSE INDUSTRY IN ISRAEL IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT TO ITS SECURITY. IN THIS CONNECTION THE ISRAELIS ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO A FORTHCOMING U.S. ATTITUDE TOWARD LICENSING EXPORTS OF THE KFIR FIGHTER AIRCRAFT. I INTEND TO CONSIDER FAVORABLY SUCH SALES TO ECUADOR AND TO BE AS FORTHCOMING AS WE CAN TO ISRAELI REQUESTS TO SEEK SUCH SALES ELSEWHERE.

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- 4 -

-- I WANT YOUR VIEWS AND YOUR SUPPORT IN THESE ACTIONS, WHICH ARE PART OF A BROAD EFFORT WE WILL BE MAKING TO IMPROVE OUR SECURITY POSTURE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND PERSIAN GULF.

-- I AM AWARE OF A CENTRAL CONCERN OF THE CONGRESS AND OTHERS IN THIS COUNTRY THAT THE PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATION HAD MADE AN UNDERTAKING TO THE CONGRESS THAT ENHANCEMENT ITEMS WOULD NOT BE SOLD TO SAUDI ARABIA. THIS UNDERTAKING WAS MADE IN CONSULTATION WITH THE CONGRESS. WE WOULD LIKE YOU TO CONSIDER WITH US WHETHER THAT DECISION CONTINUES TO SERVE U.S. INTERESTS GIVEN THE RADICALLY ALTERED STRATEGIC SITUATION IN THE AREA.

-- THAT COMMITMENT WAS MADE IN 1978. THERE IS NOW A SIGNIFICANTLY GREATER THREAT TO WESTERN INTERESTS SINCE THE FALL OF THE SHAH AND THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN.

-- WE HAVE REVIEWED THIS QUESTION IN THIS NEW CONTEXT AND HAVE DETERMINED THAT OUR OWN INTERESTS IN THESE CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRE A FRESH APPROACH. WE ARE CONSULTING WITH YOU IN THE LIGHT OF OUR COMMON RECOGNITION OF THE ALTERED STRATEGIC SITUATION IN THE AREA.

-- WE ARE ASKING YOU TO CONSIDER WITH US THE IMPACT OF THE PROFOUNDLY THREATENING CIRCUMSTANCES FACING THE WEST AT THIS TIME, AND TO JOIN THE ADMINISTRATION IN TAKING STEPS

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- 5 -

TO ENHANCE WESTERN SECURITY IN THE REGION. THESE ADDITIONAL
RESOURCES TO SAUDI ARABIA, AND MEASURES PROPOSED TO ASSURE
THE CONTINUING VIABILITY OF ISRAEL'S DEFENSES ARE CONTRIBU-
TIONS TO OUR NEW APPROACH.

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NSC 0004 2/27/81 [POLAND, CARIBBEAN BASIN, F-15, EL
SALVADOR] (3/4)

FOIA

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
867	TALKING POINTS RE F-15	3	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

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~~SECRET~~F-15 ENHANCEMENT ITEMS: SAUDI SECURITY AND
THE BILATERAL U.S.-SAUDI RELATIONSHIP

-- OUR BROADER REGIONAL STRATEGY REQUIRES A SECURE SAUDI ARABIA AND SAUDI COOPERATION WITH OUR SECURITY EFFORTS IN THE AREA. THE SALE WILL NOT GUARANTEE IN ITSELF ANY SPECIFIC SAUDI UNDERTAKING IN PREPOSITIONING, OVERBUILDING, OR THE PRESENCE OF U.S. FORCES IN SAUDI ARABIA, BUT WE CONSIDER THAT IT WILL CONTRIBUTE TO A CLIMATE THAT FACILITATES THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THESE GOALS. SUCH MEASURES ARE ESSENTIAL IF THE U.S., OR OTHER FRIENDLY STATES, ARE TO BE ABLE TO PROVIDE SAUDI ARABIA WITH TIMELY ASSISTANCE IN THE EVENT OF A SERIOUS REGIONAL CRISIS.

-- WE ALSO NEED A SAUDI ARABIA BETTER ABLE TO DEFEND ITSELF. BY IMPROVING SAUDI ARABIA'S AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITIES, THE SALE OF THIS EQUIPMENT WILL SERVE THIS IMPORTANT U.S. INTEREST.

-- THE SALE WILL CONTRIBUTE TO (BUT NOT GUARANTEE) THE PHYSICAL SECURITY OF SAUDI ARABIA'S OIL INSTALLATIONS AND POPULATION CENTERS IN EVENT OF ACTUAL ATTACK WHILE ACTING AS A DETERRENT TO SUCH ATTACK. HAVING SUCH A CAPABILITY -- EVEN THOUGH IMPERFECT -- SHOULD HELP TO INCREASE SAUDI ARABIA'S CONFIDENCE AND THEREBY BETTER INSULATE IT FROM PRESSURES THAT COULD BE GENERATED BY RADICAL AND HOSTILE FORCES.

-- THE SALE WILL CONTRIBUTE TO THE POLITICAL SECURITY OF SAUDI ARABIA BY:

- PROVIDING FURTHER CONCRETE EVIDENCE TO HOSTILE NEIGHBORS OF OUR OFT-REPEATED ASSURANCES REGARDING SAUDI ARABIA'S SECURITY, AND;

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- GIVING THE SAUDI LEADERSHIP A PLAUSIBLE AND CONVINCING RATIONALE (I.E., U.S. FULFILLMENT OF THEIR SECURITY NEEDS) WHEN EXPLAINING IN OPEC AND INTER-ARAB CONTEXTS THEIR COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED STATES.

-- THE IMMEDIATE AGENDA OF ISSUES ON WHICH WE WILL NEED SAUDI COOPERATION IS FORMIDABLE. THERE IS NO BETTER WAY TO INCREASE THE DEGREE OF SAUDI COOPERATION IN THESE IMPORTANT AREAS THAN THROUGH ASSURING THE SAUDIS OF OUR CONTINUED SUPPORT FOR THEIR SECURITY.

-- AS WE PURSUE THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS IN THE COMING MONTHS, WE WILL NEED SAUDI UNDERSTANDING OF OUR APPROACH.

-- SAUDI ATTITUDES TOWARD OUR REGIONAL SECURITY ROLE WILL BE IMPORTANT NOT ONLY TO HOW WE DEVELOP THAT ROLE IN SAUDI ARABIA, BUT ALSO IN TERMS OF OTHER REGIONAL STATES.

-- WE ALSO HAVE IMPORTANT ECONOMIC ISSUES WITH THE SAUDIS:

- WE NEED TO PURSUE CLOSE CONSULTATIONS WITH THE SAUDIS ON OIL PRODUCTION LEVELS AND PRICING IN RESPONSE TO CHANGING MARKET CONDITIONS; AND
- WE NEED SAUDI COOPERATION IN AID TO LDCS, RE-CYCLING PETRODOLLARS AND SUPPORT FOR THE DOLLAR.

-- THERE WOULD BE SUBSTANTIAL NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES TO REFUSING TO PROVIDE THESE ITEMS.

- IT WOULD BE OUT OF CHARACTER FOR SAUDI ARABIA TO SEEK TO RETALIATE IN SOME DIRECT OVERT FASHION AGAINST THE U.S. SHOULD WE FAIL TO SUPPLY THESE ITEMS. WE BELIEVE THE SAUDI

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REACTION RATHER WOULD BE ONE OF DEEP DIS-
APPOINTMENT AND DISILLUSIONMENT. IT WOULD
BE AT THE CRITICAL MARGINS OF THE RELATIONSHIP
THAT OUR INTERESTS WOULD SUFFER. WITHOUT CON-
FIDENCE IN THE RELIABILITY OF OUR COMMITMENT
TO THE COUNTRY'S SECURITY, THE SAUDIS MAY WELL
LACK THE POLITICAL WILL TO TAKE DIFFICULT --
BUT FROM OUR STANDPOINT NECESSARY -- DECISIONS
REGARDING REGIONAL SECURITY, OIL PRODUCTION
AND SUPPLY, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL COOPERATION,
AND MIDDLE EAST PEACE.

- FAILURE TO SUPPLY THIS EQUIPMENT WOULD BE SEEN
AS A REBUFF OF THE SAUDI REGIME NOT ONLY IN
SAUDI ARABIA ITSELF, BUT IN THE WIDER ARAB WORLD.
THIS COULD DAMAGE THE POSITION OF THE ROYAL
FAMILY AND SAUDI ARABIA'S ABILITY TO PURSUE
POLICIES IN CONSONANCE WITH OUR OWN. IT WOULD
DIMINISH THE EXPECTATIONS OTHER ARAB STATES
MIGHT HOLD OUT FOR THEMSELVES AS A CONSEQUENCE
OF CLOSER RELATIONS WITH US.
- THE SAUDIS HAVE ALREADY INDICATED THEY MIGHT
CANCEL THE F-15 SALE AND TURN TO THE FRENCH
SHOULD WE DECLINE TO SELL THESE ITEMS. THEY
HAVE RECENTLY CONCLUDED A \$3.5 BILLION NAVAL
BUY FROM THE FRENCH, A CLEAR POLITICAL SIGNAL
OF FUTURE INTENTIONS SHOULD WE PROVE OURSELVES
UNRELIABLE AS A SECURITY PARTNER. (THERE HAS

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EVEN BEEN TALK OF A POSSIBLE SAUDI PURCHASE
OF FRENCH MIRAGE 4000 FIGHTER AIRCRAFT.)
THE LOSS OF OUR LEADING MILITARY SUPPLY AND
TRAINING RELATIONSHIP IN SAUDI ARABIA WOULD
CONSTITUTE SERIOUS DAMAGE TO ONE OF OUR
MOST IMPORTANT ASSETS IN ACHIEVING OUR
REGIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES.

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ADDITIONAL TALKING POINTS

F-15 SUPPORT EQUIPMENT FOR SAUDI ARABIA
IN THE CONTEXT OF SOUTHWEST ASIAN SECURITY

-- THE SALE OF AIR DEFENSE EQUIPMENT TO SAUDI ARABIA IS PART OF A MUCH LARGER U.S. SECURITY STRATEGY FOR THE REGION DESIGNED TO COUNTER INCREASING SOVIET THREATS. OUR OTHER ACTIVITIES INCLUDE:

- AN EXPANDED PEACETIME NAVAL PRESENCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN;
- A COMBINED MILITARY EXERCISE PROGRAM WITH REGIONAL STATES:
- REGIONAL ACCESS ARRANGEMENTS FOR SHIPS, AIRCRAFT, AND GROUND FORCES IN PEACETIME AND/OR IN CRISIS:
- SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND MILITARY TRAINING TO REGIONAL STATES WHICH PERMIT THEM TO ENHANCE LOCAL/REGIONAL SELF-DEFENSE CAPABILITIES;
- COOPERATION WITH OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES TO ENSURE EN ROUTE ACCESS AND BURDEN SHARING OF DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS IN EUROPE AND SOUTHWEST ASIA; AND
- IMPROVEMENTS TO THE CAPABILITIES AND FLEXIBILITY OF U.S. FORCES TO UNDERTAKE SOUTHWEST ASIAN SECURITY MISSIONS, E.G., STATIONING COMBAT LOADED CARGO SHIPS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN.

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-- BEYOND THIS, WE ARE STUDYING WAYS TO BOLSTER OUR PRESENCE IN THE REGION AND ARE URGENTLY EXPLORING OTHER POSSIBILITIES FOR ENHANCING OUR SECURITY IN SOUTHWEST ASIA.

-- THE SALE OF ADDITIONAL AIR DEFENSE EQUIPMENT CONTRIBUTES TO THESE OVERALL SECURITY GOALS ON SEVERAL LEVELS:

- THE F-15 ENHANCEMENT PACKAGE AND AERIAL SURVEILLANCE AIRCRAFT WILL ENHANCE THE SAUDI AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITY:
- THE F-15 PACKAGE WILL IMPROVE OVERALL U.S.-SAUDI RELATIONS. IT IS OUR EXPECTATION THAT THIS WILL LEAD TO BROADER AND MORE DETAILED U.S.-SAUDI DEFENSE COOPERATION WHICH IS NEEDED TO UNDERPIN THE U.S. SECURITY POSTURE FOR SOUTHWEST ASIA;
- WITHOUT DEFENSE COOPERATION WITH THE SAUDIS, THE ABILITY OF THE U.S. TO MEET THE MOST DANGEROUS THREATS TO SOUTHWEST ASIAN SECURITY WILL BE SERIOUSLY CONSTRAINED; AND
- CLOSE U.S.-SAUDI RELATIONS NOT ONLY ARE IMPORTANT IN THEIR OWN RIGHT BUT BECAUSE OTHER STATES IN THE AREA LOOK TO THE SAUDIS -- AS THE LEADING REGIONAL ACTOR -- TO SET THE EXAMPLE FOR THEIR OWN RELATIONS AND SECURITY COOPERATION WITH US.

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ADDITIONAL TALKING POINTS

F-15 ENHANCEMENT ITEMS: IMPACT OF THE SALE ON ISRAEL'S SECURITY

-- THE PROVISION OF THE ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT IS PART OF OUR BROADER STRATEGY TO COUNTER SOVIET OR RADICAL THREATS IN THE REGION. OUR NEW STRATEGY WILL ENHANCE ISRAEL'S SECURITY AGAINST THE ONE REGIONAL THREAT THEY CAN'T HANDLE ON THEIR OWN -- THE ONE THE SOVIETS POSE.

-- OF COURSE, THE SAUDI F-15 ENHANCEMENT ITEMS AND AERIAL SURVEILLANCE AIRCRAFT VIEWED IN ISOLATION FROM OUR OVERALL STRATEGY DO NOT BENEFIT ISRAEL. IN FACT, VIEWED NARROWLY, PROVIDING ARMS TO SAUDI ARABIA INCREASES THE PERCEIVED MILITARY THREAT TO ISRAEL. BUT WE DO NOT BELIEVE THESE SPECIFIC ENHANCEMENTS POSE A MAJOR THREAT TO ISRAEL FOR SEVERAL REASONS.

-- TO BEGIN WITH, SAUDI ARABIA'S LEADERS HAVE REPEATEDLY ASSURED THE UNITED STATES THAT THEY HAVE NO AGGRESSIVE INTENTIONS TOWARD ANY STATE IN THE AREA. THE SAUDIS HAVE NOT PLAYED A SIGNIFICANT MILITARY ROLE IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT. IN 1973, A SAUDI BRIGADE WAS DEPLOYED TO FILL A RESERVE POSITION IN SYRIA AND ANOTHER BRIGADE HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN STATIONED IN JORDAN, BUT ALL SAUDI TROOPS WERE REMOVED FROM BOTH SYRIA AND JORDAN IN 1976.

-- RECENT CALLS BY SAUDI AND OTHER ISLAMIC LEADERS FOR A "JIHAD" OR "HOLY WAR" AGAINST ISRAEL NEED TO BE VIEWED IN CONTEXT. THIS APPEARS TO BE THEIR WAY OF DRAMATIZING THEIR POSITION THAT ISRAEL SHOULD WITHDRAW FROM THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, INCLUDING EAST JERUSALEM.

-- THERE ARE SUBSTANTIAL REASONS FOR SAUDI ARABIA TO AVOID PARTICIPATION IN A CONFLICT WITH ISRAEL EVEN WITH THE ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT FOR THE F-15S IN THEIR POSSESSION. THE SAUDIS ARE VERY MUCH AWARE THAT THE ISRAELIS HAVE A HIGHLY EFFECTIVE AIR

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DEFENSE SYSTEM, INCLUDING ISRAELI INTERCEPTOR AIRCRAFT (F-15S, F-16S, KFIRS AND F-4S) WHICH COULD ENGAGE THE ATTACKERS WELL OUTSIDE OF ISRAEL'S BORDERS, A SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE RING (I-HAWK/BASIC HAWK), AND VARIOUS AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY AND MISSILE POINT DEFENSE SYSTEMS. THIS ISRAELI AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM IS HIGHLY EFFECTIVE AND THE CREWS ARE WELL TRAINED.

-- THE SAUDIS ALSO KNOW THAT THE ISRAELI AIR FORCE COULD STRIKE BACK INTO CENTRAL SAUDI ARABIA. ADDITIONALLY, COMMITMENT OF FORCES AGAINST ISRAEL AND THEIR ALMOST INEVITABLE LOSS WOULD EXPOSE SAUDI ARABIA TO ATTACK FROM ADVERSARIES TO THE EAST AND SOUTH.

-- I WANT TO ASSURE YOU THAT WE LOOKED VERY CAREFULLY AT THE EFFECT OF THIS SALE ON THE MILITARY BALANCE IN THE REGION. BECAUSE OF ISRAEL'S PERCEPTION OF AN ENHANCED THREAT POSED BY THE F-15 ADD-ONS WE PROPOSE TO SELL TO SAUDI ARABIA, WE TOOK AN ESPECIALLY HARD LOOK AT THIS ELEMENT OF THE REGIONAL BALANCE. IN OUR VIEW, ISRAEL'S HIGHLY EFFECTIVE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM, INCLUDING SOPHISTICATED AIRCRAFT SUCH AS THE F-15 AND F-16, SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE SYSTEMS, AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY, AND POINT DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS, PROVIDES A SUBSTANTIAL DETERRENT TO ANY POTENTIAL SAUDI ATTACK. THE STRIKE CAPABILITY OF THE ISRAELI AIR FORCE IS ALSO A MAJOR DETERRENT.

-- ANOTHER CONSTRAINT TO SAUDI ACTION AGAINST ISRAEL IS THE OVERALL U.S.-SAUDI RELATIONSHIP. A CONSTRUCTIVE MILITARY TRAINING AND SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP SERVES TO ENHANCE OUR INFLUENCE AND MAKES OUR ADVICE MORE POTENT. THE SAUDIS WILL BE LESS LIKELY TO RISK THE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U.S. WHEN THEY ARE DEPENDENT ON THE U.S. FOR THEIR ULTIMATE SECURITY, FOR SPARE PARTS, TRAINING, MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, ETC.

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-- THE SAUDIS KNOW THAT THEIR FORCES SIMPLY CANNOT HOPE TO SUCCEED AGAINST THE WELL EQUIPPED AND HIGHLY TRAINED ISRAELIS, EITHER UNILATERALLY OR IN CONCERT WITH STATES IN THE REGION.

-- IN SUM, WE RECOGNIZE THAT THESE SYSTEMS DO PROVIDE SAUDI ARABIA WITH ADDITIONAL MILITARY CAPABILITY. WHILE OBVIOUSLY IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO RULE OUT ABSOLUTELY THE USE OF SAUDI F-15S AGAINST ISRAEL, AN OBJECTIVE ANALYSIS WOULD RATE THE RISKS AS LOW.

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1. 12055:GDS 2/28/87 (BUSENELL, JOHN)

TAGS: PEPR, MASS, ES

SUBJECT: ADDITIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FOR EL SALVADOR

1. CONFIDENTIAL ENTIRE TEXT

2. THE NSC FEBRUARY 27 CONSIDERED THE ADDITIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE REQUESTED BY THE GOES TO MEET CONTINUING EMERGENCY CREATED BY THE FOREIGN SUPPORTED INSURGENCY. THE FOLLOWING DECISIONS WERE TAKEN.

3. TRAINING - IN ADDITION TO THE 6 MAN NAVAL MTT ABOUT WHICH YOU HAVE ALREADY BEEN ADVISED, A 5-MAN TEAM WILL AUGMENT THE OPERATIONAL PLANNING ASSISTANCE TEAM (OPAT) WHICH IS WORKING WITH THE HIGH COMMAND ON COMMUNICATIONS, PLANNING AND LOGISTICS PROCEDURES. THE AUGMENTED TEAM WILL EXTEND THE ASSISTANCE TO THE REGIONAL MILITARY COMMANDS. ALSO APPROVED WAS THE DEPLOYMENT OF THREE

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BY KML NARA DATE 5/20/10

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1. SMALL UNIT TRAINING (SUT) TEAMS TO CAPRISON LOCAL-
SALVADORAN MILITARY UNITS TO PROVIDE INSTRUCTION
IN BASIC TECHNIQUES OF CONTROLLING, AIR MOBILE OPERATIONS,
AND INDIVIDUAL SOLDIER SKILLS. THE ASSIGNMENT OF THE
SUT'S TO CAPRISONS OUTSIDE OF THE CAPITAL WILL BE AT
THE DIRECTION OF THE CHIEF OF MISSION. THE OPATAND

THE SUTS ARE EXPECTED TO BE IN EL SALVADOR FOR APPROX-
IMATELY SIX MONTHS.

2. US MILITARY PERSONNEL WILL NOT BE PERMITTED TO ACCOM-
PANY SALVADORAN UNITS ON LAND, SEA OR AIR OPERATIONAL
OR COMBAT MISSIONS OR BE OTHERWISE PLACED IN SITUATIONS
WHERE HOSTILITIES ARE LIKELY. PERSONNEL WILL BE IN
ARMED AND MAY CARRY SIDEARMS FOR PERSONAL PROTECTION
BUT MAY NOT USE FORCE EXCEPT FOR SELF-PROTECTION OR
THE PROTECTION OF OTHER US PERSONNEL. DETAILED RULES
OF CONDUCT WILL BE ISSUED BY USSOUTHCOM AFTER CONSULTATION
WITH THE CHIEF OF MISSION.

3. ONCE THESE TEAMS HAVE BEEN COMPLETELY DEPLOYED TO
EL SALVADOR (IN ABOUT TWO WEEKS), THE NUMBER OF U.S.
MILITARY PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO COUNTRY WILL TOTAL APPROXI-
MATELY 80 (EXCLUDING THE OBSERVER MISSION). OF
THESE, TWENTY ARE MARINE SECURITY
GUARDS, FOUR ARE IN THE DAO, NINE WILL BE ASSIGNED TO
THE MILCP, 14 WILL BE CONDUCTING HELICOPTER PILOT AND
MAINTENANCE TRAINING, SEVEN WILL BE WORKING WITH THE SALVA-
DORAN NAVY, AND 25 WILL BE TRAINING SALVADORAN ARMY
PERSONNEL AS DESCRIBED ABOVE.

4. SECURITY ASSISTANCE - A PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION
UNDER SECTION 506 (A) OF THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT
IS BEING MADE TO PERMIT THE DRAWDOWN FROM DOD RESOURCES
OF UP TO \$20 MILLION IN MATERIEL AND ASSOCIATED SERVICES
AND TRAINING FOR THE GC S. THIS WILL INCLUDE 4 ADDITIONAL
UH-1H HELICOPTERS, FIELD SURVEILLANCE RADAR, GRENADE
LAUNCHERS, MORTARS, M-1 RIFLES AND ASSOCIATED AMMUNITION
AS WELL AS TRUCKS, JEEPS, AMBULANCES, TENTS, TOOLS AND
FIRST-AID SUPPLIES.

5. IN ADDITION, WE ARE NOTIFYING CONGRESS OF INTENT
TO REPROGRAM \$5 MILLION IN FY 81 FMS GUARANTEED LOANS
FOR THE PURCHASE BY THE GOVS OF COMMERCIAL VEHICLES,
UPGRADE OF SALVADORAN VAL PATROL BOATS, AND OTHER

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ARTICLES NOT AVAILABLE FROM DOD STOCKS UNDER THE 506
AUTHORITY. THESE DECISIONS WILL INCREASE FY 81 SECURITY
EXPENDITURE FROM \$12 MILLION TO \$35 MILLION (EXCLUDING
OTHER ASSETS).

3. FYT - THE DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCED FEBRUARY 28 THE EARLIER
DECISION TO DEPLOY THE NAVAL MTT. THE ADDITIONAL FUNDING
FOR DEPLOYMENTS WILL BE ANNOUNCED EARLY NEXT WEEK
AFTER CONSULTATION WITH CONGRESS. WE ARE ALSO CONSIDERING
THE DEPLOYMENT OF ADDITIONAL TRAINING PERSONNEL TO HON-
OLAND TO ASSIST THE COH IN COUNTER-INFILTRATION TECHNI-
QUES.

4. TO ADDRESSEE POSTS OTHER THAN SAN SALVADOR: ABOVE
IS FOR YOUR BACKGROUND INFORMATION. CERTAIN POSTS WILL
BE DISCUSSED SEPARATELY TO INFORM HOST GOVERNMENTS.

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TO USMISSION URGATO IMMEDIATE 9900

FROM ALL NATO CAPITALS IMMEDIATE

INFO: STATE 052134

INFO: 12055: XGTS-3 2/28/11 (EAGLEBURGER, LAWRENCE S.)

INFO: NATO, ARA

SUBJECT: NSC DECISIONS ON EL SALVADOR

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. THE NSC HAS DECIDED ON NEW SECURITY ASSISTANCE MEASURES FOR EL SALVADOR, AND WE WOULD LIKE TO INFORM ALLIES. PLEASE BRIEF THE COUNCIL ON THESE DECISIONS WITHOUT DELAY, DRAWING ON THE POINTS BELOW. IN DOING SO, YOU SHOULD EMPHASIZE THAT THE DECISIONS SHOULD BE SEEN IN THE CONTEXT OF SECRETARY HAIG'S FEBRUARY 27TH STATEMENT AT THE WHITE HOUSE (SECRET); THE SECRETARY SAID THAT OUR FIRST PRIORITY IN EL SALVADOR WAS THE PLURALIZATION OF THEIR SOCIETY ACCORDING TO THE WILL OF THE SALVADOREAN PEOPLE.

3. DETAILS OF THE NSC DECISIONS FOLLOW:

--ADDITIONAL MILITARY ASSISTANCE: MILITARY ASSISTANCE WILL BE INCREASED IN FY 1981 FROM DOLLARS TEN MILLION TO DOLLARS THIRTY-FIVE MILLION. FIVE MILLION DOLLARS OF THIS ADDITIONAL SUM WILL BE REPROGRAMMED FROM WORLDWIDE FMS CREDIT AUTHORIZATIONS. THE REMAINING TWENTY MILLION WILL BE IN THE FORM OF A GRANT, AUTHORIZED UNDER SECTION 505 (A) OF THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT, UNDER WHICH THE

PRESIDENT MAY DRAWDOWN MATERIEL AND TRAINING FROM DOD RESOURCES IN THE EVENT OF AN UNFORESEEN EMERGENCY.

***** WHSR COMMENT *****

INFO: CCL VP
INFO: ARA, DEPOL

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NLRR 108-109 #909

BY KML NARA DATE 5/20/10

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THESE PLANS ARE FOR USE OF THE FUNDS TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL UH-1H HELICOPTERS, JEEPS, AMBULANCES, SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION, M-16 RIFLES, GRENADES AND LAUNCHERS, MORTARS AND MORTAR AMMUNITION, SURVEILLANCE RADAR, TENTS, TOOLS AND ASSOCIATED TRAINING.

-- ADDITIONAL MILITARY TRAINING PERSONNEL: TWENTY ADDITIONAL US MILITARY TRAINING PERSONNEL IN FOUR FIVE-MAN TEAMS WILL BE SENT TO EL SALVADOR. WITH THE TRAINING PERSONNEL ALREADY IN COUNTRY OR ON THE WAY, THIS WILL BRING THE US TRAINING CONTINGENT TO FORTY-FIVE. ONE FIVE-MAN TEAM WILL BE STATIONED IN EL SALVADOR AND WILL AUGMENT THE 5-MAN OPERATIONS TRAINING ASSISTANCE TEAM ALREADY ASSISTING THE SALVADORAN HIGH COMMAND IN INTELLIGENCE, COMMUNICATIONS AND LOGISTICS. THE THREE OTHER TEAMS, UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE CHIEF OF MISSION, WILL BE STATIONED AT GARRISONS OUTSIDE THE CAPITAL TO PROVIDE TRAINING IN INDIVIDUAL MILITARY SKILLS AND COUNTER-GUERRILLA TECHNIQUES. US MILITARY PERSONNEL WILL GO ON LAND OR SEA PATROLS, FLY ON HELICOPTERS ON COMBAT MISSIONS, OR BE OTHERWISE PLACED IN SITUATIONS WHERE COMBAT IS LIKELY. PERSONNEL MAY CARRY INDIVIDUAL SIDEARMS BUT USE OF FORCE WILL BE LIMITED TO SELF-DEFENSE OR TO PROTECT FELLOW AMERICANS. PERSONNEL WILL WORK IN UNIFORM. THEY WILL NOT BE GARRISONED OR WORK IN AREAS WHERE THERE IS A HEAVY CONCENTRATION OF GUERRILLA FORCES, OR IN AREAS WHERE THERE IS LIKELIHOOD OF BEING OVERRUN.

-- TRAINING AGAINST SEA INFILTRATION: IN ADDITION TO THE PERSONNEL DESCRIBED ABOVE, APPROVAL WAS PREVIOUSLY GIVEN FOR THE DEPLOYMENT OF A 6-MAN NAVAL TRAINING TEAM TO WORK WITH THE SALVADOREAN NAVY. THEY WILL BE PART OF THE FORTY-FIVE MAN TOTAL FOR TRAINING PERSONNEL IN COUNTRY WHEN THEY ARE ALL ON STATION. THEY WILL ASSIST THE SALVADOREAN NAVY IN DETERMINING MATERIAL NEEDED TO UPGRADE THEIR VESSELS AND TO PROVIDE INSTRUCTION IN INTERDICTION TECHNIQUES.

-- ALSO PREVIOUSLY PLANNED IS THE ASSIGNMENT OF FIVE ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL TDY TO THE US MILITARY GROUP, WHICH IS CHARGED WITH ADMINISTERING OUR EXPANDED SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM.

-- CONTACT WITH HONDURAS: FINALLY, ARE CONSIDERING THE ADVISABILITY OF SENDING ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL TO HONDURAS. THEIR PURPOSE WOULD BE TO TRAIN THE HONDURAN ARMY IN INTERDICTION OF INFILTRATION ACROSS THE

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HONDURAS EL-SALVADOR BORDER.

1. FYI: DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCED THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE
NAVY MTF FEBRUARY 28. ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE OTHER
TRAINING TEAMS AND THE ADDITIONAL FMS AND SECTION 586
ASSISTANCE WILL BE MADE EARLY NEXT WEEK. THE
DISCUSSIONS WITH HONDURAS WILL NOT BE MADE PUBLIC AT
THIS TIME. YOU SHOULD IMPRESS ON OTHERS PERHAPS THE
SENSITIVITY OF THE INFORMATION ON CONTACTS WITH
HONDURAS. HAIG

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